

**Lonergan's Early Development in Ethics: A Study of Archives Notes on General Ethics [A  
Metaphysics of Customs]**

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## Abstract

In 1940, Bernard Lonergan was forced to flee Rome quickly. He took a few pages of an essay on Newman, seven essays and sketches later found in File 713, a set of handwritten notes on his reading of Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs*, and a set of hand written sketches titled "General Ethic [Metaphysics of Customs]." These sketches have gone relatively untouched within the body of existing scholarship on Lonergan. First, this project establishes the significance of these sketches, dates their composition, and discusses a context for understanding their relevance. Secondly, using the functional specialization of research, it provides preliminary research notes that will aid in a future interpretation of the text. Thirdly, it establishes the sketches as an early outline of Lonergan's understanding of the metaphysic of ethics found in chapter 18 of *Insight*. The project highlights connections between the sketches and Lonergan's thoughts on Kant, the dialectic of history, and Ethics.

## **Acknowledgements**

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I owe a huge debt to Michael George and Alexandra Bain of St. Thomas University who inspired me to pursue graduate studies at Memorial University and ensured my safe arrival to St. Johns in the face of trying situations. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the biggest debt of all to Michael Shute whose support, encouragement, extensive knowledge and dedication inspired me and made this project possible. Michael sympathetically understood the challenges that I faced throughout the duration of this project. I dedicate this project to him.

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### **Abbreviations:**

BLFK – Lonergan’s letter to Fr. Keane January 22, 1935.

*CWL* – Collected Works of Lonergan

DT – Lonergan Archive File 1300ADTE030 (Robert Doran's Transcription of File A13)

EFS – “Essay in Fundamental Sociology”

GE sketches – Lonergan Archive File A13 (Sketches on “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]”)

KN – Lonergan Archive File A12 (notes on Kant’s *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs*)

*LEER* - *Lonergan’s Early Economic Research*

*LQ* - *Lonergan’s Quest: a Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight*

PA – “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis”

*OLNDH* - *The Origin of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History*

*TL* - *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan*

## **List of Appendices**

Appendix 1    “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]”  
Lonergan Archive File 1300DTE030/A13

Appendix 2                    “Notes on E. Kant -  
*I Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi*”  
Lonergan Archive File 12000DTIE30 / A12



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## Introduction

Inspired by his reading of Kant's *I Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi*, Lonergan composed a set of hand written sketches titled "General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]." These sketches appear to be an outline for a book and offer Lonergan's own thoughts on the issues presented in Kant's *I Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi*. When quickly fleeing Rome, Lonergan chose to take the sketches with him and left behind a large majority of his work. Somehow, the sketches have been overlooked by Lonergan scholarship. I hope that my project will inspire others to consider the sketches in light of their relationship to the dialectic of history, Lonergan's understanding of Kant, his early development, and his understanding of Ethics.

My project highlights the significance of the sketches, especially in relation to the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology," Lonergan's notes on Kant, and chapter 18 of *Insight*. Following a discussion of their significance, I establish the dating of the sketches and then provide some initial context surrounding their composition. In the second chapter, I provide a transcribed version of the sketches. I rely heavily upon Robert Doran's transcription of the handwritten sketches for this chapter, and offer a few amendments to ensure the sketch looks as close to the original file as possible.

In chapters three and four, I provide some primary data (research notes) that I believe will be useful for future interpretation of the text. My project is very preliminary in its approach, I use Lonergan's functional specialization research as a method of approach to the sketches. In these chapters, I provide research notes to aid in a more clear understanding of references that Lonergan makes throughout the sketches. These, I believe, will be useful for future interpretations of Lonergan's early work, its place in his development, his relationship to Kant's

thought, his Ethics (as relevant to chapter 18 of *Insight*), the notion of the dialectic of history and other questions which certainly will emerge in future Lonergan scholarship.

The file is divided into three sketches, the second sketch is clearly a revised version of the first. The third sketch however, although evidently related to the first two sketches, is a separate outline for Lonergan's understanding of happiness. I explore the first sketch in chapter three and compare it to the second sketch in chapter four. I also examine the third sketch on happiness in this chapter.

My final chapter connects the file to chapter 18 of *Insight* and establishes the sketches as an early outline of the notion of ethics found in that chapter. The sketches are evidence that Lonergan began thinking about ethics long before the composition of chapter 18 of *Insight*. With all of this in mind, I turn your attention to chapter one: "Significance and Context: Sketches on the Metaphysic of Customs."

## Chapter One: Significance and Context: Sketches on the Metaphysic of Customs

I stumbled upon File 1300DTE030/A13 while doing research at the archives at the Lonergan Research Institute. The file consisted of a series of notes headed with the title “General Ethic [a Metaphysic of Customs].”<sup>1</sup> Having recently explored chapter 18 of *Insight I* immediately saw a connection between the file and Lonergan’s account of ethics in that chapter. The following chapter highlights the significance of the GE sketches and discusses a context for understanding their relevance for Lonergan’s development.

While the GE sketches are mentioned by both Liddy and Mathews in their discussion of Lonergan’s development in the 1930’s, neither treats the sketches in any depth. Yet, as I hope to show, the sketches provide us with evidence for locating an important moment in the development of Lonergan’s thinking in the 1930’s and as such, deserve a more detailed analysis. Lonergan’s impetus for writing the sketches was his reading of Kant. In 1934 he had written a review of Leo Keeler’s book *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant*, which provided an occasion for him to delve into Kant.<sup>2</sup> Adjacent to the GE sketches in the archives was a set of Lonergan’s notes titled “E Kant - *I Fondamenti della Metaphysica dei Costumi*.”<sup>3</sup> The notes were on the Italian translation of Kant’s *Grundlegung Metaphysik der Sitten*. It is highly probable, then, that the GE sketches were written around the same time and in response to his reading of Kant. Both files, then, are significant for understanding Lonergan’s response to Kant and provide an early indication of how Lonergan’s approach to ethics differs from Kant. As we shall see, the

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<sup>1</sup> Bernard Lonergan. “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]” [Lonergan Archive File 1300DTE030 / A13]. Referred here after as: GE sketches.

<sup>2</sup> Leo W. Keeler. “The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant. A Historical and Critical Study.” University of California: *Apud Aedes Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae*, 1934.

<sup>3</sup> Bernard Lonergan. “Notes on E. Kant - *I Fondamenti della Metaphysica dei Costumi*. Trad. Giacomo Perticone - ed. Signorelli. Roma 1926” [Lonergan Archive File 1200DTIE30 / A12]. Referred here after as: KN.

GE sketches also show the influence of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,”<sup>4</sup> written in the spring of 1934, and would also have some significance in an analysis of the development of Lonergan’s philosophy of history. Lonergan wrote the seminal early essay “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” in January of 1935.<sup>5</sup> These notes, then, were composed in the period between his two early essays in dialectic of history. Finally, for anyone interested in the development of *Insight*, the GE sketches are clearly related to the content of chapter 18, ‘The Possibility of Ethics.’<sup>6</sup> At the very least, the sketches are important for us because they were important to Lonergan.

I have divided this chapter into two sections. The first section considers the overall significance of the GE sketches. The second explores the context surrounding their composition.

### **Initial Significance of the GE Sketches**

Lonergan studied at the Gregorian University in Rome from 1933 to 1940. He was destined for a philosophy doctorate when, in response to a need for theology professors in his home Jesuit province of Upper Canada, his superiors informed him in 1938 that he would be switching to theology. In the fall of 1938 he began his doctoral thesis in theology on the notion of *gratia operans* in the thought of Aquinas.<sup>7</sup> Because of the advance of the German army in

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<sup>4</sup> Bernard Lonergan. ‘Essay in Fundamental Sociology’ in *Lonergan’s Early Economic Research* (ed. Michael Shute). (2010), 15-44. Referenced here after as: EFS.

<sup>5</sup> Published as *Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* (*The Restoration of All Things*). Edited with an introduction by Frederick E. Crowe. *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9:2 (1991) 139–72. The full original title of the essay is “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*: A Theory of Human Solidarity A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St. Paul A Theology for the Social Order, Catholic Action, and the Kingship of Christ in Incipient Outline.” The essay is discussed in detail in Michael Shute. *The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History*, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1993), 99-109. Referenced here after as: OLNDH.

<sup>6</sup> Bernard Lonergan. *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* Volume 3 (ed. by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran). (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). Hereafter: *CWL3*.

<sup>7</sup> The thesis was entitled *Gratia Operans: A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas of Auin* and published in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Volume 1 *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

Italy, Lonergan had to flee Rome and return to Canada, taking his thesis materials, a few pages of a 30,000 word essay on Newman,<sup>8</sup> seven essays and sketches later found in File 713,<sup>9</sup> the set of handwritten notes on his reading of Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs*<sup>10</sup> and the sketches titled "General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]." Lonergan's departure from Rome was somewhat rushed, "Lonergan was to embark on the ship *Washington* at Naples, Saturday May 18<sup>th</sup>. He would have defended his thesis according to the earlier plan, on May 17<sup>th</sup>, The *Washington*, however, was fully booked, so he had to get to Genoa and depart from there, on May 15<sup>th</sup> aboard the *Conti di Savoia*."<sup>11</sup> Acting quickly, Lonergan discarded almost all of a long essay on Newman, his work on economics and the first 94 pages of the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology."<sup>12</sup> We can assume then, that the files he selected to take were of great significance for him.<sup>13</sup> Given the importance of his later breakthroughs in economic theory in 1942 and 1944, the fact that Lonergan left behind a substantial essay on Newman and whatever work he was doing in economics and yet took the history materials, the set of notes on Kant, and the GE sketches is on the face of it quite astounding. It would be interesting to know Lonergan's thoughts as he made a decision to take these particular items.

Lonergan's notes on Kant and File 713 have been examined within the existing body of Lonergan scholarship. The work of Frederick Crowe, overall, provides the most extensive

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<sup>8</sup> See *OLNDH*, 73.

<sup>9</sup> File 713 is available online from the Lonergan Archive.

<sup>10</sup> KN. The Kant title is usually translated in English as *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. Working from the Italian translation, Lonergan refers to his own ethics project as a 'metaphysic of customs.'

<sup>11</sup> Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, *Bernard Lonergan His Life and Leading Ideas*, (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2010), 64-65. See also: <http://www.lonerganresearch.org/about-us/about-bernard-lonergan/>

<sup>12</sup> *OLNDH*, 68.

<sup>13</sup> While not all contents of File 713 were written prior to 1940 - it includes, for instance, notes on Toynbee's *A Study of History*, which we know Lonergan read after he arrived in Canada - the file contained seven essays or sketches on the topic of history all written between 1934 and 1938. These are: item 2, "Analytic Concept of History" item 3, "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*" item 6, "Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity" and "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis* - A Theory of Human Solidarity"; item 7, "Analytic Concept of History, In Blurred Outline"; item 9, "Philosophy of History"; item 11, "A Theory of History"; and item 12, "Outline of an Analytic Conception of History". See *OLNDH*, 46. See pages 67-71 for a discussion of the dating.

discussion. His short work *Loneragan* provides an overview of Lonergan's work.<sup>14</sup> His various essays on Lonergan's development have been collected in *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea* (1989).<sup>15</sup> In addition, his last work, *Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan from 1935 to 1982*, provides a further resource on Lonergan's development in his thinking on theology in the 1930's. William Matthews' book *Loneragan's Quest: a Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight*,<sup>16</sup> is designed to act as a biography of Bernard Lonergan's life and provides a broad outline of the highlights of Lonergan's development up to 1953, as does Richard Liddy's *Transforming Light*.

Despite the extent of the secondary literature on Lonergan, there is relatively little scholarship that devotes its primary attention to Lonergan's development prior to 1940. Of this literature, none deals directly with Lonergan's early development in ethics. While Crowe, Mathews, and Liddy all consider Lonergan's work in the 1930s, it is the work of Michael Shute and Patrick Brown that focuses explicitly on this period. Shute's three books on Lonergan: *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History*, *Loneragan's Discovery of the Science of Economics*,<sup>17</sup> and *Loneragan's Early Economic Research*<sup>18</sup> all concern the early Lonergan. Patrick Brown has contributed three important essays: "System and History in Lonergan's Early Historical and Economic Manuscripts,"<sup>19</sup> "Implementation In Lonergan's Early Historical

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<sup>14</sup> Frederick E. Crowe. *Loneragan* in the Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series (Liturgical Press, 1992).

<sup>15</sup> Frederick E. Crowe. *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea* (ed. Michael Vertin). (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989).

<sup>16</sup> William Matthews. *Loneragan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). Referenced here after as: *LQ*.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Shute. *Loneragan's Discovery of the Science of Economics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

<sup>18</sup> *Loneragan's Early Economic Research*, edited by Michael Shute (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). Referenced here after as: *LEER*.

<sup>19</sup> Patrick Brown. "System and History in Lonergan's Early Historical and Economic Manuscripts" *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 1 (2001): 37-76.

Manuscripts,”<sup>20</sup> and “Aiming Excessively High and Far’: The Early Lonergan and the Challenge of Theory in Catholic Social Thought.”<sup>21</sup> To these works we can add Joseph Komonchak’s essay “Lonergan’s Early Essays on the Redemption of History.”<sup>22</sup>

Generating a comprehensive outline of the development of Lonergan as a thinker is a difficult task. As Crowe argues: “The course of development, however, is not easy to follow; for although there are extremely revealing documents, there are also great blank spaces. Still, that will add zest to an already fascinating study.”<sup>23</sup> The GE sketches may help fill in a small portion of the blank spaces to which Crowe alludes.

The GE sketches are virtually untouched as a scholarly source. I have located a brief mention of them in Shute’s book *Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of Economics*<sup>24</sup> and reference to them in the bibliography of his *Lonergan’s Early Economic Research*<sup>25</sup>, and *The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History*.<sup>26</sup> The sketches are also referenced in the bibliography of Matthew’s *Lonergan’s Quest: a Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight*<sup>27</sup>, and in Liddy’s *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan*.<sup>28</sup> Also, there are two references to Lonergan’s use of Ecclesiastes 4:1-3 in the second sketch,<sup>29</sup> and a

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<sup>20</sup> Patrick Brown. “Implementation in Lonergan’s Early Historical Manuscripts” *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* 3 (2003): 231-249. <http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol3/brown.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> Patrick Brown. “Aiming Excessively High and Far’: The Early Lonergan and the Challenge of Theory in Catholic Social Thought” *Theological Studies*, 72, (2011).

<sup>22</sup> Joseph Komonchak. “Lonergan’s Early Essays on the Redemption of History. *Lonergan Workshop* 10 (1990): 159-178.

<sup>23</sup> Frederick Crowe. *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*. Edited by Michael Vertin. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 37.

<sup>24</sup> *Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of Economics*, 69.

<sup>25</sup> *LEER*, 165.

<sup>26</sup> *OLNDH*, 188.

<sup>27</sup> *LQ*, 535.

<sup>28</sup> Appears as a footnote in: Richard Liddy. *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (Michael Glazier Books, 1993), 78.

<sup>29</sup> Patrick Brown references Lonergan’s use of Ecclesiastes 4:1-3 in “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]” in “Implementation in Lonergan’s Early Historical Manuscripts” *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* 3 (2003): 231-249. A similar reference to the same Ecclesiastes passage appears as a footnote in James L Marsh and Anna J. Brown (editors) *Faith, Resistance, and the Future: Daniel Berrigan’s Challenge to Catholic Social Thought*, (New



transcription of the hand-written notes by Robert Doran.<sup>30</sup> With the exception of these references, the content and significance of the GE sketches have not been explored in the published secondary materials on Lonergan.

Taken as a whole, the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches are, then, highly significant primary sources for understanding the development of Lonergan’s thought on the metaphysical foundations of ethics. If nothing else, the sketches are significant because they clearly indicate that Lonergan began thinking about ethics early in his career; it was not a topic that first occurred to him in the writing of *Insight*.

## Context

Now that I have established some initial significance of the GE sketches, I wish to provide some context surrounding their composition. In what follows, I locate the file as a slice of development between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” (1934) and “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” (1935). After I have established this timeline, I will provide an overview of Lonergan’s life at the Gregorian University in the mid-nineteen thirties. I will highlight major influences on Lonergan during his studies in Rome, provide glimpses into his course schedule, note changes occurring at the Gregorian University during Lonergan’s stay, and provide a brief overview of Lonergan’s place of residency in Rome.

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York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 352.

I have divided the file into three sets of sketches, see Chapter 3.

<sup>30</sup> Robert Doran’s transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 1300ADTE030/A13. Referenced here after as: DT.

## Establishing a Timeline

With the exception of a letter written by Lonergan to Father Keane, the Reverend Father Provincial,<sup>31</sup> the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” and Lonergan’s notes on Kant, there are no internal or external references that we can use to precisely date the GE sketches. When we consider the contents of File A13, the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” the notes on Kant, and the 1935 letter to Fr. Keane, placing the composition of the GE sketches between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” written in the spring of 1934, and “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” dated 1935,<sup>32</sup> seems the most probable conclusion.

Lonergan composed the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” in the spring of 1934, sent the letter to Fr. Keane on January 22, 1935 and completed “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” sometime in 1935. Prior to the completed letter, Lonergan wrote several lengthy drafts of the letter detailing what he regarded as his ‘radical’ understanding of metaphysics.<sup>33</sup> Unfortunately, these drafts are unavailable but are noteworthy because they indicate the importance of Lonergan’s letter to the Reverend Father Provincial. He took his time to compose the letter. Lonergan was not writing casually or expressing quickly passing thoughts, he was sharing his fundamental ‘radical’ view with an important person; Fr. Keane is important with respect to his position and progress within the Jesuit order. The thoughts present in the letter are well developed. Lonergan wanted to ensure that he expressed himself in an appropriate manner that would be well received by his superior.

The letter establishes that Lonergan had been thinking about Kant. In the letter, Lonergan

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<sup>31</sup> Letter from Bernard Lonergan to Reverend Father Provincial. *Vis del Seminario* 120, Roma 119, Italy. January 22, 1935. Referenced here after as: BLFK.

<sup>32</sup> The original PA manuscript was dated 1935 in Lonergan’s handwriting. See OLNDH, 99.

<sup>33</sup> BLFK, 2.

reports that he has recently reviewed Father Keeler's book.<sup>34</sup> Robert Doran reports that a review of Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs* was discovered alongside of Lonergan's notes on the Metaphysics of Customs. Robert Doran also notes that Lonergan's file on Kant and the GE sketches, were written on the same style of paper.<sup>35</sup> Given this fact and the contents of the notes and sketches themselves, it is clear that we can link the GE sketches, the notes on Kant, and the Keeler review.

In the letter to Keane, Lonergan states his interest in metaphysics:

I can give you my present position in a few words. It is definite, definitive; and something of a problem. The current interpretation of St. Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation. A metaphysics is just as symmetrical, just as all-inclusive, just as inconsistent, whether it is interpreted rightly or wrongly. The difference lies in the possibility of convincing expression, of making applications, of solving disputed questions. I can do all three in a way that no Thomist would dream possible. I can prove out of St. Thomas himself that the current interpretation is wrong.<sup>36</sup>

The GE sketches appear to be, at least in part, an attempt of "convincing expression, of making applications, of solving disputed questions."<sup>37</sup>

Lonergan does not take complete ownership of his emerging 'radical' understanding of metaphysics. He attributes the realization of the interpretative error to Father Joseph Maréchal, who reigned in Lonergan's house in Louvain.<sup>38</sup> Lonergan wrote that Father Maréchal's views were frowned upon and often dismissed as "obviously wrong."<sup>39</sup> He notes that Father Maréchal's views deal with the abstract, not the concrete, therefore they cannot be "obviously wrong" as

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<sup>34</sup> Leo W. Keeler. "The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant. A Historical and Critical Study." University of California: *Apud Aedes Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae*, 1934.

<sup>35</sup> DT, 1.

<sup>36</sup> BLFK, 3.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

nothing in the abstract is concrete and therefore cannot be obvious.<sup>40</sup> Although Lonergan does not take ownership of the initial idea, he offers a clear defense of Father Joseph Maréchal and develops the idea further in a way that Maréchal was unable to do. Lonergan offers a new interpretation of metaphysics, one he believed was grounded in an accurate interpretation of St. Thomas. He used it to solve problems and to make new applications.<sup>41</sup> The GE sketches appear to be an attempt at accurately interpreting and critiquing Kant's understanding of the metaphysic of customs, and provide a glimpse of how Lonergan's 'radical' understanding of metaphysics might produce a new understanding for the metaphysic of ethics.

If my assumptions are correct, the composition of the GE sketches can be dated prior to January 22, 1935. As already established, Lonergan composed "*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*" in 1935. I argue that the sketches were written prior to the *Pantôn* essay. There is a possibility that the sketches were composed after the *Pantôn* essay, but this seems very unlikely due to the shortage of time that Lonergan had for personal study. Furthermore, the most obvious connection is with the Keeler review which was written in 1934.

In any case, William Matthews notes that Sunday afternoons were the only time that Lonergan had for personal study:

In a long letter to Henry Smeaton dated 9 May 1934, Lonergan recounts his experience of the year, describing his view of the rooftops, the noise of the traffic, and the villa Borghese. He writes amusingly about the lecturers, the difficulty of attending a morning of lectures on an empty stomach and of recovering from a soporific dinner in time for a 4 p.m. lecture. On Thursdays they had to relax outside the house, so the only time he had for some form of study was on Sunday afternoon. The lifestyle was not suited to private study, and *Deus Scientiarum Dominus* had simply added worry to a reposeful way of life.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Here we see Lonergan beginning to think about the functional specializations of Interpretation and Dialectic.

<sup>42</sup> *LQ*, 68.

To recount quickly, the GE sketches were most likely written in 1934, before the letter to Keane and certainly prior to the composition of the *Pantôn* essay. We recall that Lonergan sent the letter to Keane on January 22, 1935; he wrote several drafts of the letter prior to January 22, 1935. Based on evidence found within the letter, the GE sketches were written prior to the first draft of the letter. In light of his shortage of time for personal study, it is highly unlikely that he composed the *Pantôn* essay prior to the sketches or prior to the letter to Keane and indeed, this is confirmed in the *Pantôn* essay itself in which Lonergan provides a quote from Donoso Cortes cited by Erich Przywara in *Stimmen der Zeit* (April, 1935).<sup>43</sup> All the evidence, then, points to a composition of the notes prior to the composition of the letter to Keane.

Next, we will establish an argument that dates the GE sketches as a slice of development between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and the *Pantôn* essay. Shute and Mathews both place the composition of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” after Lonergan completed his course work in the spring of 1934. Lonergan completed a course in Church history on March 9, 1934 and the content of the course reflected much of the content of the essay.<sup>44</sup> The GE sketches contain a clear reference to the notion of the dialectic of history, which was the subject of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” Lonergan’s review of Keeler’s book was published in 1935.<sup>45</sup> Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches were likely composed around the same time and certainly after the composition of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.”

We have established a probable time line that places the notes on Kant and the GE

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<sup>43</sup> See *OLNDH*, 6, fn 17.

<sup>44</sup> *OLNDH*, 69, fn 21.

<sup>45</sup> Lonergan’s 1935 Review of L.W. Keeler’s “The Problem of Error, From Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study” in *Shorter Papers, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Volume 20. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 131-35.

sketches between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” the order is likely as follows: “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” (Spring of 1934), Leo Keeler’s book review “The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant” (composed in 1934), Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches, the Letter to the Reverend Father Provincial (January 22, 1935), and finally “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” (no earlier than April 1935).

When placed between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” the GE sketches gain additional significance. Frederick Crowe argues that “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” is: “...of absorbing interest to those who would track Lonergan's development from its beginnings, through his Thomist studies, to *Insight* and the following thirty years; but quite apart from that historical interest the paper is intriguing in its own right as a study of human solidarity.”<sup>46</sup> It is possible that Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches for a general ethic in a Christian context helped shape his “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” essay that, as Frederick Crowe has argued, constitutes a sketch of the broad lines of the remainder of Lonergan’s career.<sup>47</sup>

Now that we have placed the GE sketches as a moment of development between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*,” I wish to shift our attention to some of the context surrounding their composition. To do this, I have created three categories. Firstly, I have compiled some biographical information on Lonergan in the early nineteen thirties. Secondly, I offer a reminder that Lonergan was studying in Rome during the politically uncertain years leading up to the war. Thirdly, I have compiled relevant information on Lonergan’s studies at the Gregorian University.

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<sup>46</sup> PA, 135.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

## Lonergan in 1935

In hope of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the context of the GE sketches, I have compiled biographical research pertaining to Lonergan in the mid-nineteen thirties. To do this, I have relied heavily upon the work of Richard Liddy and William Matthews. As previously mentioned, Liddy has completed extensive research on this period in Lonergan's life<sup>48</sup> and Matthews has written a biography that includes important details of Lonergan's life in the 1930's.<sup>49</sup> I have created several categories that I believe highlight important facets of Lonergan's life in the mid-nineteen thirties, when the GE sketches were composed.

In November 1933, Lonergan arrived in Rome as one of few Canadian students awarded the opportunity to study theology at the Gregorian University.<sup>50</sup> Matthews provides details of Lonergan's residency in Rome:

He took up residence in a room with a view of the roofs of Rome, in the Bellarmino, a building steeped in Jesuit history and situated on the narrow *via del Seminario*. With his background in Roman history, he must have found the City fascinating. Turn right at the front door and walk for less than a minute and you are at the Forum. Continue across the decorative *Piazza Navone* and you are soon at St Peter's and the Vatican. Turn left at the front door and almost immediately you are at the Church of St. Ignatius where, for the cost of a small coin, a spotlight lights up the words over the high altar, *Romae Vobis Propitius Ego* (I will be well disposed to you in Rome), words that Lonergan, as *Ignatius*, felt were a good omen. Continue along the *via del Seminario* a short distance to the *via del Corso*, turn right, walk for about a minute and you are in the *Piazza Venezia*. There, from the balcony of the *Palazza Venezia*, Mussolini would address the crowds with his microphone.<sup>51</sup>

Lonergan experienced the immanent beginning of the war. As I will detail in the next few

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<sup>48</sup> Richard Liddy. *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (Michael Glazier Books, 1993). Referenced here after as: *TL*.

<sup>49</sup> *LQ*.

<sup>50</sup> *LQ*, 65.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 65-66.

sections of text, Lonergan's time in Rome was difficult, but beneficial. Liddy describes Lonergan's time in Rome as a "great boon" in his life.<sup>52</sup> It was a period of development for Lonergan; the GE sketches provide a glimpse into this period of astounding growth.

### **The war**

Lonergan arrived in Rome prior to the beginning of the war. He would have witnessed the years building up to the war. Matthew notes that: "Phillip Donnelley, a friend in Rome, recalled that he and Lonergan used to use code names when they talked about Hitler and Mussolini. According to Paul Shaugnessey, Donnelley said that he and Lonergan were just across the street from Hitler during one of his visits."<sup>53</sup> The GE sketches were composed in the midst of political uncertainty that eventually forced Lonergan to flee Rome.

### **The Gregorian University**

The Gregorian University was under tremendous change during Lonergan's stay. In 1929, the university united with the Biblical and Oriental Institutes in Rome.<sup>54</sup> The university staff expanded to over 300 and new faculties were added.<sup>55</sup> Matthew notes that the expansion included a faculty of Church history that was influenced by Robert Lieber,<sup>56</sup> an influential person in Lonergan's first year of study.<sup>57</sup> In 1931, the Vatican issued the Constitution, *Deus Scientiarum Dominus* (God, the Lord of the Sciences), in an attempt to locate "dogmatic theology within the context of the growth of positive and human sciences."<sup>58</sup> Lonergan was

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<sup>52</sup> *TL*, 74.

<sup>53</sup> *LQ*, 66-67.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 67

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.



studying at the Gregorian University during a period of growth and reform. These changes introduced Lonergan to numerous theological approaches that influenced his understanding of the dialectic of history and helped shape *Insight*.

Lonergan was influenced by a large variety of people at the Gregorian University, notably, Augustine, Henry Newman, Leo Keeler, Joseph Maréchal,<sup>59</sup> and by courses taught by Bernard Leeming and Robert Lieber. In *Insight Revisited* we read:

“It was through Stefanu ... that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not intuitive but discursive with the decisive component in judgment. This view was confirmed by my familiarity with Augustine’s key notion, *veritas*, and the whole was rounded out by Bernard Leeming’s course on the Incarnate Word, which convinced me that there could not be a hypostatic union without a real distinction between essence and existence. This, of course was all the more acceptable, since Aquinas’ *esse* corresponded to Augustine’s *veritas* and both harmonised with Maréchal’s view of judgement.”<sup>60</sup>

Prior to his departure for Rome, Lonergan spent the summer reading Augustine. Liddy writes: “Lonergan specified the works of Augustine that he read in the summer of 1933 as the ones written at Cassiciacum...These dialogues are the *De Beata Vita* (The Happy Life), *Contra Academicos* (Answer to Skeptics), the *De Ordine* (Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil), and the *Soliloquia* (The Soliloquies).”<sup>61</sup> Augustine influenced Lonergan’s shift from nominalism.<sup>62</sup> His reading of Augustine created an intellectual conviction that influenced him to write an essay on the nature of the act of faith. He gave the essay to Fr. Henry Smeaton.<sup>63</sup>

Shortly after his arrival in Rome, Lonergan composed a 30,000 word essay on

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<sup>59</sup> *TL*, 101.

<sup>60</sup> “Insight Revisited” in *A Second Collection*. Edited by William F.J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 265.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* 50.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* 41.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* 75.

Newman.<sup>64</sup> He was clearly influenced by Newman's work.<sup>65</sup> Lonergan wrote: "My fundamental mentor and guide has been John Henry Newman's *Grammar of Assent*. I read that in my third year philosophy (at least the analytic parts) about five times and found solutions for my problems. I was not at all satisfied with the philosophy that was being taught and found Newman's presentation to be something that fitted in with the way I knew things. It was from that kernel that I went on to different authors."<sup>66</sup> Lonergan gave his 30,000 word essay to Leo Keeler, who must have been impressed by it, because a short time later, Keeler asked Lonergan to review his book "Problem of Error from Plato to Kant."<sup>67</sup> I believe that this review led Lonergan to a serious consideration of Kant. As Frederick Crowe's analysis suggests, at this point in his development, Lonergan favored Plato's position on knowledge over Kant's.<sup>68</sup> Richard Liddy has examined Lonergan's review and argues that the text provides valuable perspective into Lonergan's thoughts on the relationship between materialism, realism, and idealism that he later takes up in *Insight*.<sup>69</sup> Keeler also deals with a portion of text from Hume that details Hume's position on perception. Hume concludes that causes cannot be seen. It is this conclusion that causes Lonergan to ask: "what exactly does understanding apprehend?"<sup>70</sup> Answering this, according to Mathews, was key motivation for writing *Insight*.<sup>71</sup>

Liddy and Matthews provide glimpses of Lonergan's study schedule in Rome. In a letter sent to Henry Smeaton on May 9 1934, Lonergan recounts his experience of the year, describing

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<sup>64</sup> BLFK, 4.

<sup>65</sup> *TL*, 39 and 76.

<sup>66</sup> Bernard Lonergan. "Reality, Myth, Symbol," in Alan M. Olson (ed.) *Myth, Symbol, Reality* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 32-33.

<sup>67</sup> BLFK, 4.

<sup>68</sup> *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, 34 n.49 and page 13 of fragments.

<sup>69</sup> *TL*, 76-84.

<sup>70</sup> *LQ*, 69-70.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

his view of the rooftops, the noise of the traffic, and the villa Borghese.<sup>72</sup> In the letter, we also see glimpses of Lonergan's busy schedule in Rome. As already established, he had little time for personal study.<sup>73</sup> He faced morning lectures and lectures immediately after his evening meal.<sup>74</sup> In his first year of study, Lonergan took a course on Church history taught by Robert Lieber, a relatively new face at the Gregorian University. Liddy notes that "during his theological courses in Rome one part of his Church history course dealt with political questions such as the relation of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism and Bolshevism. It also dealt with the Church in America, Latin America, and Asia. Mathews notes that, "this seems to have been one of the few courses in Rome for which Lonergan kept his lecture notes, an interesting indicator of personal interest."<sup>75</sup>

Lonergan decided to study German after his first year of studies in Rome. He spent his summer in the villa of the German College in Rome. Matthews notes that Lonergan believed there were good ideas among the Germans.<sup>76</sup> He held a high opinion of Lennerz, a German theologian.<sup>77</sup> Texts by Lennerz were an important feature of Lonergan's second year studies.<sup>78</sup>

In Lonergan's second year, courses focused on God as a unity and a trinity. These courses consulted Volume 1 of the *Summa* and two works by Lennerz: *De Deo Uno*, and *De Novissimis*.<sup>79</sup> During Lonergan's second year, Lennerz taught him a course on grace and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.<sup>80</sup> In that same year, "Filograssi introduced him to the classical theology of the Trinity, which he himself would teach in his years as a professor in

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>75</sup> *TL*, 85.

<sup>76</sup> *LQ*, 69.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 84.

Toronto and later in Rome. The course was structured around theses on the processions of a Word and of Love in God, and on the relations defining the Divine persons and missions.”<sup>81</sup> Lonergan also took a course on Creation and Redemption at this time.<sup>82</sup> In his third year, he took the course on the Incarnate World from Leeming.<sup>83</sup> Lonergan went on to teach these same courses in Toronto and Rome.<sup>84</sup> It is clear that Lonergan’s time in Rome was a period of great development for him, development that shaped the remainder of his career and the GE sketches offer a rare glimpse into this period of development.

Now that we have established their significance, dated them, and explored some of the context surrounding their composition, we turn attention to the sketches themselves. In the following chapter I have provided an annotated and transcribed version of the hand written GE sketches. In the subsequent two chapters, I explore their content and ordering. In the final chapter I highlight connections between them and chapter 18 of *Insight*. For now, we turn attention to the sketches themselves.

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>83</sup> *TL*, 114.

<sup>84</sup> *LQ*, 82-83.

## Chapter 2: Annotated Transcriptions

In the context of functional specialization, “research makes available the data relevant to ... [the] investigation.”<sup>85</sup> My primary aim in this chapter is to introduce a transcription of Lonergan’s hand-written sketches on the Metaphysics of Customs. The GE sketches were originally transcribed by Robert Doran.<sup>86</sup> I have attached copies of the archival files for the GE sketches (File A13) and Lonergan’s notes on Kant (File A12) in the appendix at the end of this project.

I have made some changes and additions to Doran’s work to provide a more accurate presentation of the text as originally written by Lonergan. The most significant changes deal with formatting. I rearranged Doran’s transcription to match the format of Lonergan’s original sketches. I found aligning the format of the transcription materially helpful in the initial stages of developing an interpretation of the meaning of the text. Lonergan himself notes “There are three basic exegetical stages: (1) understand the text: (2) judging how correct one’s understanding of the text is; and (3) stating what one judges to be the correct understanding of the text.”<sup>87</sup> In this chapter I am primarily concerned with the basic research of preparing the text to be understood.

To this end, I have restored Lonergan’s use of biblical Greek, as it appears in the handwritten GE sketches. I wanted the transcription of the text to be as accurate to the original text as possible. In a few places, which I note, the original text itself is unclear and, in these cases, I have relied on Doran’s transcription. A few additional corrections were made to the Doran transcription: arrows present within the original text were restored to the transcription,<sup>88</sup> I

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<sup>85</sup> Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 127.

<sup>86</sup> Robert Doran’s transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 1300ADTE030/A13.

<sup>87</sup> *Method in Theology*, 155.

<sup>88</sup> See footnotes 10, 18, 20, 43, 55, 80, and 81.

corrected errors made when transcribing page one and three of the original text,<sup>89</sup> and I restored the text from the left hand margin of page three,<sup>90</sup> of the original hand written sketches, to the transcribed document.

Using the minimally-edited version of Doran's transcription, I provide some initial helpful notes to aid the task of interpreting the GE sketches. As they have yet to receive any detailed inspection within the community of scholars, it is my hope that this project will generate further interest in the GE sketches and also in the related "History File"<sup>91</sup> from the same period.

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<sup>89</sup> See footnotes 23, 57 and 65.

<sup>90</sup> "Hamlet's Soliloquies" see footnote 67.

<sup>91</sup> For reference to the so-called "History File" (File 713), see: Michael Shute, *OLNDH*, 67-71.

## Transcription and Annotations

### [Page One]

General Ethic<sup>92</sup>      [Metaphysics of Customs.]<sup>93</sup>

#### 1. Origin of philosophy - Buddhism, Confucius, Platonism and Neo-Platonism

Philosophy<sup>94</sup> as a way of life: Augustine amor sapientiae<sup>95</sup>

Reflective character of philosophy – life, an object of reflection

#### 2. Spontaneous notion of happiness.    <sup>96</sup>ideal of imagination

α. 1 Solon and Croesus<sup>97</sup>

2 health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some religion to give resignation to death.

3 Aristotle puts happiness in occupation (ἐνέργεια)<sup>98</sup> and faces death as a matter of course. Does not<sup>99</sup> try to solve riddle

<sup>100</sup> 4. Greatest happiness of the<sup>101</sup> greatest number – Bentham and Utilitarians  
Well-being and advanced of humanity.

5 Bolshevism: answer of proletariat - a a more equal distribution

b philosophic system [godless, good = Soviet]

↘<sup>102</sup>

materialist.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>104</sup> ↙ Human wisdom brought to support Divine Law.

#### 3 Ecclesiastes. Pass your days in simplicity (ἐνεργεια)<sup>105</sup>

God's governance and ultimate judgement taken for granted.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> I have added the line under the heading "General Ethic" and have restored a large amount of space between "General Ethic" and "[Metaphysics of Customs]" to coincide with Lonergan's original text.

<sup>93</sup> "." Is an addition to Doran's text.

<sup>94</sup> Here Lonergan has drawn an arrow pointing to "Buddhism" in the previous line.

<sup>95</sup> Underlining of "amor sapientiae" added.

"amor sapientiae" is translated as: "love of wisdom". For a detailed explanation see: Philip Burton. *Language in the Confessions of Augustine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 80.

<sup>96</sup> Space added

<sup>97</sup> I have changed Doran's use of "a" to "α."

<sup>98</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>99</sup> The text is unclear, but Robert Doran suggests "not"

<sup>100</sup> "." Added after "4"

<sup>101</sup> Text is unclear

<sup>102</sup> Arrow added.

<sup>103</sup> "." added.

<sup>104</sup> Arrow added.

<sup>105</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>106</sup> "." added.

What does life give? 4<sup>8</sup> 2<sup>22</sup> 3<sup>9</sup> 5<sup>14,15</sup> Vanity of Vanities <sup>107</sup> <sup>108</sup>

cf Kant – impossibility of systematic attainment of happiness [counsel not precept]

ενεργεια<sup>109</sup>– 3<sup>22</sup> 5<sup>17</sup> 9<sup>4-10</sup> <sup>110</sup>

Incomprehensibility of life 8<sup>17</sup> cf. 4<sup>1-3</sup> 9<sup>2,3,11,12</sup> 10<sup>5-7</sup> <sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> I have corrected the format of biblical references to align with the original notes. I have also corrected a mistake made in Doran's transcription of the file. Doran uses: "4<sup>8</sup>, 2<sup>22</sup>, 3<sup>1</sup>, 5<sup>14,15</sup>" but I believe the file reads: "4<sup>8</sup>, 2<sup>22</sup>, 3<sup>9</sup>, 5<sup>14,15</sup>". The text is a little bit unclear, but when compared with its corresponding reference in the second sketch, it becomes clear that Ecc. 3<sup>9</sup> was the intended reference. See: sketch 2 section 2 (page 3 of the original notes).

<sup>108</sup> The verses referenced in this line are as follows:

Ecc. 4<sup>8</sup> one person who has no other, either son or brother, yet there is no end to all his toil, and his eyes are never satisfied with riches, so that he never asks, "For whom am I toiling and depriving myself of pleasure?" This also is vanity and an unhappy business. Ecc. 2<sup>22</sup> What has a man from all the toil and striving of heart with which he toils beneath the sun? Ecc. 3<sup>9</sup> What gain has the worker from his toil? Ecc. 5<sup>14</sup> and those riches were lost in a bad venture. And he is father of a son, but he has nothing in his hand. Ecc. 5<sup>15</sup> As he came from his mother's womb he shall go again, naked as he came, and shall take nothing for his toil that he may carry away in his hand. (ESV)

<sup>109</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>110</sup> Format of biblical references corrected.

The verses referenced in this line are as follows:

Ecc. 3<sup>22</sup> So I saw that there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in his work, for that is his lot. Who can bring him to see what will be after him?

Ecc. 5<sup>17</sup> Moreover, all his days he eats in darkness in much vexation and sickness and anger.

Ecc. 9<sup>4</sup> But he who is joined with all the living has hope, for a living dog is better than a dead lion. <sup>5</sup> For the living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing, and they have no more reward, for the memory of them is forgotten. <sup>6</sup> Their love and their hate and their envy have already perished, and forever they have no more share in all that is done under the sun. <sup>7</sup> Go, eat your bread with joy, and drink your wine with a merry heart, for God has already approved what you do. <sup>8</sup> Let your garments be always white. Let not oil be lacking on your head. <sup>9</sup> Enjoy life with the wife whom you love, all the days of your vain life that he has given you under the sun, because that is your portion in life and in your toil at which you toil under the sun. <sup>10</sup> Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with your might, for there is no work or thought or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol, to which you are going. (ESV)

<sup>111</sup> Format of biblical references corrected.

Ecc. 8<sup>17</sup> then I saw all the work of God, that man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun. However much man may toil in seeking, he will not find it out. Even though a wise man claims to know, he cannot find it out.

cf: Ecc. 4<sup>1</sup> Again I saw all the oppressions that are done under the sun. And behold, the tears of the oppressed, and they had no one to comfort them! On the side of their oppressors there was power, and there was no one to comfort them. <sup>2</sup> And I thought the dead who are already dead more fortunate than the living who are still alive.

<sup>3</sup> But better than both is he who has not yet been and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under the sun.

Ecc. 9<sup>2</sup> It is the same for all, since the same event happens to the righteous and the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and the unclean, to him who sacrifices and him who does not sacrifice. As the good one is, so is the sinner, and he who swears is as he who shuns an oath. <sup>3</sup> This is an evil in all that is done under the sun, that the same event happens to all. Also, the hearts of the children of man are full of evil, and madness is in their hearts while they live, and after that they go to the dead. Ecc. 9<sup>11</sup> Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to those with knowledge, but time and chance happen to them all. <sup>12</sup> For man does not know his time. Like fish that are taken in an evil net, and like birds that are caught in a snare, so the children of man are snared at an evil time, when it suddenly falls upon them.

Ecc. 10<sup>5</sup> There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were an error proceeding from the ruler: <sup>6</sup> folly is set in many high places, and the rich sit in a low place. <sup>7</sup> I have seen slaves on horses, and princes walking on the ground like slaves. (ESV)



<sup>112</sup>cf. Socrates ο αὐτος λόγος “why, I do not know”<sup>113</sup>  
12<sup>11</sup> words of wise man are as goads<sup>114</sup>  
vanity of achievement 2<sup>1-11</sup> of wisdom 2<sup>11-26</sup> 6<sup>8</sup> 11<sup>5</sup>  
of life in general [fleeting etc. passim].<sup>116</sup>

4. Buddha – desire an illusion ∴ escape to x<sup>117</sup>

Plato – assertion of moral law -  
negates spontaneous idea (Gorgias) - absolute.  
Republic as critique of society

5. Moral Theory – Stoic Logos ‘Sequi naturam, rationem’<sup>118</sup>

Augustine – lex aeterna  
Scholastics – juridical development.  
[do not forget “sentiment, analysis of virtue”]<sup>119</sup>

6. Progress of philosophy according to St. Thomas – more to less general

Kant’s greater precision  
Examination of Kant

7 Dynamic [amor sapientiae] as well as more precise foundation of ethic.

The human act – material, formal, efficient cause.

Finality – Good-True or Impulse (Nature of (Will, Obligation, Freedom))<sup>120</sup>

Rationalization (Kant’s natural dialectic)

**[Page 2]**

Man as instrument \_ a potency, external mover<sup>121</sup>

c prearranged by God

b Man’s choice – Reason or Impulse.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> “.” added after “cf”

<sup>113</sup> Original Greek restored and underlining of “why” added. <sup>114</sup> Format of biblical reference corrected in this line.

<sup>115</sup> Format of biblical references corrected.

<sup>116</sup> Removed “]” and added underlining to “passim”

<sup>117</sup> Corrected Doran’s use of “...” to the symbol “∴”

<sup>118</sup> Closing quotation mark added to align with original notes.

<sup>119</sup> Opening quotation mark added (as it appears in the original text).

<sup>120</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>121</sup> Corrected “-” to “\_”.

<sup>122</sup> “.” added.

d Social effect.<sup>123</sup>

Faith and supernatural act – Transcendent Reason.<sup>124</sup>

Dialectics of History - nature, sin, supernature.

State tends to be rallying point for lower tendency.

Christianity – solution of the dialectic – Faith (Dogma, Confession) – Charity -

Action - as moral – absolute value

- as ἐνέργεια – the days of my life, shall we remember them?<sup>125</sup>

- as effective – Living is giving.<sup>126</sup> [Reason treats all men as equal to self.]

overlooked by Kant ↑<sup>127</sup>

1 Economic division of Labour<sup>128</sup>

2 Family

3 Science, art, Research and teaching

4 giving morally – estote imitators mei<sup>129</sup>

Virtues Wisdom – Truth known and loved

Justice – Equality of all before intellect

Matter of Law in all.<sup>130</sup>

Social Justice – effecting conditions that make  
justice possible

Temperance and fortitude – re execution

Prudence – re application of wisdom to ἄπειρον<sup>131</sup>

Faith – transcendent intelligence

Hope – the goodness of the transcendent intelligence – Our Father

Charity – the beauty of transcendent Wisdom – the Ideal – the

vision splendid      oro fiat illud quod jam sitio  
ut te revelata cernens facie  
visu sim beatus tuæ glorie

Motivation: Main thing is to observe the law; man is body and soul<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>124</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>125</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>126</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>127</sup> Arrow added.

<sup>128</sup> I have changed “labour” to “Labour”.

<sup>129</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>130</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>131</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>132</sup> Underlining added.

Serviam mente, serviam et corpori

Pedagogic character of Xtian motivation.

1. Heaven and Hell<sup>133</sup>

α as reward or punishment: presupposes faith<sup>134</sup>

β as love of God - an exact idea of God's rights on instrument<sup>135</sup>

2. Reason – instrument<sup>136</sup>

3. Gratitude - goodness of creation<sup>137</sup>

qui eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum

church: doctrine, hierarchy and counsels, sacraments

4. Achievement: Adveniat regnum tuum: estote imitators mei<sup>138</sup>

overlooked by Kant ↑ ↘<sup>139</sup>

Zeal for souls - spark that leaps from example.

Xt: way, truth, life: supernatural: above our deserts

Spiritual life: supernaturalised man – what and how of every instant<sup>140</sup>

spontaneity of no account – replaced by other

union with God – an intellectual orientation

wisdom and power of God - love of cross – we can do so little – we have so short a time.<sup>141</sup>

Excessive disregard of human element is seed of spark<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> "." after "1" added.

<sup>134</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>135</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>136</sup> "." after "2" added.

<sup>137</sup> "." after "3" added.

<sup>138</sup> "." after "4" added.

<sup>139</sup> Arrows added.

<sup>140</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>141</sup> I have rearranged the text, Doran uses: "love of Cross - wisdom and power of God" but the original text is "wisdom and power of God - love of cross".

<sup>142</sup> Underlining added.

### [Page 3]

#### General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]

##### 1. Happiness as an ideal of the imagination

άνήρ σαρκικός<sup>143</sup> Economic man.

Naïve realism. Reason a means for the satisfaction  
of impulse, desire.

Social systems: |Greatest happiness of greatest number. Bentham  
|Bolshevism: state the means for this goal. <sup>144</sup>

A possible interpretation of Nicomachean Ethic.

Arist. puts the end in the activity – ἐνέργεια<sup>145</sup>  
subordinates the external as a means to end  
a humanly necessary means [competence, position, friends.]<sup>146</sup>

##### 2. Negation of foregoing.

Buddha: desire an illusion, happiness an escape to ?

Ecclesiastes: vanity of achievement 2<sup>1-11</sup> | Reflection 4<sup>8</sup>  
wisdom 2<sup>12-26</sup> 6<sup>8</sup> | <sup>147</sup>

<sup>148</sup>Ecc. 2<sup>22</sup> 'For what profit shall a man have of all his labour and  
vexation of spirit, with which he hath been tormented under  
the sun?' cf<sup>149</sup> 3<sup>9</sup> 5<sup>14,15</sup>

cf. Kant Impossibility of systematic and infallible plan for  
attaining an empirical end.

3<sup>22</sup> "And I have found that nothing is better than for a  
man to rejoice in his work: and that this is his portion."  
cf Aristotle ἐνέργεια<sup>150</sup> cf 5<sup>17</sup>, 9<sup>4-10</sup>

<sup>151</sup> | 4<sup>1-3</sup> "...I saw the oppressions that are done under the sun, and

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<sup>143</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>144</sup> Where I have drawn the two lines, Lonergan has drawn a large parenthesis joining "Greatest happiness of greatest number. Bentham" and "Bolshevism: state the means for this goal".

<sup>145</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>146</sup> "." added.

<sup>147</sup> Format of biblical references has been corrected in this section. Where I have drawn the two lines, Lonergan has drawn one solid line with "Reflection 4<sup>8</sup>" written on the right side of the line, directly between the two verses written on the left of the line.

<sup>148</sup> All biblical references in this section have been corrected.

<sup>149</sup> Doran's transcription used "9.39 5.14, 15" which I have corrected to "cf 3<sup>9</sup> 5<sup>15,14</sup>" because Ecc. 9.39 is non-existent. The mistaken "9" looks very similar to the continual use of "cf".

<sup>150</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>151</sup> Where I have drawn the perforated line, Lonergan has vertically written and underlined "Hamlet's soliloquies" between the margin of the page and the body of the text. Not included in Doran's transcription.

| the tears of the innocent. And they had no comforter: and they  
 | were not able to resist their violence, being destitute of help  
 | from any. <sup>2</sup>And I praised the dead rather than the living.  
 | <sup>3</sup>And I judged him happier than them both that is not yet  
 | born, nor hath seen the evils that are done under the sun.

<sup>4</sup><sup>9-12</sup> Friendship. <sup>152</sup>

<sup>8</sup><sup>17</sup> Incomprehensibility of life “And I understood that man can  
 find no reason of all those works of God that are done  
 under the sun: and the more he shall labour to seek,  
 so much the less shall he find; yea, though the wise  
 man shall say that he knoweth it, he shall not be able  
 to find it.” cf. <sup>9</sup><sup>2, 3, 11, 12</sup>. <sup>10</sup><sup>5-7</sup>

cf. Socrates ὁ αὐτός λόγος: <sup>153</sup> why, I do not know

<sup>12</sup><sup>11</sup> “the words of the wise man are as goads” <sup>154</sup> Socrates <sup>155</sup> gad-fly.

N.B. God’s governance taken for granted throughout and universal judgement.

#### [Page 4]

ἀνὴρ ψυχικός <sup>156</sup>

3. Assertion of Morality <sup>157</sup> [Gorgias] Plato’s Socrates. <sup>158</sup>

α Negation of ideal of imagination re pleasure and pain

β affirmation of the good – at any cost.

Social aspect – Republic – impotence

4. Development of Morality – Stoicism <sup>159</sup>

Objective λόγος <sup>160</sup>– sequi naturam ie. rationem

social impotence

-philosophy, a way of life

<sup>152</sup> Ecc. <sup>4</sup><sup>9</sup> Two are better than one, because they have a good reward for their toil. <sup>10</sup> For if they fall, one will lift up his fellow. But woe to him who is alone when he falls and has not another to lift him up! <sup>11</sup> Again, if two lie together, they keep warm, but how can one keep warm alone? <sup>12</sup> And though a man might prevail against one who is alone, two will withstand him—a threefold cord is not quickly broken. (ESV)

<sup>153</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>154</sup> Quotation marks added.

<sup>155</sup> Text unclear.

<sup>156</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes. I have placed the word above “Plato’s Socrates” as it appears in the original notes.

<sup>157</sup> “.” removed.

<sup>158</sup> “.” after “3” added.

<sup>159</sup> “.” after “4” added.

<sup>160</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

5. Augustine : α Beata vita.<sup>161</sup>

β Idea of development - amore coelestium expugnatur amor terrestris<sup>162</sup>

γ lex aeterna.<sup>163</sup>

↘<sup>164</sup>

Scholasticism

[RD: an arrow is drawn from Stoicism in 4 to development in 5, with “philosophy, a way of life” written between]<sup>165</sup>

6 Examination of Kant

7 Scholastic System – Rights and duties

άνήρ πνευματικός<sup>166</sup>

Giving a local habitation and a name to the dictate of reason of the scholastic - presenting ethics not juridically but dynamically.

Analysis of action, nature of freedom

Man an instrument.

Dialectics of history – state tends to be rallying point for lower tendency

Action as ενεργεια<sup>167</sup> – occupation [indifference] {economic scientific}<sup>168</sup>

as moral – absolute value {division of labour

as effective – living is giving {in family

κατ' εξοχήν<sup>169</sup> – giving morally.<sup>170</sup>

estote imitators mei.

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<sup>161</sup> “.” after “5” added. Underlining of “Augustine” and “α” added.

<sup>162</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>163</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>164</sup> Arrow added.

<sup>165</sup> See: Robert Doran’s transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 1300ADTE030/A13, 5.

<sup>166</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>167</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>168</sup> Parenthesis added.

<sup>169</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>170</sup> Underlining and “.” added.

**[Page 5]**

Happiness<sup>171</sup>

Impulse: ideal of the imagination – anticipation greater than  
event (am I enjoying myself) - cf. Kant (no possibility of system)<sup>172</sup>

Needed a bit of reflectiveness: one can simply drift without asking  
questions. Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting  
out of it. No doubt about desire, yearning, passion, but  
where is it all leading.

Aristotle:<sup>173</sup> in an ἐνέργεια,<sup>174</sup> some form of activity  
not in possessing something outside of self  
but in being active in a satisfying way

α<sup>175</sup> Activity of το θειοτατον νοῦς<sup>176</sup>

β<sup>177</sup> Activity of moral virtues

γ<sup>178</sup> Mass of men: fear of punishment, hope of rewards

Buddha : desire is an illusion – away with desire.<sup>179</sup>

Plato : the good : at any cost. (Gorgias)<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Double underlining added.

<sup>172</sup> Broken underline added, as it appears in original text.

<sup>173</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>174</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>175</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>176</sup> Restoration of Greek used in original notes.

<sup>177</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>178</sup> Underlining added.

<sup>179</sup> "." added.

<sup>180</sup> Underlining added.

### Chapter Three: Research Notes on the First Sketch

We have provided some context for the GE sketches, have established their significance, and have seen a transcribed version of the original sketches. We now turn our attention to sketches themselves. In this chapter, I provided some initial research notes on the first two pages of the sketches, which I will later argue constitutes the first sketch. In the following chapter, I will compare the second and third sketches with the first sketch. It is my hope that this initial research will aid in the future interpretation of the GE sketches. Let us now turn our attention to the first sketch.

#### Initial Research Notes

As Robert Doran suggests, it is apparent that in the GE sketches, Lonergan attempts to work out his own metaphysic of ethics on the basis of a reflection on the Kantian ethic summarized in File A12.<sup>181</sup> File A12, we will recall, contains Lonergan's notes on Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* which he read in Giacomo Pisticonne's Italian translation *Fondamenti della Metapsica des Costumi*. Lonergan's use of the phrase 'Metaphysic of Custom' establishes the link between his reflections on the Italian translation of Kant's work and the GE sketches. In addition, it was around this same time that Lonergan was writing a review of L.W. Keeler's *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study*.<sup>182</sup> All three sets of notes were found in the same archival folder.<sup>183</sup> Also, as Doran notes, the GE sketches and Lonergan's notes on Kant's *Fondamenti della Metapsica des Costumi*

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<sup>181</sup> From Robert Doran's notes on the transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 1300ADTE030/A13. <http://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=145>

<sup>182</sup> Bernard Lonergan, Review of L.W. Keeler, S.J., *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study* in *Shorter Papers Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, Volume 20 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 133-140.

<sup>183</sup> See: *OLNDH*.



were written on the same style of paper.<sup>184</sup>

Richard Liddy offers insight into Lonergan's concern with Kant:

Kant suffered from the obsession that the only possible justification was some sort of spiritual apprehension of the thing-in-itself - a presentation and not a mere understanding of the object. Since such a presentation was not to be had...Kant decided that there could be no theoretical justification for the demand to understand. Metaphysics had to go by the boards; we have no right to understand; all that we have is a practical need of understanding, so as to be able to carry on the dull business of daily life.<sup>185</sup>

In other words, Lonergan viewed Kant's basic error as similar to the naïve realism of the scholastics: an understanding of understanding as some kind of "spiritual apprehension of the 'thing-in-itself.'"<sup>186</sup> The GE sketches relate to Lonergan's problem with Kant. It highlights the Kantian error by revealing Lonergan's own alternative approach to the problem of grounding a general ethic.

I believe that GE sketches mark an important moment in Lonergan's development. They are, of course, a response to issues raised by his reading of Kant's *Fondamenti della Metapysica des Costumi*. Given Kant's importance in the development of modern ethical philosophy, this makes the GE sketches, if correct, significant. But of even greater interest to Lonergan scholars is the degree to which the GE sketches are an initial outline of core elements toward Lonergan's own version of a groundwork for a metaphysics of ethics. In this respect, the GE sketches provide a glimpse of the origins of Chapter 18 in *Insight*, just as his History File (File 713) provides us with the earliest sketches for the elements of chapters 6, 7 and 20 of *Insight*.<sup>187</sup> The GE sketches are clearly concerned with ethics. They explore two main questions:

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<sup>184</sup> DT, 1.

<sup>185</sup> TL, 78.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> See: *OLNDH*, 67-111.

“what is happiness?” and “what constitutes a happy life?” There is a direct link between “what to do?” questions, which are directly concerned with ethical decisions, and happiness.

In a reflection on Aristotle, Brian Cronin writes:

Aristotle's approach to ethics is called 'eudaemonist', meaning orientated towards happiness, determined by the end of seeking for happiness...The happiness that Aristotle is talking about is a total self-transcending self-fulfillment of every aspect of the person; it is not to be confused with the happiness of modern usage, which is often the same as pleasure.<sup>188</sup>

The GE sketches appear to be, at least in part, an attempt at figuring out what choices constitute a happy life. At the least, they provide a context for understanding the quest for happiness as it is relevant for a metatheory of ethics.

The GE sketches appear to be two outlines for a project or a book on Ethics and an additional summary sketch on happiness, which I will discuss at length in the next chapter. I am however, working from this assumption throughout the remainder of this chapter. The point-form structure of the GE sketches provides some grounds for this assumption. In any case, operating under this assumption does not fundamentally interfere with how we interpret the text.

Regardless of their intended purpose, the context of the GE sketches and their order of presentation are significant data for understanding Lonergan's line of thought and are especially relevant for understanding elements of his early development that eventually lead him to chapter 18 of *Insight*.

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<sup>188</sup> Brian Cronin. *Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective* (Kenya: Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press, 2006), 44.

## Research: Page One

Having now considered a few initial research notes, we turn our attention to the text itself. Page one of the handwritten GE sketches is divided into seven sections: 1) Origin of philosophy, 2) Spontaneous notion of happiness, 3) Ecclesiastes, 4) Buddha/Plato, 5) Moral Theology, 6) Progress of Philosophy (Aquinas and Kant), and 7) Dynamic [*amor sapientiae*] as well as more precise foundation of ethic. I will address each section individually and show how the sections relate to one another. It is important to note that a division of pages within the sketches does not constitute a division of thought; sections from page one relate directly to sections from page two in sub-sequential order. In the following chapter, I will address the second and third set of sketches, but for now, we focus on the first sketch.

### Section One - Origin of philosophy

In the first section, Lonergan appears to be considering the origin of philosophy in Buddhism, Confucius, Platonism, and Neo-Platonism. It is interesting that he takes such a general approach and that he considers more than just Western texts. Lonergan is using what we would now call a world-religions context. In the second line, he notes that philosophy is a way of life and directly relates it to Buddhism with an arrow. He also links it to Augustine's *amor sapientiae* (love for wisdom).<sup>189</sup> The link between philosophy as a way of life and Buddhism is perhaps self-evident. Much debate surrounds the question of whether Buddhism is a way of life or a philosophy; when considering "philosophy as a way of life," Buddhism appears to fit both categories. Nancy Ross offers a discussion of Buddhism's dual nature.<sup>190</sup> Augustine, in his autobiography

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<sup>189</sup> Philip Burton. *Language in the Confessions of Augustine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 80-81.

<sup>190</sup> Nancy Wilson Ross. *Buddhism, a Way of Life and Thought* (New York: Random House Inc., 1981).

*Confessions*,<sup>191</sup> tracks the process in which a self-reflective life is fueled by *amor sapientiae*. The text highlights Augustine's efforts to understand philosophy as a way of life.<sup>192</sup>

The final line of section one deals with the reflective character of philosophy. Lonergan links this directly to life as an object of reflection. His argument appears to be that philosophy is a way of life and life is an object of reflection, therefore philosophy has a reflective character. It seems fair to argue that under these assumptions, Lonergan, as well, understands philosophy is reflection on life. One may hypothesize that Lonergan believed Buddhism, Confucius, Platonism, and Neo-Platonism were examples of philosophy as a reflection on life and a way of life, but this is not explicitly stated here. The reason why Lonergan has included these particular four touchstones is unclear. It is possible that the sketches are a sketch for a book; if that is the case, Lonergan may have intended to use these four examples in the first chapter of the book. Of interest here is that in his "Essay in Fundamental Sociology" from 1934 we also find a reference to the Buddha which is quite suggestive in the present context.

Gotama would have been as great a dialectician as Socrates had he lived in Athens. But he lived where men had not the habit of demanding the reason why for everything, of listening to orators and appraising their arguments, of following the sophists to learn to be orators themselves. This social fact differentiated Socrates from all the wise and profound men who preceded him. It was the birth of philosophy, of following reason like the breeze, blow where it will. It was the promise of the eternal search for the reasons for everything up to the *ultimum cur*.<sup>193</sup>

It is also possible that Lonergan intended to establish a foundation that connected philosophy, history, and religion. The "Essay in Fundamental Sociology" is, among other things, a presentation of a theory of the dialectic of history that explicitly identifies links between

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<sup>191</sup> Augustine. *Confessions* (trans. Henry Chadwick) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>192</sup> *Language in the Confessions of Augustine*, 80.

<sup>193</sup> EFS, 24.

Catholicism and philosophy.<sup>194</sup> Indeed, Lonergan makes the bold claim that "Christianity was at once a symbol and a trans-philosophical higher control."<sup>195</sup>

## Section Two – Spontaneous notion of happiness

The second section deals with the spontaneous notion of happiness as an ideal of imagination. It is not clear what Lonergan means when he uses the word spontaneous, but it reads as if he means naturally occurring, a trend that we also see throughout *Insight*. Lonergan appears to be starting a list in this section, he begins by using the Greek symbol “α” but fails to include sub-sequential lettering. He includes a list of one through five following the “α” symbol that appear to be five distinct notions of happiness. Lonergan’s notes on Kant refer to the quest for happiness: “Again, what is happiness?”<sup>196</sup> Over the next few sections of text, we will see Lonergan refute the spontaneous notion of happiness, much like Kant does:

"p38 Perfect argument against any attempt to define happiness in concrete - not riches, property, long life, health."<sup>197</sup>

The first of the five divisions refers to Solon and Croesus, a story recounted by Herodotus.<sup>198</sup> To recount quickly, it is the story of a 6<sup>th</sup> century BCE king named Croesus who lived in Lydia. The king, although extremely rich, constantly sought the affirmation of other people. He wanted affirmation that he was the richest and happiest man alive. The wisest man in Greece, Solon, came to visit Croesus and was asked to confirm the name of the happiest person in Greece. Solon gave two responses, neither of which were Croesus. Solon told the outraged Croesus: “I see that thou art wonderfully rich, and art the lord of many nations; but with respect to that whereon thou questionest me, I have no answer to give, until I hear that thou hast closed

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<sup>194</sup> *OLNDH*, 69-70.

<sup>195</sup> *LEER*, 28.

<sup>196</sup> *KN*, 6.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>198</sup> Herodotus. *The Histories*. (trans. Robin Waterfield) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

thy life happily. For assuredly he who possesses great store of riches is no nearer happiness than he who has what suffices for his daily needs, unless it so hap that luck attend upon him, and so he continues in the enjoyment of all his good things to the end of life. For many of the wealthiest men have been unfavoured of fortune, and many whose means were moderate have had excellent luck.”<sup>199</sup> Later in life, Croesus faced misfortune and realized the truth in Solon’s statement. The story is an illustration of the difference between the internal state of happiness and the passing emotion of happiness, it also places the judgement of happiness in death. Furthermore, the story relates to Aristotle’s understanding of happiness, as Brian Cronin has discussed:

Aristotle's approach to ethics is called 'eudaemonist', meaning orientated towards happiness, determined by the end of seeking for happiness. His ethics is also called teleological, meaning operating in terms of a final end. Aristotle clearly thinks of man becoming. His basic metaphysical categories are potency and act. He sees humans as developing from potentiality to actuality, childhood to adulthood and changing all through life. We are not born actually virtuous; we are born with a potentiality to become virtuous or vicious. He realizes that the main categories to be dealt with in this struggle to become a good human person are happiness and pleasure. Happiness by definition is the final end of man. It is that which is chosen for its own sake and for the sake of which everything else is chosen. It is never a means but always an end; it seems to be both a subtle feeling and a state of mind.<sup>200</sup>

The second spontaneous notion of happiness lists materialistic things that potentially generate happiness: “health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some religion to give resignation to death.”<sup>201</sup> The third spontaneous notion references Aristotle’s placement of happiness in occupation (ἐνέργεια). Stephan Herzberg suggests that the word ἐνέργεια should be

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<sup>199</sup> Herodotus. *The Histories*. The quotation used is available online from Fordham University: <http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/ancient/herodotus-croesusandsolon.asp>

<sup>200</sup> *Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective*, 44.

<sup>201</sup> GE notes, 1.

translated as a life mode of actuality or activity.<sup>202</sup> In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle wrote: “for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy.”<sup>203</sup> For Aristotle, happiness is not measured by single moments or acts.

Lonerger notes that Aristotle does not try to solve a riddle, but is unclear about which riddle he is referring to. I propose that the riddle could be in reference to the Solon and Croesus story: am I happy? What does it mean to be happy? But I also note that in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” Lonergan notes: “the only science of Ethics that Aristotle would attempt was a practical ethics that neatly dodged the real questions about the ultimate of society.”<sup>204</sup>

The fourth spontaneous notion deals with the Utilitarian doctrine and Jeremy Bentham’s greatest happiness principle. Jeremy Bentham invoked a “fundamental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”<sup>205</sup> Bentham directly relates happiness, understood as utility, and ethics. For Bentham, happiness is fundamental for understanding wrong and right. Bentham’s axiom is his method for answering the “what to do?” question that is at the heart of Lonergan’s ethics.<sup>206</sup> Of course, Plato and Aristotle understood happiness as more than utility maximization. It may well be that Lonergan had Bentham’s liberal approach in mind when he wrote the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology:” “Liberalism: that was

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<sup>202</sup> Stephan Herzberg, “God as Pure Thinking. An Interpretation of *Metaphysics* A7, 1072b14-26” in Aristotle’s “*Metaphysics*” Lambda – New Essays (ed. Christoph Horn), *Philosophie der Antike*, 33, 158.

<sup>203</sup> Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics* (trans. David Ross) (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 1098a18, 12.

<sup>204</sup> *LEER*, 26. Although not explained clearly, Lonergan’s question seems to pertain to ultimate ends.

<sup>205</sup> Jeremy Bentham. “A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government” in *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart). (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 393.

<sup>206</sup> See: Philip McShane, ““What-To-Do?” The Heart of Lonergan’s Ethics” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 7 (2012), 69-93.

the negation of the need of higher control; what Plato longed for, the liberal threw away.”<sup>207</sup>

The final spontaneous notion listed in section two references Bolshevism and the proletariat. Lonergan uses Soviet communism as an example. In this “philosophical materialist system,”<sup>208</sup> happiness is generated by an equal distribution of goods and services. In the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” Lonergan writes: “Bolshevism uses theory only as a starting-point: its intrinsic nature is the domination of the *fait accompli*. It is the science of propaganda, the strategy of revolution, the political creed of cowing men by brutality and terror, and the art of permanently winning their hearts by moral perversion.”<sup>209</sup> Lonergan appears very passionate in his fight against Bolshevism in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” It represents the low point of the abandonment of a search for a higher viewpoint that began with the Greek search for happiness and was the Christian achievement of the fusion of symbol and philosophy. He will later deal with this rise and fall in his notion of the longer cycle of decline.<sup>210</sup>

In *Insight*, Lonergan develops a structure of the good that relates to the notion of happiness being discussed in this section. The first level of the good, as Lonergan writes: “is the object of desire and, when it is attained, it is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying. But man experiences aversion no less than desire, pain no less than pleasure; and so, on this elementary, empirical level, the good is coupled with its opposite, the bad.”<sup>211</sup> Searching for happiness as an empirical end coincides with the first level of the good. We may locate Bentham’s understanding of the goal of happiness at this level and perhaps we can understand his axiom as a minimal concession to the demand of the second level of the good, the good of

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<sup>207</sup> *LEER*, 27. Recall that this statement is made in the context of a discussion on the significance of the Christian Church.

<sup>208</sup> GE notes, 1.

<sup>209</sup> EFS, 28.

<sup>210</sup> *CWL* 3, 251-67.

<sup>211</sup> *CWL* 3, 596.



order.<sup>212</sup> How else are we to decide which of the possible goods is most desirable?

To summarize briefly, if my initial reading of the material is correct, section two of the first sketch references five distinct notions of happiness. The first pertains to happiness as an end, it also suggests that we cannot determine if a person is happy until their life has finished. The second point lists materialistic circumstances that may affect a person's level of happiness. The third places happiness in the hand of the individual; it makes happiness an active state of living determined by the choices of individuals respectively. The fourth holds that happiness is determined by what is best for the well-being and advance of the greatest number of people. In this system, an assessment of happiness is dependent upon a calculus of maximizing satisfactions, the greatest satisfaction (good) for the greatest number. The final is a materialist view point grounded in the notion that happiness is determined by an equal distribution of material goods. In this system, material possession appears to dictate happiness.

### **Section Three – Ecclesiastes**

Section 3 appears to be in response to the situation that emerges when we pursue the spontaneous notion of happiness, unaided by a higher control that is beyond the natural capacity of human beings. Lonergan has drawn a line from the title of this section to "Human wisdom brought to support Divine law."<sup>213</sup> His intentions are unclear, but it seems fair to argue that he sees the book of Ecclesiastes as a book of "human wisdom brought to support Divine law."<sup>214</sup> He has written "pass your days in simplicity (εὐεργεῖα)"<sup>215</sup> beside the title of "Ecclesiastes" and the following line notes that God's

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid. 596-597.

<sup>213</sup> GE notes, 1.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid. We can connect this section to Lonergan's distinction between satisfaction and value found in *Method*, 240.

<sup>215</sup> Lonergan failed to include the accent marks in his writing of εὐεργεῖα in this particular section. It is the only section within the first two pages of notes where the accents are not present in the writing of the word. The word also appears in a non-accented state on Page 4 of the GE notes.

governance and judgement are taken for granted. While Lonergan's exact meaning is unclear, this appears to be a reflection on the previous section. God's governance and ultimate judgement are not overly apparent in the downward progression of the spontaneous methods of achieving happiness listed in the previous section. Thus, perhaps the objective is to highlight that God's governance and judgment are missing in the previous section. There is need for a 'trans-philosophical higher control.'

Lonergan continues section three with a series of references to the book of Ecclesiastes. I have provided these references as footnotes in my annotation of Doran's transcription of the sketches. The first set of references are a response to the question "what does life give?" These scriptures appear to argue that we are born with nothing, can take nothing with us in our departure from life, and that all things between life's arrival and departure are vain and uncertain. Lonergan references Kant in the succeeding line. Lonergan is referring to the notion that happiness cannot be attained systematically; there are no set of rules that generate happiness. Rather than rely on 'precepts' there are counsels of prudence, that are generated from individual experience to aid in our understanding of what will make us happy. Lonergan makes note of this in his notes on Kant: "no commands but only counsels...*il problema di...*" <sup>216</sup>

In the next line, Lonergan lists three biblical references beside the word *ἐνεργεια*. I believe that this is a reference to Aristotle's notion of happiness that appears in the previous section of the sketch. The biblical references, in correspondence with what I have understood to be Aristotle's understanding of the word *ἐνέργεια*,<sup>217</sup> place happiness in active engagement with life; death is an inevitable end for all. Happiness happens as we actively engage in our own acts

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<sup>216</sup> KN, 6.

<sup>217</sup> See: Stephan Herzberg. "God as Pure Thinking. An Interpretation of Metaphysics A7, 1072b14-26", 158.

of living because there is no involvement with temporal life after death.<sup>218</sup> The remainder of the section builds upon the idea that life is lived in vain by all and that death is inevitable.

Ecclesiastes 2:11 makes happiness sound like vanity: “I considered all that my hands had done and the toil I had expended in doing it, and behold, all was vanity and a striving after wind, and there was nothing to be gained under the sun.”<sup>219</sup>

#### **Section Four – Buddha and Plato**

The fourth section of the text is concerned with Buddha and Plato’s notions of happiness. This section appears to be working as a dialectic alongside of section three. Section two establishes a quest for happiness and sections three and four reveal the futility of the quest.

The Four Noble Truths of Buddhism teach that ego-consciousness uses desire as an illusion to preserve its existence, when desire ceases the ego becomes mere illusion. Buddhists seek to rest their mind in the present in an attempt to escape the illusion of desire, the ego, and the suffering that coincides with living elusively. Buddhists dwell: “contemplating the body in the body, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world; and when he dwells contemplating feelings in feelings, the mind in the mind, and mental objects in mental objects, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then is he said to be mindful.”<sup>220</sup> Buddhism is an example of an escape from the materialistic world; for Buddhists, happiness is found internally. Thus, Lonergan appears to be using Buddhism and Platonism as examples to bring into question our spontaneous or natural notion of happiness.

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<sup>218</sup> Ecclesiastes 9:10 (ESV)

<sup>219</sup> Ecclesiastes 2:11 (ESV)

<sup>220</sup> Bruce Park. *Buddha Dharma Practice* (New York: Lotus Dharma Society, 2008), 65.

Plato asserts the notion of a moral law throughout the *Republic* and critiques the societal system. In the *Republic*, Plato argues “Unless . . . philosophers become kings in the cities or those whom we now call kings and rulers philosophize truly and adequately and there is a conjunction of political power and philosophy . . . there can be no cessation of evils . . . for cities nor, I think, for the human race.”<sup>221</sup> Lonergan quotes this passage at the beginning of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.”<sup>222</sup> It is clearly a passage that Lonergan saw as important. I believe that a direct link between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and these sketches can be made through this passage. This section may be a reflection of ideas that Lonergan had already worked out in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.”

Lonergan uses Plato’s *Republic* and *Gorgias* as examples that cross examine the earlier established spontaneous or natural notion of happiness. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates argues that an unjust man cannot be happy: “was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.”<sup>223</sup> In some sense, section four is a pivotal point within Lonergan’s outline, it is where he shifts attention from the spontaneous materialistic notion of happiness and introduces the notion of a moral law.

Lonergan also references the *Gorgias* dialogue in his letter to Fr. Keane which, as we may recall, was written shortly after the GE sketches. The letter reads:

To give a more precise instance, I was discussing the Nicomachean Ethics with

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<sup>221</sup> Plato’s *Republic* V.473c11-d6

<sup>222</sup> *OLNDH*, 68.

<sup>223</sup> Plato’s *Gorgias Dialogue* (translated by: Benjamin Jowett) available online at: <http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/plato/gorgias.htm>

Fr Nunan, our biennist here writing a thesis on the idea of the good. I advanced that Aristotle was a bourgeois, that he introduced the distinction between speculative and practical to put the 'good' as Socrates and Plato conceived it out of court, that he did so because he could not answer the dialectic of, say, the *Gorgias*, and could not admit its conclusion that happiness was compatible with suffering. This I believe manifest from countless texts.<sup>223</sup>

In both the GE sketches and Lonergan's letter to Fr. Keane, he discusses the *Gorgias* dialogue in the context of a quest for happiness. The provided reference may be beneficial when attempting to understand the GE sketches.

### Section Five – Moral Theory

With the concept of moral law in mind, Lonergan now considers moral theory. He divides the section into three main components: Stoic *logos*, Augustine, and Scholastics. At the bottom of the section he writes a reminder to not forget "sentiment, analysis of virtue." Perhaps this is a reference to Hume and Aquinas? Hume grounded his ethics in a theory of sentiments.<sup>224</sup> Lonergan refers to Hume in the Keeler review.<sup>225</sup> Aquinas has an extensive discussion of the virtues in the *Summa Theologica*. In any case, this section reveals a connection between this sketch and chapter 18 of *Insight*. Lonergan has begun to formulate more explicitly his ideas on a metaphysics of ethics.

The Stoics believed in λόγος (*logos*), an operative principle that gave life. The λόγος is present in all human beings and is similar to the concept of God as divine creator. Lonergan uses the term "*Sequi naturam*" ("follow your nature"), which is the basis for the Stoic understanding of natural law. The Stoics believe man has both nature and reason; reason is the channel that the

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<sup>223</sup> BLFK, 5.

<sup>224</sup> See David Hume, [\*An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals\*](#).

<sup>225</sup> *CWL* 20, 137.

divine *logos* uses to direct man's decision making. Maryanne Horowitz writes: "Man, distinct in this from all other things, has a reason of his own, through which the divine *logos* flows: man may spurn this divine gift and lead a wicked life, or he may be guided by reason to God's universal law and accordingly lead a life of righteousness."<sup>226</sup> In Stoicism, adhering to reason and the development of reason makes you a moral being. In doing so, you become more like *logos*. The Stoics replaced the quest for happiness with a quest for righteousness, just as the first sketch is shifting from a focus on happiness *per se* to incorporate the supernatural context for human living.

Augustine's moral theory differs from Stoicism. For Augustine, there is a moral law written on the heart of every man, *lex naturalis*.<sup>227</sup> This principle of moral law is illustrated by Augustine in *Confessions* Book II, in the incident of the stolen pears:

Theft receives certain punishment by your law (Exod. 20: 15), Lord, and by the law written in the hearts of men (Rom. 2:14) which not even iniquity itself destroys. For what thief can with equanimity endure being robbed by another thief? He cannot tolerate it even if he is rich and the other is destitute.<sup>228</sup>

In this example, Augustine shows how the *lex naturalis* is written on the heart of all men, including the wicked and unjust.

Lonergan however, uses the phrase *lex aeterna* (eternal law) rather than *lex naturalis* (natural law) when referencing Augustine. In *On Free Choice of the Will* Book 1, Augustine discusses the difference between eternal law (*lex aeterna*) and temporal law.<sup>229</sup> Temporal law

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<sup>226</sup> Maryanne Cline Horowitz. "The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 35:1 (1974), 4.

<sup>227</sup> Daniel Patte and Eugene TeSelle. *Engaging Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation*. (Harrisburg, PA: A&C Black, 2003), 151. See also: A. H. Chroust. (1973) "The Fundamental Ideas in Augustine's Philosophy of Moral Law," *American Journal of Jurisprudence*, 18, 59-79.

<sup>228</sup> *Confessions*, Book II.iv (9), 28-29.

<sup>229</sup> Augustine. *On Free Choice of the Will* (trans. Th. Williams). (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993).

can change, preserves peace within society,<sup>230</sup> and must be derived from eternal law. Following only the temporal law will result in an unhappy life.<sup>231</sup> Eternal law is unchanging, pressed upon all human minds,<sup>232</sup> and commands the soul to be ruled by reason.<sup>233</sup> Adhering to eternal law results in a happy life.<sup>234</sup> Essentially, *lex aeterna* and *lex naturalis* are the same principle.

At this point, there are two distinct aspects of moral theory emerging. First, there is the concept of a moral law that is an intrinsic part of man's being. Secondly, although present in earlier sections of the sketch, the notion of choice becomes an important factor in the equation for happiness. The notion of a concrete good, common to all rational beings, appears. In chapter 18 of *Insight*, Lonergan explores the notion of the good in section I and the notion of will in section I.2.<sup>235</sup>

### **Section Six – Progress of philosophy according to St. Thomas**

In this section, Lonergan appears to have been preparing to compare Kant's understanding of the progress of philosophy with Aquinas. The notes within this section do not contain details pertaining to Lonergan's thought process, but it is apparent that he felt Kant had a more explicit concern with the progress of philosophy, thus connecting this section more directly to Lonergan's notes on Kant which, as we may recall, were likely composed around the same time.<sup>236</sup> A large portion of the notes on Kant are in Italian, but page two of the notes relates

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid. 1.14, 25

<sup>231</sup> Ibid. 1.15, 26

<sup>232</sup> Ibid. 1.6, 11

<sup>233</sup> Ibid. 1.8, 14

<sup>234</sup> Ibid. 1.15, 26

<sup>235</sup> I will elaborate on the relationship between these notes and *Insight* in my final chapter.

<sup>236</sup> DT, 1.

directly to section six of these sketches.<sup>237</sup>

Page two of the notes on Kant reads:

B.L. True that the good will is a rigorous criterion while earthly eudemonism is no criterion at all [cf. Ignatian indifference to all in the world \* Thomas “*bonum hominis est sedum notimem esse*”] But, the Kantian expression says more than this, though his proof lead to no broader conclusion. The good will is the moral good: but only the case of the act preformed solely out of a sense of duty – *per Repetto alla legge* [observance of the law] – can we be certain of the goodness of the will – can we be certain that a man is not honest merely because honesty is the best policy, etc. cf pp. 14.15 – Therefore, the good will is the will that acts solely “*per reispetto alla legge*.”<sup>238</sup>

I cannot be certain that this passage is what Lonergan had in mind, but it appears to make some sense. Sections one through five of the first sketch have progressed somewhat naturally from one another; each subsequent section has related and expanded upon the previous. Given that pattern, sections five and seven can be useful tools for understanding section six. With this structure in mind, a section pertaining to the nature of the will does not seem out of place.

### **Section Seven – Dynamic [*amor sapientiae*]...more precise foundation of ethic**

The Latin phrase *amor sapientiae* means “love of wisdom.”<sup>239</sup> In *Confessions*, Augustine progresses from understanding the love of wisdom as a self-destructive path<sup>240</sup> to viewing it as an intrinsic part of his Christian journey.<sup>241</sup> His understanding of philosophy shifts while reading Cicero’s book titled *Hortensius*.<sup>242</sup> Lonergan appears to be using a desire for wisdom that

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<sup>237</sup> For an English translation of Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* see: Immanuel Kant *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. (Trans.) H.J. Patton (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1956), 1-148.

<sup>238</sup> KN, 2.

<sup>239</sup> *Language in the Confessions of Augustine*, 80.

<sup>240</sup> *Confessions* Book III. iii (6) –III. iv (7), 38-39.

<sup>241</sup> *Confessions* Book III. iv (8), 39-40.

<sup>242</sup> *Confessions* Book III. iv (7), 39.



develops over time (dynamic), as a foundation for a more precise foundation of ethics. The second line may be referencing Aristotle's four cause theory of metaphysics. Lonergan has omitted Aristotle's *final cause*.

The following line deals with finality. In 1943, Lonergan wrote an essay titled "Finality, Love, Marriage."<sup>243</sup> In the essay, he defines finality:

...Finality is affirmed, besides the absolute reference of all things to God and the horizontal reference of each thing to its commensurate motives and ends, a vertical dynamism and tendency, an upthrust from lower to higher levels of appetite and process; thus are provided the empty categories of the ultimate solution, since horizontal ends are shown to be more essential and vertical ends more excellent.<sup>244</sup>

Although this definition was written eight years later, it fits the context of these sketches.

Lonergan developed, at least in part, a notion of finality prior to the composition of "Finality, Love, Marriage." The notion of finality also links to chapter 15 of *Insight*. In *Insight* Lonergan writes: "By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being."<sup>245</sup>

Continuing with our analysis, on the final line of page one of the sketches, we see a clear reference to a line found in the notes on Kant: "*una dialectica natural, cioè una tendenza a ragionare sottilmente, anche falsamente contro questa legge severa del dovere*" [a natural dialectic, that is a tendency to reason subtly, but incorrectly against this strict law of need.]"<sup>246</sup> I

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<sup>243</sup> Bernard Lonergan. "Finality, Love, Marriage" in *Collected Works Volume 4* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 17-52.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>245</sup> *CWL3*, 445.

<sup>246</sup> KN, 4.

am presently uncertain about the implications of this passage. While my concern here is primarily orientated toward research, to present the relevant data, I hope that future endeavors will find my efforts useful for more fully understanding the text. Nonetheless, the emergence of the notion of finality here in the first sketch is I think significant, especially in light of the central significance of (1) the pure desire to know and (2) the notion of finality in *Insight*.

### **Research: Page Two:**

There are no left-hand enumerations on page two of the sketches. As Doran suggests, this may mean the entirety of page two is a continuation of section seven.<sup>247</sup> Doran's argument makes sense if we view the entirety of the page as a "more precise foundation of ethic."<sup>248</sup> The first sketch has focused on compiling a variety of arguments up until this point. From this point onward, it appears that Lonergan is developing his own notion of ethics based on arguments and counter arguments presented on the first page of the sketch and in his notes on Kant. If we operate under the assumption that the third and fourth pages of the file are a repetition of the first two pages, arguing that page two is a continuation of section seven seems reasonable. In the second sketch, pages three through four, we see the same pattern of seven distinct divisions of text, with the final section extending across multiple pages without left hand enumerations.

Lonergan's notion of ethics begins with man as the potential mover. In the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology" Lonergan writes:

Hence, everything that a man does or thinks is pre-moved by the action of other things. Further, this pre-motion extends into the intellectual field and constitutes the pre-motion of the will. In response to this release of pre-motion the will need not act: but if it does act then it acts according to the pre-

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<sup>247</sup> DT, 2.

<sup>248</sup> GE notes, 1.

determined intellectual form; if it does not act, then it sins in failing to follow the dictate of reason, while what takes place in action is pre-determined by the sensitive mobiles, the previous intellectual pattern, habits, etc., all of which are pre-determined....besides the unity of human nature there is the unity of human action. Human action is always pre-determined to either of two alternatives: one is rational the other irrational.<sup>249</sup>

This passage further links the sketches to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and provides insight that I think is useful for understanding the notion of ethics that is developing in the sketches.

In the first division on page two, he has listed four categories: a) potency, external mover c) prearranged by God b) man’s choice – reason or impulse d) Social effect. Lonergan’s list appears at first glance to be disorientated; rather than arrange things chronologically, he has chosen to list them in the order of a, c, b, d. He has underlined the fourth category (social effect), which may be relevant to the foundations for his notion of the good of order found in chapter 18 of *Insight*. It is clear that Lonergan is developing a notion of ethics with a specific focus on human responsibility, God, freedom of choice, reason and impulse, and the societal effect of decisions. Many of these topics are also discussed in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” The following passages from the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” are worth quoting in full. First we see a discussion of reason as it pertains to human responsibility and the internal and immanent and external and transient action of man.

Finally, the end of the individual as an individual is to accept the intellectual forms (effective assent to the true, consent to the good); by this means he attains the *ἐνέργεια* of his personality; on the other hand, inasmuch as he fails to accept the intelligible dictate and make it effective, he is merely predetermined by the physical flow; also, he sins for sin is the failure to obey reason. But on top of this immanent end of individuals as individuals there is the external flow of action,

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<sup>249</sup> EFS, 18-19.

which is reasonable or unreasonable according to the goodness of the individuals, which nonetheless is something in itself. Now we must grasp the intimate connection between the internal and immanent action of man and his external and transient action.<sup>250</sup>

Secondly, we see a discussion of action that incorporates a notion of the supernatural:

Now, plainly it is impossible to influence human wills to do good without exerting an influence upon the external action that pre-moves and statistically pre-determines wills. This is the claim of the church, of spiritual authority. On the other hand, the flow of human action considered merely as an external flow is for definite ends yet entirely under the control of the wills. This is the basis of the continuous rebellions of the state from mediaeval times to the present day.<sup>251</sup>

The following section explicitly introduces the supernatural for the first time within the sketch. Up until this point, the sketch has been concerned with human action and the quest for happiness. In this section, we are introduced to the supernatural and a third type of motivating force: transcendent reason. So far, the first sketch has focused on spontaneity and reason as the two primary motivators of the will, but here we are introduced to a third motivating factor.

The next portion of text deals with the dialectic of history and is clearly related to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” William Matthews makes an interesting point when he notes that in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan understood the philosophy of history to be a pure theory of external human action. In a single action there are three things: “a physico-sensitive flow of change, the intellectual forms with respect to the phantasmal flux, and the power of imposing intellectual forms upon the flow of change that comes from the will.”<sup>252</sup> I think that Matthews highlights what is going on in Lonergan’s notion of ethics in this sketch;

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<sup>250</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>251</sup> EFS, 19.

<sup>252</sup> LQ, 73.

there is an understanding of action emerging that is relevant to developing a metaphysic of ethics.

Thus, there appears to be a connection between Lonergan's notion of ethics and his understanding of the dialectic of history. The first sketch clearly incorporates the dialectic of history that we see in the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology." This connection is not surprising, given that Lonergan was interested in economics and the dialectic of history at this point in his life.<sup>253</sup> In this sketch, Lonergan's metaphysic of ethic and metaphysic for the dialectic of history appear to intertwine with notions of theology.

Beside "Dialectics of History" Lonergan writes "nature, sin, supernature." From what I have understood so far, human beings are rational beings by nature. Sin is a failure to obey reason. Following these ideas, a supernature is perhaps a compliance with reason that cooperates with a solution to the problem of sin. I believe that we can make a connection between what is going on in the remainder of Lonergan's sketches and chapter 20 of *Insight*. Lonergan writes:

...when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed from a bipolar to a tripolar conjunction and opposition. The humanist viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigencies of his own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands for openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man's incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism will lead beyond itself.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Michael Shute. "'Let Us be Practical' – The Beginnings of the Long Process to Functional Specialization in the 'Essay in Fundamental Sociology.'" John Dadosky, (ed.) *Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, S.J.* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2009), 471.

<sup>254</sup> *CWL3*, 728.

Lonergan is ultimately grounding his notion of ethics in the Catholic Christian tradition. The supernatural component of Lonergan's dialectic of history is Christian. It is a system that is grounded in faith, hope, and charity. Lonergan notes that the nation-state tends to be the rallying point for a lower tendency,<sup>255</sup> which may be a critique of the humanist tendency of political authority figures, much like Plato's *Republic*. It worth recalling that in the "Essay in Fundamental Sociology" Lonergan writes: "There is much on the present world-situation to confirm the view that liberalism in power is for the destruction of civilization."<sup>256</sup> In the context of that essay, liberalism means the liberal nation-state.

The next division concerns action. He divides the section into three categories and subdivides the third category into four subcategories. Action is divided into three categories: moral, ἐνέργεια, and effective. Lonergan has written "overlooked by Kant" on the margin of the text with an arrow drawn to "effective."<sup>257</sup> I believe that Lonergan is arguing that human action has three main facets, they are (1) moral, (2) what we are remembered for, and (3) effective. Human action is concerned with morality and value; our actions have value. In the second line, Lonergan writes: "as ἐνέργεια – the days of my life, shall we remember them?" This line may be suggesting that our actions are remembered by others. Lastly, our actions are effective, they have motive and meaning. Lonergan has underlined "living is giving" and has noted that reason treats all men as equal to self. Lonergan has provided a list of four motives of action: 1) Economic division of Labour, 2) Family, 3) Science, art, Research and teaching 4) giving morally – *estote imitators mei*, meaning "be imitators of me." This is likely a reference to the words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 11:1. It is interesting that Lonergan has chosen to underline "living is giving" and

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<sup>255</sup> GE notes, 2.

<sup>256</sup> *LEER*, 16.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid*.

“*estote imitators mei*” in this section. I think it shows a desire to ground his notion of ethics in theology.

Given that Lonergan highlights “effective” as overlooked by Kant, what does Lonergan mean when he speaks of effective motive and meaning? Perhaps a clue can be found in *Method in Theology* in a passage from chapter three, Meaning, where Lonergan discusses constitutive meaning. It is worth quoting in full.

A third function of meaning is constitutive. Just as language is constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. Religions and art-forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, histories, all are inextricably involved in acts of meaning. What is true of cultural achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such change involves change of meaning - a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or request. The state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or, again by working on men’s minds and hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty.<sup>258</sup>

This passage perhaps best reflects the eventual development that moves out of a critique of Kant’s governance by consistent adherence to law, *per rispetto alla legge*, to the metaphysic of ethics founded on a dynamic account of effective action that we find in *Insight*. It is here and in the “Essay on Fundamental Sociology” that we see the first sparks of that later achievement.

The fourth section on page two of the sketch is headed “virtue” and is divided into the topics of wisdom, justice, temperance and fortitude (the four cardinal virtues) and prudence, faith, hope, and charity (the three theological virtues). Beside “prudence” Lonergan has written:

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<sup>258</sup> Bernard Lonergan. *Method in Theology*. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 78.

“re application of wisdom to ἄπειρον.” *Apeiron* can be translated to mean “infinite” or “without boundaries.” Following “charity” Lonergan has included a Latin translation of the final verse of the Gregorian chant “*Adoro Te Devote*.” In English, the chant reads: “I beseech thee send me what I thirst for so, some day to gaze on thee face to face in light, and be blest forever with thy glory's sight.”<sup>259</sup>

This section relates directly to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” Michael Shute argues that, in his discussion of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” “there must be both a development of mind and a change of heart that works to restore human history to its proper ends.”<sup>260</sup> Lonergan writes: “The hope for the future lies in a philosophical presentation of the supernatural concept of social order.”<sup>261</sup> In this section, we see reference to a love for wisdom (*amor sapientiae*) and a notion of reason that treats all men as equal.<sup>262</sup> Assuming that Shute’s assessment of “the Essay in Fundamental Sociology” is correct, the topics of wisdom and justice in this section may be a reference to “a development of mind.”<sup>263</sup> Of all the sections of text so far, this portion shows the largest connection to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” The notions of faith, hope, and charity are at the heart of the remaining pages of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.”

The second last section of page two is titled “motivation: main thing is to observe the law; man is body and soul.” In the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan writes about the law in relation to a dialectic of history and ethics: “Humanity must first discover its law and then apply it: to discover the law is a long process and to apply it a painful process but it has to be

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<sup>259</sup> Lyrics available online at: [http://www.chanted.com/lyrics/godhead\\_here\\_hiding.htm](http://www.chanted.com/lyrics/godhead_here_hiding.htm)

<sup>260</sup> “Let Us Be Practical!” 15.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. [Quote taken from page 118 of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology”].

<sup>262</sup> In the following section, Lonergan lists “Value – as effective – Living is giving. [Reason treats all men as equal to self.]

<sup>263</sup> “Let Us Be Practical!” 15.



done.”<sup>264</sup> The second line, “*Serviam mente, serviam et corpori*” is Latin and translates “serve with mind, serve with body.” This relates directly to the last part of the first line “man is body and soul.” Lonergan uses the remainder of this section to further connect his notion of the dialectic of history and his notion of ethics with Christianity. He lists four factors that motivate Christians to serve the law: 1) Heaven and Hell, 2) Reason, 3) Gratitude, and 4) Achievement. Beside “gratitude” Lonergan has written “*qui eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum*” which is a reference to Colossians 1:13: “for He has rescued us from the dominion of darkness.” Beside “achievement” he has written “*Adveniat regnum tuum: estote imitators mei*” (may your kingdom come: be imitators of me). He notes that “achievement” is overlooked by Kant and also draws an arrow linking it to “zeal for souls – spark that leaps from example”.<sup>265</sup>

The final section of the sketch deals with the supernatural. To show its connection to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” I refer again to Shute. Shute writes:

...intelligence is not enough. The effective solution depends upon the appearance of a higher supernatural viewpoint than can meet the source of the deformation of the reign of sin in the conscience of individuals. Thus, while correct theory is an essential component for the reversal of the modern crisis, an effective solution depends upon the emergence of a higher supernatural viewpoint and its corresponding integration with concrete living.<sup>266</sup>

The final line of the first sketch reads: “Excessive disregard of human element is seed of spark.”<sup>267</sup> I believe that this line alludes to a shift in focus from our own lives to the supernatural. The higher viewpoint, within the sketch, appears to be the realization that our lives are not simply about our egotistical selves, rather, they are about our relationship to God and so are part

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<sup>264</sup> EFS, 39.

<sup>265</sup> GE notes, 2.

<sup>266</sup> “Let Us Be Practical!” 15.

<sup>267</sup> GE notes, 2.

of a dialectic much larger than our individual lives.

## Summary

Throughout the first sketch, we have seen a notion of ethics develop in relation to Lonergan's critique of Kant's understanding of metaphysics. This sketch is divided into seven sections that first establish a problematic understanding of happiness and then provide a solution for the problem. Lonergan combines the dialectic of history, the structure of metaphysics, and Catholic theology in his approach to the issue. I argue that his solution is to develop a groundwork for the metaphysics of ethics, a goal that found its explicit published expression in chapter 18 of *Insight*. I will argue this point extensively in my final chapter.

There are two sets of sketches remaining in File A13. The second sketch, pages three through four of the file, are clearly a refinement of the envisaged project outlined in the first sketch. The third sketch, page five of the file, may be a much more precise refinement of the second sketch or a separate sketch on happiness. In the following chapter, I will highlight the refinement that occurs between the first and second set of sketches. I will note places where there is a clear progression of thought between the different sets of sketches and track all revisions made to the second sketch. Lastly, I will briefly explore the final page of the file, the third sketch titled "Happiness," and establish an argument for its distinction from the other two sketches. With these goals in mind, let us proceed to chapter four.

## Chapter Four: The Second and Third Sketches

I have divided this chapter into two main sections. In the first section, I will compare the second sketch, pages three through four, with the first sketch. To do this, I will make note of the revisions that occur. Although the second sketch follows the same project outlined in the first sketch, there are some changes to the ordering of the text and in the terminology used. I will highlight where text has been added to the second sketch. Likewise, I will note when text from the first sketch does not appear in the second. In the second section, I will explore the fifth and final page of the GE sketches.

In this chapter, I will make the case that there are, in fact, three distinct divisions within the GE sketches. As you may recall, Robert Doran suggests that the GE sketches are composed of two sets of sketches that contain much of the same material.<sup>268</sup> In my initial reading of the file I came to the same conclusion. However, after careful reflection my understanding changed. As I now understand the texts, in addition to the two sketches for a metaphysics of ethics, there is a discrete third section. The first sketch, which I have explored extensively in the previous chapter, contains seven sections that appear to be the first attempt to sketch a proposal for the metaphysic of customs or ethics. The second sketch begins on the third page and is a more refined and developed version of the first sketch. The third division, which we find at the end of the GE sketches on page five, is either a very compact version of the content found in the first and second sketches, or is a separate set of notes on the theme of happiness. This is clear from the titles marking off each section. The first and second sketch are titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs].” The third sketch appears to be titled “Happiness.”<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> DT, 1.

<sup>269</sup> GE sketches, 5.

## A Comparison of the Sketches

As the second sketch follows the same general outline as the first sketch, the second sketch would be best categorized as a refined version of the first sketch. Lonergan has slightly modified the order in the second sketch. He amalgamates the first section of the second sketch into the following six sections and section five is split into two sub-sections, one on Stoicism, the other on Augustine. Although the ordering has changed, the project itself appears to remain fundamentally the same in both sketches. I have provided a chart that outlines the basic structure of the first two sketches using Lonergan's titles for each section:

**Table 4.1: Comparing the Order of the Sketches**

<b>The First Sketch</b>	<b>The Second Sketch</b>
<b>1. Origin of Philosophy</b>	1. Happiness is an Ideal of the Imagination
<b>2. Spontaneous Notion of Happiness</b>	2. Negation of Foregoing
<b>3. Ecclesiastes</b>	3. Assertion of Morality
<b>4. Buddha and Plato</b>	4. Development of Morality
<b>5. Moral Theory</b>	5. Augustine
<b>6. Progress of Philosophy According to St. Thomas</b>	6. Examination of Kant
<b>7. Dynamic (<i>armor sapientiae</i>) as well as More Precise Foundation of Ethic</b>	7. Scholastic System – Rights and Duties

Keeping in mind the basic order of the sketches, we turn our attention to a comparative analysis between the first and second sketch.

### **Sketch Two – Section One:**

The second sketch begins with a section titled “happiness as an ideal of the

imagination.”<sup>270</sup> This section is a refined version of section two from the first sketch.<sup>271</sup> The title of the section has changed from “spontaneous notion of happiness. ideal of the imagination”<sup>272</sup> to “ideal of the imagination.”<sup>273</sup> It is plausible that the section was originally titled “spontaneous notion of happiness” and later became “ideal of the imagination” in both sets of sketches. If you look closely at the first page of the original manuscript, the title “spontaneous notion of happiness” is followed by a period, suggesting the title originally ended there. Following the period, we see a large portion of space before “ideal of the imagination” is written.<sup>274</sup> This suggests that “ideal of the imagination” was written as a later addition to the sketch. When writing the revised version of the sketches, Lonergan uses the new title.

Lonergan’s new title was most likely inspired by his reading of Kant. In Kant’s *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs*, he argues that happiness is an ideal of the imagination. The passage is worth quoting in full:

One cannot act in accordance with determinate principles in order to be happy, but only in accordance with empirical counsels, e.g., of diet, frugality, politeness, restraint, etc., of which experience teaches that they most promote welfare on the average. It follows from this that the imperatives of prudence, to speak precisely, cannot command at all, i.e., cannot exhibit actions objectively as practically *necessary*; that they are sooner to be taken as advisings (*consilia*) than as commands (*praecepta*) of reason; that the problem of determining, certainly and universally, what action will promote the happiness of a rational being, is fully insoluble, hence no imperative in regard to it is possible, which would command us, in the strict sense, to do what would make us happy, because happiness is an ideal not of reason but of imagination, resting merely on empirical grounds, of which it would be futile to expect that they should determine an action through which to attain the totality of a series of consequences which are in fact infinite.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> GE sketches, 3, section 1, line 1.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., 1 section 2, line 1.

<sup>272</sup> The title as it appears in the first sketch: GE sketches, 1, section 2, line 1.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, line 1.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid., 1, section 2, line 1.

<sup>275</sup> Passage taken from: Immanuel Kant. “Second Section: Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysics of Morals” in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 35. Available online at: [www.pitt.edu/~mthompsa/readings/GroundworkII.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompsa/readings/GroundworkII.pdf)

Since, as I have argued, the GE sketches are indeed primarily a response to Lonergan's reading of Kant's *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs*, it seems reasonable to argue that changing the title from "spontaneous notion of happiness" to "ideal of the imagination" is inspired by this passage from Kant.

The second line of the revised sketch is a new addition. It reads: "ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός economic man." In Greek, the phrase means "man of flesh." I associate the phrase with Paul the Apostle and the book of Romans. Both Lonergan and Paul are referring to the carnal nature of man when they use the word σαρκικός.<sup>276</sup> Lonergan seems to be connecting 'economic man' with the carnal or material nature of man. This reference most likely relates to Lonergan's developing thoughts on economics at this time. Lonergan will remark in his essay "For a New Political Economy" that underlying the superstructure of culture "there stands as foundation the purely economic field concerned with nourishment, and shelter, clothing, utilities, services, and amusement."<sup>277</sup>

The third and fourth lines of the revised sketch introduce: reason, impulse, and desire. They are part of the seventh section in the first sketch. In the revised sketch, a notion of the metaphysic of customs or ethics develops earlier than it does in the first. In the first sketch, a notion of the metaphysic of ethics is not clearly in place until the seventh section. In the second sketch it informs the entirety of the revised sketch, thus reinforcing the case that Lonergan is honing his focus on this topic. It appears that Lonergan has divided the text into three sections. As previously discussed, the first section introduces the ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός (fleshly man). The text appears to discuss ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός until the end of the third page. At the top of page four, there is

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<sup>276</sup> See: Romans 7-8.

<sup>277</sup> *CWL*21, 12.

an addition to the text that, like ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός, is not included in the first sketch. The addition is: ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός meaning “natural man.”<sup>278</sup> ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός is the focus of discussion until the seventh section, where we are introduced to the spiritual man (ἄνθρωπος πνευματικός).<sup>279</sup> The three types of human beings act as divisions within the text. The first two sections discuss the fleshly man, sections three through six are concerned with the natural man, and section seven pertains to the spiritual man. This division anticipates that same division that is a central concern of the latter 1935 essay “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” and which anticipates the division of human process into nature, history and supernatural that is an organizing principle for the 1943 essay “Finality, Love, Marriage.”<sup>280</sup>

In the first sketch, Lonergan lists five spontaneous notions of happiness: 1) Solon and Croesus 2) health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some religion to give resignation to death 3) Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια 4) Bentham and Utilitarian 5) Bolshevism.<sup>281</sup> The list is not included in the revised sketch. Solon and Croesus are removed completely, the list in number two is shortened and joined with Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια; they are given their own subsection in the first section of the revised sketch. Bentham, Utilitarianism, and Bolshevism are amalgamated into one category labelled “social systems.”<sup>282</sup>

It is interesting that more attention is given to Aristotle at the beginning of the revised sketch. In both sketches, Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια is continuously referred to. In the first sketch, it is included as part of a list in the second section.<sup>283</sup> In the revised sketch, a significant portion of the first section is dedicated to Aristotle.<sup>284</sup> The seventh line of the revised sketch reads: “a

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<sup>278</sup> GE sketches, 4.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., 4, section 7, line 2.

<sup>280</sup> See: “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 42-48. cf. the diagram on p. 42.

<sup>281</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 2, line 3.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, lines 5-6.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid., 1, section 2.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, lines 7-10.

possible interpretation of Nicomachean Ethic.”<sup>285</sup>

Other changes relating to Aristotle are made in the revised sketch. Firstly, Lonergan has changed the language he uses when referring to Aristotle’s notion of happiness. In the first sketch, he writes: “Aristotle puts happiness in occupation (ἐνέργεια).”<sup>286</sup> In the revised sketch, “Aristotle puts the end in activity itself - ἐνέργεια.”<sup>287</sup> Additionally, the lines “death as a matter of course”<sup>288</sup> and “does not try to solve riddle”<sup>289</sup> do not appear in the revised sketch. The revised sketch adds the line: “[Aristotle] subordinates the external as a means to end a humanly necessary means [competence, position, friends].”<sup>290</sup>

### **Sketch Two – Section Two:**

Section two in the revised sketch is titled “negation of foregoing.”<sup>291</sup> It appears to be a revised version of the third section in the first sketch. Much of the content in both sketches is identical. The obvious change is that, in the revised sketch, Lonergan has provided some scriptural quotations. In the first sketch, all scriptures appear as references, quotations are not provided. The scriptures are ordered differently in the revised sketch. Additionally, Ecclesiastes 2<sup>11</sup> is omitted from the revised sketch and Ecclesiastes 4<sup>9-12</sup> is added. I have created a chart that allows us to easily compare how the scriptures are ordered in both sketches:

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<sup>285</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, line 7.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid., 1, section 2, line 5.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, line 8.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 1, section 2, line 6.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, lines 9-10.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 1.



**Table 4.2: Ecclesiastes References**

The First Sketch		The Second Sketch	
Section	Verses from Ecclesiastes	Section	Verses from Ecclesiastes
<b>What does life give?</b>	4 <sup>8</sup> , 2 <sup>22</sup> , 3 <sup>9</sup> , 5 <sup>14-15</sup>	Vanity of achievement	2 <sup>1-11</sup>
<b>ἐνεργεια</b>	3 <sup>22</sup> , 5 <sup>17</sup> , 9 <sup>4-10</sup>	Vanity of Wisdom	2 <sup>12-26</sup> , 6 <sup>8</sup>
<b>Incomprehensibility of life</b>	8 <sup>17</sup> , cf. 4 <sup>1-3</sup> , 9 <sup>2,3,11,12</sup> , 10 <sup>5-7</sup>	Reflection	4 <sup>8</sup>
<b>Vanity of achievement</b>	12 <sup>11</sup>	Quotation Provided Referenced	2 <sup>22</sup> 3 <sup>9</sup> , 5 <sup>14-15</sup>
<b>Vanity of wisdom</b>	2 <sup>1-11</sup> , 2 <sup>11-26</sup> , 6 <sup>8</sup>	Quotation Provided	3 <sup>22</sup>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px;"> Ecc. 2<sup>11</sup> omitted from second sketch  Ecc. 4<sup>9-12</sup> are an addition to the second sketch </div>		ἐνεργεια	cf. 5 <sup>17</sup> , 9 <sup>4-10</sup>
		Quotation Provided	4 <sup>1-3</sup>
		Friendship	4 <sup>9-12</sup>
		Quotation Provided	8 <sup>17</sup>
		Referenced	9 <sup>2,3,11,12</sup> , 10 <sup>5-7</sup>
		Quotation Provided	12 <sup>11</sup>

There are in total sixteen revisions made in this section. Firstly, “Buddha: desire an illusion, happiness an escape to?”<sup>292</sup> is added to the section. It appears in the fourth section in the first sketch.<sup>293</sup> Secondly, in the first sketch, “God’s governance and ultimate judgement taken for granted”<sup>294</sup> is the second line in the third section. In the revised sketch, it is moved to the final line in section two.<sup>295</sup> Thirdly, the line “pass your days in simplicity (ἐνεργεια)”<sup>296</sup> is not included in the second sketch. Fourthly, in the first sketch, “vanity of achievement”<sup>297</sup> and “vanity of wisdom”<sup>298</sup> appear at the end of the third section,<sup>299</sup> in the revised sketch, they are moved to the beginning of the second section and are the first reference to Ecclesiastes in the

<sup>292</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 2.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid., 1 section 4, line 1.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 2.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid., 3 section 2, line 28.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., 1, section 2, line 1.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 9.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 10.

sketch.<sup>300</sup> Fifthly, Lonergan has edited the scriptural reference that he uses as an example of “vanity of wisdom.” As previously mentioned, he references Ecclesiastes 2<sup>11-26</sup> in the first sketch and changes it to Ecclesiastes 2<sup>12-26</sup> in the revised sketch. Sixthly, beside “vanity of achievement”<sup>301</sup> and “vanity of wisdom”<sup>302</sup> Lonergan has written “Reflection 4<sup>8</sup>,”<sup>303</sup> which does not appear anywhere in the first sketch. Seventhly, Ecclesiastes 4<sup>8</sup> is used to answer the question “what does life give?” in the first sketch.<sup>304</sup> The question does not appear anywhere in the revised sketch. Eighthly, Ecclesiastes 2<sup>22</sup>, 3<sup>9</sup> and 5<sup>14, 15</sup> are written beside “what does life give?” in the first sketch.<sup>305</sup> In the revised sketch, Ecclesiastes 2<sup>22</sup> is quoted at length<sup>306</sup> and Ecclesiastes 3<sup>9</sup> and 5<sup>14, 15</sup> are written as references at the end of the verse.<sup>307</sup>

The ninth revision pertains to the terminology that Lonergan uses to reference Kant. In the first sketch he writes: “cf. Kant – impossibility of systematic attainment of happiness [counsel not precept].”<sup>308</sup> In the revised sketch: “cf. Kant Impossibility of systematic and infallible plan for attaining an empirical end.”<sup>309</sup> The statements are very similar. In the first sketch, Lonergan notes that Kant faced the impossibility of a systematic attainment of happiness. In the second sketch, he is noting the impossibility of a systematic attainment of happiness and the impossibility of an infallible plan for attaining an empirical end.

The tenth revision comes after Lonergan’s reference to Kant. The revised sketch quotes Ecclesiastes 3<sup>22</sup>.<sup>310</sup> In the first sketch, Lonergan uses Ecclesiastes 3<sup>22</sup>, 5<sup>17</sup>, and 9<sup>4-10</sup> as examples

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 5.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 3.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 4.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 3.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 3.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 3.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 5-7.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 7.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 4.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 4-5.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 6-7.

of ενεργεια.<sup>311</sup> In this sketch, he quotes the verse and then references Aristotle's ἐνέργεια, Ecclesiastes 5<sup>17</sup>, and 9<sup>4-10</sup>. In the first sketch, ενεργεια appears without accents, in the revised sketch the accents are included, marking an eleventh revision. Notably, in Ecclesiastes 3<sup>22</sup>, Solomon uses the Greek word ποιήμασιν (workmanship), not ἐνέργεια. Although the terminology differs between Solomon and Aristotle, the overall concept is consistent.

In the first sketch, Ecclesiastes 4<sup>1-3</sup> is used alongside of Ecclesiastes 8<sup>17</sup>, 9<sup>2,3,11,12</sup> and 10<sup>5-7</sup> as references for the "incomprehensibility of life."<sup>312</sup> In the revised sketch, Lonergan quotes Ecclesiastes 4<sup>1-3</sup> and 8<sup>17</sup>, then references Ecclesiastes 9<sup>2,3,11,12</sup> and 10<sup>5-7</sup>.<sup>313</sup> Between the quote from Ecclesiastes 4<sup>1-3</sup> and Ecclesiastes 8<sup>17</sup>, Lonergan quotes Ecclesiastes 4<sup>9-12</sup>, a scripture discussing friendship, something not included in the first sketch. The fourteenth revision is that Lonergan has written "Hamlet's soliloquies" on the left side of the page beside Ecclesiastes 4<sup>1-3</sup>.<sup>314</sup> Hamlet is not referenced in the first sketch.

In the final lines of the third page, Lonergan references Socrates, just as he does in the first sketch. In the revised sketch, however, there are two apparent differences. In the first sketch, Lonergan underlines the word "why"<sup>315</sup>, he does not do this in the revised sketch. Lastly, in the revised sketch he references "Socrates gad-fly,"<sup>316</sup> something we do not see in the first sketch.

While it is the main intention of this chapter merely to present and provide a minimal context for understanding the materials, there are some shifts and changes that stand out and would be worth investigating further. In the revised sketch, Lonergan references Ecclesiastes 4<sup>9-12</sup>, a passage on the topic of friendship. This is an interesting addition to the text that seems

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<sup>311</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 5.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 6.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 25.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 13-18.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid., 1, section 3, line 7.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid., 3, section 2, line 26.

somewhat out of place when we consider it in the context of the surrounding verses. Ecclesiastes 4<sup>9-12</sup> reads:

Two are better than one, because they have a good reward for their toil. For if they fall, one will lift up his fellow. But woe to him who is alone when he falls and has not another to lift him up! Again, if two lie together, they keep warm, but how can one keep warm alone? And though a man might prevail against one who is alone, two will withstand him—a threefold cord is not quickly broken.<sup>317</sup>

The reference to friendship is placed between Ecclesiastes 4<sup>1-3</sup>, a verse that suggests the dead are more favored than the living, and Ecclesiastes 8<sup>17</sup>, a verse that suggests life is incomprehensible. The topic of friendship seems to be out of place given this context. However, if we grant some weight to what appears to be an increasing interest in Aristotle's ethics then the addition makes sense given the fact that Book VIII of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is about friendship.

Another revision worth further investigation is the addition of the reference to Socrates gad-fly. As we may recall, Socrates believed he was similar to the gad-fly, his purpose was to remind the state of its proper duties and obligations. Perhaps the addition of friendship and the reference to Socrates' gad-fly are connected. The GE sketches may suggest that like the gad-fly, human beings are responsible for reminding one another of their proper duties and obligations. This action, like we see in Ecclesiastes 4<sup>9-12</sup>, would result in the preservation of humankind. This of course is only a hypothesis and should be treated as such. Further investigation is required.

#### [Page 4] Sketch Two – Section Three:

As previously discussed, “Buddha – desire an illusion ∴ escape to x”<sup>318</sup> is now located in the second section of the revised sketch. Also, it may be important to restate that this section is

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<sup>317</sup> Ecclesiastes 4<sup>9-12</sup> (ESV).

<sup>318</sup> Originally located as GE sketches, 1, section 4, line 1.

where the second division, a discussion of ἀνὴρ ψυχικὸς (natural man) begins. In the first sketch, Lonergan uses the phrase “assertion of moral law,”<sup>319</sup> in the revised sketch, it is changed to “assertion of morality.”<sup>320</sup> Lonergan divides the section into two categories in the revised sketch, the first deals with the *Gorgias Dialogue* and the second with the *Republic*. These are the same texts referred to in the first sketch, but this time he uses the *Gorgias* to (α) negate the ideal of the imagination and (β) affirm the good – at any cost.<sup>321</sup> In the first sketch, the *Gorgias* was only used to negate the spontaneous idea of happiness.<sup>322</sup> We may recall that for Kant, happiness is the ideal of the imagination, not of reason.<sup>323</sup> The change in wording in this section mirrors the earlier discussed revisions to the title of first section where it changes from “spontaneous notion of happiness”<sup>324</sup> to “ideal of the imagination.”<sup>325</sup>

## **Sketch Two – Sections Four and Five:**

In the first sketch, Lonergan places Stoicism and Augustine in section five. They are divided into their own sections in the second sketch, allowing for a more elaborate exploration of each. Lonergan links the two sections with an arrow in the revised sketch. In the first sketch, this section is titled “Moral Theory,”<sup>326</sup> in the revised sketch that title disappears. Section four is titled “Development of Morality.”<sup>327</sup> Section four does not introduce anything not found in the first sketch, but “philosophy a way of life”<sup>328</sup> is relocated from the first section to this section in

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<sup>319</sup> Ibid., 1, section 4, line 2.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., 4, section 3, line 1.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., 4, section Three, lines 2 and 3.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., 1, section 4, line 3.

<sup>323</sup> *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 35.

<sup>324</sup> The title as it appears in the first sketch: GE sketches, 1, section 2, line 1.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid., 3, section 1, line 1.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., 1, section 5, line 1.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid., 4, section 4, line 1.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid., 1, section 1, line 2.

the revised sketch. In the first sketch, it references “Augustine amor *sapientiae*,”<sup>329</sup> so it is not unusual for it to be used as a lead up to section five titled “Augustine.”<sup>330</sup> As we may recall, *amor sapientiae* means “love of wisdom.” What we might add, especially in light of the extensive exploration of development in *Insight* (chapter 15), is the link that emerges here between ‘development’ and ‘a way of life.’ In “Insight Revisited,” Lonergan’s speaks of “the correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion of culture”<sup>331</sup> that began with his reading of Dawson in 1930. Here we have some textual evidence of the shift in progress in 1934. In *Insight* his understanding of ethics is fully informed by his understanding of human living and is dynamic and in development. This is in stark contrast to the static ideal of consistency in Kant’s categorical imperative.

In the revised sketch, section five elaborates on Lonergan’s reading of Augustine. We see an additional development of this topic on the fifth page, which I will explore in the second half of this chapter. In the revised sketch, Lonergan lists three points in the section on Augustine.

Firstly, there is the notion of *beata vita*, which Lonergan takes from the *Cassiciacum Dialogues*. The English title reads “On a Happy Life”.<sup>332</sup> Secondly, he lists: Idea of development – *amore coelestium expugnatur amor terrestris*.<sup>333</sup> A literal translation of the Latin is: “heavenly love refutes earthly love.” Lonergan links this section to Stoicism in the last section with an arrow.<sup>334</sup> Lastly, we read: *lex aeterna* (eternal law), something that we are introduced to in the first sketch.<sup>335</sup> In the sketches, he connects *lex aeterna* to Scholasticism with an arrow.

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<sup>329</sup> Ibid.

<sup>330</sup> Ibid., 4, section 5, line 1.

<sup>331</sup> *CWL2*, 264.

<sup>332</sup> The Latin title of the dialogue is “De Beata Vita” (On a Happy Life).

<sup>333</sup> GE sketches, 4, section 5, line 2.

<sup>334</sup> DT, 5.

<sup>335</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 5, line 2.

### **Sketch Two – Section Six:**

Section six in the revised sketch offers very little additional information. The section is titled “Examination of Kant.”<sup>336</sup> I suspect that this section intends to deal directly with what Lonergan addressed in his notes on Kant (File A12). File A12, then, would provide the extensive and detailed expansion that is suggested in the section title. In the first sketch, section six includes a discussion of the progress of philosophy according to St. Thomas, but that is removed in the revised sketch.

### **Sketch Two – Section Seven:**

As previously discussed, this section marks the beginning of the third division of text, dealing with the spiritual man (ἄνθρωπος πνευματικός). The section is titled “Scholastic System – Rights and duties.”<sup>337</sup> Most of the material from the first sketch is found in the revised sketch, the most notable change is the ordering of the text. Lonergan is more precise in the revised sketch, making section seven much shorter than it is in the first sketch. In the first sketch, Lonergan uses the following order: a more precise foundation of ethics, “man as instrument,” “faith and supernatural act,” the dialectics of history, action, virtues, motive and then spiritual life. In the revised version of the sketch, he discusses: the scholastic system, a foundation of ethics, action, freedom, man as an instrument, the dialectics of history, and then elaborates on action again.

There are a few additions to the revised sketch. In the first sketch we read: “dynamic [*amor sapientiae*] as well as more precise foundation of ethic,” in the revised sketch it changes to: “Giving a local habitation and a name to the dictate of reason of the scholastic - presenting ethics

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<sup>336</sup> Ibid., 4, section 6, line 1.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., 4, section 7, line 1.

not juridically but dynamically.”<sup>338</sup> As we have already mentioned, Lonergan’s understanding of ethics in *Insight* is fully informed by his understanding of human living and is dynamic, which is a stark contrast to the static ideal of consistency found in Kant’s categorical imperative. The development from a “more precise foundation of ethic” to “presenting ethics not juridically but dynamically” can be understood as an early development toward Lonergan’s understanding of ethics in chapter 18 of *Insight*.

In the revised sketch, Lonergan has written “economic scientific”<sup>339</sup> beside “occupation” in the section on action. It is not written in the first sketch. Lastly, following the line “action as effective,”<sup>340</sup> Lonergan has added “κατ' ἐξοχήν.”<sup>341</sup> Finally, there is a lot of material from the first sketch that does not appear in the revised sketch. Most notably, the topics “Faith and supernatural act,”<sup>342</sup> “Virtues,” “Motivation,” and “Spiritual Life” do not appear in the revised sketch. Also, Christianity as a solution for the dialectic of history and direct references to Kant are not included in the revised sketch.

We have now analyzed the relationship between the first and second sketch. Although some revisions and developments occur, the envisage project remains the same. The second sketch is a revised version of the project outlined in the first sketch, which is a response to Lonergan’s understanding of Kant’s notion of the metaphysic of customs. The third sketch, although related to the quest for happiness found in the first two sketches, is a separate item that we will now turn our attention to.

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid., 4, section 7, lines 3-4.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., 4, section 7, line 8.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., 4, section 7, line 10.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid., 4, section 7, line 11.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid., 2, section 7, line 9.



## Page Five – “Happiness”

The last page in file A13 appears to be one of two things: it is either a continuation of the second sketch, or an entity of its own. I think that, although it connects to the quest for happiness found in both sketches, it is a separate item. I have two arguments to support my claim. Firstly, as previously discussed, the two sketches are titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]” while the third outline appears to be titled “Happiness.” “Happiness” is underlined twice in the top left hand corner of the page.<sup>343</sup> The page is clearly related to the envisage project as it contains a repetition of much of the material found in the other sketches. If nothing else, the page is a third revision of the envisage project, not a continuation of the second sketch. My second argument requires an analysis of the original, non-transcribed file. As we may recall, I have attached the original archive file as an appendix at the end of this project. If we look at the division between the fourth and fifth pages, we see something not captured in the transcribed version. The writing stops about halfway down the fourth page, suggesting the second sketch ends there. If the fifth page is a continuation of the second sketch it would make sense for it to be written on the same page, not start on a new one. The fifth page is clearly a division of its own.

Unlike the two sketches, page five does not contain left hand enumerations, but is clearly divided into four subtopics: Impulse, Aristotle, Buddha, and Plato. Page five is a repetition of much of the same material found in the other sketches. It is possible that it is a further revised version of the first two sketches, but if that is the case, it appears to be incomplete. All this suggests to me that the page is a separate reflection on happiness. Although much of the material can be found in the other sketches, the layout of the text is different. If my hypothesis is correct, the notes read 1) happiness as it relates to impulse 2) Aristotle’s notion of happiness, 3)

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<sup>343</sup> Ibid., 5.

happiness as it relates to the Buddha, and 4) a discussion of Plato on happiness.

I approach the page under the assumption that it is an outline on happiness. As we have previously discussed, the sketches are primarily concerned with the quest for happiness, just as the notes on Kant are in search of a systematic attainment of happiness. These points are driven home in the third sketch.

## **Impulse**

The first section deals with the relationship between happiness and impulse. The first half of the section reads: “Impulse ideal of the imagination – anticipation greater than event (am I enjoying myself) - cf. Kant (no possibility of system)”<sup>344</sup> We have seen most of these things in the previous sketches. The “ideal of the imagination” appears in the second section of the first sketch and again in the first and third sections of the second sketch. As we may recall, it deals directly with the quest for happiness in both sketches. The reference to Kant also appears in both sketches. The line “anticipation greater than event (am I enjoying myself)” is a new addition to the text. The next portion of the section deals with reflection. The topic of reflection is included in the previous sketches, but is not discussed in the extensive manner that it appears in this section. With the exception of the quotations from Ecclesiastes, this is the first time that the sketches offer a hint of Lonergan’s own self-reflection breaking through. I find this section an insightful tool for understanding elements of the first two sketches. Lonergan is clearly highlighting a need for a shift in perspective, from a focus on the present to the future. We note as well that in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” there is a section called “D. We turn to the philosophic estimate of the future.”<sup>345</sup> This is all in accord with his interest in history not only as

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<sup>344</sup> Ibid. 5, section 1, lines 1-2.

<sup>345</sup> *LEER*, 30.

a remembrance of the past but as an anticipation of the future that is emerging in his thought at this time and which ultimately becomes the line of division for movement from data to results in the method of functional specialization. He writes about this division, “The first principle of the division is that theological operations occur in two phases... In brief, there is a theology *in oratione obliqua* that tells what Paul and John, Augustine and Aquinas, and anyone else had to say about God and the economy of salvation. But there is also a theology *in oratione recta* in which the theologian, enlightened by the past, confronts the problems of his own day.”<sup>346</sup>

Lonergan does not ignore the reality of impulse and desire, like the Buddha, rather he acknowledges its existence and then adds to it. Like Kant, Lonergan searches for an understanding of happiness that encapsulates both motive and desire.<sup>347</sup> He appears to use this section as a tool for shifting attention away from desire as negative or troublesome to a notion of motive and desire as a positive orientation, which in light of the central significance of the notion of the pure desire to know in *Insight*, is worth noting.

## Aristotle

In the second section, Lonergan offers insight into his reading of Aristotle. This section provides useful data for understanding Lonergan’s developing understanding of Aristotle and for understanding the role of references to Aristotle within the sketches. The section reads: “Aristotle [places happiness] in an ἐνέργεια, some form of activity [,] not in possessing something outside of self but in being active in a satisfying way.” Lonergan then lists two types of activity and a type of motivation for acting. The first is the activity of the divine mind

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<sup>346</sup> *Method in Theology*, 133.

<sup>347</sup> KN, 11.

(Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1074b15-1075a10). The second is the activity of moral virtues. The third reads: "mass of men: fear of punishment, hope of rewards."<sup>348</sup>

Lonergan's notes on Aristotle highlight three movements that influence human action. First, there is the activity of the divine mind that influences what we know, which in turn holds potential for influencing human action. Second, there is the activity of moral virtues, habitual patterns inspired by our morals that we have developed over time. These habitual patterns can influence decision making, just as our understanding does. Lastly, human action can be influenced by hope or fear.

## **Buddha**

As previously discussed, the Buddha seeks to avoid desire because it is an illusion that keeps man from becoming one with all living things. For the Buddha, desire is an illusionary trick that keeps the ego-consciousness alive. As earlier mentioned, Lonergan does not ignore the reality of desire. Lonergan acknowledges the existence of desire and rather than strive to escape from it, he searches for an understanding of happiness that incorporates motive and desire. The first level of the good, as detailed in chapter 18 of *Insight*, is desire. Also worth noting, Lonergan equates being with the pure desire to know in this same chapter.<sup>349</sup>

## **Plato**

The last section of GE notes reads: "Plato: the good: at any cost. (Gorgias)."<sup>350</sup> Lonergan does not provide any additional information in this section so it is difficult to formulate opinions

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<sup>348</sup> GE sketches, 5, section 2, line 6.

<sup>349</sup> *CWL3*, 596.

<sup>350</sup> GE sketches, 5, section 4, line 1.

on what he wanted to communicate. We can however, compare this section to relevant portions of the first two sketches. In the third section of the revised sketch, we see a very similar reference: “Assertion of Morality [Gorgias] Plato’s Socrates. (α) Negation of ideal of imagination re. pleasure and pain (β) affirmation of the good – at any cost.”<sup>351</sup> The final section of the third sketch appears to be a more developed version of the third section from the second sketch. If my analysis of the previous section is correct, Lonergan has shifted attention from desire as a negative notion and has given it a positive orientation. If I am correct, “(α) Negation of ideal of imagination re. pleasure and pain” is no longer a required discussion. Therefore, Lonergan can focus entirely on Plato’s notion of “the good at any cost” in this section. Desire is no longer a problem. Once again, we see a connection to the first level of the good in chapter 18 of *Insight*. Lonergan connects his notion of the good and his understanding of desire in the first level of the good.

## Summary

In this chapter we have identified three distinct divisions within the GE notes: the original envisage project, a revised version of that project, and a separate sketch on happiness. We have compared all three sketches, tracking the revision that occurs between the first and second sketches. The third sketch is considered to be separate from the other sketches, but connected nevertheless; it clearly reveals a bit of Lonergan’s own self-reflection for the first time in the GE sketches. The sketches are three snapshots that capture Lonergan’s understanding of the notion of the metaphysic of ethics as it first begins to develop. As we will see in the following chapter, the GE sketches provide a glimpse of the origins of chapter 18 in *Insight*.

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid., 4, section 3, lines 1-3.

## Chapter Five: Connecting the GE Sketches to *Insight*

In the first chapter I establish the significance of the GE sketches and provide some initial context for them. Chapter two provides an annotated transcription of the file. Chapters three and four are a comparative analysis of the three sketches contained within the file. In the following chapter, I will connect the GE sketches to chapter 18 of *Insight*, showing that they are a preliminary attempt at understanding the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. The following quote is of fundamental importance:

"There follows a conclusion of fundamental importance, namely, the parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics. For just as the dynamic structure of our knowing grounds a metaphysics, so the prolongation of that structure into human doing grounds an ethics."<sup>352</sup>

I open with this quote from *Insight* because I believe it clearly expresses the connection between the GE sketches and *Insight*. In the quote, Lonergan links the structure of metaphysics to the structure of ethics. The quote is a key for understanding the GE sketches. Read from the context of Chapter 18 of *Insight*, the sketches are highlighted as a first attempt at understanding the relationship between metaphysics and ethics, which bears mature fruit in *Insight*. At minimum, the GE sketches are stark evidence that Lonergan was thinking about ethics much earlier in his development than is commonly supposed. Not only can we link the notes to chapter 18, we can also connect them to other chapters of *Insight*. In this chapter, I will directly connect Lonergan's GE sketches to chapter 18 and relevant portions of chapters 15 and 20.

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<sup>352</sup> CWL3, 602.

## Chapter XVIII: The Possibility of Ethics

At the beginning of chapter 18, Lonergan clearly states his intentions for the chapter:

Metaphysics was conceived as the implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. The fundamental question of the present chapter is whether ethics can be conceived in the same fashion. Our answer, which prolongs the discussion of questions raised in the chapters on common sense and in the study of human development, meets the issue in three steps.<sup>353</sup>

We can link Lonergan's answer to this question to the passage that I have quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The GE sketches are evidently related to this discussion. If nothing else, the title "General Ethic [Metaphysics of Customs]" suggests the relationship of the GE sketches to this discussion. There are of course, as we will discuss in the remainder of this section, other arguments that connect the GE sketches to this chapter. It is important to note that the sketches, like chapter 18, are not concerned with drawing up a code of ethics but with meeting the relevant prior, foundational, questions.<sup>354</sup> In the GE sketches, Lonergan's effort begins as an attempt at a systematic understanding of happiness as the goal of human living, in the end he does this, but also creates a sketch for the metaphysic of ethics. In chapter 18, he argues that the structure of ethics and the structure of metaphysics are intrinsically related. With this in mind, we can connect portions of the GE sketches to the notion of the good, the notion of will, and the ontology of the Good that emerge in *Insight*.

### The Notion of the Good

There is a clear connection between the GE sketches and the notion of the good in

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<sup>353</sup> CWL3, 595.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

chapter 18. I have briefly mentioned these connections in chapter three. Lonergan's discussion of the spontaneous notion of happiness, later called "the ideal of the imagination,"<sup>355</sup> clearly connects to the first level of the good. In chapter 18, he writes: "On an elementary level, the good is the object of desire and, when it is attained, it is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying. But man experiences aversion no less than desire, pain no less than pleasure; and so, on this elementary, empirical level, the good is coupled with its opposite, the bad."<sup>356</sup> It is clear that Lonergan associated the first level of the good with the empirical experience of feeling happy, that is a particular good. At this level, we are satisfied (happy) when we obtain the particular object of desire, that is, the spontaneous notion of happiness found in the GE sketches. Thus Lonergan writes: "Reason [is] a means for the satisfaction of impulse, desire."<sup>357</sup> Bentham is one example provided in this section. We can locate Bentham's understanding of the goal of happiness at this level; searching for happiness as an empirical end coincides with the first level of the good.

In the notes on happiness, he writes: "one can simply drift without asking questions. Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting out of it. No doubt about desire, yearning, passion, but where is it all leading."<sup>358</sup> This quote clearly connects the spontaneous notion of happiness with the first level of the good, but also suggests a connection, at least in the transition into, the second level of the good in chapter 18. In this quote, Lonergan expresses a clear dissatisfaction in empirical obtainment of happiness. He writes:

However, among men's many desires, there is one that is unique. It is the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As other desire, it has its

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<sup>355</sup> See my discussion of this in chapter four.

<sup>356</sup> Bernard Lonergan, "The Possibility of Ethics" in *Insight: a Study of Human Understanding Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3*. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 596.

<sup>357</sup> GE notes, 3, section 1.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid., 5.



satisfaction. But unlike other desire, it is not content with. Of itself, it heads beyond one's own joy in one's own insight to the further question whether one's own insight is correct. It is a desire to know and its immanent criterion is the attainment of an unconditioned that, by the fact that it is unconditioned, is independent of the individual's likes and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious thinking.<sup>359</sup>

In the quote from the GE sketches we can see a clear connection to this passage from chapter 18.

In the GE sketches we find a nascent notion of the pure desire to know, which grounds the dynamic of his metaphysic, in his reflection on the happiness as a goal or end.

The second aspect of the good is the good of order. Lonergan writes: "Now through this desire [to know] and the knowledge it generates, there comes to light a second meaning of the good. Beside the good that is simply object of desire, there is the good of order. Such is the polity, the economy, the family as an institution...the good of order is dynamic...it possesses its own normative line of development..."<sup>360</sup> The GE sketches anticipate this later development of the good of order as a distinct, and higher, level of the good. In the first sketch, Lonergan deals with the topic of action. He divides the section into three topics, action as: moral, ἐνέργεια, and effective. Under effective, he lists: 1) Economic division of labour 2) Family 3) Science, art, Research and teaching 4) giving morally – *estote imitators mea*.<sup>361</sup> This section is clearly related to the later notion of the good of order. In fact, Lonergan lists the economy and the family institution in both texts.

The third aspect of the good is value. In chapter 18 we read: "This brings us to the third aspect of the good, which is value. For the good of order is linked, not only with the manifold manifestations of spontaneous desires and aversions which it orders, but also with a third type of

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<sup>359</sup> CWL3, 596.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., 596-597.

<sup>361</sup> GE sketches, 2, section 7.

good that emerges on the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and choice.”<sup>362</sup> We can further connect the GE sketches to chapter 18 through this passage. Again, we turn attention to the section on action in the GE sketches. The text reads: “Action – as moral – absolute value.”<sup>363</sup> The passage is repeated in the second sketch.<sup>364</sup> There is not enough detail in this section to build a connection as strong as the connection to the other levels of the good, but it expresses a connection nevertheless. On its own, it is not an overly persuasive argument, but placed in context of the overall argument, it holds significance as part of an early outline of chapter 18.

Now that we have established a clear connection between the GE sketches and the notion of the good, we turn attention to the notion of will. The notion of will connects to discussions of the nature of the will, rationalization, and morality in the GE sketches.

### **The Notion of Will**

In chapter 18, Lonergan establishes will, willingness, and willing.<sup>365</sup> Will is a capacity: “Will, then, is intellectual or spiritual appetite. As capacity for sensitive hunger stands to sensible food, so will stands to objects presented by intellect. As a bare capacity, will extends to every intellectual object, and so both to every possible order and to every concrete object as subsumed under some possible order.”<sup>366</sup> Willingness is a developed habit: “Just as a person that has not learnt a subject must go through a laborious process to acquire mastery...so too a person that has not acquired willingness needs to be persuaded before he will, yet once willingness is acquired,

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<sup>362</sup> CWL3, 597.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> GE sketches, 4, section 7.

<sup>365</sup> CWL3, 598.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid.

leaps to willing without any need of persuasion.”<sup>367</sup> Willing is human action: “willing is rational and so moral...so it is that the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts.”<sup>368</sup> Definitions of the three aspects of the will are important when connecting the GE sketches to chapter 18.

In the GE sketches, it is clear that Lonergan intends to discuss the nature of the will. In fact, he lists “Nature of Will, Obligation, Freedom” as part of a discussion on a more precise foundation of ethic in the first sketch.<sup>369</sup> Will as a capacity is somewhat of a requirement for discussing the quest for happiness. In the quest for happiness in the GE sketches, happiness is what satisfies the appetite of the will. Without the capacity to will, there would not be a desire for happiness.

It is difficult to connect willingness explicitly to the GE sketches. There are no direct references to ‘willingness’ or the establishment of habits. It is possible that willingness, as its own distinct notion, had yet to appear in Lonergan’s understanding of the notion of the will. The term is not used in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” or in “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*.” It is possible that the focus of the project, as Lonergan envisaged it in 1934, may not have required an extensive discussion of the development of habit. Once he seriously encounters Aquinas in his thesis, this will of course change as virtue or habit is a central component of Aquinas’ discussion of ethics. We can loosely link the development of habits with “Development of Morality – Stoicism” from the second sketch.<sup>370</sup> The GE sketches do not provide enough detail for us to argue that Lonergan makes an explicit connection between the two.

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<sup>367</sup> CWL3, 598.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., 598-599.

<sup>369</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 7.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., 4, section 4.

Unlike willingness, we can connect the GE sketches to willing. Willing, as we have already established, is an action. The GE sketches are full of references pertaining to action. The key is to link the references to chapter 18. Finding references to action in the GE sketches is not enough to strongly connect it to chapter 18. What we need is a reference that places action (willing) in relation to will and willingness. As we have already seen, the capacity of the will, the development of habits, and human action, are entities that can be connected to most of the thinkers referenced in the GE sketches. To demonstrate that they are explicit connection to chapter 18, these notions need to, at the very least, appear together in the text. The only place that a reference like this appears is in section seven.<sup>371</sup> In that section, titled a “more precise foundation of ethic,”<sup>372</sup> Lonergan references the human act, the nature of will, and rationalization.

What we can say for certain is that Lonergan was thinking about the topics of human action, the development morality, and the will during the composition of the GE sketches. We cannot directly link the GE sketches to the understanding of will, willingness, and willing found in chapter 18. We can however, argue that Lonergan’s thoughts found in the GE sketches helped shape the understanding of ethics found in chapter 18. At the very least, we can argue that Lonergan was thinking about the notions found in chapter 18, prior to the composition of *Insight*.

In this same manner, we can, at the very least, argue that Lonergan was thinking about the notions of freedom and reflection when composing the GE sketches. The notion of freedom is discussed in section two of chapter 18<sup>373</sup> and is mentioned in section seven of the GE sketches.<sup>374</sup> Lonergan notes reflection several times throughout the GE sketches: “Reflective

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<sup>371</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 7.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid.

<sup>373</sup> CWL3, 607.

<sup>374</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 7 and GE sketches, 4, Section 7

character of philosophy – life, an object of reflection,”<sup>375</sup> “Reflection [Ecclesiastes] 4<sup>8</sup>,” and most prominently in the notes on happiness: “Needed a bit of reflectiveness: one can simply drift without asking questions. Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting out of it. No doubt about desire, yearning, passion, but where is it all leading.”<sup>376</sup> Lonergan discusses practical reflection in section 2.4 of chapter 18.<sup>377</sup>

### **The Ontology of the Good**

The GE sketches can be connected to chapter 18 in one final way. In a section titled “The Ontology of the Good” we read:

...our analysis has been concerned with the good in human sense, with objects of desire, intelligible orders, terminal and originating values. But as the close relations between metaphysics and ethics suggest, it should be possible to generalize this notion and, indeed, to conceive the good as identical with the intelligibility that is intrinsic to being. The main line of the generalization are grasped easily enough...we propose to speak of a potential, formal, and actual good, where the potential good is identical with potential intelligibility and so includes but also extends beyond objects of desire, where the formal good is identical with formal intelligibility and so includes but also extends beyond human intelligible orders, where the actual good is identical with actual intelligibilities and so includes but also may extend beyond human values.<sup>378</sup>

In this passage we are again reminded that Lonergan parallels the structure of metaphysics with the structure of ethics.

The evidence clearly points to the conclusion that the GE sketches are an early attempt to work out the relationship between the structure of metaphysics and the structure of ethics. The

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<sup>375</sup> Ibid. 1, Section 1.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid. 5.

<sup>377</sup> CWL3, 610-612.

<sup>378</sup> CWL3, 604-605.

GE sketches do not provide an elaborative discussion of the potential, formal, and actual good, but may be a foundation for developing these ideas. Within the GE sketches there is a gradual shift in focus that begins with materialistic objects of desire, where for example, the Soviet is equated with the good<sup>379</sup> and moves toward the notion of transcendent intelligence, which Lonergan calls “Faith.”<sup>380</sup> Lonergan clearly recognizes a shift in intelligibility in the GE sketches; there is a shift in perspective that stretches from a focus on the materialistic through to a focus on the nature of man and lastly to a focus on the supernatural.

### **Undeveloped Notions in the GE sketches**

Now that we have highlighted the connections between the GE sketches and chapter 18 of *Insight*, we must also mention briefly that the entirety of chapter 18 is not found in the GE sketches. The GE sketches are an early sketch of the notion of ethics from chapter 18. In the chapter, we also see the topics of essential and effective freedom,<sup>381</sup> possible functions of satire and humour,<sup>382</sup> moral impotence,<sup>383</sup> and the problem of liberation.<sup>384</sup> These topics do not appear anywhere in the GE sketches and most likely occurred as later developments in Lonergan’s understanding of Ethics.

### **Connecting the Sketches to other Chapters of *Insight***

We can further connect the GE sketches to *Insight* through two passages, one in chapter 15 and the other in chapter 20. I briefly mention these passages in chapter three. We shift our

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<sup>379</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 1.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 2, section 7.

<sup>381</sup> CWL3, 619-624.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid., 624-626.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., 627-630.

<sup>384</sup> Ibid., 630-633.

attention to them.

## The Notion of Finality: Chapter 15

We can further connect the GE sketches to *Insight* through Lonergan's notion of finality. Although they offer little detail, the GE sketches include a notion of finality: "Finality – Good-True or Impulse (Nature of Will, Obligation, Freedom)."<sup>385</sup> As we have previously discussed in chapter three, about eight years after writing the GE sketches, Lonergan composed an essay titled "Finality, Love, Marriage." In the essay, he provides a definition for finality: "...Finality is affirmed, besides the absolute reference of all things to God and the horizontal reference of each thing to its commensurate motives and ends, a vertical dynamism and tendency, an upthrust from lower to higher levels of appetite and process; thus are provided the empty categories of the ultimate solution, since horizontal ends are shown to be more essential and vertical ends more excellent."<sup>386</sup> We also find a definition of finality in chapter 15 of *Insight*: "By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being."<sup>387</sup> Because of the GE sketches, we can track the origin of the notion of finality, found in chapter 15, to an earlier origin than "Finality, Love, Marriage."

## Chapter 20

We can connect the GE sketches to chapter 20 through a discussion of the supernatural. Like in the discussion on the ontology of the good, we see a reach beyond ourselves in this

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<sup>385</sup> GE sketches. 1, section 7.

<sup>386</sup> Bernard Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage" in *Collected Works Volume 4* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 18.

<sup>387</sup> CWL3, 445.

chapter. In the GE sketches, a discussion of faith and supernature is placed before a discussion on the dialectic of history and sin.<sup>388</sup> We can connect these topics to chapter 15, where Lonergan writes:

when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed from a bipolar to a tripolar conjunction and opposition. The humanist viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigencies of his own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands for openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man's incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism will lead beyond itself.<sup>89</sup>

In both the GE sketches and chapter 20, we see a supernatural solution for the problem of sin, which is essentially a proof for the existence of God. In the GE sketches Lonergan equates spiritual life with the supernaturalised man.<sup>390</sup> He further connects it as a “union with God – an intellectual orientation.”<sup>391</sup> The two texts are clearly related, establishing a final connection between the GE sketches and *Insight*.

## Summary

In brief summary, we have established a connection between the GE sketches and chapter 18 of *Insight*. The GE sketches provide an early sketch of chapter 18, much like the History File provides us with the earliest sketches for the elements of chapters 6, 7 and 20 of *Insight*.<sup>392</sup> The notion of ethics in chapter 18 is clearly connected to the GE sketches. They are a significant tool

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<sup>388</sup> GE sketches, 1, section 7.

<sup>389</sup> *CWL3*, 728.

<sup>390</sup> GE sketches, 2.

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>392</sup> *OLNDH*, 67-111.



for understanding Lonergan's early development and have been overlooked within the body of existing literature. At the very least, my project has established their significance and calls for further attention to the file. We have also established a connection between the GE sketches and chapters 15 and 20 of *Insight* and have noted portions of chapter 18 that do not appear in the GE sketches.

## Epilogue

The Lonergan Archive File, A13, titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs],” has been examined extensively throughout this project. My project, although focused on the preliminary function of research, has dated the sketches, corrected errors made in earlier transcriptions of the file, highlighted three distinct sketches within the file, and provided research that clears up references within the text, bringing us one step closer to interpreting the text. I suspect the text is significant in ways that we are yet to uncover. I have linked the file to portions of *Insight*, but suspect that I am only beginning to uncover the full extent of the relationship between the two texts.

At the very minimum, I hope the significance of this file to the larger body of Lonergan scholarship has been established. As we have seen in the last five chapters, the sketches relate to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan’s early work and development, Kant’s *I Fundamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi*, Lonergan’s understanding of Ethics found in chapter 18 of *Insight*, and the notion of the dialectic of history. We have also seen hints of the sketches in some of Lonergan’s other texts, such as “*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*” and “Finality, Love, Marriage.” Moving forward, a more comprehensive exploration of any of these connections would be beneficial to the existing body of knowledge on Lonergan.

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Appendix 1:  
“General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]”  
Lonergan Archive File 1300DTE030/A13

## General Ethics [Metaphysics of Customs]

1. Origin of philosophy - Buddhism, Confucius, Platonism & Neo-Platonism  
Philosophy as a way of life: Augustine amor sapientiae  
Reflective character of philosophy - life, an object of reflection

2. Spontaneous notion of happiness, ideal of imagination

### 1. Human Concerns

- health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some religion to give imagination to death.
- Aristotle puts happiness in occupation (eudaimonia) and sees death as a matter of course. Does not try to solve riddle
- Greatest happiness of the greatest number - Bentham & Utilitarians  
well-being & advance of humanity.
- Aristotelianism & answer of proletarian - i.e. more equal distribution  
of philosophy system [Kantian, good = virtue] & materialist.

3. Ecclesiastes: Human wisdom brought to support divine law.  
Pass your days in simplicity (eudaimonia)  
God's governance & ultimate judgment better for granted.

What does life give? 48 22 30 514, 15 Variety of varieties  
of Kant - impossibility of system for attainment of happiness [as concept]  
Eudaimonia - 322 517 94-80  
Incompossibility of life 817 of 41-3, 92, 3, 11, 12, 105-7  
of Socrates 20005 days "why, I do not know"  
12" words of wise man as words  
vanity of achievement 21-111 of wisdom 211-22 68  
of life wisdom [flecting etc] passion.

4. Buddha - desire an illusion i.e. escape to a  
Plato - assertion of moral law -  
negative spontaneous idea (origins) - absolute.  
Republic as critique of society

5. Moral theory - Stoic dogmas "equi naturam, rationem."  
Augustine - lex aeterna  
dehlisticis - juridical development.  
[do not forget "sentiment, analysis of justice"]

6. Progress of philosophy according to St Thomas - more to his general  
Kant's greater presence  
examination of Kant

7. Dynamic [amor sapientiae] as well as more precise foundation of ethics.  
The human act - material, formal, efficient cause. [well  
Obligation  
Finality - Good-Tone or Impulse (Nature of Freedom)  
Rationalisation (Kant's rational. dialectic)]



Man as instrument - a potency, external mover  
c. pre arranged by God  
d. Man's choice - Reason or Imagination.  
d. Social aspect.

Faith & supernatural act - Transcendent Reason.

Dialectics of history - nature, sci, superstructure.

State leads to the rallying point for lower tendency.  
Christianity - state of dialectic - Faith (Hope, Imagination) - Charity.  
Action  
[ as moral - absolute value  
as 'irresponsible' - the days of my life, shall we remember them?  
as effective - living is giving. [Reason treats all men as equal to self.]  
overshadowed by Kant  
1. Economic division of labour  
2. Family  
3. Science, art, Research & teaching  
4. Giving morally - solid imitations men

Virtues  
Wisdom - Truth known above  
Justice - Equality of all before intelligent  
Matter of law in all.

Social justice - effecting conditions that make justice possible

Temperance & fortitude - in execution  
Prudence - in application of wisdom to 1911/20  
Faith - transcendent intelligence  
Hope - the goodness of the transcendent intelligence - Our Father  
Charity - the beauty of transcendent Wisdom - the Ideal - the vision splendid  
no first illud quod tunc sitis  
ut te revelata carnis facie  
visu sui hater tuus gloriam

Motivation: Man's thing is to share the law; man is body & soul  
human nature, human at origin  
Pedagogic character of Christian motivation.

1. Reason itself  
A as reward & punishment: purgation faith  
B as love of God - no exact idea of God's rights on instrument
2. Reason - instrument
3. Gratitude - goodness of creation  
qui regit nos de potestate transhuman  
church: doctrine, hierarchy, sacraments  
4. Achievement, Advancing government: solid imitations men.  
2nd for soul - spark that leaps from example.  
Xt: way, truth, life: supernatural: done on death  
overshadowed by Kant

Spiritual life: supernaturalised man - what & how of every instant  
spontaneity of no account - replaced by others  
union with God - an intellectual orientation  
wisdom/poverty - love of God - we can do so little, we have so short a time.  
Example in regard of human element is that of God

## General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]

### 1. Happiness as an ideal of the imagination

ὁππὸς ὁπκικὸς. Economic man.

Naive realism. Reason a means for the satisfaction of impulse, desire.

Social systems: [Greater happiness of greatest number. Bentham  
Utilitarianism: state the means to his goal.

A possible interpretation of Nicomachean Ethic.

Arist. puts the end in the activity - *εὐδαιμονία*  
subordinates the external as a means to end  
a humanly necessary means. [competence, position, friends.

### 2. Negation of longing.

Buddha: desire an illusion, happiness an escape to?

Epicurus: vanity of achievement 2<sup>1-11</sup>  
wisdom 2<sup>12-26</sup> 6 | Reflection 4<sup>8</sup>

Ex. 2<sup>22</sup> "For what profit shall a man have of all his labour and vexation of spirit with which he hath been tormented under the sun?" of 3<sup>9</sup> 5<sup>14, 15</sup>  
of Kant impossibility of systematic & infallible plan for attaining an empirical end.

3<sup>22</sup> "And I have found that nothing is better than for a man to rejoice in his work: and that this is his portion." of Aristotle *εὐδαιμονία* of 5<sup>17</sup> 9<sup>4-10</sup>

11am 6.15 11.15  
4<sup>1-3</sup> "I saw the oppressors that are done under the sun, and the tears of the innocent. And they had no comfort: and they were not able to resist their violence, being destitute of help from any." And I praised the dead rather than the living.  
5 And I judged him happier than them both that is not yet born, nor hath seen the evils that are done under the sun.

4<sup>9-12</sup> Friendships.

8<sup>17</sup> Incomprehensibility of life "And I understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God that are done under the sun: and the more he shall labour to seek, so much the less shall he find: yea, though the wise man shall say that he knoweth it, he shall not be able to tell it." of 9<sup>2, 3, 11, 12</sup> 10<sup>5-7</sup>

of. Locutus of *εὐδαιμονία* *εὐδαιμονία*: why, I do not know

12<sup>4</sup> "The works of the wise men are as goods" *εὐδαιμονία* *εὐδαιμονία*

A.B. G. 2's prominence taken for granted throughout & universal judgement.

3. Assertion of Morality. [Rogian] Plato & Socrates. δύο ψυχῶν  
 a. Negation of ideal of imagination is pleasure & pain  
 b. Affirmation of the good - at any cost.  
 Social aspect - Republic - importance
4. Development of Morality - Stoicism  
 Objective dogma - σέβη κατὰ φύσιν i.e. rationalism  
 Social importance  
 ↓ philosophy, a way of life
5. Augustine: a. Beata Vita.  
 b. Idea of development - amor coelestium superius amor terrenis  
 γ. de civitate  
 ↳ Scholasticism

6. Critical examination of Kant
7. Scholastic system - Rights & duties

δύο ψυχῶν  
 7  
 1  
OVERUPSTATIONS

Giving a local habitation & a name to the dictate of reason of the  
 Scholastic - providing ethics not juridically but dynamically.

Analysis of action, notion of freedom

Man an instrument.

Dialectics of history - state tends to be colliding point for lower

Action as εργασία - occupation [intelligent] { τέχνη  
 as moral - absolute value { οικονομία  
 as affective - living is πρῶτον { δένειον of labour  
δὲ καὶ ἡθικῶς - giving morally.  
καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν

# Happiness

Impulse : ideal of the imagination - anticipation greater than  
event (am I enjoying myself) - g. Lamb (no possibility of system)

Needed a bit of reflection: one can simply drift with asking  
questions. Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting  
out of it. No doubt about desire, yearning, passion, but  
where is it all leading.

Aristotle : in an *epiphora*, some form of activity  
not in possessing something outside of self  
but in being active in a satisfying way  
Activity of *to do* *to have* roots  
Activity of moral virtues  
Man of man: fear of punishment, hope of rewards.

Buddha : desire is an illusion - away is desire.

Plato : the good : at any cost. (Gorgias)

Appendix 2:

“Notes on E. Kant - *I Fondamenti della Metaphysical  
dei Costumi*”

Lonergan Archive File 12000DTIE30 / A12

# E Kant - I Fondamenti della Metafisica dei Costumi

Trad. Giacomo Ponticorno - ed. Einaudi - Roma 1926

Via Erio, 19

Scope - to state Kant's points as theses  
to state his arguments  
to state their logical interrelation  
to state their truth and error.

Preface. Philosophy (PK) divided into Physic, Ethic, Logic.

Logic is purely formal: it is concerned with the intelligible as such.

Physic + ethic arise from the conjunction with the intelligible of two different types of content - nature or liberty

- 2 As there is a metaphysic of nature, so there is a metaphysic of liberty, of customs.
- 3 A metaphysic of customs treats of morality as such, the morality incumbent not merely on man but on all reasonable beings. Needs to be supplemented by experience, sound judgment, affectionate motives so that it penetrates to the will. Concerns only the pure form of obligation.
- 4 Morality requires more than mere conformity with moral law: it requires that the motive of this conformity be morality.

"per rispetto alla legge"

Because: morality is otherwise casual, haphazard

↳ a confusion of pure morality with empirical rules leads to error and is unphilosophic

But: ↳ supposes hypothesis false - presupposing conformity, must the motive be morality itself.

↳ is beside the point - to obtain truth or be philosophic is excellent. What has that to do with my motives?

The question of motive is a question of practical execution.

Primum est esse: in first place conformity to law  
in second place higher motive.

But practically, the higher the motive, the greater the attention effort + thoroughness of one's moral life. On the other hand, it is a very gradual process by which natural spontaneity is overcome and reflective motives dominate all thought words actions. On Kant's criterion of possible universalization the reflectiveness of "per rispetto alla legge" is not possible; hence his impossibility is empirical

N.B. there are higher motives than these

Volontà pura: una volontà unicamente determinata da principi a priori, anz' alcun momento empirico.

1. Will of will - not "volontà pura" but "volontà in generale"

Part I      Passaggio dalla conoscenza razionale comune  
alla conoscenza filosofica della morale:

9. Non si può pensare nella nel mondo - vi in generale di là da esso - che sia assolutamente buona, purché una buona volontà. *Nichtbessers als gutem, als bösem, als gutem, als bösem, als gutem, als bösem.* This being good depends upon conjunction with a good will.
10. Again, the goodness of the good will is incommensurable: it retains its value whether an external end be attained or not. Failure to attain an external good does not of itself detract from the merit of the effective effort of will.
11. If the end of man is something to be attained by man [la sua conservazione, il suo benessere, in una parola la sua felicità] nature would have moved in making not instinct but reason the means of man's disposal for attaining his end.
12. Aristotle - would better please if man were free.
13. ∴ the aim of nature is "una volontà buona in sé stessa e non una volontà buona come mezzo per conseguire altri scopi".
14. "Può darsi dunque che questa volontà non sia il bene totale di unio, ma dev'essere il bene supremo, condizione di ogni altro, come di ogni aspirazione alla felicità".
15. True that the good will is a rigorous criterion with which earthly sentimentalism is no criterion at all [cf. Iquation indifference to all in world + Thomas "bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse"] But, the Kantian expression says more than this, though his proof leads to no broader conclusion.

16. The good will is the moral good: but only in the case of the act performed solely out of a sense of duty - *per rispetto alla legge* - can we be certain of the goodness of the will - can we be certain that a man is not honest but merely because honesty is the best policy, etc. of pp 14, 15 - Therefore, the good will is the will that acts solely "*per rispetto alla legge*".

But, the good will is the will that is in conformity with the dictate of reason. It is good, whether we can know its goodness or not. Kant confesses the superhuman method of isolation with moral precept. The question whether a motive is right or wrong is a moral question and an empirical question: it has nothing to do with a metaphysics of customs. On the other hand "*per rispetto alla legge*" is the fundamental motive - the promise to all others - the only motive - that can be considered in a pure ethic. Any other motive involves with the empirical or a theory of the empirical. Catholic doctrine makes too the motive but God is a pure intelligible - it supports this motive with others but this is the practical question of p 3.

17. The Kantian contention is that the good act performed out of inclination is not formally a moral act. As a theoretical position, this is unsatisfactory: it defines moral, moral goodness.

Kant - Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals. p 3:

Duty - ① done out of duty not by inclination.

16 ② Moral worth is measured by moral principle of action and not by the end to be attained. p 18.

17 - otherwise we are moved by empirical and so not by duty.

③ Duty is the necessity of performing an action out of "per rispetto alla legge"

Hence, since no object can move the will to a moral act but only the moral law as such, it follows that the will must proceed entirely from the empirical: practically, the maxim: *osservare tutte le leggi, anche a costo di tutte le mie inclinazioni*.

19 - What is the moral law as something distinct from the result of action and the morality of such a result?

"io non devo mai agire se non a fondizione di poter volere che la mia massima divenga legge ~~per se stessa~~ universale. La semplice legalità universale è dunque ciò che serve qui di principio alla volontà --"

Truth of this is that universality is an aspect of the intelligible as such. The moral law is an intelligible; all intelligibles as such are universal; ergo, the moral law is an universal.

Verification: is lying permissible. If it ever is, it always is. But it cannot always be. Ergo.

Objection: quanta is as a general rule lying is not permissible. But do not circumstances alter cases, put a new intelligibility in things?

Is it not sufficient to universalise the complete case: *in every circumstance as such, lying is permissible.*

Similarly, for manism.

Kant is right, but why?

You have to appeal to an intrinsic significance of reason function or speech that is found in every case and under all circumstances, neither manism or lying unacceptable. ~~to~~ Kant tries to understand but his



p4 empty category has a content. It has not.

p22. ... nei bisogni e nelle inclinazioni, il cui completo soddisfacimento si chiama felicità

... una dialettica naturale, cioè una tendenza a ragionare sottilmente, anche falsamente, contro questa legge severa del dovere ...

## Parte II Passaggio dalla filosofia morale popolare alla metafisica dei costumi.

25ss. Duty a pure a priori and not a matter of experience [other example, p27]

Certainly, the moral law is not a proposition purely & simply. But it has no content at all, only the notion of universality & the like, unless the empirical element is introduced. There has to be an understanding of the function of postulates for there to be a moral law with a content of duty, 19.

28 -- non c'è bisogno di molta arte per farsi comprendere dalle masse, quando si rinuncia ad ogni profondità --

30 "Invece una morale ibrida, che si compone di impulsi derivanti dai sentimenti e dalle inclinazioni, e nello stesso tempo di concetti razionali, deve render lo spirito indeciso tra motivi che non possono mai ripetersi a nessuna principio, che solo per caso possono condurre al bene, ma più spesso al male."

Kant was not in reproachly confining the moral good to the dictate of reason but in too narrowly interpreting the dictate of reason. He does this in two ways

1° Intellect understands experience & so morality depends on experience as upon a specifying matter. The content of the moral law is intrinsically specified by experience & not externally determined by the pure notions of intelligibility. There is synthesis in the content, not merely universality in the form.

2° Good is the pure intelligible.

3° supernatural motives depend upon the transcendence of the Intelligible

4. p10 "... tutte le nozioni morali hanno la loro origine perfettamente a priori nella ragione --"

15. Kant - Fund. Metaph. Customs.

E, 7, 1 - 1779<sup>13</sup>

q. Nicom. II, 2, 5 - 1129<sup>6</sup>

131 -- la volontà non è altra cosa che la ragion pratica."

-- la volontà è quella parte che non permette di scegliere se non ciò che la ragione, indipendentemente dall'indole, riconosce come praticamente necessario o come buono. Ma se la ragione non determina sufficientemente da sé sola la volontà, se questa è inoltre sottoposta a condizioni oggettive (a determinati impulsi) che non sempre si accordano con le condizioni oggettive, in una parola, se la volontà non è in sé perfettamente conforme alla ragione (come avviene realmente tra gli uomini) le azioni riconosciute oggettivamente necessarie sono soggettivamente contingenti, e la determinazione di tale volontà, d'accordo con leggi oggettive, è costrizione; cioè il rapporto delle leggi oggettive a una volontà che non è assolutamente buona, è rappresentata [sic to be conceived] come la determinazione della volontà di un essere razionale, per mezzo di principi razionali, è vero, ma ai quali questa volontà studiata non obbedisce necessariamente per sua natura."

"la rappresentazione di un principio oggettivo, in quanto obbligatorio per la volontà, si chiama comando (della ragione); e la formula del comando imperativo"

15. Imperative is "dictate of right reason in the <sup>general</sup> concrete"

33 Imperative implies possibility of evil act: human liberty <sup>in</sup> is not a perfectio pura but it contains imperfection.

Imperatives are hypothetical or categorical.

Hypothetical regard means to an end that need not be desired; and possible actual (real).

Categorical are simply imperatives, whether we matter what we desire or wish or will.

Pre-categorical imperative follows from the nature of the will  
appetitus rationalis sequens formam intellectus.  
inclinetis naturalis sequens formam intellectus. 1/87/4c.

Hypothetical imperative

a. Problematic: end possible - practical science - mechanical acts.

35 b. Assertive: end actual (real) - happiness: as a matter of fact this end exists in all men

Categorical imperative is apodictic (34) -- non riguarda la materia dell'azione, né quel che deve risultare, ma la forma e il principio donde deriva l'azione stessa; e il suo

16.

16. carattere di bontà essenziale consiste nell'intenzione, qualunque possa essere il risultato."

- 1. regole di abilità - hypothetical or possible
- 2. consigli di prudenza - hypothetical or actual
- 3. precetti di moralità - categorical or intellectually absolute.  
→ hypothetical: amounts to means: possible or end
- 4. technical      2. pragmatic [i.e. for well-being]      3. moral

N.B. Person who desires heaven as his happiness will with consistency desire sin in his life and a death-bed repentance. The preacher's argument that you have a higher place in heaven if no sin, that you cannot be certain of a death-bed repentance, etc., is not always effective. Again, confessor's for telling this is only a venial sin: that will be taken as abatement to a general licence to commit the sin as often as you wish.

Again, what is happiness?

1. 38. Best arguments against any attempt to define happiness in terms - Not riches, learning, long life, health.

"Non si può dunque agire secondo principi determinati per essere felice, ma solo secondo consigli empirici, per esempio: la sanità, l'economia, la gentilezza, la prudenza, etc..."

∴ no commands but only counsels

∴ "il problema di determinare sicuramente ed in modo generale la condotta idonea a procurare la felicità di un essere razionale, è perfettamente insolubile..."

"la felicità non è un ideale della ragione, ma dell'immaginazione"

Yes, that is Kant's sense of happiness, but it can be an ideal of reason - i.e. attaining the end of creation

39. No a posteriori proof of categorical imperative, because we are unable to know with certainty that any act was ever performed simply "per rispetto alla legge".

Mean strive; therefore, there is something to be strived for; there is a meaning to Action; that meaning is the specified moral law.

p. 41 Agisci secondo una norma che tu possa volere  
diventi nella stessa legge universale.

Agisci come se la massima della tua azione  
dovesse, per tua volontà, diventare legge universale della  
natura.

48. The introduction of "nature" involves the empirical to  
the extent that the existence of nature is implied.  
We are no longer dealing with the pure form. Hence  
Kant is able to test "maxims" by asking could the  
maxim represent a law of nature. Now to presuppose  
a nature is to presuppose a being that has in  
itself a given intelligibility and Kant's test  
becomes simply a test of whether or not in a  
particular case we have stated the natural  
law or not. i.e. Kant presupposes the existence  
of a natural law.

This is evident from the instances Kant gives pp 42, 43.

The transition is from the pure intelligible [legge  
universale] to the applied intelligible [legge universale  
della natura].

But on p. 41 Kant says he is merely attempting  
testing whether his norm of morality is a  
premise to the applied moral law. It is not  
such a premise but only a test.

p. 44 "la cui deduzione dall'unico principio susposto  
cade sotto gli occhi

45. -- solo ci proibisce la libertà personale di fare una  
eccezione (per una volta) per noi stessi e per una  
nostra inclinazione."

Contradiction between one thing as universal law and  
another as the law for exception in my favour.

Contradiction between will as potency & will  
as determinate of person, i.e. inhibition of phenomenal  
flow.

46 "Ma non siamo riusciti ancora a dimostrare a priori che un tale imperativo esiste realmente -"

It follows from the a posteriori account of the idea of morality.

48 "ciò che serve alla volontà come principio soggettivo per determinarsi è il fine."

Distinguished: end to be attained by action  
 motive of action = intellect as law of action  
 impulse to action = mere desire

If the end is immediate, i.e. happiness below, then the action is moral & based on categorical imperative  
 If the end is not immediate but attained by something else done first, action is amoral & based on hypothetical imperative

49. Hence man & every rational creature exists as an end in itself and never merely as a means.  
 For, the action has an end in itself (conformity to law) and since the end of the action is in itself, therefore the end of the man acting is in himself.

Kant seems to lack precision. From his premise it only follows that "man acting" has within himself [i.e. not in empirical order or outside the act as such] the end of the acting. This does not involve that man is never simply a means but that no human act is never simply a means. It does not exclude the hierarchy that makes the human act a means to God, since God's end is precisely the goodness of the human act as a means to His eternal glory.

This consideration of "man acting" as an end in himself is but a partial understanding of the datum: it does not belong to the pure practical reason; the partial understanding by its incompleteness leads to confusion & possibly error - certainly to a lack of perspective.

50. "Agisci in modo da trattare l'umanità, sia nella tua persona, come in quella di ogni altro, sempre come fine, e mai semplicemente come mezzo."

:"la natura ragionevole esiste come fine in se"

The end of action is in the action itself; as much in that of others as in the case of my own. Reason seeks this absolute value indifferently for all, though there is a natural order (charity vs self or those at hand, piety vs pleasure etc.)

The criterion is valid as an understanding of human life: living is giving - above all, it is giving the moral good. Hence, the supreme "giving" is St Paul's "estote imitators mei sicut et ego xpi." for this giving is giving the spark that leaps from one soul to another and directs all thought and all effort to the eternal by its whole-hearted disregard of the world, the flesh, the devil.

52. "l'idea della volontà di ogni essere ragionevole come volontà legislatrice"

54. autonomy of will: it is a law in itself.

heteronomy of will: it is moved by an interest and the act is a means to the end. true but simplistic & so easily led to false conclusions.

56. What has a value has an equivalent; "una cosa che è al di sopra d'ogni valutazione e che non può quindi avere un equivalente, ha una dignità."

58. "L'autonomia è dunque il principio della dignità della natura umana e di ogni essere ragionevole."

61. "Leges dei fini" a word parallel to "regno della natura"

I Kant nature speaks blindly according to law  
I morality consists in constituting and executing the law

"il rispetto per una semplice idea debba servire di norma inflessibile per la volontà"

"altrimenti non potrebbe esser concepito che come l'attorciglio alla legge fisica dei suoi bisogni"

64. Autonomy of will: "is debitas pro quanta causa, perchi voglio  
un altra cosa"  
 Autonomy of will: "debbo agir così, quand'anche non voglia alcuna  
 cosa"

Opponent: if the reason of the "ought" is a "willing" "desiring"  
 the question returns: th why ought I will? desire?  
 Eventually, there must be simply an "ought" and or  
 there is no "ought" at all that merely desire with  
 consequent "oughts" that are purely hypothetical.  
 The simple "ought" the ultimate "ought" has to be  
 an "a priori" of Reason and has to be pure Reason &  
 in no way empirical.

However, the autonomy of the will is very relative.  
 The will constitutes no law otherwise: Reason  
 constitutes the law and will executes it; now,  
 it is not human reason but absolute Reason that  
 constitutes the law; human reason is merely the "praxis".  
 Kant's narrow field of consideration and his disjunction  
 autonomy vs. heteronomy lead to make the truth of the  
 matter (submission to God's law) appear plain.

As the other hand, avoid error of saying that there can be no debt obligation  
 apart from a natural theology. There is not a true & complete theory  
 of obligation apart from God, Cosmology. There is no debt  
 obligation which, understood, proves the existence of God, Nagel.

Finally: "I ought to act in this way, no matter what I  
 wish" is simply the refusal to explain. The "perchi"  
 is not the reason why I do the thing but the explanation  
 of why I ought to.

65 Kant again insists that he is not demonstrating the  
 actuality of the categorical imperative: his point is,  
 if the common notion of morality as an absolute  
 implies necessarily a categorical imperative.

p<sup>II</sup> III Panaggio della metafisica dei protinni alla critica  
della ragione primitiva pura.