EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATION
FOR POLITICAL SECURITY
UNDER THE THIRD FRENCH
REPUBLIC, 1879-1880: THE
DEBATE OVER ARTICLE 7 IN
THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

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EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATION FOR POLITICAL SECURITY UNDER THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC, 1879-1880: THE DEBATE OVER ARTICLE 7 IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

by

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ABSTRACT

The publication of the Doctrine of Papal Infallibility by the First Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church in 1870 had significant implications for democratically elected governments of predominantly Roman Catholic nations; a view held by the members of the Republican government of France in 1879 who used the event to lay the basis for a political argument which found expression in Article 7 of the "Law Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education", introduced into the French legislature of the Third Republic on March 15, 1879.

The introduction of the article, and the furor it raised in the two houses of the legislature and in the nation, provides the background for a study of the government's objective of Republican security contained within the article, its feelings towards the Roman Catholic Church generally, and its attempts to integrate the two into an ecclesiastical policy which would neither compromise the future of the Republic nor be persecutory, in the opinion of the government, towards the Church. This paper proposes to be such a study and it analyzes Article 7 both for its political objective and its method of achieving that objective through educational legislation, and the interrelationship of both, as perceived by the spokesmen of the government.

As the latter unfolded their arguments in the Chamber of Deputies during the legislative debate on Article 7, and in their speeches and writings on matters relating to Article 7, they collectively depicted the emergence of a massive coalition of anti-Republican forces...
in the nation, forces which were in evidence in every level of government administration, and were represented in the Chamber by the parties of the Right — the legitimists, the Orléanists, and the Bonapartists. The leadership and direction of the coalescing forces, and the focal point of organization and bond of the alliance, ran the Republican argument, was provided by the non-authorized teaching orders of the Church, especially the Jesuits. Through the publication of papal infallibility they had accomplished their aim of control of the universal Catholic Church as a first step in the plan of world domination, in accordance with their doctrine of indirect power. As agents of that doctrine, the Society was seeking to control the national churches in the various Catholic countries through obtaining a pre-eminent place of authority and increasing their numbers of communities, a development which, according to the Republicans, was already well under way in France. In this process of gaining control they were placing the vast power and influence of the Church, as perceived by the Republicans, in the service of the parties of the Right both by using the hierarchy, authority and obedience of the Church to attain the organization and control of the present electorate and by using the educational system of the Church to indoctrinate the youth of France in the political thinking of the Right to ensure control of the future electorate. If the process were to continue, the Republic was certain to be threatened, if not destroyed, by the creation of a second France within its very bosom; a France which would be eternally hostile to the Republic and would only exist in a state of war with it.

To ensure the future of the Republic and the unity of the nation, the Republican government felt compelled to expel the
Jesuits from the nation and secure control of the other non-authorized orders through authorization. Both could be achieved, they felt, and the integrity of Church-State relations preserved, through the implementation of Article 7, which, in their minds, was simply the reapplication of the terms of the Concordat of 1808. The Concordat had provided mutual protections and guarantees for both Church and State through the arrogation to the state of the right to regulate or authorize religious orders; an arrogation which had been set aside through the anti-Revolutionary reaction of the previous three decades. Since the Jesuits and the other orders in question fell within the category of non-authorized congregations, the reviving of the terms of the Concordat to combat their presence and activity placed the Republican government, in the opinion of its spokesmen, in a legal and justifiable position relative to the orders, a position which in their further opinion could be readily identified with the positions of all previous French governments stretching back to the monarchies of pre-Revolutionary days. Also, the reincorporation of the Concordat meant that the government, in its political quarrel with the Jesuits, was not embarking, in its own estimation, on any new, drastic policy toward the Church, such as persecution or separation, but was demonstrating its good faith in reverting to a policy of compromise and moderation, a policy which had been in force since the Revolution and had only been permitted to lapse over the previous three decades. Thus, concluded the Republicans, Article 7 was intended to combat a political threat from political forces whose leadership was operating under the guise of agents of education; hence the presence of political objectives in educational legislation.
This explains the working of the title of the thesis and describes, in capsule form, the thesis itself which the author proposes. It does not attempt to objectively judge the relative strengths or weaknesses of the policy, nor whether the policy was a success or a failure in achieving its political objective. It is merely an attempt to portray the thinking of a government faced, as it believed, with the threat of political extinction in the definitive sense, and its attempt through legislation to remove that threat without prejudicing the very ideals and freedoms they believed they represented. The study of Article 7 is the portrait of a government in a dilemma; in the same legislative breath to remove the Church as a threat without interfering with the Church as a functioning institution. Article 7 was the government's solution to that dilemma and, given the circumstances of the government which initiated its creation, and the alternative policies which they perceived were available, can be regarded as a genuine attempt to resolve the complex Church-State issue of the Third Republic in 1879 and, relatively speaking, an ecclesiastical policy of the first order.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In submitting this thesis I wish to thank all those who rendered me assistance throughout its preparation. Most credit is due my supervisor, Dr. Christopher English, without whose criticisms, recommendations and encouragement the paper would not have reached completion. A special word of thanks goes to the Head of the History Department, Dr. James Tague, who recommended the granting of a special time extension. The library staff have been most helpful, especially the staff in the inter-library loan division, who were most efficient in obtaining necessary material which was not available in the university library. To members of the History Department who have taken the time to give helpful criticism, encouragement or have provided information on various aspects of the paper, and here I especially mention Dr. Hon-Cheung Mui, I express my sincere gratitude.
PREFACE

Relations between the Third Republic of France and the Roman Catholic Church during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was a peculiarly French expression of the general state of relations which existed in other European nations which also contained a large or majority percentage of Catholics within their boundaries. The government of the newly unified Italian states had removed the Church as a temporal power through seizure of the Papal States, and embittered relations between the papacy and successive Italian governments were not resolved until the Lateran Treaty between Mussolini and Pope Pius XII in 1929. At the time, the German government under Otto von Bismarck was engaged in the official persecution of the Church known as the "Kulturkampf", which lasted from 1871 to 1883. In varying degrees, other independent governments of predominantly Catholic nations were involved in Church-State conflict.¹

Relations were especially strained when the governments of these nations, in the two decades following 1870, began the organization of public education systems funded and administrated by the state; since, in this era, the implementation of state administration automatically meant the curtailment of the control of the Church over education. Between 1870 and 1880, the continental nations mentioned above, together with other major European powers such as Russia and

¹For example, Austria annulled the Concordat of 1855 on July 30, 1870.
lesser powers such as Belgium and Holland, devised national public education systems, and substantially reduced and even removed the authority and influence of the Church from education.

This transition of control from the Church to State authorities in France, and increased control by State authorities, was done within a context animated by suspicion and distrust, and heightened by verbal, and even physical, violence, since the activists and proponents of the respective ideologies of Church and State had become polarized in a conflict situation. Statesmen, imbued in the main with the secular ideologies of the nineteenth century, viewed mass education as the means of developing the new liberal democratic citizen responsible to the state, a development which was predicated upon the removal of most, if not all, of the Church's authority over the individual.

Churchmen, who viewed the permeation of society by secularist and materialistic ideologies as critical for the existence of Christianity, held up a directly opposite aim for education — to imbue the child with principles under the direction of the Church in order to combat the secularist and materialistic principles which they believed the State espoused.²

It was not surprising then, that the assumption of the direction of education by various national governments created emotional conflicts, especially in the Third Republic of France, where the authority of the Church in education was demonstrated in the legislative recognition embodied in the Failoux Law of 1850, the "Free

²Louis Méjan says that "neither the Church understood the State nor the State understood the Church." La Séparation des États et l'État (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1903), p. viii.

iv
School System" of education which derived from the Concordat of 1808
and the presence of powerful representation on the "Conseil Superieur", the
highest educational policy-making body in the nation. The education
reform programme through legislation carried through by the early mini-
sters of the Third Republic was within the tradition of educational
reform which began with the Revolution, was continued through the
Restoration period to the end of the Second Empire, and was personalized
by such noted educators as Victor Duruy.\(^3\) However, though moderate in
comparison to the methods to ensure control used in Germany, and Italy,
the reform programme in France met with bitter and violent opposition
on the part of the Church and its parliamentary spokesmen. To study
the great battle which took place in 1879 in France over educational
legislation is to study one small facet of the great Church-State
struggle which seems to have been ongoing since the inception of the
Christian religion.

\(^3\)Victor Duruy was appointed Minister of Education by
Emperor Napoleon III to promote the secular or state education system,
which he did effectively, though with caution, during his years as
minister. For his biography see Jean-Rohr, Victor Duruy (Paris:
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In most European countries the two decades following 1870 witnessed major conflicts between the Roman Catholic Church and various national governments over the amount of control and influence which the Church should be permitted to exercise over the youth of nations in which its membership constituted a predominant or sizeable segment of the population. This was especially true of the Third Republic of France, the government of which became involved in 1879 in a truly epic conflict with the Church following the introduction of two bills of educational legislation by Jules Ferry, then Minister of Education in the cabinet of William Waddington. The first law, dealing with the reorganization of the Higher Council of Education, or Conseil Supérieur, could have been construed to be a truly serious blow to the Catholic presence in the French educational system, since it removed the Church's episcopal representation from that body, thereby eradicating Church input.

1. M. J. Letaconnoir, Lutte Scolaire en France au XIXe Siècle (Paris: Alcan, 1912), p. 9. The word 'Church' or expression 'Church in France' will be used in the paper to denote the Roman Catholic Church in France. Church thinking or pronouncements will be taken from published statements of the French episcopacy.

2. The ministry of William Waddington held office from January 30, 1879 to December 6, 1879 and was then replaced by the ministry of Charles de Saulces de Freycinet, whose ministry held office until Freycinet's resignation on September 18, 1880. The time period under study roughly spans both ministries. Jules Ferry was Minister of Education from February 7, 1879 to November 11, 1881, and on two later occasions. He was also Prime Minister on one occasion. See Thomas F. Power, Jr., Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966), p. 18, for dates of terms of office.
from the highest level education policy-making body. However, its importance as provocative or controversial legislation paled before the introduction of the second law, a law dealing with regulating certain aspects of education at the university level and entitled "A Bill of Law Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education." One clause of this bill, the seventh article, or Article 7, as it came to be called, following its introduction, stated that "no person is permitted to engage in public or free education, nor to direct any such institution, of whatever kind, if he belongs to a non-authorized religious order."5

The introduction and wording of the Article was immediately interpreted as the beginning of an official policy of government persecution of the Church by the opposition parties to the Right of the political spectrum in 1879.6 These parties, together with a group of


6In the dual educational system then in operation, which had emanated from the Concordat of 1808, the public or state school system was administered by the Department of Education of the government, the "free school" system was administered by the Church with the government providing a system of inspection. To be authorized meant that a religious order or congregation had undergone a procedure in accordance with a stipulation in the Concordat, and had received "authorization" or permission to function as an association or group in public service. Over the previous decades the procedure had been ignored, and newly-formed religious orders came to be referred to as non-authorized. Both authorized and non-authorized orders taught in both systems.

6The term "Right" will be used to refer to the grouping of parties which sat to the right of the Chamber, a grouping which included
Republicans of the Centre who had up until that point supported the government on legislative policy, initiated a violent attack upon the article, and sought, through parliamentary and other means, to prevent its passage, or, at the least, modify its scope. This attack was supported in the nation at large by the Church, the Catholic press, and anti-Republican regional and local administrative councils, and was paralleled by a counterattack in support of the article by government partisans, the composite result being a clash between government and Church over an educational issue; a clash that was critical in both its immediate and long-term effects.

The political storm created by one article of a bill of law, which was isolated from the surrounding legislation and fought independently, when the other articles and the accompanying bill of law met with little opposition, would have in itself stimulated an historical curiosity. However, the fact.


There were five main Republican groups, according to François Goguel. These included the Extreme Left, represented by Louis Blanc; the Radical Republicans, represented by Clemenceau; the Republican Union, as represented by Gambetta; the Republican Left, as represented by Jules Ferry; and the Centre Left as represented by Dufaure. See François Goguel, La Politique des Partis sous la IIIe République (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1946), p. 34. See Prost, Histoire, p. 357—for numerical strength.

that the government persisted to incorporate the objectives of the article into executive decree form, after it had been successfully fought and defeated in the Senate, and after it had aroused such emotion in the nation, suggests that the article, both to its sponsors and its opponents, was an extremely important piece of legislation.

With the latter statement, few historians who have studied the period would disagree, whatever shade of the political spectrum they represent. Jacques Chaustnet, in his biography of Gambetta, called the article the focal point of the debates.\(^9\) Léon Dubreuil, Republican biographer of Paul Bert, concluded that "the reorganization of the Council of Education did not arouse the same passions as the law on higher education, and notably Article 7 of that law."\(^10\) The Catholic historian, R.P. Lecanuet, exclaimed that after Article 7, "... there was no longer in France any other question to be discussed."\(^11\) Alfred Rambaud, biographer of Jules Ferry, declared that "It was Article 7 and Article 7 alone which provoked the violence of the debates (on the law on Higher Education)."\(^12\) Other historians have made like comments in attesting to the importance of the article, and to the emotional reaction which it engendered.\(^13\)

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Similarly, historians agree as to the immediate and long-term effects of the introduction of the article. Bainville wrote that "Article 7 raised an unprecedented wave of emotion, which left long memories behind it, and fastened on its sponsor an aversion which was soon to be merged in crushing unpopularity."\(^{14}\) Maurice Pottecher described the article as "... this famous, this unforgivable Article 7, which raised such a storm, which divided not only parliament, but the nation, and which, in most minds, partisan or opponent, constituted the core of the great school laws..."\(^{15}\) J.J. Chevallier wrote that "the agitation and emotion surrounding it were beyond description."\(^{16}\) For René Rémont, "the alliance of liberal Catholics and moderate Republicans would have succeeded except for Article 7."\(^{17}\) Again, Pottecher analysed that "... [it] cut France in two ... [and] ... clearly brought about this division into two parts, ... which do not yet seem prepared to be reconciled to each other."\(^{18}\) Others see in the legislation the beginning of the violent struggle of the first decade of the present century. For Thomas F. Power, Jr., the laws of 1879-1880 heralded the total separation of the spiritual and temporal power of 1905-1906.\(^{19}\) In general,


\(^{14}\)Bainville, The French Republic, p. 77.

\(^{15}\)Pottecher, \textit{Jules Ferry}, p. 157.

\(^{16}\)Chevallier, \textit{Histoire}, p. 385.

\(^{17}\)Rémont, \textit{La Droite}, p. 145.


\(^{19}\)Power, \textit{The Renaissance}, p. 20.
historians accord the article singular importance and attribute violent, and long-range, effects to its introduction.

However, if historians are in consensus as to the singular importance which Article 7 assumed and the events it set in motion, there is far less agreement as to why Article 7 was introduced, what it was intended to achieve and why the government pushed for the implementation of its objectives in the face of violent opposition, disengagement within its own ranks and rejection by the other branch of government; questions which are the object of study for this paper. For example, Geoffrey Brunn, in his biography of Clemenceau, proposes that the motivation for Article 7 lay in the government's need for a diversionary political action, deliberately formulated as a political smoke screen to hide the government's inability or unwillingness to cope with the critical problems facing the nation. In his words, "some positive item had to be selected from the Republican programme, and carried through with vigour, if for no other reason than to divert the electors in the lower brackets from fundamental social and economic reforms." His conclusion is that the article served its purpose as a "red herring" and helped hide the failure of the opportunities to attack more fundamental social and political reforms. Guy Chapman, who reaches a similar conclusion, questions whether "it was merely a bogey useful to soothe the need for

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inquiry into such matters as employment." In this sense, Article 7 was just "a miserable political expedient."23

Another group of historians, in a general way, ascribe motivational responsibility to the French Freemason organization, in that they were the power behind-the-scenes formulating the policies and plans for the government to implement in their anticlerical war on the Church. The best representative of this group is Mildred Headings, whose doctoral thesis systematically develops this argument.24 Similarly, George Duby and Paul Maudrou write that "the Freemasons largely developed and formulated ... the plans of the Third Republic."25

Still other historians relate the anti-clericalism implicit in Article 7 to French and German diplomatic relations following the Franco-German War of 1870. The Republican government was being subtly pressured by the German government to initiate an anticlerical campaign against the Church and the Royalist elements in French society, as part of a German plan to keep France republican, divided and weak.26 An action, such as Article 7, directed against the Jesuits, as it turned


out, would please Bismarck, and, from the point of view of the German
government anyway, contribute to stable relations. 27

A variation of this theme views the article as part of a
general educational reform programme undertaken by the French government
as a result of the shock effect of the defeat by Germany in the war of
1870. The French leaders, runs this argument, saw the reasons for the
defeat of France in the total superiority of the German culture which
was based, as they believed, on progress in science and technology; and
fostered by what they considered to be a highly efficient educational
system. In the words of Alfred Cobban, “the disaster of 1870 was a
victory for the German school master.” 28 This explanation postulates
that Article 7 was part of a general educational reform programme, under-
taken in emulation of the German model.

An examination of the supportive arguments for the four
theses posited above would no doubt be enlightening in studying the
motivation for and the objectives contained within Article 7, but the
author has chosen to avoid such an examination, feeling it to be too
presumptuous, given the éminence and intellectual stature of the

27 Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe, Memoirs, Vol. II (London:
William Heinemann, 1906), pp. 74-76 contains a speech delivered in the
Reichstag by the Prince on May 15, 1872, describing anti-state activities
of the Jesuits. Prince Chlodwig was German ambassador to France during
the period under discussion.

who share the same view include Frederick Lewis Schuman, War and
Diplomacy in the Third French Republic (New York: H. Fertig, 1969),
p. 5; Adrian Dansectte, Histoire Religieuse de la France Contemporaine
W. Soert, The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France (The
to investigate his own hypothesis that the Republican government in 1879, and its supporting groups, introduced Article 7 deliberately and consciously, that the Article contained specific immediate and long-range objectives, and that it reflected government policy intended to promote the unity of France, ensure the future security of the Republican form of government and society, and bring peace to the nation. Though at first reading it appears that the Article is out of place in relation to the content of the other articles, the author believes that the Republican ministry had sound political reasons for choosing this method of introduction, reasons which will be explained in the development of the argument. Further, it will be shown that the government in 1879, instead of being " Opportunist", as they were labelled by their opponents, (a derivative epithet which has since been applied to them by generations of historians) was attempting to implement through Article 7 an ecclesiastical policy which they asserted would benefit France and Republican society by preventing too much control by the Church, as advocated by the extreme Right, but fell far short of the separation and legislative constraints advocated by the extreme Left. They advocated that the true solution to the Church-State problem had already been devised by the Revolution, of which they believed themselves to be the true heirs, and expressed by the Concordat of 1808, which justly delineated the proper and respective spheres of Church and State, and which had not been imposed, one on the other, but had freely been agreed to by the Church. In essence, Article 7, to the Republican government which sponsored it, became the revivification and reaplication of the Concordat of 1808 and a truly wise, just and moderate policy.
However, before the reader at this point in the paper becomes confused by this entanglement of religion, education and politics which was implicit in Article 7, it will be necessary to show in more detail how and why the Republicans evolved such a policy and why they came to the conclusion that this particular policy, and this one only, was necessary for the nation. This will be done primarily through an examination of the speeches of the Republican leaders of the Chamber, delivered in the Chamber during the debates on Article 7, while officiating at various functions or on political campaigns during tours of their districts. These will be supplemented by evidence gained from other sources, such as collections of letters, writings, publications and contemporary biographies in the attempt to gain insight into the thinking of the Republican leadership in government. The author has engaged in a day-by-day study of the debate on Article 7 through its main legislative stages. The first of these was the actual introduction or Exposé des Motifs by the Minister, Jules Ferry, which contained the rationale behind the law, the reasons for its introduction and its objectives from the initial point of view of the government. The second stage was committee study and the delivery of the Report by the rapporteur for the government, M. Eugene Spuller. The third stage was the debate and vote. The debate on Article 7 in the Senate has not been studied

29 A number of publications by leading Republicans, that the author expected to be very valuable considering their titles, their authors and the authors' importance in the political scene, were not available through inter-library loan from the Bibliothèque Nationale.

30 Actually, there were seven stages, or even eight for an individual article, from the introduction by the President to the vote. However, in terms of exposition of government policy, there were three. See R.K. Gooch, The French Parliamentary Committee System (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1935), pp. 147-179.
in any detail, since it is the author's conclusion from preliminary investigation that such a study would add nothing of significance to the evidence gained from the Chamber debates since it was the ministry in the Chamber which initiated and carried through the legislation against the opposition of the Senate.

Leading personalities are quoted throughout the paper with most frequency, a fact especially true of government spokesmen who, in accordance with French parliamentary tradition, were given precedence when they so requested it over other speakers. Speakers like Jules Ferry, the minister, Eugene Spuller, the rapporteur [reporter for the committee which finally studied the law], Paul Bert, the chairman of the standing committee that had given the law first study, appear prominently in the debates and are cited frequently in this paper. Important opposition spokesman appear frequently since their colleagues would defer to their position or rank within the party when it was the turn of the opposition to speak. For example, Emile Gaslonde, who spoke against Article 7 on a number of occasions, was a member of the Centre, who, as a member of the final committee, constituted in that committee the only opposition vote to Article 7. Other speakers from the Right, for example, who figured prominently were M. de Gasté and M. le Duc de Peltré who proposed alternative bills and a moderate Rightist attack on Article 7. The thinking of the extreme Right and the extreme Left was represented by speakers such as Baron de Maceau and Madier de Montjau respectively.

The political affiliation of the important speakers will be denoted, depending on the availability of such knowledge from the sources.
The paper is divided into seven chapters to correspond to the various stages of the development of the thesis. In Chapter II the author begins with a description of the political circumstances of the Republican Government in 1879 to set the stage for the introduction of Article 7. This is also necessary to demonstrate the apparent political recklessness of the government, to bring the questions relative to Article 7 into sharper focus. The description is followed by the chronology of events surrounding the article as the reader is taken through a detailed expostulation of Article 7 in the legislative process. In Chapter III the reaction to Article 7 in the Chamber, and in the nation as reflected in the Chamber, is described in detail, and in Chapter IV the relationship between the first two chapters comes to the fore in formulating the question which constitutes the basis for the thesis (why the government introduced Article 7 given the political circumstances) and advancing what the author suggests to be an answer (that the article was necessary to the future security of the Republic). Chapter V examines the impact of the publication of the Doctrine of Infallibility on the Republican government of France in 1879, and attempts to portray the apprehension and fear on the part of the government of the potential political power of the Church as a result of the publication. More specifically, the chapter sets out the Republican government's view of what they construed to be the organization of the Church for political anti-Republican purposes. Chapter VI continues from the preceding chapter by developing the Republican fear of the Church's political potential to a further stage. Whereas Chapter V showed, in the government's view, the Church being organized for political ends, Chapter VI describes how the government viewed the Church educational system as
the preparation of a future anti-Republican electorate by the indoctrination of French youth with anti-Republican and countercultural thinking. In both chapters it will be shown how the government attributed these developments to the Society of Jesus. In Chapter VII the author examines the dilemma in which the Republican government found itself, having, of necessity as they felt, to be severe in dealing with a part of the Church which it considered to be a threat to the continued existence of the Republic without engaging in a confrontation with the Church or alienating its membership. The chapter continues to show how the government viewed Article 7 as the solution to the dilemma, as a return to the Concordat to ensure the future of the Republic, and the peace and unity of France.

Throughout the development of the thesis, the author will describe historical events and their effects and ramifications as they were perceived by the Republican government and to record these perceptions and the government's interpretation of events in a documentary manner, without affecting any judgment. It is the author's contention that the Republican ministry of 1879 possessed an acute awareness of the political circumstances in which they found themselves, that, as difficult as it might seem at first glance, they were sincere in their dealings with the Church, and that they seemed convinced that Article 7 represented the best and only ecclesiastical policy for the government to pursue. Their degree of political acumen and the relative success or failure of the policy contained in Article 7 must be measured against the background of the political circumstances which confronted the government in 1879 and their subjective view of these.
circumstances; which must at least receive a cursory study in order to appreciate the magnitude of the importance of Article 7 to the Republican government.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) In this context one has to agree with Robert Byrnes, when he states that "the Third Republic at its origin inherited a religious-political issue almost as sharp as it had been in 1792." Robert F. Byrnes, The Christian Democrats in Modern France, in Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth French Republics, ed. by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 156.
CHAPTER II

ARTICLE 7 IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Viewing from hindsight the introduction and political impact of Article 7 in 1879, one could reasonably conclude, at first glance, that the Waddington Ministry could not have picked a worse possible time for the introduction of highly controversial legislation. The loose coalition of Republican parties had indeed won the elections of 1877, but all the Republican parties combined had received only fifty-four percent of the popular vote, which indicated that close to half of the French nation was still opposed to the Republican form of government. Divisions within the Republican coalition precluded any genuine guarantee that legislation proposed by the ministry would receive automatic support from allied groups. In fact, spokesmen for the ministry in 1879 publicly denounced the political ideology of the Far Left, and on occasion separated themselves from the extreme anticlericalism which that group espoused. Parliamentary democracy was not yet well established; no one party commanded a plurality of votes in the Chamber, and the constantly changing ministries testified to the fact that governments did not hold support in the Chamber for very long.


In the education ministry alone, for example, there had been twenty-seven ministers in six years, a fact noted by a member of the Right in condemning what he considered to be the very unstable system of government which the Republicans represented.4

The opposition parties to the Right, though defeated, retained powerful representation in the Chamber, and comprised a majority in the Senate. The political and social groups which they represented were still predominant in the civil service, in the officer corps of the armed services and on the councils of regional and local government. No one in 1879 could have predicted that their electoral defeat had been a permanent one, or that they would not return to power in another election.5 The government, though Republican, was still operating within the framework of the Constitution of 1875, which had been drafted by a predominantly monarchist assembly, and contained a clause which provided for easy constitutional change, presumably to effect an easy transfer to some form of monarchical government should the circumstances arise. The Comte de Chambord, the Legitimist heir, was still alive, and the Royalist presence was very evident in the frequent banquets held by monarchical supporters, the constant communication that was being maintained with the Comte by his supporters in the nation, and the rumours of royalist coups which circulated on occasion through the country.6 The Crisis of

4Paul Lenglé, Deputy for Haute-Garonne, Ch. Dep., June 30, 1879, J0, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5934.


May 16, 1877 had occurred less than two years before, and Marshall MacMahon, the President of the Republic who had used his office to prepare for the return of the monarchy, had just resigned on January 30, 1879. The elections of October 14-28, 1877 had been precipitated by MacMahon's dissolution of the Chamber on June 19, 1877 on what was in effect a monarchical principle of government — whether ministerial responsibility should be to the Chamber or to the President. On the basis of the above, it would be reasonable to observe that the Waddington Ministry took office on January 30, 1879 in the midst of a very unstable political climate.

In fact, as a corollary to the point raised above in reference to the electoral defeat of the Right, no one in 1879 could have prophesied that the Republican form of government was in France to stay. The first experience in Republicanism was dealt the death blow by the ascendancy of Napoleon I and the return of the monarchy in the presence of Louis XVIII. The second attempt was even less short-lived, in 1848, and was destroyed in the reactionary aftermath which set the stage for the empire of Napoleon III. The third attempt was born amidst the circumstances following the defeat at Sedan, the occupation by German troops, and the civil war experience of the Commune, and, in 1879, was still only eight years in existence. The nation still held bitter memories of these experiences, which were kept alive in the political.

7 For events of May 16, see Maurice Reclus, Le Seize Mai (Paris: Hachette, 1930), passim; and Émile de Marcère, Le Seize Mai et la Fin du Septennat, Vol. II of Histoire de la République (Paris: Nourrit et Cie, 1910), passim.
are by the discussion of such topics as amnesty for the communards. Politicians in 1879 still remembered the greatness of France before 1870, when the defeat at Sedan and subsequent German diplomacy rendered the nation diplomatically isolated in Europe.

In addition, a study of the secondary sources on the subject reveals that the Waddington and Freycinet ministries were confronted with severe economic problems in the nation. Phylloxera was crippling the wine industry in large areas of the country, French luxury industries were losing on the international market to competition from cheaper Italian products, and severely bad harvests occurred in 1878. The economy was in a period of recession, the country was lagging in industrial productivity, and, in those areas of the country where industrialization was taking place, it was attended by severe social problems. One could conclude that the ministry, in the midst, as it was, of unfavourable political circumstances, and confronted by sufficient internal and external problems, should have chosen a more cautious programme rather than introducing extremely controversial legislation.

Yet, this is exactly what was done. Barely two years after having been elected to office, the Republican government, under

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9 Bruun, Clemenceau, p. 39.
the direction of the Cabinet of William Waddington, president of the cabinet and minister of foreign affairs, began, through legislation, an almost revolutionary reorganization of the post-secondary educational system of France, a reorganization which assumed political and religious overtones, and plunged the nation into a serious confrontation between the government and the Church. Jules Ferry, as minister of education, was the articulator of government policy, and his name came to be identified with the programme of legislation. One writer refers to him as "the personification of the movement," while one of his biographers describes his articulation of government policy as "the most brilliant in our [French] parliamentary annals." He introduced and guided the two beginning bills of law through the various stages of the French legislative process, which began with the Exposé des Motifs on March 15, 1879.

However, the study of Article 7 should properly begin with mention of the introduction earlier of a bill of law by Paul Bert, a bill which was similar in objectives to Ferry's second bill containing Article 7. A member of the radical left and deputy from Yonne, Bert was a doctrinaire Republican who, besides being a prolific writer of


12 Though not as radical as the Extreme Left position on relations with the Church, as represented by Louis Blanc. See Goguel, La Politique, p. 34. Biographies include Léon Dubreuil, Paul Bert and Hector Depasse, Paul Bert (Paris: A. Quantin, 1883).
scientific treatises, contributed numerous books, articles and speeches to the academic attack on the position of the Church in the educational system of France.

Bert's bill, aimed at restricting the position of power held by the Church in education, was described as "Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education", and was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on January 23, 1879. In the Exposé des Motifs, Bert, in accordance with French parliamentary procedure, set forth the principles and objectives of the law, after which it was placed in the hands of a parliamentary committee for study. This committee, under the chairmanship of Émile Deschanel, deputy for the Seine and a member of the Radical Left, gave its report on May 20, 1879 and, while sanctioning the principles contained in the bill, recommended that it be studied by the same committee which was at that time studying the bill on higher education, previously submitted on March 15, 1879. Bert agreed to the recommendation and formally withdrew his bill of law in favour of the minister's.

Actually, Jules Ferry had placed two laws before the Chamber on March 15. The first was described as "Relating to the Higher Council of Public Education" and was not immediately read, due, as the speaker of the Chamber pointed out, to its inordinate length; although

13 For the full text of the law "Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education" see Appendix III. Reprinted from JO, No. 45, February 15, 1879, Annexe No. 1083, p. 1095.

14 See Gooch, The French Parliamentary Committee System, pp. 147-179 for the role of the committee system in the legislative process. The bill was first handed over, after its introduction, to an examining committee, which decided whether or not it would be given consideration. Then it was examined by the bureau.

one could reasonably suspect, given the events that immediately transpired in the Chamber, that this was simply a manoeuvring action, the second bill, the law Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education, being deemed so important that members were impatient for its submission. In essence, the first bill proposed to reorganize the membership of France's highest educational policy-making body, Le Conseil Supérieur, or Council of Higher Education, by removing the representatives of powerful corporations such as the various branches of the military services and the churches. They would be replaced by a totally professional membership made up of the representatives of the various major educational agencies of the nation, whose appointment would be directly approved by the minister of education, a procedure which did not apply to the membership of the old council, only twelve of whom were subject to ministerial approval, out of a total membership of thirty-six. Under the terms of the proposed legislation, the membership would be reduced to twenty-nine, and all would be subject to appointment by the minister. Nevertheless, though, in the words of Paul Bert, "the representatives of organized religion would be given no place on the Council," and though the Church must have realized the implications of the proposed legislation, there was no significant reaction on the part of the Church supporters in the Chamber. With

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16 See Appendix I. The bill contained twelve articles and was approximately 1500 words in length. Reprinted from JO, No. 87, March 29, 1879, Annexe No. 1238, pp. 2659-2660.

17 The Roman Catholic Church was usually represented by four archbishops.

the exception of its mention in the various legislative stages, the bill
tagtracted only passing reference in the debates on Article 7 that
followed.

The second bill of Jules Ferry, entitled, like Bert's,
"A Bill of Law Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education", evoked an
entirely opposite reaction, being immediately attacked by the opposition
because of the wording, and interpreted intent, of the seventh article.
The bill contained ten articles, the majority of which were aimed at
subjecting the post-secondary education system of the Church to the
regulations then currently governing the state university system.
Article 1 stated that only state institutions could hold tests or
examinations leading to the awarding of degrees. Students of the Church
system could pursue their studies in the Church-run universities and
colleges, but would have to take their examinations in the state
universities. Article 2 dictated equality for students of both systems
in terms of the awarding of financial help, and in the general imple-
mentation of university regulations. Article 3 prescribed that students
of the Church system register in the state institutions on the same date
as the students of the public system registered, and prescribed an equal
registration fee. Article 4 recognized two systems of secondary-edu-
cation: "schools founded or maintained by the communes or by the state,
and which are termed universities, colleges or public schools; [and] ... schools founded or maintained by individuals or associations, which have
no other name than 'free schools'." Article 5 stated that degrees and
certificates could be awarded to candidates only after they had submitted
to the examinations which were prescribed for state institutions. Article
6 specified that the offering of courses outside of the prescribed ministerial curriculum would be in accordance with the law of July 12, 1875. Article 7 stated that "no one is permitted to participate in public or free education, nor to direct any institution, of whatever kind, if he belongs to a non-authorized congregation." Article 8 declared that no free educational institution, or any organization formed for the purpose of public education, could be placed in the "public-service" category (and hence eligible for government financial support), unless it complied with the law. Article 9, in accordance with the traditional structure of French legislative bills, cited measures for contravention of the law, and Article 10 formally ruled that all previous legislation contrary in wording or principle to the proposed legislation was rendered inapplicable. Ferry followed the introduction of the bill with the customary request to have the two bills of law sent to the parliamentary committees for study, and the agenda for March 15 followed.

On March 27, 1879 the Duc de Feltre, a moderate Rightist spokesman, submitted a counterproposal to Ferry's second bill, setting forth, in his opinion, the same legislative objectives as were contained in the "Law Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education" in providing "safeguards for the interests of the state while guaranteeing to the Church the same rights [in education] as to other persons." Article 4 of his bill of law was a counterarticle to Article 7 of Ferry's bill in providing for intensive state supervision, to protect the interests

19For full text of the law of the Duc de Feltre, see Appendix IV. Reprinted from, Jo, No. 103, Annexe No. 1493, April 15, 1879, p. 3264.
of the state, but accorded the right to teach "to all citizens, without exception, who reside in France."

On May 15, 1879 M. de Casté, deputy for Finistère and Centre Republican in political affiliation, proposed a bill "Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education" which was essentially a compromise measure between Ferry's Law and that submitted by the Duc de Feltre and, as indicated by the political affiliation of M. de Casté, took a position between Right and Left on the issue of the right to teach of the non-authorized congregations. Article 3 of his law would forbid the right to teach to the non-authorized congregations in the State secondary school system, and accommodate what he believed to be sufficient Republican objectives; but would permit the non-authorized congregations the right to teach in the Church system. It stated simply that "no one is permitted to teach in the State education system, if he belongs to a religious congregation which is not authorized by the state."

All of the laws "Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education" were given to a special committee under the chairmanship of Paul Bert, a committee which reflected, in the composition of its membership, the various shades of Republican thinking, with the exception of the Extreme Left, as personified by Louis Blanc. Of the group, Eugene Spuller and Édouard Lockroy were members of the Republican Left, the government party, Bert and Nadier de Montjeu were Radical Left, and Charles Gaslonde was Centre Republican. The remaining members of the seven member committee were Justin Labuze (secretary), Antoine de

Sonnier, Bertrand Mir, M. Gedin, Jules Maigne and Étienne Drumel. Their political affiliation was not as distinct; and except for casting their votes in committee in favour of retaining Article 7 in the second bill of law, they do not appear as speakers in the debates. Eugene Spuller was chosen as rapporteur, as spokesman for the government to deliver the report or recommendations of the committee, to deliver the second stage of the elucidation of government policy.  

The report was lengthy, occupying seventeen pages in the Journal Officiel, and contained approximately 32,000 words. It first dealt with and officially rejected the counter-projects proposed by the Duc de Feltrè and M. de Gastè; the Duc de Feltrè's because "it was too removed from the government's proposition to be amended"; M. de Gastè's because it did not, in the committee's opinion, go far enough in support of the minister's bill to be incorporated. The report then proceeded through three structural divisions to examine the general role of the State in education, to provide the setting for the expostulation of the bill, to examine and analyse the counter arguments to the bill, and to examine each of the articles of the bill in detail. The report was then tabled until the beginning of the debate on the proposed legislation, and circulated for study to the membership of the Chamber. Both the

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21The Rapport in relation to the Exposé was government policy having taken into account internal criticism and committee reaction. It could modify or enlarge the scope of a bill, or reject it completely. Hence the report, at this stage, was considered government policy. The choice of the reporter is significant. See J.E.C. Bodley, The Church in France (London: A. Constable, 1906), p. 18 for the importance of reporter of the commission. A much published writer on the issue of church-state relations in France, Eugene Spuller, in his writings and speeches, personally espoused the type of relatively moderate ecclesiastical policy which the Waddington, and later, Freycinet ministries formally endorsed.

2230, No. 159, June 12, 1879, Annexe No. 1442, p. 5005.
Exposé and the Report would become the focus of argument for and against when the Chamber met to discuss the legislation and debate the advantages and disadvantages of the bill of law.
CHAPTER III

THE CHAMBER REACTS

The debate on "The Law Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education" in the Chamber of Deputies began on June 16, 1879 and, until the vote was taken on July 9, was marked by two distinct features: the violently emotional tone of the debating and the isolation of Article 7 from the main bill as the focus of the entire debate, an isolation which had been foreshadowed by the amount of time devoted to the article in the Exposé and the Report previously. Indeed, the counterprojects introduced by the Duc de Feltre and M. de Gasté were only of significance in that they provided alternative policies for treatment of the non-authorized orders, policies which reflected the authors' political leaning. Whereas Article 7 forbade the right to teach in any school system to the non-authorized congregations, the Duc de Feltre's bill would grant them the right to teach in both systems, while de Gasté's compromise would grant them the right to teach in the Church system. The Extreme Left would not grant the right to teach to any religious order, authorized or non-authorized. Thus the debate on Ferry's second bill became a debate on Article 7 of that bill, a debate which was intended to decide the fate of the non-authorized religious congregations, an issue which attracted every political grouping to attack or defense.
The members of the Chamber, especially those who played important roles in the legislative process, were keenly aware of the importance of the article. The two government members who were most involved in the legislative process, Ferry and Spuller, openly drew attention to its importance. In the Exposé, Ferry declared Article 7 to be "one of the most important articles of the new law."¹ In his report, Spuller stated that Article 7 "had provided the basis for the lengthiest discussions in the committees and bureaux of the Chamber, in the press and in the nation."² Paul Bert, chairman of the special committee which studied the law and who had himself introduced a similar bill, described the article as "the newest, the most important, and the one article most deserving of attention."³ Charles Gaslonde, the member of the committee who cast the one dissenting vote, summarized that "article 7 ... [was] the entire law."⁴ Baron de Mackau, legitimist politician and leading spokesman for the Right on the issue, made the following analysis:

... the famous Article 7, which has become everything. The Exposé des Motifs speaks only of it. The Report of the honorable Mr. Spuller dwells on it only, and the speeches delivered at this rostrum focus only on this point.⁵

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¹Jules Ferry, Ch. Dep., March 15, 1879. Jo, No. 90, April 1, 1879, Annexes No. 1239, p. 2707.
⁵Baron de Mackau, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. Jo, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5593.
The article had engendered such political harangues that, as one speaker, Paul Lenglé, deputy for Haute-Coronna, wryly noted, though the article had been introduced as part of a law dealing with education, and though the other articles were specifically educational in nature, for the fifteen days of debate that had just ended, education hadn't even been mentioned.\(^6\) Fredinand Boyer, deputy for Garde and speaker for the Right, stated in his address that the article had aroused "considerable emotion" in France, and predicted that not only would it be fought by numerous speakers in the Chamber and in the Senate, but its inclusion would bring about the defeat of the total law.\(^7\)

In his first prediction, Boyer was accurate; as "numerous" speakers did fight the article, and fought it violently, a fact attested to by no less a government member than the second prime minister to hold office during the debate on Article 7, Charles Freycinet.\(^8\) The reaction was so violent, in fact, in his opinion, that he thought at times that the two parties, the Right and the Left, would actually physically attack one another in the Chamber.\(^9\) Whether the government realized it or not, it had raised a question which involved the very existence of the Church.\(^10\)

\(^6\)Paul Lenglé, Ch. Dep., June 20, 1879, J.O. No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5934.
\(^7\)Ferdinand Boyer, Ch. Dep., June 17, 1879, J.O. No. 165, June 18, 1879, p. 5326. He had earlier declared that the Right would "fight to the end" on behalf of the Church. Ibid., p. 5319.
\(^8\)Freycinet, Souvenirs pp. 86, 119.
\(^9\)Ibid., p. 121.
\(^10\)See Paul Tillich, "The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church," Social Research, Vol. 1 (November 1934), 405-433, for a subjective development of the argument regarding the necessity of education to the Church. The official Church position can be obtained
In the words of Antonin Debidoir, "it was the most lethal thrust that the government could take at the non-authorized congregations," and, in view of the above, a serious blow to the Church of which they were an integral part. Certainly, this was how the speakers for the Right interpreted the article when they began the attack on the article during the very first opening day of the debate.

Freycinet's fears of physical conflict in the Chamber were probably prompted by the atmosphere on that opening day, created initially by the first speaker, a speaker for the Right, Paul Cranier de Cassagnac, deputy for Gers. Cassagnac opened his remarks by a personal and heated attack on one of the government ministers, Pierre Girard, the minister of agriculture. Possibly hinting at some alleged illegal activities on the part of the minister, Cassagnac uttered the sarcastic statement that only a government with M. Girard among its membership would initiate legislation like that contained in Article 7. The speaker of the house, Léon Gambetta, ruled Cassagnac out of order, and would not permit him to speak unless he apologized to M. Girard. When he refused, and in spite of his protestations, and the protestations of supporters from the Right, he was censured by the speaker and expelled from the Chamber. The expulsion set off a commotion in the Chamber, which culminated in physical confrontation between members of the Left and of the Right who were "exchanging blows in front of the speaker's

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The speaker considered it necessary to recess the debate in order to restore calm and the debate was not resumed until the next day. The account of the incident served to portray the reception accorded the introduction of Article 7 by the Right, a reception which, to repeat Fréycinet, was actually violent.

This violence of reaction arose directly from the interpretation which the Right had assigned to the article. Regardless of the assurances which exponents of government policy gave regarding the limitations and scope of the law, every speech from the Right, in some form, denounced Article 7 as the beginning of an official government programme of persecution of the Catholic Church; a beginning which had as its objective the destruction of the Church university system. By their count, passage of the law would effectively close "641 religious communities, exclude 6740 teachers from the Catholic education system, and deprive 61,409 students of a Catholic education, when," in the opinion of the Right, "there was neither space, teachers nor money to accommodate them in the state system." Further, it would reduce the Church university system to a second-rate position, an analysis of which is best given by Léon Bourgeois, deputy for Vendée:

Our universités, our institutions, will be considered ghettos, their pupils - outcasts and lepers; their doctors, bachelors and licentiates -

12Ch. Dep., June 16, 1879. A detailed account of the incident can be obtained from J.O., No. 164, June 17, 1879, pp. 5274-5278.

13Baron de Hëck, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879, J.O., No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5396. These statistics were reiterated by Ferdinand Boyer and Étienne Lamy, both of whom were prominent in the debate on Article 7. J.O., No. 165, June 18, 1879, p. 5329 and J.O., No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5676.
outlaws. Only those who wear the government epaulettes on their shoulders and carry government certificates will have a place in the sun. 14

For this reason, Article 7 had affected on the Right "a veritable explosion of sorrowful surprise and violent protest." 15 Members from the Right, continued Bourgeois, had expected that the government would be more conciliatory towards the Church and the Catholic religion, since official statements by the minister of religions, Emile de Marcère, had been very conciliatory in tone. In fact, the minister had assured the Right that any laws to be passed by the government would be permeated by a spirit of appeasement. However, the recent action of the government in introducing Article 7 indicated that "the era of compromise and conciliation" had swiftly degenerated into hostility against religious ideas and institutions.16

In this way, Article 7 was transferred from the realm of education and debated by the Right and defended by the government within the context of anti-religious legislation. The bill which began as a bill of educational reform was subjected to successive stages of interpretation by the Right: first as the destruction of the Church university system and the educational hardships this would entail, followed by the destruction of the non-authorized religious congregations which would in turn be followed by the destruction of all religious congregations, which would be concluded by the attack on the

15Ibid.
16Ferdinand Boyer, Ch. Dep., June 17, 1879. Id., No. 163, June 18, 1879, p. 5319.
secular clergy and the Church itself. These successive stages of interpretation continued to emerge in one form or another from the speeches from the Right, as members sought to portray Article 7 as a most venemous piece of anti-religious legislation.

Thus, in the opinion of Bourgeois, it was not the Jesuits that the government really wanted, but the Church, religion itself. It was not just the four male non-authorized orders that warranted expulsion by the government, "it was a question of the entire clergy of France; it was religion, God Himself, whom they wished to chase from education." The government could protest as it wished against these interpretations, the Right was convinced that the ultimate aim of the article was the eventual exclusion from education of all orders, authorized and non-authorized, for "this was certainly the aim proposed by the author of the project." It was not just an attack on religious orders, it was an attack on Catholicism itself. If Gambetta had already coined the slogan "Clericalism; there's the real enemy," the minister of education had varied it somewhat by the introduction of Article 7. For the Right the new Republican slogan had become "Catholicism, there's the real enemy." For Gasqon also, the Centre Republican who fought the article, the exclusion of the Jesuits would be followed by the outlawing of all clergy, and, finally, by the prohibition of Catholicism.

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
itself. For Benjamin Bardoux, deputy for Puy-de-Dôme, the bill on
the freedom of higher education was based on the anti-religious
philosophy of laïcité, "and that philosophy inspired the basic article
of the project, Article 7." When the government did reply to these interpretations,
and deny their foundation, the denials were ignored. The Right had
watched closely the relationship between the government party and the
Radical Left, and were not impressed with the degree of influence which
the latter party was, in their opinion, exerting upon the government.
Alexander Ribot, deputy for Pas-de-Calais, noted that when Ferry replied
to the radical demand of Nadier de Montjau that all religious orders be
refused the right to teach, the best reply that the minister had been
able to muster was that "it was not an opportune time to take such an
action." The charges of religious persecution and harassment continued.
Baron de Mackau called the policy contained in the article "the first
step in a new campaign." Étienne Lamy, deputy for Jura, described
Article 7 as "a transitional measure; the bridge between the freedom
that the government had abandoned and the despotism it was preparing."
For Msgr. Freppel, deputy for Finistère, it was "a veritable declaration of war." He continued that "the bill had substituted, in the nation, religious parties for political parties, had accursed the Catholic Church and, in the long run, was designed to prevent all Catholics from teaching." In effect, as assessed by Baron de Rochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia, the article was little more than "a policy of harassment for Catholicism and religion."  

Speakers from the Right proceeded from this more violently verbal tone of attack on Article 7 to a more academic attack, to undermine the government arguments for Article 7, and the necessity of its incorporation into legislation. They challenged the government for evidence of the dangers which allegedly emanated from the presence of the religious orders, and for proof of the conspiracies and intrigues in which the orders were supposed to be involved. They dismissed government allegations that the religious orders were creating civil division and inciting civil war as fictitious, even laughable, as "the echoes of some old fairy tale." Documents which had been presented by the government as evidence, but which the Right noted, were conspicuously not read, were scoffed at as "erroneous works, novels, certainly not representative." They countered that the number of

26Quoted in Lecanuet, L'Eglise de France, p. 21.
27Baron de Rochefoucauld, Duc de Bisaccia, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. Jo, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5772.
28Ibid.
Catholic clergy and laity who had served with distinction under the Republic, in peace and war, was limitless. They could even consider the government charge of anti-Republican education as amusing when it could be pointed out that so many elected Republican deputies in the Chamber, even on the far Left, had been educated in the colleges and universities of the non-authorized congregations.

Also, the Right questioned the need for the Article as a protection for the state in ensuring adequate state control when there already existed by legislation, and in the civil service, a system of supervision by state school inspectors who could oversee the teaching in the schools and furnish evidence of reasonable education on the part of the orders. Even the minister himself, it was pointed out, upon interrogation, had admitted that all schools had been inspected. It was ironic, too, in the opinion of the Right, that the government inspectors had given excellent commendations to the schools of the non-authorized orders, even to the Jesuit schools. If the orders were acting illegally, there was in existence ample legislation to provide for the protection of the state, legislation which even provided for

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30 The theme of Catholic service to the Republic was expounded by de Gasté, JO, No. 146, p. 4434; Le Comte de Maillé, JO, No. 171, p. 5548; Lamy, JO, No. 174, p. 5678; Boyer, JO, No. 178, p. 5527. Emile Keller, deputy for Haut-Rhin, was then working on the massive work Les Congrégations Religieuses en France en 1880 which accumulated the service records of all Catholic religious orders in France throughout the nineteenth century, and was intended to show the contribution of the orders. The work was published in 1880 by Fournié Frères of Paris.

31 De Maclaine, Ch. Dep. June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5725.

32 Baron de Roche-aucal, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5796.
the expulsion of illegal orders.\textsuperscript{33} The conclusion they drew was that
if there already existed legislation for the inspection and control of
non-authorized orders, and if the principles purported to be in Article
7 were already embodied in legislation, how could the government,
possibly justify the introduction of the article unless it were a front
for a much more sinister plan?\textsuperscript{30}

In the minds of the Right the article also raised the
spectre of the worst excesses of the Revolution, when the revolutionary
government, especially during the terror, attempted to destroy the
Church through persecution, execution and confiscation of property.\textsuperscript{35}
Arthur de Valon, deputy for Lot, described Article 7 as "the re-enact-
ment of the despotism and autocracy of the French Revolution, which
destroyed the Gallican Church, and now seeks to destroy the Church in
France."\textsuperscript{36} De Mackau pointed out that even while they were debating
Article 7 and the government was protesting that the article had nothing
to do with religion, the municipal council of Paris was decreeing the
removal of crucifixes from the classrooms of state schools; an action
strikingly similar to the action of the Convention in 1793, when the

\textsuperscript{33}Lamy, "Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27,
1879, p. 5678; Boyer, Ch. Dep., June 17, 1879; JO, No. 165, June 18,
1879, p. 5326.

\textsuperscript{34}De Mackau, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June
25, 1879, p. 5593.

\textsuperscript{35}See Gabriel Le Bras, Introduction à l'Histoire de la
Pratique Religieuse en France (Paris: Bibliothèque de l'École des
Hautes-Études, 1943), pp. 100-103 for the result of the revolutionary
campaign against the Church.

\textsuperscript{36}De Valon, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June
25, 1879, p. 5604.
removal of statues and crucifixes was decreed since they were considered the refuse from an outmoded cult. In that same year, he continued, the Commune of Paris decreed the abolition of all religions. Another speaker compared the existing ministry to the Jacobin party of the Revolution when he predicted that "Article 7 will soon lead to the decree of 3 Messidor, An XII." The Right did not merely think it coincidental that the appearance of Article 7 should coincide with a wave of anti-clerical and anti-religious activity then being carried out by municipal and regional representatives of the Republican government. Neither could they ignore the fact that a number of very significant anti-religious bills were then being concurrently introduced for discussion. In the minds of the Right, there was no question of government thinking behind Article 7 when the Communards, who had attempted to destroy the state, were receiving favourable treatment in educational legislation, while Catholic religious orders who had faithfully served the state were being discriminated against.

In another method of attack, the opponents of Article 7 sought to demonstrate the serious negative reaction which the article

37 De Mackau, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5598; Bourgeois, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879, JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5792.

38 Boyer, Ch. Dep., June 17, 1879. JO, No. 165, June 18, 1879, p. 5326s.

39 JO, No. 174, p. 5689; No. 175, p. 5728; No. 176, p. 5792.

40 Examples were the laws restricting the activities of chaplains in the services, restriction of the number of religious feast days and the bill on divorce. JO, No. 83, March 24, 1879, p. 2472. See JO, No. 157, June 10, 1879, pp. 4906, 4934; No. 166, June 19, 1879, p. 5374.

41 Boyer, JO, No. 165, June 18, 1879, p. 5319; De Mackau, JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5592.
was causing in the nation. Gosalonde cautioned the government against "misunderstanding the great movement of public opinion opposed to the article," and pointed to the fact that one-third of the departmental councils were opposed to its introduction. He appealed to the government to take seriously the vast number of petitions being presented in opposition to the article, and the centres of action then being set up to combat its passage.\(^2\) Later in the same speech he repeated the warning that "a considerable movement of public opinion was centring around the bill," and described the nation as "divided and shocked" by Article 7.\(^3\) In describing the reaction of the Church, members of the Right claimed that the bishops were unanimous in opposing the laws, and disagreed with the government regarding the unanimity of the opposition of the clergy, asserting that the entire clergy, including the secular clergy, were involved in the protest.\(^4\) In fact, continued

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\(^2\) Gosalonde, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5544. A typical example of a JO reading of the submitting of petitions is demonstrated by the following extract from the Senate session of May 12, 1879, JO, No. 131, May 13, 1879, p. 3964: "M. Chesnelong introduced a petition from the archbishop of Aix, and the bishops of Digne, Gap, Fréjus and Toulon, Agisco, Nice and Marseilles, ... from the archbishop of Algiers, the bishops of Constance and Hippoé, from the bishop of Oran, the archbishop of Rennes, and from the bishops of Saint-Breube, Vannes and Quimper.

\(^3\) Gosalonde, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5545.

Bourgeois, they had protested with "such admirable unanimity and such enthusiasm that the government has described it as rebellious."45

Government speakers, during the beginning of the debates, sought to minimize the impact of Article 7, but became more cognizant of the articulation of public opinion for and against the article as the legislative process continued, and thereby added more evidence regarding the national reaction to Article 7. As early as the report, Spuller alluded to the reaction of the Church when he stated that the article had become "the object of petitions circulated throughout the whole of the French nation, of sermons and pastoral letters of bishops."46 Towards the end of the debate, Ferry would refer to Article 7 as "having caused such problems, and which has been cursed by everyone."47

Of the latter statement, Ferry could provide firsthand evidence from a speaking tour of the South of France in 1879, after the parliamentary recess. In a series of letters to Madame Ferry, he described the various reactions to the article which he observed as he toured his route, referring to the demonstrations for and against the article as "unanimous and spontaneous." In Languedoc, even the children chanted 'Article 7' in greeting. In Perpignan, "Vive Article 7" was


synonymous for "Vive La République." In Marseilles, his entourage was stopped by a mob of young teenagers shouting "Article 7" as a derogatory epithet. It was also at Marseilles that "ordinary, peaceful people cursed Article 7," while at Lyons, Ferry came to the conclusion that the article "had divided the mind of the nation into two camps." After the tour he was convinced that he had "touched the most vibrant chord of the nation." Paul Bert came to a like conclusion when he visited Perpignan, Beziers and Marseilles during the same period. In his case, Republican supporters everywhere along the route welcomed him with "Vive Article 7."

However, such realizations did not come until after the debate in the Chamber had finished. During the debate, to repeat, the government minimized the magnitude of the reaction and discounted Rightist and Centralist evidence as not being representative of the nation as a whole. Spuller dismissed the petitions as unrepresentative since he claimed that they contained only the signatures of women and children, signatures obtained by the clergy by placing the faithful under duress. Ferry placed the blame for the petitions, and the reaction in general, on certain clergy who were misleading the people.

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46Ferry, Lettres, No. 116, p. 266; No. 117, p. 299; No. 118, p. 300, No. 120, p. 302. Other examples can be found in letters numbered 113, 114, 115, 119.

47Ibid., p. 300.

48Ibid., p. 296.

50Ibid., p. 296.

51Quoted in Dobraski, Paul Bert, p. 97.

52Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 12, 1879, 30, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5012.
by playing on their fears and giving them false information; "activists and petitioning agents, curés in their pulpits and vicars-general in the countryside, ... who told the ignorant populace that it was a question of driving the brothers and sisters from the village schools." The petitions were not valid, in his opinion, since the people signed out of a fear created by false propaganda. Not satisfied, he continued, the leaders of the protests and those who organized the petitions compounded these lies by propagandizing that the Protestant leadership of the nation wished to annihilate Catholicism, and convinced the people that Article 7 was intended to suppress the teaching of religion in the schools. To Ferry, it was perfectly understandable that the people should react with such violence and send petitions with such numerous signatures, when they were being told by these activists that the children would not be allowed to pray in the schools, that textbooks introduced would be immoral, as would be the teachers, that the catechism and the crucifix would be prohibited in the classroom, and that the government ministers were monsters and communards, and the dregs of society. These inciters had been telling the people that "the moment of persecution had finally arrived, that the guillotine was being prepared, and that the only time that God would henceforth be mentioned would be to prove that he didn't exist." Though the purpose of speakers like Spuller and Ferry was to demonstrate that the

53 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5728.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
reaction to Article 7 was exaggerated and deliberately provoked, they
inadvertently acted as witnesses for the violence of a reaction which
paradoxically they had set out to play down.

Ferry also evidenced the opposition to Article 7 which
emerged from another quarter in the Chamber, possibly unexpected and
very much of concern to the government: the opposition from the
Republicans of the Centre who, up to that point, had been supporting
government policy. In their view, the other articles of the bill
Relating to the Freedom of Higher Education were in complete accord
with Republican philosophy as they construed it, but Article 7 was
viewed as despotic and harmful to the nation since it would only serve
to precipitate a war with the Catholic Church. Representative spokesmen
of this group, like Benjamin Bardoux and Paul Léon Bourgeois, recommended
that the two school systems be permitted to operate side by side, with
the free school system subordinate to the state in administrative matters,
but autonomous in matters of faith and conscience. Thus, they could not
vote with the government on Article 7 but, on this occasion, had to
separate themselves from the minister. 56 Bardoux described the govern-
ment's thinking on education as "authoritarian" and, whereas he considered
himself Republican in thought and feeling and did not oppose either the
content or wording of the other articles, he accused the government of
deviating from true Republican philosophy and initiating autocracy in
the form of a French Kulturkampf. 57 Ferry addressed them as his "dear

56 Benjamin Bardoux, Puy-de-Dôme, Ch. Dep., June 20, 1879.
JO, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5939.
57 Ibid.
friends of the centre-left," and, while asking for their support, pessimistically predicted that they would not vote the law. He sought to placate "this little group of conservatives of the Centre," who, in his words, "were flirting with the idea of separating from the government at such a critical time," and refusing to the government's support: "on which they were accustomed to depend." Freycinet, writing later, blamed Ferry for "provoking a spirit of division in the Republicans of the Centre," a charge taken up by some historians of the Third Republic who assert that Article 7 precipitated lasting divisions in the Republican alliance. The irrelevancy, at this point, of the latter statement, does not in any way diminish the significance of the fact that the Republicans of the Centre joined with the parties of the Right in rejecting Article 7 and seeking to prevent its passage as a bill of law.

The inclusion of the rejection by the Centre Republicans concludes the account of the reaction to Article 7 in the Chamber of Deputies, a reaction in which the members of the Right, principally, attacked the article as anti-Catholic and persecutory, as a revival of the horrors of the Revolution, and sought to undermine the government's position by pointing out the immediate negative effects which the

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58 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879, J0, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5687.

59 Ibid., p. 5722.

article would have on education generally and on Catholic education in particular. They argued that, given the existing legislation, the law was totally unnecessary and that it was a cover-up for the government's true intentions which they deemed to be the first step in a programme of officially sponsored persecution of the Catholic Church. Through their statements and presentation of petitions, the Right further provided evidence of the emotional storm which the article was precipitating in the nation, a fact also inadvertently attested to by government members and their supporters who, in their speeches and writings later, exhibited clear evidence of how Article 7 affected the populace generally. There can be little doubt at this point that the article directed against the non-authorized congregations and contained in an educational bill of law was more than just a controversial piece of legislation. Neither can one dispute the fact that, from the evidence provided by contemporary witnesses who were continually in the midst of the legislative process, the introduction of the article set off a political storm in the Chamber and in the nation, and was violently fought by its opponents, members from the Right and the Republican Centre; as a deadly piece of legislation; the obvious objective of which was in their minds, the eventual destruction of the Catholic religion.

8 Other "areas of reaction" included the Catholic press, a study done by Mona Ozouf, L'École, l'Église et La République (Paris: Coll, "Kiosque", 1963), passim.
CHAPTER IV

ARTICLE 7 — THE QUESTION POSED

The violence of the reaction to Article 7 by the parties of the Right in the Chamber, and the emotional controversy which it engendered in the nation, especially among the membership and clergy of the Catholic Church, raises serious questions relating to the introduction of the article, especially when the reaction is set against the background of what might be described as the unfavourable political circumstances of 1879.1 When one considers, to recapitulate, that the Republican government, relatively speaking, was still in its infancy and lacked firm control over the political and social forces of the nation; that it governed a nation still living with the aftermath of defeat, occupation, civil war and the political tensions following May 16; that it had to contend in 1879 with formidable opposition in the Chamber, the Senate, in government and regional administration; and was racked by parliamentary instability and internal divisions, and confronted by economic problems; one could, at the outset, question its political acumen in introducing legislation which added to party and national division, and created a political uproar which threatened its very existence.2 Instead of providing responsible leadership and

1See above, pp. 15-18.

2In fact, the second ministry which dealt with Article 7, the Freycinet ministry, was forced to resign over the issue of the decree.
introducing legislation to bring peace and unity to consolidate the nation after the very traumatic events of the decade, the government seemed to be doing the exact opposite, as observed by one of the members of the committee who studied the bill. \(^3\) In fact, Freycinet, the premier of the second ministry which carried through the bill, called the article "the worst legislative bill that anyone could have invented."\(^4\)

It could perhaps be argued that, prior to its introduction, the government was not aware of its seriousness, or that it would create such an uproar, or that they included the article lightly, simply not realizing its import. Such observations cannot be upheld, however, in the face of Perry's clear and emphatic statement that the government introduced the article "with deliberate purpose and after serious thought."\(^5\) In his memoirs, Freycinet admitted that "M. Say and Waddington ... could not misunderstand the import of this innovation [Article 7]."\(^6\) He writes that when he predicted to Léon Say, in council, that the article would "cause an uproar" Say agreed with him. Such statements clearly indicate that the Waddington ministry recognized the importance of the article, and that its advent on the political scene would not be a smooth one.

\(^3\) Caslonde, Ch. Dep, June 27, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 28, 1879, p. 5545.

\(^4\) Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 120.

\(^5\) Perry, Ch. Dep., April 1, 1879. JO, No. 90, April 2, 1879, Annexe No. 1239, p. 2767.

\(^6\) Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 71.
Nevertheless, if one wished to pursue this argument in spite of Ferry's admission of government forethought, why did the government continue to press forward with the article not only in the face of the opposition of the Right, which in itself was understandable, but after the defection of the Centre and after becoming cognizant of the agitation which the article was causing in the nation? Even more important, why did the legislative process not stop when the article was rejected by the Senate on March 9, 1880? From the presentation of the Report in the Senate on December 8, 1879, through the debate in the Senate which ran from January 23 to March 9, 1880, the article and the matter of the right to teach of the non-authorized congregations again became the focus of the argument and was again heatedly debated. When the debate ended on March 9 the total bill, including Article 7, was defeated by a vote of 148 to 127. After further consideration of the bill, all articles except Article 7 were passed. In a separate vote, Article 7 was defeated by 187 to 103. The article at this point should have simply ceased to cause any further concern. Yet, notwithstanding the rejection by the Senate, the Republican ministry, this time under the premiership of Charles Freycinet, embodied the objectives of Article 7 in executive decree form and published two decrees on March 16, 1880. The first ordered that the Society of Jesus be expelled from France within a three-month period, and its property transferred to the secular clergy. The second decree demanded that all other non-authorized orders apply for authorization within the same period, or face penalties for violation of the law.7 The decrees were implemented immediately, and

Penalties were not specified. Unlike the preparation of Article 7, which was well thought out, the decrees, according to Freycinet, were hastily prepared and as hastily executed. Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 121.
precipitated disturbances between supporters and opponents of religious orders wherever the police had to forcefully carry out eviction and expulsion.\textsuperscript{3} The objectives of Article 7 were finally realized, if not through abandonment of the legislative process, certainly through a deviation from it, in resorting to administrative decrees when the government objectives could not be attained in the normal legislative manner.

This by-pass action of the government poses questions of its own, the most interesting being why the ministry didn't use the decree method in the beginning, or somewhere along the way before the opposition toughened. However, the publication of the decrees is more important to the original question in that it focuses on the persistence of the government to achieve the objectives of Article 7, almost in spite of any form of opposition. This persistence indicated that the passage of Article 7 and the embodiment of its principles in law was a matter of great importance to the Republican government, and that the attainment of its objectives held profound meaning for its members. Whatever the historiographical discussion regarding the motivation of introduction of Article 7, whatever arguments exist as to its aims or effects, one cannot dispute the fact that a clause of a bill of law which was deliberately introduced amidst the most unfavourable political circumstances, which was carried through in the teeth of violent opposition and a split in government support, and was still forcefully...\textsuperscript{3}Louis Andrieux, Souvenirs d'un Préfet de Police (Paris: J. Rouff, 1883), pp. 289-90 describes such disturbances. Andrieux was inspector-general of the Paris police, and was charged with the enforcement of the decrees in that city.
implemented in another form after the parliamentary process had rejected its passage, must have dealt with a matter of great concern to the government in the Chamber.

Paradoxically, it was the unfavourable political circumstances of 1879 which produced Article 7, and the reaction from the Right and the Church, and from the Senate and the Centre, were reflective of the reasons for the introduction of the article and, in the mind of the government, justification for the implementation of its objectives. For, as the government assessed their situation in 1879, the opposition in both houses, and from the Church through the intermediary of supporters in both houses, represented the existence of a powerful alliance of anti-Republican forces in the nation. Article 7 was the stated government response to its most critical challenge: the threat which the combined strength of these forces held for the continued existence of the Republican form of government and society. Government speakers declared that it was intended to resolve the crucial political and social problems of the nation by preventing the resurgence of monarchical, anti-Republican France, and securing, through a return to the Concordat’s ecclesiastical policy, the future of the Third Republic. Further, they professed that it was designed as a forceful immediate action to prevent the coalition of anti-Republican forces from merging into a single unified force, a development which meant for the Republicans the division of France into two nations, division which, considering the bitterness and mutual hostility which they thought

9 Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879, JQ, No. 159, Annexe No. 1443, June 17, 1879, p. 5019.
existed, could only mean ultimately, another civil war of disastrous consequences, a fear kept real by the memory of the frightful carnage of the Commune of 1871. Hence, they considered it as more than just preventing a Rightist return to power in a future election. They presented it as a calculated move to destroy the leadership around which the various anti-Republican forces were massing, and thus fragment and weaken these forces by removing their unifying leadership, the religious orders who were the directors of political organizations and the indoctrinators of the future electorate.

The Republican government seemed convinced that a massive coalescence of anti-Republican forces was taking place in the nation, a coalescence which they variously referred to as the coalition and the counter-revolution. They further believed that this coalescence was being spearheaded by certain non-authorized orders, especially the Jesuits. The latter, according to the Republicans, were most prominent in this role of leadership, and it was at them that the article, and later the decree, was principally directed. For the Jesuits, through the unique position of power which they had attained in the Church through the publication of the Doctrine of Papal Infallibility, had gained control of the French Church, and were in the process of organizing all the component parts of the Church, clergy and laity, into a powerful political machine, which, from the point of view of the government, they could then place at the disposal of the Right in any forthcoming election.

In a concomitant process, this same order, through the Church educational system which they controlled, was indoctrinating the youth of France.

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10 See Paul Seippel, Les Deux Frances (Lausanne: Payot, 1905), passim, for insight into how Republican apologists developed the concept of two Frances.
with anti-Republican philosophy, and thus preparing the future electorate for the monarchical Right. Considering the political usage to which the obedience implicit in Papal Infallibility could be put, as the Republicans interpreted the doctrine, the success of the political organization and educational indoctrination of the Jesuit order would spell doom for the Republican cause in a future election, or even before that through a possible coup d'état.

Hence the Jesuits, the focal point of the coalescing forces, had to be removed, and quickly, if the future of the Republic was to be secure. The Right would then be powerless without the political organization and direction which they supplied, the political potential of the Church organization would be disengaged from the services of the Rightist parties, and the educational system would cease to pervert the minds of youth, the future electorate, with anti-Republican doctrines. The Church could return to its proper sphere, the sphere of the spiritual, and the Republicanization of France could peacefully continue, without a second France to create disunity and civil disharmony. From the government's point of view, according to the sources examined, this was what Article 7 was intended to do. From this point of view, Article 7 was much more than 'a miserable political expedient', but was vital to the continued existence of the Third Republic.

The Right, inadvertently, substantiated the objectives of Article 7 by divining "the true aim of the project," and correctly analyzing, though in negative form, what the government intended to achieve.11 Whereas the government stated the objective of Article 7 to

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11 Bourgeois, Ch. Dep., June 18, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5791.
be the security of Republican France, the Right assessed the objective to be, by implication, the destruction of monarchical or royalist France. Bourgeois called the article "a law of revenge", and accused the government of taking advantage of a democratic electoral mandate to autocratically destroy the opposition.\(^{12}\) To Paul Lenglé, it was not a law dealing with education, "but a political law, ... a law of revenge."\(^ {13}\) Édouard de la Bassetière, deputy from Vendée and speaker for the Right, charged that the educational reasons put forth by the government were merely a front for the government's true reason; "what one would call a raison d'État, ... a political objective."\(^ {14}\) Étienne Lamy concluded that "the true reason for Article 7" was a political one, the final eradication of the Legitimist party.\(^ {15}\) It was because they believed, correctly, that the implementation of Article 7 would lead ultimately to their disappearance as a political and social force in the nation that they fought the article as they did.

However, although the Rightist assessment of the objectives of the article was correct, it was the government spokesmen who developed the logic of the argument through the various legislative stages; the speakers from the Right merely added, through their correct interpretation of the aim of Article 7, further proof of the government's

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\(^{12}\)Ibid.

\(^{13}\)Lenglé, Ch. Dep., June 30, 1879. JO, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5934.

\(^{14}\)De la Bassetière, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5729.

\(^{15}\)Lamy, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5678.
intentions. Hence, it was the government speakers, and their Republican supporters, who outlined in detail the reasons for the introduction of Article 7, and set out its aims and objectives. It was their collective view that saw the clergy and laity of the Church, the political parties of the Right and the supporting groups of the Right in the nation being welded into a powerful anti-Republican coalition by the non-authorized religious orders under Jesuit direction; a view which was elaborated in the Exposé, the Report and in the frequent government speeches throughout the debate. Thus one must examine these speeches in particular to understand how the government articulated its assessment of the threat to the existence of the Republic and its fear for the Republic's future survival. Such an examination will show how the government viewed the entanglement of religion, education and politics as being the greatest source of power for the opposition Right, and their belief that their disentanglement through Article 7 was the only way to truly Republicanize the nation.
CHAPTER V

ULTRAMONTANISM, JESUITISM AND
THE POLITICAL THREAT OF RELIGION

The investigation of the Republican government's rationale for introducing Article 7 begins with the reaction of the Republicans to the promulgation of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility on July 18, 1870. The doctrine, which stated that "the pope, when speaking ex cathedra, possesses infallibility in decisions regarding faith or morals, in virtue of his supreme apostolic power," was interpreted by the Republicans in a totally political context. The obedience which the Catholic individual was bound in conscience to give to the pope when the latter was rendering decisions regarding faith and morals, a specific

1Definition from William L. Langer, ed. & comp., An Encyclopedia of World History (Cambridge, Mass: The Riverside Press, 1952), p. 664. The statement of the First Vatican Council was much more explicit and reads as follows: "... that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of themselves, and not from consent of the Church, irrefutable." First Vatican Council, Session 4, July 18, 1870, First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ, ch. 4 (LS 3074), cf. also LG 25. Quoted in Ronald Lawler, O.F.M. Cap., et al., eds., The Teaching of Christ: A Catholic Catechism for Adults (New York: America Press, 1966), p. 228. For a concise summary of the theological background to the doctrine see ibid., pp. 222-230.
obedience implicit in the doctrine, was viewed by the Republicans as a potentially powerful weapon were it ever to be used against secular governments for political purposes. The interpretation was, especially alarming in a nation such as France where the immense majority of the electorate were Catholics. Interpreting the doctrine within a narrow political framework, they could foresee the pope, if he so chose, by a simple command turning the Catholic electorate into an anti-Republican electorate.

Republican speakers of all shades of Republican thinking condemned the doctrine and expressed the same fears of its political ramifications; the principal among these was the fear that the doctrine had effectively destroyed the Gallican church and the political principles of the Concordat upon which church-state relations had been based up to that time. 2 Gambetta had earlier described its effects as "reducing to silence and obedience all those who were of any importance in what could be called the national clergy." 3 Speakers in the debates, though removed by nearly a decade from its publication, referred to the doctrine in very emotional terms. Emile Deschanel called the doctrine "a great revolution" in relation with the Church, since the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was the absolute negation of the Gallican doctrine which had been enshrined in Revolutionary legislation, especially in


the Organic Law of 18 Germinal, An X. If the pope were truly infallible, he continued, the nation may just as well consider useless its principles of public right, "since they could be, in effect, obliterated by a papal direction at any time." Spuller described the proclamation as "a revolution which ten years ago destroyed Catholicism ... and changed the pope from a minor prince ... to the sole head of a powerful, universal party strong enough to provoke dissension in all Catholic nations." The dangers which emanated from this situation, he continued, were very real, since the doctrine set against the government "all French people who considered it a religious duty, as a duty superior to all other duties, to obey completely, any directive arriving from Rome." Such people he considered as doubly dangerous since they already regarded the government as a hostile power. The most extreme viewpoint, expressed by the radical deputy Louis Janvier de la Motte, saw the papacy through the means of the newly-established universal suffrage, preparing the voters for the re-establishment of the Empire.

Thus, stated Spuller, in his summation of the government position, France must fight the ultramontanism which was being imposed.

4Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548. The Organic Law of 18 Germinal An X gave the government, by law, the right to inspect all Church published statements prior to publication and generally set down the powers of police in relation to the Church. For text of law, see Bodley, The Church in France, Appendix Two, pp. 120-124.

5Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548.

6Spuller, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5605.

7Ibid.

8De la Motte, deputy for Maine-et-Loire and Radical Republican, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, Nd. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5786.
on the nation through the promulgation of the Doctrine of Infallibility, just as the nation had always fought, in previous decades and centuries, "to resist the exclusive and jealous domination of Rome and the Papacy." All previous French governments over the past eighty years, he continued, have had to defend themselves against ultramontanism and its usurping claims, but these encroachments had been resisted successfully. However, ultramontanism continued to emerge from the defeat, necessitating a continual battle to overcome it definitely. The state had to be the true bulwark of resistance against the encroachments of ultramontanism and the designs of Rome, averred Spuller later, and, introduced the relationship of the doctrine to the French Revolution by concluding that "the French Revolution would only end on that day when Ultramontanism could no longer prevent it from ending." From statements such as these, it is reasonable to assume that, far from being some unknown, obscure doctrine which was ignored or dismissed, the Doctrine of Papal Infallibility raised grave apprehensions in the minds of Republican leaders since they believed it posed a most serious threat to their continued government of a nation of Catholics.

8 Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JD, No. 159, June 12, 1879, Annexe No. 1442, p. 5010. Ultramontanism is defined as "the policy of the party in the Roman Catholic Church that favours increasing and enhancing the power and authority of the popes." The concept of ultramontanism was opposed to the more democratic secular movements which would have power reside in the episcopacy or in the various national church movements such as, in the example of France, Gallicanism.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., June 24, 1879. JD, No. 172, June 25, 1879.
The Republican leaders did not lay full blame for this development on the Church itself, but considered the Church as a quasi-innocent victim of the long-range plans of the Society of Jesus who, in their view, was using the publication of the Doctrine of Infallibility as a first step towards their dream of temporal domination in the nation."12 The Republicans seemed convinced that once the Jesuits had achieved their aim of unchallenged papal authority the Church could be easily dominated by dominating the pope, since, in the words of the radical de la Motte, "They [the Jesuits] knew that it was always relatively easy to make one man an instrument were he seated in the Chair of Peter, while it was almost impossible to overcome a universal representation of Christian conscience."13 This plan, continued the Republicans, had already begun elsewhere in time and place, since they had "poisoned the Council of Trent by their Ultramontane doctrines, and had contributed to the degeneracy of the southern European nations by linking them to perverse papal and ultramontane doctrines."14

Throughout the debates, Republican speakers elaborated on what they believed to be the predominant role played by the Jesuits in bringing about the final victory of ultramontanism. De la Motte contended that not only had infallibility been lauded and extolled by

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12 Ferry, Ch. Dep., March 15, 1879. JO, No. 87, March 29, 1879, Annexe No. 1238, p. 2657.
13 De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5706.
Civilta Cattolica, the society's official journal, but had been introduced into the rules of faith and, finally, had become the official dogma of the Church. To be quite brief, he continued, the bishops sanctioned and adopted whatever the Jesuits had written. Thus, he concluded, "assured forevermore of the obedience of a thousand bishops, of half a million priests exercising their influence on 180 million Catholics, the Roman Pontiff can carry out, whenever he pleases, the assault on Liberalism." Emile Deschanel observed that the publication of infallibility could only be interpreted as a triumph of Jesuit doctrines, since they had pursued the recognition of infallibility for so long. In Paul-Bert's scientific terminology, the Catholic Church had "crystallized" around Jesuitism.

To the Republicans, the publication of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility and the victory of the ultramontanist movement seemed part of the master plan deriving from the Jesuit philosophy of the 'indirect power of the papacy'; a philosophy which the Republicans interpreted as having two basic, but politically crucial, premises: that the spiritual power of the papacy was superior to the temporal power of the state, and that the control of the civil state must be

15 De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5787.
16 Ibid.
17 Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548.
returned to the clergy.\textsuperscript{19} For those from the Right who demanded to see proof of this plan, the Republicans pointed to the official organ of the society in Rome, the Civiltà Cattolica, which, in their opinion, clearly asserted that the temporal power was subordinate to the spiritual power.\textsuperscript{20} The Republicans interpreted the philosophy, as they did infallibility, in a political context, and were convinced that the ambition of the Church was "the absolute domination of the spiritual power over the civil power."\textsuperscript{21} This thinking, which had been developed into a philosophic structure by Joseph de Maistre, the Republicans claimed had been adopted into the official thinking of the Church under the aegis of the Jesuits.\textsuperscript{22}

Once having secured control of the Church through the achievement of Papal Infallibility, according to the Republicans, the Jesuits then became agents of ultramontanism to secure control of the various national churches and reduce them, as Ferry phrased it, to complete servitude.\textsuperscript{23} "To arrive at this end," quoted Emile Deschanels; "they

\textsuperscript{19} Ferry, Ch. Dep., March 13, 1879. J0, No. 87, March 29, 1879, Annexe No. 1238, p. 2657.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., June 26, 1879, J0, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5687.


\textsuperscript{23} Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879; J0, No. 175, June 28, 1879; p. 5726; Deschanels, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. J0, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5550.
began by dominating the clergy."

De la Motte described the order as "the principal arm of the papacy," who, having discovered organization as the greatest political weapon of the Catholic Church, proceeded through control of the colleges and the universities, and in other ways, to enforce their will on the secular clergy. Ferry referred to this development as "the assimilation of all the authorized and non-authorized orders, the association of all the secular clergy, and even an immense segment of the French Church in the lay sphere with elements of Jesuitism." By 1879, in the opinion of the Republicans, the Jesuits were already in fact the directors of the spiritual power in France since the bishops were no more than apostolic prefects and the other orders recognized the superior position of the society. As for the secular clergy, who had been the backbone of the French Church, they were no longer considered by anybody to be of any real importance.

In Ferry's opinion, these statements could be proven statistically. Figures he provided showed that the order had grown from seven communities in 1828 to twenty-seven by 1879. By contrast, establishments of the secular clergy had dropped from 152 in 1865 to

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24 Deschanel, op. cit., p. 5548.
25 De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548.
26 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5725.
27 Spullar, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, June 12, 1879, Annexe No. 1442, p. 5015.
28 Ibid.
29 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5686.
122 in 1879, a twenty percent decrease in only fourteen years. In the
field of education specifically, he noted that the free laic institutions
were losing student population to the educational institutions of the
non-authorized orders generally, having lost, since 1865, a total of
11,760 students. The great majority of these students, continued Perry,
had been lost to the schools of the Jesuits, a concrete example of the
degree of power and influence which the order was already exerting.

The position of ultimate direction and control of the
French Church which the Republicans believed had been achieved by the
Jesuits in 1879, coupled with the strict obedience which the former
believed was inherent in the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, was
viewed by the Republicans as an extremely dangerous political situation,
given what they construed to be the state of the electorate in the pre-
dominantly Catholic nation which they governed. The latter they
described as ill-educated and fickle, and easy political prey for the
monolithic organization which they believed the Church had become.
Perry described the Church as "the freest, most powerful, best organized,
the richest ... of all the forces [in France]," and pointed out that
when it operated in a society with "unrestricted freedom," was always
the strongest.30 Spuller concluded that the Church had set itself up
as "a state within a state," and was trying to make the rest of the
world believe that Catholics were not citizens who had to submit to the
same laws as others.31 Bert described what he referred to as "the

30Perry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JQ, No. 175, June 28,
1879, p. 5726.
31Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JQ, No. 159,
Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5014.
extent of official power and secret influence" which the Catholic Church exercised in France, and "the dangers which derive[d] from this situation for the political and social state." 32 Given such power and influence among the people, combined with the hierarchic structure by which one command from the pope could be easily and readily transmitted to the laity, and the fact that such a command would have to be obeyed through the newly achieved infallibility, it was not difficult for the Republicans to take their apprehensions the next logical step and see a political directive emanate from the papacy which would instantaneously turn the Catholic laity into a vast anti-Republican electorate. 33 Why the electorate would be so receptive to such a command was explained by the Republicans by the former's political ambivalence. As Ferry put it, when describing their fickleness, they "possessed a strength and a weakness." They had elected the Republican form of government, but were still imbued with "the old memories" that, in his words, the modern day intellectualism of 1879 had not eradicated. 34

The 'old memories' which Ferry referred to as being kept alive by the masses was an allusion to royalist or monarchist sentiment, which they believed that the Church, with Jesuit direction, was exploiting on behalf of the parties of the Right, especially the legitimist party. The Republicans had already noted that the Church espoused a political doctrine of indirect power which, as developed by

32Bert, Le Clericalisme, p. 282.
33Spuller, H'Evolution, p. 110.
34Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JG, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5723.
de Maistre in Du Pape, and developed as they believed by the Jesuits, was predicated on the existence of the monarchical principle of government as the expression of temporal power. Thus, in the Republican mind, a natural bond united the Church and the parties of the Right, the link being the mutual benefits which would accrue to both the Church and the Right through the re-establishment of the monarchical form of government in France. The Republicans called the alliance by various names; the clerical party, the party of the counter-revolution, the revolutionary party, or the coalition. They seemed to prefer, however, the clerical party as a descriptive epithet denoting the collusion between politics and religion, a collusion which they frequently denounced in their allusions to the Right, describing them as "a party clamoring for religious war, inflamed with political ambition, wishing to reign at any price, even through the controls of fanaticism and superstition."35 Should this party succeed, the total obliteration of the Revolution and the Republic was imminent.36

This latter fear was not so far-fetched in 1879 as it appears today, given the hindsight of more than a century, since the Right in 1879 still retained formidable power in the nation, a fact of which the Republican government was well aware. Their defeat in the recent election had not been overwhelming, since their combined parties had received forty-six percent of the electoral vote in the Chamber, and it was not until after the debates on Article 7 had been concluded

35 Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879, JO. No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5551.
36 ibid.
that they lost the majority which they commanded in the Senate.\textsuperscript{37} As was noted during the discussion of the political circumstances of the government in 1879, the constitution had been heavily influenced by the Right and, up to that point, although the Radical Republicans were pressing for change, the Republican government was reluctant to do so.\textsuperscript{36} Rightist personnel controlled the civil service, local and departmental councils, and the judiciary, a fact which one speaker from the Right thought should caution the government towards pressing on with Article 7, considering the problems it would have with administrative implementation.\textsuperscript{39} The same speaker pointed out that thirty-seven departmental councils opposed Article 7 and would oppose the government's attempts to administer it.\textsuperscript{40}

Other speakers in the Chamber, among them government members and supporters, testified to the existence of this power and influence still commanded by the Right. In his inaugural address to the Chamber, the President of the Republic, Jules Grévy, stated that "the cabinet ... [would] not hesitate ... to give to the Republican majority legitimate satisfactions ... notably in that which concern[ed] administrative and judiciary personnel."\textsuperscript{41} The purging of all levels

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37}Campbell, The French Electoral System, p. 74.
\item \textsuperscript{38}M.A. Sieghart, Government by Decree (London: Stevens, 1950), p. 186.
\item \textsuperscript{39}Baron de Mackau, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879: JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5593.
\item \textsuperscript{40}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
of administration provided these 'legitimate satisfactions' after the Republicans achieved a majority in the Senate following the senatorial elections of January 5, 1880. However, these purges did not take place until after the debate on Article 7 was completed in the Chamber and consistent reference was made throughout the debates to the continued presence of the Right in their position of power, particularly by government supporters farther left, who accused the government of proceeding much too slowly. In a speech at Bagnères-et-Bigorre on October 8, 1879, Paul Bert attacked the position of the Right in the nation stating that, although they had lost the electoral victory, they still went about the country telling the peasants that they were still the masters, that the Republic dared not touch them, that they still controlled the civil service, the prefectures and the courts. What was even worse, Bert continued, in testimony to the power they still wielded, "the peasants believed them." Ferry noted that "the avowed enemies of the Republic" were always the first names on the petitions. Some speakers of the Right, still confident of their power, described the government as presiding over "a republic in its death throes." Given such a position of preponderance and strength

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42 Spuller, L'Évolution, p. 108.
45 Ibid.
46 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 30, 1879. JO, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5943.
which was attributed to the Right, one could perhaps agree with F. Buisson, a later Republican apologist, who wrote that the Republic existed "only as a precarious, contested fact, without title, without a charter, without guarantee, and perhaps without a future."48

The alignment of a vast organization like the Church, with its unlimited potential as a political machine, perfected by the Jesuits and infallibility, with the power and influence retained and wielded by the Right, had as a singular purpose in the Republican mind, the elimination of that future. This was particularly evident in what they construed to be the political activism of the Church among workers and with royalist groups generally, activism which the Republicans held up as concrete evidence of the organization of the electorate. Through "Catholic Committees" and "workers' circles" spiritual influence was becoming political control. Dq la Motte, by his count, enumerated "more than 300 Catholic committees and circles, Associations of Jesus the Worker," who, in his opinion, were working with "the counter-revolution" "seeking to implant into the nineteenth century a repeat of the sixteenth."49 Ferry drew the attention of the Chamber to what he described as "this network of Catholic committees and workers' circles" which, in his words, covered France entirely and constituted a formidable association.50

Whatever altruistic motives the Church may have had, their presence among

49 De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JD, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5788.
50 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JD, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5788.
the workers was interpreted within the political context of the Church-
Right alignment as another example of religious association being used
for political purposes.

The Republicans viewed the romantic religious revival
generally, and the pilgrimages which were a particular aspect of that
revival specifically, in the same way.\(^51\) The most obvious feature of
the revival as they viewed it was the development of a mystical,
emotional and fanatical spirit among segments of the laity. The
militant brand of Catholicism which resulted from that contrasted with
what they considered to be the liberal and intellectual features of
Catholic Catholicism. In Spuller's mind there existed a tremendous
gulf between this tradition as represented by Richelieu, Bossuet and
Fenelon, and "the miserable miracle apologists of La Salette and
Lourdes."\(^52\) In the organization and participation in pilgrimages,
which increased as a result of the advent of the railroad and the
leadership of the 'Assumptionist Fathers, the Republicans saw 'political
rallies under the guise of religion', a situation which de la Motte
described as "truly provoking."\(^53\)

\(^51\)Dansette, Histoire Religieuse, p. 325; Chapman, The
Third Republie, p. 209; Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co., 1966), p. 302; Roger N. Soltono, French Parties and
scholarly accounts of the romantic religious revival, see Roland-
pp. 149-231.

\(^52\)Spuller, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27,
1879, p. 5604.

\(^53\)De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 176,
June 28, 1879, p. 5788.
However, as important as these two examples were of the evidence of the political-religious interrelationship which derived from the Church-Right alliance, much more evidence was found in the reports of the parliamentary committees which investigated Church involvement in the election campaigns of 1877 "in which", according to Ferry, "the clerical party had played a role of activism and high-level direction."^4 Through what he described as "ceaseless intervention", the Church utilized every means at its disposal, including indulging in a campaign of propaganda and providing clerical personnel for the cause of the Right, in order to undermine the Republican cause and malign the Republican candidates. The methods of involvement were detailed in the reports, which did not form an integral part of the debate in Article 7, although, coincidentally, they were being delivered concurrently and were used in the debate to fortify the government's position.

The report of the main parliamentary committee charged with investigating the degree of involvement which the Church demonstrated in the elections of October 1877 was given on April 5, 1879, the various sub-committees from the district having been given to the main committee previously.55 In his summation of the sub-committee reports, the reporter, Édouard Millau, emphasized the positive findings of the sub-committees and quoted passages of the sub-committees at length to

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54 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. 10, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5722.

55 Ch. Dep., April 5, 1879. 10, No. 135, Annexe No. 1345, May 17, 1879, p. 4031. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations relating to the report are included in this citation.
illustrate for the Chamber the type of anti-Republican propaganda which the clergy had used, some examples of which will suffice to demonstrate what the Republicans considered as 'election involvement'.

The sub-committee for the department of the Marne had reported that "in the district of Sainte-Menehould, the clergy had intervened in the electoral battle" and that "a number of bishops had authorized public prayers for the next elections, and had given them publicity in their pastoral letters." The latter fact was significant since, given the Republican view of the hierarchic organization of the Church, the pastoral letter was an effective and efficient means of disseminating political propaganda. The sub-committee for Seine-Inférieure reported that "the intervention of the clergy was none the less active, though discreet." According to the testimony of the witnesses interviewed, "a large number of the communes were under the control of the clergy, who . . . directed, during the electoral period of 1877, . . . a veritable crusade against all that seemed Liberal or in any way connected with Protestantism." In an allusion to the collusion between the Church and the power of the Right in the Civil Service, the report stated that "the action of the clergy was approved, of most significance; . . . by the majority of government civil servants."

The report of the sub-committee from Savoy was given particular emphasis in the main committee report, a fact which suggested

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56 Edouard Millaud, deputy from Rhône and Radical Republican.
57 A pastoral letter was, and still is, a communication in the form of a letter sent by the bishop of a diocese to be read to all laity by the clergy of that diocese.
that it, of all the sub-committee reports, served the government's purpose best by illustrating detailed methods of Church involvement and containing numerous examples of anti-Republican invective. The report described in microcosm what the Republicans postulated to be true of the nation as a whole, the political effectiveness of the Church's hierarchic organization. The introduction began with the statement that "when the archbishops and bishops spoke [in Savoy], their voices were heard and echoed in the humblest parish." The report went on to state that "the bishops of Savoy ... substituted political discussion for Christian thought, [and], involved themselves in the intrigues of political parties, giving emergent help to official [Right] candidates."

One pastoral letter was quoted at length in which the bishops asked priests to hold prayers "for the success of the elections," exhorted Catholics to hold public and private prayer for the cause of the Right, and asked priests to arrange times of religious devotions so that they would not interfere with the turnout of the Catholic electorate at the polls. The report cited witnesses for the Republican side who described the "clerical pressure" as "frightful, their propaganda unrestrained," and "very evident" in the towns of Thoiry, Lemenc, Saint Bardolph and Saint Pierre-de-Sancy. The report cited examples of such "very evident" activity. Seminarians at Saint Pierre d'Albigny were transformed into electoral agencies in support of M. Le Marquis de la Chambre. In wards where the Republican candidate, M. Parent, contested the seat with the candidate for the Right, M. de Moigne, the assistants to the parish priests distributed copies of Figaro (the Legitimist magazine) and other Rightist journals denouncing the Republicans, "even using little children for the task." Other clergy intervened just as "scandalously,"
distributing bulletins or money, taking an official stand against republicanism in sermons or assisting at political rallies, as was the case of the minor seminary of Beauvoisin." At D'Albertville, the chaplain of the teacher training college acted as chairman at Rightist electoral meetings. At St. Jean de Maurienne, clergy played similar roles.

The report to the Republicans was also particularly illustrative of the type of "unrestrained anti-Republican propaganda" which the government claimed the Church had used to discredit Republican candidates; a propaganda which had fused religion and politics, in their opinion, in a detestable way. A circular made to the priests of the region by the Legitimist candidate, the Marquis de la Chambre, was cited exhorting the clergy "to carry to their parishioners the fact that the war-carried on every day by radicalism proved that behind every political question lay a religious question" and urging that "the enemy be opposed with unrelenting vigilance, unceasing battle and invincible unity." The frequently used "votés-bien" of the clergy meant voting for candidates of the Right. Republican candidates were referred to as "bad candidates", enemies of the nation, "candidates for the Revolution" and "ferocious beasts ... capable only of atrocities and carnage." In religious language they were described as "the successors to the scoundrels and pharisees, the same enemies of the Messiah, sovereign pontiffs of those evil sects who have vowed to destroy the reign of God on earth," and "wearing the stamp of their supreme ruler, Satan?" In distinguishing between the candidates of the Right and the candidates of "the evil party", ton the report, clergy instructed voters to search for the candidate who was "impious, unbelieving, indifferent, with poor morals,"
for "he was the candidate for the Revolution." Pastoral letters were cited in which the Archbishop of Chartres, "speaking as if he were the pontiff himself," stated that a victory for the Republican parties would mean "a return to the domination of the paganism of the Revolution ... to those lamentable times, to those disasters, to those crimes." In conclusion, the report dealt with what the committee considered to be the abuse of Church authority by the bishops when they instructed the faithful that to vote for the candidates of the Right was "a serious Christian duty" and, "while Christians and children of the Church ... to vote for those enrolled in the army of the Revolution would be the same as insulting the flag of the nation." Bishops, stated the report, compared the latter action to "receiving a sacrilegious communion."

The reports of the parliamentary sub-committees on the political activities of the Church in the October elections of 1877, reports and quotations which, according to Millaud, could be multiplied, were considered by the Republicans as proof of the awesome potential of the Church, and the latter's collusion with the parties of the Right. Further, coupled with the expanding control which they believed the Church was attaining through workers' organizations and the religious revival, and the ever-intensifying centralization due to the action of the Jesuits through infallibility, the reports provided the basis for a fear of this potential in a futuristic sense. Throughout the crisis of May 16, the October elections of 1877, in 1879, all the forces of the Church had been brought into the political arena except one: the obedience of infallibility. As strong as the forces of the Church and the Right had been, they were disparate and lacking coordination in a national sense. However, if the pope had used his authority gained from
infallibility, the degree of involvement and the outcome may have been quite different. Spuller, writing later of the events of May 16 which immediately preceded the elections, stated that "if the episcopate had so desired, a word of command would have swept through the nation and transformed all the priests of France into electoral agents." 58

The fact that this was not done was not convincing proof to the Republicans that it would not be done in the future. Ferry agreed that the full power of the Church had not been used, that a directive from Rome had never been employed to such an extent in the political sphere to that date, but warned that "it will be tomorrow, if you [the Republicans] don't take precaution." 59 Should the Jesuits succeed in achieving complete domination of the Church, an objective that, in the opinion of the Republicans, they were rapidly attaining, and coalesce under their leadership the scattered and disunited parties of the Right with the anti-Republican forces in the nation, another election could spell the end of the Republic. Already, according to Ferry, the Jesuits dominated the Catholic committees, the political meetings, the press and other areas of public life. 60 Soon the process would be completed: the Jesuits would control the Church entirely and direct its vast resources and influence towards the defeat of the Republican parties and the re-establishment of the monarchical régime, having already united all the forces of the Right under their leadership.

58Spuller, quoted in J. Cadillo, La Pensée et l'Action, p. 110.

59Ferry, CR. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5726.

60Ferry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879. Quoted in Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 57.
Writing of the events later, Spuller clearly stated that "Article 7 had as its objective the dissolution of the coalition which was the bulwark of the conspiracy of May 16." In his report he emphatically declared that "the religious congregations, and the Jesuits who dominate and direct them, ... constitute the militia of the counterrevolution." Ferry was just as emphatic when he stated that Article 7 was directed at the Jesuits, and "striking at the Jesuits was striking at the head of this coalition of parties which threatens the Republic." With one legislative blow, the potential political influence of ultramontanism and infallibility would be effectively reduced; the Church would be removed from the political direction imposed on it by the Jesuits, and the coalescing forces of the Right would again return to disunity and ineffectiveness. In a relative sense, the immediate threat to the Republic would be eliminated.

61 Spuller, quoted in Gadille, La Pensée et l'Action, p. 108.
62 Spuller, Ch. Dép., March 29, 1879, JO, No. 159; Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5015.
63 Ferry, Ch. Dép., June 24, 1879, JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5603.
CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION FOR COUNTERREVOLUTION:
THE SECOND FRANCE

Article 7, however, by removing the Jesuits, was intended to eliminate the future as well as the immediate threat to the Republic, since the Jesuits, as claimed by the Republicans, had assumed control of the educational system with which French youth, the future electorate, were being indoctrinated with anti-Republican and counterrevolutionary philosophy. They believed, like Leibnitz, that whoever controlled education controlled the future of the nation, and were convinced that the Jesuits were directing an educational system "formally and systematically hostile to our [Republican] institutions."¹

The Republicans were critical enough of the teaching in the Church education system, and that given by the orders in the state school system, before they attacked the system on political grounds. They were condemnatory of Church intellectual thought which had been published in such encyclicals as the Syllabus of Errors, which the Radical Republican de la Motte described as "that collection of all the condemnsations successively pronounced against the freedom of believing, writing and governing."² The Syllabus was an "assault on Liberalism"

¹Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879: 30, No. 175; June 28, 1879, p. 5721.
²De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879: 30, No. 176; June 29, 1879, p. 5786. See Anne Fremantle, The Papal Encyclicals in
and, in contrast to the spirit of scientific inquiry and rationalism
which the Republicans felt they projected, represented "darkness,
superstition, hypothesis, dogma ... and idols." They were sometimes
very cynical in tone when referring to the Catholic catechism, the
teaching regarding prayer, and other aspects of teaching in the Catholic
schools. Such Republican denunciations ranged from general polemics to
attacks on such specific subjects as the Catholic teaching on the indis-
solubility of marriage. In effect, the Republicans demonstrated in
their remarks very little respect for either the content or pedagogical
methods which they perceived to exist in the Catholic system of education,
and in one instance compared the students educated in the Church system
to the damned in Dante's Inferno, "kept behind by a hideous education,
... eternally marching with their heads turned behind them." The
Republicans wished education to contribute towards progress, science,
reason and intellectual light. What they saw as the contribution of
the Church system was the exact opposite — reaction, superstition,
blind faith and intellectual darkness.

143-155 for complete syllabus. The Syllabus of Errors was a collection
of previously promulgated consistorial allocutions, encyclicals and
pastoral letters which contained official papal stands on various
social and political movements.

3Ferry, distribution of prizes at the Sorbonne convoca-
tion, August 4, 1879, quoted in Robiquet, Discours, p. 197.

4Bert, Le Clericalisme, p. 128.


6Bert, Le Clericalisme, p. 128.

7Bert, Ch. Dep., June 22, 1879; JO, No. 169, June 23,
1879, p. 5491.
However, as condemnatory as they were of the Church's educational system on purely academic grounds, the Republicans considered the Church's interpretation of political history, which they believed to be taught in the schools, outrightly dangerous to the Republican cause. This was especially true when the Republicans examined what was being taught concerning the Revolution, upon the principles and philosophy of which the Republicans were modelling their government and society. Spuller quoted texts purportedly used in the Catholic system which taught that "Republican legislation was inspired with the Satanic spirit of the Revolution", which was referred to as "the origin and cause of every evil, every disaster and every degeneracy" for the French nation. Ferry cited a parliamentary report of 1844 which praised the Church system of education because "it did not permit the creation of bad citizens"; that is, citizens who respected the Revolution and its accomplishments. He held up textbooks in the Chamber, textbooks in which, he said, students were taught "to believe that the French Revolution was a crime, that Napoleon was a usurper punished for his defeat, and France his accomplice punished with him, that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was a praiseworthy measure." In other textbooks which he had before him, continued Ferry, the French Revolution was described as "a bloody revolt under the influence of

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8Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. 30, No. 159, Annex No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5015.
10Ibid.
pagan theories, that it annihilated liberties which protected the
provincial population from the despotism of the state; that Napoleon,
like Attila, was the scourge of God."11

For such interpretations and their inclusion in the
Church school system, the Jesuits, again, were ultimately responsible
since the order was using the system to preach the triumph of the pope
and return of the monarchy, the specific application of the general
doctrine of indirect power.12 They were "instruments of the counter-
revolutionary party, professing principles directly opposed to those
of the Republican regime."13 Ferry stated that "... the spirit of
hostility against all that constituted the tradition of the French
Revolution" was introduced into France by the Jesuits, and that, under
their direction and influence, this spirit was rapidly becoming the
atmosphere in the French Catholic system.14 He expressed his alarm
that the Jesuits condemned "totally" the Revolution of 1879 and all its
achievements, and that "all these odious doctrines" were being taught
in French schools.15 Spuller ascribed to the Jesuits the stated aim of
"abolishing the French Revolution and its principles, and wiping out

11bid.
12Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. J0, No. 159;
Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5015.
13bid.
14Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 25, 1879. J0, No. 174, June
27, 1879; p. 5688.
15bid.
its moral and material conquests."\textsuperscript{16} It was the Jesuit order actually, Spuller contended, which taught that the legislation of the Republic "was inspired with the satanic spirit of the Revolution," a statement that originally had been ascribed to the Church generally.\textsuperscript{17} In their schools, students were being prepared, in his opinion, for "slavery to the ultramontane conspiracy," and were under the care of teachers who taught them "to detest the Republican state and its laws.\textsuperscript{18} Their teaching was the absolute negation of French laws and institutions since the Revolution to them was "a great modern heresy."\textsuperscript{19} In his elaborate treatment of the teaching of history in Jesuit schools and colleges, Ferry recounted repeated instances in which the teaching was anti-Revolutionary and anti-Republican.\textsuperscript{20} For example, he said the feudal relationships of the Middle Ages were held up as social ideals, a specifically 'Catholic' account of the Wars of Religion was taught, along with justification for repeal of the Edict of Nantes, and the constant condemnation of the French Revolution. To elucidate the latter statement, Ferry quoted lengthy passages from a standard history which he claimed was being used extensively in the Catholic system, written

\textsuperscript{16}Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5015.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 5019.

\textsuperscript{18}Spuller, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5603.

\textsuperscript{19}Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548.

\textsuperscript{20}Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, pp. 5689-5591.
by a certain Abbé Gournal, which described the Revolution only in "gory, lurid details." 21

The teaching of such distorted interpretations, from the Republican point of view, of the great political and social movement which they were using as the basis for the new French Republic, could not be condoned. Their affinity for the principles and philosophy of the Revolution of 1789 was extolled by all the Republican speakers who took exception to the interpretations. For Spuller, the Revolution was "the very raison d'être and purpose for Republican development, the principle of Republican actions, the origin and fountain of Republican life and hope." 22 He described the beginning of the Third Republic as "entering the second century of the Revolution." For Perry, to defend Article 7 was to defend Revolutionary ideals, "these ideals, ... which for twenty-five years soldiers, authors, philosophers, orators and politicians combined their efforts and shed their blood." 23 Addressing his colleagues in the Republican ranks he stressed that "this heritage must be transmitted to your children, as your fathers have left it to you." De la Motte restated the point when he spoke of the defense of Article 7 as "the defense of the principles of the Revolution." 24 Though individual Republicans associated themselves with different

21Ibid.

22Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5019.


parties and identified themselves with differing Republican philosophies, they considered their common bond to be the revolutionary heritage just as the common bond of the parties of the Right was the monarchical principle. Their interpretation of history was in accord, that civil society had been in slavery to the Church and the forces of clericalism, and that the Revolution had as its objective to emancipate it for all time.25

To accomplish the latter, and perpetuate the French revolutionary tradition, education was to play a vital role. In a speech delivered at Le Havre on March 21, 1880, a speech which may be taken as representative of Republican thinking on this subject, Paul Bert stressed the indispensability of education to the promulgation of Republican (i.e. Revolutionary) ideas.26 Not only must the educational system teach the child knowledge of the political organization of the nation, but he must learn the relative value of the different social organizations. In other words, the system "must make the student recognize the superiority of the democratic, Republican regime over the monarchical."27 It must, continued Bert, make him understand how the first is the reign of equality and the second the reign of privilege; the former the regime of law, the latter the regime of absolutism. Therefore, it was the duty of the Republican government "to make sure that the principles of the Revolution triumphed over those of their


27Ibid.
adversaries." Spuller developed the same argument in his report when he dichotomized society into "two logical states—autocracy and democracy."\(^{28}\) If the child were to be prepared to be a good citizen, he said, (that is, a Republican citizen), then the laws of education, the first to be applied to a child, should be in accordance with Republican philosophy.\(^{29}\)

Education was to play a vital role also in the achievement of one of the most important ideals of the Revolution of 1789, the total unity of the nation, an ideal which the Republicans considered most pressing in 1879 and which they considered as "the most distinctive feature and principal force of the French Revolution."\(^{30}\) Since the Republican party was the most direct heir of the Revolution of 1789, he continued, it had "the gravest responsibility for maintaining the unity of doctrines which emanated from the Revolution to the Republic."\(^{31}\) Spuller referred to the Republican as the principle of unity for the Republican parties and, in attempting to show that all the parties of the Right could offer France was division, demanded to know, in return, their principle of unity.\(^{32}\) In his report, he defined a unified French society as "a society where all the citizens of the same country, whatever their religious affiliations, serve in the same army, support the

\(^{28}\) Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annex No. 1443, June 12, 1879, p. 5006.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5682.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Spuller, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5606.
same burdens, are equally admissible to all occupations, ... [and] are imbued with the same civic spirit." The monarchy had pursued this great work of national unity, he said, "and the Revolution had achieved it" by "drawing to a common centre all the forces of the nation which had been scattered and captive under a thousand individual and opposing powers." Administration, justice, finances, the clergy, public education, had all disappeared "in the burning furnace of the Revolution," and from there had emerged a new France. Paul Bert also spoke of the responsibility of the Republic to maintain unity. In a speech at Fontaine on August 4, 1879. He, like his Republican colleagues, believed, as expressed by Deschanel, that "the unity of the schools expressed the unity of the nation" and saw the main objective of the national education system to be the creation of a united Republican France.

What the Republicans perceived to be happening was exactly the opposite. For, in their studied opinion, the educational system under the direction of the Jesuits was sowing the seeds of national disunity through the introduction of odious doctrines into the education, not only of adolescents, but also of little children."

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33Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. J0, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5006.
34Ibid.
35Bert, Leçons, p. 326.
They were, in the words of de la Motte, attempting to achieve the plan of conquering the future by forming the impressionable minds of children, with all the doctrines that the educator of the early years is capable of giving him. Paul Bert wrote of "the dangers for the peace and moral unity of the nation, of the education given by this order." The teaching did not stop with the termination of the school year since the Jesuits prolonged the control though the confessional, through a constant, spiritual, and vigilant control. Deschanel stated that their teaching "created secret division in spiritual affairs and in matters of conscience, division on all the great moral questions which constituted the foundation of life." For example, they taught that civil law had no jurisdiction over marriage, that clergy were exempt from taxation and the civil law, that concordats had to be kept by governments but not by the pope, and that equality of ownership in marriage led to destruction of family unity and was monstrously evil. Republican teaching on all these matters, in accordance with the teaching of the Revolution, was entirely opposite.

However, again, it was within the political context that the education system of the Jesuits came in for most condemnation by the

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39 Bert, La Morale des Jesuites, p. 4v.


42 ibid.
Republicans. Instead of love for the Revolution and the pursuit of unity in the nation, the Jesuits disseminated hatred for the Revolution and sowed the seeds of division in the nation by controlling "the establishments, where they teach the school of counter-revolution, where students learn to hate and curse all the ideas which are the honour and foundation of modern France." The doctrine of the counter-revolution, described by Deschanel as "the destruction of the society which the French Revolution had made, of the civil and political society which the Republicans constituted, the society which they owed to the generations which followed, was the most dangerous of all doctrines taught; since its success would bring about the total political transformation of youth." The anti-Republican leadership of the future was being trained since the doctrine was instilled in the minds of those "who aspire to rule society and furnish it with administrators" and they emerged from these establishments having "neither love for the present nor faith in the future." They were, continued Ferry, an "elite trained to condemn and degrade the French Revolution." The doctrine, described by Puller as "the detestable influence of the Jesuits", had succeeded to the point where it had brought about the transformation of the upper classes of society, since these classes had made it a practice.

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43 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JD, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5688.

44 Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JD, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548.

45 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JD, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5723.

46 Ibid.
of enrolling their children in the schools and colleges of the order.\footnote{Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879; p. 5015.}
The ultimate political end to all of this, in the mind of one Republican, would be the resurrection, "spearheaded by the Jesuits.\footnote{De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879; p. 5784.}
If one wanted proof of the existence and teaching of this doctrine, according to Ferry, he had only to examine the textbooks of the teachers. "In practically every case, their authors are Jesuits.\footnote{Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5688.}
Spuller had earlier stated the point somewhat differently when he stated that "all one had to do was examine the writing of their doctors, the publications of their sermon writers, their periodical reviews, their daily newspapers, the works they undertook, their foundations, their establishments." In all of these, he said, the Jesuits constantly proclaimed themselves the "soldiers of the counterrevolution.\footnote{Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5015.}

They were, in effect, creating a second France within the French nation: a France whose religious affiliation was the Catholic Church and whose political and social ideals were, respectively, the monarchical principle of government and pre-Revolutionary society. The Jesuit system of education, instead of pursuing a work of compromise with Republican society, was accentuating the time-honoured divisions between the two hostile Francises, the Revolutionary and pre-Revolutionary;
which already existed in embryo." As Ferry expressed it, the logical result of continuing the then current state of affairs in education would be "the creation of two camps, opposed to one another. In all phases of activity, in all walks of life, in the army, in the magistracy, in industry, in civil life."\(^5^1\) On one side would be ranged the students of the Church system and on the other side "all who emerged from the common mass, all who placed their hope in work and industry, bringing into the encounters of life diametrically opposed feelings and passions."\(^5^2\) The result of perpetuating this system would be, concluded Ferry, "not simply the state of a passing crisis, but a lasting and permanent state, ... a France in perpetual dissension, a France eternally divided against itself."\(^5^3\)

His statement expressed a theme which was recurrent throughout the debate on Article 7 — the fear that the impact of the teaching in the Jesuit-directed Church system would ultimately lead to an actual civil war, a fear heightened by the fact that the memories of the Commune were still very much alive. Ferry predicted that the society of France would eventually become a battlefield, a situation which could only bring about the end of France.\(^5^4\) Other Republicans reiterated the fear. While exhorting all Republicans to support Article 7, Paul Bert declared that to permit continued division in education would be permitting

\(^{51}\) Ferry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879, quoted in Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 58.

\(^{52}\) Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879, J.O, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5723.

\(^{53}\) Ferry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879, quoted in Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 59.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.
"The preparation of civil war in the minds of the nation's youth."55
Not to support Article 7, declared Deschanel, "was tantamount to
subjecting the students in the colleges to dissimunity and the germs of
civil war."56 They held up the Commune as an example of a civil war
experience from the past to illustrate what they considered would be,
as a result of the education system under the Jesuits, the civil war of
the future. For, argued Ferry, if the Jesuits, under the aegis of the
Church, were to be permitted to continue this divisive form of
education, then there was no reason why the communards should not be
permitted to control their own education system and instruct their
children, not according to the ideals which derived from 1789, "but
according to an ideal learnt from more recent times, from this violent
and sinister era, comprising the time from March 18 to May 24, 1871."57
The rejection of Article 7 could, only mean, he said, the conflict of
the schools and a youth divided, a France perpetually divided and in
dissension, a situation which would inevitably lead to civil war.58

Summation of the Republican position regarding the rationales
for Article 7 would, then, read as follows. The Jesuits, through the
publication of infallibility, had gained control of the universal Church
through control of the papacy, and were rapidly gaining control of the

55Bert, Ch. Dep., June 21, 1879. JO, No. 169, June 27,
1879, p. 5497.

56Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171,
June 24, 1879, p. 5546.

57Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28,
1879, p. 5722.

58Ibid., p. 5723.
national churches, especially the French, through an increase of personnel and institutions, but especially through the preeminent position of influence and authority they had attained. They held the doctrine of 'indirect power', and in their plan of subjugation of the temporal to the spiritual sphere in France, were welding all the disparate anti-Republican forces into a massive coalition with the power and authority of the organized Church in its service, organizing and preparing the electorate, in the immediate political sense, for the return of the Right. Concomitant with the preparation of the then present electorate, the adult population, the Jesuits and the Church educational system that they controlled were preparing the future electorate, the youth of France, by indoctrinating them with anti-Republican, counter-revolutionary doctrines. Should this state of affairs continue, both the present and future electorate would be lost to the Republican government and the future of the Republic and the nation would be in jeopardy.

This, to quote Spuller, was what Article 7 had the object of preventing. The removal of the Jesuits would remove the source of direction and leadership from the anti-Republican coalition, both in education and politics, and, in the Republican mind, would separate politics and religion, breaking the link between the Church and the Right. Republican spokesmen were clear and direct on this point and, in the debate on Article 7, were equally clear that the article was aimed directly at that order. Perry stated that "what we [the government] are aiming at in particular are the non-authorized congregations, and, among them, I will state clearly, a congregation which is not only not authorized, but which is forbidden by all our history, the Society of
Jesus." 59 In his report, Spuller reiterated this point and described the mistrust which France had always had for the non-authorized congregations, "especially the Jesuits." 60 Paul Bert, in his reference to the order, declared that "among these [non-authorized] congregations, there is one ... whose activities are so well known ... that the law need only be directed against them." "The law placed before you," he continued, "has as its object the removal from the Jesuits of the right to teach youth, and to vote for or against this law will be equivalent to voting for or against granting the right to teach to the Society of Jesus." 61 Thus, it was "particularly the Jesuits at which Article 7 was aimed." 62 In his Memoire Freycinet wrote that, "one order alone was condemned without a moment's hesitation, the Jesuits." 63 Speakers from the Right also observed that the attack on or defense of Article 7 was an attack on or defense of the Jesuits. As Paul Bourgeois noted, "the arguments concentrated on a single point: the non-authorized orders, ... but especially the Jesuits."

Even if such clear statements of the aim of Article 7 had not been made, one could almost deduce the aim from the amount of

60 Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5014.
62 Ibid.
63 Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 124.
64 Paul Léon Bourgeois, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5792.
invective which was levelled at the order by the Republican speakers during the debate. Speakers unfolded what was in their opinion a lengthy history of political and ecclesiastical agitation in which the order was involved. De la Motte claimed that the Bourbon who governed France, Spain, Portugal, and Naples were powerless to combat them and accused them of creating "all the difficulties of the Imperial Government." 66 Dechanet cited quotations of Napoleon I, Pope Clement XIV, Louis XVI and Charles X directed against the Jesuits, all of whom, he said, condemned the Jesuits for their political activity, "their divisive action in Church and State, and their aims of domination and conquest." 67 Their existence afforded the patriotism and unity which Republicans wished to represent from the Revolution. While the Republicans proclaimed themselves French, the Jesuits were proud to be Romans. 67 Deschanet described the order as "a blind instrument in the hands of a spiritual chief, ... who was always a foreigner." 68 This fact was particularly emphasized by Ferry who deduced that because the order was a foreign one, with a foreign superior, a citizen's allegiance could not be demanded of them. Thus they evaded the supervision and control of the laws of the state, and the proper domination by civil authority. 69 In the words of de la Motte, they comprised "an autonomous state within

65 De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5782.
66 Dechanet, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5548.
67 Paul Bert, Le gave, p. 438.
68 Dechanet, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5547.
69 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5686.
They could never be integrated into the Republic, in Bert's opinion, since their true country was Rome. Their whole history had condemned them since, as Spuller later wrote, they introduced everywhere divisions, quarrels and schisms, were an enemy of the peace of the Church, and were created, as an order, more for the ruin than for the edification of the faithful.

Integrating the latter point into the main Republican argument and changing the wording a little, one could say that in the opinion of the Republican government and its supporters in 1879, they had been created specifically for the ruin of France. They had, in the view of the latter, massed all the anti-Republican forces into the counterrevolutionary coalition through their political leadership and were securing the electorate for the future through their educational leadership. As the Republican government viewed their political circumstances in 1879, they could not permit the continuation of this situation for to do so would spell imminent doom for the Third Republic. In their minds, there were no alternatives: to preserve the Republic and ensure its continuity, to ensure a peaceful, unified France, the coalition would have to be broken and the Church removed from politics, both from immediate political activism and future political influence through education. These ends were to be attained through the removal of the Jesuits and the authorization of the remaining non-authorized orders.

70 De la Motte, Ch. Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 176, June 29, 1879, p. 5782.
71 Bert, Leçons, p. 373.
72 Spuller, Ignace de Loyola, p. 166.
the stated objective of Article 7. They were convinced that they had recognized the true danger of the Republic and believed that Article 7 would provide the solution to its most pressing problem, its continued existence. 73

73 Spuler congratulated Ferry in the Chamber for "having recognized the true peril," Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5602.
CHAPTER VII

ARTICLE 7 - THE 'CONCORDAT REAPPLIED

The Republicans had recognized and identified the threat to the Republic emanating from the political activism of the Church under the direction of the Jesuits and the political ends to which the Jesuits had oriented the Church educational system, but were very cognizant of the fact that such recognition and identification presented a dilemma — how to formulate a policy capable of combating this threat without creating further disharmony and disunity. They knew that to initiate action directed against any part of the Church, and the orders were an integral part, would most certainly embroil the government in conflict with the Church as a whole, and perhaps bring to a climax more quickly the process of anti-Republican coalescence which the action was intended to prevent. In other words, the government was in the position of having to draft a plan of action to protect the Republic from division and disunity, without, through that same plan of action, contributing further to internecine conflict by unleashing a war with the Catholic Church and all that such a conflict entailed. The process of anti-Republicanism had to be stopped, the enemies of the Republic had to be conquered, finally and definitively and their leadership destroyed, the bond between the Right and the Church had to be broken, and the Church removed from its incursion into politics if the Republic was to be secure. All of this had to be attained through some plan of action which would, at the same time, be genuinely defensible as a policy of compromising and conciliation.
The fact that the Republicans felt that these objectives had to be achieved, and achieved as soon as possible, explains the seemingly paradoxical timing of the introduction of the article, raised earlier in the paper as an essential component of the basic question, why controversial legislation should be introduced when the government already had a sufficiency of serious problems with which to occupy itself. As the Republicans analyzed their political situation, the threat to the continued existence of the Republican form of government was the problem per excellence which overshadowed all others. Once the Republic was secure, then the government could direct its attention to other things, relatively lesser in importance. If the process of anti-Republicanization of French society were to be permitted to continue and develop to what the Republicans believed could be the only logical ultimate culmination, the eternal division of France was assured and the Republic was in jeopardy.

Thus, to the Republicans, time was of the essence. Indeed, such was the danger to the Republic that it could collapse "in the near future." As Freycinet wrote afterwards, "it was easy to foresee the day when the latter [anti-Republican groups] would arise in force, undertake the offensive and create serious difficulties for the Republic." Ferry stated that in 1879 "the peril was more threatening than ever."  

1 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. 30, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5722.

2 Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 38.

To quote Spuller, it was a question of existence, and the government had better act quickly if it didn't wish to perish. When questioned by the Centre as to the need for Article 7 at that particular time, he metaphorically described the government's position as "not waiting to slip on a dangerous slope." The legislation contained in Article 7 answered, for the Republicans, "the most urgent necessities of the situation," "the danger of which was greater in 1879 than at any other previous time in the history of France." "Ten more years of this blindness, of this permissiveness," he predicted, and France would see "this beautiful freedom in education ... directed by a new freedom, the freedom of civil war." Emile Deschanel agreed with the minister that there wasn't a moment to lose, and reiterated Spuller's statement that the necessity of action was "a question of existence." For Republican speakers generally, as Edouard Lockroy declared, the continuation of the situation was impossible and action by the government could be delayed no longer.

The immediacy of the danger, as the government spokesmen pointed out, also coincided well in their opinion with the propitiousness

Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JN, No. 159, Annexes No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5020.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JN, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 548.

Edouard Simon Lockroy, representative for Bouches-du-Rhône and radical Republican, Ch. Dep., June 30, 1879. JN, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5933.
of the time for action. There was no better time to devise a plan of counterattack than when the government was young, strong, confident and imbued with purpose. To Ferry, the alternatives were clear: the government either had to act immediately or it would never act. The problem in his opinion would only get harder to resolve as time passed. Any delay, he warned, would compromise the future of the Republic.

Besides, he said, the electorate had given the Republican parties a mandate to act, and it did not conform to that mandate from the nation as they interpreted it "to permit their lifelong enemies to remain entrenched in education when they had been routed from their political fortresses." At no other time were the fallen parties, the parties of the Right, in his opinion, weakest; at no other time were they more conquered, more beaten, more powerless. The Republic, he confidently assured his colleagues, would never be more powerful, better established or better protected by the mandate of the nation.

This belief, that the majority of the French electorate were in support of the objectives contained in Article 7, was shared by all Republicans of the left who pointed to the results of the recent elections as evidence for that belief. On April 23, 1879, at a banquet at Épinal in his home department, Vosges, Ferry told his audience that

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10 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5727.

11 Ibid.

12 Quoted in Lecanuet, L'Église de France, p. 27.

13 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5727.
"... except for a group, more noisy than numerous, the true nation is with us." 14 In the Chamber, Perry again expressed the conviction that everything which emanated from the agreement of both houses would be accepted by the nation. 15 Paul Bert did not doubt his conviction and, in his turn, agreed that France had been consulted "and had answered clearly," pointing to the six million votes cast in support of the Republican parties. 16 Spuller also believed that the nation was in support of the Republican programme. 17 Though more cautious Republican deputies from the Centre made the point that support for Republican candidates at the polls did not necessarily mean support for a government offensive against the religious congregations, the Republican parties never doubted that the majority of the electorate were solidly behind them in their bid to destroy forever the threat from the Jesuit-directed coalition. 18

In fact, they argued that they would be acting irresponsibly if they failed to seize this opportunity to respond to the wishes of the electorate. The government, asserted Perry, had been given "a formal mandate, not only to consolidate the Republic... but also to found it

14 Perry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879, quoted in Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 53.
15 Perry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879, J.O., No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5728.
on solid bases."  

In his analysis this mandate was given "to see to it that a certain coalition ... be absolutely destroyed, that the parties hostile to the Republic lose their support, ... that the usurpations of clericalism be made impossible forever."  

The evidence of opposition in the nation at this time, as perceived by Right and Centre deputies, was not considered by the Republicans as reflective of the true state of opinion in France, even among the French Catholic laity. Ferry was convinced that "the immense majority of French Catholics" did not dream of a return to the Old Regime.  

In his interpretation, the petitions and other forms of organized opposition simply demonstrated what he had been stating all along; that it was evidence of the control of the "coalition" over the populace, not of actual popular discontent at the Republican legislation. The Republic, Bert remarked, didn't represent 1,500,000 signatures of women and children ... but 6,000,000 votes."  

In a banquet speech at Coulanges-sur-Yonne on August 15, 1880 he pledged fidelity "to the only government which is today possible, to the only one which can claim the solid majority in the France of universal suffrage."  

In his words, "the Republic had proven itself."

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19Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JD, No. 175, June 26, 1879, p. 5728.  
20Ibid., p. 5602.  
21Ibid., p. 5725.  
22Bert, Ch. Dep., June 21, 1879. JD, No. 169; June 22, 1879, p. 5496. The Right quickly pointed out that they could claim representation from a France of 5,000,000 votes.  
23Bert, Lecoms, p. 449.
Eugene Spuller believed and stated that "France [was] with her government," that the nation was not "with those who attack her and who use, in order to attack her, the defense of religious interests." He, like Bert, viewed the petitions as not representative, numerically speaking, claiming that if the supporters of the law had wished to campaign for signatures "they would have obtained figures difficult to wrestle with." In his opinion, the petitions in favour of the religious congregations contained too many "signatures with the same writing, lists of women, young girls and children" to be taken as accurate indicators of true public opinion. A year earlier, Gambetta had concluded that the Republic "was invested in the allegiance of the great majority of the people." Emile Deschanel told his colleagues that they could be "certain, that they had, in their support, the national feeling."

In attempting to reassure their supporters and answer critics from the Right regarding the question of the unity of support in the nation generally, the Republican spokesmen pointed to the unity of the Republican parties of the Left in their approach to Article 7 as symbolic of national agreement with the objectives of the article.

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25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


28 Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5530.
Ferry categorically asserted that the government was never more united for such a course of action. For those who talked of "the government's being divided on Article 7," he could state with assurance that the government had been, "from the beginning, unanimous on this question." If there had been some disagreement "it was never more than a trace of light dissent."29 Where anti-Republican sentiment was still strong, for example, in the Senate, the Republican spokesmen were confident that with the forthcoming senatorial elections, a Republican majority would be returned. In the words of Paul Bert, "harmony would be reestablished between the two houses of government."30 With solid majority support for the government, as they believed, in the nation, and with unity within their ranks, the Republican government was convinced that there would never be a more favorable time to strike at their political and social enemies, before the vast potential of the latter was fully united and capable of threatening the Republic.

However, if quick, decisive action was necessary, and though they were convinced that the time for such action could never be better chosen, the Republicans were still very conscious of the political dilemma in which they found themselves and sought, at great length, to emphasize that Article 7 had political ends only and was not in any way intended as anti-religious or, specifically, anti-Catholic legislation. One cannot doubt the sincerity of the statements of government spokesmen...

29 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JD, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5728.

30 Bert, Ch. Dep., June 21, 1879. JD, No. 169, June 22, 1879, p. 5498. In fact, this was what actually happened.
who consistently denied that the article had any religious connotation whatsoever, in what they considered to be the realm of things religious. Perry openly stated that to attack Catholicism and put the Republic in a state of war with the faith of the majority of French citizens would be "the worst and most criminal of stupidities." When members from the Right at one point, as they did frequently, attack the article as legislative persecution, Perry demanded evidence of this persecution, where and how persecution was taking place, where Catholicism was being interfered with. In rebutting the charge he pointed to the fact that Catholics enjoyed complete freedom of the press and worship and that provision in the Budget des Cultes for government support of the Church: far from being restricted, had actually been increased. In Republican logic, it would be literally impossible for the state of France to declare war on Catholicism since, the vast majority of Frenchmen being Catholic, such an action would be the same as declaring war on itself. As Spuller stated when he replied to the charges from the Right that "some kind of war has been declared upon Catholicism," indicating his Republican colleagues, "you are the state; you do not declare war upon anybody in the state." Paul Bert was emphatic that "from the beginning" no one had uttered any intention of declaring war against the Catholic religion.

31 Perry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879, J.O., No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5726.

32 Ibid.

In his opinion, it would be political stupidity for the Republic to make the mistake of attacking, as politicians, a religion which still counted among its membership the greatest percentage of the population of France.

Spuller clarified the government's stand on the question, insisting that such thinking had no place in government policy.

They do not dream of it; they do not wish it. Just and moderate politics will be the rule in this legislature. There is nobody among us to unleash a religious war. The government is not aggressive, it is tolerant. It has not the zeal of an apostle, it has not the passion of the sectarian and fanatical enemy. It does not encroach upon the realms of conscience.

In fact, the committee, imbued with the spirit of the government, had, in his opinion, already demonstrated the moderate intentions of the government by dismissing the extreme recommendations of the Far Left.

They still regarded the percentage of the population of France. The government was well aware that the religious war was the worst war that any government could wage.

\[34\] Bert, Leçons, p. 366.
\[35\] Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 25, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5016.
\[36\] Spuller, op. cit., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5606. Here Spuller was alluding to that section of the Report which condemned the Far Left position.

\[37\] Ibid.
charge that the law "constituted an attack upon the liberty of conscience
and was a death-blow to the Catholic religion." Freycinet felt it
wasn't even necessary to reply to such charges; they were so removed
from Republican thinking. He, like other Republicans, "had always pro-
foundly respected religion," and if such were needed, he said, the
government to which he belonged knew how to protect and defend it.

The solution to the Republic's greatest threat was contained in legis-
lative action directed against religious congregations, but this was a
political action with a political objective and was not meant to harm
religion in the slightest way.

The Right considered such talk to be merely part of the
government façade to subtly ensure the attainment of the objectives
of Article 7, but the government steadfastly clung to the stand that
the article was not anti-religious, but was a statement of the highest expression
of Republican Church policy and the best ecclesiastical policy for the
Church and the nation, of all the alternatives that were available.

These alternatives were represented by the policies advocated by the
divergent political groups in the Chamber and varied in relation to the
group's position on the political spectrum and the position which that
group wished the Church to occupy in the state. There were four such
alternatives, Spuller summarized, and they included "enforcement of the

38 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28,
1879, p. 5728.

39 Freycinet, speech at Montauban, July 30, 1879, quoted
in Andrieux, Souvenirs, p. 269.

40 Members from the Right described this portion of the
Republican defence as "velvet-gloved opportunism." Bourgeois, Ch.
Dep., June 28, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 29, 1879, p. 5794.
Church by the State, subordination of the State to the Church, and liberty given to all — none of which were acceptable to the Republican government as an ecclesiastical policy beneficial to both Church and State, for reasons which Spuller explained.\(^1\)

The first such alternative policy, "enslavement of the Church by the State," was the policy of the Extreme Left, the Communard spokesman, who spoke openly of restriction and persecution of the Church and, in relation to the particular objectives of Article 7, would forbid the right to teach to any member of a religious order or any clergyman. This policy was openly denounced by the Extreme Left spokesman on the committee, Madier de Montjau, and was publicly renounced by Spuller because of the repression it entailed for the Church and religion, a repression which, in Spuller's analysis, was not part of the government's intentions. If such a policy were adopted, he continued later, the government would be in a state of incessant war with Catholicism, a situation which would most certainly not bring true peace to the country. Besides, not only were persecution and harassment alien to true Republican philosophy but it would be politically foolish to initiate anti-Catholic legislation when the Republic depended on the support of so many Catholics.\(^2\)

The second alternative, "the subordination of the State to the Church," would be, in Spuller's opinion, a return to the state of affairs of the Old Régime, a policy which he ascribed to the parties

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\(^1\) Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5019.

\(^2\) Spuller, op. cit., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172; June 25, 1879, p. 5606.
of the Right. Generally speaking, the implementation of such a policy would mean the control of all matters of the State by the Church, a situation which he considered would be "obviously disastrous for liberalism and Republican France." In relation to Article 7, the Church then would have "exclusive authority in the realm of education and would use that authority for the diffusion of doctrines contrary to the principles of modern society." Thus, the Church, having had direction of education at all levels and "having held the child in bondage in the school, would hold him still, as an adult, in society." Such a policy did not even warrant discussion by a Republican government other than to show its obvious dangers.

The third alternative, "liberty given to all," was Spuller's way of referring to the formal separation of Church and State, a policy which the government considered would constitute a positive danger to the peace and unity of France. This alternative, which engendered heated discussions in the Chamber in later decades, and was finally achieved in 1905, was not desired by the Republicans of 1879 since, in their view, it would bring added trouble to the nation. To turn loose powerful and potentially uncontrollable anti-Republican forces in the nation, both from the Far Left and the Far Right, when the Republic was not firmly established, would be, in Ferry's opinion, to foolishly invite disaster since these forces would be permitted to

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"Ibid.

operate beyond the control of the state. The year 1879, in his opinion, was not the time for separation, a feeling held by the Republicans generally, who felt that this policy, like the two preceding, would not bring true peace and unity to the nation.\(^{45}\)

Since none of the three alternative policies, as far as the Republican government was concerned, provided a satisfactory solution to the threat from the non-authorized religious orders, or provided the basis for the Church-State relationship which the government wished to implement, the Republicans chose a fourth policy. This was in effect the reapplication of the Concordat of 1801, on which they built their ecclesiastical policy in 1879 and the terms of which they incorporated in Article 7 in relating to the religious congregations.

In accordance with the principles of this policy, as expounded in the Concordat, the Church would be an integral part of the state and for that reason entitled to rights and privileges within its own proper sphere, but would be subservient to the state in temporal or civil matters, while the state would have no claim to superiority in spiritual matters.\(^{46}\) Far from harassing the Church or restricting its operations in the legitimate sphere of spiritual service, the government was "animated by an equal concern for the protection of the rights of the state and the rights of the Church."\(^{47}\) In a lengthy speech

\(^{45}\)Ibid. As late as 1885 Ferry was still opposed to separation. In a speech at Bordeaux on August 30, he condemned separation, foreseeing that "discord will only increase." Quoted in Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 43.

\(^{46}\)Spuller, quoted in Cadille, Pensée et Action, p. 109.

\(^{47}\)Ibid.
defending this policy in the Chamber of Deputies on December 4, 1880, Paul Bert stressed the basic principle of this relationship.

We do not wish the teacher any longer dependent on the Church, but the teacher free in his school. At the same time, we leave the priest free in his Church. To both, protection, respect and freedom. In this manner, we separate the two domains; we leave each one free; we avoid confrontation and ensure public peace.48

The solution provided by the Revolution of 1789, the proper, yet limited, control of the Church by the State with the Church inviolable within her proper sphere of spirituality, was the solution posited in Article 7 to counteract the political threat of the non-authorized orders.

If the terms of the Concordat had continued to be observed throughout the previous century and had not been permitted to lapse into desuetude, the problem, in the Republican view, perhaps, would not exist in 1879. However, a procedure crucial to proper Church-State relations, dictated by the Concordat, the authorization of religious orders, had been deliberately set aside and religious orders were being permitted to function and involve themselves in all sorts of non-spiritual activity dangerous to the Republic, without the state being capable of exercising its rightful authority; the orders being subject only to their foreign superiors. This trend had been climaxed, according to the Republican argument, by the Falloux Law of 1850. It was thanks to this reaction, stated Spuller, that the non-authorized religious orders had been able to open schools.49 The result was that

48Bert, Le Clericalisme, p. 204.

49Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5014.
by 1879 the state had effectively lost the protective controls which rightfully belonged to it by the Concordat, and numerous religious orders, never authorized legally by the government, were in a state of illegal association in violation of the law of the nation. The Church had arrogated to itself in education what was not intended as the proper sphere of the Church as spelled out in the Concordat. Thus, continued the Republican argument, the Church, through the presence of the non-authorized congregations, "had usurped areas in the political and social sphere, which rightfully, in accordance with the Concordat, belonged to the state." During the reign of the national assembly, and under succeeding governments, the Church, with the cooperation of the legislator, had left its proper domain; ritual, dogma, the moral and spiritual direction of the faithful, and had encroached upon areas reserved to the state; the administration and organization of public education.

This basic premise, that only the state, and no subordinate group of the state, e.g. the Church, could ultimately control and direct public education, was central to the Republican argument. The state could delegate its responsibility, but it must retain ultimate control. Spuller quoted Renouvier, the great Republican educationalist, to support his argument that "educational reforms, of necessity, must be the right of the State." From all times, under the monarchies as under the

50 Ibid., p. 5005.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. He was quoting at length from an article of Renouvier's in the Revue Philosophical Critique (May 18, 1876). Charles Bertrand Renouvier, Republican and philosopher, led a neo-kantian revival in reaction to the positivistic trends in philosophy.
Republic, continued Spuller, in modern states as well as in those of antiquity, people have believed that control of education has been a legitimate and necessary function of the state. In France in particular, since the state had arrived at a stage of fixed and regular organization, education had been a government right, a branch of the civil authority, an element of social power.  

All the great legislators and thinkers of the past, continued his argument, had demonstrated agreement in political thought on the matter and he incorporated their philosophical arguments into his own. Guizot had reconciled the authority and supremacy of the state with the freedom of the Church to teach in a speech delivered to the Chamber of Deputies on May 6, 1844.  

Neither did the constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe renounce its ancient right of the control over education. When M. le Duc de Broglie presented a law providing for the dual system of education, he said, his law stated that "private education must be in accordance with the laws of the nation, and remain subject to the supervision of the state authorities,"  

M. Broglie, said Spuller, had claimed pre-eminence for the state, and its inalienable right — supervision. So even when the state agreed to the partitioning of the educational system it still retained its power and control over education because "the state was the foremost instructor of the nation,  

53 Ibid.  

54 François Guizot, royalist doctrinaire and educationalist who led, as minister of education, the education reform of 1833.  

55 Victor François, duc de Broglie, liberal autocrat and politician under the Orleanist monarchy and the Second Empire.
possessing an educational function, which is the most important of the functions which it fulfills for society. 56

This point had even been supported by the great anti-
Republican educationalists of the past in France, asserted Spuller, as he quoted from a speech of Comte Alexis de Saint-Priest, a leading
monarchical thinker under the Second Empire. Regarding the supremacy
of the state, he also had concluded that the supervision of the state
must be exercised legitimately over public education, not only in the
interests of religion and morals, "but also in the sacred interests of
nationalism." Even the initiators of the Law of 1850, though they had
to take responsibility for beginning a dangerous trend, "built in a
supervision of the private system to prevent any education contrary to
the laws of the state" since, to them, "the superior right of the state
was evident." 57

One-third of Spuller's report dealt with "the fundamental
question of the right of the state to the control of education." 58 To
him, there was nothing more certain nor "more solidly established" in
the public right of France than the authority of the state in this area.
Freedom to teach, without limits or controls, which the Republicans
perceived to be the claim of the Church, could never be permitted since
the State had the right, and the duty, to control and supervise. 59

56Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. 30, No. 159, Annexe
Nov. 14, 1879, June 12, 1879, p. 5005.

57Perry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879, quoted in
Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 53.

58Spuller, op. cit.

59Ibid., p. 5019.
At this point the general philosophical argument defending the rights of the state in education had been developed by the Republicans into a specific defense of the action against the non-authorized religious orders, for control by the state was particularly applicable when the nation was transforming itself into a Republican democracy and the rights of the state focused on the right of permission to teach. 60 The control of textbooks and the right of supervision, Ferry said, were no doubt serious rights which the state already had, but when, behind the texts there were teachers, "teachers who made their books what they wanted to make them, ... how ridiculous it was to suppress the textbooks and permit the teachers to teach." 61 If the state felt that an individual or group existed "to inculcate youth with doctrines hostile to [Republican] institutions, there existed for the state a protective measure; exclusion [from teaching] ... which is the state's right and prerogative." 62 If the rights of the state in education had been lost through the usurpation of these rights by certain personnel in religious orders, he argued, the logical action for the state was to reclaim these rights of control through the authorization or exclusion of these personnel. It was time, to repeat his metaphor, to bring full circle the Revolutionary wheel of the rights of both state and Church. However, the control through authorization had been ignored and the sole control

60 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5724.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.
of the orders had been assumed by the Church, a right which the Church had never possessed, in relation to the Concordat. Thus, it was necessary to return this right to the State.

If this were not done, then the non-authorized orders would continue in their state of illegal existence, their very community association being a violation of the law of the nation, a point stressed by the Republicans. As Ferry pointed out, the government was very much aware that there existed in France "countless religious orders which had never been granted formal authorization by past governments." 64

These orders existed in a state of perpetual and impermissible violation of the law and were, in effect, functioning, in relation to the laws of the nation, illegally. 65 Earlier he had described them as "groups who associate outside the law, outside the state, who refuse to reveal their laws, who refuse to submit their laws to civil society, and recognize its right and supremacy." 66 Freycinet considered it "totally unnecessary that, under the pretext of religion, associations not permitted by the Concordat should aspire to place themselves above the law." 67 Even worse, their activities in the field of education were "arousing genuine fears for the Republic and for the nation." 68 The religious congregations

64 Ibid., p. 5728.
65 Ibid.
66 Ferry, op. cit., June 21, 1879, J0, No. 169, June 22, 1879, p. 5495.
67 Freycinet, speech at Montauban, July 30, 1879. Quoted in Andrieux, Souvenirs, p. 289.
68 Ibid.
had usurped an authority, an influence, "thanks to the tolerance of the last fifty years," which had never been legally accorded them. Their position in relation to the law was clear: those who formed any manner of association to live in accordance with laws which had not been presented to the government, which had not been approved in the prescribed manner, were in violation of the law. Without the proper authorization, these religious orders had placed themselves in a veritable state of war with the nation and were actually threatening the nation. To the Republicans, the non-authorized orders were clearly "in a state of illegal existence," a fact which Ferry repeatedly drew to his colleagues' attention, "who, perhaps, have not understood immediately what point there was in Article 7."72

To remedy this situation, to counteract the threat from the religious orders, to prevent the state from being subordinated by the Church and to ensure the future of the Republic, there was no need in the minds of the Republican policy-makers for any relatively drastic action or any necessity of searching for new, unproven solutions. All that was necessary was to revert back to the terms of the Concordat, to the proper delineation of Church and State rights, of Church and

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70 Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 30, 1879. J0, No. 178; July 1, 1879, p. 5728.
State spheres, to that era of harmonious relationship in which both the Church and the State served and respected one another.73 The Concordat then "would constitute the unshakable foundation on which the Third Republic wished to base its ecclesiastical policy."74 This policy was neither Far Left nor Far Right; it neither persecuted nor left the state unprotected, but was in accordance with the fourth alternative within the context of which the Republican government developed their policy. It was in this sense that "the spirit of the law [Article 7] was the spirit of the government," for Article 7 contained the same objectives and limits as did the terms of the Concordat on the matter of religious orders.75 It was simply a matter of "reducing the Church to the equality of the common lay, that is to say, in obedience to the state, in temporal matters."76

In defining the limits and scope of Article 7 in this manner the Republicans attempted to demonstrate the relative moderation of the law in relation to the other alternatives. If Article 7 was a reimplementation of the terms of the Concordat, it not only reimposed the rights of the State and restored to the State the controls which belonged to it, it also defined in relation to the Concordat the bounds beyond which the State could not go. This constituted, relatively

73 Ibid., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5726.

74 Ibid.

75 Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annex No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5016.

76 Perry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879, quoted in Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 58.
speaking, a protection for the Church. The Republican spokesmen were insistence that the objectives contained within Article 7 were therefore definitely limited. "It was a question of restoring," affirmed Spuller, "and nothing more than that."77 It was the "first attempt to restore the rights of the state ... which had been weaned away deceitfully."78 The Revolution had completed the process which the monarchy had begun, the construction of the "true state with supreme authority, but the reaction of 1850" had interfered with this process and it was incumbent on the Republican government of 1879 to reclaim these lost rights.79

The government, he said, was not asking the Chamber "to destroy with violence all that had been done in the realm of public education over the last forty years," but was urging the Chamber "to ascend a dangerous incline, to reassign to the state its legitimate control in the field of education; to recapture a power that should never have been abandoned."80 Without returning to the Old Regime, he continued, the government had to retrace its steps because "a bad road had been constructed." Indeed, there was no reason why the Republican government of 1879 should not possess the same powers as all the other previous governments of France.

The government simply wished to protect itself from encroachments which seemed dangerous to the nation, and by doing so through the enactment of Article 7, was merely reviving the terms of

77 Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5019.
78 Ibid., p. 5007.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 5014.
the Concordat. By doing so, the Republicans pointed out, the article was "neither new, radical nor exceptionally demanding." 81 As Perry stated, "in made no pretense of legislating, but only implemented existing statutes."

Spuller had emphasized this point earlier, stating that the article did not in any way eradicate existing legislation, nor postulate new. 83 As far as he was concerned, it innovated nothing, and the laws relating to the matter (of the non-authorized congregations) did not cease to be in effect nor were changed in any way.

In fact, ample precedents for Article 7 could be found in these laws which proved, at least to the satisfaction of the Republicans, that the principles of Article 7 possessed a long tradition in the legislative annals of France. In his report Spuller went beyond the Revolution, finding the basis for the legislation in monarchical France and directly connecting it with all previous legislation on the matter from St. Louis to Charles X, identifying it with the national struggle for unity against enemies who sought to destroy France from within. 84 Historic documents, he said, were precise and in agreement on this point, the right of the state to control religious orders, and they abounded in the France of the past as well as in the France of 1879. 85

81 Perry, Ch. Dep., June 27, 1879, JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5726.
82 Ibid.
83 Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879, JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5014.
84 Ibid., p. 5019.
85 Ibid., p. 5005.
He cited as examples the decree of the Parliament of Paris of 1767 and the edict of Louis XVI of 1777, both of which were directed against the Society of Jesus, as was Article 7. The edicts of Francis I and Henry IV, the edict of February 1763 and an edict of Louis XV, had the same legislative objective. In a speech at Épinal on August 23, 1879 Ferry seemed perplexed that Article 7 should evoke such attention when there existed such a body of exactly the same type of legislation. He cited the law of 1790, the law of August 18, 1792, the decree of Messidor, An XII, the law of January 2, 1817, and the law of May 24, 1825, "all of which clearly set out the legal position of all religious congregations." In his opinion, no text was clearer and nobody could say any more clearly what was intended to be meant.

When speakers from the right challenged that these laws had ceased to have any significance, Ferry replied that not only had they not been repealed, but that each subsequent piece of legislation relating to the status of the religious orders had endorsed and strengthened the previous one, creating a continuing tradition of legislation embodying the principles of Article 7. This was proven by the fact that all previous governments had used these laws in dealing with the non-authorized congregations, which indicated that "the civil powers always considered the laws active."
From M. Portail in the Chamber of Paris in 1825 to M. Rouland, minister of the Empire in 1865, the Chamber of Deputies of 1845, the government of Louis-Philippe, who applied the decree of Measidor to the non-authorized congregations, to the Imperial government who applied them in 1861, to an order of Capuchins who were, I believe, established in the Department of the Nord.

In relation to the Jesuits; he continued, "the special laws of Louis XIV and Louis XVI abolished the Society of Jesus in France," while the general laws of 1789, 1792 and 1802 prescribed and suppressed in France all religious associations of men. Earlier, in the Exposé, Ferry had cited the decree of 1804 and the two laws of 1817 and 1825 as having established the principle that religious associations could not be formed anywhere within the nation without authorization from the government. In terms of the law of 1825 such authorization had to be given by law. The Ordinance of June 21, 1828 formally forbade the direction of or teaching in colleges or minor seminaries to be under a religious order not legally established in France. Spuller reminded his colleagues that a precedent for Article 7 had been set as late as 1876 when a law with the same legislative intent as Article 7 was presented to a royalist-dominated Chamber. The evidence produced by such examples should demonstrate, the Republicans felt, that Article 7 was merely repeating what had been done on many occasions by previous

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., March 3, 1879. JO, No. 90; Annexe No. 1239, April 1, 1879, p. 2768.
82 Ibid.
83 Spuller, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 172, June 25, 1879, p. 5601.
governments, when these governments felt that the rights of the state were in danger.

In asserting that "Article 7 was nothing more than that," the government spokesmen were attempting to assure all that the government also was restricted in relation to how far it could go in its restraining policy towards the Church. No radical or punitive measures, in their opinion, were necessary. The legislative solution contained in Article 7, the return to the Concordat, was "efficacious and sufficient ... by the very moderation of the measure."94 The article did not represent revolution, or violence, or brutal rupture with tradition or custom."95

It was not the beginning of a series of laws; it was a special measure, a measure outside and beyond the normal legislation. The reclaiming of the rights and protections lost through the reaction of 1850 and subsequent legislation was entirely "the scope of the law."96 Article 7 was not even meant to reclaim the severity of those laws, "but to maintain order in the legal sphere."97

In fact, there were certain things that the article could not do since it could go no farther than what was specified in the Concordat. Did the laws not respect the teaching rights of the

94Perry, Ch. Dep., June 30, 1879. JO, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p. 5943.
95Ibid.
96Spuller, Ch. Dep., March 29, 1879. JO, No. 159, Annexe No. 1442, June 12, 1879, p. 5005:
97Ibid., June 24, 1879. JO, No. 173, June 25, 1879, p. 5601.
Brothers of Christian Doctrine, for example, Ferry queried, or the
teaching rights of the numerous authorized congregations of women who
devoted themselves to education? 98 Were the secular clergy not free to
work? he asked. Was the teaching of the state to become irreligious
and did the government propose to suppress religious education in the
colleges? Ferry's reply to all these self-posed questions was a firm
negative: "No, gentlemen, all that is respected." 99 Article 7 was
directed only at the non-authorized congregations. Members were "well
aware," declared Ferry, "that it was not directed at the Brothers and
Sisters." 100 There were, according to government statistics, eighteen
to twenty thousand schools staffed by the religious congregations which
the law did not threaten. 101 Further there were 130 institutions
staffed by the secular clergy and twenty-four or twenty-five under the
direction of bishops, beyond the jurisdiction of the law. 102 According
to another spokesman, five authorized congregations of men would remain
to teach and the confiscated establishments would remain the property
of the Church and be administered by the secular clergy. 103 Notwith-
standing Article 7, the parent would always remain free to give his

98Ferry, Speech at Épinal, April 23, 1879, quoted in
Robiquet, Discours et Opinions, p. 56.
99Ibid.
100Ferry, Ch. Dép., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28,
1879, p. 5728.
101Ibid., June 30, 1879. JO, No. 178, July 1, 1879, p.
5941.
102Ibid.
103Penchand, Ch. Dép., June 23, 1879. JO, No. 171, June
24, 1879, p. 5549.
child a Catholic education and, if he wished to place him in the care of the religious orders, he would always have the right to do so.\textsuperscript{106}

The fact that the authorized orders would not be touched in any way by the legislation—should be proof enough, from the government's point of view, of its moderate intentions. As Ferry stated, "the committee ... drew a distinction between the authorized and non-authorized orders."\textsuperscript{105} The government, he said, "did not have, could not have, any quarrel with the authorized orders who submit to the conditions imposed by law, who bring their laws to it, modify them at its demands, as the brothers at the beginning of the century did, who implored the assistance and recognition of the rights of the state."\textsuperscript{106} They existed with the permission of the government and the government had to extend to them the rights and privileges of the Concordat. All that the government was asking now was that relations return to this state of affairs. Ferry saw nothing to prevent the non-authorized orders, except the Jesuits, from seeking authorization, and affirmed that Article 7 was not opposed to any order of men who wished to be authorized to come before the Chamber and have their regulations approved.\textsuperscript{107}

Somebody mentioned the Sulpicians, the Marists and other congregations. Who has led you to believe that if they brought their regulations, the Chamber

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 21, 1879. JO, No. 169, June 22, 1879, p. 5494.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 5495.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., June 27, 1879. JO, No. 175, June 28, 1879, p. 5727.
would refuse, to authorize them without exception or distinction? Who has told you? 108

The government could not be accused of prescribing the non-authorized orders through Article 7 when it was the express purpose of the article to encourage them to seek authorization and when no request had ever been submitted for authorization. 109 Furthermore, Article 7 did not deny the contemplative life to anyone, nor the right to enter a religious order, but, declared Spuller, it forbade the right to teach to men who by choice had submitted to regulations 'which the state did not authorize.' 110 Deschanel supported Spuller regarding the right of the individual to enter the contemplative life, but considered the right to teach 'a different matter: ... for the right to teach, the right to give instruction and education is a daily, direct and permanent influence on young minds, on young souls, and consequently on the future of the nation.' 111

Understanding this distinction was essential if one were to understand the policy contained within Article 7. The distinction between the right to exist as a religious order and the right to participate in education, as government speakers asserted, was a key point in demonstrating the good faith and sincerity of the government's intentions.

108bid.
109Freycinet, Souvenirs, p. 130.
The return to the Concordat meant a return to the control of religious congregations through authorization, but once authorized the state was bound by that same Concordat to extend to the authorized congregations the freedom of their role. Similarly, though Article 7 was intended to combat clericalism and remove the Church from the political sphere as stipulated by the Concordat, it could not in any way restrict or interfere with Catholicism which the Concordat formally recognized and respected. Spuller would "say it a hundred times and repeat it to the end: ... Catholicism and Clericalism are not the same thing." What the Republican government wished, said Spuller, was "to unmask those who practice politics under the guise of religion." Clericalism was totally different from Catholicism, in their interpretation, in that the former was a political matter, the bond of alliance which united all the anti-Republican forces; "all the parties discontented with and in hostility to the spirit of the Revolution and the government of the Revolution." Paul Bert, in his writings, distinguished the individual believer, to whom the French Revolution had promised, to whom the French Revolution owed, the freedom of conscience, the free practice of his religion, the right of gathering with his fellow Catholics in a church, the right of teaching his faith, from the huge political and social organization which was called the Roman Church and which aspired to substitute its principles and

112Spuller, Ch. Dep., June 26, 1879. JD, No. 172, June 28, 1879, p. 5605.

113Ibid.

114Ibid.
infallible authority for the rational principle on which French society rested, and to govern this society as it wished to govern all other human societies. This latter aspiration Bert defined as clericalism. Through Article 7, through the reapllication of the terms of the Concordat, clericalism was to be curtailed, restricted; if possible rooted out of the body politic, while Catholicism was to be put in its rightful, respected place, protected and given freedom for expression.

Article 7 then was moderate legislation which followed neither the extremes of the Right nor of the Far Left, but incorporated a policy which benefitted and protected both Church and State. The Committee reviewing the article had already demonstrated proof of this in placing itself squarely behind the government and not going beyond the objectives assigned to it. From the Republican point of view the Church should also see it that way; that the legislation was neither anti-religious, anti-Church nor anti-Catholic. It was a political solution to a strictly political problem. In their analysis religion, education and politics had become so entangled by the Rightist reaction of the previous mid-century that all three had to be disentangled through the application once again of the Concordat and the restoration to the State of its legal rights. Ferry told the Chamber that "the proposed bill of law is primarily a political one, and responds to the most urgent necessities of the situation." The question of the freedom of education was not an abstract question, a cabinet theory; it

115Bert, Le Clericalisme, p. vi.
116Ferry, Ch. Dep., June 24, 1879. JD, No. 172, June 25, 1879; p. 5602.
was a practical principle, a means given to government to protect itself, and the questions of education had to be resolved, not by philosophers and theoreticians, but by statesmen, practical men.\textsuperscript{117} It was a matter, argued Deschanel, not of religion, but of public and social order, of civil legislation, a matter to be decided upon by government, by itself and for itself.\textsuperscript{118} The matter did not touch upon such deep principles as freedom of conscience, Bert stated; it was simply a law of social defense.\textsuperscript{119} The Concordat had been ignored, the laws of the nation governing Church-State relations were being openly violated, and the Church, through the agency of the non-authorized orders, was encroaching into a realm which, according to the Concordat, properly belonged to the State. Implementing Article 7 would merely make the non-authorized orders come within the scope of existing legislation and restore proper state control as set out in the Concordat.

This, to the Republicans, was the cardinal point contained in Article 7. The state would be protected through the restoring of the legitimate controls of the Concordat and the Church would return to its legitimate sphere so that both could function freely without fear of each other. Indeed, the development of an ecclesiastical policy based on the Concordat guaranteed rights and protection to both Church and State. It is little wonder that the Republicans, viewing the extreme,

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., June 26, 1879, JO, No. 174, June 27, 1879, p. 5582.

\textsuperscript{118}Deschanel, Ch. Dep., June 23, 1879, JO, No. 171, June 24, 1879, p. 5545.

\textsuperscript{119}Bert, Ch. Dep., June 21, 1879, JO, No. 169, June 22, 1879, p. 5490.
and in their opinion, dangerous, alternatives that were available for an official policy towards the Church, described the programme begun by Article 7 as "a great work of compromise." Spuller would write later that "these reforms in education must be understood as a work of peace and harmony, and not as a propaganda, as a battle against any manifestation of conscience, which, above all, must remain free and respected." It was a philosophy animated not only by political necessity but by the 'great philosophy' spoken of later by Paul Bert. It was a philosophy of moderate Republicanism, of stability, security and peace.

It was a philosophy well symbolized by the type of men who made up the government and who were chosen as official Republican spokesmen. In Grévy's opening speech upon being inaugurated as President of the Republic, a speech read by Waddington to the Chamber and de Marcére to the Senate, he described the Republican philosophy as "liberal, yet truly conservative." Even at the height of the storm over the decrees and their execution, he continued to speak of compromise and peace, cautioning the Republicans not "to instigate impatience, exaggeration or violence." According to Freycinet, prime minister

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124 Ibid., p. 528. Discours en réponse à l'allocution du Maire de la ville Dijon, August 17, 1880.
of the Cabinet, government supporters in the Chamber and Senate described their policies as being "too timid." 125 Gambetta, as speaker of the Chamber, described prudence as the guiding principle of Republican politics and used his position as speaker to control the frequent outbursts which characterized the debate on Article 7. The self-affirmed moderation and tone of Spuller’s and Ferry’s statements were consistent throughout their lengthy appearances as official government spokesmen.

Though their policies, contained in and symbolized by Article 7, were condemned by both their contemporaries of Right and Far Left and were found easier to condemn than understand by historians of later periods, they themselves were convinced that they had a firm grasp on the realities of the political and social situation and, without being either too conservative or too radical, felt that they could resolve the almost insoluble problem of survival which, in their opinion, confronted the Republic. They found the answer to that problem in that period of their nation’s history from which they had drawn all their political and philosophical ideology, in the experience of the Revolution; and they saw in the reinstatement of the terms of the Concordat a just, tolerant and compromise policy for Church-State relations. The fact that they were condemned by their contemporaries as political ‘opportunist’, or considered politically inept by some later critics, does not detract from the sincerity of purpose with which they pursued their goal of peace and unity for their nation, nor discredit their conviction that Article 7 was the only true solution to bring about the achievement of that goal, an achievement which they considered imperative for the continued existence of the Republic.

125 Freycinet, Souvenirs, P. 39.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In concluding this study of Article 7 — the Republican government's professed reasons for introducing it and its significance as a legislative expression of moderate Republican ecclesiastical policy — one is reminded of a statement of Eugen Weber's that "we shall not grasp the ideological roots ... of the Third Republic of France unless we understand the Intentions and principles of the Republic's education policy." However, in relation specifically to this thesis, one is tempted to rewrite that "we shall not understand the Third Republic's education policy unless we have a firm grasp of what the Republicans considered to be their ideological roots". The reversing of the statement though in no way undermines the relationship between ideology and educational policy since the Republican ideological roots, as they themselves perceived them, provided the basis for the introduction of Article 7 and the arguments in its defense when it encountered the severe opposition that it did.

These arguments, hopefully, have been presented with some degree of clarity. The questions concerning the introduction of Article 7, its aims and objectives, were raised at the beginning of the paper against the backdrop of the unfavourable political circumstances. 

of 1879 in order to emphasize their importance as questions for discussion.  
A cursory survey of some historiographical material dealing with the question was included for the same purpose. The paper then proceeded into an account of the introduction of Article 7 into the Chamber of Deputies, detailing facts of importance concerning the legislative stages of the article and other pertinent background information, such as the introduction of the counter bills of law. A special section followed dealing exclusively with the reaction to the article in the Chamber, especially from the parties of the Right and Centre, and the reaction generally in the nation as evidenced by members of the Chamber.

The question was then formally posed as to why the Republican government of 1879, considering its inexperience, political circumstances, instability and many problems, should introduce a legislative measure to increase and aggravate its instability and problems, and bring harmony and disunity in its train when the avowed policy of that same government was a programme of peace, stability and unity for the nation.

The explanation for this paradox lay in the way the Republicans who made up the government, and their supporters, analyzed those same unfavourable political circumstances, and in their interpretation of the historical developments of the previous century since the Revolution, analyses and interpretations which were incorporated in the succeeding chapters of the paper. To the Republicans, although they had just succeeded in winning the elections, the future of France as a Republican nation was threatened by the coalescing of all the anti-Republican forces into one massive, united coalition; a coalescence which would transform the weak, individual forces into a political force of such magnitude that, when completed, would either bring about the end
of the Republic or engender civil war between two mutually hostile
Francois. From this Republican point of view, the non-authorized religious
congregations, and the Jesuits in particular, were the focus of this
movement and were providing the leadership and direction to bring about
its success. The society was performing this role to achieve their aim
of 'indirect power' to bring about, through the democratic electoral
process or otherwise, the subjugation of the civil authority to the
Church and destroy modern, liberal society. Their association with the
parties of the Right and the other anti-Republican forces was, in the
opinion of the Republicans, a logical and necessary one since 'indirect
power' could only function in conjunction with the monarchical principle
of government.

The Jesuits could wield such power and influence because,
as leaders and exponents of the Ultramontanist movement, they had
succeeded in the first stage of their plan, achieving control of the
universal Church. They accomplished this through the publication of
the Doctrine of Infallibility which, in the interpretation of the
Republicans, rendered the Pope absolute in terms of bending the members-
ship of the Church to his will. This position of authority the Republic-
cans viewed with alarm considering the threat which they saw it posed
for the political realm in a vastly Catholic nation like France, given
the hierarchical organization of the Church and the unquestioning
obedience which they perceived to be part of infallibility. Once the
Jesuits had achieved this control through infallibility, they had then
proceeded to achieve control of the national churches by increasing
their numbers and obtaining, through means of the power wielded as
agents of ultramontanism, a place of undisputed leadership of the Church.
in the nation. Concomitant with securing mastery of the French Church in general, the Jesuits, and the other non-authorized orders, were fast gaining control of the Church educational system in particular. As the Republican surveyed the social and political forces at work in 1879 the one development which caused them the gravest concern was the subordin-
ation of the Church, its clergy and educational system to the will of the Society of Jesus.

That which caused the greatest apprehension, however, was the action of the Jesuits in bringing the vast influence and potential of the Church into the political sphere and allying these with the political forces of the Right, still formidable in the government, administration and society of the nation. They were providing the Right with a bond of unity and a political philosophy, and were organizing the electorate under the guise of religious activity, through pilgrimages and workers' circles. They had demonstrated their methods of using the Church and religion in the elections of 1877 and the Republicans feared that should this process of consolidation be brought to fruition, united to the full power of the Church among the electorate, the Republican cause was doomed. In addition, the Jesuits were compounding the threat to the Republic by attempting to indoctrinate the youth of France, the future electorate, with anti-Republican and counterrevolutionary thinking and imbuing them with the political philosophy of the parties of the Right. By thus-winning control of the masses of the present and future, the Jesuits were engineering the destruction of Republican society, its laws and institutions.
Thus, for the sake of the Republic, and its continued existence, the Jesuits had to be removed from their position of leadership and control of the coalition of anti-Republican forces. The necessity of quick action was imperative before the process was completed, and the forces, consolidated to a position of unlimited power, could threaten the Republic sooner even than an election. In striking at the Jesuits, and excluding them from the nation, the Republican government would be freeing the Church from their control and removing the potential of the Church from the political sphere by breaking the link between the Church and the forces of the Right. The unifying bond and leadership which the order provided for the disunited parties of the Right would be removed, and the parties would lapse into the position of political weakness which they held after their electoral defeat. Thus, by removing the Jesuits, and controlling the other non-authorized orders, the anti-Republican forces would be dissipated and cease to pose any further threat to the Republic.

However, the Republicans were aware that in initiating any form of attack on the Jesuits, legislative or otherwise, or any religious order, they were creating a dangerous situation. They knew that, given the position of power which the Jesuits had attained in the Church, any attack on the order could easily be interpreted as an attack on the Church. For that reason, they were aware that any policy which combatted the Jesuits and protected the Republic must not in any way interfere with the Church's true function, as they perceived it. None of the alternative policies presented by the Far Left, e.g. persecution or separation, or the Right, subordination of the State to the Church,
would, they asserted, achieve the true Republican objectives of peace and unity.

Instead, the Republicans found the solution to their problems, and their way out of a crucial dilemma, in the solution provided by the Revolution — in the Concordat of 1808. There, they believed, their Republican predecessors had set forth a just policy which provided for protections and guarantees to both Church and State, and delineated the proper rights and spheres of each agency. Foremost among these protections for the State was the right of authorization of religious orders which, in subsequent centuries, notably in the period following 1850, had been set aside, permitting the creation of non-authorized religious orders who were not under the control of the State. As perceived by the Republicans in 1879, the non-authorized orders, especially the Jesuits, were responsible for the threat to the future of the Republic. Thus, all that was necessary was to revive the terms of the Concordat as an ecclesiastical policy, demand authorization of all non-authorized religious orders, and restore the control of the state in an area in which the Republicans felt control was absolutely necessary for the protection of the state.

This was what Article 7 was meant to achieve, the restoration of a particular right to the State which had been arrogated to it by the Concordat, and which had been weaned away in the previous decades, the right to control teaching personnel for the protection of the State. It was not an attack on Catholicism, the faith of Catholics, but an attack on clericalism, the intrusion of the organized Church into politics, the removal of the Church from a sphere to which it did not
belong. If the policy limited a particular activity of the Church in accordance with the Concordat, it also set limits to the activities of the State in relation to the Church since, once authorized, the orders had to be given, by law, every freedom and cooperation. If the policy protected the State by restoring the right of control it protected the Church by permitting only the terms of the Concordat to be the basis for Church-State policy, thus guaranteeing the Church respect and protection by law.

Considering their view of the political circumstance in which the Republicans found themselves, the uncertainty with which they viewed the political future, and the alternatives which they saw being presented to resolve the threat to internal unity and the continued existence of the Republic without in any way hindering the true role of the Church as they perceived it, it is difficult not to respect, if not fully agree with, the policy which they chose, and their description of that policy as just, compromising and moderate. It is always easier afterwards, gifted with hindsight, to enumerate the bad results emanating from any governmental action, especially from one as significant as the legislation of Article 7. It is always harder to view the historical situation exactly as the contemporary people viewed it, and accord to them honesty of analysis and sincerity of purpose in relation to the solution of problems which confronted them. This paper has been an attempt to document such honesty and sincerity and, hopefully it will contribute in some small way to the study of the seemingly eternal problem of relationships between Church and State and, even more optimistically, to a furtherance of mutual respect and understanding between the two, as the Republican government of the Third Republic sought in Article 7.
APPENDIX

PROJET DE LOI

TITRE PREMIER: "DU CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L'INSTRUCTION PUBLIQUE"

Art. I Le conseil supérieur de l'instruction publique se compose de cinquante membres appartenant à l'enseignement. Il est présidé par le ministre.

Art. II Le conseil se réunit en assemblée générale deux fois par an. Le ministre peut le convoquer en session extra-ordinaire. Vingt de ses membres forment une section permanente.

Art. III Les membres du conseil supérieur sont désignés de la manière suivante:

1. Quinze membres nommés par décret du Président de la République, en conseil des ministres, et choisis parmi les inspecteurs-généraux, les recteurs, les professeurs en exercice de l'enseignement supérieur public.

2. Les trois directeurs des enseignements supérieurs secondaire et primaire du ministère de l'instruction publique.

3. Le vice-recteur de l'académie de Paris.


5. Un professeur de Collège de France élu par ses collègues.

6. Un professeur du musée élu par ses collègues.

7. Cinq professeurs des facultés de l'État, et des écoles supérieures: pharmacie, écoles, au scrutin de liste, à raison d'un pour chaque ordre d'enseignement, par l'ensemble des professeurs chargés de cours, agrégés et maîtres de conférence pourvu du grade de docteur.

8. Un directeur de l'école des hautes études élu par le personnel enseignant de l'école.


10. Un professeur de l'école des chartes élus par ses collègues.
11. Un membre du personnel enseignant de l'école polytechnique élus par les examinateurs, professeurs et répétiteurs.

12. Un professeur de l'école des beaux-arts élus par ses collègues.

13. Un professeur de l'école centrale des arts et manufactures élus par ses collègues.

14. Un professeur de l'enseignement agronomique élus par le personnel enseignant de l'institut agronomique et des écoles d'agriculture.

15. Six proviseurs ou professeurs titulaires de l'enseignement secondaire publique, élus au scrutin de liste par les professeurs en exercice dans les lycées et collèges pourvus du titre d'agréé ou du grade de docteur.

16. Six membres de l'enseignement primaire élus au scrutin de liste par les inspecteurs primaires, directeurs et maîtres adjoints des écoles primaires.

17. Quatre membres de l'enseignement libre nommés par le Président de la République sur la proposition du ministre.

Art. IV Tous les membres du conseil sont nommés pour six ans. Ils sont indéfiniment rééligibles.

Art. V La section permanente donne nécessairement son avis sur les projets de loi, de décret et de règlement, et sur les programmes d'études particuliers aux écoles publiques.

Sur les créations des facultés, lycées, collèges et écoles normales primaires.

Sur les créations ou transformations des chaires.

Sur les livres qui peuvent être introduits dans les écoles publiques et sur ceux qui peuvent être défendus dans ces mêmes établissements comme contraire à la morale, à la constitution et aux lois.

Sur les demandes formées par des étrangers et tendant à obtenir des équivalences des grades, à enseigner, à ouvrir, et à diriger une école.

Elle connaît, avant leur renvoi devant les conseils académiques, de toutes les affaires de révocation, de révocation, avec ou sans interdiction du droit d'enseigner, relatives aux professeurs titulaires de l'enseignement public.

En cas de vacance d'une chaire dans une faculté, la section présente deux candidats concurremment avec la faculté intéressée.
La section donne enfin son avis sur toutes les questions d'études, d'administration ou de discipline qui lui sont renvoyées par le ministre.

Art. VI. Le conseil en assemblée générale donne son avis:

Sur les règlements relatifs aux examens communs aux élèves des écoles publiques et des écoles libres.

Sur les règlements relatifs au suivi, des écoles libres.

Sur les livres peuvent être interdits dans les écoles libres, comme contraire à la morale, à la constitution et aux lois.

Art. VII. Le Conseil, en assemblée générale, détermine le tarif des droits d'inscription, d'examen et de diplôme, à percevoir au compte du Trésor Public, dans les établissements d'enseignement supérieur. Il règle les conditions, d'âge pour l'admission aux grades. Il statue en dernier ressort sur les jugements rendus par les conseils académiques dans les affaires contentieuses relatives

(1) à l'obtention des grades et aux concours devant les facultés;

(2) à la révocation des professeurs titulaires de l'enseignement supérieur ou secondaire public;

(3) à l'interdiction de droit d'enseigner ou de diriger un établissement d'enseignement prononcé contre un membre de l'enseignement public ou libre;

(4) sur l'exclusion des étudiants de toutes les académies.

Toutefois, il ne peut prononcer définitivement l'interdiction de l'enseignement que si sa décision est prise aux deux tiers des suffrages.

TITRE DEUXIÈME: "LES CONSEILS ACADÉMIQUES"

Art. VIII. Il y a au chef-lieu de chaque académie, un conseil académique composé:

(1) Du recteur, président;

(2) Des inspecteurs d'académie;

(3) Des doyens des facultés, des directeurs des écoles supérieures, de pharmacie de l'État et des directeurs des écoles de plein exercice et préparatoires de médecine et de pharmacie du ressort;

(4) De trois membres, élus au scrutin de liste, par les professeurs titulaires, suppléant, chargés de cours...
et maîtres de conférences de ces facultés et écoles, pourvu du grade de docteur.

(5) De deux proviseurs nommés par le ministre.

(6) De trois professeurs ou principaux, agrégés ou docteurs, élus au scrutin de liste par les professeurs en exercice dans les lycées et collèges du ressort académique, agrégés ou docteurs.

(7) De quatre membres choisis par le ministre dans les conseils généraux ou municipaux qui concourent aux dépenses de l'enseignement supérieur ou secondaire.

Art. IX

Le conseil académique se réunit deux fois par an en session ordinaire. Il peut être convoqué extraordinairement par le ministre.

Art. X

Il donne son avis sur les règlements relatifs aux collèges communaux, aux lycées et aux établissements publics d'enseignement supérieur; sur les budgets et comptes d'administration de ces établissements; sur toutes les questions d'administration et de discipline concernant les mêmes établissements qui lui sont envoyées par le ministre. Il adresse chaque année au ministre un rapport sur la situation des établissements d'enseignement secondaire et supérieur et sur les améliorations qui peuvent y être introduites.

Il instruit les affaires disciplinaires relatives aux membres de l'enseignement public, secondaire ou supérieur, qui lui sont soumises par le ministre ou le recteur, et prononce sauf recours au conseil supérieur, dans ces mêmes affaires.

Pour les affaires contentieuses ou disciplinaires intéressant les membres de l'enseignement libre, supérieur ou secondaire, deux membres d'enseignement libre, nommés par le ministre sont adjoints au conseil académique.

Art. XI

Les membres du conseil académique, nommés par le ministre ou élus, le sont pour deux ans. Leur mandat est indéfiniment renouvelable.

Art. XII

Sont et demeurent abrogées toutes les dispositions des lois, décrets, ordonnances et règlements contraires à la présente loi.
APPENDIX II

PROJET DE LOI DE M. JULES FERRY
"DE LA LIBERTÉ DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR"

Art. I Les examens et les épreuves pratiquant qui déterminent la
collation des grades ne peuvent être subis que devant les
établissements d'enseignement supérieur de l'État.

Art. II Les élèves des établissements publics et libres d'
enseignement supérieur sont soumis aux mêmes règles d'
edudes, notamment en ce qui concerne les conditions d'âge,
de grades, d'inscriptions, de travaux pratiques, de stage,
dans les hôpitaux et les officines, les délivres obligatoires
entre chaque examen, et les droits à percevoir au compte
de Trésor public.

Art. III Les élèves des établissements libre d'enseignement supérieur
prénnent leurs inscriptions aux dates fixées par les
règlements, dans les facultés de l'État.

Les inscriptions sont gratuits pour les élèves de l'État et
pour les élèves libres.

Un règlement délibéré en conseil supérieur de l'instruction
publique, après avis du ministère des finances, déterminera
le tarif des nouveaux droits d'examens.

Art. IV La loi reconnaît deux espèces d'école d'enseignement
supérieur. (1) Les écoles au groupes d'écoles fondées ou
entretenu par les communes et par l'État, et qui prennent
le nom d'universités, ou de facultés, ou d'écoles publiques.
(2) Les écoles fondées ou entretenu par des particuliers
ou des associations et qui ne peuvent prendre d'autre nom
que celui d'écoles libres.

Art. V Les titres ou grades d'agrégé, de docteur, de licence, de
bachelier, etc., ne peuvent être attribués qu'aux personnes
qui les ont obtenu après les concours ou examens réglementaires
subis devant les facultés de l'État.

Art. VI L'ouverture des cours isolées est soumise, sans autre réserve,
aux formalités prévus par l'article III de la loi du 12
juillet, 1875.

Art. VII Nul n'est admis à participer à l'enseignement public ou
libre, ni à diriger un établissement, de quelque ordre de
ce soi, s'il appartient à une congrégation religieuse non
autorisée.
Art. VII Aucun établissement d'enseignement libre, aucune association formée en vue d'enseignement ne peut être reconnu d'utilité publique qu'en vertu de la loi.

Art. IX Toute infraction aux articles IV, V et VII de la présente loi sera, suivant le cas, passible des pénalités prévues par l'article XIX de la loi du 12 juillet, 1875.

Art. X Sont abrogées les disposition des lois, décrets, ordonnances et règlements contraires à la présente loi, et notamment l'avant dernier paragraphe de l'article II et les articles XIII, XIV, XV et XXII de la loi de 12 juillet, 1875.
APPENDIX III

PROJET DE LOI DE M. PAUL BERT.
"DE LA LIBERTÉ DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR"

Art. I L'éducation supérieure est libre.

Art. II Tout citoyen français jouissant de ses droits civils et n'ayant subi aucune condamnation pour crime ou pour un délit contraire à la probité ou aux mœurs pour ouvrir des cours sur des matières du domaine de l'enseignement supérieur, sous la seule condition d'adresser huit jours auparavant au recteur de l'Académie une déclaration indiquant le local où seront faits les cours et l'objet de l'enseignement qui y sera donné.

Lorsque le recteur jugera que l'objet de l'enseignement n'est pas du domaine de l'enseignement supérieur, il pourra prononcer la fermeture du cours. Appel pourra être fait de cette décision au conseil supérieur de l'instruction publique; cet appel ne sera pas suspensif.

Les inspecteurs de l'enseignement public auront toujours les entrées dans les cours des établissements privés.

Art. III Toutefois les leçons isolées ou conférences destinées aux adultes et portant sur des matières appartenant au nom ou à la science de l'enseignement supérieur, demeureront au droit commun et feront partie des réunions publiques au privilège.

Art. IV Les établissements privés d'enseignement supérieur ne pourront prendre les titres de faculté ni d'université.

Les certificats d'études qu'on y jugera à propos de décerner aux élèves ne pourront porter les titres de

Art. V Les associations fondées en vue d'organiser des établissements d'enseignement supérieur ne pourront être reconnues d'utilité publique que par une loi.

Les déclarations d'utilité précédemment accordées par décrets sont rapportées.

Art. VI La loi du 12 juillet, 1875, est abrogée.
APPENDIX IV

PROJECT DE LOI DE M. LE DUC DE FELTRE
"DE LA LIBERTÉ DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR"

Art. I Les facultés libres auront, concurremment avec celles de l'État le droit de délivrer les diplômes et de conférer les grades.

Art. II L'État n'admétra dans les fonctions qui relèvent directement de son autorité, comme dans ses écoles, que les candidats diplômés par son université.

Art. III Tout personne pourvue d'un diplôme ou d'un grade quelconque, sera tenu de joindre, en toute circonstance, à son titre, le nom de la faculté qui le lui a conféré.

Art. IV Tout français aura le droit d'enseigner dans un établissement d'instruction d'un ordre quelconque s'il est âgé de vingt-cinq ans, et s'il n'est pas atteint par les prescriptions de l'article VIII de la loi du 12 juillet, 1875.

Art. V Les droits d'inscriptions et d'examen sont supprimés dans les facultés de l'État.

Art. VI Toute infraction à l'article III de la présente loi entrainera une pénalité qui sera ultérieurement fixée.

Art. VII Sont abrogés les disposition des lois, décrets, ordonnances et règlements contraire à la présente loi, notamment les articles XIII et XIV de la loi du 12 juillet, 1875.
APPENDIX V

PROJECT DE LOI DE M. DE GASTÉ
"DE LA LIBERTÉ DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPÉRIEUR"

Art. I Les examens qui servent à déterminer la collation des grades de bachelier, licencié et docteur dans les facultés de droit, de docteur, dans les facultés de médecine, de licencié et de docteur dans les facultés des sciences et des lettres, ne pourront être subis que devant un jury nommé par l'État: les professeurs de ces facultés ne pourront faire partie de ces jurys mais qu'ils resteront en exercice.

Il n'est rien innové en ce qui concerne la collation des grades de bachelier des lettres et de bachelier de sciences.

Un règlement d'administration publique, pourra charger les professeurs des facultés libres et de l'État, chacun dans la faculté où il professe de toutes les épreuves, de tous les examens autres que ceux qui précèdent immédiatement la collation des grades dont il vient d'être question, ou d'une partie seulement, à condition que les professeurs des facultés libres aient les mêmes droits, à cet égard, que ceux des facultés de l'État.

Jusqu'à la promulgation de ce règlement d'administration publique, indiquant le nombre et les conditions de ces épreuves et des examens intérieurs dans les diverses facultés, la collation des grades aura lieu dans les conditions présrites par la loi du 12 juillet, 1875.

Art. II L'ouverture des cours isolés est soumise, sans autre réserve, aux formalités prévues par l'article III de la loi du 12 juillet, 1875.

Art. III Nul n'est admis à participer à l'enseignement de l'État, s'il appartient à une congrégation religieuse non autorisée par l'État.

Art. IV Les personnes qui entreront dans les congrégations religieuses d'enseignement, après la promulgation de la présente loi, seront soumises aux mêmes conditions que les laïques pour diriger les établissements d'instruction.
Les religieuses qui auront plus de 25 ans à l'époque de cette promulgation continueront à pouvoir remplacer le brevet d'institutrice par la lettre d'obédience; celles qui auront moins de 25 ans, auront trois ans pour obtenir le brevet d'institutrice, si elles veulent continuer à pouvoir diriger les écoles.

Art. V

Dans toutes les grandes communes dans chacun des arrondissements de Paris et de Lyon, ayant plusieurs écoles communes pour chaque sexe, lorsqu'on voudra changer le rapport existant entre les écoles congréganistes et les écoles laïques, on consultera les pères et les mères de famille séparément pour chaque sexe.

Dans chaque scrutin, il y aura trois votes différents, vote pour avoir des écoles laïques et congréganistes, vote pour n'avoir que des écoles laïques, vote pour n'avoir que des écoles congréganistes. Le vote pour avoir les deux genres d'écoles à la fois comptera dans les deux groupes en même temps pour régler le partage des écoles entre les deux genres d'enseignement.

Les pères de familles et les veufs ayant des garçons n'ayant pas dépassé l'âge pour aller à l'école, voteront seuls pour le répartition des écoles de garçons dans la commune ou dans l'arrondissement; les mères de famille et les veufs ayant des filles n'ayant pas dépassé l'âge pour aller à l'école, voteront seuls pour la répartition des écoles des filles.

Un règlement d'administration publique décidera à quelle époque et dans quelles conditions on pourra faire cette consultation des pères et des mères de famille, et comment on fera successivement le remplacement des écoles en respectant les droits acquis et les engagements pris.

De ministre de l'instruction publique assignera aux instituteurs et aux institutrices des écoles communes de traitements convenables comme dépenses obligatoires des communes, quand le conseil municipal ne l'aura pas fait.
I. PRIMARY SOURCES


*Discours Prononcé par M. Paul Bert le 5 août 1879 à la distribution des prix du Lycée Fontanes*. Paris: G. Murat, 1879.


II. SECONDARY SOURCES


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