Youth Violence and Radicalization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis

Abstract

Most of the theories on youth violence and radicalization focus on Western youth. It has been a challenge for researchers to link youth these theories to Orient. Edward Said acknowledged the biasness of analyzing these theories from specific lens by introducing the radical notions of Orientalism and Occidentalism. Orientalism is motivated by the suffering of gathering the information about countries, peoples and cultures of the Orient. Occidentalism is a counter-field of research which can be developed in the Orient in order to study the West from a non-Western world point of view. Said (1978) considered these differences between East and West as imaginative geographies. This paper interprets the youth violence and radicalization thesis as a sweeping caricature shot through Orientalist imaginaries. The culture of violence argument is considered to invoke imaginative geographies that problematically erase the contingency, fluidity and interconnectedness of the violent. Moreover, factors at different levels of social organization are also described in detailed in order to understand the underlying situation of youth violence and radicalization. However, in Orient, the focus has almost exclusively been on the use of Islam as a political ideology that justifies and promotes radicalization and violence in society. While other manifestations of the problem also exist (such as organized crime, and gangs), it is this strand that remains most critical to Occident interests. It is concluded that the factors outlined in the paper may vary according to the context, experience and situation of youth living in East and West. But there are differences in perspectives in understanding youth violence and radicalization in East and West.

Keywords: Youth violence, radicalization, orientalism, occidentalism, imaginative geographies

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Introduction

Contemporary views of radicalism in the West have been framed primarily within the context of trying to understand current manifestations of terrorism, both secular and non-secular, which is directed against an established governmental authority. This paper will examine youth violence and radicalization through the lens of Edward Said's work of orientalism. Further, it will contextualize the factors of youth violence and radicalization in different societies by using the theoretical perspective of orientalism.

Western orientalism has impeded efforts to understand how radicalization can lead to militant extremism in non-Western cultures. This is particularly true when examining the factors that lead to extremism in non-western countries. The fundamental error of characterizing groups rather than individuals, which subsequently leads to the construction of stereotypes, has been a powerful factor in shaping attitudes about foreign cultures, particularly of perceptions of the Middle East (Costanza, 2012).

There are many possible meanings of youth radicalization, but most of the relevant distinctions can be represented with the usual social psychological distinctions among youth's belief, feeling, and behavior (Fenstermacher, Rieger, & Speckhard, 2010). This psychological aspect of radicalization can also apply to both state preparation for conflict and to non-state preparation for conflict (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Common discourse about radicalization focuses on non-state groups that represent a challenge or threat to the state. A state and its citizens are radicalized in the run-up to inter-state conflicts and war, and in the state's response to terrorism as well (Costanza, 2012).

There are many kinds of youth radicalization where strongly held beliefs may motivate youth radicalization, depending on its current situation and its history. For example, a group may say that they are superior or the chosen group, have been unfairly treated and betrayed, or that no one else cares about or will help them, or the situation is dire—the group and cause may be in danger of extinction (Orofino, 2016), are various conditions where an individual may become radicalized. Youth radicalization can occur at different levels. For example, youth may be radicalized by both personal grievances and by identity-group grievances as conveyed by mass media, rumor, or the testimony of others for example youth join radical groups after personal or family loss, or join such groups in order to demonstrate power. Youth are also radicalized as members of small face-to-face groups for example competition for the same base of support, or competition with state power or within group competition. Political groups and mass publics are radicalized in conflict with states and with other political groups for example hate towards political parties or state, or martydom. Each of these levels can be explained with respect to their socio-political culture of the specific society (Orofino, 2016).

The association between culture and youth violence is also self-evident, since violence is part of human activity (Winton, 2005). Thus, it is not the call for youth violence to be understood as a social process informed by culture that is problematic; rather it is probable to colonize this observation with imaginative geographies that distort it in such a fashion that deliberately or inadvertently enable geostrategic aims to gain validity (Springer, 2011). The principal method of distortion is Orientalism, which as ‘a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts’, is ‘an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction’ but a whole series of ‘interests’ which create, maintain, and have the intention to understand, control, manipulate, and incorporate that which is manifestly

different through a discourse that is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power: political, intellectual, cultural, and moral (Said, 2003: 12). Orientalism is a form of suspicion that fodders on cartographies of fear by producing 'our' world negatively through the construction of a perverse 'Other'. Violence can bind itself to somatic geographies and lived experiences of place, in the same way that culture is not limited to any particular place, so too do violent geographies stretch inwards and outwards to reveal the inherent dynamism of space as multiple sites are repeatedly entwined by violence (Fanon & Sartre, 1963).

In this paper, I recognize the relational geographies of both youth violence and radicalization in respect to the East and West. Youth violence and radicalization is understood in terms of how it is perceived to be manifestation as a localized and embodied experience, this very idea is challenged when place is reconsidered as a relational assemblage. Further, I will also discuss the broad contours of Orientalism, Occidentalism, and youth violence and radicalization theoretical. The notion that violence is ever 'irrational' is an ascription applied to individuals and cultures in an attempt to mark them as 'Other', which is effected through the invocation of very specific kinds of imaginative geographies.

In this paper, I interpret youth violence and radicalization in the East within the framework of a sweeping caricature shot through with Orientalist imaginaries. The culture of violence argument is considered to invoke imaginative geographies that problematically erase the contingency, fluidity and interconnectedness of the places in which youth violence occurs. While violence is certainly mediated through both culture and place (Springer, 2011a). I explore the nature of youth violence and radicalization with the lens of Edward Said's work of Orientalism and Occidentalism. Moreover, factors at different levels of social organization are also described in detailed in order to understand the underlying situation of youth violence and

radicalization in East and West. It is concluded that the factors outlined in the paper may vary according to the context, experience and situation of youth living in East and West. But there are differences in perspectives in understanding youth violence and radicalization in East and West. Certainly, violence can be a cultural performance that is shaped by its specific context, but the culture of violence thesis simplistically reduces this to a linear relationship where 'culture' alone is viewed as the basis for violence in Eastern and Western societies.

Theoretical perspectives

Said states that the complex concept of Orientalism is "a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction but also a whole series of 'interests', which…it not only creates but maintains" (Burney, 2012). Vested interests of discovery, trade, and economic control lead to the appropriation of geographic and cultural landscapes. The building of Eurocentric and ideological "knowledge" by the Orientalist expert, which could be deployed strategically as "power" to govern the Other (Burney, 2012) is another aspect of orientalism.

Orientalism is an academic discipline by which the Orient is "approached systematically as a topic of learning, discovery and practice" (Burney, 2012). It is a style of thought that functions on contradictions, conflicts, and binary oppositions that are socially constructed between the Orient and the Occident. It sees the Orient as a corporate institution for cultural and political domination, linked to colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, the changing role of East and West since the historical period (1940s) when Europeans became the studying subject and

the Muslim world became an object of study are the theoretical debates of orientalism (Abu-Lughod, 1989).

Occidentalism is a counter-field of research which was developed in the East in order to study the West from a non-Western point of view. Said (1978) contends that "the Orient" is a European invention. The Orient (East) and Occident (West) have been historically, culturally, and politically defined as binary oppositions. The West not only socially constructed and produced the Orient, but also controlled and managed it through working through the tropes, images, and representations of literature, art, visual media, film, etc. Colonialism and imperialism not only "conquered" the Orient and its territory, but also its identity, history, culture, landscape, and voice. Said (1978) aimed to show how and why the Orient was created as a binary opposition to the Occident by decoding the structures of power and knowledge hidden in texts and discourse, which were employed by colonialism and empire for conquest and domination of the Other (Fanon & Sartre, 1963).

Orientalism questions the very foundations of Western representation and the social construction of the "Orient" as the ultimate Other in history, literature, art, music, and popular culture. It has changed the way of seeing the Orient or the East, creating a paradigm shift in our ways of seeing and knowing. It also sheds light on the underlying structures of power, knowledge, hegemony, culture, and imperialism that have been historically embedded in colonial discourse, a discourse that presents the Orient as the Other (Burney, 2012).

Said critiques the workings of systemic power, declaring "the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony" (Burney, 2012). The image of self and Other help us to understand the concept of youth violence and radicalization. Further, the image of self and Other can be understood

through the concepts of colonization (colonizer and colonized). Historically, the West has the colonizer over the East to obtain ideological supremacy.

Fanon (1961) offers a raw depiction of both the colonizer and the colonized, describing colonialism as a *source* of violence caused by the colonizers, rather than the colonized (which had been the common view). I posit that Edward Said's work raises the inner consciousness of the "Other" and highlights the ways and means by which the "Other" has been socially constructed, to initiate resistance against cultural and colonial domination. According to Said, the "Orient", as depicted and mediated by the West, was actually an imaginary construct created by the writings and representations of "expert" Western Orientalists with a repertoire of repetitions and stereotypical images. For example, western literature assumes that all radical youth have a personal history of victimization that might explain their sacrifice. There may be individuals with such a history who nevertheless would not have moved to violence without seeing their victimization joined to the victimization of their ethnic or national group (Loza, 2007). But the stereotypical images do not allow to think from the other dimensions of the root causes. Said quotes the Imaginary of Arab mind by the Israeli writer Raphael Patai:

> The Arabs ... have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity. … They show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them … The Arab has little chance to develop his potentialities and define his position in society, holds little belief in progress and change, and finds salvation only in the hereafter (Said, 1977 p309-310).

Orientalism deeply disturbed the "purist" field of literary studies. Said believed that "contemporary scholarship keeps itself pure" by various exclusionary ways. In the 1960s and 1970s, English studies usually focused on white, male, mainstream authors (Folch-Serra, 1988).

University courses were governed by the study of genres, themes, and periods, without any reference to what Said calls the “World”.

The dominance of the western perspective in literature has been a significant factor that tends to emphasize the West at the expense of the cultural context in which violence is situated (Folch-Serra, 1988). Orientalism is a complex web of Western representations of the Orient. Said reiterates that a hegemonic process that robbed the East of its identity, voice, and indigenous culture created the Orient. The imagined reality was substituted with pictures, perceptions, and perspectives derived from the “Western gaze” (Said, 1978). This Western gaze subjectifies and objectifies all that it sees in its own image, through its own colored lenses, and from its own position of power. Orientalism views the Orient through its own vested interests, and from its own vantage point (Cain, 2000).

Youth violence and radicalization can more appropriately be understood as an unfolding process, arising from the broader geographical phenomena and temporal patterns of the social world. Through such a reinterpretation of place, geographers are much better positioned to dismiss Orientalist accounts that bind violence to particular peoples, cultures, and places, as was the mandate of colonial geography. We can instead initiate more emancipatory characteristics that challenges such colonial imaginings by questioning how seemingly local expressions of violence are instead overlap within wider socio-spatial and political economic patterns (Springer, 2011). This allows for the recognition, with a more theoretical force, how ongoing (neo)colonial frameworks, like neoliberalism, are woven between, within, and across places in ways that facilitate and (re)produce violence. As Patai (1973) claims that Palestinian resistance against Israel is based on ‘basic personality traits peculiar to Arab peoples’, which refers to the notion that ‘the Arabs are a fiercely violent people’ (Tuastad, 2003).

Youth Violence

Youth is defined in a culture (Brown et al., 2002). The definition and experience of youth vary across a society's history, culture, time demographics such as gender, social class and cohort (Brown et al., 2002; Daiute & Fine, 2003). Western adolescent theory is the most widely documented and influential in informing how young people are defined in the U.S.; however, the social and historical forces that determine this life stage are often overlooked in adolescent research (Burman, 1994; Lesko, 1996). Hall's theory of adolescence: It was used to rationalize slavery, colonialism and the superior social position of white adult males because non-whites, women and youth were thought to be less evolved, incapable of rational thought, autonomy, and possessing rights (Burman, 1994a; Lesko, 1996).

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation (Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002, p. 5). WHO defines youth violence as violence that includes children, adolescents and young adults from 10 to 29 years of age. In the United States, the CDC (2006) uses a narrower age range that considers those aged 10 to 24 years as youth.

Violence cannot be conceptualized in the narrow sense of victimization; exposure to violence may refer to a more general level of violence that exists in a youngster's everyday living environment (Finkelhor et al., 2014). For example, young people living in an urban environment are exposed to community violence that includes direct victimization, perpetration, and witnessing and hearing about violent acts in their surroundings (McDonald et al., 2011). Recent studies have reported that young people's exposure to violence is linked with the

characteristics of disadvantaged neighborhoods (Gibson 2012; Harding 2008; Yonas et al., 2010; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999), although the precise mechanisms of such linkages are yet to be determined.

In these contexts, high rates of poverty, residential turnover, a high ratio of single parents and ethnic heterogeneity, culture of violence, poor performance of social institutions, social disorganization, individual aggression, and weak social networks are considered as significant factors for youth violence and radicalization (Voisin, Bird, Hardestry & Shiu, 2011). Given their relatively weak and unstable family relations, young people usually rely on the "street" as a source of socialization and form networks with non-school-going older peers, who may be unemployed and poorly educated (Elijah, 1999). The "street" may further weaken young people's attachment to school and reduce their involvement in constructive activities (e.g. sports, reading). By becoming disengaged from the social mainstream, young people may pursue an "alternative model of success," usually by adopting negative coping behaviors, such as substance abuse or earning respect and recognition through the illicit use of drugs and sometimes violent means (Benhorin & McMahon, 2008). Orientalist also argues that orient lack the psychological readiness, less civic ethos which is necessary for political communities which ultimately leads towards poor management of resources and poverty (Taustad, 2003). Moreover, orient views youth violence in the occident as tied to radicalization while it is tied to similar factors as to what is going on in the orient – poverty.

In his study crime violence and inequitable development Bourguignon (1999) found that high degree of inequality and relatively poor growth performance in developing countries were increasing due to high and increasing level of crime and violence. He used different models like economic model and crime model. In economic model inequality in society, crime deterrence

policy variables and socio-cultural factors were explained in the light of crime. On the other hand, in crime model public decisions in safety maters, panel studies rules, and existence of a private protection were described in a comprehensive manner. Researcher gave more weight to social stratification as a determinant of crime and violence. This situation is true for both orient and occident as economic, political and social inequality in both spheres are significant factors for youth radicalization.

Analyzing cross-sectional data on African American children in small towns and rural areas, Stewart et al. (2002) find a positive relationship between codes related beliefs and aggressive behavior, controlling for other relevant variables. Children in the study who believed it was important and/or necessary to use violence to prevent intimidation and loss of respect tended to exhibit relatively high levels of aggressive behavior, such as physical assault, threatening and bullying behavior, and use of a weapon. Youth in occident believe the same that radical behavior will be the ultimate solution in case self-respect or self-consciousness is affected.

Analyzing data from a national survey of youth, Agnew (1992) observed that only a very small percentage of young people express general approval of violent behavior (e.g., hitting others for no reason). However, a sizable percentage of young people believe that violence is appropriate or necessary in response to insults or various other provocations. Moreover, Agnew found that such beliefs or justifications—often referred to as "definitions favorable to violence"—exhibit significant effects on subsequent violent behavior, controlling for prior violent behavior and other relevant variables. This finding suggested that code-related beliefs or definitions play a causal role in the development of future violence and are not simply rationalizations that develop "after the fact."

Pavis and Burley (1999) conducted a research on male youth street culture in UK. They used ethnographic research primarily participant observation to health-related behaviors of youth. The study tried to investigate the motivations, meanings and behaviors of young people hanging around on the streets during the evening. Study largely focused on risk factors associated with health relevant behaviors and to provide an understanding of the roles of alcohol, illicit drugs and tobacco within the youth's street culture.

Sabir & Zaman (2013) claim that researches conducted in West like Latin America, Germany and Russia on youth violence where youth have a specific culture, have an equal level and intensity of the violence that occurs in Pakistan. They further document that in such countries collective and group violence will be common due to political, ethnic, religious and sectarian segregation. The significant factors for youth violence are poverty, illiteracy, inequality and limited opportunities for positive social interaction (Sabir & Zaman, 2013). Interestingly, it can often be observed that East have unstable political situations (Arab countries, Pakistan); high population growth, and particularly a high percentage of youth (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, China); and resource scarcity.

Ferguson & Burges (2008) argue that violent crimes decreased over the years in America. On the other hand, crime and youth violence both have increased enormously in East. For example, Murray, Castro Cerqueira & Kahn (2013) argue that both crime and violence increased in Brazil at the cost of social and economic activities. Injuries, fear, robbery, theft, use of drugs and many other criminal activities leads toward youth violence. The countries where crime rate is already high like Nigeria, Rwanda, Brazil, and Congo have also tendency of high youth violence in the country (Cole & Gramajo, 2009). In these countries where youth feel powerless against non-democratic government use violence to commit crime as a logical means of gaining

power. In such situation youth become violent in result of limited rights with low social standing and dysfunctionality of the social and political institutions of the society.

Social conditions in the East, like high rate of poverty, high illiteracy, lack of social justice, unequal distribution of resources among masses, and poor health conditions leads toward crime and violence in society (Loza, 2006). Demographic characteristics also play a significant role in determining the involvement of youth in violence radical activities (Willems, 1995). As most of the non-western countries have the high population growth and a large number of young people living in the country (Fuller, 2004). For example, Germany is a developed country, but the economic deprivation of youth has increased during the last few years (Pawils et al., 2012). In Lebanon, a small, middle-income, Middle-Eastern country, in spite of the fairly pluralistic and modern background youth violence has steadily increased (Sibai et al., 2008). Pakistan is a majority Muslim (97%), populous, low-income country with poor performance in governance and deteriorating socio-economic conditions, where extremist tendencies are on the rise among young people (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010). Additionally, Pakistan and Lebanon have a high proportion of young people, who are more prone to violence because of increasing social deprivation and disparate economic opportunities (World Development Report, 2012).

Rebels and Youth Radicalization

Rebellion is also an act of violence or to resist the authority or against the state. The concept of youth as rebels goes back at least to the ancient Greeks (Arendt, 1970) and still we found rebels in all countries despite of classification as western or non-western. West views Eastern youth as rebels in such conditions where society is facing political turmoil, where salience of violence is prevailing, a society is experiencing social movement or revolution, or

where certain socio-economic conditions prevail. These factors are quite prominent in non-western countries and less customary in West.

The East that had revolts in the Arab Spring in 2001: Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and Syria all had one common thing, had large youth bulges. That is why these countries experienced a great number of youth violence and radicalization. Researchers have also demonstrated that countries that have a high percentage of youth have more tendency that youth become radicalized. This is because of socially disorganized neighborhood context where structural and social characteristics that increase vulnerabilities (Gibson, 2012). In this scenario, poor and unstable socio-political conditions of the country further make the situation worse and compel youth to fulfil their demands by adopting violent and radical behavior (Yusuf, 2011). Other countries like Pakistan which is facing youth bulge and have almost 65% of the population consisting of young people but experience less rebels and more terrorism (Verkaaik, 2004). Same is the case true for other countries like Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan who are also facing religious radicalization among youth along with youth violence. Other countries like Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Somalia, Nigeria, and many other countries have well organized rebel groups which are working mostly against the state. The anticipated increase in the number of young radicals in orient may represent only part of the challenge associated with this type of anticipated demographic group. Fox (1996) predicted the same violent and radical youth in US based on similar demographic bulge which will result in further prevalence of youth violence and radicalization in United States.

Rebel groups in the East always look for week structural and poor economic conditions which provide opportunity to start agitation against government (Tuasted, 2010). These conditions provide financial benefits to the rebels where they adopt many violent and brutal ways

to threat government. Moreover, literature also suggest that the rebel groups become more strong when state become week due to instability, external pressures, poor practices of human rights, and limited capability of state to handle such violent acts by youth as rebels (Loza, 2006). Such conditions can be found in Columbia, Botswana, South Africa, and Somalia. In this scenario such incidents further strengthen the oriental perspective through projection of media with the combination of fascination fear and anxiety (Shelly, 2011).

West views terrorism and extremism because of extreme religious ideologies which play a central role in radicalizing young Muslims, recruiting and indoctrinating them into the terrorist ideology, and eventually asking them to commit terrorist acts (Ibrahim, 1980). The war against terrorism further accelerated violence and radicalization among youth and their ideology become more extreme and radical in nature (Borum, 2011). This youth radicalization and violence is not only limited to West but also widely spread in East. Rather scholars argue that conflict between East and West is basically a war against terrorism (Loza, 2006). Many of these acts of terrorism have been linked to a violence-condoning interpretation of the Islamic faith, and the perpetrators are often referred to within the media as Islamic extremists. Extremism and advocating violence in the name of religion are historically common. They are not a new phenomenon or unique to the Islamic faith (Stern, 2003).

Non-state actors like terrorist groups in non-western countries have sometime more organized and strong networks that states are unable to control them (Bowen, 2004). Like in the case of Pakistan and India both are facing high rate of youth violence and terrorist threats occasionally. Moreover, religious extremism and fundamentalism among youth is one of the key factor of terrorism where not only youth rather whole society is being affected (Korteweg, 2008).

In the result of this religious extremism among youth intolerance, aggression, lack of trust on state and state institutions, and political instability are prevailing which is breeding further youth violence and radicalization (Bowen, 2004). This results further stereotypical views towards west which further encourage Muslims to boycott non-Muslim celebrations such as Christmas, not to eat or drink with Christians, their food or the food prepared by them (Abu-Zaid, 1996; Montasser, 2006), to prohibit their children from playing with Christian children (Montasser, 2006), and to fight against Jews and Christians.

Youth exposure through witnessing casualties either in person or through media to terrorism further manifest violence and radicalization (Archetti, & House, (2012). For example, youth exposed to the Bosnian war, Iraq war, Palestinian War, Kashmir War, Afghanistan War and Vietnam War have more chances to engage in terrorist and violent activities. Interestingly, most of these types of scenarios are going on or experienced mostly by non-western countries as compare to western countries (Acharya, 2001). In the result of this, when youth experience and witness the use of weapons, deaths and killings of common people, suicide attacks, and bomb blasts then youth are prone towards violent and radical means of releasing their frustration and restlessness (Ferguson, & Burgess, 2008).

Factors of Youth Violence and Radicalization

Risk factors for youth violence are not static and even nature of risk is not same in East and West. Their predictive value changes depending on when they occur in a young person's development, in what social context, and under what circumstances (Green, Mitchell & Bunton, 2000). Risk factors may be found in the individual, the environment, or the individual's ability to respond to the demands or requirements of the environment (Gorman–Smith & Tolan, 1998).

Some factors come into play during childhood or even earlier, whereas others do not appear until adolescence (De Jong, 2010). Some involve the family, others the neighborhood, the school, or the peer group (Lösel & Farrington, 2012). To complicate the picture even further, some factors may constitute risks during one stage of development but not another (Dahlberg & Potter, 2001). Finally, the factors that predict the onset of violence are not necessarily the same as those that predict the continuation or cessation of violence (Herrenkohl et al., 2000). Risk of being involved in violence and radical activities may vary in East and West but factors identified by researchers can be find everywhere despite of East and West.

In the field of youth radicalization and violence, researchers have identified various factors at different societal levels (e.g., individual, family, school, peers, and community) that increase the risk that youth will: (1) engage in violent and delinquent acts (Bardis, 1973; Sampson, 1986); (2) be exposed to violence (Smith & Tolan, 1998); (3) learn violent culture; (4) be at risk of greater victimization (Fagan, Piper, & Cheng, 1987); (5) and have violent and aggressive behavior (Moffit, 1993). It is now evident from the research that not only do individual factors affect youth's risk of violent and delinquent behavior, but also the existence of multiple risk factors at various societal (micro, meso and macro) levels results in a dramatic increase in risk. These factors can be considered in developmental (Moffit. 1993), socio-political (Sampson, 1986), cultural (Sykes & Matza, 1955), social (dis)organization (Bursik, 1988), anomie (Merton, 1938; Cloward, 1959), low self-control of individual (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), social structure, (Hirschi, 1969) and social strain (Agnew, 1992). Moreover, pathways to violent behavior among youth occur in a community context, which has emerged as an increasingly important influence on violence.

At the individual level, characteristics like early aggressive behavior appear as one of the key predictors of later violent behavior (Moffitt, 1993; Farrington 1994; Reiss and Roth 1994). Further, the development or trajectory of aggressive behavior from early childhood can be a more significant predictor of violence and radicalization than the singular occurrence of aggressive behavior at early ages (Moffit, 1993). Further, substance abuse, the use of drugs, and psychological and socialization issues in young adults might be considered significant factors as well (Pfohl, 1985).

The institution of family has also been examined in the literature by several different researchers with regard to later violent and radical behavior among young persons, with a lack of control, poor supervision and parental surveillance being found as the most significant risk factors for later violence (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990 p. 87). Moreover, parents' education, parental income, emotional ties to parents, the presence of domestic violence and overall family functioning are considered as important factors for later violent and radical behavior (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990 p. 97, 98; Cohen & Felson, 1979). Young people living in non-western countries may receive inappropriate parental socialization (due to parental discord, scarcity of resources, the high ratio of single parent families, long working hours of parents, etc.) and ineffective disciplining practices. Thus, the youth may possess lower self-control (Agnew, 1992) and be more likely to become involved in activities that bring short-term pleasure, such as smoking, overeating and spending leisure time on the street (Pratt & Cullen, 2000). Because of their low self-control, such young people lack the capacity for deferred gratification (the ability to put off the receipt of a reward in order to gain a better reward later) (Agnew, 1992).

Educational institutions like schools and colleges have also been documented as important settings for the development of violent and radical behavior (Fagan, Piper & Cheng,

1987). Studies have found that giving attention to the aggressive behavior of students within classrooms or dealing with students according to their aptitude are considered to be risks for later aggressive behavior. One of the strongest predictors of violence and radicalization found in studies is involvement with delinquent and criminal peers (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Herrenkohl et al., 2000).

Socio-economic status (SES) remains a topic of interest for youth involvement in violent and radical behavior. Researchers have articulated that SES is associated with parenting knowledge and behavior for rearing or socializing children (Messerschmidt, 1997 p. 5; Pratt & Cullen, 2000). There is evidence that low SES families have higher probabilities of increased maltreatment of children (Sampson, 1986; Herrenkohl et al., 2000). Other measures of low SES families such as unemployment and limited access to social and economic resources are significantly related with the delinquent, criminal, and terrorist behavior of children (Pratt & Cullen, 2000).

Youth's exposure to deteriorating neighborhood activities has a strong effect on youth's violence and radical behavior. Thus, neighborhoods influence the developmental outcomes of youth, which operate through various community and neighborhood factors such as culture, crime and delinquency rates, arrest rates, a culture of violence, and the presence of weapons (Anderson, 1999). For terrorist behavior, however, neighborhood contexts are less important than peer, family, education and societal factors at large. Community characteristics act as a primary concern for the development of such behavior among youth. Studies suggest that youth living in disadvantaged neighborhoods may be more likely to have delinquent and criminal behavior due to poverty, structural violence, less availability of economic opportunities, racial/ethnic differences, and neighborhood violence (Pfohl, 1985 p. 159; Herrenkohl et al.,

2000). Orientalist argue that such neighborhood conditions are quite visible in occident and consider them the significant factors for youth violence and radicalization. At the same time, these factors are true for orient but in more worse conditions dute to poor socio-economic conditions. (Springer, 2009a).

At the community level, neighborhoods that suffer from weak intervention mechanisms are incapable of controlling the deviant behavior of young people (Bursik, 1988). Such neighborhoods lack "collective efficacy," meaning the willingness of residents within the neighborhood to exercise informal social control in situations of disorderly conduct by youth (Herrenkohl et al., 2000). People living in such neighborhoods often experience a low level of trust among residents and have a lower sense of cohesiveness (Anderson, 1999) and less of a consensus about normative behaviors.

Young people living in disadvantaged communities face an increased risk of exposure to community violence and associated negative consequences (Parkes, 2007). Though youngsters living in such countries (non-western) are at high risk of violence, it would be simplistic to say that their counterparts in well-off countries (western) are safe from the negative effects of "disadvantaged neighborhoods". With the rise of urbanization, modernization, and the popularization of television, the expectations and aspirations of youth (both privileged and poor) have been democratized, although their societies have denied disadvantaged youths the means to satisfy their expectations (Archetti & House, 2012).

Factors at the macro level are also significant and are directly associated with youth violence and radicalization. Anderson (1999) provided a vivid description of societal factors for youth violence, arguing that every street has specific codes and that these are rooted in societal circumstances. Structural conditions of concentrated poverty, joblessness, racial stigma,

inefficiency of state institutions, poor governance, political instability, economic decline and deprivation, restricted opportunities, lawlessness, and weak rule of law lead to alienation and a sense of hopelessness in society, which in turn spawns subculture consisting of norms "often consciously opposed to those of mainstream society" (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971 p. 476). Poverty, joblessness, poor governance and political instability are found common and similar factors for youth violence and radicalization in both orient and occident.

Fullilove et al. (1998) examined the effect of the violence epidemic on community life. Area of the study was Washington in United States where qualitative research method was used. The researcher tried to find about the perception about violence in community. This definition of violence varied from individual to individual based on their experience. People experienced violence that was why they saw violence everywhere. People rated sections of the neighborhood as "low", "medium" and "high" violence areas. People felt safe in low violence areas and faced less violent events in these areas. In medium violence areas, violence was not a part of daily life but people became concerned that signs of decay may be found. However, in high violence sections of neighborhood seeing, hearing and experiencing of many different forms of violence were commonly found. Like occident, orient may also be divided into low, medium and high violent areas. Although this research was conducted in US, but these deteriorating conditions can be found in any metropolitan city in East where youth violence and radicalization is evident.

Winton (2004) reviewed literature on urban violence and focused on youth gangs in the Central America. The research differentiated between political, institutional, economic and social violence. Study highlighted the deprivation as one manifestation of structural violence. Researcher argued that income differences is not only product of deprivation but also generates lack of security, inefficiency of state institutions and lack of cohesion. The study documented,

that urban violence is deeply rooted in complex social, political, and institutional processes. And the main purpose of these processes is to resolve conflict and gain power. This in turn, is related to existence of cultures of violence. Deprivation in orient is one of the manifestations of youth violence radicalization like occident.

Robert & Johns (2005) made a sociological frame work in which researcher assumed two dimensions of social violence i.e. situational and cultural. This framework is further divided in to three dimensions; this framework can be understood from the figure given below:

Figure: Three dimensions of violence



Source: Robert (2005)

At *first level* where violence is originated, is an important level but not easy to identify association between variables. It determines a transformation in society that creates the basis for violent behavior but does not determine what necessarily occurs. The factors which are included at this level are inequality in the distribution of wealth, more education less employment, more aspirations but less capacity to meet them, less social control by family, and less force of religion. The *second level* contains meso-social aspects with less structural roots and factors refer to ferment violence. Factors at this level may encourage and facilitate violence, but modifying this level is simpler than the previous one. It includes segregation, urban density, masculinity

culture, drug market and impunity. The *third* and last level includes micro social factors which may call facilitators, because they are more in individual nature and considered as cause. The associations between factors are easier to establish, they also indicate more association than causality. Factors included at this level are: increase in fire arms among population, alcohol consumption and inability to verbally express feelings.

Radicalization is a rather amorphous concept, especially if one seeks to measure objectively its prevalence in a society (Abbas, 2007). Most often, radicalization is a first step toward violence, which is taken up by a subset of a radicalized polity. As the term is most often employed in literature on youth, all those who perpetrate any form of organized violence are radicalized. However, the type of violence, if it in fact occurs, differs across cases and is driven by the context that radicalized youth find themselves in (Borum, 2011). However, in orient, the focus has almost exclusively been on the use of Islam as a political ideology that justifies and promotes intolerance and violence against certain foreign and domestic segments of society. Youth involvement in religiously motivated militancy, be it through transnational organizations, groups targeting the state, or sectarian outfits, is seen as the principal manifestation of radicalization in today's Orient (Mandel, 2011). While other manifestations of the problem also exist (such as organized crime, gangs, and ethnic insurgencies in the periphery), it is this strand that remains most critical to Occident interests, and indeed, for regional security and stability in Orient.

Orientalism, Occidentalism, youth violence and radicalization

The radicalization of youth in various communities has created a pool of potential candidates vulnerable to recruitment by extremist organizations, who seek to establish their version of a

utopian society (Baumung, 2012). In some parts of the world the radicalization problem has been particularly exacerbated by the marginalization of disenfranchised youth who are disillusioned by the lack of economic and political opportunities (Abbas, 2007). In the Middle East, for example, youth face the paradox of having expanded access to education, only to learn upon graduation that many will be unable to find jobs. Despite this, youth-led protests in Tunisia and Egypt have demonstrated that most youth in these countries remain politically engaged and are actively seeking a voice in determining their future.

Within this context, youth are engaging their respective political systems through civil resistance to promote the removal of autocratic elements in their societies in favor of a more inclusive and participatory form of government (Yousaf, 2011). It has been a messy, turbulent process that has also displayed an unsettling violent dimension, as government authorities and protesters have periodically clashed; however, there remained the underlying assumption that the political system needed to be reformed, not destroyed, and elections were subsequently held as scheduled (Sandbrook & Romano, 2004). Alternatively, there remains a small minority of violent extremists who reject all forms of political engagement with established authority, and who view the destruction of the current system and the imposition of their worldview as the only legitimate form of governance (Orofino, 2016). Consequently, extremist groups on both the right and the left, secular and non-secular, remain positioned to offer a radical option to susceptible youths who have determined that they have no real future within any version of the current system. In some circumstances, youth must live in extremely hostile environments such as war zones, where their security and very survival are threatened daily (Garbarino, 2001). In the case of Sri Lanka, a generation of children grew up during a civil war never having experienced peace, their world constantly populated by enduring threats. For instance, there were the threats

posed by the Tigers of Tamil Elan, commonly known as the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), who often bolstered their ranks by kidnapping youth and subsequently training them to be soldiers.

The youth within this sociocultural environment of the East were forced to weigh their futures within the context of trying to satisfy their fundamental needs for safety, security and ultimately, survival. Violence is linked with space (Springer, 2011), that is why place-based ideas concerning violence is linked with certain peoples, primarily in 'non-western' spaces, as 'backward' or 'savage others'.

Orientalism, which produces the Western world positively through the construction of a perverse 'other'. Such imaginative geographies are constructions that fuse distance and difference together through a series of spatial segregation that not only mark people as 'other', but also configure Western space of the familiar as separate and distinct from 'their' unfamiliar space, the East, that lies beyond (Said, 1978; Gregory, 2004). Orientalism maintains an underlying assumption that violence sits in places, and as an affect and effect of discourse, this Orientalist view is enabled because the production of space and place is largely a discursive enterprise (Bachelard, 1964). For example, in the context of the 'War on Terror', 'African', 'Asian' and 'Islamic' cultures are said to be inherently violent. Thus, it is not the call for violence to be understood as a social process informed by culture that is problematic, but the potential to colonise this observation in such a way that enables geostrategic aims to gain validity (Springer, 2009).

In much the same way that cultural practices and ideas can contribute to youth violence and radicalization, as a political economic agenda in mind (Hardt & Negri 2000), we need to at least open ourselves to the possibility that neoliberalism which is the concept came from west (Occidentalism) may foster conditions that are conducive to the further manifestation of violence

in Orient. The notion that violence is irrational and marks a culture as "other" itself describes the imaginary explanation and association of the culture of violence in the East (Gregory, 2004), as some cultures, particularly 'Asian', 'African', or 'Islamic' cultures, are conferred with a supposedly inherent predilection towards violence. Youth violence also varies across cultures and societies. Youth living in the West and East have different experiences and exposure to violence. Youth living in poverty, with exposure to violence, sometimes breeds more violence (Duhart, Candenhead, Pendergrast & Slaven, 1994). Violence can be a cultural performance that is shaped by its specific context. Sanctioning certain acts of violence as 'rational', while condemning others as 'irrational' can be discerned as a primary instrument of power insofar as perceived rationality becomes misapprehended with legitimacy. Equally problematic is that such a dichotomy becomes a dividing line between 'civilization' and 'barbarism', one that is given spatial license through imaginative geographies (Said, 2003). The power to represent and imagine geography and its subjects like this rather than like that, is thus at once both a process of articulation and valorization (Gregory, 2004b).

The opposite of Orientalism, Occidentalism presumes the 'sameness' of key cultural categories, practices and institutions (Cain, 2000). At a theoretical level, it is claimed that the relation between crime and youth is cultural universal which should be recognized as expressions of a profoundly occidentalist discourse (Cain, 2000). This forms the foundation of the argument at the theoretical level where the relation between youth and violence, or radicalism in east or west are associated with each other. Bayley and Shearing (1996) made a similar statement that criminality is associated with young males. All these discourses are the reflections of Occidentalism which is not only true for youth living in western societies, but also for youth living in eastern societies.

Traditionally, these explanations of youth violence and radicalization are associated with theories that locate the roots of violence within the person or within the social environment (Adler & Adler, 2006). Simultaneously, some specific theories provide the explanation that humans are naturally prone to act violently, and these acts require little stimulation or motivation (Gottfredson & Hirchi, 1990), and in this case violence is, eventually, the consequence of a failure of constraint or control (Gottfredson & Hirchi, 19900. Other ad hoc theories demonstrate that youth are predominantly motivated to conform to the rules of institutions and order (Hirchi, 1969; Bernard, 1987), requiring much in the way of stimulation or motivation (Skyes & Matza, 1957), and in such cases violence is, ultimately, the result of unusual or "deviant" impulses (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Moffit, 1993). In addition, from a non-critical perspective, violence is "normative" in one case and "abnormal" in another case (Durkheim, 1975; Merton, 1938). Dialectically, however, it may very well be the case that various forms of violence are normative and abnormal at the same time, depending on whether or not they are sanctioned or unsanctioned as culturally and socially appropriate or inappropriate.

Conclusion

Technological advancements, especially in social media and other means of communication, have reduced the social and communicative distance between "privileged" and "unprivileged" youth. Here is the paradox: the economic benefits of the most recent waves of technological innovations have reached the most talented and well-educated members of society, thus causing massive social inequalities. This unanticipated and often neglected role of technology in "knowledge societies" has widened the gap between the "haves and have-nots" (Messerschmidt, 1997 p. 5) and hardened the economic grievances of disadvantaged youth in non-western

countries. It has sharply increased their vulnerabilities well beyond the resilience capacity of the system and, thus, more and more young people are adopting negative coping strategies, including involvement in violent and radical activities.

While understating the discourse of orientalism and Occidentalism it shows that differences are only in perspectives and theories not in East and West. Although there are different social and political conditions in the East and West, based on this notion youth radicalization and violence have the same factors at different social organization

Risk factors contributing to the likelihood of engaging in violent and radical activities are established during adolescence and are often maintained into adulthood, affecting wellbeing in later life. Researchers have documented various factors which predispose problematic risk behavior among youth, including unintentional injuries, aggression, violent and criminal behavior, use of drugs, domestic violence, intimate partner violence, hopelessness, the loss of intimate relations and a loss of self-control. The evidence has documented that risk factors in the development of youth are found at individual, family, school and community levels. For instance, individual level risk factors resulting from head injuries or exposure to toxins in early childhood, poor impulse control, and early initiation of substance use have been identified as problems in the development of adolescents and youth.

As emerged from this literature review, radicalization is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explored through one single path; it needs instead a multi-factor framework. Various theories have been discussed in previous sections to explain the phenomenon of youth violence in non-western countries. The analysis has demonstrated that all those theories were quite capable in understanding the youth violence and radicalization in Pakistan.

In this paper, I tried to build understanding about youth violence in non-western countries by using different theories and findings of researches from major lines of research on youth violence from western countries. Although there is a significant body of empirically-based research pointing to risk factors' influences on crime and delinquency (Herrenkohl, 2000), there are still significant gaps for the contexts of rebellion and terrorism that need to be filled. Further, although the neighborhood characteristics for developing youth violent behavior (criminal, delinquent, rebellion and terrorist) are evident, there is a great deal to be learned about the role of the community in the causal pathways leading to youth violence (Sampson, 1997).

The analyses of extensive literature indicate that definitions favorable to violence (in this case, the belief that violence is acceptable or necessary in response to various slights) mediated the effects of SES, parental influence, and peer influence on subsequent violence. In comparison to their higher status counterparts, youths of lower SES are more likely to be exposed to power-assertive parenting; they are subject to lower levels of parental supervision and they tend to have more extensive histories of aggressive behavior. The learning of violent definitions, in turn, represents the best predictor of future violent behavior after considering prior violence and other variables. Interestingly, we can conclude that political and cultural context exhibited direct or indirect effects on violent behavior after adjusting for SES, neighborhood crime, urban residence, and other factors in non-western countries. Moreover, we can also conclude that due to deteriorating social conditions, a culture of violence and an unstable political context amplify more youth violence in non-western countries then western countries.

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