Diversity under Stress: Exploring the effect of the independence referendum process on political attitudes towards immigration in sub-state nationalist regions

by

© Maggie Catherine Peyton, B.A

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Abstract

This thesis examines the link between independence referenda and minority nationalist discourses on immigration in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland. I demonstrate that the referendum period acts as lock-in mechanism that secures minority nationalist discourses towards immigration. Importantly, political frames used throughout the referenda play a role in the development of either an accepting or a sceptical narrative toward immigration. Through process tracing and discourse analysis, I note the development of a skeptical narrative toward immigration in Quebec, whereas I observe a more accepting or accommodating rhetoric in the Catalan and Scottish cases. The latter two cases extend beyond civic and ethnic studies of nationalism into an analysis of political mobilization by the sub-state nationalist parties throughout the referendum period.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Wealthy societies have witnessed rising immigration over the past several decades. In these regions, immigration has become an increasingly prominent political issue. This issue assumes different characteristics in multinational states, where the politics of immigration intersects with the politics of minority nations. In minority nations the nationalist movements have instrumentalized the question of immigration in order to facilitate the process of nation-building. In some cases, this instrumentalization has allowed newcomers to become a part of the national fabric, allowing political tensions that are sometimes found between locals and immigrants to ease. In others, it has facilitated tensions between the two groups.

In the past 20 years, sovereignty movements have intensified in Western multinational states. Quebec, and more recently Scotland and Catalonia, have all held independence referenda. As a test to the national unity in the minority nations, immigrants were either framed as friend or foe during this politically turbulent period. This thesis examines the independence referenda process in sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs) in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom in order to showcase how the process solidifies the discourse vocalized by political leaders of the nationalist parties. I test the hypothesis that the independence referendum process may act as a lock-in mechanism that further solidifies minority discourses about immigrants that were articulated in prior nationalist frames. That is to say, referenda play a role in the development of either an accepting or a suspicious narrative toward immigration. In this thesis, I argue that without a referendum the relationship between the nationalist movement and immigrant communities would be more fluid.
Importantly, the complex relationship between the central state, the sub-state nationalist regions, and the immigrant population has a causal effect on the discourse developed within each. The SSNR discourse toward immigrants is normally constructed in opposition to central government policies and discourses on immigration. Each minority nation uses immigration policy to further solidify the identity difference between the sub-state nation and the broader political community. Thus, as the United Kingdom becomes less welcoming toward immigrants, Scotland develops the opposite discourse toward immigration. In Quebec, the policy of ‘interculturalism’ was introduced as a way for Quebec to distinguish itself from Canadian multicultural policies consequently developing its own immigration narrative. In Catalonia, integration polices were implemented in response to the strict changes to Spanish immigration law in the year 2000. This, again, created a separate discourse with regards to immigration.

Nationalists have implemented the opposite of the central state immigration policy in order to build a separate national identity by emphasizing another dimension on which the minority nation is different. For instance, sub-state politics in Quebec and Catalonia focus on language while all three regions utilize a different narrative compared to the central government with regard to political economy. Quebec and Scotland have also developed differing strategies to the state on social policies. Immigration policies and consequent discourse in each region have developed in a similar fashion, accompanying the other policies in the nationalist arsenal of nation-building policies and associated discourses. This dynamic constitutes the political background for this thesis, but is not explained by it. The issue of the constitution of minority national identity in opposition to the central state has been studied elsewhere (Barker, 2015; Jeram, 2014; Hepburn, 2011; and Beland and Lecours, 2008). Rather, I pick up where these
scholars leave off, examining the link between referenda on independence and minority nationalist discourses on immigration.

If independence referenda ‘epitomise’ popular sovereignty (Guibernau et al., 2014), how do such nation-building efforts influence attitudes toward immigrants? I argue that the political elite activate attitudes towards immigration, which are consequently ‘locked-in’ by the referendum process. I develop my argument through an investigation of the discourse and policy development of sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs) toward immigrants during the referendum period. Through the use of process tracing, I argue that without a referendum the minority nationalist perceptions of immigrant communities would remain fluid, with greater possibility of fluctuation in political attitudes. The immigrant community position on the referendum (in favour or against) may act as the mechanism that will lock in the minority nationalist discourses on immigrants. In other words, the independence referenda can be seen as lock-in mechanism that secure the immigrant identity frames presented by sub-state nationalist party elites.

This paper adds to the scholarship on nationalism in multinational states by incorporating a nuanced link in the causal chain; the lock-in mechanism created by the referendum process. The link between referenda and immigrant integration in SSNRs is understudied in existing scholarship. In fact, although other studies have focused on the conditions of diversity in multinational democracies none have analyzed the referendum process as a determinant in discourse toward immigrant attitudes. My study contributes not only to the study of nationalism in multinational states but also the study of immigrant integration and the study of discourse in politics.

Throughout the paper, I use several terms that require some conceptual clarification. The most frequent term is SSNRs, which I define as territorial units within sovereign states that
contain a large proportion of a minority nation and serve, either *de facto* or *de jure*, as homelands for those minority nations. SSNRs wish to preserve their identity either through full sovereignty, or through enhanced self-government within the existing state framework. These regions will be referred throughout this work as either minority nations or sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs).

The main parties found in these regions will be referred to as sub-state nationalist parties (SSNPs) (Jeram, 2014), or by their actual names in abbreviated form. In Catalonia, I examine the Convergence and Union Party (Convergència i Unió in Catalan (CiU)); in Quebec, the Parti Québécois (PQ); and in Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP). I use both the terms ‘central government’ and the ‘multinational state’ (or even just state) interchangeably throughout the text to mean the same thing.

1.1 Immigrants and Minority Nations: The Framework

Many scholars offer theoretical insight into how immigrants and minority nations affect each other. Zapata–Barrero summarizes the commonly expressed arguments about this relationship in seven basic premises, four of which are relevant here (2007). First, as immigrants tend to integrate into the majority community this undercuts the demographic position of minority nations. Second, the preceding point warrants the increase in minority nationalist demands for control over immigration policy, thus providing another dimension to demands for self-government. Third, although some demands between nationalists and immigrants may be contentious they could also share similar interests. This occurs when a convergent conception of a minority nation arises, i.e. if the self-government capable of being multicultural or if there is willingness on part of immigrant to adapt to cultural aspects within the region.

Fourth, and ultimately, the most relevant for the development of my research question, Carens, and Baubock question whether both immigrants and minority nations are at a
disadvantage in relation to the state (2001). During independence referenda, the cultural demands of minority nations and immigrants become increasingly intertwined and their potential differences increasingly salient. Thus, examining the referenda serves to understand if diversity under stress will allow for a cohesive vision for self-determination or, as the scholarship alludes, will their situation ‘worsen’ as their cultural demands will be at odds with one another.

Independence referenda are critical moments in the political aspirations for self-determination, in which the cultural demands of the minority nations and immigrants intersect. The independence referendum represents a time for solidarity in the political community and a time to highlight ‘commonness’ regardless of ethnicity where both immigrants and nationalists can show its attachment to “a clearly demarcated territory” (Guibernau, 1999: 14). In other words, an independence referendum is important to nationalist imagery and emancipation from the central state. This historical moment highlights the cultural demands complicated by the relationship that exists between the multinational state, the sub-state, and immigrants, especially as immigrants typically show greater commitment to the norms of the dominant state culture.

Indeed, immigrant behaviour in this particular instance is more important than during times of ‘normal politics’, as it is an opportunity to show allegiance to the minority nation. Existing literature highlights that identity conflicts intensify when immigration is discussed more frequently throughout political discourse — as it is during the referendum (Bohman, 2011; Howard, 2009; and Zapata-Barrero and Garces-Mascarenas, 2010). My analysis highlights that during the Catalan and Scottish referenda, minorities were perceived as supportive to the sovereignty movement by nationalist party leaders. Therefore, one might hypothesize that subsequent minority-nation discourse should develop in ways sympathetic to the immigrant communities. Within Quebec, on the other hand, some politicians faulted Anglophone and
immigrant minorities within the province for hindering the sovereignty movement. This altered the relationship between immigrants and minority nationalists after the referendum and contributes to a more mistrustful nationalist discourse toward immigrants.

Existing scholarship highlights the complex relationship between the multinational state, sub-state nationalist movements, and immigrants, offering valuable insight for the conceptualization of the causal chain explained in this thesis. Moreover, in response to state policies, many minority nations have re-conceptualized citizenship in order to construct a ‘regional citizenship’ based on rights, participation and membership at the regional level (Hepburn, 2011). Indeed, who does or does not belong to a region has become a highly salient issue and becomes particularly more so during the independence referendum. This thesis complements arguments made by these scholars and fills an important lacuna in the literature by introducing a link in an existing causal chain between the actions of the central government, the SSNR oppositional policies, and political discourse directed toward immigrants.

This thesis emphasizes political party discourses because they are the key to understanding how actors in nationalist contests create or change identities through political framing. I utilize discursive institutionalism (DI) to observe the discourse employed throughout a period of potential institutional change; the independence referendum. Exploring institutional change through a discursive perspective better equips researchers to highlight how actors in various institutional settings can transform established “interests, institutional obstacles and cultural impediments to change” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 207) with contemporary ideas. As such, it is advantageous to analyze discourse through the referendum period as both institutional change and ideational frames may be created.

Current works on discourse and nationalism highlight the benefits of using discourse
analysis. Individual nationalisms are defined by a ‘particular content’ that creates and circulates its general culture and values through political ideological discourse (Finlayson, 1998). Indeed, discourse analysis links the production of national identity to broader political discourses (Finlayson, 1998). In this same regard, the literature shows how the politics of immigration becomes more salient when differences are discussed within political communities (Zappata-Barrero and Garces-Mascarenas, 2010; Agrela, 2002; and Bohman, 2011) as discourse analysis uncovers the impact of these discussions on intrastate relationships.

Elite discourse can shape the way political actors or groups are framed among members of the targeted society. Much of the literature on framing seeks to understand under which conditions certain frames are created and politicized. For instance, Howard highlights that the creation of liberal policies by the political elite may be blocked when far-right movements activate (or frame) anti-immigrant public attitudes during public referenda (2009). The way in which the political elites frame events or policies shape behaviours and attitudes within the region, influencing what is considered as appropriate behaviour and procuring desired political outcomes (Falleti and Lynch, 2009).

In each of the three cases considered in this thesis, I focus on the independence referendum process to understand the perception that the minority nationalist movements develop toward immigrants (accepting and accommodating, or suspicious and 'integrative'). I examine how the minority nationalist interpretation that, because of immigrant 'behaviour' during the referendum, they either are or aren't a feasible partner in sub-state nation-building process becomes a causal mechanism. The question is one of their potential to be 'integrated' within the minority nation or the broader state-wide nation. The relationship with the multinational state, in each case, is examined as it has broader implications on how discourses and policies directed
towards the immigrant populations are developed by the nationalist movement. Ultimately, each case study allows me to analyze what happens because of the referendum.

Without the independence referendum in the SSNRs it is difficult to say with any certainty whether or not subsequent policies in the regions, such as reasonable accommodation in Quebec, would have been adapted. Subsequent policy development in Scotland and Catalonia has yet to be evaluated as the referenda concluded in 2014 and 2015. Nevertheless, it cannot be known how attitudes would have developed without the discourse built around the immigrant integration throughout the referendum and their participation (particularly in Scotland) in the referendum process.

In order to evaluate the hypothesized causal argument, I first analyze the policies that were made in responses to state’s policies by the SSNRs. Second, I analyze government documents produced by the CiU<sup>IV</sup>, PQ, and SNP, as well as political speeches by their parties’ main advocates to determine how immigrants were framed in the independence referendum process. Finally, I analyze what policies were made after the referendum in the case of Quebec as a result of ‘locked-in’ nationalist perception of immigration, while predicting the similar outcomes for the other two cases. The analysis of these cases requires process-tracing methodology, normally deployed to assess the causal effect of ideas (Bennett, 2010).

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter two, I provide an overview of the existing literature, how it contributes to my project and what I expect to add with my argument. In Chapter three, I outline the theoretical and methodological considerations for the project showcasing the theoretical development of the referendum as a lock-in mechanism. In Chapters 4-6, I explore each case study through a qualitative examination of secondary sources, media sources, policy documents, and the discursive and anecdotal examples by the SSNPs
political elites and immigrant groups. I conclude the project in Chapter 7 by offering an overview of the argument and the main findings. I also discuss the limitations of the study and implications for future research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This literature review begins by defining nationalism in order to understand how it is used contemporarily by SSNRs in Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland. Following this, I outline the literature on contemporary nation-building practices and tools while drawing on important works in Discursive Institutionalism in order to examine the process of framing in each of the three cases studied. I conclude the section by discussing the relevance of political framing and articulation. The literature review provides the necessary background for the premise of my main argument that referendum creates a lock-in mechanism on immigrant discourse in minority nations.

Traditionally, many scholars defined nationalism in civic or ethnic terms. Commonly, civic nationalism is described as a shared citizenship or political rights regardless of one’s ethnicity, race, or language, whereas ethnic nationalism is supposed to be rooted in one’s inherited ethnicity. Scholars have extended the civic/ethnic definitions by introducing a post-ethnic nationalism (Kymlicka, 2001) adapted by regions if they have control over the terms of diversity in their respective communities, such as the number of immigrants entering their region. Certainly, the way in which a nation perceives newcomers may be affected by the definition of nationalism under which they fall. In this thesis, I adopt Smith’s definition of nationalism as ‘an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential nation’ (2001:9). This is the clearest, most relevant definition with regard to the three SSNRs, as all three regions seek to attain greater autonomy through independence referenda.

Minority nation-building practices have moved beyond their traditional, exclusionary molds in order to encapsulate a more current ‘nation’. Nationalist efforts continuously adapt to
the changing political demands and discourse, so as to meet the demands of their nation-building project. Contemporarily, minority regions are host to various layers of diversity, including class, gender, generational, race, ethnic and nationalists. Therefore, national identity can be ‘aspectival’ as its form is shaped by the angle through which one observes it (Tully, 1995: 13). Further, modern nation-building politics have changed the concept of citizenship due to factors, such as European integration and the decentralization of power (Hepburn, 2011; and Jeram, 2014).

Accordingly, while regions are influenced by diversity, they are also affected by relational comparisons to the multinational state in which they are found. For example, identity in Quebec may be created through comparisons with the ‘rest of Canada.’ National identity within Quebec may not be exclusive or progressive toward migrants but exists as a result of the differing national identities within the region itself (Barker, 2010).

The institutional context and experiences of minority nations may affect attitudes towards immigration. Barker examines the intersection between the 'new' diversity from immigration and the 'old' politics of sub-state nationalism (2015). She highlights how the sub-state response to immigration is created by three factors: institutional and power arrangement of the multilevel state; how the leaders perceive immigrants to be impacting national autonomy goals; and the nation-building process. Jeram analyzes diversity and its subsequent policies as new marker of national identity and/or as a tool in the nation building process for SSNPs (2014). This link between the use of public policies and identity-building in SSNRs is not new, and it has been studied in relation to other policy areas that are usually not considered inherently identity based, such as social and economic policy (Beland and Lecours, 2012).

The literature highlights a growing trend in the politics of minority nationalism to utilize immigration as a nation–building tool. Sub-state national regions do not necessarily view
immigration as a threat, but manipulate it to the region’s advantage (Zapata-Barrero, 2013). Sub-state nationalists parties wish to differentiate from the central state parties and many of them have become ‘modern and forward looking’ (Keating, 2001; and Guibernau, 2013). Minority nationalist movements are becoming much more sensitive to charges of exclusivist ethnic nationalism. They are, therefore, far more cautious in the type of rhetoric they employ, including toward migrants into their regions.

As already suggested, however, it is difficult to understand the politics of minority nation-building without linking that process with the politics of the central governments in multinational states. Scholars on diversity and multiculturalism in multinational states explore how the cultural demands of immigrants and minority nations interact. As noted, some of the scholarship is premised on the idea that the interests of immigrants and minority nations may conflict. This is so because immigrants arriving to the SSNRs may integrate into the majority community, thus undercutting the demographic position of minority nations (Carens, 2000; Kymlicka 2001; Baubock 2001; Zapata-Barrero, 2004a). This may intensify the political demands of the minority nations. SSNPs may therefore try to position themselves in such a way as to channel immigration to the advantage of the nation-building project. Indeed, they may aim to tackle the issue proactively by incorporating immigrants as part of the minority nation.

This presumption offers a connection between the desire for increased capacity with regard to immigrant management for minority nations and their demands for self-government. Put differently, the reception to immigration by a community creates part of its ‘self-understanding’ (Carens, 1995: 20) as views on immigration can be mirrored from individual opinions to societal views in general (Zapata-Barrero, 2004a; 2004b). Thus, policies influence this self-understanding as a minority region. Yet, as argued by those in the institutional
nationalism studies, this is only possible if a *genuine* self-government exists. Indeed, some view diversity management as one of the fundamentals that constitute the minority nations demands for self-government (Zapata-Barrero, 2004a; 2004b; and Carens, 1995)

As the foregoing discussion suggests, while the interests of immigrants and minority nations may be at odds, they do not have to be antagonistic. This is especially so if the immigrant community and the SSNPs have a convergent conception of the minority state (Zapata–Barrero, 2007). For example, if the government of SSNR is capable of accepting diversity or if there is willingness on part of the immigrant to adapt to cultural aspects within the region that will contribute to the development of the SSNR’s project. This variable dynamic is an important one when it comes to the minority nationalisms of Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland. In these regions nationalism no longer focuses on a ‘consensual identity’ but is maintained through the participation and interaction between the diverse residents in the region (Maclure, 2003). This is not to say that all regions are inclusive of immigrants but that how immigrants contribute to sovereignty movements may impact how sovereigntists frame them in the referendum period.

Additionally, despite the ‘disadvantaged’ situation both immigrants and minority nations face in relation to the state, some question whether this situation worsens when the two communities’ concerns are linked, such as during a referendum (Carens, 2001; 1995; and Baubock, 2001). Some scholars argue that such ‘linked’ interactions can produce bonds between citizens, which may lead to positive deliberation between immigrants and minority nationalists (Maclure, 2003; Gagnon and Tully, 2001). Others stipulate that the more ‘intertwined’ the cultural demands of minority nations and immigrants become, the more opportunity there is for contention to arise between them (Zapata–Barrero, 2007). Overall, the literature seems to present that as long as the cultural demands of minority nations and immigrant are able to
maintain a similar attachment to the goals of self-determination of the former, there will be little contention between the two groups.

At the same time, many studies of nationalist politics in multinational states add that current state immigration policies do not allow the tools or resources for the SSNR to manage itself, affecting its ability to develop as a cultural community. This impedes its ability to foster an appropriate environment for immigrant integration. Scholars have long recognized the role of the state in the regulation of immigration streams and their integration (Brubaker, 1992; Castles and Miller, 1993; Geddes, 2003; Lahav, 2004; Massey et al., 2002; Sassen, 1996; 1999; Zolberg, 2006), while other research has explored the extent to which the state, through its institutions, also influences societal attitudes toward immigration. In the same regard, studies on immigrant attitudes in the sub-state regions are also valuable. Studies on structural influences examine how the state can establish the confines for the interactions between citizens and newcomers, they also play a vital role in forming inter-ethnic relations. Zamora–Kapoor, for instance, offers structural account to explain that states establish the confines for the interactions between citizens and newcomers, thereby also playing a vital role in forming inter-ethnic relations (2013).

Studies in social psychology provide additional insights into the possible relations between minority nationalists and immigrants in their midst. Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1997; Escandell and Ceobanu, 2009) predicts that people who share similar goals and statuses, and collaborate with and support elites are seen as part of the same group. Marginality theory (Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989; Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Fetzer, 2000a; 2000b) provides insight into the connection between national identity and immigrant exclusion. Marginality theory is premised on the idea that oppressed (such as minority nationalists in a multinational state) groups will be more sympathetic to others (immigrants) because of their own
marginalization experience. Indeed, both of these theories are relevant to this thesis and connect further to the institutional premises brought forth by Carens, Kymlicka and Baubock. If these ‘disadvantaged’, *marginalized* groups have shared goals and collaborate in their obtainment, then, according to current scholarship their relationship should be congenial. Yet, this is not always the case. Therefore, while institutional and social theories provide insight into the causal chain explained here, they fail to fully explain the development of immigrant attitudes in each case. We need to turn our attention to specific discursive practices via which structural features of the context are translated into particular political dynamics. For this reason, many scholars have incorporated discursive practices in order to understand the relationship between immigrants and the (sub) state.

A number of scholars have analyzed the way attitudes develop toward immigrant integration through the use of discourse analysis (Finlayson, 1998; Agrela, 2002; O’Connor, 2006). Importantly, many in this tradition emphasize the construction of the ‘other’ by the elite. These frames are produced through political discourse, in which specific actors or groups can be framed as either friendly or threatening, or any variation of these. Political discourse characterizes immigrants as either a ‘threats’ or an ‘allies’ to the independence movement and, therefore, they are framed as ‘threats’ or ‘allies’ to the cohesion of the sub-state national unit. In other words an ‘us-versus-them’ dichotomy may be created through the use of political frames. Indeed, if the immigrant is framed as an enemy to the solidarity movement they are normally framed as such by the political elites’.

Scholars of discursive politics depict frames that guide social practice (Butler, 1996; and Foucault, 1994), wherein elite discourse creates a certain image that can be ‘normalized’ through repetition and saliency (Balzacq, 2010; and Bohman, 2011), as would be the case in a time of
stress such as a referendum. Further, some scholars highlight that human actions are regulated through *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1990), meaning that human beings are products of their environment. This habitus is created through the power of discourse (Balzacq, 2010). Therefore, it is important to understand how discourse is used within institutions. Schmidt and Radaelli suggest that investigating institutional transformation through a discursive lens will equip researchers to better understand how actors in various institutional settings are able to change values, institutions, and cultural aspects with new ideas (2004).

This paper employs Discursive Institutionalism (DI) in order to examine the process of framing in each of the three cases studied. Discursive institutionalism (DI) is concerned about two factors in political science research: the communication of ideas (or frames) and the institutional setting through which frames are conveyed through discourse (Schmidt, 2010). DI extends beyond the constraints of traditional institutionalisms and views institutions as dynamic — in contrast to the other neo-institutionalisms, which define institutions as static wherein change is often brought about by external factors. Discursive Institutionalists views ideas as dynamic institutions (Schmidt, 2010; Hajer, 2003; and Fischer, 2003).

DI is a comprehensive term that encompasses a wide array of literature. On the one hand, some works examine the functional applicability of ideational research, which includes general work such as that of Schmidt (2008) and Mehta (2010), as well as the research of policy ideas and paradigms (Hall, 1989; and Berman, 1998) and work that discusses normative ideas through the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989). On the other hand, further works investigate the ‘coordinative’ and the ‘communicative’, and/or ‘interactive’ processes, (Schmidt, 2002) through which frames and ideas are expressed (or performed) through discourse. This thesis develops its arguments on the basis of the communicative processes of political elites.
during the independence referenda in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland. While this research focuses on a particular institution in alignment with HI it pays closer attention to the influence of discourse than is usually given by scholars in HI tradition. For many Historical Institutionalists (such as Lieberman, 2005; Beland, 2005; King, 1999; and Rothstein, 2003) HI and DI can fit easily together (Schmitt, 2008) as where HI provides the structural context, DI provides the ideational clarification.

For instance, Beland highlights how the incorporation of ideas into core assumptions will expose how the ideational process matters in the agenda setting process in policy-making institutions. In fact, ‘ideational forces can become an independent variable’ to determine the framing of policy alternatives and development (Beland, 2005: 2). Beland stresses the importance of agenda-setting and policy paradigms that are framed by individual political actors (2005). Political actors must rely on frames in order to garner support for the policies they put forth. Thus, the discourse surrounding these policies and their alternatives merit attention as framing can impact all policy areas. King also incorporates ideas into his book on immigration policy in the UK and the US while heavily emphasized on the HI components his focus on the role of ideas and knowledge place his study closer to DI (1999). Further, scholars theorize that ideas are integral to problem-definition during the policy-making process (Beland, 2005). Such ideas can influence substantive aspects of the policy solution while motivating the political tactics elites may use in order to garner public support for their cause. Thus, ideas, expressed through political discourse, may expedite change by influencing public opinion and convincing interest groups and the public, that policy change is or is not necessary (Blyth, 2002; and Schmidt, 2002).
Examining the independence referendum process as an important political movement enables the research to uncover how, as an institution, the referendum constrains the actions of political actors inside of it while being “created and changed by [those same] actors” (Schmidt, 2008). It is, therefore, the shared ideas, interpretations, and meaningful attachments that conduct human behaviour. Discourses are recognised as both the consequence and vehicle of human action (Hajer, 1995). This work adheres to the basic assumptions of DI as it accepts that “institutional dynamics originate from the emergence of new ideas, concepts and narratives in society that institutionalize in social practices and that affect social outcomes” (Arts and Buzier, 2009: 340). Indeed, the institutional dynamics during the referendum period were created by frames and narratives articulated by the SSNPs with regard to immigrant attitudes.

As many sociologists have used framing to explain the process of social movements, the same logic can be applied to nationalist movements. Frames “operate by [re]activating information already at the recipients’ disposal” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997: 225) which is to say, that the frame is not new, as it has already been constructed or perceived through another source but is reinforced through political articulation. The literature highlights that political frames should be relevant to whom the message is intended (Snow, Tan, and Owens, 2013). For instance, how minority nationalists frame immigrants during the referendum periods may depend on how immigrants align themselves in the process. An analysis of political frames is used to understand the referenda ‘lock-in’ mechanism as the literature associates political articulation with anti-immigrant attitudes. Often the perceptions of immigrants are the result of context or of the images conveyed by the elites, as suggested by Bohman (2011). When main parties articulate certain frames, these perceptions of immigrants become activated and
normalized (Howard, 2009; Bohman, 2011). This literature provides the rationale for the examination of the SSNP elite discourse in the referendum process that I undertake in this thesis.

The scholarship on political articulation offers insight into the factors that influence anti-immigrant attitudes. Some studies suggest that political articulation may affect anti-immigrant attitudes by influencing the visibility of immigrants within society. If immigration becomes a salient political issue then prejudicial attitudes may arise due to increased visibility of the group. Allport stresses that visibility is a prerequisite for a minority group to become subject to negative perceptions (1954), evident in the referendum process. Moreover, some studies have shown that attitudes articulated by traditional parties have the most political impact (Bohman, 2011) and that the perceptions of immigrants portrayed in public space activities and states are more influential when made by pertinent political actors (Blumer, 1958). Likewise, political articulation may solidify anti-immigrant attitudes into “the sphere of acceptance” (Bohman, 2011; Rydgren, 2003; and Eatwell, 2003). In this regard, negative (and/or positive) attitudes can be normalized. This will further be elaborated in the theory section of this paper, but is mentioned here, as it is crucial to understand that much of the literature supports the rationale behind the construction of the referendum as a lock-in mechanism. Indeed, political discourse has the power to create, change and lock in perceptions of immigrants in minority nations.

Examineing institutional discourses has become a relatively ubiquitous approach in certain areas of contemporary political studies. Some works depict how the foreign population is conceptualized in institutions of power through discourse of the elite. The manner in which political elites frame events or policies in institutions may model behaviours and attitudes within the region. This may normalize certain appropriate behaviours and procure desired political outcomes (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). Discourses produced through the differential process can
also create *symbolic demarcation* that integrates the foreigner (Agrela, 2002). Discourse offered by political elites forms the way certain individuals or groups are framed through political articulation and, as such, much of the literature on framing seeks to understand under which conditions certain frames are created and politicized.

Existing works on discourse and nationalism emphasize the benefits of incorporating discourse analysis into the study of nationalism. Individual ‘nationalisms’ may be defined by a ‘particular content’ that constitute and disperse its common cultural and values through political ideological discourse (Finlayson, 1998). Moreover, the scholarship demonstrates that identity conflicts become salient when immigration is discussed repeatedly throughout political discourse (as it would be during the referenda) (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés- Mascareñas, 2010; Agrela, 2002; and Bohman, 2011). In fact, analytical overviews of national discourses on tolerance and cultural diversity reveal that politicians within diverse multinational state may avoid discussing immigration as it stirs up conflicts of identity (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés- Mascareñas, 2010). Thus, during periods of political stress, when identity divides become more salient, it is important to focus on the discourse of politicians in the SSNRs.

Other studies on nationalism highlight how rhetoric can ignite or diminish divides within regions or increase salient issues by investigating how and why certain discourses dominate independence movements. In some instances, elites advocate self-determination or devolution in the name of economic progress, whereas in other cases, self-determination movements may be based on ethnic identities (McCollom, Nowok, and Tidal, 2014; and Finlayson, 1998). Works on nationalist rhetoric compare a variety of attitudes from both the political elite to the public masses in order to illustrate the articulation of national identity by differing groups in different contexts through discourse analysis (Leith and Soule, 2011). Yet, few works have analyzed
discourse throughout the referendum period (see O’Connor 2006) and none have analyzed the impact of the discourse on the subsequent relationship between the minority nation and the immigrant population. My work contributes to the literature by incorporating a missing link in the determinants of nationalist attitudes towards immigrants in minority regions.
Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology

This thesis builds on the preexisting theoretical work that develops a complex causal chain whereby minority regions develop policies in response to the central government. The causal chain is illustrated in Figure 1. This section elaborates on the key elements of this causal chain and the assumptions that underpin it. It also outlines my own contribution, positing the role of independence referenda in the development of a lock-in mechanism. I argue that the discourse in minority regions toward immigrants is constructed in opposition to central government policies and discourses on immigration. Therein, immigrant communities become more or less disposed towards independence, and the political framing by the sub-state nationalist parties towards immigrant groups develops accordingly, creating a discursive feed-back loop thereafter.

Figure 1: The development of a lock-in mechanism

3. 1 Theoretical Assumptions

Based on an extensive literature review, my work rests on four hypotheses which serve to develop the theory of referenda as a lock-in mechanism and the causal chain displayed above:

1. Sub-state nationalists regions develop unique diversity policies in opposition to state immigration policies; therefore, diversity management becomes an important part in the nation-building effort.
Public policy has a dual purpose in SSNRs. It has the customary function of providing public goods, but it is also frequently used in order to build separate identity. Thus, public policies in these regions is often devised in opposition to the policies prevailing at the centre (Barker, 2015; Jeram, 2014; Hepburn, 2011; and Beland and Lecours, 2008). Immigration and integration policies serve a similar function. This premise highlights the first point on the causal path analysed, the role these policies play in the development of nationalist discourse towards immigrants. As mentioned, this dynamic constitutes the political background for this thesis, but I focus on the link between referenda on independence and minority nationalist discourses on immigration as will be set forth in my second claim. Although, the nationalist discourse during the referendum is relevant, it is the perceived behaviour of immigrants during the referendum that locks in the discourse. The discourse is the background whereas the referendum is the vehicle behind attitude solidification based on immigrant participation/behaviour in the process. The medium in these cases produces the ‘message’viii, which leads me to my second assumption.

2. Immigration becomes a more salient issue under times of political stress, i.e. an independence referendum.

An independence referendum is significant to both nationalist symbolism and separation from the multinational state. Moments for self-determination are rare in modern multinational states so they represent an important phase for those seeking independence through solidarity. Because it is so important, the referendum can become the medium for the solidification of nationalist discourse toward immigrants as well. Further, immigrant behaviour in this particular moment is more salient as it is an opportunity to show allegiance to the minority nation. The oppositional policies created by the nation-building process may generate diversity practices
wherein immigrants are perceived a certain way by the SSNRs. In one case, the minority region opposition results in more inclusive diversity policies and in the other, in more exclusive policies. In turn, in one case, immigrants might be more supportive of independentist movements and in the other, more supportive of the central government/preservation of the state. This, then may create an environment wherein immigrants may counter such policies by supporting the cohesion of the multinational state rather than the emancipation of the sub-state nationalist region. Therefore, this claim lends itself to my final two hypotheses on the importance of immigrant framing during the moment of self-determination.

3. Frames “operate by [re]activating information already at the recipient’s disposal” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997) which is to say, that the frame is not new, as it has already been constructed or perceived through another source but is reinforced through political articulation. For instance, how nationalist policies frame immigration are the underlying source for discursive framing in the independence referendum process.

In order for frames to be effective, the frame needs to be relevant to the experience of the participants (Snow, Tan, and Owens, 2013). The frame must also be significant to a larger belief system, while being salient to multiple values and prevailing cultural narratives and symbols. Without this salience, the frame may be discounted by the recipient audience (Snow and Benford, 1988). Indeed, immigrant frames created prior to and during the independence referendum are relevant to the nationalist movements as immigrants are perceived either to aid or to undermine self-determination for the minority nation. Nationalist movements akin to social movements, function to construct meaning for it participants and its opponents (Snow and Benford, 1988).
Throughout the referendum period, many examples of ‘frame amplification’ (Snow et al., 1986) may be observed. Frame amplification denotes the “clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events” (Snow et al., 1986: 469). Such an interpretive frame may stimulate the importance of existing beliefs or values. The analysis that I undertook for each case study points to the use of frame amplification by political elites in order to highlight the involvement (or lack thereof) of immigrant communities in the sovereignty movement. Such analysis has led me to view the referendum as lock-in mechanism for SSNP’s discourse and my final hypotheses.

4. Minority nationalists’ perceptions of immigrant communities can be secured and normalized through increased framing process and political articulation especially when linked to political opportunity.

Importantly, I show how the discourse developed prior to the referendum by the minority nationalist movements and continued throughout the process is locked-in throughout the referendum period. The immigrant community position on the referendum (i.e. whether they are more or less disposed toward independence) will act as the mechanism that will lock in the minority nationalist discourses on immigrants. This mechanism is fed by the increased frame repetition (and amplification) articulated by SSNP’s political elites toward immigrant communities. The perceptions of immigrants become normalized in the referendum process. Further, a referendum, due to its symbolic salience as a 'test of loyalty', is a very special kind of an event that can be framed differently. The way in which immigrants are framed by movement actors can depend on the extent they constrain or facilitate the group’s collective action (i.e. the bid for independence). In other words, framing process and political opportunities can be interactively linked (Koopsman and Duyvendak, 1995).
These four hypotheses allow me to highlight the causal chain that shows the link between the independence referendum process and sub-state nationalists attitudes towards immigrant communities. I construct my argument through an examination of the discourse and policy development of sub-state nationalist regions (SSNRs) toward immigrants during the referendum period. Through the use of process tracing, I argue that without a referendum the minority nationalist perceptions of immigrant communities would be subject to greater flexibility of interpretation with a higher likelihood of variation in political attitudes. In other words, the independence referenda act as lock-in mechanisms that secure the immigrant identity frames presented by SSNP elites.

3.2 Methodological Considerations

I have chosen a small-n comparison for my analysis as it allows for theory building and tentative theory-testing by examining in more detail the political circumstances of Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland. This comparison supports the conceptualization of a referendum as a lock-in mechanism through political narrative. I compare how despite differences in the institutional make up of each of these cases, the independence referendum process presents as a lock-in mechanism in each case. This comparison allows me to illustrate that minority nationalist’s perceptions of immigrant groups can affect the immigrant groups’ involvement in the referendum, therefore, locking in discourse in multiple contexts. The project examines similar political movements in order to determine the impact of independence referendum in different cases.

The cases I have selected represent differing autonomous projects. Quebec holds the most autonomous powers of the three sub-states being examined and is situated in a federal system in conjunction with the other provinces of Canada. Quebec has more control over the
immigration process than Catalonia or Scotland. It also maintains the least immigrant friendly policies and attitudes. Quebec has held two referenda, one in 1980 and the second in 1995, both resulting in a ‘no’ vote winning the majority.

Catalonia has less autonomy than Quebec, but more than some other regions in Spain. As an ‘autonomous community’ it does hold some power over certain policies such as the socioeconomic integration of immigrants, yet little control over the immigration process itself. Unlike Canada, Spain is functionally, though not constitutionally, a ‘quasi-federal state’. This relationship gives Catalonia the capability to implement some policies, but little constitutional power with regard to immigration. The lack of constitutional sway also prevents Catalonia from officially seceding from the country, as they are not constitutionally permitted to hold an independence referendum, despite their efforts in the process in 2014\textsuperscript{ix} and 2015.

Lastly, Scotland is a devolved region in the unitary state of the United Kingdom and maintains certain control over education and health, which can be useful in the integration process, but holds no power over immigration procedures. Of the three cases at hand, the Scottish Government appears to foster the most positive opinion towards immigration, in which its main political parties seem united in the quest for independence. In 2014, Scotland held its first independence referendum with many immigrants voting ‘yes’ and with many also participating in the ‘yes’ campaigns.

The cases at hand were chosen for their variance, but also for their use of referenda in the nation-building process. The differences in political make–up between these regions strengthens the theoretical conception of a referendum as a lock-in mechanism as they highlight that this occurrence can happen in different countries. The temporal variance between the individual referenda also contributes to the argument, as it is the referendum process analyzed as critical
instance in a nation’s political history that allows this project to understand how immigrant perceptions are formed and locked in.

My work seeks to evaluate the development of the political discourse toward immigrant populations during the independence referendum process. The goal is to investigate one particular similarity within different political systems. Comparing cases in multiple ‘sub-systemic settings’ (Anckar, 2008) facilitates a focus on fewer variables and provides more detail on the cases being analyzed. In other words, by focusing on the referendum period in differing cultural contexts allows my research to analyze similar outcomes in each case.

I analyze government documents produced by the CiU, PQ (and Bloc Québécois), and SNP, in addition to political speeches by their parties’ main advocates in order examine how immigrants were framed in the independence process. I also evaluate various media, and other secondary sources including election polls. Through process tracing, I reconstruct the discourse and policy development that occurred before, during, and after the referendum in each case. Process tracing allows me to build the causal chain that has led to the model of the referendum as a lock in mechanism as it is exceptionally suited to identifying causal paths in circumstances of complex and interactive causality (Vlamskamp, 2009). The reconstruction of the developments in the discourse and policy patterns enables me to present a clear causal chain for analysis. Process tracing highlights the referendum to be a key determinant in the lasting rhetoric used by minority nations toward immigrant communities.

This analysis seeks to highlight referenda as a critical point in the nationalist objectives in each of these regions. In each of the case studies, I analyze the political articulation directed toward immigrants by the elites of the SSNPs. Examining political articulation enables me to highlight its causal impact on the perceptions of immigrant groups and, consequently on their
behaviour in the referendum process. This creates a feedback loop in each case between the minority regionalists’ views of immigrants and subsequent immigrant behaviour.

This chapter has highlighted the theoretical and methodological considerations of this project. The following chapters apply these considerations to each of the case studies at hand. Ultimately, I demonstrate, through various examples of discursive and anecdotal evidence as well as secondary sources analysis, how rhetoric used by SSNPs political elites in the independence referendum process affects nationalist immigrant perceptions thereafter.
Chapter 4: Quebec Case Study

Immigration is a central political issue in Canada, and by extension, in Quebec as well. The history of immigration in Quebec is complex as it was coupled with the rise of French Nationalism in the 1960s. During this time, French Canadians were primarily concerned for the survival of their unique identity in terms of language, society, and culture. Therefore, this case study begins by outlining the historical background on immigrant and language policy in Quebec, particularly from the impact of the Parti Québécois (PQ). This is followed by a discussion on the immigration policies and discourse that were developed in Quebec in opposition to Ottawa’s policy of multiculturalism. Furthermore, this analysis highlights an important dynamic between French and English speakers in the province and how this dynamic is further complicated by immigrant allophone speakers.

The second section of the case study examines the independence referendum period and outlines the relationship between the PQ and immigrants during the process. This section also highlights the influence of the central government in Ottawa on voters within the region. Through an analysis of discourse and secondary sources, such as reports and polls, the referendum period is shown to lock-in political discourse towards immigrants. It appears that the needs of immigrants continue to be secondary to the demands of the French identity following the referendum. While immigrants were not a prominent political issue prior to the referendum they became politicized throughout the referendum (a time of political stress in Quebec), but were not framed as part of the nationalist fabric. This lack of inclusion in such a political process consequently impacted the support for sovereignty amongst immigrant voters. It is important to note that of the cases examined here, Quebec appears the least welcoming with regards to attitudes and policies directed towards immigrants, resulting in immigrant groups supporting a
unitary Canada. Lastly, the third section of the case study examines the post–referendum period in Quebec in order to determine what happened as a result of the referendum.

4. 1 Immigration, Language and Interculturalism in Quebec

Until the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, the general policies of the Quebec government deterred immigration in order to maintain the unique character of French Quebec (Hepburn, 2011). Yet, throughout the same period, the immigration of various other cultural groups (especially, Vietnamese, Haitians, Latin Americans and Lebanese) was needed to boost a declining population in the province. Quebec depended on immigrant arrivals throughout the 1970s and 1980s (and beyond) in order to mitigate population decline from low fertility rates and outward migration. A Quebec-specific immigration policy would therefore allow the province to recruit more French-speakers, potentially alleviating some of the population challenges while maintaining a certain level of national identity. In order to accomplish such a policy, the Quebec government requested more autonomy in the selection of immigrants (Hepburn, 2011).

Elected for the first time in 1976, the PQ continued the immigration negotiations that the Quebec Liberals had previously started with the federal government in order to attract and retain French-speaking immigrants while seeking greater immigration control for the region (Hepburn, 2011). The legislation they put forward in 1979 provided the foundation for the 1991 Accord that the Quebec Liberal Government signed with the Canadian Federal Government. The PQ had advocated since 1979 for greater autonomy for the province, in regards to immigration control and the selection of immigrants from French-speaking countries. This policy objective was achieved in 1991 with the Canada-Quebec Accord, which formally broadened the abilities of the Quebec government by granting Quebec control over sixty percent of its immigration population and provided them control of the selection and integration of immigrants (Kelley & Trebilcock,
The adoption of the Canada-Quebec Accord has consequently resulted in Quebec having its own points-based system for immigration that does not require major input from the federal government. Accordingly, Quebec actually uses greater points of discretion than the federal government when choosing immigrants for their region. For instance, candidates are graded under a 22 point scale for “personal suitability” (Canada, 1991), compared to the 10-point scale under the federal immigration program. Candidates for the Quebec region were also graded under “personal quality, motivation and knowledge of Quebec” (Canada, 1991). Each applicant was given 12 points for knowledge of the French language, while English language skills only grants them two points (Canada, 1991). Immigration policies in Quebec were specifically designed to attract and retain immigrants that would appropriately contribute the Quebec nation without harming its cultural integrity.

When the PQ government returned to power in 1994, they designed immigration and educational policies that would facilitate access to French-language courses and promote the integration of immigrants in Quebec society. Despite Canada being a country built on immigration, most of the past provincial departments of education have had historically assimilating educational policies (Ghosh, 2001). Therefore, while those in the rest of English-speaking Canada have received education from the angle of an Anglo-dominated culture, those in Quebec have been assimilated in the same vein, but through the French language and with a concentration on Quebec culture (Ghosh, 2001). Such a society implies there is no acceptance, or rather a lack of recognition of cultural differences, except between the ‘dominant’ English and the ‘subordinate’ French for ethnic groups in all of Canada and Quebec. Historically, in all regions of the country, racial and ethnic differences were ignored in an effort to diminish the characteristics of non-dominant groups (Ghosh and Abdi, 2004). The exclusion of the ‘other’ in
Canada, as can be seen in Quebec, was structural, and perpetuated through negation and language (Ghosh and Abdi, 2004). The historical impact of this exclusion is important to understanding the divide between French and English groups. This divide has allowed politicians to ignore other ethnic pressures within Quebec.

The creation of a dichotomy between those who speak French, and those who do not, may extend beyond English speakers during a time of political turbulence such as the referendum. The creation of the ‘other’ in Quebec is the result of structural changes to Quebec legislature that were implemented in order to safeguard the French language from increasing immigrant patterns (Ghosh, 2004). Those who do not incorporate themselves into the French-speaking group may not be seen as part of the Québécois national community, and then may be framed as outsiders.

The link between immigration and language use in Quebec is a particularly important one. In 1974, French became the sole official language of Quebec. In 1977, Bill 101 was introduced, which made it law that all children, save those with English parents, be educated in French. Immediate controversy followed this Bill as it gave primacy to the rights of Francophones as a collective over the individual rights of non-Francophones. However, the preference of most Quebec immigrants has been to send their children to English schools “for economic and social prestige reasons” (Ghosh, 2004: 558). The ability to speak English would also provide them with a greater connection to the rest of Canada, meaning with changes such as Bill 101 many immigrants during this time were less sympathetic to the PQ and the sovereignty agenda (Ghosh, 2001).

Bill 101 was the first significant change brought forth by the PQ government and highlights an important aspect of sub-state national party politics as it demonstrates that ‘integrating’ immigrants to suit the nationalist project begins with education. Notably, this Bill
also came shortly after the Federal Official Languages Act, which made both French and English the official languages of Canada, and was presented during a time when the Federal Government under Pierre Trudeau was encouraging a pan-Canadian identity that embraced bilingualism. In its response, the PQ instead attempted to embrace the French Québec identity for the province. This was, however, met with discontent amongst immigrants wishing to learn English (Ghosh, 2004).

In 1978, extending on the French educational initiatives in schools, the PQ government developed the Policy on Cultural Development, which stipulated the importance of diversity in the establishment of a common society through the French Language. This policy was ultimately developed into the intercultural initiatives that were established in response to the multiculturalism policies set forth by the Federal Canadian Government. With regards to education, “Intercultural Education” was to be the method for integrating newcomers to the province (Ghosh, 2004). Education policies in Quebec, theoretically, created “‘new efforts to integrate immigrant students and prepare the whole student population to participate in social integration in democratic, Francophonic, pluralistic Quebec’” (Quebec, 1998: v). SSNPs, in general, and the PQ in particular, noted that (French) Education would play a key role in ensuring the social order of the nation.

For Quebec, interculturalism means a society that is pluralistic in outlook, but Francophone through its reliance on the use of the French language. It is the immigrants' responsibility to acquaint themselves with the ‘‘cultural codes of the new society and redefine one’s identity to reconcile these values with those of one’s original culture’’ (Quebec, 1990: 45). As Québécois national project aims to protect the erosion of Francophone identity from the English Canadian majority, the needs of other cultural communities become secondary in that
they are met through the context of "Quebec nationalism and not based on their own merit" (Ghosh, 2004: 561). This means that despite their unique views and cultural practices, immigrant demands (educational, economic, etc.) are met through a French lens in order to benefit the nationalist movement. While language learning is essential, it is not an adequate requirement to enhance the overall intercultural education in Quebec. Meeting the rudimentary equality needs of cultural communities continues to occupy little space for concern in Quebec education and society (Ghosh, 1995), in which Quebec’s concentration on the French versus English dichotomy pushed immigrant Allophones in the region to the background.

Despite this apparent disparagement, the educational initiatives set forth by the PQ have in some way aided their pro-independence agenda. For many immigrants whose children (or they themselves) have been educated under Bill 101, a level of sympathy towards the sovereignty movement is more readily identified (Duerr, 2011). These individuals are more recent arrivals from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, and have not been exposed to the previous ethnic-based nationalist policies (Duerr, 2011). Long-term immigrant groups such as Greek, Italian, and Jewish immigrants, however, are less sympathetic towards the PQ as the sovereignty movement to them is defined more on ethnic lines.

Contemporary Canada and Quebec are both very ethnically, racially, and culturally diverse, yet use different tools when approaching immigration and diversity. Canada upholds a policy of multiculturalism in which individuals are encouraged to retain and share their cultural heritage. Quebec (especially under the PQ) has adamantly rejected this ‘Canadian’ model of diversity and uses its own policy of interculturalism. Notably, this method is seen as weakening the bi-national conception of Canada (McRoberts, 1997). Historically, Quebec perceives multiculturalism as a rejection of the English–French Canadian identity and one that undermines
the distinct society of French Quebec through embracing all cultural communities that exist within Canada. With the resurgence of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism investigated the relationship between Francophones and Anglophones and the binary nature of Canadian society, and concluded instead that there were more than two cultures in Canada. The concept of Canadian multiculturalism emerged after the Commission (Hanson, 1992; Gagnon, 2000; Tremblay, 2010-1; McRoberts, 2001) and Pierre Elliott Trudeau formalized a Canadian multiculturalism policy in 1971.

Some scholars argue that Trudeau may have developed multiculturalism as a tool to integrate Quebec Francophones into the rest of Canada (McRoberts, 2001; Classon and Howes, 2012). This perception has certainly been viewed through the political discourse in Quebec as all elected governments of Quebec have firmly rejected federal multiculturalism (Bouchard, 2010-11, p. 462). The perception that multiculturalism was intended to weaken Quebec and its nationalist aspirations is quite common in Quebec politics and has infiltrated the way in which cultural communities are discussed. Ultimately, Quebec views multiculturalism as way to demean Quebec culture as a part of the ‘Canadian cultural mosaic’ instead of as a distinct society and a nation, which delegitimizes Quebec’s nation-building policies (Tremblay, 2010; Bouchard, 2010; McRoberts, 2001; Blad and Couton, 2009). Consequently, multiculturalism disagrees that Quebec should be able to institute itself as the main rallying point of identity for its inhabitants (Gagnon, 2000).)

The PQ has fostered policies of interculturalism in response to Canada’s multiculturalism strategy. Quebec has actively rejected both the federal policies of bilingualism and of multiculturalism and developed a unique intercultural political approach to diversity that is explicitly in opposition to Federal Canadian multiculturalism (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007: 96).
Throughout the 1970s Canada saw an influx of immigrants from various countries. Under the Trudeau government, the 1976 Immigration Act saw individuals arriving from ‘non-traditional’ countries, coupled with an increase in “visible minorities”\(^\text{xi}\). At the same time, Quebec began pursuing its own methods of immigration and integration. The 1970s were a time of rebellion for the PQ against federal government policies and initiatives, which culminated in Quebec’s first unsuccessful independence referendum in 1980.

The PQ views diversity as an opportunity to build on the notion of Quebec as a shared nation for all of its residents. One distinction between multiculturalism and interculturalism is that in Canada identity can be hyphenated. For example, someone originating from Iraq would be Iraqi-Canadian. Whereas in Quebec, everyone becomes ‘Québécois’. While interculturalism appears akin to assimilation, as no one maintains the identity of their country of origin, it distinguishes itself by expecting all newcomers to affect the culture of the province given their background. Immigrants can help shape Quebec culture, but they cannot maintain long-term connections to their ancestral roots (Duerr, 2011). Immigrants to Quebec are expected to learn the (French) language, while acquiring a Quebec identity. Many members of the PQ argue that it is up to the individual to choose the language spoken at home and one’s religion (Duerr 2011).

The influx of immigrants to Canada and the rise of the sovereignty movement in Quebec ran historically parallel to one other. While the PQ has attempted to include new arrivals into the province it has a hard time convincing all immigrants towards the sovereignty movement. Québécois nationalism is derived from “a homogenous tradition, whereby the population was historically French speaking, ethnically homogenous, and Catholic” (Duerr, 2011: 4). Therefore, some believe that Quebec independence has only significance to those with French ancestry. In this vein, interculturalism should provide “the key element... to a common purpose in public
matters” and a more cohesive path for self-determination in Quebec (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 96). Interculturalism, as shown through Quebec’s integration strategies, is supposed to create unity amongst all residents in Quebec by offering “a centre which also serves as a marker of identity in the larger society and denotes in itself a pole of allegiance for all citizens” (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 96).

Immigrants, however, threaten this cohesion by choosing the English-speaking culture over its French counterpart. Therefore, immigrants threaten the French collectivity indirectly by increasing Anglophone numbers and reinforcing their institutions (Breton, 1988). In this vein, Quebec’s political discourse may often be voiced as suspicious of immigrant populations. Correspondingly, much discursive evidence highlights the xenophobic comments that have come from various people in leadership positions and at different levels in the movement (Duerr 2011, Saywell 1977). For instance, the PQ founder Rene Lévesque once wrote on “the mission of our race” (Saywell 1977, 2), which emphasized ethnicity and marginalized others that fell outside this traditional identity.

Upon re-election in 1994, some efforts were made by the PQ to garner immigrant support through civic nationalist lines in preparation for the second referendum in 1995. Some attempts were made to facilitate immigrant’s access to French courses in an effort to better integrate them into Quebec Society (Hepburn, 2011). PQ policies, however, offered many contradictions in regards to attitudes towards immigrant groups. While the PQ’s official line had become that a Québécois was whoever chose to live in Quebec, they had also implemented a new computerized Quebec electoral list that required proof of Canadian citizenship (Smith, 2013). The new system would cross check each voter through a service provided by the Quebec Health Insurance Board. This system was anticipated to disprove the eligibility of thousands of immigrants who had voted
illegally in the past. Logically, I assume that in such a close campaign that could be decided by fewer than 100,000 votes, invalidating non-eligible immigrants, traditionally pro-federalist, could prove beneficial to the sovereignty movement.

Discursive evidence also shows similar contradictions in the PQs attitudes towards immigrants. Bernard Landry (when PQ vice-president) was often quoted saying that “*pure laine* belongs to the textile industry and not to Quebec sociology” (Thanh Ha, 2015). This statement insinuated that the out-of-fashion term *pure laine* — used for the traditional Québécois identity of a ‘homogenous French and catholic culture’— was no longer what the PQ party represented. In these statements, Landry had become the PQ’s ‘ambassador’ to the ethnic communities. Yet, only a year before the referendum, Landry stated that it was not “healthy that democracy in Montreal is at the complete mercy of the vote of ethnic communities” (Turner 1995). Philippe Pare, Parizeau’s consultant, also thought, “that non-French speakers should abstain from the vote and let Francophones settle the issue themselves” (Turner 1995).

At a January 1993 nomination meeting in the Charlevoix riding, Parizeau claimed that the Charlottetown accord had been vetoed in Quebec mainly thanks to francophone voters. Parizeau had stated that that it “proves [that] when we Québécois, *Francophones de souche*, want something democratically, we are able to get it” (Thanh Ha, 2015). Later Mr. Parizeau tried to amend himself by stating that “a Québécois is whoever wants to be a Québécois” (Thanh Ha, 2015) but the damage had already been done. Ultimately, these examples serve to set the political foreground as Quebec enters the referendum period in 1995. As will be highlighted in the following sections, while Québécois nationalism prior to the 1995 referendum moved in the direction of civic variety, it nevertheless retained ethnic elements. Because of this, it was a nationalism that was perceived as ethnically exclusive by many immigrant voters. Such a
perception may have consequences for the support of sovereignty amongst the immigrant demographic. This perception is now explored throughout the period of the referendum campaign and following the vote.

4.2 The 1995 Independence Referendum

In 1995, Quebec, under the PQ government, held its second independence referendum. This thesis examines the referendum period from September 1995, when the National Assembly was presented with a Bill outlining the conditions for a sovereign Quebec. The independence referendum process was to run similar to a provincial election campaign with the "Yes" camp led by ‘Le Comité national du OUI’, and the "No" camp led by ‘Le Comité des Québécoises et des Québécois pour le NON’. The Parti Québec leader, Jacques Parizeau, headed the Yes Campaign, while the No campaign was led by Québec Liberal leader, Daniel Johnson, and backed by the Federal Government under the Jean Chrétien Liberal Administration. The referendum question asked: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”

Up until a few weeks before the vote, the NO side had been garnering the most support. This prompted Parizeau to give way to the charismatic Lucien Bouchard as chief negotiator. Bouchard appealed to the Québécois desire for change and to finding a solution to the longstanding issues with Canada through a new partnership rather than separation. Bouchard was so appealing to the public that his comments towards Québécois as a "white race" with the lowest birthrate, stating; “we’re one of the white races that has the fewest children”, went without much controversy (Cardinal 2005). The discursive repercussions of such a statement, however, are important to note. When political leaders use such terminology, they insinuate that
the national project is focused on ethnic components, not to mention such statements are
marginalizing to non-white cultural communities. Moreover, the absence of political backlash for
such a statement underlies an important theme in Quebec politics, that oftentimes immigrant
groups have simply been ignored.

Notably, Suzanne Tremblay, a MP with the Bloc Québécoisxiv, did receive more criticism
than Bouchard for her comments regarding the name of Montreal based Journalist Joyce Napier
(whose parents are of Egyptian origin) (Vancouver Sun, 1995). When Napier questioned
Tremblay on how minority Francophones outside of Quebec would be supported in the case of a
successful independence referendum, Tremblay responded by saying that Napier's family name
and lack of a Québécois accent made her question irrelevant (Edmonton Journal, 1995). This was
a clear ethnic insinuation based on Napier’s family’s heritage, highlighting the underlining ethnic
national themes as presented by members of the PQ and BQ.

Another example that demonstrates the sparking divide between French Québécois and
the immigrants also comes from Tremblay. During the referendum campaign, Suzanne Tremblay
criticized Liberal Leader Daniel Johnson for his statement that all Canadians (except aboriginals,
but including Québécois) are immigrants to Canada. Tremblay stated that "we came first, the
others arrived later" and "treating us all as immigrants is reducing us all to the rank of ethnic
groups"(Ditchburn, 1995). Tremblay’s attitudes marginalized newcomers and aided in the chasm
between immigrant groups and sovereigntists. As voiced by Aminata Diabate, a Guinean who
came to Quebec a generation ago, “comments like [Tremblay’s] are alienating [to] potential
sovereignty supporters” (Ditchburn, 1995). While Diabate is a native French speaker, she freely
admits that she does not find solidarity in the sovereignty movement, as she has nothing in
common with sovereigntists (Ditchburn, 1995).
Such examples emphasize the antagonistic relations that developed between sub-state nationalist regional (SSNR) party members and immigrants throughout the referendum period. Other scholars, such as Breton (1988), O’Shea (2000) and Hepburn (2011), however, argue that while some attempts were made by the party to secure their votes, immigrant voters did not usually support the PQ. Many immigrant voters do not believe the PQ to be a representative of their interests (Hepburn, 2011). It is conceivable that many immigrants have strong feelings for Canada because they chose to come to Canada for a better life (Handler, 1988). Canada as a country has provided this life for many immigrants and their families. Therefore, many immigrants may not hold their allegiance to Quebec but to Canada as a whole. Numerous immigrants are opposed to Quebec sovereignty because they have already devoted significant means into becoming Canadian citizens (Handler, 1988: 178). Discursive examples also show this impression exists among separatist parties in Quebec. During Question Period in October of 1995, a Bloc Québécois MP questioned the rapid rate in which newcomers to Quebec were being granted Canadian citizenship during the month of October prior to the referendum. It was suggested that citizenship applications were being hurried for immigrants who would most likely vote ‘No’ (Canada, 1995).

A discursive analysis of immigrant opinions highlights their perception of the PQ and the BQ. This examination offers important insinuations for their voting patterns and support throughout the sovereignty movement. For some immigrants the sovereignty movement appealed to them as they could relate to it based on their own struggles with national aspirations in their home countries. For example, Kurdish immigrant Arthur Kaplan stated that “Kurds [understood the movement] because [they] have been struggling for the same thing” (Ditchburn, 1995). Kaplan had actually been a member of the BQ ethnic commission, but left soon after (along with
four others) as he felt that the immigrant members were “there to represent ethno-cultural communities in the sovereigntist movement but [the BQ] just wanted us to be puppets” (Ditchburn, 1995). While such examples hint that the efforts of the sovereignty moment to appease immigrant voters may have been simply political window-dressing, they more importantly demonstrate the existence of similar perceptions within the immigrant community.

Admittedly, not all immigrant groups were against the sovereignty movement. There existed a few groups, such as the coalition of Latin American Quebecers, who represented approximately 20 to 35 per cent of the 5,000-strong community that supported the movement. Some Arab Quebecers were also not content with Federal Liberal attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic communities, as voiced by the president of the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations who stated: “Our community has felt a blatant elitist arrogance on the part of the federal government” (Ditchburn, 1995). Nevertheless, some Italian, Greek and Jewish groups were very politically active for the No campaign and had impressive success in their endeavours. Spokespeople from the Jewish, Greek and Italian National Congresses worked together in order to have greater impact on the separatist debate. While the individuals who are considered part of the immigrant groups may have their own unique origins and demands, they may also share similar interests. So while there was some discontent toward the Canadian Federal Government, as was exhibited by the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, the majority of support from immigrants was directed towards the No campaign.

The preceding examples highlight the contradictory political actions that are found throughout the referendum period and how the period itself heightened the disconnection between the main separatist groups and immigrant voters. Throughout, and prior to the referendum period, members of the PQ and the Bloc Québécois had either ignored or alienated
immigrant groups. While many political speeches and statements do not specifically outline discontent towards immigrants, the racial insinuations are evident (Duerr, 2011). Significantly, the referendum period appeared to highlight a widening chasm between immigrants and Francophones in terms of who should be deciding Quebec’s fate.

Discursive evidence leading up to the referendum vote highlights the existence of this growing divide and strengthens the concept of Francophones as insiders and immigrants as outsiders. A week before the final vote was held public opinion polls suggested that the majority of Francophone Québécois would vote for independence. However, the 1.1 million Anglophone and allophone votes could have provided federalists a narrow victory. In this vein a “linguistic canyon between voters” may have provoked fears of backlash from those working on both the Yes and the No campaigns (The Daily News, 1995).

Some critics questioned why Francophone Québécois should not get to decide the fate of Quebec for themselves, stating that it was “too bad that mass immigration and the English could overturn a unanimous decision of Francophone Quebecers” (The Daily News, 1995). Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau was further criticized for expressing a similar viewpoint in a statement that preceded his election in 1994, in which he argued that “old-stock Quebecers” could win a referendum (The Daily News, October 22, 1995). During Parizeau’s campaign he also had to let go of his consultant, Pierre Bourgault, after Bourgault forewarned of the difficulties that would evolve if Anglophones and ethnic voters held back the will of the francophone majority (The Daily News, October 22, 1995).

During the referendum period, many former politicians cautioned towards the developing linguistic and ethnic divide that was occurring. Former Liberal Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, warned that ‘social peace’ could be threatened by this kind of linguistic divide. It was
becoming evident a No vote may lead to a volatile post-referendum dynamic between Francophones and the ‘other’, which risked moving from the “fringes to the frontlines” (The Daily News October 22, 1995). For this reason, Bourassa advised against targeting any single demographic group after the referendum results were counted as it would be “risky to identify certain groups and say it's because of old people or non-Francophones or women” (The Daily News October 22, 1995). Other politicians, such as Lucien Bouchard, also cautioned against the development of this divide earlier in 1994. Former Mulroney Cabinet Minister, Marcel Masses also suggested the post-referendum would be challenging after a No vote as "it will be a big clash six or seven months after (a No vote) when they will realize for the first time since 1759 the majority of Francophones have no control of their land.... that will be a big shock" (The Daily News October 22, 1995).

The role of immigrant groups is a very delicate and ambiguous subject in Quebec, yet remains a consistent feature in the region’s politics. With such a public role within politics, a loss for the separatists could provoke tensions between the two groups. Scholars at the time predicted this same dynamic as they argued that Francophones might feel Anglophones and immigrants should not have a role in their destiny (Simard, 1995). As an attachment to Quebec, as the national region is not perceived in immigrant groups, the francophone groups may feel betrayed by ‘outsiders’, while it was not “politically correct to say it too openly ” (Simard,1995). Ultimately, the perception of the immigrant groups as the ‘other’ plays a large role in how they may or may not support for the sovereigntist movement in Quebec.

Important to address is the fact that much of the preceding analysis comes from English sources. The occurrence of this is somewhat intentional as the English media sources are more pertinent to this discussion for two reasons. Firstly, immigrants tend to learn English and would
assumedly pay more attention to English news sources. Secondly, these media outlets perpetuated the rhetoric used by the separatist politicians and consequently contributed to the way immigrants were framed throughout the referendum. While French media sources show some integrationists attitudes; they mostly come from Bernard Landry. As previously mentioned, Landry was dedicated to merging concepts of Francophone Quebec with that of non-Francophones. Despite his efforts for the party, however, the nationalism of the PQ was slow to fully integrate non-Francophones to his conception of the Quebec nation (Legault, 1995). Aside from the commitments published in various texts and party programs, it is clear that PQ still tends to appoint non-Francophones as an ‘other’ within their nationalist perceptions. The ‘other’, ‘the immigrant’, the ‘allophone’, and the ‘ethnique’, are rarely presented as an organic part of Quebec's collective identity (Legault, 1995). Such labeling makes it challenging for newcomers to become a part of the Quebec nation in any true fashion.

French sources also highlight the inconsistencies in the PQs ability to treat immigrants as part of Québécois national fabric. In attempting to integrate the immigrant they more often than not alienate them, which is a unique phenomenon in Quebec of the case studies analysed here. While Scottish and Catalan parties do create some social cohesion between immigrants and SSNPs, the same attachment to the nation is not found amongst the majority of the immigrant population in Quebec.

As was originally predicted, without this social cohesion many immigrants voted against the referendum in 1995. In the weeks leading up to the election polls forecasted a strong francophone majority for YES, and a non-Francophone vote for the NO (around 95%). The statistical analysis of voting cards indeed confirms the same voting patterns (Drouilly, 1995). While the exact results cannot be determined, based on country of origin, they can be determined
on linguistic lines. Based on an analysis of the referendum vote results, the polarization of the vote on a linguistic basis is strongest. As revealed in Pierre Drouilly’s (1995) analysis of the Quebec referendum results, language is a strong determining factor to explain voting behaviour. While the referendum was very close (50.6% NO to 49.4% YES), with 80 constituencies voting yeses and only 45 voting no, the imbalance present reflects the imbalance in the geographical distribution of voters according their mother tongue (Drouilly, 1995).

While almost all regions of Quebec voted yes, the pattern of votes in Montreal mirrors the region’s linguistic boundaries. The results obtained by the yes in the 125 constituencies are actually strongly linked to the percentage of Francophones in each of them (correlation 0.861). This relationship is obviously higher in the Montreal area, however, (correlation 0.959) than in the rest of Quebec (correlation 0.598). Conversely, the results of the no vote are strongly linked to the percentage of English voters (0.801 correlation) or allophones (0.626 correlation) (Drouilly, 1995).

The results highlight that perceptions leading up to the vote are confirmed by the analysis offered in Drouilly’s study. These perceptions have created immigrant identity frames presented by SSNP elites, thereby affecting voter choice by immigrant groups. The immigrant vote against independence, or more importantly the perception of this, feed back into Québecois hostility to immigrants as a possible threat to the national project. The independence referendum process in Quebec has acted as a lock-in mechanism that secures negative discourse towards immigrants that extend beyond the referendum period.

Ultimately, the infamous statement by Jacques Parizeau that the defeat of the yes vote in the 1995 sovereignty referendum should be blamed on “money and ethnic vote” has a twofold importance. Firstly, Parizeau played on perceptions built up throughout the referendum period.
Many immigrants did not vote for independence as the PQ and the Bloc have had difficulties in incorporating immigrants into the sovereignty movement. The alienation towards immigrants indeed continued and intensified during the referendum process. Secondly, Parizeau’s statement acts as an important discursive point for the argument of this thesis. As from this point, the relationship between immigrant groups and the PQ does not improve. The post referendum period will now be examined in the following section to understand how the referendum locked-in political discourse of the PQ towards immigrants.

4.3 After the 1995 referendum

The independence referendum process in Quebec exposed and intensified ethnic and national divides in the region (Cairns, 1996; McRoberts, 1997). Moreover, it worked against the sovereignty movement by increasing particularistic identities amongst immigrant (and English and aboriginal) populations to the detriment of the Francophone identity (Cairns, 1996). As demonstrated here and voiced elsewhere (Cairns, 1996; McRoberts 1997; Breton, 1988) the allure of the YES vote was to the Francophone majority, as the movement was intended to boost the French culture and language of the Québécois and not to improve the positions of minority groups; this intention was generally understood by immigrant groups (Cairns, 1996). As such, discursive examples, such as Parizeau’s ‘money and ethnic vote’ statement underlined the tensions existing within the region following the vote. The period of time from 1995-2001 exhibits further examples of national divides in the region and the unease created between immigrants and separatists, which was exemplified in policy and discursive developments. As will be demonstrated in the succeeding paragraphs, a feedback loop between anti-immigrant sentiments and immigrant unease leading into distrust of the sovereignty movement is developed in the region as consequence of the referendum period. To understand this feedback loop, I
begin by highlighting some discursive evidence from those involved in the sovereignty movement, which is followed by an examination of immigrant perceptions.

While Parizeau’s declaration was widely denounced, some separatists and scholars admit that it accentuates the thread of ethnocentrism and intolerance that can be found in the fabric of Francophone nationalism in Quebec (Turner, 1995; Cairns 1996; and McRoberts, 1997). Notably, Parizeau's remarks were not the only ones to cause controversy, as there were news reports of others in the separatist movement criticizing immigrants for their involvement in the loss (Thanh Ha, 1995; Mussally, 1996.) After the referendum, several news outlets reported that Deputy Premier Bernard Landry caused a disturbance at a hotel by ranting about the results of the vote to two immigrant employees, insinuating their involvement in the defeat of the independence referendum (Turner, 1995). An apology was made after the hotel incident, but Landry surrendered his cabinet post as immigration minister on November 10, soon following the incident. Separatist advocate, Pierre Bourgault, also exclaimed that it was the Jews, Italians, and Greeks of Montreal who are “racist” for voting as a bloc against sovereignty. Bourgault labeled these groups as “racist” due to their leaderships in the no campaign for the immigrant population (Turner, 1995). Such examples highlight the ‘us versus them’ rhetoric that is framed in the PQ and sovereigntist discourse.

Correspondingly, the way immigrants’ feel they are framed by SSNPs could impact how they feel about the sovereignty movement, which is what appears to have occurred in the referendum process. As such, the referendum results contributed to a new sentiment among allophone groups that opposed sovereignty and also Quebec nationalism itself (McRoberts, 1997). Some immigrant groups also feared public backlash following the results and statements made by certain political officials. Discursive evidence indicated that immigrants who have lived
in Quebec for decades now felt an unwelcome animosity, as if “in back of everyone's mind [they’re] not wanted here” (Mason, 1995). Such sentiments were particularly found in Montreal where thousands of immigrants from countries such as Greece, Haiti, Mexico, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and China voted against independence.

Additionally, those that were heavily involved in the campaign against the separatist option were left feeling threatened by repeated affronts against the ethnic minorities in Quebec (JTA, 1995). Bourgault’s accusation in November 1995, that the province’s Jewish, Greek and Italian communities are racist, but the Québécois are not, generated anxiety within the Jewish community (JTA, 1995). The Canadian Jewish Congress responded to Bourgault on behalf of the Quebec Jewish Community by stating that: “Pierre Bourgault’s remarks on ethnic communities are reprehensible, intolerant and reflect a profound disregard for democratic values as well as the fundamental right of all Quebecers to freely express their political opinion,” (Max Bernard; JTA, 1995). The Hellenic Congress of Quebec and the National Congress of Italian Canadians issued similar statements criticizing Bourgault and calling for social harmony in Quebec. Furthermore, anxiety surrounded the formation of a new right-wing nationalists group, the Quebec National Liberation Movement (MNLQ) that was created to specifically address the separatist cause.

Raymond Villeneuve, a separatist extremist involved in the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) in the 1960s, spearheaded the Quebec National Liberation Movement (MNLQ). Villeneuve stated that the new group would “seek to ostracize the foes of separatism” (JTA, 1995). Other goals for the group included “seeking a moratorium of immigration to Quebec, launching an ‘unrelenting struggle’ against Canadian domination and against the ‘internal enemies’ of Quebec, and the creation of an all-French school system”(JTA, 1995). In September
1996, Villeneuve made a statement that specifically targeted English speaking Jews for their venerable opposition to Bill 101 and the Quebec separatist movement, and offered a general warning that these communities will need to prepare for a free Quebec (Canadian Jewish News, 1996). Such statements focused attention on mainstream separatist parties, with the Federal Liberal Party attempting to link the Bloc to such statements, while the PQ attempted to distance itself. The official position of mainstream separatist parties is that every Quebecker is equal and that citizenship is defined by residence, not heritage. Many of the main advocates in the sovereignty movement, however, have been caught vocalizing the opposite.

The evidence in Quebec appears to indicate the development of a discursive feedback loop in the post-referendum period. Indeed, the referendum in Quebec locked-in a discursive feedback loop between immigrant unease and the development of anti-immigrant rhetoric as seen in figure 2.

_Figure 2: Discursive feedback loop in Quebec_
As this cycle became locked-in, following the disappointing loss in the referendum and controversial statement, Parizeau resigned his position as Premier and Parti Québec Leader. The party’s successor, Lucien Bouchard, worked quickly to draw attention away from the sovereignty question and move towards other issues in Quebec, such as the province’s public finances (McRoberts, 1997). Yet, as was discussed previously, the political tensions that had been opened during the referendum did not dissolve quickly. The following section of this chapter outlines that provincial policies also developed in a similar contentious manner.

In the December following the referendum, the PQ's National Council met to review various resolutions and proposals between conventions, and discuss the future of party leadership following Parizeau. Some members of the PQ were hoping to promote a harder line on the promotion of French Language and immigrant integration. In addition to choosing their new premier (which was thought to become and would become Lucien Bouchard), many proposals were submitted that outlined stricter language requirements. One proposal suggested the resurrection of the restrictive language requirements of Bill 101 that were passed by the first PQ government in 1977. Another proposal outlined “the imposition of unilingual French signs both inside and outside any private or public establishment in order that Québec have an essentially French face” (Herbert and La Pierre, 1995). Prior to this there had been various exceptions that allowed bilingual signs.

Another resolution highlighted the sovereigntists’ failure to win any significant support from Quebec immigrant communities in the October 30 referendum. Thus, the resolution called for an analysis of the ethnic vote and an effort to develop a new approach including ”political education and discussion(s) on sovereignty” (Herbert and La Pierre, 1995). These resolutions, however, came at a time when Bouchard had hoped to appease apprehensions in the province's
English-speaking and ethnic communities. In this vein, the party had little success in rebuilding its relationship with immigrants politically. In the 1998 election, the PQ in the Quebec National Assembly elected only one ethnic minority; all other minority members were Liberals.

Language also continued to be a factor that marginalized newcomers to the province. Quebec schools were to exemplify the Francophone vision by equipping students of all cultural communities with the French language skills necessary to contribute to the common Quebec identity. In the PQ government’s *Plan of Action 1998–2002*, the Francophone aspects of Quebec life were to override all others in order to ensure the survival of French Quebec. Therefore, the government made it a policy that schools and other educational institutions must present French as the more favourable linguistic option (Quebec, 1998).

After the events of September 11, 2001, the PQ struggled against racism in Quebec by mobilizing various government institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to counteract potential xenophobic reactions. Despite these efforts, and preceding the war in Iraq, Quebec residents of Iraqi origin feared that they would be “incarcerated as enemies of the state” if Canada, and by proxy Quebec, became too involved in the fight overseas (Labelle, 2003). However, my study emphasizes the pre-9/11 period because that was a separate factor that contributed to suspicion of (particular type) of immigrant in Quebec. However, political frames are operationalized by re-activating information that the frame recipients already know. In other words, political parties had already generated a level of resentment towards immigrants before and during the referendum period, particularly towards those who were not of Caucasian decent. 9/11 played upon aspects of framing, which was outlined in the theoretical section of this thesis. Evoking sentiments towards a particular population through framing may amplify particular emotions towards immigrant groups. Therefore, any pre-existing understandings may have
prepared people to feel in a particular way towards immigrants. While this evidence may be circumstantial, is important because, in the case of Quebec, the feedback loop was locked-in by the referendum process and continuously cycled attitudes thereafter.

One could argue that the logic of tensions started around the 1995 referendum continued in the 2000s, with the debates surrounding ‘reasonable accommodation’ of cultural differences and the passing of a ‘code of conduct’ by the town of Hérouxville (Duerr, 2011). In 2007, Hérouxville adopted a code of conduct for those living within its municipality. Commonly known as “The Standards”, this code defined immigrant integration through a one-sided approach, in which immigrants coming to the region have to abide by “The Standards” set forth by the town (Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2009). Such standards rejected things such as violence against women and children, abstinence, a lack of knowledge about Christian traditions, and an interest in religious schools. Many of the qualities rejected by “The Standards” were based on the stereotypes of an “extremist, radical, and violent Muslim”, which was circulated by Western media post 9/11 (Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2009). Within Hérouxville, immigrants presented as a potential threat to the dominant norms of the community, in which “The Standards” normalized and protected the community’s (constructed) collective identity against the arriving ‘other’. The construction of ‘the other’ in Hérouxville should be understood as part of a larger battle between national identity and immigration in Quebec (Nieguth and Lacassagne, 2009). Such a code that prohibited ‘non-Western’ practices was indicative of a greater population’s anxiety about the threats other cultural practices posed to the national culture of Quebec.

The political landscape that extends beyond formal policy and the media has also highlighted the ethnic nationalism that persists within Quebec. Macpherson argues that ethnic nationalism could be viewed as “le nationalisme identitaire”—identity nationalism...[yet]... it’s
the same old insecure, defensive nationalism of protecting ‘us’ against the exaggerated threat of ‘them’” (2007). While derogatory language was not found throughout the analysis of government speeches and documents, many of the current and former members of the PQ, or the sovereignty movement, made contentious statements regarding ethnicity in the media. In 2007, former PQ leader Andre Boisclair used the term “les yeux brides”, which exists as a derogatory expression about “slanting eyes”, and was obviously perceived as a slight toward people from East Asia (Robitaille, 2007). In March of 2015, PQ leader Pierre Karl Péladeau speculated that immigrants were harming the sovereignty movement. He stated that they wouldn’t “have 25 years ahead [of us] to realize sovereignty...with demographics, with immigration, it’s clear [we] lose a riding each year...[We the French] would like to have better control, but let’s not fool ourselves” (Authier, 2015).

The preceding case study demonstrated the outcomes of the independence referendum in Quebec. While only a few examples of the hundreds of samples available have been chosen, this evidence successfully demonstrates the political environment that exists in Quebec from a particular perspective. The first section of this case study provided a brief history and comparison of differing immigration policies in Quebec and Canada. Following this, the chapter linked to the referendum period and outlined the relationship between the PQ and immigrants during the referendum process. The third section reviewed the post referendum period in order to demonstrate how the referendum locked-in a particular political discourse of the PQ towards immigrants. Ultimately, this case study highlighted that the discourse used during the referendum was locked in by the referendum itself, consequently creating a feedback loop, which impacted policy development and discourse towards immigrants in Quebec. Lastly, this particular case study highlighted that while the sovereignty movement persists in Quebec, the
possibility that immigrants will remain to be seen as outsiders to the PQ is very high, due to the feedback loop being locked in place within society.
Chapter 5: Catalonia Case Study

Amongst the case studies presented, Catalan SSNPs appear to represent the middle ground between the SSNPs in Quebec and those in Scotland in regards to attitudes and policies directed towards immigrants. While Catalonia practices some assimilation policies in regards to immigration, it has also implemented more open immigration practices than the Spanish central government under the People’s Party (Partido Popular or PP) in Madrid. In comparison to the PQ in Quebec, discursive examples that may appear offensive to immigrant and minority groups are not as prominent in the sub-state nation’s main nationalist party, Convergence and Union or Convergència i Unió (CiU), rhetoric. Further, the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy present in my previous analysis of the PQ discourse is not as prevalent in CiU politics. While only five percent of immigrants see themselves as holding a Catalan identity over a Spanish identity, some evidence depicts a shared emotional bond between those born in Catalonia and those not, which is unique to this case study (MacInnes, 2006). This emotional bond has evolved as a result of the political mobilization of immigrant groups during the sovereignty movement and will be discussed in this case study analysis. These factors evidently influenced how immigrants were framed in Catalan’s November 2014 Independence Referendum and, by consequence, immigrant involvement in the sovereignty movement.

The first section of my case study outlines a brief history of immigration policy in Catalonia in order to understand link to the 2014 referendum itself. The second section of the case study discusses the independence referendum period and emphasizes the relationship between the CiU and immigrants during the process. In this section, I argue how the referendum period ultimately locks-in political discourse towards immigrants. The third section offers some predictions to how the locked-in discourse may continue post-referendum. This section also
examines how immigrants have become involved in the sovereignty movement since the
November 2014 Referendum, due to their emotional bond and political mobilization during the
referendum process.

5. 1 Political Developments on Immigration in Catalonia

Catalonia began to develop its own political competencies after Spain’s democratic
transition in the late 1970s. Throughout the Franco era, Catalan identity and autonomy were
stifled. The CiU was a key political party throughout the initial democratic transition and
beyond, having governed Catalonia from 1980 to 2003\textsuperscript{XV}. Foreign immigration was not a
particularly salient issue during democratic transition, as immigration rates did not increase until
the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was not until 1985 that the Spanish Parliament passed their first
act on immigration with the “Act on Foreign Nationals (Ley de Extranjería de 1985)”. In
response to the immigration concerns and policies put forth by the Spanish Government, Catalan
government adopted its own immigration policy, in which the immigrants were framed as both
“beneficial to the economy and Catalan nation” (Hepburn, 2011: 517). During these early stages
of democracy, the Catalan government began preparations for what would become an
unprecedented influx of immigration from outside of Spain. Throughout the first decade of the
21st century, immigration swelled at an exceptional rate in Catalonia as the immigrant
population grew from about 200,000 people to more than 1 million people (Hepburn, 2011). In
the year 2000, immigrants made up for about 2.9% of Catalonia’s population, but by 2011 they
had reached almost 16% of the populace (Climent-Ferrando, 2012).

Such an influx can explain why Catalonia advocated for greater control in regards to
immigrant management within their region, though enhanced autonomy on immigration issues
has been among Catalan demands since the transition. CiU governments from 1980 to 2003
accepted the arrival of immigrants and pursued resources to support their integration into Catalan society, as the 1978 Spanish Constitution did not outline immigration capacities that delimited governance and policy management amongst the first regional Statutes of Autonomy (Spain, 1978). Therefore, immigration in Spain, and by consequence in Catalonia, arose as an administrative issue in the 1990s and became a political and social issue in the next decade (Climent-Ferrando, 2012).

At first, the Catalan Government focused on managing immigration within the limits of its Statute of Autonomy. In the 1980s, the CiU ratified a language ‘normalisation’ law with aims to integrate “the non-Catalan population into the Catalan culture”, and to avoid the formation of ‘cultural ghettos’ (MacInnes, 2006). At this time, the CiU also supported immigrants with welfare state services and offered them free Catalan language classes. Such efforts made the ability to speak Catalan perceived to be a “badge of achieved status” (Keating, 2001). Following the Franco era, there was sense of revitalized nationalism in the region and with it a new strategic vision for immigration. Such a strategy included a nation that was created by all members of Catalan society, regardless of origin. Catalonia, like Quebec has been shaped through immigration and by its relationship to the central government in Madrid, but is also divided along language and identity lines. Thus, Catalonia has developed its own immigration capabilities, despite the Spanish central government, to suit its own nationalist project.

The way immigration powers are arranged between the autonomous regions and the central Spanish government is a ‘deep-rooted issue’ in Spain and Catalonia, in which decisions surrounding such policies and practices are usually met with controversy (Climent-Ferrando, 2012). The Spanish government is responsible for border control, immigration flow and citizenship/nationality, while the Catalan government is in charge of accommodation and/or
integration of immigrants into their region. The nationalist project built under the CiU has, therefore, focused on accommodating immigrants, while also encouraging policies of acceptance, integration, and citizenship. The administrative distribution of immigration capacities at each governmental level, however, is ambiguous, as they were not debated during constitutional negotiations after the Franco era. Such constitutional ambiguities have exacerbated political tensions between the central government and its sub-state national regions counterparts, especially in regards to diverging views on immigration practices.\textsuperscript{xvi}

As a distinct society within Spain, Catalonia has created its own approach to diversity management. Catalonia must maintain its own language and culture that differs from the mainstream Spanish language and culture. In order for Catalonia to utilize immigration to the betterment of its nationalist project, it must have greater control over immigration policies. As such, immigration has been a salient issue in Catalan national politics for the past two decades.

In 2001, in response to the restrictive immigration policies put in place by the Spanish government (under Aznar’s PP), the CiU created an immigration policy draft that better emphasized social rights and citizenship for immigrants than the state immigration law (Sedura I Mas 2001). Similarly, the process of immigration policies being developed by sub-state national parties in response to those developed by central governments also occurred within Quebec and Scotland in response to Canada and the UK’s policies respectively. Catalonia applied an accommodating approach to immigration that was followed by the tripartite government of the PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) and IC-V (Iniciativa per Catalunya – Verds) upon their election in 2003. This coalition government developed the Immigration and Citizenship Plan 2005-2008 (Generalitat 2005).
The Citizenship Plan 2005-2008 (the Plan), created two novel structural changes with regards to immigration in Catalonia. Firstly, the Plan provided with its own budget along with a complete policy framework to support it. Second, it implemented its own approach to citizenship within the region, whereas in order to be incorporated into the politics of the region immigrants simple had to register in the local registrar office, or padró. Catalan policy developed in contradiction to the Spanish policies, whereby once immigrants registered it meant they were willing to commit to sharing Catalonia as a community with all residents. This tactic created a new link to nationality at the regional level, rather than to the Spanish State. Ultimately, the plan began a new era in immigration policies in Catalonia, as it highlighted an important component in Catalan politics; the development of their own immigration strategies separate from the central government in Madrid.

An important aspect of the Plan is the concept of resident citizenship. This concept is common amongst sub-state national regions and is utilized in all three of the regions analyzed in my thesis. Resident citizenship allows national regions to offer a sense of belonging through ‘theoretical’ citizenship in the region (Hepburn, 2011). In this way, the Catalan government can offer residency in Catalonia without the authority to offer citizenship to Spain (Climent-Ferrando, 2012). Such a strategy frames the newcomer as a part of the national fabric and would theoretically encourage their allegiance to the Catalan region rather than the Spanish state. Resident citizenship is therefore intended to produce symbolic social cohesion in the region.

The notion that all persons, regardless of their country of origin, would be considered citizens of Catalonia is significant in two ways. Firstly, this philosophy acts as a useful nation-building tool when creating the Catalan social fabric. Similar nation-building tools have also used by Quebec and Scotland. Secondly, it is a nuanced approach to opposing the political
philosophy of the Spanish State. Catalan ‘citizenship’, in which immigrants referred to as “nous ciutadans” (new citizens) become part of the Catalan public reality. This frames a sense of their belonging to the region (Climent-Ferrando, 2012). While the concept may allow for more immigrant involvement in public life, however, it cannot provide the juridical, economic, and social equality needed by ‘new citizens’. In order to access all social services and be represented in public institutions, immigrants still need to be naturalized through the Spanish state to access all public and legal capacities of the region.

In this regard, education becomes integral in fully incorporating immigrants into the Catalan national fabric. In 2004, the Catalan regional government’s Department of Education developed its Language and Social Cohesion Plan (Generalitat, 2004) that would ensure immigrant children were incorporated into society by the instruction of the Catalan language and would receive some supports in the development of student’s first language. The latter was not seen in the Quebec example.

Similar to Quebec, language is intertwined with immigration politics in Catalonia. Catalan politics, however, appear to demonstrate more accommodating policies towards immigrants than those found in Quebec. Catalonia’s 2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan laid the ground for Catalan to be the communal language or “llengua comuna” in the region (Generalitat, 2005). Catalan soon became the language used in the public space and the language all citizens shared in the region. The initial concept brought forth by the Plan was institutionalized in the in The National Agreement on Immigration (Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració) (Generalitat, 2008) and in the Llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i retornades a Catalunya (Generalitat, 2009).

In 2006, Catalonia and Spain negotiated a new Statute of Autonomy for the region. The
2006 Statute granted the region *certain* powers over immigration, including the reception and socioeconomic integration of immigrants (Generalitat, 2006: Article 138). From these powers, the Catalan government developed *the Pact for Immigration* (the Pact) in 2008. The 2008 Pact stated that all those who have lived in the region for more than three years could potentially obtain definitive residency if they spoke and understood Catalan. While the definition of ‘definitive residency’ is unclear, as the Spanish government technically awards permanent residency, the language in the Pact contradicts that of the Spanish Central Government. Accordingly, permanent residence is rewarded to persons living in Spain after two years for nationals of Latin America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, or Portugal, and ten years (five years for refugees) for all remaining nationalities. While the CiU supported the Pact, the right-wing Catalan PP was in opposition and presented a much more restrictive and security-focused policy on immigration. Notably, the Catalan PP were a regional extension of the state-wide PP, the main opposition party at the time, demonstrating that a key party at the centre of government was opposed to the policies put forward by the Pact.

The increase in regional government control of immigration in Catalonia polarized the immigration issue, redirecting the attitudes of the CiU. From a discursive standpoint, Catalan nationalism was never immune to ethnic chauvinism. From its political beginnings, representatives of the CiU made some questionable statements in regards to ‘outsiders’ entering and remaining in Catalonia. As early as 1976, Jordi Pujol\(^\text{xvii}\) described ‘immigrants’ (who were at the time were mostly Spanish people from Andalusia) as “ignorant, ‘mentally poor’ people, incapable of self-control or creativity who threatened to ‘destroy’ Catalonia” (MacInnes, 2006). While this statement, was later retracted by Pujol, different statements were made towards other immigrant groups or other political affiliations in order to garner support (Goligorsky, 2002; and
Indeed, like politicians in Quebec, some of Pujol statements were filled with contradictions.

Once in power, Pujol’s conflicting statements did not end. In 2001, when immigration was due to increase substantially in Catalonia, Pujol claimed that the region was again threatened by the influx of immigrants. This time, however, they came from parts of North Africa rather than Andalusia. In reference to integration (or assimilation) of this particular immigrant group, Pujol was quoted as saying that “if an immigrant doesn't adapt, you need to respond with ‘zero tolerance’” (MacInnes, 2006). To Pujol, immigrant groups (particularly those of Muslim origin) should be made to speak Catalan and not Spanish, as “every country has its norms and outsiders shouldn't be allowed to break them” (MacInnes, 2006). Furthermore, various CiU representatives later outlined a connection between immigration and criminal behaviour, warning that ‘cultural mixing’ could damage Catalonia's ‘distinctive personality’ (MacInnes, 2006).

Other CiU ‘militants’ also notoriously made questionable comments, such as Pujol’s wife, Marta Ferrusola. Ferrusola condemned newcomer Muslims as imposing their culture on the region, stating that "they want to impose their own way [and] all they know how to say is: 'Give me something to eat'"(Tremlett, 2001). Ferrusola’s claim was that the majority of social security payments were going to immigrant families and that "these benefits go to people who do not even know what Catalonia is” (Tremlett, 2001). Similar views on immigration were shared by a senior figure in Catalan separatism, the former Regional Parliamentary President and Secretary of the Catalan Republican left, Heribert Barrera. Barrera also believed “that the region would disappear under the weight of immigration” (Tremlett, 2001). Ironically, these statements were made prior to the large influx of immigrants that followed in the succeeding decade (2000-2011).

Nevertheless, various nationalist parties from both the left and right end of the political
spectrum populate the Catalan political sphere. Other nationalists on the left denounced such statements, stating that: “immigrants realized that Catalonia is a society with a distinct personality and integrated, making this cause their own, without having to give up anything” (Colomines I Companie, 2001). The discursive divide amongst party mentalities is obvious in the policy development prior to the independence referendum in November 2014. While attitudes towards immigrants (from the CiU) were contentious at times, they were not representative of the whole scope of nationalist politics in Catalonia. These examples of political discourse provide some insight into contradicting political attitudes before the referendum.

Despite efforts made to avoid fragmentation and ensure (social) cohesion in promoting the Catalan identity “new immigration brings with it new problems” (Pujol 2004). Pujol continuously argued that the region must “find a policy of integration” (2004), because even though Catalonia receives many immigrants, a policy of respect towards (Catalan) identity as a country is still paramount. Such a policy on integration and respect towards Catalan identity was considered the balance between rights and responsibilities (Pujol, 2004). The province of Quebec also sought to find policies to welcome and integrate newcomers. However, Quebec struggled to actually incorporate immigrants as welcomed insiders within the region.

Correspondingly, such ‘welcoming attitudes’ in Catalonia are sometimes akin to assimilation, as “for the CiU, the goal was not to achieve a multicultural society, but to assimilate immigrants into the Catalan community so that the nation remained culturally distinct from the rest of Spain” (CiU, 2008). The stress on assimilation has bordered towards a more restrictive representation of citizenship. Deliberations concerning the revised Statute showed the CiU party arguing that only immigrants with familiarity of the Catalan language should be given equal access to social services (Hens, 2006). Furthermore, the CiU has been seen suggesting a
system of social benefits and rewards for ‘dutiful’ immigrants along with a ‘voluntary contract’ for immigrants that would reward knowledge of Catalan language with better access to public services (The Economist, 4 February, 2010).

While the CiU has been moderately successful in pursuing immigrants as supporters of the Catalan nation-building project; the party has yet to elect an immigrant to the Catalan Parliament (Hepburn, 2011). The CiU has so far made only a modest effort to garner electoral support amongst immigrant groups (Velten, 2006). The same can be said for most parties in Catalonia, as only a single political party (the ERC Party) in the region has developed official relationships to immigrant associations (Velten, 2006). In fact, the majority of parliamentary representatives have been born in Catalonia, save for Mohammed Chaib. Chaib, a member of the ERC Party, was elected in November 2006 and expressed the desire “to help Muslim immigrants find a balance between cultures” (Hens, 2006). While making voting rights and the civic and political participation of immigrants a central theme in its election campaigns, the ERC used Chaib to “promote understanding between the Catalan people and immigrants” (Hens, 2006).

The time before the referendum highlights the complex relationship between immigrant groups and the various political parties in Catalonia, particularly the CiU. The re-election of the CiU (under Artur Mas in 2010) and consequent rise in the sovereignty movement, however, created a different political climate for many immigrant voters. The decision to allow all immigrants (and minors) to vote in the independence referendum had unprecedented outcomes on their involvement in the referendum period itself and consequently, the way in which sub-state national parties framed them.
5. 2 The Plebiscite Independence Referendum

In October 2014, the president of Catalonia’s regional CiU government, Artur Mas, officially signed a ruling for a referendum on Catalonia’s independence, despite the appeal made by the Spanish government to the Constitutional Court. Catalans were encouraged by the independence referendum in Scotland, and undeterred by the negative outcome. The independence referendum in Catalonia was not a constitutionally binding process, but a "process of citizen participation" (Kassam, 2014). After the Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the ‘non-referendary popular consultation’, it was re-labeled as a participatory process by the Government of Catalonia. Catalonia has the ability it to implement policies in specific domains, but does not have the constitutional power to secede from the country or to hold a referendum on such an issue without permission from Madrid. This stipulation means that constitutionally, the independence referendum is invalid. Despite this and the efforts made by the Spanish Government (which further highlighted the contentious relationship between the multinational state and the sub-state), the CiU government continued with the process.

Catalonia’s informal independence referendum, framed as a non-binding civil society initiative, was held on November 9, 2014. The referendum was unique for being a simulation of a binding plebiscite, but also for its inclusion of minors (aged 16 and 17) and immigrants (who have lived in Catalonia for over a year if they come from another EU country, and over three years if they are from non-EU countries) in the vote, which under Spanish law would not have been possible.

Throughout the referendum campaign it was difficult to determine how immigrant groups would vote. As was the case in both Quebec and Scotland, support for Catalan independence was not unanimous. Results from the Catalan Political Opinion Barometer two-weeks prior to the
referendum vote date, indicated how cultural background (i.e. language) may also influence independence support. Voters that indicated Catalan as their primary language largely favoured independence at 70 percent, but among bilingual speakers this support decreased to 50 percent and an even further 20 percent amongst Spanish only speakers (CIS, 2014). Immigrant community leaders based their support for or against independence based on their pre-existing loyalties to their local political parties (Munoz, 2014). It was therefore not clear how immigrant voters would choose. Despite being permitted to vote they were still required to register their residency status prior to the referendum vote (Munoz, 2014).

Discursive evidence collected from media sources prior to immigrants being included in the vote highlight the level of diversity in immigrant opinion towards independence. A spokesperson from a settlement organization in Barcelona argued that “for most of the immigrants we help, their only preoccupations now are finding a job, making sure their papers are in order and meeting their basic need… Indeed, their minds and goals are very far from a political debate that they don’t even have the right to vote in” (Minder, 2012). Some other immigrant groups, such as Sikh immigrants, however, held greater empathy for the sovereignty movement, based on similar experiences in their home countries. Likewise, Pakistanis living in Barcelona who come from Punjab, a region that also shares similar nationalist aspirations could also understand and share the process (Minder, 2012). Furthermore, some immigrants are fluent in Spanish but prefer to speak Catalan (Minder, 2012). This demonstrates an important linguistic connection with Catalonia.

For many South Americans, however, the sentiment for independence was complicated by an attachment or resentment toward the "motherland" Spain (Giner, 2014). Some believed in the sovereignty movement, but wanted independence to be achieved through more consultation
and not a plebiscite vote, while some others rejected it outright, in favour of a united Spain. Furthermore, some blamed the economy for the fervent resurgence of nationalist feeling in the region (Giner, 2014). It is important to note, however, that while I can make general assumptions towards the voting patterns of particular groups, it is impossible to completely generalize the sentiments of an entire population of immigrant voters.

While opinions among immigrant groups varied, an important theme arose throughout the Catalonian case study: the ‘Contagio Emocional’ or rather the Emotion Contagion (Giner, 2014). Within this concept the group sentiment of one population becomes contagious to the other. In this vein, immigrants adopt a nationalist fervour through their interaction with sovereigntist groups or they adopt the same anti-independence zeal through their connection with those in favour of a united Spain. In this case, so it seems, the independence process is less about identity and more about political mobilization. Separatist political parties in Catalonia have, therefore, tried to socialize immigrants through a civic identity based on equality and opportunity, while also incorporating the Catalan language. In general, the nationalist parties have largely abandoned their ethnicity-based speeches with a view to include immigrants in their political ranks.

For newer immigrant groups, identity ties to the Catalan region may not be as strong as they are to the Spanish Crown. During this referendum process, however, immigrant groups were given the opportunity to participate in an important political process for the first time, something the Spanish government had yet to offer them. Moreover, both pro- and anti-independence groups and parties created campaigns that were directed towards these communities. Since talks of the referendum began, political leaders, such as Artur Mas, advocated for the benefits of including immigrants (and minors in the vote) in the sovereignty movement. Indeed, the
Generalitat claimed that if independence were won, immigrants would become citizens of Catalonia and therefore be eligible to obtain a passport to (potentially) an EU country (Munoz, 2014). Providing foreigners with the opportunity to vote, along with a promise that if independence is achieved their citizenship will be granted, may result in a favourable outcome for independence. For many undecided voters, as many did not care if they were Spanish or Catalan, the possibility of acquiring a European passport would be an important incentive.

Throughout the referendum campaign political pandering to immigrant groups was a common theme. Various Spanish media outlets suggested that the CiU Plan’s to accommodate the teachings of Islam and Arabic and Berber languages in public schools that had a large percentage of Muslim students was created in order to garner support from these immigrant communities (Munoz, 2014). Furthermore, throughout the campaign Jorge Fernández Díaz, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, alleged that "Nous Catalans" (New Catalans; a pro-independence group), was promising ‘paradise on earth’ to Muslim voters living in Catalonia in pursuance of their support (Munoz, 2014). Such comments did not serve Fernandez Diaz well as he was a known member of the Catholic group Opus Dei and a Spanish minister interfering with Catalan politics. Nous Catalans retorted by condemning the minister for racism, while contesting that their campaign activities were transparent and democratic (Munoz, 2014).

Ultimately, the Catalanian case study is unable to show the quantitative data on how immigrants voted in the referendum. More specifically, Catalonia, does not poll based on ethnic basis, so it is not possible to find exact data on immigrant voting patterns. Unlike Quebec, immigrants were not framed as outsiders in the referendum process, therefore, even polls do not ask about ethnicity. Many immigrants in Catalonia were incorporated into the political environment and as such took part in pro- or anti-independence rallies based mostly on their
political allegiances with local parties (Munoz, 2014). Without the ‘us versus them’ mentality, negative frames towards immigrants were not present, as immigrants were no longer seen as outsiders. The referendum highlighted that discourse towards immigrants throughout the process was inclusive, as they were involved in the political movements on either side and had the ability to vote. The inclusiveness of this process may have had something to do with the relationship of Catalan nationalism toward immigrants in the preceding period. While discursive evidence shows some contradictions in attitudes towards immigrants in the CiU, other SSNPs voicing more inclusive attitudes and policies attempted to incorporate immigrants into the Catalan identity and ‘emocion’.

While the vote was only a plebiscite, the pro-independence vote was successful. Significantly, the independence referendum process created a bond among all those living in Catalonia, while allowing for the political socialization of immigrant groups. The next section offers further insight into the present day implications of the immigrant involvement in the referendum process.

5. 3 Post-Referendum Catalonia: Predictions and Observations

This section offers some tentative predictions on how policy development will continue in the post referendum period, based on how political discourse towards immigrants was locked-in during the referendum. This section also offers observations from the time of the referendum until the end of 2015. While it is too soon after the referendum to witness any major policy developments, and as the latest immigrant polices were completed in 2013 with a view to continue into 2016, I offer my predictions for the Catalan Case. I predict a similar trend for policy development in Catalonia based on observations with regards to policy development in Quebec following its independence referendum. In Quebec, as immigrants were portrayed
negatively in the public statements of some nationalist Québécois politicians in the debates before and during the referendum periods, they continued to be treated the same afterward. Despite failed attempts at mending the relationship, the PQ continued to perpetuate a negative discourse toward them. This experience highlights the referendum as a lock-in mechanism. I should expect a similar sequence of events to arise in Catalonia, but with the opposite effect. In Catalonia, immigrants were involved in the referendum process and positively framed throughout. The referendum locks in the discourse, with attitudes towards immigration often frozen as a result. Correspondingly, the independence movement was met with an even more fervent attitude from immigrant groups after the referendum.

The latest regional elections in Catalonia elected a new sovereigntist party, Together for Yes, under Artur Mas. The same rhetoric that was found under the (now disbanded) CiU should be prevalent in current Catalan politics, but with an even more ardent attitude to include immigrants. Moreover, the current Spanish government continues to be led by the PP, which has been known to embrace borderline xenophobic mandates and discourse. Based on my theoretical assumptions this should mean that the Catalan nationalist parties are even more likely to continue their welcoming attitudes towards immigrants. The Catalan PP, which has strong ties to the Spanish PP, received the least support in the September 2015 elections. The lack of this support signified an increase in nationalist aspirations and a decrease in support towards exclusive immigrant notions.

The latest election was another checkpoint on the road to sovereignty for Catalonia. Following the results of the November 2014 referendum, Artur Mas stated he would hold plebiscitary elections in the months to follow. The political implications from this are three-fold. First, it would mean a coalition would have to be formed by various nationalist parties, beyond
that of the CiU. Second, if this coalition won, they intended to leave Spain within 18 months of the election. Third, the same inclusionary rhetoric and tactics that were used to involve immigrants in the referendum process should be present in the election campaigns. Notably, the CiU was dissolved in June 2015, with its founding counterparts running separately. A new coalition formed by the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC), Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), Democrats of Catalonia (DC) and Left Movement (MES) ran under the Together for Yes (Junts pel Si) banner for the election. Together for Yes ran with Artur Mas as the presidential candidate. The Democratic Union of Catalonia ran without another party affiliation.

Along with a zealous anti-Madrid attitude, 2015 election campaigns courted immigrant votes throughout the regional elections. Together for Yes, ensured it supplied electoral pamphlets in Arabic, Chinese and Urdu. The Catalan National Assembly (ANC), a large civic group in favour of independence with strong ties to the ‘Together for Yes’ coalition, had a department dedicated to immigrants. The campaigns created connections between native Catalans and those from Latin America, Asia, and Africa allowing everyone to feel as ‘compatriots’ (Bosque, 2015). Many of these populations also want to be ‘free from Spanish rule’ and be the ‘founding fathers’ of the Catalan republic (Bosque, 2015). Catalan’s positive rhetoric towards immigration throughout the referendum and its policies to teach immigrants the Catalan language, as well as the region's history and traditions, have contributed to its emotional contagion in the independence movement. The September 2015 elections saw unprecedented activity at the polls with a 77.4 percent turnout rate. The pro-independence lists garnered 48 percent of the votes and won 72 seats out of 135, whereas unionist lists obtained 39 percent of the votes and 52 seats. This election was the conclusion of four years of political mobilization by both parties, of all
persons, including immigrant voter groups.

The preceding case study demonstrates the development of minority nationalist-immigrant political dynamic in relation to the informal, non-binding independence referendum in Catalonia. The first section of my case study outlined the political developments in Catalonia with regards to immigration. The second section of this case study discussed the independence referendum period and highlighted an important point to Catalan Nationalism – the emotional contagion. This emotional component extends the case study beyond the civic and ethnic nationalism into an analysis of political mobilization by the nationalist parties in Catalonia and how these emotions were locked in by the referendum period. The third section reviewed the post referendum period to understand how the political discourse of the nationalist coalitions towards immigrants in Catalonia is locked-in during the referendum. This consequently impacted the way discourse was positively directed towards immigrants in Catalonia along with subsequent political campaigns. I predict that policy towards immigrants will develop accordingly, as they did in the Quebec case, except with a more positive view.
Chapter 6: Scotland

Scotland exemplifies the most welcoming nationalist project among the case studies. Political parties within the region, particularly the Scottish National Party (SNP), offer the most inclusive platforms in regards to immigration of the case studies examined here. As such, the SNP encourages population growth through multiculturalism and immigration, in opposition to the central policies of the British Government. Distinguishing Scottish politics from the other two cases is its concentration on territorial markers, as Scottish identity is not as strongly linked to linguistic and cultural factors. This aspect of Scottish politics makes it a nuanced addition to my case studies as it highlights how the lock-in mechanism can be understood in different political contexts.

The first section of the case study begins by outlining how immigration is conceptualized differently in British and Scottish settings. Subsequently, I offer a brief history of immigration policy in Scotland in order to portray its effects on discourse and immigrant participation in the independence referendum. This first section also highlights Scotland’s contentious relationship with the United Kingdom. The second section of the case study discusses the independence referendum period. Immigrants are well incorporated into the Scottish sovereignty movement and their involvement in the referendum period is indicative of the relationship between the SNP and immigrants. The Scottish independence referendum showcases an important link between welcoming political discourse and the way in which immigrants vote. Similar to the results in the Catalan case, I show how the independence referendum process created a bond among all those living in Scotland while allowing for the political socialization of immigrant groups. This bond explains how discourse can be locked in throughout the referendum campaign. The third section evaluates how immigrant involvement in the sovereignty movement contributes to an inclusive
dialogue thereafter. This section demonstrates how the political developments of the SNP after the independence referendum process were affected by the campaign. Ultimately, this section shows the continuation of the locked-in discourse in the post referendum period from the time of the referendum until the end of 2015.

6.1 Immigration Conceptions and Developments in Scotland

Scotland hosts a smaller number of immigrants than Quebec and Catalonia. However, net immigration to Scotland has increased over the past 40 years, with the biggest influx arriving between 2001 and 2011 (Scotland, 2014). Immigrants now represent seven percent of the Scottish population with the largest numbers coming from Poland and India. This trend was paralleled by the increase in immigration to the UK since the 1990s under the British Labour government’s immigration strategy (Davis, 2008). While this immigration program was successful in recruiting high skilled workers through the creation of a points-based system, its policies have been criticized as pursuing economic interests over the needs and rights of migrants (Davis, 2008; and Somerville, 2007). Furthermore, the UK’s policies directed towards economic immigration have created more severe asylum requirements. Consequently, immigration regulations have been restricted as the result of four separate bills since 1999.

The influx of migrants to the UK has created different reactions in the Scottish and the English Media. While English media reports highlight that increased migration is received by fear, panic, and resentment, Scottish party statements and media reports have generally been welcoming (Hepburn, 2009). English media reveal a public perception of immigrants as being a “drain on the welfare state and difficult to integrate” (Hepburn, 2009: 521). Bailey argues that the English media has perpetuated a dichotomy of ‘us versus them’ by defining immigrants and asylum seekers as the ‘other’ (2005). The same dichotomy is not present in Scottish discourse.
The necessity for immigration to compensate for emigration and decreasing birth rates in Scotland contribute to the more positive mentality, even though the region receives a lower amount of immigrants per head than the rest of the UK (Wright, 2006). The needs for immigration, as well as Scottish nationalist attitudes that differ from UK politics have created diverging attitudes from those found in England (Saeed et al., 1999; and Bond, 2006). These attitudes are reflected in the political discourse of main political parties.

A declining sense of ‘Britishness’ in Scotland represents the continued importance of the ‘Scottish Question’ in UK constitutional politics (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Scholars argue that ‘Scottishness’ rests primarily upon territorial or ‘civic’ markers, in particular where people were born and where they live (Kiely, Bechhofer, and McCrone, 2005; Bond, 2006; and Rosie and Bond, 2006). In contrast with Quebec and Catalonia, Scottish identification does not emanate from cultural or linguistic markers but rather through territorial connection (Arrighi de Casanova, 2014; and Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Accordingly, Scottish nationalist politicians emphasize place and the institutions of daily life, rather than cultural and linguistic aspects when referring to Scottish identity. Indeed, Scottish political parties have actively welcomed newcomers to their region (Hepburn, 2009). Scholars have noted that it is very likely that someone who is born, raised, and currently living in Scotland will not only self-identify as Scottish, but be accepted as Scottish by others regardless of ethnic origins (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). While Quebec and Catalonia have pursued policies related to civic identity, the evidence in Scottish case is markedly different in terms of politician’s commitment to a place of belonging for all those living in Scotland.

Of the three cases examined, Scotland has the least capacity to regulate policies around immigration and ethnic diversity. While Scottish government is able to offer input on a policy,
the Scotland Act of 1998 (the Act) stipulates that Westminster maintains final legislative powers. The Act assigns immigration, nationality, and asylum policies to Westminster (Barker, 2010). The Act offered Scotland more legislative and decision-making power but with limited financial capacities. With devolution, the Scottish Government, particularly under the SNP, took action on some aspects of immigration and other related areas, such as education and child welfare in order to support integration efforts at the regional level (Barker, 2010).

Scotland’s limited immigration capacities may be another reason why immigration is a fairly uncontested issue in the region. Without full control over the issue politicians need not polarize voters by pandering to fears about migration (Shin, 2011). By contrast such pandering can be noted in UK politics. At the UK level for example, Labour went from an “economically motivated liberalization of regulations” in 2001 to a more ‘managed’ control of immigration in 2005 (Odmalm, 2012). This shift advocated for a more restrictive system that links immigration to enforcement, control, and punishment (Labour, 2010). Comparatively, the Liberal Democrats promoted policies based on human rights issues in 2001, but were framing illegal immigrants as a part of organized crime by 2010 (Odmalm, 2012; Grayson, 2010; and Liberal Democrats, 2010). The UK Conservative Party has been unswerving in its avocation of stricter immigration controls (Conservative Party, 2010). Indeed, the central message of the 2010 UK election was that immigration posed a threat to Britain and that it should be reduced.

At the Scottish level, regional parties have renounced immigration as a threat and suggest instead that immigration is necessary in tackling Scotland’s economic and demographic concerns (Hepburn, 2009; 2011). Furthermore, Scottish politicians emphasize humanitarian principles in welcoming foreigners to Scotland, incorporating a discourse of belonging into parliamentary politics (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Due to a necessity for immigrants and a lack of direct
control over immigration, the political parties in Scotland are all ‘inclusive’ towards immigration (Hepburn, 2009). The political parties in the region therefore do not have contentious views on immigration.

In contrast to the UK developing negative discourse towards immigration, Scottish Party manifestos continued to demonstrate its importance to the region. In 2005, party manifestos demonstrated commitment to increase immigration in order to improve Scotland’s economic prospects (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Notably, the term ‘New Scots’ became a regular part of the Scottish political rhetoric. This cemented the idea that those arriving from somewhere else belonged to the Scottish national fabric. While the SNP committed to “pursue an immigration policy that welcomes new Scots and encourages people to move back to Scotland” (SNP, 2005: 6), all Scottish parties worked to spite British Government policies. The Scottish Labour Party argued against the UK Labour’s more stringent line on immigration, which included fingerprinting, a ‘crackdown on abuse’, compulsory ID cards, and ‘secure borders’ (Scottish Labour, 2005: 52–3). Similarly, the Scottish Liberal Democrats’ manifesto argued that: “we will work with the Scottish Executive to ensure that decisions taken at Westminster help and do not hinder Scotland’s drive to reverse population decline” (Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2005: 11).

Even the Scottish Conservatives rarely attacked the region’s immigration policies. The political situation in Scotland differs strongly from that found in the UK where immigration, asylum, nationality, and multiculturalism have become strong points of cleavage.

With such contrasting views on immigration (and other issues) to the UK, Scottish independence has become the most salient issue in the region’s political rhetoric. Moreover, an important factor to national sovereignty includes full control over migration matters (Hepburn, 2011). In lieu of direct control over immigration, Scotland has augmented other policies that
can affect integration, such as education, that fall within Scottish policy competencies. When the SNP\textsuperscript{viii} obtained a majority movement in 2011, they put the plans in motion to pursue full autonomy from the UK government. Scotland’s incapacity to effectively use immigration to attain national objectives became more obvious when the SNP took office in 2007. The lack of political capacities was matched by national interests to create a more open immigration policy and a more inclusive concept of citizenship. In response to its limited policy-making capacity abilities, the SNP has promoted a devolved immigration policy for Scotland as a precursor to full independence that would give the region full control over migration. This devolved immigration policy would allow the region to attract skilled workers (SNP, 2007). The goals for this policy are two-fold, as they would support economic growth in the region while championing diversity as an important Scottish value (SNP, 2007). This directly opposes the ‘failed’ multiculturalism that politicians have begun condemn in the UK (BBC, 2011). Members of the SNP, such as Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill, have demanded devolution of immigration policy on the grounds that Scotland’s “economic and social needs are different and distinct to the rest of the UK...as a nation of emigrants [the Scots] wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland dealt with kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression” (Hepburn, 2009). MacAskill’s statement alluded to the contentious treatment of asylum seekers in Scotland, an issue within Westminster’s jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Scottish ministers met with the UK immigration minister to discuss how the point-based system already existing in the UK could be better designed to support Scotland’s population growth targets. However, despite their efforts, the UK would only commit to promoting Scotland as a place to live and to providing some supports with regards to temporary workers. Such commitments did not help the SNP’s aims to regionalise the points-based system
in efforts to devolve Scotland control (Scottish Government, 2009a). In the time leading up to the referendum such a policy did not come into place.

As previously stated, the Scottish political context hosts political elite that are “united and consistent in proclaiming their vision of an ‘inclusive’ Scotland” (Hussain and Miller, 2006: 27). Therefore, the SNP’s pro-immigration platform is not subject to contestation. It is also worth mentioning that there is no far-right anti-immigrant party in Scotland, which is distinct from the case of the British National Party in England (Hopkins, 2004). Indeed, there is no party that is even comparable to the ADQ in Quebec or the regional PP in Catalonia. To this end, the region provides a more fertile ground for inclusive immigrant policies. Even main opponents of the SNP have advocated for policies that suit a more diverse Scotland. For instance, in 2004 the Labour Party (the SNP’s main opponent) and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government that negotiated the ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative with the British government. This initiative enabled international students to apply for a two-year extension to their visa following graduation to seek employment (Hepburn, 2011).

The political context of Scotland differs significantly from that of Quebec and Catalonia, which has impacted how immigrants are integrated into the political sphere and how they were involved during the referendum process. Similar to other case studies, however, is that the main point of contention in the sub-state nationalist region exists between the sub state nation and the state, i.e. Scotland and the UK. Many of the policies introduced by the SNP, as I note below, were in contrast to measures put in place by the British government.

In general, the SNP posed its citizenship policy as more inclusive and welcoming than that of Westminster, while specifically criticising aspects of the central government’s policies (SNP, 2003a). With regards to the British Government’s 2008 points-based system for skilled
immigrants, the SNP stipulated that this policy did not mirror “the needs, requirements and indeed the values of Scottish society” (Hepburn, 2011). The SNP has also criticized the UK’s plans to restrict conditions for immigrants to access social services. The SNP disputed Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s proposal that would levy conditions on immigrants in order to access social services. Such conditions included community service similar to that imposed for a criminal offence (Tempest, 2007).

While Westminster continued to develop restrictive policies towards immigration and citizenship, pro-migration interests were emerging in Holyrood (Barker, 2010). Indeed, immigration in Scotland was framed (and perceived) as an important instrument in national development (Barker, 2010). With immigration being upheld by both the Scottish Labour Party and the SNP as an important motive for population growth (Barker, 2010), the Fresh Talent initiative was introduced in 2004 by Scottish First Minister Jack McConnell with a view to mitigate the projected population decline and to attract individuals with sought-after qualificationsxix. The SNP strived to differentiate itself, however, from the Scottish Labour Party by disparaging its ‘Fresh Talent’ initiative for its minimalist goals (Barker, 2010). The SNP also stated that the Scottish Labour Party too closely mirrored London Labour’s policies that would hinder Scotland’s economic and demographic interests (Barker, 2010). Unlike many of the parties examined in the other case studies it is interesting to note that the parties in Scotland vie for votes by catering to immigration interests rather than to treat immigration as threat to the nationhood.

Furthermore, the SNP has contested the citizenship classes and loyalty oath the British government has put in place as a part of their ‘Proud to be British’ citizenship rules (SNP, 2003b). In opposition to UK policies, the SNP has promoted the idea of a dual identity for
newcomers. The SNP has suggested that it makes sense for newcomers to Scotland to have a dual identity. New Scots can be both proud of being Scottish while retaining an affinity to their country of origin (SNP, 2003b). If independence was achieved for Scotland, the SNP argued that immigrant rights would be expanded to complete access to public services and political participation. These rights were in stark contradiction to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s proposal that created conditions for immigrants to access social services such as undertaking community service (Hepburn, 2009).

In addition to the promotion of more inclusive policies, the SNP has proposed policies to establish more control of immigration, of which would include a special ‘Green Card’. Such policies would allow the Scottish government to “create a fair and efficient process for people coming to Scotland” (SNP 2003a: 30). The introduction of a Green Card also allows the Scottish government to establish a certain criteria for immigrants with a goal to augment the number skills-targeted immigrants in the region by up to 50,000 every year. The Green Card would allow Scotland to “compete with other nations in the global market for non-EEA highly skilled workers and . . . encourage migrants to seek Scottish citizenship” (Scottish Government 2009b: 24–25). It was further anticipated that the program would boost labour markets by allowing newcomer families to contribute to Scotland while stabilizing the declining population (SNP, 2007).

Scotland’s immigration strategies, particularly those under the SNP, are influenced by party dynamics but also by wider state discourses, policies, and media coverage (Hepburn, 2009). In Scotland (and Catalonia), this can be seen through the parties’ criticisms of the central government’s perceived restrictive immigration policies, and the necessity for immigration policies in the regions in order to increase the size of the workforce (Hepburn, 2009). In fact,
both the SNP and the CiU have attempted to situate themselves as more democratic and progressive than their national governments (Hepburn, 2009).

Notably, former SNP leader John Swinney accused the Blair government of being xenophobic due to the development of new immigration restrictions. Similar sentiments were echoed through the Scottish media as “the idea of Poles coming in as sort of hairy, cheap labour and taking jobs away from honest working men is a complete misconception” (Hepburn, 2009). These examples expose a comparable dynamic between public and political opinion in Scotland. Similarly, the CiU in Catalonia has also critiqued the Madrid government for creating a limited immigration policy that does not supported the integration of newcomers (Hepburn, 2009).

While the SNP has responded similarly to the central government as other parties do in Quebec and Catalonia, it stands alone in regards to the extent to which it encouraged the political participation of immigrants groups (Hepburn, 2011). Since 1995, the party has established periphery groups, such as the ‘Asian Scots for Independence’ and ‘Young Asian Scots for Independence’, in order to foster political support and participation amongst Asians and youth communities. Such endeavours have contributed to the political discourse that existed during the referendum surrounding the involvement of immigrant groups.

In 2007, the organizer of the Asian Scot for Independence, Bashir Ahmad, was the first member of an ethnic minority elected to the Scottish Parliament. In the 2010 election, the chief executive of the Scottish-Islamic Foundation was the SNP candidate in the general election. The promotion and inclusion of ethnic minorities in the SNP has increased support for the party amongst Scottish Muslim voters (Hepburn, 2009).

The SNP had previously gained immigrant support in 2006 by launching their party leaflet in various languages in order for EU citizens and “particularly the 20,000 Poles in the
capital” to understand their right to vote in both the Edinburgh Council and Scottish Parliament elections in May 2007 (BBC, 2006). In order to gain support for immigrant communities it is important to engage them in the political process. The SNP touted the ideology that “regardless of the languages [spoken] all of the citizens of Edinburgh have the right to have their voices heard at the ballot box” (BBC, 2006). The brochures released in Polish, German, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, and Catalan removed an important linguistic barrier to political participation amongst immigrant voters.

Correspondingly, the efforts made by the SNP to appeal to the typical ‘labour supporting Scottish Muslim voters’ have been effective (Hepburn, 2011). Some minorities, such as Scottish Pakistanis, are now more likely to identify as Scottish rather than British (Hussain and Miller 2006), which may affect how they voted in the referendum. Scottish Pakistanis actually offered more support to the SNP than the average Scot as they were twice as likely to vote for them. In a study completed in 2006, the majority of the group revealed that they supported an independent Scotland (Hussain and Miller, 2006). The same study also stipulated that the “SNP’s welcoming political stance over the years and especially its opposition to the invasion of Iraq has made it even easier for [ethnic Pakistanis] to identify with Scotland” (Hussain and Miller, 2006: 169). The SNP’s welcoming endeavours have, therefore, made some immigrant groups more supportive of the independence movement.

In addition to the SNP’s involvement of immigrant groups in its electoral strategies, the party has promoted a progressive version of Scottish membership whereby “citizenship in Scotland would be based on an inclusive model designed to support economic growth, integration and promotion of diversity” (Scottish Government, 2009b: 5.13). In this vein, Scottish citizenship would be based on birth or residency, in which “everybody who is here
regardless of where they are from would qualify for citizenship” (SNP, 1997: 7). In contrast with the model that has ‘failed’ in the UK, the SNP has incorporated ‘multiculturalism’ as a keyword in its discourse about Scottish national identity (Leith, 2008). The party has stated that ethnic minorities contribute to their national identity (SNP 2003a: 28). While the UK is distancing itself from the multiculturalism model, Scotland pursues a nation that is “sensitive to the needs of other communities which are a part of the rich tapestry of Scotland” (SNP, 1997: 17). While immigrants represent a small percentage of the electorate their involvement in the referendum process has still had an impact on campaign process and results, as will be noted in the subsequent section.

The preceding section has outlined the political landscape in Scotland prior to the independence referendum period. Interestingly, it appears that nationalism and the need for immigration in Scotland has risen at the same time in recent decades. The political context prior to the referendum highlights the strong support for the SNP and independence amongst some immigrants, while also exemplifying the relationship between Scotland and the UK. There is no doubt that the SNP’s electoral strategy catered to immigrant groups and more progressive voters and was continued throughout the independence referendum period.

6.2 A Referendum on Scottish Independence

Held on September 18, 2014, the Scottish Referendum resulted in an unprecedented 84.6 percent voter turnout. The pro-independence forces were organized under the 'Yes Scotland' organizational umbrella (led mainly by the SNP), while Better Together was the main campaign group in favour of staying a part of the UK. Under Better Together, the No campaign won with 55 percent of the vote, while the Yes side garnered 45 percent.
While the voting period took place in the preceding four weeks, planning for the referendum began in November 2013 with the passage of the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill. With the passage of this Bill, the Scottish Government, under the SNP, produced a 670 page White Paper entitled *Scotland’s Future*, which outlined the advantages of independence in addition to how Scotland may look if it were to become an independent country. The White Paper upheld by Nicola Sturgeon (then Deputy First Minister) in Scottish Parliament as "the opportunities of independence, the benefits for individuals, families, communities and the nation as a whole and the practicalities of how we move from a Yes vote in September next year to becoming an independent country in March 2016" (Scottish Government, 2013). This document outlined specific items with regards to immigration and citizenship. The White Paper had already set the tone for the inclusion of immigrants in the referendum process, particular to pro-independence campaign when the Scottish Independence Referendum Act was enacted between the Scottish and UK governments.

Specific to immigration, the White Paper discussed an approach that would better suit the Scottish region. In particular, the SNP hoped to “reverse some of the decisions taken by Westminster which are damaging the ability of Scotland's colleges and universities to attract high-quality international students” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). Furthermore, the document argued that it would be “difficult to conceive of a Scottish government that would ever adopt the crude ‘go home’ approach tried by the current Westminster Government” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). The document cites Westminster’s ‘go home’ attitude multiple times throughout the document, as well as referring to the UK’s “aggressive approach to immigration, asylum seekers and refugees” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). Evidently, the Scottish
government in its White Paper was inferring that their approach would be more welcoming, and inclusive towards immigrants.

With regards to citizenship, independence would give Scotland autonomy and “the power to determine rules on citizenship and nationality” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). Therefore, Scotland proposed an inclusive model where people could maintain multiple identities, including their previous national identity as well as their new Scottish identity. Importantly, “a commitment to a multi-cultural Scotland” was to be considered as “a cornerstone of the nation on independence” (Scottish Government, 2013: 11).

The plan would offer citizenship to British citizens living in the Scotland and those who hold dual citizenship with other countries, as well as Scottish born British citizens that lived outside of Scotland. Moreover, those not in these categories would also be able to apply. For instance, those with a parent or grandparent who qualified for Scottish citizenship would then qualify themselves. Those who also had a “demonstrable connection to Scotland” and had spent at least ten years living there at some point in their life would also be able to apply (Scottish Government, 2013: 11). Certain immigrants on qualifying visas would also have the opportunity to apply for naturalisation as a Scottish citizen. These stipulations highlighted a commitment from the SNP to maintain an inclusive society; even though it was unclear how easy it would be for various types of immigrants to qualify or become citizens once they applied. Importantly, this document was translated into 13 different languages spoken by the majority of newcomers (and long-time immigrants) in Scotland. The translation of the document highlights another way in which the SNP promoted an inclusive Scotland and catered to the immigrant vote.

Discursive evidence throughout the referendum period highlights the same mentality from the SNP. Throughout the campaign many of the themes found within the White Paper were
used to appeal to immigrant voters. In June 2014, three months before the vote, the Yes campaign saw an increase in support for independence among minority groups, with one radio poll presenting that 64 percent were in favour (Elgot, 2014). First Minister and SNP Leader Alex Salmond stated that immigration was used as a "weapon" to fuel anxieties about Scottish independence by those against it (Brooks, 2014). Salmond denounced opposition parties for “pandering” to UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) instead of upending anti-immigration rhetoric (Brooks, 2014) as most had done previously. Furthermore, when shadow home secretary Yvette Cooper criticized the SNP’s plans to loosen immigration controls, Christian Allard stated that "Yvette Cooper's rhetoric on immigration is also deeply worrying and yet another example of how UKIP is dictating Westminster's agenda – despite the party being completely irrelevant in Scotland" (Carrell, 2014). Throughout its Yes campaign the SNP attempted to garner the immigrant voter support while distancing itself from the UK central policies.

While immigrant voters (particularly those from outside the UK) may have perceived Holyrood (under the SNP) as more welcoming than Westminster (due to some of the anti-immigrant rhetoric voice by UKIP), in the months leading up to the vote not all were convinced independence was the best choice. In a poll conducted by YouGov in the weeks before the vote a two percent lead was forecasted for the Yes side among voters born in Scotland, while the No vote led 69 to 31 percent among those born in the rest of the UK and a 58 to 42 percent lead among those born in other countries. It was therefore not surprising that the immigrant vote was further courted by the SNP in the following weeks as in the anecdotal evidence observed among immigrants to Scotland.
Discursive and quantitative evidence from immigrant voters in the week before the September 18 independence referendum showed a divide in support for and against independence. Many voiced economic uncertainty as reasons to stay a part of the UK, such as shop owners (many of whom are Pakistani) who were worried that “It’s not the right time. We don’t have the resources…They’re asking us to follow them into the darkness.” Others simply enjoyed being part of the United Kingdom, such as one person who stated that: “I like to be Scottish but part of the U.K. I don’t think there is anything wrong with that” (De Bode, 2014), as well as being part of the EU and Common Travel Area. However, many other groups and individuals did support independence.

A study by the Centre of Dynamics of Ethnicity conducted during the referendum period highlighted that the way people perceived ‘Scottishness’ from ‘Britishness’ may have played a lead role in the voting results, as the SNP tried to differentiate Scottish society with its immigrant-friendly policies and rhetoric from the rest of the United Kingdom (CoDE, 2014). In the week before the vote, at least one poll had shown (for the first time) the Yes side with a narrow lead (CoDE, 2014). While the same study could not predict how immigrant communities would vote, it demonstrated that Scotland’s Pakistani immigrants were almost twice as likely to identify as Scottish as England’s Pakistani immigrants were to identify as English. Furthermore, the study showed that Scottishness was perceived as “more inclusive” than the English identity for many ethnic groups (CoDE, 2014). Many minorities viewed “Englishness as a white-only identity,” while immigrants living in Scotland feel the country’s identity is more “inclusive” (CoDE, 2014). This is an important trend especially in regards to framing; if minority groups are framed as part of the nationalist fabric then they will feel part of the fabric and they
should vote accordingly, especially if they feel like the rest of the UK does not accept them to the same degree.

The spokesperson for *Scots Asians for Yes* stipulated that many were encouraged to favour the idea of an independent Scotland based on the hostility created towards their community from the UK’s failing foreign policy in the Middle East (De Bode, 2014). Such minority supported sub-groups were common throughout the Scottish independence campaign. The SNP and the independence movement had the unique support of immigrant groups such as *Polish for Yes, Italians for Si (Yes), Africans for an Independent Scotland*, as well as multiple Asian-immigrant led independence groups. The involvement of these groups in the referendum process sets Scotland apart from the other case studies, while also alluding to the inclusive atmosphere that was part of the Scottish nationalist project.

The rhetoric created by these immigrant groups contributed to the discourse that can be analyzed throughout the referendum process. Evidently, their own cultural and political experiences are brought into their campaign for an independent Scotland. For instance, the members of ‘*Yes Scotland Hong Kong*’ group may be more sympathetic to Scottish independence given their own political history. For some African migrants, the referendum encouraged minorities to take part in Scottish politics. Some believed that “with a yes vote, changes will happen to all those who are in Scotland, especially ethnic minorities who have come as immigrants, who have nowhere they can call home. They’ll start calling this place their home” (Ng, 2014). Others felt that “often as immigrants [they] are challenged to engage with the mainstream, so [they thought it was] very, very important for people from ethnic minority groups to engage with this kind of referendum and the debate and the decision making” (Ng, 2014). The incorporation of minority groups into the sovereignty movement speaks to their importance in
the independence referendum process. Similar to the Catalonia case, the same ‘emotion contagion’ can be seen in the immigrant populations in Scotland but to an even greater extent. To this end, through interactions with sovereigntist groups in Scotland, immigrants adapted the same nationalist zeal or through connecting with anti-independence groups they adopted the same anti-independence ardour.

Pro and anti-independence groups were also active on social media in their pursuit. The use of social media is an interesting aspect used in the Scottish case. Social media was also used throughout the Catalonia campaign, but not in the Quebec case. In the case of the Quebec, the lack of availability of such technological mediums in 1995 is an obvious deterrent. While the impact of its use extends beyond the research of this thesis, I mention it here as the use of social media contributed to public participation in the movement. An example of this was noted near the end of the voting period when the *Italians for Yes* group dismissed the *No* campaign’s latest promise to devolve more power to Scotland if they remained in the union by stating on twitter: “The No campaign is doing a Berlusconi — bribing the electorate a few days before the vote. Don't fall for it Scotland #VoteYes”. By the same token, however, promises are part of the election game and both the *No* and *Yes* campaigns played accordingly.

As is common in most political campaigns, the referendum campaign was not without controversy. Claims were made that *No* activists attempted to garner pro-union support in the Polish community by warning Polish and other EU nationals that they would be forced to leave the country if Scotland became independent as they would no longer be protected by EU free movement of people laws (McArdle, 2014). The pro-independence groups condemned such anxiety-inducing manoeuvres. *Polish for Yes* and lobbyists for independence demanded that the *No* campaign apologise for creating fear and panic among Polish families (McArdle, 2014).
Notably, membership of the EU was a salient issue in the referendum debate. While the Scottish Government insisted it could negotiate entry as an existing member state within 18 months of independence\textsuperscript{xix}, the Pro-Union lobbyists indicated that an independent Scotland would have to apply for re-entry, which could take significantly longer\textsuperscript{xxi}. Elected members of the SNP also spoke out about these claims as Humza Yousaf, Minister for External Affairs, stated that the government is committed to Scotland's European migrants and an independent Scotland will be part of the European Union, therefore the freedom of movement between Scotland and all EU countries would continue (McArdle, 2014).

Although the issue of immigration was not as salient to Scottish voters, it remained one of the main cleavages between the Yes and the No camps (Hepburn, 2015). As noted, the Scottish Government had previously promoted their vision for an inclusive and multicultural model of citizenship in an independent Scotland. This position on immigration compares with “the SNP’s self-perception as a democratically inclusive party” (Hepburn, 2015). While the SNP’s commitment to multiculturalism contrasts largely with the “neo-assimilationist approach of the UK government” its vision for a multicultural Scotland does not differ from the views of the No Camp (Lewis and Craig, 2014). The No camp did not seek to contest the Yes camp on concepts of multiculturalism but instead targeted issues relating to immigration control. No lobbyists highlighted the detriments that a liberal immigration system could bring, not to Scotland itself, but to the rest of the United Kingdom. The issue of immigration in the Scottish independence referendum period was mainly contested between the Scottish and the British Governments, or rather the Yes supporters, led by the SNP, contending against the unionist parties in Scotland (Hepburn, 2015). As noted in a previous section the comparable rhetorical approaches to immigration used by all parties in Scotland could explain this occurrence.
Two weeks before the September 18th referendum, the polls showed non-Britons favouring the No campaign, but by a smaller margin than Britons born outside of Scotland (Brooks, 2014). Therefore, Alex Salmond held a rally in Edinburgh targeted at immigrants voters. Pictures of the event depicted various individuals holding signs with vote “Yes” in various languages. This rally was part of a concentrated effort to gain the last bit of foreign vote support possible. Furthermore, First and Deputy First Ministers, Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon, delivered their final plea for Yes to hundreds of people from the city’s African and South Asian communities just three days before the final vote at Glasgow’s Central mosque. Salmond and Sturgeon’s discourse remained positive and inclusive. Sturgeon began by stating: “I don’t care where you have come from… If you choose to make Scotland your home and you do this country the privilege of making it your home, then you have as much say in the future of our country as anyone else” (Ng, 2014).

Sturgeon’s sentiments were echoed by Salmond in a statement suggesting that Scotland “will have a country that will be concerned not just with economic prosperity, but social justice, and embrace every single one of [their] communities in what we describe as the great tartan of Scotland… That’s why [he is] absolutely confident that whatever else happens, the majority of Africans, the majority of Asians, the majority of people who come from a variety of Scotland’s will vote yes to independence” (Ng, 2014). Similar discourse could be noted throughout the independence referendum process.

Despite efforts made by the SNP, the polls continued to show the immigrant vote divided, which is, notably, still impressive level of support when compared to what I derive from the Quebec case. The rhetoric, however, never became negative. With a sufficient number of immigrants supporting the cause, it would have been very imprudent to do otherwise. While the
Yes campaign lost the referendum, the immigrant vote was so closely divided they could not be ‘blamed’ for the loss as in the Quebec case, nor would they have been based on the inclusive discourse cemented throughout the independence referendum process.

When the results were tallied immigrants were not targeted but instead incorporated into the feelings of disappointment echoed by the Yes camp, as they had been incorporated and welcomed into the sovereignty movement. To this end, SNP MSP Christian Allard is quoted as saying that “Scotland is the country of everyone who lives here, regardless of where they were born, and we take decisions on our future together… the diversity of Scotland’s population is a matter for celebration.. While we were disappointed with the result of the referendum, this study shows that a clear legacy has been greater political involvement, particularly among young people… And that is something to be proud of” (Clegg, 2015). Moreover, in my research I was taxed to find any accounts of negative discourse by the SNP in recent years or any at all by the first minister and deputy minister at the time of the referendum in regards to views on immigration. This lack of negative discourse has shown Scotland and the SNP as an outlier among the case studies.

In regards to immigrant voting behaviour, a study on the voting patterns of Polish immigrants in the referendum highlights the importance of attachment (Piętka-Nykazaa and McGhee, 2015). As the immigrant group with the largest population, Polish nationals may have more of an impact on voting outcomes than other immigrant groups. The findings in this study also denote the concept being an important aspect in immigrant political participation. For example, the intention to stay in Scotland along with substantive attachments (social, economic and relational or familial) to the region were engaging factors to the Polish nationals involvement in the referendum vote (Piętka-Nykazaa and McGhee, 2015).
While my thesis focuses on political discourse, public opinion also has an effect on the immigrant vote. Some studies (Migration Observatory, 2014; and McCollom, Nowok, and Tidal, 2014) have inferred that public opinion in Scotland, with regards to immigration, is actually much closer to that of the UK than SNP politicians have vocalized. To this end, public opinion could have an impact on the divide in the immigrant vote. The reports reveal that general attitudes to immigration in Scotland are less negative than in the rest of Britain, but they also reveal that public opinion is distinguished based on the type of immigrant. For example, those coming from the Middle East may be viewed less favourably than those coming from elsewhere in Europe. There are decidedly different attitudes toward various sub-groups and categories of immigrants in Scotland. Moreover, the reports note a complicated relationship between immigration attitudes and constitutional issues that extends well beyond the capacity of this thesis. Ultimately, an analysis of public opinion outspreads the focus of this thesis, but it is worthy of mentioning as a point for further research.

The Scottish independence referendum highlights an important connection between political discourse and the way in which immigrants vote. As it did in Catalonia, the independence referendum process created a bond among all those living in Scotland while allowing for the political socialization of immigrant groups. The next section offers some insight into the implications of the immigrant involvement in the sovereignty movement in Scotland and the political developments of the SNP after the independence referendum process.

6.3 The Post-Referendum Period

Despite the disappointing results for Yes campaigners, the results were accepted with dignity on all sides. While ‘New Scots’ were not specifically thanked for their efforts in the movement, they were not demonized either. In fact, the only blame placed was on the No
campaign’s last minute promises to pursue further devolution for Scotland. There is no need in Scotland to specifically thank a group of people that have been so well incorporated into both sides of the movement. Following the referendum, elected officials used inclusive language that brought all Scots together. Indeed, divisive rhetoric was not commonly observed in any of the materials I analyzed in the post-referendum period. The language used in the campaigns, on both sides, was about being together. While on the Yes side, those were encouraged to come together for an independent Scotland, the campaign Better Together on the No side denotes double significance.

In Alex Salmond’s speech, on the final outcome of the referendum, he thanked those who voted for independence. More importantly, Salmond wanted to bring all Scots together by acknowledging the region’s commitment to the political process with the highest voter turnout “in the democratic world for any election or any referendum in history” (Salmond, 2014). Such involvement in the referendum vote was upheld as a victory for the democratic institutions that exist within the country. Salmond also used inclusive words, such as ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘friends’ in his speech, denoting the importance of togetherness despite the results (Salmond, 2014). Notable to my thesis, was Salmond’s reference to the involvement of “new sections of the community” in the referendum campaign (Salmond, 2014). While not specifically highlighting the involvement of immigrants, one could infer that “the touched sections of the community who’ve never before been touched by politics” (Salmond, 2014) could be a reference to immigrant groups. Furthermore, Salmond touts the participation of these sections of the community to have influenced both his party and the political process.

Following the Scottish Referendum, the same inclusive rhetoric can be observed by the SNP. In fact, since the referendum, SNP party membership has more than quadrupled and overall
electoral support for the party has risen. In the last UK Federal Election the SNP won 56 of Scotland’s 59 Westminster seats and they are currently the largest supported party in local government (Stuart, 2014). Notably, predictions made in my hypotheses can help to explain the rise in support of the SNP. The rise in support for the SNP compliments the continuation of the progressive rhetoric that is shared by the SNP, particularly with regards to immigration. The discourse articulated by the SNP throughout the referendum is locked-in and the same rhetoric is continued thereafter. Thus, the progressive rhetoric and policies favoured by the SNP become the status quo, especially as support for the party continues to rise. Furthermore, after the referendum the SNP continued to push the UK on its failing immigration policy, denoting an important trend in migration politics in the region.

Scottish ministers particularly insisted that the UK government reinstate work visas for foreign students after a study revealed that nearly half of all migrants to Scotland had been educated to degree level or higher. Humza Yousaf, the Scottish government’s Minister for Europe and International Development, has spoken about the way in which the UK “immigration policy is currently too heavily influenced by the priorities of the South-East of England, based on the values of the current UK government and driven by a desire to reduce the numbers of incoming migrants which does not recognise Scotland’s needs and does not serve their economic or societal interests” (Carrell, 2015). Similar discourse was found throughout the UK general election as the SNP has stated that they would only “support immigration policies that meet Scotland's economic needs; seek the reintroduction of the post study work visa; and, review current immigration detention system and regime, in order to deliver a fairer and more effective system” (BBC, 2015). Evidently, the SNP could be pushing a pro-immigration strategy in order
to strengthen their economy, but regardless the party continues to create positive political discourse towards immigration as a result.

More recently, the SNP has challenged the UK government on its ‘inhumane’ treatment of asylum seekers. The motion particularly referred to a specific dawn raid on a family of asylum seekers in Glasgow, June 2015 and more generally to a motion on closure of the Dungavel Detention Centre, that is located in Scotland but of which Scotland has no jurisdiction over. The MP for Glasgow East has insisted that the rights of asylum seekers are high on the SNP’s agenda. Other members of the SNP are also active in this message, such as the SNP Spokesperson for Immigration, Asylum and Border Control, Stuart Macdonald. MacDonald was the one to propose the two motions in parliament that would better support asylum seekers. Another SNP member, Angus Robertson, publicly criticized the UK government’s lack of support for Syrian refugees and the migrant crisis, particularly with “migrants drowning in Mediterranean” (Paton, 2015). Advocating for a more suitable immigration system for Scotland, along with migrant rights, has become a regular part of the SNP rhetoric stemming from the lock-in after the referendum.

The foregoing case study demonstrates what happens because of the referendum process in Scotland. The first section of my case study outlined the political developments in Scotland in regards to immigration. This section continued by outlining the relationship between nationalist parties and immigrants that would develop during the independence referendum process. The second section of the case study discussed the independence referendum period and highlighted an important point in Scottish Nationalism – the incorporation of immigrants in the Scottish identity. As seen in the Catalan study, the emotional connection created between Scots and immigrants throughout the referendum extends the case study beyond the civic and ethnic
nationalism into an analysis of political mobilization by the SNP and other nationalist factions in Scotland, and how these sentiments were locked in by the referendum period. The third section reviewed the post referendum period to understand how the referendum locked-in political discourse of the SNP offering tentative predictions for the future.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis has examined the link between independence referenda and minority nationalist discourses on immigration. I demonstrate in each case that the referendum period acts as lock-in mechanism that secures minority discourses about immigrants that were created by nationalist frames throughout the process. Importantly, the referenda played a role in the development of either an accepting or a sceptical narrative toward immigration. In Quebec, I note the development of a suspicious narrative toward immigration, whereas I observe a more accepting or accommodating rhetoric in the Catalan and Scottish cases. The aim of this research project is to answer the question if, without a referendum, the relationship between the nationalist movement and immigrant communities would be more fluid in each of the case studies presented.

The intersection of the cultural demands between minority nations and a diverse region showcases the role of the referenda in congealing minority nationalist attitudes towards immigrants. The preceding analysis has allowed me to highlight that without a referendum the minority nationalist views of immigrant communities would have remained more flexible. Further, each case demonstrates that the immigrant community position in the referenda (whether they are more or less favourably disposed toward independence) acts as the mechanism that locks in the minority nationalist discourses on immigrants. In other words, through the independence referenda immigrant identity frames presented by SSNP elites are locked-in. This final chapter offers a synthesis of the findings from each case study. This allows the reader to understand how and to what extent the information presented in the case studies matches the hypotheses set out in Chapter 3. Through my research, I am able to identify notable theoretical
and policy implications of my study. I conclude by discussing these, along with the limitations of the study and areas for future research.

My work is premised on four claims that developed the theory of the independence referendum as a lock-in mechanism that secures SSNP political elite discourse toward immigrants into the minority region. The following paragraphs illustrate how the empirical data presented here fit with the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. First, all SSNRs analyzed developed unique diversity policies in opposition to state immigration policies. Diversity management became an important part in the nation-building efforts for nationalist parties in Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland. While all three cases were limited by constitutional constraints in terms of how they could direct their own immigration policies, managing immigration and integration became an important nation-building tool, notably in contrast to the central state. For instance, Quebec SSNPs rejected the Canadian multicultural model for the use of its own policy of interculturalism. As noted, this rejection is based on the perception that multiculturalism was intended to undermine Quebec nationalist aspirations. As such, this perception has affected the way in which cultural communities are discussed in the region. Further, Quebec offers intercultural education policies that are used to integrate immigrants into the French culture rather than link them to the Canadian English institutions. While in policy, the PQ view diversity as opportunity to build on the nation of Quebec as nation for all its residents, discursive examples noted point to the opposite.

In Catalonia, language is also a contentious issue as politicians attempt to encourage the use of Catalan to differ from the mainstream Spanish language and culture. As such, immigration has become a salient issue in Catalan national politics. Catalonia adopted more accommodating policies toward immigrants in contrast to the Spanish state in 2001. Importantly, this progressive
approach to immigration was continued throughout the 2003 elections and beyond, although party competition played a role in the creation of negative rhetoric, particularly from parties of the right but also from within the CiU.

The Scottish region has embraced diversity as an important building block to their national identity despite the central message of the UK that views immigration as a threat. The SNP have committed to pursue welcoming policies around immigration and all Scottish parties worked to spite British Government policies. Therefore, the use of public policy in SSNRs is twofold. It has the expected function of providing necessities to the public, but it is also frequently used in order to build separate identity. Certainly, the dynamic between policies of the state and policies of SSNPs have a role in the development of nationalist discourse toward immigrants. With such divergent views on policies, independence becomes one of the most salient issue in SSNRs.

Second, an independence referendum represents an important period of political stress in each region identified here, where immigration becomes a more prominent topic. The referendum becomes the medium for the solidification of nationalist discourse toward immigrants, especially as the oppositional policies created by the nation-building process produce diversity practices wherein immigrants are perceived a certain way by the SSNRs. While the province of Quebec did offer some policies in efforts to integrate newcomers, it struggled to actually incorporate immigrants into the sovereignty movement, due to exclusiveness of the PQ and the BQ parties. In Catalonia, the CiU were somewhat successful in gaining supporters for the sovereignty movement yet discursive examples from main party advocates, such as Pujol and Ferrusola, highlight the fragmentation in party views towards immigration. Scotland offers the clearest example of welcoming policies and discourses before the referendum.
period especially as the dichotomy of us versus them was not noted in any of the discursive examples presented here.

In Quebec, the minority region opposition results in more exclusive diversity policies and in turn, the majority of immigrants appeared more supportive of the central government/preservation of the state. In Scotland, the minority region opposition results in more inclusive policies and therefore immigrants appear more supportive of the independence movement. In Catalonia, the relationship between SSNRs and immigrant groups is complicated by regional party ties to the central state. However, under, the CiU, some inclusive (although assimilationalist) policies were presented and therefore immigrants appeared more supportive of independentist movement. Or rather, immigrants were so well integrated into the political sphere such a distinction did not play a factor in the discourse. Further, the decision to allow all immigrants to vote in the independence referendum had unparalleled effects on their involvement in the referendum and, in turn the way in which they were framed by sub-state national parties in Catalonia.

Third, immigrant frames created by SSNPs prior to and during the independence referendum were relevant to the nationalist movements. In Quebec, immigrants were perceived as undermining self-determination for the minority nation whereas in Catalonia and Scotland immigrants were so well incorporated into the movement there was no need to frame them as outsiders; many simply voted along with previous party allegiances. Indeed, while there are some discursive examples from members of the CiU that denote negative attitudes towards immigrants prior to the referendum, there are none noted here during the Catalan independence referendum period. Immigrants in Scotland were usually framed as part of the Scottish national fabric, setting the region apart in the case studies analyzed here.
The Catalan and Scottish cases highlight the important relationship formed between immigrants and minority nations by involving the former in an important political opportunity. Further, while political pandering to immigrant groups was noted in all cases, its effects were only noted in Catalonia and Scotland. SSNPs in the Catalan and Scottish cases did make claims that immigrant groups would be better supported by an independent state. Immigrant groups in Quebec felt they did not fit into the nationalist fabric. Further still, the Québécois majority seemed so caught up in the divide between French and English there was very little room for the allophone minority. Therefore, no promises were made to groups in anticipation of them supporting sovereignty. Moreover, the referendum period seemed to open a chasm in the political divide between some immigrant groups and separatists as noted above.

Fourth, how the minority nationalists’ perceived immigrant voting patterns in the referendum ultimately affected their attitudes toward immigrant communities after the referendum took place. These views were secured and normalized through the framing process and political articulation associated with the referendum period. This is especially true in the case of Quebec upon an analysis of policy and discourse development after the referendum period.

The Catalan and Scottish Case studies highlight the importance of political mobilization used by the nationalist parties. Separatist political parties in these regions have tried to socialize immigrants through the concept of belonging. In these two cases, the independence process becomes more about political mobilization than identity. Therefore, my work has implications for future studies that discuss the connection between immigration and minority regions by incorporating research on political mobilization. The referendum period in Quebec saw the widening of political divides between two community groups whereas the process in Catalonia
and Scotland seem to mirror modern social movements by incorporating marginalized groups into the political process. Notably, future research should consider analyzing the societal impact of referendums as social movements, especially the impact on typically marginalized groups.

Ultimately, my work provides a nuanced addition to the studies on nationalism and immigrations by examining the referenda as a lock-in mechanism. I add to the scholarship on nationalism in multinational states by introducing a novel approach to understanding the relationship between nationalist movements and immigrant groups under a time of political stress. However, while more extensive work could be done through content analysis, this study has sought to provide an introduction to the impact of referenda on nationalism and attitudes towards immigration. Future research should include more qualitative methodology, with a greater reliance on primary sources. Certainly, interviews with notable individuals involved in the referendum period would shed more light on perceptions of the time. Furthermore, the limited availability of quantitative information on voting patterns prevents me from making conclusive remarks about immigrant behaviour. However, perceptions of immigrant behaviour by minority regionalists groups, as noted in the cases study analysis, demonstrate that referendums due matter in terms of subsequent policy and discursive development. Notably, moments of political stress offer an interesting opportunity for researchers to examine how minorities are incorporated into society. As ‘othering’ becomes a part of the rhetoric on immigrants and refugees in certain areas of the contemporary, western world it is important to understand that this research offers starting point in discursive studies on the views of immigrants in minority regions.

A final note should be made about the current world political climate in 2016. While I examined political developments in the regions until the end of 2015, this thesis was completed
at a particularly politically turbulent time. Throughout the time I wrote my thesis, the world saw the rise of ISIS and the complexities of the Syrian crisis; which have created the biggest outflow of refugees since World War Two. While unprecedented terrorist attacks are becoming more prevalent throughout Western Europe, Britain exits the European Union. Moreover, the former Stephen Harper Administration in Canada used divisive political techniques to pit certain citizen groups against one another. Certainly, the analysis of these factors has no place in my thesis but there is no doubt that these factors would have had an effect on global and minority regionalist’s perceptions. As Britain takes leave from the EU, one might analyze how this change could impact Scottish political rhetoric, especially with regards to its will to leave the UK. Did Québécois rhetoric towards immigration change based on the conservative ideals that were presented under Stephen Harper Administration? Moreover, will minority regions demand for more control over immigration, especially over a perceived type of immigrant? And, how will this affect their views on immigration?
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The independence referendum held in Catalonia was not a binding or even regional-government mandated referendum. It holds little constitutional weight but it is still important to the overall national movement in Catalonia (and relevant to this research) as it signifies the increasing desire for emancipation from the Spanish Kingdom in that SSNR.

See Carens, 1995; 2001; Kymlicka, 1995; 2001; and Baubock, 2001

I refer to framing literature as the works found in social movement literature, rather than in political behaviour literature. Particularly relevant is the work of Snow et al (1986) where I incorporate elements such as frame amplification which I see as the process where an interpretive frame has an effect “on a particular issue, problem, or set of events” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469) through its “invigoration.” Other scholarship on framing, such as works by Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 2007, Goffman (1974), and Snow and Benford (1988) will also be outlined in the following sections.

The former coalition between the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the Democratic Union of Catalonia, which broke up in June of 2015, led by Artur Mas.

Notably, hostility may also come from 'below', from the general population, but such an analysis extends beyond the confines of my work.

I define referendums in this context as an extension of the state’s institutions and therefore analyses it as an institution itself.

Political articulation refers to images and views conveyed by political representatives.

The “medium is the message” is a term coined by Marshall Macluhan first introduced in his book Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964). Macluhan states that it is the medium itself that should be the focus of study rather than solely the content. I analyse both the medium (the referendum) and the content (the discourse) in my study.

Notably, the informal referendum in 2014 was not the last word on independence in Catalonia. Indeed, the subsequent 2015 election was supposed to be a plebiscitary one to initiate the process of secession.

Notably, this thesis focuses on the relationship between newcomers to the country and nationalist movements. Notably, internal migrants, i.e. Canadian citizens moving from Toronto to Montreal (in the Quebec case); Welsh and/or Irish individuals moving to Scotland; or Andalusians moving to Catalonia are not the primary focus of this study. The Anglophones discussed in the Quebec case are unique, as many have been in Quebec since it’s inception and I do not consider them part of the newcomers discussed. I include them in my discussion as political actors mention them, as Anglophones are not considered part of the French nationalist fabric of Quebec akin to many immigrants. Further, internal and international migrants are distinct actors with different access to resources: while one is a regional ‘minority’ the other is a ‘double minority’. I focus only on the latter as they seem to have the biggest impact on political rhetoric analysed here yet the cultural differences the former bring in is not ignored but is saved for further research opportunities.

The official term for non-white groups in Canada; in contrast Quebec uses the term “cultural communities”.

Another term used to describe old stock Quebeckers.

Much of this was decided between negotiations between the Federal Government of Canada and the main political parties in Quebec, led by Jacques Parizeau (PQ), Lucien Bouchard (BQ) and Mario Dumont (ADQ) and was put into agreement on June 12, 1995.

The federal Bloc Québécois party has important ties to the provincial Parti Québécois, and had obvious intentions in the support of the 1995 independence referendum. Therefore, I take into account the actions of their party members as if they were a part of the Sub-State Nationalist Regional party.

It was in power again in 2010 up until 2015 when the coalition party was dissolved.
Various constitutional battles have played out over time between the Spain Government and Catalonia, as was witnessed even in the case of the (unconstitutional, non-binding) independence referendum.

Jordi Pujol was the leader of the party Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) from 1974 to 2003, and President of the Generalitat de Catalunya from 1980 to 2003 under the CiU label.

Since its inception in 1934, the SNP has remained one of the leading parties in Scotland. The main goal of the SNP has been independence for Scotland from the UK. Integral in the fight for Scottish devolution, the SNP became the official opposition of the newly formed Scottish Parliament in 1999. The SNP has formed the minority government between 2007 and 2011, and subsequently has governed up until the publication of this thesis as a majority government.

Subsequently, the United Kingdom’s turn to a more restrictive points-based immigration system eradicated the limited capacities that Scotland appreciated under Fresh Talent. While Scottish governments continued to lobby for flexibility in applying immigration rules, Ministers and the Home Office were not receptive.

Based on Article 48 of the Treaties of the European Union

In reality, the No side stated that it could take up to a few years without a guaranteed membership at the end, based on using Article 49 of the Treaties of the European Union.