Reconstituting Rural Communities and Economies: The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program,

1965 – 1970

By

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Abstract

In Newfoundland, the word ‘resettlement’ evokes strong emotions decades after the program was abandoned. Many people feel that a heartless government uprooted families who were living an idyllic lifestyle in remote communities scattered along the coast. My thesis is that households were not forced into slums by the state. Although they did not resort to violence, coastal people were not as apathetic or powerless as the literature on resettlement suggests. Although it was more coercive than the preceding provincial Centralization Plan, the notoriety of Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program (FHRP) is due, in part to the dearth of historical studies of resettlement. Historians have left the field to social scientists and the artistic community to write the narrative that laments a lost heritage. The archival record is replete with evidence that coastal people redefined the objectives of the FHRP and pressured governments to amend the Resettlement Agreement. Through appeals to church leaders, provincial and national politicians, and the media they persuaded the Fisheries Household Resettlement Committee (FHRC) to approve moves that planners considered irrational, but which made perfect sense to the relocatees. When the FHRC agreed to concentrate a large number of fishers into a receiving community with scarce resources and employment opportunities, charges of coercion were heard in the capitals where lack of planning turned relocation into a debacle.
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>ARDA</td>
<td>Agricultural Renewal and Development Act</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Archives and Special Collections</td>
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<td>CMHC</td>
<td>Central Mortgage and Housing</td>
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<td>Centre for Newfoundland Studies</td>
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<td>FHRC</td>
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<td>Fisheries Household Resettlement Program</td>
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<td>FFTA</td>
<td>Frozen Fish Trades Association</td>
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<td>FPL</td>
<td>Fishery Products Limited</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Fishermen’s Protective Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISER</td>
<td>Institute for Social and Economic Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHA</td>
<td>Member of the House of Assembly</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFEL</td>
<td>Newfoundland Association of Fish Exporters Ltd.</td>
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<td>NFDA</td>
<td>Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority</td>
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<td>NFF</td>
<td>Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen</td>
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<td>NFFAWU</td>
<td>Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied Workers Union</td>
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<td>NFTA</td>
<td>Newfoundland Fish Trades Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLHC</td>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador Housing Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANL</td>
<td>Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
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<td>RDO</td>
<td>Rural Development Officer</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In its first two decades as a province of Canada Newfoundland experienced a social, cultural and economic revolution that threw into question a century old way of life. Premier Joseph Smallwood in a rush to modernize the province told fishermen to burn their boats and flakes. Alleging that Newfoundland must develop or perish, Smallwood embarked on a modernization program to raise consumption closer to the standard enjoyed by North Americans. The rapidity of cultural and economic change created concerns among scholars at Memorial University.¹ Historian and university president, Leslie Harris, asserted that changes which had occurred over the space of decades in other provinces were being crammed into years.² Academics were concerned that the distinctive elements of Newfoundland culture would soon disappear.

The majority of the rural population accepted Smallwood’s promise that union with Canada would mean an end to poverty. Many had been awakened to the benefits of industrial employment during World War II. Between 1945 and 1953 nearly 50 communities relocated voluntarily. David Damas draws a distinction between two types of resettled communities on the basis of the processes by which communities come to be resettled. One process, termed migration, occurs without intervention of external agencies while the second process involves planned movement of communities and individuals to a destination determined by outside agents.³

² Webb, Observing the Outports, 200.
In the case of the Newfoundland centralization programs the two processes were combined. Some resettled without intervention by an outside agency while others were relocated to a destination determined by the state. In Newfoundland migrations have had a long history but rural to urban migrations have proceeded at a slower pace than in most Western states due to dependence on a staple resource. The construction of the railway, development of mines and paper mills along with military base construction drew people from coastal settlements. In the post- World War Two era the pace of migration speeded up when thousands left the shore fishery to build roads, hospitals, schools, as well as to work in the small-scale manufacturing industries established in the 1950s. For rural communities Confederation represented a chance to escape the poverty trap through a combination of wage labour and social welfare benefits that they were entitled to as Canadians. They sought escape from the pluralistic peasant economy which was remarkably similar to a Himalayan peasant village.4

Domestic commodity production everywhere requires the equal participation of women. In Rock Harbour, and hundreds of other coastal communities, families engaged in a variety of market and non-market activities. Gender roles were fairly well defined but did not always conform to socially constructed definitions of femininity. Males and females performed the back-breaking work of “making” fish, but women, believed to be “Jonahs,” never fished. Fishing was a masculine activity. Just as in Kumaun, a northern Indian village, men prepared the soil while women planted and weeded gardens and took care of the cattle. Men cut the hay and firewood, caught the fish and occasionally worked

outside the community while women stoked the stove, cooked and cared for children. Women sheared the sheep, spun yarn and made clothing for the family. During the 1950s the economy underwent significant change when families abandoned the fish flakes and sold their fish green to companies with artificial dryers or delivered it in a fresh state to fish plants. Household production declined further when cheap duty-free produce entered the province after Confederation.

The demand for modern services also intensified when the pro-confederates raised expectations. I watched as one inshore fishing village welcomed roads, electricity, telephone and telecommunications, and the opportunity to trade a risky enterprise for the security of wage labour. In the 1960s most Rock Harbour households gave up the shore fishery when governments built a shipyard and a fresh/frozen fish plant in Marystown. The construction boom, and concomitant employment propelled the region into a modern age wherein automobiles replaced horses and boats as a means of transport while telephones and television reduced the desire to gather in public and private places for socialization and exchange of information. Even the architectural landscape underwent change. When people accepted the bungalow as a symbol of modernity, owners of two-story houses cut off the second story. Within homes parlours previously set aside for the repose of the dead became living rooms furnished with chesterfields and appliances bought on the installment plan. The new oil stoves ended the practice of putting the fire out before going to bed, and families no longer broke the ice in chamber pots and water buckets on winter mornings.

I bring to this work a personal knowledge of the traditional fishery and the experience working in fresh fish processing plants at Fortune, Marystown and Trepassey.
I was born in 1948 at Rock Harbour, a Placentia Bay settlement of 135 persons. Until 1955 transportation was by water or cart road. The nearest doctor was ten miles away. One of my earliest memories is of my mother, who was haemorrhaging badly, being lowered into a trapskiff for transport to the Burin Cottage Hospital via Marystown. The outport economy, which had changed little in a hundred years, underwent a radical transformation in the space of a decade. The fishery continued to be the economic mainstay of outports but family allowances, old age pensions, and unemployment insurance benefits softened the blow of a bad season. Social welfare also reduced the length of the fishing season to the caplin scull in many outports. When caplin struck off fishers took up codtraps and the commercial fishing season concluded mid-August. The social safety net contributed to the decline of fishing incomes which made it easier for policymakers to present resettlement as a rescue mission.

One of the criticisms of the traditional fishery is that it allowed male heads to exploit the labour of his wife and children. From age of eleven I earned a small share of the catch by placing fish on the splitting table, a common job for the sons of trap-skippers. However my parents made it clear that my main job was to go to the one-room school to qualify for a white-collar job. Very few of my generation entered the fishery, an occupation with irregular hours and income. Most graduates became teachers or nurses and chose to live in more urban centres. School curricula awakened pupils to new possibilities and opportunities to move out of isolation and escape the industry that kept families and regions poor.

The Canadian government became interested in addressing the problem of rural poverty during the Great Depression, but did not introduce the first regional development program until the 1960s. All Newfoundland premiers, from Smallwood onwards, have consistently argued that the federal government has an obligation to introduce programs to improve incomes and services of the poorer regions.⁶ Canada’s regional development policy-makers were influenced by the works of French economists Francois Perroux and J. R. Boudeville who investigated causes of regional disparities in France.⁷ Perroux theorized that economic development tends to concentrate around certain growth poles or centres. He suggested ‘growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it reveals itself in certain growth points or poles, with different degrees of intensity, [and] spreads through diverse channels.’⁸ Development experts in the Canadian government accepted growth pole theory as a strategy for eliminating poverty in slow-growth regions of the country. They accepted as truth the concept that industries located in an urban area would induce further development of economic activity throughout its zone of influence.⁹

Growth pole theory provided a framework for economic development programs that aimed to eradicate rural poverty in northeastern New Brunswick, the Gaspe Peninsula, and rural Newfoundland. Rural development planners advocated a multidimensional approach that included improvements in water and sewerage systems, educational facilities, and productivity in agriculture and fisheries. When they concluded

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the labour force was out of balance the bureaucrats accepted resettlement as the appropriate remedy. Fisheries commissions accorded low productivity to low technology and a surplus of fishers in the inshore sector and recommended centralization of the population and modernization of the fishing industry. Smallwood introduced a modest resettlement plan 1953 to little effect and in 1965 Newfoundland and Canada entered into an agreement to modernize and rationalize the fishery by moving people from small outports to growth poles.

In Newfoundland, the word ‘resettlement’ evokes strong emotional sentiments decades after the program was abandoned. Many people feel that a heartless government uprooted families and interrupted an idyllic lifestyle. How did the myth of a cold-hearted state corralling people in poor neighbourhoods become part of our historical narrative? Jerry Bannister proposes that to understand the origins of this narrative we need to consider the use (and misuse) of history.\(^\text{10}\) Bannister suggests that the arts community created a body of nostalgic literature that resurrected old narratives of conflict and persecution and ignored the contemporary revisionist literature. Songs and plays on the theme of uprooted people remain popular. Harold Horwood, Ray Guy and Farley Mowat produced works that mourned the loss of Newfoundland’s distinctive way of life. In their narrative powerless outport people were shuffled about by agents of the state. Sociologists and anthropologists focussed on qualitative issues, and they too painted a romantic picture of a folk society. Newfoundland history texts introduced a whole generation of school children to fishing admirals and naval governors who forced settlers

\(^{10}\) Jerry Bannister, “Making History: Cultural Memory in Twentieth Century Newfoundland”, *Newfoundland Studies*, no.18, v. 2 (2002): 175-190, 175.
into coves where he battled nature and built a home on forbidden ground. Nationalists considered Confederation itself to be a threat to our distinctive culture. Bannister, quoting Sandra Gwen, wrote: “The old order that produced all of us is being smashed and homogenized, and trivialized out of existence.”

Memorial University’s orator, Shane O’Dea, introduced Parzival Copes as the chief apologist for resettlement and the man who had tried to destroy Newfoundland’s cultural soul.

A mostly urban-based cultural elite constructed a narrative in which powerful bureaucrats and politicians imposed a ruthless resettlement program on a population that were so marginalized they could not resist. My thesis challenges the narrative that the state forced impotent subjects to move from pristine locales to growth centres. The evidence does not support the narrative of persecution and displacement. Men, women and children were actors in the process. Contrary to popular belief women did not always support community evacuations. A close examination of archival documents reveals that some women actively protested against resettlement and influenced outcomes.

In most cases there was no form of local government to act as a buffer between the state and the community. In unincorporated settlements agents of the state consulted with the local power structure and left without holding a public meeting to explain the

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13 Alex Hickman, MHA for Burin District in the 1960s, informed the author spring 2013 that Lottie Senior was a major force in the Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour move. Her name does not appear on any of the archival documents I examined but she did appear in an episode of Land and Sea, a popular local CBC production.
14 Stewart Fyfe, A Review of local Government in Newfoundland: A Report to the Minister Of Municipal Affairs (St. John’s: Institute of Local Government, 1966), 3. Out of a total of 1,200 communities in 1966 there were two cities, 62 towns, 4 rural districts, 10 local improvement districts, and 72 incorporated communities.
program. Although few communities were incorporated in the 1960s many coastal people had some experience running organizations. They ran co-operatives and local roads committees, organized locals of the Fishermen’s Protective Union and locals of the Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen. Through church-related sororities and fraternities women and men acquired skills to run meetings and participate in political discourse. Construction and administration of lodges, churches, schools, and union halls are examples of coastal people working co-operatively to build a better community. The Amulree Report proclaimed the majority of Newfoundlanders were unfit to participate in public life and their dependent nature rendered them incapable of self-help. Lord Amulree’s comments influenced Newfoundland historiography the rest of the century.

Despite the Report’s slanderous judgement of the Newfoundland character, the people demonstrated they were capable of taking collective action against a state-sponsored migrations. They engaged in resistance activities which anthropologist James Scott called “weapons of the weak.” Both Scott and sociologist Ramachandra Guha claimed peasant protestors in remote northern India and Malaysia made effective use of non-violent forms of resistance. Marginal groups rarely engage in violent uprisings and when they do resort to violence it usually precipitates a violent reaction from the state.

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The Newfoundland loggers strike in 1959 is a local example of an underclass of workers confronting a multi-national company supported by the state. Smallwood used the power of his office, a ruthless propaganda campaign and the police to crush the strike and outlaw the loggers’ union. Scott argues that everyday resistance strategies such as foot dragging and evasion do not make news headlines but when repeated thousands of times they become an effective weapon. When angry residents of Rencontre East greeted the Director of Resettlement as he got off the boat they chose not to throw him overboard, but today a defiant message greets travellers: “Welcome to Rencontre East. Isolated and Proud of It.” A row of neat stages lines the beach and out in the harbour farmed salmon breach in a cage.

The history of resettlement is not a violent one. Communities opted to write letters, circulate petitions, enlist the aid of local elites, send delegations to the capital, and threaten to vote against the Liberal Party. Few communities publicly proclaimed their intention to stay and the paucity of such headline-grabbing activity reinforced the trope of victimization. But unlike the blacks of Africville whom Jennifer Nelson contended were so marginalized that they lacked the means to protest, residents of the outports engaged in political and civil protest to reign in overzealous civil servants and MHAs. The Department of Fisheries adopted a more restrained approach than was in vogue when the Parks Branch expelled the Ojibway from Rocky Mountain National Park, Manitoba. Nor was the FHRP as coercive as the relocation of northern Quebec Inuit into the high

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Historian Tina Loo contends that all relocations are traumatic since trauma originates from being asked to turn away from all the familiar physical landmarks and pattern of life. Development consultant Donald Savoie argues that cultures exist in spaces and that environments play a crucial role in forming cultural identity. He advised economic planners to be sensitive to people’s attachment to place and their desire to live and work in familiar spaces. Among the pull factors Savoie identified are:

- Family, friends, institutions, landscapes, climates, a general sense of belonging and of knowing how to behave in a particular society - these exercise a strong pull on most people. And this pull means that mobility could never be costless, instantaneous, and painless even if transport were free, and if churches, houses, hospitals, schools could be transported, instantaneously and costlessly, along with the people.

In the case of Newfoundland Household Resettlement planners left it up to the people to remove churches, schools, halls and other public property. The relocatees attempted to prevent previous knowledge, training and experience from becoming useless by relocating to familiar spaces and by returning seasonally to the old community to fish familiar grounds. But cultural and physical environments could not be transported and social connections could not be reestablished in another place.

The shortage of employment in reception centres ensured that many resettled harbours would be occupied during the fishing season. The shore fishery remained the

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occupation of last resort. Even in the fisheries growth centres the fish processors needed the inshore fish to create full-time work and to maximize profits. Fish plant managers realized that the inshore sector could produce a higher quality product at less cost than trawlers could supply. Plant managers welcomed inshore fishers. One suggested that the governments should outfit them with longliners to allow them to return to the old grounds to recover a lost resource. These events indicate that while companies needed more plant workers and crewmembers, they also recognized the value of preserving the inshore fishery.

Knowledge that their production was valued gave relocatees the power to resist and control the migration, sometimes to the detriment of all. When fishers convinced the Committee to assist moves to neighbouring fishing communities, the newcomers overtaxed resources and infrastructure in the receiving centre. The attempt to implement the program without a clear statement of goals gave relocatees room to manipulate the process. Stratford Canning contended that confusion surrounding the goals of the program created much speculation on policy objectives and empowered the community. Economists A. L. Robb and R. E. Robb considered the absence of a comprehensive study prior to implementation of the FHRP problematic. They reckoned moves bordered on irrational when the value of real estate in the sending community outweighed the assets of the reception centre. Their study confirmed that some moves only made economic sense if they negated the building a road. The Robbs reported that the absence of rational

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25 The vice-president of Fishery Products, and the managers of Booth Fisheries and BC Packers recognized the importance of the inshore catch to their firms.
criteria for designating growth centres gave relocatees the luxury to resettle in a place that they considered a *nice* place to live. By the end of the joint resettlement program the Resettlement Committee had assisted moves to 321 centres.

There were three phases of resettlement. The first was the provincial Centralization Plan which remained in effect from 1953 til the second phase came on stream in 1965. This program subsidized moves from one inshore fishing community to another with minimal change to the economy. Historian Jeff Webb attributed the provincial centralization plan to Smallwood’s drive to modernize and his intense desire for progress. But in Ottawa rural development planners considered it to be a welfare program and refused to get involved. The second phase, the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program, was the most interventionist, in that it aimed to direct settlers into designated growth poles. The third phase came into play just as the outcry against resettlement peaked. The new Resettlement Agreement was administered by the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) and Newfoundland’s Department of Community and Social Development (C&SD). Historian Raymond Blake regarded the joint programs “exemplary example [s] of co-operative federalism.”

The concept was acceptable but mismanagement turned the FHRP into a political liability. The Resettlement Committee, with the approval of cabinet ministers, approved community evacuations at a pace that created housing, education and unemployment crises. Resettlement became a political liability for the Smallwood regime when the Progressive Conservative Party attacked it during the 1971 election. Two years into his

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27 Webb, *Observing the Outports*, 278.
mandate. Premier Frank Moores announced an end to community evacuations and Don Jamieson, Minister of DREE and MP for Burin Burgeo, reported that Ottawa would assist individual moves from non-petitioning communities.\textsuperscript{30} In a St John’s Rotary Club address Jamieson announced that the federal government was considering the possibility of improving fishing facilities in evacuated outports.\textsuperscript{31}

My dissertation focusses on the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program for several reasons. Firstly the FHRP was the most successful in terms of the number of communities and persons relocated, but it was mismanaged. The large number of government departments and agencies, which sometimes had opposing agendas, made it a difficult program to manage. The FHRC was unable to control the pace of resettlement or direct households into growth centres with opportunities for employment and more modern amenities. Consequently people often did not move to improved circumstances. Many of the problems can be traced to the rush to resettle communities. By proceeding before relocatees received sufficient information to understand their obligations and responsibilities and by allowing political pressure groups to interfere in the selection of growth centres, the goal of moving people from isolation and poverty into urban centres of employment was undermined. Subsequently relocatees often felt worse off and more socially isolated than they had been in the old community. Secondly, the archival record includes official reports and correspondence, but most of all resounds with voices from

\textsuperscript{31}Donald Jamieson, “Notes From an Address by Don Jamieson, Minister of DREE, at a meeting of Rotary Club, in Conjunction with Business Week Activities at MUN” (St. John’s, 1973), 17-18. A. G. Stacey Collection, Binder “O,” #74, Archives and Special Collections (ASC), Memorial University.
the outports as they protested moves, requested modern services, and sought clarification of their status. Thirdly, the negative publicity generated by cultural groups, the media and politicians turned resettlement into an emotionally charged national debate that culminated in the abolition of community evacuations.

While critics of FHRP condemned Smallwood for destroying a traditional way of life, historians David Alexander and Shannon Ryan contended the decline of the inshore fishery can be traced to the nineteenth century. Several enquiries into the fishery convinced governments that only an industrial approach to fisheries development could improve productivity of fishers and alleviate rural poverty.  

32 The Amulree Report (1933)33 and the Kent Commission (1937)34 focussed on creating an orderly marketing regime and enhancing the reputation of salt fish but Kent favoured expansion of the deep-sea banks fishery.35 But until 1934 the Commission government merely tinkered with improving standards of grading and marketing of salt cod. An important policy shift occurred during the war when sales of fresh/frozen fish to Europe and the UK increased rapidly. In 1944 Commissioner of Natural Resources P. D. H. Dunn announced a fisheries reconstruction plan that favoured expansion of the corporate fishery. He informed his radio audience that the Commission planned to extend loans and subsidies


to fresh fish companies supplying frozen fish products to North American markets.\textsuperscript{36} Post-war fisheries committees concluded that the frozen fishery should be developed to the fullest possible extent with utmost haste by transferring labour from inefficient traditional inshore activities.\textsuperscript{37}

Sociologist J. Douglas House reported that fisheries economics was informed by three fundamental assumptions:

Firstly, the fishery must be conducted in the most rational and productive manner possible; secondly, these measures can be best achieved by organizing the fishery on the model of other viable resource and manufacturing industries; and thirdly, the exploitation and development of the common property resource required government oversight and intervention.\textsuperscript{38}

House disagreed with fisheries economists who proposed the fishery could be best organized on a model of other viable resource and manufacturing industries. The lack of alternate employment for displaced households made the industrial modernization model inappropriate for the Newfoundland fishery. House challenged the model of development endorsed by Dunn, Bates, post-war fisheries committees, the Walsh Commission, the South Coast Commission, and the Pushie Commission.

The Walsh Committee produced a very gendered report. It claimed the shore fishery could not alleviate rural poverty even when it exploited women and children who could be more suitably employed at home and school. The Committee suggested the traditional fishery interfered with a woman’s role as homemaker and nurturer and

\textsuperscript{36}P. D. H. Dunn, “Fisheries Reorganization in Newfoundland” (Radio Address, 21 January 1944), Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{37}See Alexander, \textit{Decay of Trade}, 8.
disrupted children’s education.\textsuperscript{39} In the industrial model the male breadwinner would work for wages while women, freed from the flake, could concentrate on non-market activities. Similarly, male plant managers and union leaders restricted female employees to positions that they defined as unskilled. Modernists promoted education programs in which women were not encouraged to enrol. They were discouraged from enrolling in technical courses. Middle-class ideals of masculinity reserved science and technology courses for male breadwinners and confined women to home economics courses to prepare them for the role of homemaker and consumer. The Walsh Report connected fisheries modernization to a realignment of gender roles and transfer of production from family units to factories wherein \textit{skilled} workers were male.\textsuperscript{40} Modernist planners, who alleged female workers were exploited in the traditional fishery, were willing to condone exploitation of women by male factory managers and union leaders who concocted gendered definitions of skilled and unskilled work and negotiated rates of pay accordingly. Filleting, a masculine task, was deemed to be more skilled than packaging fillets, which was a feminine activity.


Anthropologist Reade Davis declared that “the same high-modernist ideology that fuelled the international development movement was at the heart of efforts to transform Newfoundland’s environment, economy, society and culture during the twentieth century.”  

Evoking Scott, Davis argues that high-modernists had an unshakable faith in science, technology and planning to put rural societies on the road to modernity. Although Scott’s analysis of high modernism is limited to projects undertaken in authoritarian states, elements of high modernist ideology informed Smallwood’s modernization schemes. For 23 years Newfoundland was essentially a one-party state controlled by a populist leader who equated industrialization with progress. Smallwood, like other proponents of resettlement around the world, framed modernization and mobility programs in the discourse of orderly development and social services such as provision of health clinics, sanitation, adequate housing, education, clean water, and infrastructure.  

Education was an important component of the modernist agenda and the curriculum reinforced the notion that urban life was superior to rural and thereby stimulated rural to urban migrations. School texts associated rural lifestyles with poverty, ignorance, and backwardness while urban lifestyles were connected to progress and sophistication.  

Fisheries reports decried the ignorance and poverty in coastal Newfoundland and produced statistics to support the efficacy of transferring fishers from small open boats to

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decked vessels. Sinclair proffered that fisheries investigations from the Walsh Committee to the Atlantic Salt Fish Commission (1964) created an impression that Newfoundland would be better off if the salt fishery disappeared entirely.\textsuperscript{44} Reports downplayed the low wages of plant workers, the dangers of deep-sea fishing and exaggerated the profitability of producing fresh fish for US markets. The South Coast Commission Report (1957) recommended eliminating facilities and withdrawing services from unviable outports. The appointment signalled Smallwood’s faith in co-operative development had faltered and his commitment to the industrial model had been strengthened by the South Coast Commission. Secondly, the Premier appointed an interdepartmental committee to identify outports that were in decline. Shortly thereafter he announced that the pace of community evacuations must be increased. In 1958 he doubled household resettlement grants to encourage householders to move.

While fisheries commissions touted the benefits of industrialization and the province poured millions of dollars into new technologies of harvesting and processing, the corporate fishery continued to struggle. Meanwhile the traditional fishery was suffering from neglect. By the time the governments provided bounties and loans for the purchase of more efficient gear the resource was in decline due to overfishing by the offshore fleets that frequently trespassed into inshore fishing zones. Average per capita landings fell and incomes remained stagnant despite increased prices.\textsuperscript{45} The build-up of

\textsuperscript{44}Sinclair, \textit{State Intervention}, 50-1.
national trawler fleets and increase in factory freezer trawlers eroded stocks, demoralized inshore harvesters and increased dependence. Wright contended that planners ignored the correlation between the build-up of offshore fleets and decline of the inshore fishery.\textsuperscript{46}

In the 1950s and 1960s fisheries economists in both capitals advocated a policy of development based on growth pole theory. Provincial economist Robert Wells, who wrote a report on resettlement, asserted that the raison d’être for many communities had disappeared, and that unless the fishery incorporated the results of applied scientific research the industry the outports dependent upon the traditional fishery, would remain marginal.\textsuperscript{47} Gordon Bradley, Newfoundland’s first federal cabinet minister, informed the Walsh Committee that the problem of the fishery could only be resolved by scientists and engineers in the laboratory.\textsuperscript{48}

Development experts believed that state intervention was necessary to break the cycle of illiteracy and economic dependence.\textsuperscript{49} By 1965 Canada was funding a number of regional development programs that were intended to improve productivity in rural areas. In 1957 Diefenbaker introduced the first equalization program to help slow-growth regions to attain more equitable services and standard of living. To reduce unemployment and rural poverty the federal government began to provide incentives to private companies to relocate to less developed regions. In 1961 Parliament passed the

\textsuperscript{46} Miriam Wright, “Newfoundland and Canada,” PhD thesis, Memorial University, 1997, 98.
\textsuperscript{47} Robert Wells to Smallwood, 22 July, 1958. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Col 075, File 3.10.078, Archives and Special Collections, Memorial University. See also Robert Wells, \textit{Report on Resettlement in Newfoundland} (St. John’s: Queen’s Printer, 1960).
\textsuperscript{48} Raymond Blake, \textit{Canadians At Last} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 166.
\textsuperscript{49} Ralph Matthews, \textit{The Creation of Dependence}, 19. See also Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}, 5 -7.
Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA) to rationalize agriculture by consolidating family farms and introducing new methods of production. ARDA aimed to improve productivity in rural regions through research, development of water and soil resources and promotion of employment programs. This initiative was followed by Area Development and Initiatives Act (ADIA) and the Area Development Agency (ADA), legislation that gave the Minister of Industry license to assist private industry initiatives in the poorer regions. ARDA and ADIA focussed on economic development within the poorer regions but in the mid-1960s the emphasis switched to reducing the numbers employed in domestic commodity production and training displaced workers for factory work in urban Canada. The Fund For Rural Economic Development (FRED) signalled an ideological shift in rural development policy. FRED provided funding for residents of the Gaspe Peninsula, north-eastern New Brunswick, all of Prince Edward Island and the Interlake region of Manitoba to settle in areas with expanding economies.\(^{50}\) FRED encouraged males to train for jobs in factories in urban centres.\(^{51}\) The creators of the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement applied the same ideology to fisheries development in Newfoundland.

In the spirit of co-operative federalism Canada agreed to pay two-thirds of the cost of relocating 80,000 people into designated growth centres. The Resettlement Committee started to compile a blacklist of communities, but then decided it was not advisable. The stated economic goal of the FHRP was to relocate people from communities in decline “to other communities more favoured within the province in

\(^{50}\) See Savoie, *Regional Economic Development*, 26-30.
\(^{51}\) Ralph Matthews, “There’s No Better Place than Here:” *Social Change in Three Newfoundland Communities* (Toronto: Peter Martin and Associates, 1976), 123.
terms of social services and modern amenities.”52 Smallwood’s refusal to assist extra-provincial migration contributed to the employment crisis in the reception centres. Like so many other economic development projects, the FHRP was weakened by inadequate planning. The settlement proceeded without any comprehensive sociological or anthropological studies of the outports or the designated growth centres. Reacting to the program, Herbert Pottle, a former provincial cabinet minister, described it as “planning gone mad and only justifiable during a time of national crisis.”53 From the outset the Resettlement Committee was on the defensive. Over the life of the Agreement criticism solidified and designated outports began to demand the right to move to a reception centre of their choice or stay put.

A variety of events led to community evacuations. In the 1957-65 period fishing incomes were static while the numbers of inshore fishers increased by thousands due to a decline in the construction industry and the extension unemployment insurance benefits to independent male fishers.54 It was easy to conclude that there were too many fishers and fishing communities. Decline of the rural economy was not always fisheries related. Subsistence activities declined when family allowances and other social welfare benefits boosted household disposable income. Mechanization of the logging industry and decline of the seal fishery decreased earnings and increased dependence on social welfare programs. Perhaps the greatest push factor was the development of a negative attitude

52 The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement enacted by the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada, 16 July 1965. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, File 1.05.001, January to June, 1965, ASC, MUN
53 Herbert Pottle, Newfoundland, Dawn Without Light (St. John’s: Breakwater, 1979), 156.
54
towards fishing as a career choice for high school graduates. They were the cohort that could have been trained as professional fishers. Parents discouraged their offspring from entering the fishery and with no alternate employment available the young generation moved away. The closure of the federal experimental fish drying stations signified Ottawa was not interested in reviving the salt fish trade. With Canada’s share of the Atlantic offshore catch declining Prime Minister Lester Pearson decided to expand and modernize the Canadian fishing fleet and show the flag.

Fisheries economists calculated that offshore trawlermen were 10 times more productive than inshore fishers and that their earnings were six times greater. Furthermore each offshore fisher would create three to four workers on shore.55 While the aim of the FHRP was to expand the industrial fishery, government support for the inshore sector continued. Continuation of subsidies for small craft and price supports in the form of unemployment insurance created ambiguity about the goals of the resettlement program. On the one hand the governments hoped to move fishers into the offshore industrial fisheries bases but on the other offered them incentives to stay in the traditional fishery. For instance, the unemployment insurance regulations favoured fishers who continued to salt cod and penalized the shore fishers who sold their product in a fresh unprocessed state. These kinds of ambiguities and contradictions in fisheries policy made the resettlement program less effective than it could have been.

The belief that Smallwood forced families out of the outports was entrenched by 1970. Matthews contended that panic-stricken people took on a herd mentality when press releases were followed-up by visits from the director of resettlement. He attributed the panic to lack of counselling but agreed with Copes that a more visible official presence would have left governments more susceptible to charges of coercion. Matthews reported that no social researcher found any member of a dispersed community who admitted to having moved voluntarily. Post mistresses, wharfingers, clerks, power engineers, and merchants felt aggrieved. Historian Miriam Wright argued that the FHRP was a highly engineered program in which planners compiled lists of communities and sent officials out to encourage people to leave. The resettlement grants, which were as much as three times higher than fishing incomes, were an inducement. Ken Harnum visited nearly every community in the province in 1966 leaving behind applications and petitions with the male power structure.

My thesis argues that the degree of resistance to resettlement was determined by the social vitality of a community, the industriousness of the population, the amount of capital invested in the fishery, the attitude of community leaders, and the existence or absence of local government. I subscribe to the hypothesis that coastal men and women exercised much greater control over their lives than has been heretofore recognized. The literature on resettlement has generally assumed that women encouraged husbands to leave for the sake of the children. The archival record contradicts the widely held belief

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57 This debate is taking place today in Little Bay Islands. Those who want to stay fear they will be left without electricity, water, roads or a ferry.
that wives led the exodus from the outports. Wives sometimes convinced husbands to stay. Women who ran businesses, managed post offices and taught school were often unwilling to abandon careers. Though mostly male signatures appear on resettlement petitions, a widow’s vote could be decisive. The patriarchal notion that the old hen was sure to follow the old rooster was challenged.59

Many have questioned the benefits of resettlement. Pottle claimed government left self-help and social capital, such as local group support, off the balance sheet, downplayed the viability of rural communities and exaggerated the absorptive capacity of growth centres.60 A. L. Robb and R. E. Robb, who conducted a cost-benefit analysis of resettlement, calculated it would take decades for some households to recoup losses.61 The cost of supporting a dependent family in a rural community was less than supporting a welfare dependent family in an urban centre.62 Anthropologist Ottar Brox declared that welfare payments could outweigh the cost of bringing services to the outports and advocated a more decentralized approach to fisheries development.63 Storrs McCall suggested that if planners had concentrated more on quality of life issues than savings on services, they would have proposed more “stay options.”64 Pottle accused government of

60 Pottle, Newfoundland, Dawn Without Light, 66.
62 Storrs McCall, “Quality of Life in Concrete Situations,” 16-17.
64 Storrs McCall, Quality of Life (Montreal: McGill University, 1975), 16-17.
placing policy ahead of people, and of using resettlers as fuel to stoke the industrial vision.  

Pressure to resettle came from several sources. It arose when government refused to repair harbour facilities, when petitions were circulated several times, when bureaucrats suggested changes to community boundaries in order to gerrymander the vote, and when overzealous officials exaggerated the benefits of moving. Pressure came from priests wishing to consolidate parishes and from announcements by teachers, nurses and merchants that they were leaving. It also came from neighbours and kin who had already moved or planned to relocate. It also came from a desire to reunite with family. For those who worked outside the community it could mean a shorter commute. Many seized the opportunity to move to better services.

Resettlement planners in Newfoundland were as familiar with growth pole and modernization theory as development experts in other Western nations. In the post-war era states embraced them as blueprints for transforming peasant societies by altering attitudes and awakening within the people a desire for “the good life,” which governments of welfare states believed was possible for all citizens. Historian Tina Loo contended that most provinces and the federal government invested in capitalist mega projects with the understanding that massive projects like Churchill Falls could improve the quality of life for everyone. Such models of modernization required rural people to cast off a belief system founded on “traditions, superstitions, fatalism or emotions,” and

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66 Tina Loo, “We Was Drove,” *Canada’s History*, (August-September 2013), 26-33.
to replace them with a more civilized outlook “dominated by reason, an appreciation of efficiency and the ability to explain the world scientifically.” Western leaders had a faith in capitalism and applied science to produce a better world for all. President Harry Truman professed that through the systematic transfer of scientific knowledge, technology, and capital the West had the ability to eliminate the ignorance, hunger, disease and poverty. Development experts envisioned modernization as a process that required social, psychological, economic, cultural, and even biological changes. Modernizing was “a multi-faceted process that had the power to change human thought and activity.” Education was the key to modernity, but middle-class ideals of femininity and masculinity excluded women from the technical trades.

Western development specialists aimed to replicate in slow-growth regions a process of development that included “industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and widespread adoption of modern education and cultural values.” Roberts and Hite suggested the modernizers’ credo was “borrow, import, imitate and rationalize.” W. W. Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth* solidified modernists’ faith that primitive economies could

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72 Roberts and Hite, eds., *From Modernization to Globalization*, 9.
be transformed by injections of capital and applications of science, and technology. Development experts, convened by the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, reported underdeveloped societies needed to go through a painful metamorphosis that required “[dismantling] old social institutions, bonds of race and creed, and leav[ing] behind those who cannot keep up with the pace of progress.” In Newfoundland, older people, who found it hard to adjust to life in a growth centre, believed administrators of the FHRP sacrificed their well-being to improve the lot of the next generation.

Arturo Escobar professed that progress exacted too high a price when it involved suppression of culture, identity, and history. He suggested that the modernist dream of progress and development became a nightmare of indebtedness, exploitation and impoverishment. Scott contended that modernists, who saw a symbiotic relationship between progress, industrialization and urbanization, had a misplaced faith in science and technology to improve “backward” societies. The American defeat in Vietnam and the collapse of northern cod stocks raised doubts about the ability of capitalism, science and technology to create a good life for all. The decimation of the northern cod caused fisheries managers to create an inclusive management regime that incorporated data collected by sentinel fishers. The mismanagement of staple resources undermined the rural economy thereby increasing dependency and pressure to migrate. Multinational companies destroyed ecological diversity, depleted resources, and limited local access.

75Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 5.
Researchers contend that there is a correlation between the increase in deep-sea fishing and decline of the inshore cod fishery especially in the 1960s after the capitalist fishery depleted haddock stocks. Canada and Newfoundland responded by subsidizing the harvesting and processing operations of transnational food companies like Booth Fisheries, British Columbia Packers, Atlantic Sugar Refining, Ross Steers, Unilever, and National Sea Products. Despite the huge public investments in the offshore sector, including the Marystown shipyard, employment in the inshore fishery remained near the 1949 level in 1966.

Fear of mass emigration to the mainland provinces motivated Smallwood to issue a manifesto: “We must develop or perish. We must develop or our people will go in the thousands to other parts of Canada. We must create new jobs ... Develop, develop, develop, that’s been my slogan and that will remain my slogan.”

He appointed Alfred Valdmanis, a Latvian with connections to German industrialists, to take charge of economic development. Most of the small-scale manufacturing failed, but Smallwood was not one to commiserate over setbacks. His faith in capital and technology generated wealth intensified over time. In the 1960s he turned to energy megaprojects as a strategy for attracting industry to growth poles.

Architect Robert Mellin postulated that Smallwood’s interest in progress is present in the modern design of public buildings in St. John’s and it “reinforce[s] a

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perception that the town [is] superior to the outport.”\textsuperscript{78} The Premier equated modern architecture with progress, and by extension, considered the stage and fish flake to be symbols of regression and the antithesis of modernity. Mellin believed that Smallwood’s enthusiasm for modern architecture arose from acceptance of a post-war modernist vision which was based on a “profound confidence in the power of institutions - political, cultural, and architectural - to create systems that could change lives for the better.”\textsuperscript{79}

Journalist and former cabinet minister, William Callahan, stated that the aim of the Urban and Rural Planning Act was to replace the irregular organization of towns with modern suburbs. Planners believed it was necessary to remove coastal people from an architectural landscape that was filled with symbols of backwardness.

The next chapter discusses the ideology that informed resettlement. It places the Canada-Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program in the context of modernization and explores the tensions between the proponents of the program and its critics. Criticism emanated from many sources: social scientists at Memorial University, who were hired inform policy but later became potent critics, print and electronic media, politicians, and the relocatees themselves. Inshore fishers resisted planners’ efforts to move them from familiar spaces and occupations. The architects of the FHRP underestimated attachment to place and never understood the role home ownership played in a pluralistic economy.

Chapter III discusses the strategies fisheries planners used to address the labour shortage in four major fisheries growth centres on the Burin Peninsula. The central theme

\textsuperscript{79} Mellin, \textit{Newfoundland Modern}, 13.
is how resettlers challenged the goals of resettlement when they clashed with local values. Rural people’s avoidance strategies forced state officials to reconsider the terms of the Resettlement Agreement. The primary goal was to move underemployed householders from unviable outports into growth centres by promising employment and more modern services and amenities. The architects of the FHRP discovered that most domestic commodity producers had little desire to assume the risks of deep sea fishing, work in fish factories for minimum wages, or accept the social disruption that a shift into modernity required. Island communities preferred moves to the near mainland where resettlement grants were sufficient to cover moving expenses, and wherein they could continue to live in relocated homes and fish traditional grounds.

Chapter IV describes the disappointments and problems relocatees experienced in growth centres when the population exploded due to the influx of resettlers. It highlights the social and financial hardships that resulted from concentrating of too many people in two inshore fishing communities, namely Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour. The congruity of housing and employment crises and infrastructure challenges in these centres created negative perceptions of the FHRP that intensified over time. The old residents resented the newcomers for overcrowding facilities, polluting community wells, imposing municipal government, increasing the cost of living and attracting a lot of negative publicity. On the other hand resettlers accused landowners of fraud and profiteering and alleged schools were inferior to the ones they abandoned. At Southern Harbour a dozen families found themselves living in worse conditions, and in a more isolated state, than before resettlement. These deficiencies, along with the high rate of unemployment, brought the FHRP into disrepute.
Chapter V explores the social and psychological impact of resettlement by examining the experiences of resettlers in Placentia, Trepassey, and Harbour Breton. The decision to concentrate resettlers in subdivisions on the fringe of growth centres caused families to feel so alienated they shunned participation in lay and religious organizations. Denominationalism hindered integration of relocatees into Trepassey. In Harbour Breton long-time residents blamed underemployment and low wages on resettlement while resettlers at Placentia competed for scarce jobs in a town with a declining economy and no inshore fishing facilities. Families who moved there had to choose between returning to the abandoned community and going on welfare and suffering the scorn of townspeople who considered them backward, lazy people. The failure of FHRC to provide adequate counselling, before and after the move, made the transition from rural to urban and from traditional to modern a traumatic step.

Chapter VI focuses on the role of church leaders in centralization. Religious leaders played a key role in the political evolution of Newfoundland from colony to province and their participation in implementing rural development programs was important. Church leaders of all denominations supported centralization, but criticized FHRP for not compensating the church for abandoned property. Clergy also raised concerns over lack of counselling and social justice issues, particularly housing and employment. Roman Catholic priests in Placentia West and St. Barbe North opposed extending services to communities to force people out. An Apostolic Faith pastor in White Bay North used political influence and charisma to pressure the FHRC to approve the Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm move. On the south coast the Anglican rector at Burgeo urged Smallwood to improve transportation and communication services in
parish communities as well as to provide better schools and recreational facilities in Burgeo. The United Church felt resettlement provided an opportunity for outreach services to make the church more relevant in a modern world. The response of the clergy varied within denominations and between regions, but clergy of all denominations supported the FHRP.

Chapter VII discusses strategies coastal people employed to protest community evacuations. Resistance to the FHRP solidified over space and time. This chapter presents several community case studies that attest to the determination of the residents to bring services to their community. In 1968 media reports, academic studies, and the grievances of those who relocated created a groundswell of opposition to the program. When the Premier offered Fogo Islanders a choice between resettlement and development, they opted for development and centralization within Fogo Island. Communities such as Great Harbour Deep in White Bay North to Point Lance also rejected overtures to resettle and fought for new and improved services.

Chapter VIII is a study of a community’s struggle to resettle as a viable unit. Under the leadership of the community council, the merchants, and the UC clergy, 40 Port Elizabeth inshore fishing families forced the provincial cabinet and the federal Minister of Fisheries to designate an evacuated outport as a growth centre. By standing together, Port Elizabeth retained its social vitality and traditional economy and avoided problems of integrating into an existing community. The Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour move illustrates the degree to which resettlers were able to manipulate bureaucrats and cabinet ministers in the fourth year of the joint Resettlement Agreement. It is also testament to the degree to which resettlers were able to control moves.
My thesis focusses primarily on the people who were most directly affected by FHRP rather than the policymakers in the capital. It draws on archival records and anthropological, sociological and historical studies of resettlement. The records show that there were many players in the resettlement drama and the key actors were the resettlers. I argue that the lack of planning by the state resulted in moves to growth centres that were ill-equipped to handle the influx and the consequences were such that resettlement was a traumatic experience for relocatees and long-time residents. The FHRP was not so much coercive as mismanaged. This work is a study of ways the subjects resisted and influenced state policy.
Chapter II

The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program: Ideology and Methodology

Introduction

Newfoundland’s population increased steadily throughout the nineteenth century without any corresponding increase in economic diversification. By 1900 the colony had a population of about 200,000 scattered in 1,000 harbours scattered along six thousand miles of shoreline and adjacent islands. All relied heavily on a single staple economic resource, the cod fishery which was harvested and cured by family units. As the number of harvesters increased the catch per capita declined and the total number of quintals remained fairly constant and household incomes declined. Except during the Great War, coastal people were heavily dependent on subsistence activities and government relief projects. When the Great Depression came along salt cod prices plummeted, throwing the country into a crisis. Despite the addition of a second paper mill the opening of several mines, and some manufacturing in the urban centres, 35,000 coastal people depended on household production utilizing manual methods. Although the Royal Commission Newfoundland (1933) reported that the fishery must remain the mainstay of the Newfoundland economy, it recognized the necessity to reduce the number of fishers, rationalize marketing, and rehabilitate a demoralized population. In an effort to reduce dependence on the fishery, the Commission Government initiated a land settlements program to introduce fishing families to co-operative and commercial farming. The Second World War construction boom disrupted these efforts. Markets for fish improved and about 20,000 men and women became wage labourers building military bases. The
war created prosperity and reduced dependence on the salt cod trade, and created a desire for modern amenities which Smallwood reinforced during the Confederation campaign.

By 1951 the new province responded to requests from Bonavista Bay communities for in-kind assistance to move from the islands to the near mainland to take advantage of employment in woods camps and the construction trades.

**State-sponsored Resettlement Programs**

Defenders of resettlement have noted that nearly 50 settlements disappeared between 1946 and 1953 without any encouragement or assistance from government. Nonetheless, Premier Joseph Smallwood, arguing that many more families would resettle if they had the means, introduced a centralization plan to cover moving expenses up to $300 provided everyone agreed to leave. The Centralization Plan was ineffective in the sense that it generally assisted moves from one fishing community to another. But in 1957 the province transferred Co-operatives from Fisheries to Agriculture and replaced Bill Keough, a co-operatives organizer in the Commission Government era, with John Cheeseman, a person who was a director of John Penney and Sons of Ramea. The changeover reflected a change in rural development policy and stronger emphasis on centralization. When Cheeseman, chair of the South Coast Commission, advocated curtailing services to unviable settlements, Smallwood decided it was time to make the Centralization Plan more efficient. In 1957 the Premier appointed an interdepartmental committee to identify communities that were economically unviable. The committee engaged welfare officers, medical professionals, educators, and clergy in the effort to identify outports that ought to be resettled. Smallwood equated urbanization with progress and Newfoundland could not progress as long as Newfoundlanders continued to
live in more than 1,200 communities dispersed along six thousand miles of coastline. Realizing that the least remote communities were the first to evacuate, the Smallwood government increased the grant to $1,000 for households who resettled from very remote places such as the Horse Islands, White Bay. The pace of urbanization was slow, and Smallwood, who wished to eliminate half the outports, had to accept that only 113 communities had been eliminated by 1965, the year the provincial program ended. It was obvious that Newfoundland would need a richer resettlement program to entice people to leave the coves and crannies. The province lacked the funds to establish a more lucrative so the Premier looked for a partner.

Effective 1 April 1965 Newfoundland entered into a joint centralization program with Canada known as the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. The FHRP had two main objectives: to create a stable industrial labour force to allow for the expansion of the offshore fisheries by moving surplus labour from the traditional inshore sector; and secondly to bring the people to centres with better opportunities for education of children and better access to services for all. The FHRP was the first of several five-year agreements that would oversee the relocation of 80,000 persons over a period of 15 years. Each household qualified for a basic resettlement grant of $1,000 plus $200 for each member if 90 percent of household heads signed the community resettlement petition and agreed to move to one of the reception centres approved by the Federal-Provincial Fisheries Household Resettlement Committee (FHRC). In 1966 governments attempted to increase the pace of resettlement by reducing the 90 percent requirement to 80, and, perhaps realizing that the elderly and disabled were the least likely to move, by providing grants to elderly and disabled householders who wished to
reunite with families elsewhere in Newfoundland. The following year Smallwood created the Department of Community and Social Development (C&SD) to manage resettlement, but the federal Minister of Fisheries retained control in Ottawa.

The 1967 Agreement differed from the 1965 agreement in two respects. First, it extended assistance to individual householders who wished to move to a major fisheries growth centre and could produce evidence that they had employment in that place. Secondly, the amended agreement introduced a lot supplementary mortgage up to $3,000, which was forgivable at a rate of 20 percent per year for each year the resettled householder occupied the land. At the end of the fifth year the householder, without having made any payments, could apply for title. The FHRC restricted maximum lot supplementaries to families who moved onto a serviced lot in a land assembly area of a major fisheries growth centre, a town with a fresh fish plant that was in operation year round. The maximum supplementary grant in other centres was limited to $1,000. The administrators of the FHRP intended to reverse the flow of resettlers into other organized reception centres and direct them into offshore fisheries bases. The 1967 amendments clearly aimed to strengthen the economic goal of the FHRP. Critics of the provincial plan alleged that resettlers moved without improving employment opportunities and in the first two years the FHRP appeared to be assisting moves from places of underemployment into centres of unemployment. Social scientists, geographers and economists produced reports that questioned whether the FHRP met either its social or
economic goals, while the media and the arts community produced works commemorating pre-Confederation outport culture.¹

In late twentieth century, Newfoundland and Labrador writers revived the theme of persecution that had dominated the pre-1960s historiography. In these narratives settlers dispersed into remote locations where they developed a semi-subsistence society that modernist bureaucrats and politicians regarded as medieval. In 1965, Newfoundland and Canada agreed it was advantageous to evacuate hundreds of coastal villages by assisting the households into more urban environments where families could enjoy the benefits of a wage economy and social amenities, more specifically easier access to medical, educational, and transportation services. By imagining rural Newfoundlanders as deprived citizens, living in crannies beyond the limits of civilization, and by denigrating household production, resettlement planners justified a radical program of resettlement.²

Nationalist narratives arose from disillusionment with Smallwood’s failed modernization schemes which the arts community and the media claimed were destroying the very fabric of Newfoundland culture. Poet Al Pitman, satirist and journalist Ray Guy, novelists Harold Horwood and Farley Mowat, artist David Blackwood, and the popular CBC series Land and Sea, celebrated and sometimes romanticized outport life. Revisionist historian, David Alexander blamed the federal bureaucrats, who considered the inshore fishery to be an antiquated industry, for

¹See A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, Binder N, ASC, Memorial University and Iverson and Matthews, Communities in Decline, Appendices.
²W. A. Black, Fisheries Utilization St Barbe Coast Newfoundland (Ottawa: Geographical Branch, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, ARDA Study, 1043, 1966).
undermining the traditional rural economy.\textsuperscript{3} When productivity in the inshore fishery declined relative to the offshore sector, the fisheries authorities made a case for transferring labour from the inshore sector into fisheries growth centres wherein they would be more productively employed.

The increase in the number of foreign draggers and factory-freezer trawlers, plus the expansion of the Canadian fishing fleet in the 1950s and 1960s placed unsustainable pressure on the northern cod stocks. By the early 1960s it was possible to connect the reduction of annual catches of inshore fishermen to expansion of the offshore sector. The demise of the Labrador fishery, which for more than a century had supported thousands of northeast coast families, created a crisis that led people to abandon the islands of Bonavista Bay, Burin Peninsula, Placentia Bay, and south coast communities experienced a setback when the salt fish schooner bank fishery ended, but the loss was cushioned by the establishment of fresh/frozen fish plants.\textsuperscript{4}

Migration was a natural response to crises the world over and Newfoundlanders were not immune. The South Coast Commission (1957) reported many south coast communities were abandoned without any assistance. They migrated to the Canadian mainland or to Burgeo, Ramea, Gaultois or one of the industrial fishing towns of the Burin Peninsula where they crewed draggers or remained in the shore fishery. F. W. Rowe, a cabinet minister in the Smallwood government and author of several historical works, argued that the centralization of the population began with the construction of the railway, and accelerated during the construction of the pulp and paper towns of Grand

\textsuperscript{3}Alexander, \textit{Decay of Trade}, 19.
\textsuperscript{4}See Jack Feltham, \textit{The Islands of Bonavista Bay} (St. John’s: Harry Cuff Publishers, 1986).
Falls and Corner Brook, and the mining towns of Bell Island, Buchans, and St. Lawrence. Rowe also felt employment in military base construction awakened men and women to the benefits of a cash economy. For William Whiteway and Robert Bond there was a symbiotic relationship between railways, industrialization and progress. In the second half of the nineteenth century out-migration increased as the fishery became saturated and per capita productivity declined. The productivity problem continued to plague the salt fish industry throughout the twentieth century. After Confederation Smallwood looked for a way to prevent a mass exodus to the Canadian mainland by adopting a program of fisheries modernization and introduced a resettlement program to free people from the inconveniences of isolation and bring to an end a semi-subsistence economy.

A report by the Inspector of Protestant Schools reflects the ideology of nineteenth century educated elites, but also the thinking that shaped the attitudes of government officials in the post-war era. Like John Haddon, who advocated moving people from the “barren islands and rugged creeks and coves” of Green Bay into four or five larger centres in which they could “find the blessings of civilization: resident clergymen, doctors, efficient schools, and the great blessing of good roads ... If the people could be withdrawn from the barren coast line and established in agricultural parts of the bays, what a vast amount of future poverty, discomfort and ignorance would be prevented, and what a large degree of material prosperity and happiness would be promoted.”

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report supported a strategy of development based on landward development which had been in vogue since the early 1800s. In short, Newfoundland would not progress unless the government moved the fishing population from the rugged shoreline to places with greater potential for agriculture, mining and logging.

There was broad support for modernizing the fisheries. The *Newfoundland Royal Commission (1933) Report* recommended that fisheries must be the centrepiece of any plan to rehabilitate the country. John Hope Simpson, Commissioner of Natural Resources in the Commission Government, agreed, but feared the economy could not absorb the excess labour that would be released from the inshore sector.⁸ The Commission favoured development of a fresh/frozen industry but were convinced a radical restructuring of the fishery would create massive unemployment and raise the ire of the fish merchants.⁹ Tied to merchant credit and outdated production methods, the salt fish trade could not provide the 35,000 fishermen and their families with decent incomes, except during times of international crises.

When Newfoundland entered Confederation there were two distinct economies.¹⁰ Historian Rosemary Ommer and anthropologist Ottar Brox commented on the wide gulf between the economic organization of industrial centres and the outports wherein families engaged in a potpourri of market and subsistence activities. Salt fish, the mainstay of the rural economy, was generally a low-priced, low-quality commodity

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⁹In the mid-1930s there were an estimated 35,000 inshore fishermen. *Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1935* (St. John’s: King’s Printer, 1935).
produced by families utilizing manual methods to produce a product for export to poor countries in southern Europe and the south Atlantic. Increased exports of fresh/frozen cod during the war stimulated interest in developing that sector. Immediately after World War Two, the National Convention, which was set up to decide the future of the country, felt it was advisable to encourage expansion of the fresh/frozen industry for North American markets. The National Convention Sub-Committee Report on Fisheries concluded modernization of the fishery necessitated concentrating the fishery in a few ports and shifting production from family-based units into mechanized plants.\(^{11}\)

Raymond Gushue, chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board and the Post-war Fisheries Planning Committee, predicted that when European fisheries recovered total world production of salt cod would again exceed market demand. The Committee warned that reduced prices would not only threaten Newfoundland’s traditional economy, but might also dash Newfoundlanders’ dreams of political independence.\(^{12}\) As an international trader with a small internal market and with no means to adjust currency exchange rates, Newfoundland was handicapped when it came to negotiating bi-lateral trade deals. Dependent on the return from cod exports for much of its revenue, Newfoundland could do little more than contribute to the glut by increasing production to offset low returns.\(^{13}\) The Post-War Committee reported “it is obvious that further expansion of the frozen fish industry in Newfoundland to the greatest extent and as

\(^{12}\)Newfoundland Fisheries Board, Report of the Fisheries Post-War Planning Committee (St. John’s, 1946) in Alexander, Decay of Trade, 8.
\(^{13}\)Alexander, Decay of Trade, 9.
rapidly as possible, is most desirable... and as many men as possible should be diverted, not only into the frozen fish trade, but also into canning and other branches of the fishery.”¹⁴ The Fisheries Committee of the National Convention agreed and stressed “the urgency to consolidate the United States market for our frozen fish products.”¹⁵

The Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee agreed. The Walsh Report recommended that all fish, except the smallest and poorest quality, should be processed into fresh/frozen products for the US market. This proposal, if adopted, threatened to further marginalise the salt fish trade and coastal communities dependent upon it. The report of the federal-provincial committee recommended government provide financial assistance to private companies to expand plants and deep-sea fishing fleets and encourage inshore fishers to move into longliners or deep-sea trawlers. Like previous studies the Walsh Report considered undercapitalization, low productivity, low incomes, a short season and an over dependence on salt cod to be major concerns.

Bates, along with W. L. Mackenzie, who wrote most of the Walsh Report, and the Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Newfoundland and former federal fisheries bureaucrat, Clive Planta, shared a belief that the pluralistic, family-based enterprises should be eliminated. As Ommer put it: “The seaward rural economy was seen as backward, inefficient and part of the past that was often scorned and had to be outgrown.”¹⁶ The fisheries economists assumed injections of capital and technology, along with moral

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¹⁴Newfoundland Fisheries Board, Report of the Fisheries Post-War Planning Committee, 72.
¹⁵Hiller and Harrington, Report of the Fisheries Committee, 19A.
¹⁶Rosemary Ommer, ed., The Resilient Outport, 34.
rehabilitation of fishers, was the solution to the productivity problem. Smallwood, Planta and John T. Cheeseman, chair of the South Commission (1957), contended retention of traditional methods and attitudes kept communities mired in poverty and ignorance. But coastal households, who demonstrated a willingness to migrate to Nova Scotia and New England to find work, were reluctant to make permanent moves, even within Newfoundland. Consequently, summer labour shortages in fish plants mushroomed into a crisis in winter when workers drawn from the hinterland returned home to pursue customary subsistence activities and collect unemployment insurance.

But Prime Minister St. Laurent, who had reservations about making more federal assistance available to Newfoundland than was available to other provinces, balked at investing in private companies. Historian Raymond Blake suggested that if the St. Laurent administration had accepted the advice emanating from the Department of Fisheries bureaucracy, rural Newfoundland would have undergone very radical change in terms of distribution of population and industry. In 1949 Smallwood had reservations about implementing the industrial model as well. He established a Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives and appointed William (Bill) Keough to the portfolio. In 1953 cabinet approved a modest resettlement program to assist families to move anywhere in the province on the stipulation 100 per cent of householders agreed to evacuate. The principal goal of the Centralization Plan, which was administered by the

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18 Wright, “Newfoundland and Canada,” 105-7.
19 See Raymond Blake, Canadians at Last (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), Introduction.
Department of Public Welfare, was to bring people to improved social services, and building an industrial fishery was secondary. It was apparent that while government had invested millions of tax dollars in private companies and doubled resettlement grants to speed up community evacuations, he had not given up on the traditional salt fishery.

Although the joint Fisheries Development Committee recommended governments offer financial assistance to the offshore sector, St. Laurent was not willing to offer more support. The Premier decided to modernize the fishery with minimal help from federal sources.20 The federal government did finance construction of bait depots, community stages, and funded research. The Report linked improvements in productivity to centralization and modernization which required a redistribution of the population. Secondly, harvesters needed access to capital to purchase larger boats to extend their range and fishing season. The Committee, finding the employment of women and children in processing and curing fish unacceptable in the modern age, proposed switching from sun-cure to artificial drying, a change that was already happening without government intervention.21 The government of Canada financed experiments in artificial drying at Valleyfield and Catalina in an attempt to replicate the quality of the light salted sun cure. The federal government refused to invest in trawlers and fish plants owned by private firms, but improved the standard of living of rural Newfoundlanders by extending Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits to fishermen. When the post-Confederation construction boom wound down and the Canadian economy went into recession in the

20Blake, Canadians at Last, 165-8.
21Alexander, Decay of Trade, Chapter 6. Alexander asserted that most fishermen switched from light-salted sun cure to production of heavy salted or saltbulk fish for artificial drying between 1948 and 1960.
late 1950s, UI benefits made a return to the inshore fishery more attractive and kept families in remote places where they could survive on a combination of home ownership, subsistence and market activities, family allowance and unemployment insurance. UI transferred more of the social welfare bill to Ottawa, but frustrated the provincial centralization program.

Three years after Newfoundland introduced the Centralization Plan, Smallwood expressed impatience over the lack of progress and assembled an interdepartmental committee chaired by Provincial Economist G. K. Goundrey. The committee consisted of senior bureaucrats from several departments together with Ministers of the Departments of Public Welfare, Education and Highways.\(^{22}\) The objective of the exercise was to compile a list of communities that should be resettled and to discover ways to make the Centralization Plan more efficient. The task force enlisted the aid of educators, civil servants, medical personnel, and clergy to survey the communities under their purview. The release of a report on the poor state of the economic conditions on the province’s south coast may have impelled the Premier to act.

The South Coast Commission reported that the inshore fishery could never produce sufficient wealth to correct the adverse conditions found in many of the 180 communities between Cape Ray and Long Harbour. Only one-third of them had a population in excess of 200 and 35 had fewer than 50 inhabitants. The Commission attributed the backwardness of the region to lack of transportation and communications services along with overdependence on the shore fishery and predicted that the situation

\(^{22}\)“J. R. Smallwood Statement Re: Sub-Committee, 1957,” A. G Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 1.01.002, ASC, Memorial University.
was unlikely to improve so long as people remained in remote unstable communities without opportunity for economic or social advancement.\textsuperscript{23} The Commission recommended establishment of a federally funded resettlement program to assist relocation of the most marginal communities to Harbour Breton, Burgeo, or to one industrial fishing ports on the Burin Peninsula. The Report suggested amendments to the Centralization Plan to enable the Department of Public Welfare to assist individual householders, moving to preferred areas, to supplement resettlement grants with interest-free loans based on need.\textsuperscript{24} The Commission stressed that the success of any resettlement program depended on employment opportunities in reception centres, and only resettlers moving into those centres should receive assistance.\textsuperscript{25} It advocated moving families from the inshore sector to industrial fishing bases or industrial town where there were opportunities for employment. The Commission reported that the fishers of the region were so demoralized that between 1953 and 1956 an average of 400 per year abandoned the shore fishery. The report considered further investments in harbour facilities or other infrastructure in declining communities to be a waste of public funds.

Their message was clear: the raison d’être for living in remote coastal communities no longer existed; the traditional mixed economy that had supported these settlements at a level close to subsistence had no place in a modern industrial state; and therefore governments in St. John’s and Ottawa had no obligation to continue to provide anything beyond the most basic of services. Although the province and Canada were unwilling to act on the Committee’s recommendations in 1957, the authors of the FHRP

\textsuperscript{23}Newfoundland, \textit{Report of the South Coast Commission, 1957} (St. John’s: 1957), 5.
\textsuperscript{24}Newfoundland, \textit{Report of the South Coast Commission}, 138.
\textsuperscript{25}Newfoundland, \textit{Report of the South Coast Commission}, 140.
used the *Report of the South Coast Commission* to articulate a program of fisheries modernization based on centralization. The Premier discussed the possibility of entering into a federal-provincial resettlement agreement with Newfoundland’s representative in the federal cabinet, who also favoured the idea, but St. Laurent was defeated and nothing came out of the talks. The Commission’s proposal to set up a joint resettlement program for Newfoundland received little attention in Ottawa in 1957, but in the mid-1960s Canada and Newfoundland signed a joint resettlement agreement that incorporated many of the Report’s recommendations. Most notably, the architects of the FHRP emphasized the importance of directing households from remote communities to industrial growth centres and provided supplementary assistance to householders who wished to move to fisheries growth centres with potential for expansion.

Provincial economist Robert Wells concurred with the findings of the South Coast Commission. He argued that providing services to people in remote communities was cost-prohibitive. Aware that the first communities to vacate were those nearest service centres, Wells proposed the province institute a more radical program to move people from the remote regions of White Bay and the south coast districts where people were unaware of more modern services and opportunities for industrial employment. Implicit in this statement is an assumption that the inhabitants of these regions, many of whom

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26 Smallwood and Jack Pickersgill exchanged letters and met at Confederation Building to discuss the possibility of working out a joint cost-shared centralization program in 1957.
27 Robert Wells to Smallwood, 22 July 1958, J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
28 Wells, “Assessment of Resettlement Figures,” A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 1.03.004, ASC, Memorial University.
had travelled outside the region for generations to work in Nova Scotia and New England, were too ignorant to recognize how backward and indigent they really were.

A rural development officer’s account of a visit to Horse Islands, White Bay illustrates how uninformed of conditions in remote outports a bureaucrat in St. John’s could be. Horse Islands, perhaps the most remote community on the island part of the province, contradicts the provincial economist’s assessment of conditions in remote places. A. W. Thoms saw a village bustling with activity when he entered the community on a June morning in 1967. The vitality of the place was evident as inhabitants engaged in construction and repair of houses, boats, wharves, stages, and stores. Others were occupied spreading codfish caught the previous fall. He was aghast at the busyness of the place at such an early hour. The only cloud hanging over their community sprung from concerns over education. Forty-eight students had no teacher in 1966-7 and parents feared the unhappy situation would be repeated in 1967-8. Thoms reported families realized they would have to move if the school remained closed. Their willingness to sacrifice homes and abandon a way of life indicates the high regard for education in coastal communities. The above example reveals that not all outport people fit the stereotype image accepted by those who had the power to alter their lives. The visit to Horse Islands gave the development officer a chance to witness the industriousness of Horse Islanders and experience the social vitality of a remote island community.

To impose development policies without a needs assessment of either the sending or receiving community is to invite failure. Sociologist Ralph Matthews, who co-

authored a study of the FHRP for the federal Department of Fisheries and later wrote a PhD thesis on resettlement, argued that development experts, who had no direct knowledge or experience in rural Newfoundland, used hard economic data to devise development plans that ignored local social and cultural mores. He suggested that by exempting “subjective” data from their model, planners assumed they could create development plans that could be applied universally. Fisheries bureaucrats believed that a modernization model, designed to rationalize the Nova Scotia fishery in the 1940s, could be applied successfully to rural Newfoundland in 1960s. They ignored the economic reality that Nova Scotia had a more centralized population, a more industrialized fishery, and a more diversified economy to absorb labour freed from traditional activities.

Newfoundland’s population was scattered in over 1,200 communities, most of which had fewer than 100 people, and few opportunities to change occupations. Modernization of the fishery would require a more radical approach than Smallwood’s Centralization Plan which placed no restrictions on where resettlers moved.

P. D. H. Dunn, R. A. Mackay, Stewart Bates, Albert Walsh, Raymond Gushue, and John T. Cheeseman, believed that only an industrial fishery producing frozen fillets

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31 Canada and Newfoundland, *The Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee Report* (St. John’s: Queen’s Printer, 1953), estimated there were 19,500 fishermen, 12,000 of whom were living in very small communities scattered along the coast with an average of 50 to 100 fishermen per 15 miles of coastline. Fisheries Minister C. Max Lane reported that between 1 January 1954 and 31 March 1965, 112 settlements were evacuated under the Newfoundland centralization program but the number of inshore fishermen remained constant. See C. M. Lane, “Centralizing Our Population,” in Joseph R. Smallwood, ed., *Book of Newfoundland* (St. John’s: Newfoundland Book Publishers (1967) Ltd., 1967, 564-7. Lane, Minister of Fisheries, signed the FHRP Agreement on behalf of Newfoundland. In 1967 Smallwood transferred responsibility to F. W. Rowe, the minister the newly created Department of Social and Community Development.
for North American markets could solve the productivity problem.\textsuperscript{32} The Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic State and Prospects reported that the outlook for the salt fishery was meagre and suggested that a fisherman in a one-man dory “using primitive, inexpensive and manually operated equipment” could not compete with a trawler equipped with the most modern navigational and fish-finding equipment.\textsuperscript{33} Smallwood, who invested millions building roads and rural schools, accepted the findings of experts and concluded modernization was not only an economic necessity, but also a means to ease the hardship of isolation. The Centralization Plan was a response to a declining shore fishery and mechanization of the forest and mining industries. In the beginning the social welfare benefits of the Plan were most important. In the late 1950s, when efforts to diversify the rural economy through small-scale manufacturing faltered, Smallwood became more committed to expanding the industrial fishery. The establishment of a task force to survey rural communities to assess community viability and compile a list of outports which were likely to resettle, along with reasons why they ought to be resettled, attested to the Premier’s desire to speed up the modernization process. The decline of Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries, in tandem with the loss of auxiliary employment in mining and logging, increased reliance on UI benefits and social welfare programs. The safety valve for Newfoundland historically was out-migration and

\textsuperscript{32}Stewart Bates was federal Deputy Minister of Fisheries when Newfoundland became a province of Canada.

\textsuperscript{33}Blake, \textit{Lions or Jellyfish}, 114.
Smallwood’s Centralization Plan and other modernization schemes were intended to be the finger in the dyke that would prevent a mass post-Confederation exodus.\textsuperscript{34}

In the twentieth century the federal government expanded its role in regional development. In the 1930s the national government began to address regional disparities by introducing programs to revitalize Prairie agriculture to stem the tide of out-migration that followed several crop failures. In the 1940s Mackenzie King introduced equalization grants to redistribute wealth to poorer provinces to provide basic services without overburdening the tax-payers of the less developed areas.\textsuperscript{35} The Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects (1957) recognized that there were disparities between provinces and regions, and recommended Canada create programs to redress economic disparities in the Atlantic region.\textsuperscript{36} In 1961 the federal government passed the Agricultural Renewal and Development Act (ARDA) to improve productivity of marginal land, and in 1966 established the Fund for Rural Economic Development (FRED) to assist households to move from marginal farms into industrial centres.\textsuperscript{37} FRED reflected the high modernist ideology of economic planners who advocated eliminating pluralistic economies that they considered to be outdated by relocating the rural workforce into more productive industrial centres. Although the ARDA programs were formulated to rationalize agriculture in the less developed regions of Canada, such as Northeastern New Brunswick, the Gaspe Peninsula, and Northern Ontario, the

\textsuperscript{34}Parzival Copes, “Newfoundland Diversification” in Anthony Hall, ed., \textit{Taking or Making Wealth} (Toronto: Breakout Educational Network, 2003), 54-67.

\textsuperscript{35}The Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations (Ottawa: 1940), often referred to as the Rowel-Sirois Commission, recommended equalization grants and unemployment insurance as measures to mitigate regional inequalities.

\textsuperscript{36}Blake, \textit{Lions or Jellyfish}, 46.

\textsuperscript{37}Matthews, \textit{There’s No Better Place than Here}, 123.
Newfoundland government saw them as an opportunity to get federal assistance to rationalize, centralize and modernize the fishery. In 1963 Smallwood appealed to the federal government for a renewed fisheries development program.

In 1964 Newfoundland’s Minister of Fisheries, C. Max Lane, requested assistance to solve what he considered a desperate labour shortage in fresh/frozen integrated trawler-processing plants and the government of Lester Pearson responded positively.\(^{38}\) Ottawa, which had refused to provide funding for fisheries development to Newfoundland that was not available to other provinces, accepted Smallwood’s request for fisheries funding equivalent to that which had been made available to farmers through ARDA was timely.\(^{39}\) At this time fisheries scientists began to observe the effects of overfishing in the offshore by European fleets that arrived in the early 1950s and in the 1960s were generating concern in the nation’s capital.\(^{40}\) The federal government, aware that Canada’s share of the Northwest Atlantic fish was shrinking relative to foreign nations, responded with a plan to build up a competitive modern trawler fleet.


\(^{39}\) Wright, *A Fishery*, 70. A delegation, led by Deputy Minister of Fisheries Stewart Bates, arrived in Newfoundland to investigate the recommendations of the Walsh Report. They confirmed that the federal government should not invest in private frozen fish companies, but agreed to construct harbour facilities at La Scie wherein the province planned to build a plant to process salt and fresh/frozen product.

\(^{40}\) Wilfred Templeman, *Marine Resources in Newfoundland*, Bulletin 154 (Ottawa: Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 1966) in Wright, “Newfoundland and Canada,” 106. In 1962 Canada’s gross tonnage of vessels fishing on the east coast was less than half of Portugal’s, and taken alone the Newfoundland tonnage was approximately one tenth of the total tonnage fishing off Canada’s east coast. The largest fleet came from the USSR - 200,000 gross tons. Templeman noted that despite a 53% increase in the number of inshore fishermen, 57% increase in vessels, a 69% increase in traps, and a 1,819% increase in gillnets, the total catch in the inshore fishery had not increased. Templeman believed the increase in the offshore fishing effort was responsible for stagnation in the inshore sector.
Government financed construction of a shipyard at Marystown to build stern trawlers to replace the less efficient, but more dangerous, side trawlers. These vessels would be crewed by men recruited from the inshore cohort. The success of the fisheries development program, drafted in 1964, rested on creating a stable workforce. Newfoundland and Canada entered into a joint resettlement agreement to meet the projected increase in demand for workers to staff fish plants and crew trawlers. The newly created Fisheries College offered courses in navigation, refrigeration and marine engineering to train young men for the expanding modern fishery. When the two Ministers of Fisheries signed the Canada-Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement they sealed the fate of hundreds of Newfoundland coastal communities.

In 1965 the national and provincial governments passed the Newfoundland Resettlement Act, an Act that gave birth to the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program (FHRP) which was to be effective from 1 April 1965 to 31 March 1970 and to be administered by the Fisheries Household Resettlement Division of the provincial Department of Fisheries. The statute authorized the federal and provincial Ministers of Fisheries to appoint a fifteen-person advisory committee, to be known as the Federal - Provincial Household Resettlement Committee, hereafter the Resettlement Committee. Although the federal government agreed to pay two-thirds of the cost, the joint committee was co-chaired and 10 members of the Resettlement Committee were provincial. The Resettlement Division, which came under the purview of the provincial

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Department of Fisheries, took on the task of administering the Resettlement Agreement that was signed by the two governments 15 July, 1965 and was retroactive to 1 April. The Director of Resettlement Division, Ken Harnum, played a key role in the implementation of the program. Harnum and his staff visited coastal communities to explain the FHRP to key people such as the merchant, postmaster, clergy, or the teacher and asked them to disseminate information on procedures for resettlement as outlined in the Agreement, but did not see fit to call a public meeting to inform everyone of the advantages and mechanics of the FHRP.\(^4\) The decision to include persons who sat atop the local social hierarchy in the process was sound strategy, but it left rural communities vulnerable to rumour.

The first step in the process of resettlement required an interested party, including resettled householders, to request a two-part petition. Secondly, the Agreement required the individual, or group to call a public meeting, often chaired by a clergyman or teacher. If a majority of householders was present, the meeting had a duty to elect a three-member community resettlement committee, made up of a chairman, a secretary and an additional member. The local committee had a legal duty to bring the petition to each householder and certify its authenticity by dating and signing the completed document. The committee secretary then sent the petition to the Director of Resettlement. If 90 percent of householders signed the petition and agreed to move to an approved reception centre, the

\(^4\)K. M. Harnum, Director of Resettlement, visited most coastal communities to discuss resettlement. Harnum brought with him all necessary resettlement documents and left information in the community outlining the resettlement process, and the financial assistance and benefits available under the FHRP. See Community Resettlement Files, GN39/1, Boxes 126-132, The Rooms.
Resettlement Committee could declare the community an evacuated outport. After moving to an approved centre a householder then applied for assistance by completing a form which included former and current address, number, name and age of all household members, along with current intended occupation. Item nine of the application required householders to agree not to reoccupy the vacated property without the consent of the Minister of Fisheries. The resettlement authorities approved assistance on condition that ownership of real property in the abandoned community revert to the crown, with a proviso that houses and other structures could be removed by the owner or sold to another person for removal or dismantling. If the application was approved, the family received a basic grant of $1,000 plus $200 on behalf of each member, as well as reimbursement for travel, expenses for removal of personal chattels along with the cost of fishing gear and equipment of householders who intended to continue fishing after the move. The cost of removing real property rested with the householder who had to pay the cost of removal, transport and setup from the resettlement grant. Initially, householders relied on private operators to relocate homes but in 1968 government purchased a motorized barge to alleviate the housing crisis in growth centres created by the rush to resettle. Although government made the barge available free of charge, the fees charged by the private operators and the purchase of a building lot, especially in major fisheries growth centres, consumed a significant portion of the resettlement grant and often left relocatees indebted. Consequently, movers tended to settle in reception centres where

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43 See Iverson and Matthews, *Communities in Decline*, Appendix A, 146-150.
cheap land was available rather than in a serviced land assembly in a major fisheries growth centre\textsuperscript{45} where the price of building lots was prohibitive.

Iverson and Matthews identified the cost and availability of housing and the importance of home ownership in the rural communities as factors inhibiting resettlement. They recommended increased grants to address the problem.\textsuperscript{46} When resettlement planners realized that the high cost of lots in growth centres stymied the economic goal of the FHRP, they enriched the program for householders who opted to move into major fisheries growth centres.\textsuperscript{47} Households that moved after 1 April 1967 from a petitioning settlement onto a lot in a special land assembly in a major fisheries growth centre, qualified for a maximum supplementary grant of $3,000. The maximum lot supplementary was $1,000 in all other cases.\textsuperscript{48} The resettlement planners hoped to make housing more affordable in the industrial centres and thereby prevent people from moving into marginal centres that were as resource poor as the old community.\textsuperscript{49} By June 1967, 5,000 persons had been resettled, but the labour shortage in the fish plants still threatened to derail the fisheries development program initiated in 1964.

\textsuperscript{45} A major fisheries growth centre was a place with an integrated trawler-processing plant in operation year round. It had a serviced land assembly and potential for expansion.
\textsuperscript{46} See Iverson and Matthews, \textit{Communities in Decline}, 114-35.
\textsuperscript{47} Michael Skolnik, “Resettlement in Newfoundland: Some Economic Comments,” in Michael Skolnik, ed., \textit{Viewpoints on Communities in Crisis} (St. John’s: ISER, 1968), 1. Skolnik, expressed concern that, since centralization had been taken over by the Department of Fisheries too much emphasis was placed on moving households into growth centres “at the expense of other aspects of Newfoundland’s economic life.”
\textsuperscript{48} An exception was made for the residents of Tacks Beach, most of whom had moved prior to 1 April 1967.
\textsuperscript{49} Cato Wadel, \textit{Marginal Adaptations and Modernization in Newfoundland} (St. John’s: ISER, 1969), 33.
The fisheries planners also reduced the percentage of petitioning households from 90 percent to 80 and provided assistance to widowed and disabled persons to move anywhere in the province, as well as to individual householders who wished to move to a fisheries growth centre. By 1966 the Resettlement Division realized how difficult it was to get the 90 percent of householders to vote for relocation. Consequently, the FHRC sometimes asked the Newfoundland minister responsible for the FHRP to use his discretionary power provided by the Resettlement Agreement to approve petitions signed by fewer than 80 percent of householders. The minister, for example, used discretionary authority to approve evacuation of the Placentia West communities such as St. Kyran’s, St. Leonard’s, Harbour Buffett, Port Anne, Oderin and Woody Island when more than 20 percent of householders withheld signatures. The Harbour Buffett petition, on which only 72 percent of householders’ names appear, included signatures of 10 resettled household heads. Families, who moved no more than 18 months prior to approval of the petition, qualified for resettlement grants. In some instances the Resettlement Director encouraged resettlers to pressure the residual population by informing them that unless 80 percent agreed to evacuate the settlement, the resettled households would only qualify for a supplementary grant of $1,000.

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50 For example, Western Cove (Bar Haven Island), had seven families. The Resettlement Committee could not approve assistance for the six households who signed the petition. GA39/1, Box 126, File S68, The Rooms. At Clattice Harbour Southwest 10 of 12 householders wished to move, but FHRC could not approve applications for assistance. GN39/1, File S106, The Rooms. See also Philip J. Lewis, Parish Priest, Merasheen to Ross Young, Newfoundland Fisheries Development Authority, GN39/1, File S11, The Rooms. Lewis informed Young that it was unrealistic to expect 90% of householders to move at once. He suggested a figure of 50% or 40% would be more realistic and speed up community evacuations.

51 GN39/1, Boxes 125-130, Community Resettlement Files, PANL.

52 GN39/1, File S21, PANL.
The decision to assist individual household moves reduced the population of designated outports, raised the average age in the community and when young families moved, reduced school enrollments, and the incentive for governments to maintain existing infrastructure, or to introduce new services. The out-migration of younger families and youth created an atmosphere of unease and uncertainty. During this anxious time, if the local resettlement committee circulated a petition, it was likely to succeed. When the signatures of former residents were combined with those of resident households, the die was cast for all. It was a wearing down process that was sometimes led by former residents who wished to qualify for, or maximize, resettlement grants. C. W. Keeping, the main merchant in Sagona who resided in Harbour Breton, wrote Harnum that he was tempted to flatten his business premises in Sagona to “create the desired effect,” namely force the people off Sagona Island by preventing reestablishment of the business by a new supplier. Resettlement was an attractive option for workers who commuted regularly to work outside the community. Iverson and Matthews maintained that frequency of travel increased the sense of isolation.

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53 Clinton S. Herrick, Migration as an Adaptive Strategy in Newfoundland (St. John’s: ISER, 1971, 19 and 41. Herrick reported that a disproportionate number of migrants ranged from 17-25 years.
54 See Harnum to W. N. Rowe, 10 February 1969 re: Grole. Harnum advised the Minister of C&SD that nine resettled households at Marystown wished to avail of the $3,000 lot supplement to acquire homes but did not qualify for more than $1,000 because Grole was not a designated outport. He reminded Rowe of a provision in the Resettlement Act that authorized the Minister to use discretion in cases “where the 80% requirement is impractical or imposes unfair or prejudicial treatment of the householders concerned.” In a memo re: Grole Sametz informed Harnum that if a complete listing of those who had already moved had been gathered ministerial intervention could have been required. Sametz to Harnum, 1 August 1969, GN39/1, File S343, PANL.
55 C. W. Keeping to Harnum, 10 July 1968. GN39/1, Box 127, File S146, PANL.
56 Iverson and Matthews, Communities in Decline, 58.
The case of Williamsport, White Bay North demonstrates how complex, and divisive, the process of resettlement could be. Residents employed in whaling joined with local merchants to oppose resettlement.\(^{57}\) On 10 December 1965 21 of 37 households signed the petition. A second petition circulated on 19 February 1966 garnered 29 signatures, and when the Director of Resettlement visited in May he added eight names to the February petition.\(^{58}\) While the local resettlement committee implored their MHA to intervene, and warned that they would not let the matter rest, opponents of resettlement questioned the validity of the petition. The postmistress informed the Resettlement Director that the petition was the work of a former teacher and another person, neither of whom were long-time residents of Williamsport. She alleged that those individuals organized a committee at Englee without convening a public meeting at Williamsport. The postmistress, whose job depended on community survival, claimed several names should be removed from the petition because they were not householders, or had left before the FHRP took effect.\(^{59}\) Resettlement caused so much bitterness that the Resettlement Committee asked Ken Harnum to visit the community to compile a list of those in favour of resettling along with a list of resettled families requesting financial assistance and the dates they had left.\(^{60}\) The FHRC discussed the evacuation Williamsport in two meetings, but were unable to reach a decision. In February the local committee, which favoured resettlement, implored the MHA for White Bay North to intercede on

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\(^{57}\) Leslie Randell, Chair Williamsport Resettlement Committee, to Harnum, 28 December 1965, GN39/1, Box 126, File S69, The Rooms.

\(^{58}\) See the Williamsport resettlement petition in GN39/1, Box 126, File S69, The Rooms.

\(^{59}\) Mrs. Andrew Randell, Postmistress, to A. G. Stacey, Secretary, Resettlement Committee, 12 April 1966. GN39/1, Box 126, File S69, PANL.

\(^{60}\) Stacey to Harnum, 25 March 1966. GN39/1, Box 126, File S69, The Rooms.
their behalf and asked to be treated the same as Little Harbour Deep which they said had
been evacuated with only 85 percent voting to relocate of which only 61 percent intended
to move to approved reception centres.\textsuperscript{61} On the other side the postmistress threatened
legal action if the Committee sanctioned the move.\textsuperscript{62}

The animosity within families and neighbourhoods destroyed the social integrity
of the communities, and much of the discord resulted from lack of information and
counselling, especially in those places that evacuated before the FHRP was fully
organized. At Great Paradise no one was willing to call a public meeting to elect a local
committee to take the petition to the people, perhaps fearing reprisals. Householders in a
close-knit community did not wish to offend neighbours who wanted to stay.

Consequently, the majority of residents of Great Paradise relocated to Placentia before
the FHRC designated it an evacuated outport.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{61}Williamsport Local Resettlement Committee to Walter Carter, MHA, 21 February
1966. GN39/1, Box 126, File S69, The Rooms. See also D. M. Smallwood, Welfare
Officer, to A. J. McCrowe, Director of Public Welfare, 19 April and 8 June, 1965.
GN39/1, Box 125, File S30, PANL. Smallwood reported six families “left without
following any policy or procedure” and he gave the following reasons why the remaining
ten households should leave: poor harbour; no road connection; no doctor or nurse or
teacher; no mail in winter except by walking overland; and no public wharf.

\textsuperscript{62}Mrs. Andrew Randell to Stacey, 12 April 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, File S30, PANL.

\textsuperscript{63}Harnum’s Report on visit to Great Paradise, 19 April 1967, GN39/1, File S138, PANL.
He reported 12 householders remained, 12 had resettled. Harnum discussed resettlement
with six men, none of which would take the petition. A local committee was elected at a
public meeting attended by 90\% of the remaining 9 householders. The 9 signatures on the
petition appear to be written by the same hand and the signatures of the local committee
did not appear in the document. The local committee normally validated the petition.
In 1967 the FHRC classified growth centres according to absorptive capacity and potential for economic development.\textsuperscript{64} Year-round industrial offshore fishing bases with sufficient land for subdivision development and in-fill housing were assigned Category “A” major fishery growth centre status. Communities with potential for urban development and within commuting distance of a major fisheries growth centre were also included in category “A.” Towns that had fresh fish plants, but lacked space for organized land assemblies were classified type “B,” other fishery growth centres. Category “C,” other growth points included major urban industrial centres like St. John’s, Mount Pearl, Grand Falls, Corner Brook and Labrador City. Category “D” consisted of 31 approved organized reception centres that were considered to have sufficient absorptive capacity.\textsuperscript{65} The latter included Rushoon, Arnold’s Cove, Come-by-Chance, Little Harbour East, and others that had a road connection, better access to services, but few amenities. The shortcomings of these communities are discussed in a later chapter.

In 1968 Noel Iverson and Ralph Matthews released \textit{Communities in Decline},\textsuperscript{66} a study commissioned by the federal Department of Fisheries in 1966 to determine the effectiveness of the program. The report identified unemployment and housing as the two main concerns. It received widespread media coverage and caught the attention of planners in Ottawa and St. John’s. The Director of Special Planning Secretariat suggested “it might be in the interest of Ottawa and the Province to engage in a comprehensive


\textsuperscript{65}A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 1.04.005, ASC, Memorial University.

\textsuperscript{66}Iverson and Matthews report on resettlement was based on data collected July-August 1966. The authors released a preliminary report which was discussed at a colloquium on “Resettlement in Newfoundland” organized by ISER in February 1967.
housing program” that would include rental, co-operative and shell.\textsuperscript{67} On 1 April 1967 Canada and Newfoundland amended the Resettlement Agreement to address the concerns raised by sociologists. At the federal the Department of Fisheries continued to administer the program but the province decided to pass control to the newly created Department of Community and Social Development (C&SD). Acting on the recommendations of Iverson and Matthews, federal and provincial governments launched an initiative to alleviate the shortage of affordable housing in growth centres wherein the high cost of serviced lots discouraged resettlers.\textsuperscript{68} Ottawa and the province agreed to cost-shared development of land assemblies on a 75-25 basis respectively.\textsuperscript{69} Resettled householders who moved from an evacuated outport to a category “A” growth centre qualified for a maximum $3,000 supplementary grant to offset the cost of purchasing a lot in a serviced land assembly area. Relocatees who moved to other approved reception centres qualified for a maximum $1,000 lot supplementary, on condition the householder serviced the lot within eighteen months and they had moved from an outport in which a minimum of 80% of householders petitioned to relocate. It also provided assistance for widowed and disabled persons to reunite with family or to be nearer health-care facilities. The 1967 changes, encompassed an element of humanity, but also revealed impatience with the


\textsuperscript{68}Government of Canada, \textit{Draft of Agreement Between the Governments}, 1967. H. J. Robichaud Minister of Fisheries for Canada and F. W. Rowe, Minister of Community and Social Development issued a press release 20 June 1967 announcing amendments to the FHRP. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 3.10.078. ACS, Memorial University.

\textsuperscript{69}The 1967 Amended Agreement was effective from 1 April 1967 to 31 March, 1970. C&SD administered ARDA programs and the FHRP. Smallwood to Pearson, 17 January 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 3.10.078, ACS, Memorial University.
slow pace of resettlement which is revealed in correspondence between the Premier and the Prime Minister.

In January 1967 Smallwood reminded Pearson that the goal of “transferring people from a dependent status, to productive employment” was not being met and stressed that “the potential benefit of the centralization programme for the future of this province cannot be over-estimated.” The Premier advised the Prime Minister that the housing crisis in each of the fisheries growth centres - Marystown, Burin, Trepassey, Fortune, Grand Bank, Harbour Breton, Fermeuse and Harbour Grace - was no closer to a solution. Smallwood advised Pearson that unless the housing situation was resolved, the

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70Smallwood to Pearson, 12 January 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
71Smallwood to Pearson, 12 January 1967, J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University. Smallwood noted that those wishing to buy houses in the Marystown subdivision would have to support a mortgage of $9,000. He provided a summary of the costs: $3,500 for serviced lot, other costs $11,500 for a total of $15,000. To meet the cost CMHC offered a $9,000 mortgage, FHRP - $2,000, personal capital - $1,000 of which could be “sweat equity.” The remaining deficit of $3,000 needed redress. The solution struck upon was a lot supplementary mortgage which did not require the mortgagee to make payments. The mortgage was forgivable at a rate of 20% per year so that after occupying the land for five years the mortgagee could apply for title. For those who could not sustain a $9,000 mortgage, it was intended to make shell housing available at a greatly reduced cost. Smallwood did not consider it desirable for resettled families to occupy subsidized rental units indefinitely. In a province where families were forming at a very rapid rate, the Premier saw an opportunity to address the general housing shortage and have Ottawa shoulder the majority of the cost. (Smallwood informed Pearson that 47% of the people living in Newfoundland in 1967 were born after 1949.) The issue of affordable housing remained a problem in the major fisheries growth centres for some time. Resettled fishermen who earned $2,800 per annum in a fish plant could not sustain a $9,000 mortgage. Trawlermen who earned $4,000 annually were in a better position to purchase a house, but they spent 90% of their time at sea and could live anywhere. In a province where home ownership was prized, the notion of a household leaving his home to take on a mortgage or rent was unrealistic.
whole offshore fisheries development plan would remain in jeopardy. In the same vein, a memorandum warned the Minister of C&SD that the program was not meeting the target of moving “10,000 inshore fishermen involving at least 5,000 households” in the five-year period, and furthermore resettlers were not relocating to industrial fishing ports where fish processing plants could absorb new workers at the rate of 500 per year.

The federal and provincial governments realized families in the outports preferred to move to smaller growth points wherein they were more likely to remain homeowners. Resettled people, who valued home ownership more than industrial employment, tended to avoid the centres where a labour shortage was threatening the survival of established processing plants and the viability of new plants such as the one at Marystown. The authorities realized that the housing crisis threatened the fisheries development program, of which the FHRP was a key component. In 1967 the planners decided to direct more workers into urban settings by offering subsidized building lots and rental rates tied to family incomes. The future of the fish plants, as well as the towns, were at risk. The future of the industrial fishery depended on herding relocatees into category “A” growth centres, but politicians were aware that too much meddling by overenthusiastic bureaucrats would draw more unwanted public criticism. The program was already under

72 Smallwood to Pearson, 12 January 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
73 Memorandum Re: The Newfoundland Fisheries Resettlement Program. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
75 “1967 Amended Agreement,” J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
public scrutiny and being condemned by nationally renowned author Farley Mowat and Ray Guy of *The Evening Telegram* and A. B. Perlin of *The Daily News*.

In the 1960s academic interest in rural Newfoundland resulted in a series of economic and social studies funded by ARDA and published by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University. ISER recruited graduate students from Norway, the UK, and the US to produce socio-ethnographic studies in Newfoundland outports over a two-year period. Ian Whitaker, the Director of Sociological Research at ISER asked the researchers to focus on values, political orientation, and power structure as they studied evolution of a people from primitive peasant society to modernity. The social scientists reported that the economic backwardness of rural Newfoundland was attributable to values, family-based production methods, and the individualistic nature of society that stymied discussion and co-operative initiatives. The Iverson and Matthews’ report, discussed above, thrust the FHRP into the forefront of academic discussion. A colloquium at Memorial University sponsored by the federal Department of Fisheries and ARDA provided a forum for discussion of the concerns raised by the study. Michael Skolnik stressed the importance of giving persons in remote communities the freedom of choice to move to a well-serviced rural community or to an urban centre. Ottar Brox noted that the FHRP was founded on the premise that inshore fishermen were “longing”

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for a chance to move into draggers to improve incomes, but found little evidence to substantiate the claim.\textsuperscript{79} Brox referred to the move from Lumsden North to Lumsden South to illustrate how fishing families pressured government to waste money on useless moves. The people moved houses two miles down the road but intended to utilize all the resources of the old community, including gardens, fishing premises and animals. Both parties benefited - the households received resettlement grants while the government reduced the number of outports using federal tax dollars. Brox claimed a desire to end isolation was not a prime motivating factor since it was communities in close proximity to developed areas that moved first. He believed the absence of a fish buyer, teachers, and local government rather than poor roads or rough seas marginalized communities. He called for a rural development program, one that would focus on improving the general welfare of the people in their own communities.\textsuperscript{80} The benefits of the FHRP to the province included elimination the cost of continuing services to remote outports while using federal money to develop infrastructure in reception centres.

Wadel contended that in some cases there were few alternatives to resettlement if the people wanted modern services, but thought that many communities were easily serviceable.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, he challenged the simplistic method of calculating fishing incomes by dividing the value of codfish by the number of inshore fishermen.\textsuperscript{82} This methodology omitted incomes from other fisheries, contributions of other family

\textsuperscript{80}Brox, “Resettlement in Newfoundland,” 24-5.
\textsuperscript{81}Cato Wadel, \textit{Marginal Adaptations and Modernization in Newfoundland}, (St. John’s: ISER, 1969, 34-5.
\textsuperscript{82}Wadel, \textit{Marginal Adaptons}, 39.
members to the household economy, as well as other income from wage work or
subsistence activities. A. P. Dyke noted a study of communities of Bonavista North
prepared by the Newfoundland Task Force on Rural Development in 1963 attributed one-
third of earned incomes of fishermen in the region to non-fishing activities.\textsuperscript{83} Dyke, who
surveyed nine households in Bonavista Bay, discovered that cash incomes from the sale
of salt cod averaged $900 while total average cash incomes, including UI, family
allowances, old age pensions, and other social welfare benefits, was in excess of
$1,900.\textsuperscript{84} He argued that when one factors in cash income from all sources and added the
value of home ownership, rural households were not living in such dire straits as Parzival
Copes and Smallwood claimed. By limiting household incomes in Newfoundland’s
coastal communities to earnings derived from the sale of a single species, the
Resettlement Committee could more easily make a case for designating an outport
unviable and present the evacuation of the community as a humanitarian relief exercise.
Dyke allowed home ownership provided annual income in kind in excess of average
returns from sale of salt fish, and Brox pointed out that relocatees preferred to move to
Trinity, where they could afford a house, rather than Marystown where they could get a
job in a fish plant, but could not afford a house.\textsuperscript{85} Furthermore, he stated that if families
were only given the choice of moving from Ireland’s Eye to Marystown, they might not
have moved at all.

\textsuperscript{83} A. Prince Dyke, “Subsistence Production in the Household Economy of Rural
\textsuperscript{84} Dyke, “Subsistence Production,” Table 3, 47.
\textsuperscript{85} Brox, “Resettlement in Newfoundland,” 20.
At the provincial level the Deputy Minister of C&SD, the Director of the Resettlement Division, Ken Harnum, Director of Urban and Rural Planning, J. T. Allston, along with Premier Smallwood, Ministers of Fisheries, C. Max Lane (1963-7),\textsuperscript{86} and Aidan Maloney, Minister of Fisheries and Community and Social Development (1967-71), William N. Rowe, Minister of Resettlement and Housing, were strong advocates of resettlement. Equally supportive of fisheries modernization were Prime Minister Pearson, Fisheries Ministers H. J. Robichaud and Jack Davis, A. W. Needler, co-chair of the FHRC and W. C. Mackenzie of the Fisheries Development Branch, federal Department of Fisheries. Through a process of relocation, employment and training, they argued, rural people would undergo a metamorphosis that would free them from an impoverished, dependent lifestyle that had changed very little since early nineteenth century. The Resettlement Committee presented the FHRP as a civilizing mission, a part of a process that would lead to integration into North American consumer society. Scott claimed that high-modernist ideology found “its most fertile soil among planners, engineers, architects, scientists and technicians” who became designers of a new order.\textsuperscript{87} Politicians and bureaucrats used state power to alter people’s work habits, attitudes and to stimulate desire for goods and services. Rostow’s belief that primitive people would eventually acquire attitudes that would permit them to enjoy the benefits of an industrial consumer economy in an urban environment. Modernists equated rural with backwardness and connected urbanization to progress.

\textsuperscript{86}In 1963 Smallwood changed the Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives portfolio to the Department of Fisheries. It signalled a new approach to rural development.
\textsuperscript{87}Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}, 5.
A. G. Stacey, a former statistician with the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS) who transferred to ARDA and later became secretary to the Federal - Provincial Resettlement Committee, recommended Newfoundland adopt the Icelandic model. The Icelandic government assisted harvesters to acquire large boats equipped with the most efficient gear and modern navigational equipment to maximize productivity and income. Stacey suggested that profits generated through the use of more efficient harvesting technologies could be invested in processing plants to create shore employment for those rendered redundant by the efficient fishing fleet. Experts, including William Black, emphasized the need to educate the next generation to prepare them for employment in the industrial fishery.

The FHRP aimed to change more than mailing addresses; it aimed to transfer people from a regressive social and economic setting into modern industrial fish processing centres. W. A. Black’s study of the northwest coast suggested that unless a way was found to awaken a desire in the people for consumer goods, they would remain stuck in a semi-subsistence economy. Black recommended installing a television service to alter values, concentration of the fishery into several large harbours, and evacuation of the “crannies” as strategy for creating a more productive workforce. ARDA’s development experts dismissed the older generation and focus on training high school graduates to captain longliners and enter trades to equip them for the modern fishery.

A common goal of all fisheries development programs - education, training, and resource utilization - was to raise fishermen’s incomes above the subsistence level, but

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88 A. G. Stacey, ed., Rural Resettlement Opportunities, 197.
89 W. A. Black, Fisheries Utilization St. Barbe Coast, Newfoundland, 6.
the real focus was on breaking the cycle of dependence. Black’s study of the St. Barbe coast, gave as much attention to the necessity for changing attitudes as it did to reforming the economy. He proposed establishment of a six-week education program for adults and a two-year program at the Fisheries College to prepare high-school graduates to establish fishing enterprises or become skilled workers in the mechanized fishery. Secondly, Black recommended constructing medium size fish plants in larger ports like Port au Choix and St. Anthony. He proposed evacuating communities with a population of less than 225 persons. If government had actioned these recommendations there would be few communities on that section of coast from Bonne Bay to Cape Norman.90 His suggestions for modernizing the fishery echoed a common refrain: a switch from manual to mechanical production; a change from family operations to fish plants; a change from unskilled to skilled labour utilizing mechanized methods, and a change from an individualistic, horizontally organized production to vertically integrated processing plants located in designated growth poles.91 Black’s recipe for fisheries modernization was similar to those written by fisheries consultants and commissions for over two decades. The alternative the experts suggested was to leave people in a backward state.

Smallwood insisted that the resettlement programs originated from a need to raise the standard of social services in Newfoundland closer to the level enjoyed by the citizens of western countries. He argued that raising the standard of living hinged on providing the younger generation with quality education in schools staffed by university trained teachers. Implicit in the Premier’s thinking was the assumption that families needed to

90 In the census year 1966, 648 of 942 communities had 300, or less, residents. See Matthews, “There’s No Better Place than Here,” 19.
91 Black, Fisheries Utilization, St. Barbe Coast, Newfoundland, 113.
move to larger centres to enhance educational opportunities. Reacting to a 1976 magazine article that denounced the tactics employed by the province to implement the FHRP, Smallwood replied:

My administration’s reason, and my only reason, for being willing to help people who wished to move was primarily a powerful wish to help the children. As our programme of upgrading the standards of excellence of the teachers came into successful play, it became difficult, and ultimately impossible, to get qualified teachers to teach in small settlements, especially small islands, or in any remote or isolated settlement. The same was (and is!) true of doctors and nurses. By 1970 the situation at Marystown was critical. Every conceivable space was converted to classrooms. Students were taught in the corridors and cafeteria of a forty year-old school without toilets, library, gymnasium, or other facilities. See Phil Walsh, Chairman of School Building Committee to W. N. Rowe, 15 January, 1970. GN39/1, Marystown V. II, File S263, The Rooms.

Smallwood remained convinced that the level of social services and incomes of coastal people could only be raised by assisting families to move to larger centres where modern amenities already existed and better opportunities for wage employment existed. Planners, who Matthews suggests often held values that conflicted with their subjects, concluded that only a radical state-funded program of fisheries modernization and elimination of hundreds of declining outports could improve the standard of living to a level approximating the North American standard.

Raymond Gushue, Director of the Newfoundland Board of Fisheries, W. C. Mackenzie, Director of Economic Services of the federal Department of Fisheries and federal representative on the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee and the

92Joseph R. Smallwood, Letter to the Editor, Decks Awash, v. 6, no. 1, (February 1977), 64. The article that Smallwood to write the editor can be found in Decks Awash, v.5, no. 6, (December 1976). Among the difficulties resettled families experienced in the new community was overcrowding in schools to the point where school boards refused to admit new students. By 1970 the situation at Marystown was critical. Every conceivable space was converted to classrooms. Students were taught in the corridors and cafeteria of a forty year-old school without toilets, library, gymnasium, or other facilities. See Phil Walsh, Chairman of School Building Committee to W. N. Rowe, 15 January, 1970. GN39/1, Marystown V. II, File S263, The Rooms.

author of the Report, and John T. Cheeseman, proposed a reorganization of the province’s chief industry to bring it more in line with production techniques used by other industries throughout the developed world. Their work formed the basis of a fisheries policy that led Smallwood to introduce the Centralization Plan in the 1950s and the joint resettlement program in which governments of Newfoundland and Canada agreed that “it was desirable that a considerable number of householders in the Province should be enabled to remove from small settlements in outlying areas of the Province where opportunities for economic development are limited, to other communities more favoured within the province.”

One Canadian paper presented the FHRP as a rescue mission designed to free householders mired in poverty in isolated outports. Newfoundland Fisheries Minister C. Max Lane saw the FHRP as a means to solve the “desperate” shortage of trawlermen and plant workers in the fishery growth centres, especially the industrial fishing towns of the Burin Peninsula. The problem of creating an industrial labour force for Marystown, Burin, Grand Bank and Fortune is the subject of the next chapter. Few inshore fishermen considered resettlement a liberating experience and chose to relocate to a more traditional centre where housing was more affordable, access to social services easier, and from which they had the option to continue in the inshore fishery utilizing salvaged gear and equipment on old grounds. If government’s only offer was relocation to Marystown, the

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94. The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement enacted by the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada, 16 July 1965. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, File 1.05.001, January to June, 1965, ASC, Memorial University.
95. “Prisoners of Outports to be Rescued in Newfoundland,” Guelph Daily Mercury, 9 April, 1965. The reporter felt outport people were a subaltern race.
communities of Placentia Bay might have ignored the entreaties of parish priests, fish plant managers, and resettlement officials who promised a better life.

**Conclusion**

By the mid-twentieth century, the state decided pluralistic economies of less wealthy rural regions needed radical intervention to raise incomes and productivity closer to the Canadian average. Many studies and commission reports emphasized that the traditional inshore fishers using manual methods of production could not supply their families with the basic necessities without the assistance of state welfare programs. In the 1950s and 1960s the Newfoundland government embarked on a program of modernization and urbanization that would free coastal people from isolation, poverty, and ignorance by assisting them into growth points. The first state-sponsored plan, which was administered by the Department of Public Welfare, privileged the social over the economic, but Smallwood’s goal was to eliminate most of the small outports by providing modest financial support. In the 1960s much of the discourse centred on ending occupational pluralism. The FHRP was an attempt by the state to rehabilitate the population and improve productivity of the fishing industry by assisting fishers to growth centres with factories operated by vertically integrated trawler-processing companies.

Resettlement was not a natural migration of people moving voluntarily to improve their well-being; it was different from the rural to urban migration that normally occurs in all industrial societies because whole communities moved at once. Evacuation of outports, urban renewal and the reordering of nature were projects conceived by high-

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modernist planners. In *Seeing Like a State* James Scott provides examples of high modernist commitment to the reordering nature, space and bodies. High modernism favoured homogeneity over diversity and presumed the mixed economy and social ordering of Tanzanian hill dwellers, the Appalachian population and rural Newfoundlander was necessary to create a more productive society. Governments used centralization programs to make society more accessible, productive and accountable. Modernist fisheries planners believed that applications of science and technology and centralization of industry and population could transform a pluralistic rural economy into a modern consumer society.

Enquiries into the fisheries of Newfoundland and Atlantic Canada recommended centralization of the fishing industry in key ports where mechanical methods would replace manual and decked vessels would replace open boats. The principal aim of the FHRP was to remove fishers from one-man dories and trapskiffs and put them into 200 ton trawlers outfitted with the most modern harvesting and navigational technologies. The labour freed from the family-based inshore sector would be employed in the processing plants. In 1965 the governments of Canada and Newfoundland entered into an agreement designed to free coastal people from poverty by concentrating them in industrial offshore bases. The degree to which the rural population resisted and frustrated the main goal of the FHRP is examined in the next chapter.
Chapter III

Obstacles in the Road to Modernity: Recruiting Industrial Labour for Four Major Fishery Growth Centres on the Burin Peninsula

Introduction

The architects of the fisheries development program overestimated both the absorptive capacity of the offshore sector and the earnings of the corporate fishery. The most salient of all obstacles inhibiting modernization of the Newfoundland fishery was the failure of the fresh fish industry dependent on North American markets to render sufficient returns to improve the standard of living of fishers and plant workers. Increases in the cost of housing and services associated with modernity ate up plant workers’ wages. Furthermore, many coastal people preferred the freedom of living in an environment in which they had some control over their working lives. Many subsistence activities could not be practised in growth centres. Householders who had capital investments in the inshore sector wished to move to nearby centres from which they could utilize gear and equipment and fish ancestral grounds. In addition, some residents, whose job depended on the survival of the community, organized resistance to resettlement to any growth centre. On the other side, town councils of major growth centres passed by-laws barring salvaged houses from subdivisions. Discontented households claimed resettlement reduced them to a degraded state in which they experienced a greater sense of alienation and isolation than they ever felt before the move. The authors of the FHRP, who aimed to move fishing families from a peasant-style economy into a wage economy by offering cash incentives and promises of a better
quality of life and a higher standard of living, created a regimented underclass whose wages were so low they could barely cover basic needs.

Building an Industrial Fishery on the Burin Peninsula

Nowhere was the problem of the transition to a modern fishery more acute than on the Burin Peninsula. Fishery Products Ltd., a company which John T. Cheeseman, Newfoundland’s fisheries minister (1957-1963) compared it to a sick patient requiring regular blood transfusions to stay alive, opened a plant at Burin in 1942.¹ In the 1950s Bonavista Cold Storage Ltd. opened a plant in Grand Bank and Booth Fisheries Ltd. took control of a plant owned by the Lake Group of companies at Fortune. In 1967 Atlantic Fish Processors Ltd. leased the government-owned plant at Marystown and acquired a fleet of stern trawlers to supply it. Burin, Grand Bank, Fortune and Marystown were ice-free ports located close to the Grand Banks and access experienced deep sea fishers.

The construction of the fish plant and shipyard transformed Marystown into a modern industrial town, the commercial and service centre of the Burin Peninsula. To accommodate the anticipated population increase, Newfoundland and Labrador Housing Corporation (NLHC) developed a subdivision with more than 200 housing units. Marystown, equipped with banks, a modern hotel, a shopping mall, a shipyard with a synchrolift, and the newest and largest fresh fish processing plant in the province was poised to become one of Newfoundland’s top industrial towns. The plant, during peak production, employed a thousand workers on shore and at sea. The Daily News reported

¹John T. Cheeseman, Minister of Fisheries, notes prepared in advance of a cabinet meeting to discuss extending further loans to Fishery Products Ltd. He advised cabinet to approve the loans because the company had become too important to the Newfoundland economy to allow it to fail. Smallwood Collection, Coll. 065, File 2.11.011, ASC, Memorial University.
in the winter of 1969 that the demand for labour and provision of affordable housing in
the four Burin Peninsula towns made resettlement on the Burin Peninsula more organized
and successful than anywhere else in the province. The report glossed over the growing
pains that these towns experienced and the struggle resettlers had to find affordable
housing.

The Resettlement Agreement empowered the Newfoundland Fisheries Household
Resettlement Committee (FHRC) to select and classify growth centres. All major
fisheries growth centres were Category “A”, i.e., offshore fisheries bases with fresh fish
plants operating year round and having space for expansion. Four of eight towns in
Category “A” were located in former banks fishing centres on the Burin Peninsula.
Although the industrial fishing bases experienced unprecedented growth, small inshore
fishing communities declined and several petitioned to relocate. Among them were
Colmer, High Beach, Roundabout, Long Cove, Wandsworth, Point Rosie and Corbin.
During the period 1965-70, the population of Burin increased by 700, Fortune by 400,
Grand Bank by 500, and Marystown had a net gain of nearly 1600. Much of Marystown’s
increased population was due to amalgamation of neighbouring communities of Mooring

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3 David S. Courtney, “The Newfoundland Household Resettlement Program: A Case
Study in Spatial Reorganization and Growth Centre Strategy,” M. A. Thesis, Memorial
University, 1973. The FHRC also classified Fermeuse, Harbour Breton, Harbour Grace,
and Trepassey as major fisheries growth centres in 1967. Resettled householders moving
into land assembly areas in a major fisheries growth centre qualified for a supplementary
grant up to $3,000 in addition to regular grants.
4 Memorandum from Ken Harnum to Ross Young, Newfoundland Fisheries Development
Authority, “Population of Places on the Burin Peninsula,” 29 August 1969. GN39/1,
Burin Peninsula File S349, PANL.
Cove, the site of the fish plant, Little Bay, and Creston.\textsuperscript{5} The post-war baby boom, as well as resettlement, contributed to this population growth.

While centralization added to the population of the four major fisheries growth centres, citizens of neighbouring settlements were often reluctant to relocate to one of the industrial fishing towns. For example, families from Wandsworth resettled despite warnings from the Director of Resettlement that they would not receive resettlement grants.\textsuperscript{6} After taking note of the age structure of the householders intending to move, the FHRC relented and approved the Wandsworth to Epworth move on humanitarian grounds. Corbin families who also chose not to resettle into Burin or Marystown also received resettlement grants.\textsuperscript{7} The residents of Point Rosie resettled only after the FHRC added Garnish to the list of approved reception centres and rationalized their decision by stating Garnish was within commuting distance of Category “A” growth points. Following a visit to Point Rosie, H. R. V. Earle, MHA, and Ken Harnum formed the opinion that women were eager to move for the sake of the children, but the older men wished to stay.\textsuperscript{8}

Older fishers, who had capital invested in the inshore fishery, were often the most opposed to leaving the outports. They had an antipathy to the offshore sector which intensified when offshore vessels trespassed on inshore grounds. Inshore fishers accused dragger skippers of destroying gear and fishing grounds. Whatever their reasons, or

\textsuperscript{5}Harnum to Young, “Population of Places on the Burin Peninsula.” GN39/1, Burin Peninsula File S349, PANL.
\textsuperscript{6}A. G. Stacey to Harnum, 21 June 1966. GN39/1, File S66, PANL.
\textsuperscript{7}GN39/1, File S221, PANL. The minister of C&SD used Section 3(e) of the Agreement to declare Corbin an evacuated community.
\textsuperscript{8}H. R. V. Earle to Harnum 6 September 1966. GN39/1, File S143, PANL.
grievances, the FHRC had difficulty encouraging resettling households to join the industrial workforce. Brox found that the problem for Burin Peninsula fish plants was not so much a labour shortage, but one of labour instability. He attributed the high turnover of plant workers and trawler crews to low wages of fish processing companies and the high cost of living in industrial towns. Brox found that resettlers sometimes preferred to move to communities that were more resource poor than the sending community, but in which affordable building lots and houses were available. Rural people had an aversion to rent and mortgages, and the expenses of urban living. They valued a house more than a job; for them home ownership represented security.

By 1966 the FHRC realized housing, together with the schools crisis, threatened to defeat the goals of the joint resettlement program. Unless they found a solution to the housing bottleneck, the FHRP was unlikely to provide sufficient labour to satisfy the needs of the fresh fish processing companies. Harnum informed the FHRC that only five percent of resettled householders moved houses in the first year of the program and the lack of available housing and serviced lots had reached the crisis stage. Until the Newfoundland and Labrador Housing Corporation (NLHC) and the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) made affordable housing available the resettlement

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9See Brox, “Resettlement in Newfoundland,” in Michael Skolnik, ed., Viewpoints on Communities in Crisis and Ottar Brox, ed., The Political Economy of Rural Development: Modernization Without Centralization, (Netherlands: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2006). Brox calculated that the average fish plant worker with an income of $2,800 could not afford a mortgage on a home costing $15,000 even if he received maximum assistance. 10Federal/Provincial Committee Meeting on Centralization, 10-11 March 1966. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 1.03.004, ASC, Memorial University.
program was unlikely to meet the goal of moving 20,000 people in five years.\textsuperscript{11} Housing was blocking the transfer of people from subsistence work into waged activity.

Industrialization depended on urbanization, and fish plant operators continued to wrestle with the problem of labour instability and shortages. A meeting of the Ministers of C&SD, Municipal Affairs and Housing, Education and Highways, together with their deputies, projected that the industrial sector would require 3,350 new workers, afloat and ashore, to satisfy the needs of the industrial fishery in the last half of the 1960s. They anticipated the Burin Peninsula plants alone required at least 2,000 additional workers to maximize the profits in the offshore sector. The human resource needs of processing companies could not be met until the housing problem was resolved, and most realized that a fisher could not replace the house he left behind on a plant worker’s salary of less than $3,000. The full-time offshore fishers, who earned annual salaries in the $4,000 range could probably afford the mortgage payments on a $15,000 home, but they did not need to live in one of the growth centres. At a housing conference in 1966, J. T. Allston, Director of Urban and Rural Planning, Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing, emphasized the need to develop municipal plans that set aside land for sub-divisions. He estimated lots could be developed at a cost of $2,000.\textsuperscript{12} A. Vivian, Newfoundland commissioner of housing, later head of the NLHC, informed the meeting that CMHC was prepared to pay 75 percent of the cost of municipal plans and land acquisition and development. In addition the Commission would make mortgages available to individuals

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Report on a Conference on Housing in Growth Centres, April 6 1966.” A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, Box 1, File 1.04.002, ASC, Memorial University.}

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Report on Conference on Housing in Growth Centres, April 6 1966.” A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, Box 1, File 1.04.002, ASC, Memorial University.}
as well as processing companies that wished to build homes for employees. He suggested co-operative housing, shell housing and subsidized rental units were options for keeping costs within an affordable range. Vivian informed the government that the price of housing was “beyond what the average plant worker can afford, or is prepared to pay.”

The idea of salvaging houses from the old community did not enter the discussion. Nor did the conference consider in-fill housing as an alternative to assembling and servicing land for construction of houses.

Vivian emphasised the need to improve counselling services, especially in the sending community, to prepare rural people for the shock of urban living and the myriad of new expenses they would encounter. He warned that efforts must be made to avoid “misunderstandings” that would inhibit the resettlement of households into major growth centres where Vivian felt they would be better off. C. Max Lane seemed more preoccupied with the orderly arrangement of houses in the new community than the welfare of the relocatees. Lane stressed the need for an ordered transfer to prevent a higgledy-piggledy arrangement that would result if households were permitted to squat anywhere. James Faris’ study of Cat Harbour and Gerald Pocius’ work on Calvert

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13 Memo on Resettlement and Housing prepared by A. Vivian, 13 December 1966. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 2.07.001, ASC, Memorial University.
15 Raymond Blake suggests that the government was concerned that without municipal plans, houses were likely to be placed in a haphazard fashion making them expensive to service. Blake, Lions or Jellyfish, 133.
demonstrate that coastal communities were more ordered than it appeared to an outsider.\(^\text{17}\)

As early as 1966 governments knew that housing was blocking the transfer of labour from the inshore to the offshore sector in which economist Parzival Copes alleged a trawler crew member could catch enough fish to employ three to four workers on shore. In February that year Harnum reminded the Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the danger of underestimating the value rural Newfoundlanders placed on home ownership and freedom from government regulation. The desire to own a home played a part in the decision of many families who left communities in Placentia West to move to the Isthmus of Avalon, where employment was doubtful, rather than resettle in the Burin Peninsula towns where fish plants were short of workers. Max Lane, Deputy Minister E. M. Gosse, and Assistant Deputy Minister Aidan Maloney, and Harnum were aware of the need to persuade resettlers into major growth points, but feared giving too much direction would expose the FHRP, which they insisted was a voluntary program, to charges that they were forcing resettlers to move to the Burin Peninsula. Harnum advised Gosse that any overzealous attempt by government bureaucrats to direct householders into a receiving community could create a backlash that could jeopardize the success of the program.\(^\text{18}\)

While Harnum advised bureaucrats to practice restraint, he had no reservations about using local power structures to persuade families to move to industrial fisheries


\(^{18}\)Memorandum from Harnum to the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, 21 February 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
bases. Harnum proposed that mayors of growth points, plant managers, and clergy visit communities contemplating resettlement in order to apprize them of the benefits of moving to a town with modern services and guaranteed employment. The team should also inform communities contemplating moving of the availability of serviced and unserviced land, as well as information on schools and religious services in the town. By using local leaders as point men, Harnum postulated the resettlement division could achieve its goal with a minimum of negative publicity. He asked the deputy minister to send a letter under the Department of Fisheries letterhead to industry, civic and church leaders to enquire as to what they were prepared to do to entice resettlers into their towns.\textsuperscript{19} Burin responded by organizing a delegation that included the manager of the Fishery Products plant and the Roman Catholic parish priest.\textsuperscript{20} The priest, they believed, could persuade people in Catholic communities that they would be better off in Burin where they could avail of better spiritual and education services. Aubrey M. Penney claimed that “old people and government employees, who knew where their cheque was coming from,” blocked moves from Tack’s Beach to Burin where work was available.\textsuperscript{21}

In a letter to Harnum, Augustus (Gus) Etchegary, Vice President of Fishery Products Ltd., informed the Resettlement Division of the company’s need for additional workers at both Burin and Trepassey.\textsuperscript{22} He claimed that the labour shortage in the Burin

\textsuperscript{19}Memorandum from Harnum to the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, 21 February 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
\textsuperscript{20}Aubrey M. Penney to Harnum, 2 March 1966. GN39/1, Box 32, File H1925, PANL.
\textsuperscript{21}Penney to Harnum, 2 March 1966.
\textsuperscript{22}A. A. Etchegary to Harnum, 27 June 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
plant was so critical that he threatened to divert Burin-based trawlers to the Maritimes.\textsuperscript{23}

He claimed a shortage of cutters was threatening the viability of the company in all the single-industry towns in which Fishery Products operated. Etchegary urged Harnum to recruit more workers for Burin and Trepassey, which the company recently converted into a year-round operation. The vice-president claimed the difficulty would not exist if the government took a more aggressive approach to guide fishermen into industrial centres.

Etchegary blamed the dire situation on ineffective, or non-existent counselling in sending communities. He felt government was not doing enough to make householders aware of the procedures for getting resettlement grants or distributing sufficient data on employment prospects in growth points to enable those contemplating resettlement to make informed decisions. He, and no doubt other industry leaders, believed government had an obligation to eliminate confusion by sending a team of officials to explain the mechanics of resettlement, availability of grants, and opportunities for employment in fisheries growth centres. Etchegary believed a counselling team could discourage householders from moving to centres with few employment opportunities and services, and encourage families to move to Burin and Trepassey where worker shortages were likely to bankrupt the company. He urged Harnum to send a counselling team into the

\textsuperscript{23}Etchegary alleged that large numbers of plant workers and trawlermen defected to Marystown. He reported that Burin trawlers landed fish in Burgeo, Isle aux Morts, Catalina, and Trepassey because Burin labour force could not process the catches. Lew Fizzard, production manager of the Burin plant in the 1960s, informed the author that Fishery Products contracted the Bonavista Cold Storage company to process fish caught by Fishery Product trawlers. The Burin plant, as did all processing companies, hired high school students to fill gaps in the production line on weekends. As a high school student at Fortune, the author worked some weekends at Booth Fisheries.
outports before teachers were appointed for the following year. Etchegary feared that if householders learned the school would reopen in the fall they might not move that year.  

He asserted that more outports would evacuate if they received more direction from resettlement officials. Etchegary referred to a letter he received from a resident of Greenspond alleging that four or five households were prepared to move if they “could come up with somewhere to go.”

Harnum responded by visiting the Burin Peninsula to survey conditions in the growth points and to determine the extent of the labour shortage. Following the tour he informed Zeman W. Sametz, Deputy Minister of C&SD, that he had met with management of all four fish plants and all claimed that they had reached the “point of desperation” in their efforts to maintain a workforce of sufficient strength to operate efficiently. The shortage became even more critical during the winter when trawlermen and plant workers, who lived outside the industrial centre, returned home to engage in subsistence activities and reunite with families. At Grand Bank Harnum interviewed men who each spring left families in Seal Cove, Fortune Bay, to work at the Bonavista Cold Storage plant. He reported that 20 of the 21 workers agreed to resettle permanently if their houses could be floated to Grand Bank. The Director agreed that plant workers could only afford to move permanently if houses were transported and NLHC offered lots at a price the low-income plant worker could afford. If the Seal Cove workers were a typical sample, then it could be inferred that sentimental attachment to place could be

24 Etchegary to Harnum, 27 June 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
25 Marshall Green, Greenspond, to Gordon C. Shea, 24 June 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
26 Memorandum from Harnum to Deputy Minister of C&SD, 1 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
overcome if homes were moved along with the household. To illustrate, Harnum informed Sametz that 12 of 30 families of Oderin, who indicated to him an interest in moving to Marystown and/or Burin, were now resettled in less productive centres, such as Rushoon.27

Harnum returned from the Burin Peninsula convinced that the Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing was responsible for the housing debacle, especially at Marystown, a town blessed with two industries. He noted that the FHRC had designated Marystown, Grand Bank, Burin and Fortune for growth in the winter of 1965, but two and one-half years later moves to these centres were being blocked due to the Planning Division’s tardiness in developing a Municipal Plans for those towns. Until the plan was completed the local council could not authorized a building permit.28 Harnum informed Sametz that the Marystown town clerk showed him many applications for building permits, but until Municipal Affairs lifted the land freeze, the council’s hands were tied. The Director insisted that Marystown desperately needed land assembled for lot layouts to accommodate both new and relocated homes. At Burin Fishery Products attempted to mitigate the crisis by constructing bunkhouses. At its best, this was a temporary solution.

Management knew bunkhouses would not solve the high rate of worker turnover, eliminate absenteeism or the custom of returning home for the winter. This seasonal ritual was part of an established routine in rural Newfoundland and should not be misconstrued.

27Harnum to Deputy Minister, Community and Social Development, 1 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
28Memorandum from Harnum to Sametz, 1 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
as laziness or an aversion to the discipline of wage labour. Historian Steve High attributed the high rate of worker turnover at Argentia to a desire to maintain a traditional culture, rather than “a general disposition to continuous work,” or an inclination to hibernate each winter. There was a dearth of defenders of a pluralistic economy or a fishery centred in household production, but rural Newfoundlanders continued to practice it because families with limited savings could not afford basic necessities in an urban setting on a plant worker’s wages.

If the integrated trawler-processing companies experienced difficulties attracting and keeping workers, then higher wages appeared to be a solution. But the companies claimed profit margins were low due to Scandinavian and European countries dumping fish in US markets. An increase in labour costs would drive them out of business. If one accepts this as true, then the only solution was low-cost public housing or larger supplementary grants to compensate for the high cost of living in urban centres. Unless a creative solution to the housing problem emerged, resettlers would continue to flock to organized reception centres where there were fewer amenities, and opportunities to improve their condition were minimal. The majority of residents of Tack’s Beach rejected offers of employment in Burin and elected to move to Arnold’s Cove, a community with cheaper land and a lower cost of living. Burin had modern amenities and schools to accommodate the children, but households preferred to relocate to a place which was a terminus for the privately operated ferry from Tack’s Beach. It was a

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30 High, Base Colonies, 151.
convenient location for commuting workers, and brought the elderly and disabled closer to medical services. For the employed, the disabled, and the retired, employment was a non-issue. Those who wished to remain in the fishery, like Millicent and Frank Best, had the option, inconvenient as it was, to return to old fishing rooms at Tack’s Beach to fish in an evacuated outport with no services.31

One disgruntled relocatee told Harnum that old people, government employees, and the merchants conspired to prevent fishermen from moving to growth centres, but claimed women were mainly responsible for the decision to move to Arnold’s Cove, a place where there was “only welfare and no work.”32 If one of the goals of resettlement was to transform a “peasant-level society into a market-oriented industrial one” as sociologists claimed, the architects of the program would have to overcome the psychological, economic and social barriers that blocked their engineering project.33

Economist Michael Skolnik proposed that while industrialization necessitated centralization, reduction of communities would not necessarily lead to industrialization.34 He correctly argued that without a program of education and training the transition to an urban industrial society would be bumpy.

One Federal Department of Fisheries bureaucrat seemed satisfied that the “benefits of resettlement would be felt in the next generation.”35 A. W. Needler,

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32Aubrey Penney to Harnum, 2 March 1966. GN39/1, Box 32, Householder File H1925, PANL.
33Iverson and Matthews, Communities in Decline, 135.
35A. W. Needler, Chairman of the Federal - Provincial Advisory Committee, Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program Annual Meeting, St. John’s,
Chairman of the Federal/Provincial Advisory Committee, stated that the primary purpose of federal fisheries department’s participation in the FHRP was to oversee a program of fisheries development that would make fishers more mobile. Needler contended that planners could not have predicted the problems in housing and education that arose from resettlement. He did not explain why the planners did not foresee that relocation of 20,000 persons in a five year period would lead to a school and housing crisis. Needler stated the objectives of the program were: “to help people adjust their income and raise the standard of living; to benefit the next generation; and to make the fishing industry more viable.” These were noble goals but were difficult to achieve without greater state coercion. No doubt the incomes of many resettlers improved, but disposable income actually declined due to elimination of subsistence activities such as gathering firewood and agriculture. Many households chose reception centres that had better transportation and medical services, but few opportunities to change occupations.

“We have,” Smallwood wrote Lester Pearson, “an anomalous situation in which there are large numbers of unemployed and underemployed people [in isolated outports] and at the same time unmet labour demands [in growth poles].” Brox found little evidence of fishermen moving from trapskiffs to druggers, or improvements in standard of living. Inshore fishermen, accustomed to having the freedom to decide if the conditions were suitable for fishing and comforted by the thought they would spend each

12 June 1969. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, File 1.04.004, ASC, Memorial University.


37 Quoted in Blake, Lions or Jellyfish, 134.

38 Brox, “Resettlement in Newfoundland,” in Viewpoints, 12.
night safe in their own home, did not find the prospect of spending up to two weeks at sea, in all kinds of weather, very appealing. Nonetheless, there were exceptions. For example, Brox reported that some former residents of Tack’s Beach were aboard Burin draggers in the winter of 1968, but most of the ethnographic studies found that resettlers preferred to move short distances to places that offered them opportunities to continue in the inshore sector using old fishing grounds. Brox proposed that fishermen took advantage of the program to pressure government to expend funds on useless moves.

Social anthropologist Cato Wadel recommended planners introduce a new program to keep community evacuations to a minimum by supporting innovation in situ. The FHRC dismissed the social scientists as romantics and one Committee member, W. L. Mackenzie of the federal Department of Fisheries and Forestry, accused Brox and Wadel of wishing to keep the outports in a static state to preserve them for future study. Zeman Sametz claimed Brox, Wadel and Dyke exaggerated the economic benefits of subsistence activities and minimized the cumulative effect of community closures. For example, the resettlement of isolated communities in Placentia Bay cut the

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39 Fred Earle, a MUN Extension field worker, showed a film of depicting life aboard an offshore trawler during the Fogo Island Experiment in rural development. Earle’s motive was not to encourage Fogo Islanders to resettle to Burin, but to encourage them to develop local resources.


41 Cato Wadel, Marginal Adaptations, 73.

42 Minutes of Federal - Provincial Advisory Committee, Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program Annual Meeting, St. John’s, 12 June 1969. (A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, File 1.04.004, ASC, Memorial University. In his 1969 budget speech Smallwood defended the old and new resettlement programs by attacking academic and media critics. He dismissed academic studies as useless and accused Farley Mowat and W5, a CTV documentary program, of portraying government officials as criminals who had murdered an unspoiled way of life. (J. R. Smallwood, Budget Speech, 30 April, 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
cost of providing coastal boat service to a minimum in the space of two years. The Committee confined its comments on the Iverson and Matthews report to a single statement. It alleged that the decision to combine data from two programs skewed their report. In contrast, the Committee considered reports prepared by economists A. L. Robb and R. E. Robb, and Parzival Copes, to be more rational, objective and accurate. Sametz criticized the sociological reports for ignoring the economic benefits of releasing youth to the labour force, but youth left rural regions without state intervention. Smallwood dismissed the sociological studies as useless and denounced reports that accused government of cultural genocide.

The Director of Programs for the Atlantic Region, G. E. McClure, wondered whether resettlement should be one of several development strategies or if government would continue to make it a central piece. The Committee concluded that the FHRP was producing beneficial results in three respects: first, it had made a significant improvement in the economy of the province; second, economic, social and cultural benefits accrued to the participants; and the evacuation of isolated communities had helped eradicate illiteracy that was linked to poverty. In his closing remarks, Needler acknowledged that resettlement had been slowed by inadequate infrastructure and lack of employment in reception centres. The fisheries scientist refuted the claims of economists who purported

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44 Parzival Copes, *Resettlement of Fishing Communities in Newfoundland*.


fishing vessels over 100 feet were the most productive and efficient. He pointed out vessels less than 75 feet landed half of the total catch for Canada. Paradoxically, he cautioned fisheries development experts not to rush into resettlement or neglect the inshore. Earlier in the conference he proposed reducing the number of inshore fishermen by 50 percent. Needler concluded his address by predicting the resettlement program should continue to eliminate illiteracy and to lay the foundation for a modern fishery.\textsuperscript{47}

Copes’ main criticism of the FHRP was that it did not go far enough. He criticized Smallwood for restricting the program to assisting moves within the province, arguing that moving people from one unviable area to another did not improve the provincial economy or produce more productive citizens.\textsuperscript{48} His study, which was principally an analysis of the inshore fishing economy, criticised the FHRC for not directing householders into major fishery growth points, where a labour shortage threatened to destroy the fisheries development plan.\textsuperscript{49} He proposed that the resettlement program should assist multiple moves in order to orient households to wage work in Newfoundland, and after they had acquired the necessary skills, and were orientated to industrial work, they should be assisted to relocate to Ontario and Alberta.\textsuperscript{50} Brox, Wadel and Skolnik considered the FHRP too intrusive, but Copes criticized the FHRP for not being more interventionist.


\textsuperscript{48}Smallwood would not agree to expand the FHRP to include extra-provincial migrants. His aim was to create jobs to allow Newfoundlander to stay home.

\textsuperscript{49}Parzival Copes, \textit{Resettlement of Fishing Communities in Newfoundland} (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Rural Development, 1972), 75.

\textsuperscript{50}Copes, \textit{Resettlement}, 113-7.
Ralph Matthews challenged Copes’ study, claiming Copes produced a biased study which denigrated the inshore fishery without subjecting the offshore sector to the same degree of scrutiny. He produced data to demonstrate the dependence of shore fishers on social welfare, but downplayed the dependence of fish companies on government supports. Matthews wondered how viable the offshore fishery would be if the government eliminated the massive program of subsidies paid out for construction of plants and trawlers.\textsuperscript{51} Alexander calculated that between 1949 and 1970 the state extended $40 million in loans and grants to the offshore sector most of which were never repaid.

Novelist Farley Mowat questioned the merits of resettlement on humanitarian grounds. He accused resettlement planners of “unsettling the mind and distressing the spirit” of communities while promising rural people a utopian lifestyle in a growth centre. In his narrative, outport people, succumbing to the overtures of resettlement officials, concluded that they had to trade the deprived life of a fishing community for the “good life” in a growth centre. Mowat rejected the claims of “apostles of instant change” who professed centralization was the best means to improve quality of life and standard of living:

The entrepreneurs of the new industries wanted labour and they wanted it cheap. The outport people had to be induced - and if not induced, then forced - to abandon the ways of the world they knew. The government reduced services and let them run down and

then devised a centralization plan to induce them to move to growth centres where no jobs exist and young men have to move to central Canada.\textsuperscript{52}

Mowat, who lived in a fisheries growth centre in the 1960s, acknowledged that Burgeo had increased in population, but he considered it a dying community unable to employ the current population.\textsuperscript{53} The journalist Ray Guy shared Mowat’s belief that the resettlement program forced families from pristine productive environments into slums.\textsuperscript{54} These renowned authors railed against the resettlement program and its promoters. Guy attacked Smallwood and his officials for considering outports to be beyond the realm of civilization, ignoring cultural values and treating people as pawns to be moved at the will of distant governments.\textsuperscript{55}

While such attacks affected public opinion and embarrassed politicians, it diminished the role played by locals, as we shall see in subsequent chapters. The evacuation of King’s Island and Long Island, Placentia Bay, for example, remains controversial, but the fact is the residents of Tack’s Beach, Best’s Harbour, Broad Cove and Harbour Buffett insisted on resettling to the isthmus where a freeze on development was in effect. They pressured the Resettlement Committee to approve Come-by-Chance, Arnold’s Cove, Southern Harbour, and Little Harbour West as organized reception centres. Similarly, Placentia West families refused to relocate until government agreed to relocate them to Rushoon from which fishers could continue to fish the old grounds.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53}Farley Mowat and John de Visser, \textit{The Rock Within the Sea: A Heritage Lost}, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), unpaged.
\textsuperscript{55}Ray Guy, “We Shall Undercome,” in \textit{That Far Greater Bay}, 54.
\textsuperscript{56}See GN39/1, Box 128, Rushoon File S168, PANL.
The families of Port Elizabeth mounted such strong opposition to resettling to Marystown and Burin that they forced government leaders to re-open Red Harbour, an evacuated outport.\textsuperscript{57} The householders of Port Elizabeth, backed by their merchant, clergy, and community council, pressured the provincial and national governments to build a new community, thus contravening the principles of resettlement.

People refused to move to the fisheries growth centres or other industrial towns within the province for many reasons. Land freezes, the price of building lots, the attachment to home ownership, their aversion to taxes, mortgages and rent, all combined with a reluctance of fishers to change occupations were obstacles in the road to modernity. The administrators of resettlement realized that fishers, turned plant workers, could not carry a mortgage on a home in a growth centre even with supplementary assistance.\textsuperscript{58} In Ottawa the Special Planning Unit in the Privy Council Office opined that the state had never invested in privately owned housing. However, cabinet did approve lot supplementary mortgages, which were described in the previous chapter.

Until government solved the housing crisis, the labour shortage in the offshore fisheries bases would continue to put the modernization program at risk. Premier Smallwood expressed his concerns in a letter to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{59} He alleged that unless the housing problem in the industrial fishing ports could resolved, the whole fisheries development initiative would crumble. The Frozen Fish Trades Association,

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{57} In other chapters of this thesis I have provided several examples of resistance in which communities either rejected resettlement outright, or refused to be directed into urban growth centres.
\item\textsuperscript{58} Harnum to Deputy Minister, Community and Social Development, 1 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, Burin File S5, PANL.
\end{footnotes}
The Frozen Fish Trades Association, Ltd. presented a brief to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing outlining difficulties the housing shortage presented for the frozen fish trade. Responding to appeals from the Association, and reports from the Director of Resettlement acknowledging that plant workers could not afford houses built to national standards, the governments decided to provide supplementary assistance to householders who moved into major fisheries growth centres. In 1967 Canada and Newfoundland negotiated improvements to the Agreement that included payment of supplementary grants to offset the high cost of building lots in urban growth centres and thereby reduce the cost of home ownership. The Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing estimated an average plant worker could only sustain a debt load equivalent to half the cost of a house constructed to national standards on a serviced lot while older workers could sustain even less.

CMHC and NLHC began assembling land in Burin, Grand Bank, Fortune and Marystown to free the bottleneck. At Burin the rugged landscape in the town and a land freeze at Marystown restricted housing development. In March 1969 the Daily News reported NLHC had completed 20 new homes and Fishery Products, Ltd. was in the process of constructing an additional 12 in Black Duck Cove subdivision at Burin. In addition six Port Elizabethan homes were set up in the subdivision. Similar developments took place in other growth points, but the municipal councils of Fortune

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60 The Frozen Fish Trades Association, Ltd. to John Crosbie, 23 February, 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
62 Burin Peninsula Staff, “Housing Corporation Continues to play Big Role in Development,” Daily News, 10 March 1969. GN39/1, File S 349, PANL.
63 See chapter on move from Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour.
and Grand Bank passed a by-law prohibiting placement of houses salvaged from vacated communities in subdivisions within their town boundaries. The towns advised C&SD officials that they would continue to welcome new resettlers on condition they purchased or rented existing units, or built new ones.\textsuperscript{64}

In the summer of 1969 several families from Rencontre West became the first casualties of this municipal-imposed embargo. According to R. Hatcher, the Anglican parish priest, the regional development officer made a commitment to move their houses to Fortune, and have them ready for occupancy. However, the priest alleged the resettlers arrived in the town with no one to greet them and no place to live.\textsuperscript{65} The town council was not prepared to receive any more houses unless a representative of council inspected the houses in the sending community. In 1974 the town of Grand Bank informed Harnum that they, too, would not accept any more units from the inventory of salvaged houses until the town clerk verified the condition of homes.\textsuperscript{66} The by-laws passed by Grand Bank and Fortune councils resulted in part from a decreasing demand for plant workers due to depressed US markets.\textsuperscript{67} The situation had changed drastically from the heady days of 1966 when Harnum informed the Minister of Fisheries that “reliable sources”

\textsuperscript{64} A Meeting of officials of the Department of Community and Social Development and Harvey Lake, Fortune Town Manager, 11 February 1972. GN39/1, File S 349, PANL. Lake informed the meeting that he had informed the resettlement division of the municipal resolution when it was passed in 1970.
\textsuperscript{65} Rev. R. Hatcher to W. N. Rowe, Minister of Community and Social Development, 19 October 1970. GN39/1, File S 349, PANL.
\textsuperscript{66} A. S. White, Town Clerk, to Harnum, 21 May, 1974. GN39/1, Box 125, File S13, PANL.
\textsuperscript{67} “Fish Plant Operations Slowed Down,” \textit{Daily News}, 19 March 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S13. The Rooms. The report stated that Bonavista Cold Storage workers were getting only two days work per week and the employees at Harbour Breton were reduced to 1.5 days.
anticipated that Booth Fisheries would need a total of 400 new plant workers and trawlemen.\textsuperscript{68} Buoyed by this report, Harnum urged the town of Fortune to assemble land for a layout of 400 lots to accommodate new families.

In the same year Arthur H. Monroe, owner of Fishery Products Ltd., advised the Burin MHA, Alex Hickman that due to a shortage of plant workers and the high rate of absenteeism he had decided not to expand the trawler fleet for the Burin plant.\textsuperscript{69} Monroe complained that the shortage of filleters and the high rate of absenteeism threatened the viability of the Burin plant.\textsuperscript{70} His second grievance was against trawler crews who refused to sail before new year’s day. Monroe informed Alex Hickman that in previous years the first dragger had left port on Boxing Day. He complained crews now refused to leave port before New Year’s Day. The company owner displayed no empathy for men (they were all men) who had a forty-eight hour turnaround period between trips.

Trawlermen were co-adventurers who sometimes spent a hazardous ten to fourteen days at sea without earning enough to pay the expenses.\textsuperscript{71} Similarly if management decided the catch literally did not pass a smell test, the full load was sent to the meal plant without any remuneration for the crew. Awareness of these conditions combined with loss of life at sea discouraged inshore fishers. The deck of a trawler was a hazardous workplace, and during the winter months the dangers increased. The loss of the Blue Wave and the Blue

\textsuperscript{68} Harnum to Mayor of Fortune, 22 February 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{69} Arthur H. Monroe to T. Alex Hickman 29 December, 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{70} Monroe to Hickman, 29 December 1966. Monroe informed Hickman that the Burin cutting line required 85 workers but they were down to 50.
\textsuperscript{71} See David Macdonald, \textit{Power Begins at the Cod End: The Newfoundland Trawlermen’s Strike, 1974} (St: John’s: ISER, 1980).
Mist in 1959 and 1966, respectively, further discouraged participation in the deep-sea fishery. Monroe, apparently, saw no relationship between working conditions and the company’s struggle to recruit and retain workers, or that the hazards of the offshore fishery deterred resettlers from manning trawlers. Fishery Products, which paid slightly more than the industry average, could have reduced absenteeism and attracted new employees by adopting more humane practices and paying higher wages. Monroe chose to blame the company’s labour problems on its Marystown competitor, Atlantic Fish Processors, Ltd. He contended the competition for labour in a market where there were “at least two jobs for every man” drove up labour costs and reduced productivity. The plant owner also claimed that NLHC ignored housing needs of Burin, Grand Bank and Fortune and directed all resources to building new subdivisions in Marystown. He wrote that Atlantic Fish had made the labour situation so unstable that management had been

72 In 1959 The Blue Wave sank during a winter storm. An accumulation of ice on the superstructure causing the vessel capsize. None of her sixteen-man crew survived. The Blue Mist II, a sister ship, sank in similar circumstances on 5 December, 1966 taking a crew of 13 men with her. The latter tragedy occurred a mere three weeks before Arthur H. Monroe penned a letter to T. Alex Hickman begrudging trawlermen time on shore to celebrate Christmas with family.

73 See Macdonald, Power Begins at the Cod End, Chapter 3. In the 1970-4 period the Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied Workers Union (NFFAW) negotiated wage increases of 300% for plant workers and negotiated better fish prices for shore fishers and trawler crews. Following a nine-month strike by trawlermen in 1974-5, the companies agreed to end the co-adventurer system. However, a fraction of a trawler crew’s income still depended on the amount, quality and specie of fish delivered to the plant.

74 Fishery Products, Ltd. directed its trawlers to land at any one of several ports in which they operated plants. A crewmember whose home port was Burin, could be diverted to Trepassey, Catalina, Isle aux Morts, giving crew practically no time with family. Furthermore, the company adhered strictly to the co-adventurer system, limiting the income of trawler crews to a share of the catch. Atlantic Fish Processors cracked the co-adventurer system by paying their crewmembers a per diem starting in 1967.
forced to employ 700 different persons in 1966 to maintain a workforce of 300.\textsuperscript{75} Monroe advised the Burin District MHA that until government addressed the housing problem, labour instability would continue to plague the industry. Monroe refused to recognize low wages and sub-standard working conditions as one cause of Fishery Products’ labour and low worker productivity. Monroe accused government of wrecking an organization that had been operating for 20 years by constructing a competing plant at Marystown. The Vice-President of Trawler Procurement, Gus Etchegary, attacked government for denying Burin an opportunity to benefit from the resettlement program by concentrating housing developments in Marystown.\textsuperscript{76} He implied government was willing to put the Burin plant at risk by diverting labour to Marystown to ensure the viability of the crown-owned plant.

Executives of Bonavista Cold Storage and Booth Fisheries also complained that shortage of affordable housing hindered labour recruitment and stability. At a public meeting attended by representatives from C&SD and the Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Booth Fisheries plant manager, H. Maugher, stressed the need to assemble and develop more lots. Maugher reported that 75 percent of the company’s trawlermen, and 55 percent of all employees commuted.\textsuperscript{77} Like Etchegary, he believed that his company would benefit more from the FHRP if Municipal Affairs made more housing units available. He also anticipated that improved harbour facilities would entice more inshore fishers and longliner operators to relocate to Fortune and contribute to the profitability of Booth Fisheries by allowing the company to reopen lines shut down due

\textsuperscript{75}Monroe to Hickman, 29 December 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{76}Monroe to Hickman, 29 December 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{77}Harvey Lake, Town Clerk, Fortune, to Beaton J. Abbott, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 16 July 1968. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
to lack of fish. He contended that the resettlement program became counter-productive when it removed fishers from traditional fishing grounds. Maugher suggested that the government should outfit resettled shore fishers with longliners to permit them to return to fish the abandoned grounds. The plant manager also suggested that the high cost of purchasing stern trawlers, plus the cost of fuel and trawl nets, made the draggers less efficient than smaller inshore and near-shore vessels. He reported that 85 local and relocated fisher supplied one-eighth of total output of the Fortune plant. Maugher hoped government would improve harbour facilities to make room for more inshore fishers. It was very rare to hear an executive of the industrial fishery trumpet the benefits of preserving the inshore sector. The council estimated Fortune would needed fifty houses to meet immediate demand. The council informed the C&SD that eight families of Parson’s Harbour inquired about building lots, but only two were available. Council was trying to make arrangements for the other six households. The town also considered the price of serviced lots to be beyond the means of householders who did not qualify for maximum lot supplementary assistance.

Government’s decision to not make supplementary grants retroactive generated discontent among resettlers and discouraged moves to industrial towns. The vacancy rate

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78 Meeting of Community and Social Development Officials and Town of Fortune, 11 February, 1972. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
79 “Deep-sea Fishing Activity Costs Double: Increased Activity Could Hurt,” Evening Telegram, 8 November 1968. Maugher told the Telegram that trawlers were forced to fish further from home ports, and to fish rougher bottom due to fish being depleted on smoother ground. He warned that any increase in fishing effort by foreign fleets would “bring great harm to the stocks.” In 1970 Booth Fisheries purchased 12.5% of the 59.5 million pounds it processed from local fishermen. Gary Campbell, “Re: Proposed Access Road, Fortune, 1970 Study.” GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
80 Meeting of Community and Social Development Officials and Town of Fortune, 11 February 1972. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
in an NLHC subdivision in Fortune was nearly 50 percent in 1970.\textsuperscript{81} Sametz stated that only a fraction of the 60 families resettled to Fortune could afford the serviced lots.\textsuperscript{82} Maugher reported that unless 85 percent of Booth Fisheries employees lived in Fortune, plant efficiency would suffer.\textsuperscript{83} Plant managers in Fortune, Grand Bank and Burin looked askance at Marystown and questioned why that town should benefit so much from resettlement.

While municipal councils and plant managers complained that Marystown received a disproportionate number of housing units, government officials considered the investment justified. The Burin Peninsula study reported that the majority of Marystown had the potential to accommodate a population of 8,000.\textsuperscript{84} Marystown had no municipal services or industry prior to construction of the fish plant and shipyard.\textsuperscript{85} In 1966 the Provincial Planning Office projected a need to develop 1,350 new building lots to accommodate workers.

Correspondence between Atlantic Fish executives and Newfoundland’s Fisheries Minister reveals that Marystown, too, had housing problems. Atlantic Fish Processors advised Maloney, that the rents charged for NLHC units were “unrealistic” and beyond the means of production workers as they amounted to 40 percent of incomes.\textsuperscript{86} J. M.

\textsuperscript{81}Harvey Lake, Fortune, to W. N. Rowe, 6 February 1970. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{82}Sametz to W. N. Rowe, 18 February 1970. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{83}Hickman to W. N. Rowe, 26 February 1970. GN39/1, Box 125, File S20, PANL.
\textsuperscript{84}“Marystown Municipal Plan: Burin Peninsula Study.” GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
\textsuperscript{85}“Marystown Municipal Plan: Burin Peninsula Study.” GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
\textsuperscript{86}J. M. Roberts, Atlantic Fish Processors, Ltd., to Aidan Maloney, 24 October 1967. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
Roberts also reminded the minister that Atlantic Sugar Refining leased the plant from Mooring Cove Building Company, Ltd. on condition a trained labour force be in place by 1 February 1967. He attributed labour instability, shortages and discontent amongst workers to the high cost of housing in the town. Roberts reminded Albert Vivian that very few families moving from the 80 outports resettled in 1967 had relocated to Marystown. He warned that the housing situation would become critical when the company’s lease on trailers housing key personnel expired. Many fish cutters, the most skilled production workers, lived in a temporary bunkhouse, or commuted from considerable distances daily. Like all company management, he argued the housing crisis jeopardized company plans to increase processing and harvesting capacity. Roberts alleged the cost of housing was driving Marystown Seafood Workers Union to demand unrealistic wage increases at a time when the plant was operating at only 50 percent capacity.

Roberts also accused NLHC of discriminatory housing practices. He claimed that NLHC gave preference to employees of Marystown Marine Works and denied housing to Atlantic Fish personnel on the same terms. Roberts asked NLHC to reserve a minimum of 100 low rental apartments to accommodate production workers who were forced to live apart from families. Unless the housing corporation mitigated the housing crisis Roberts contended the recruiting team, which included the plant manager and

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87 Roberts, Atlantic Fish Processors, Ltd., to Aidan Maloney, 3 January, 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.  
88 Roberts to Vivian, Chairman of NLHC, 3 January 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.  
89 Roberts to Vivian, 3 January 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
representatives of C&SD and Canada Manpower, would have limited success. He urged Maloney to immediately press into service the motorized barge, which was undergoing conversion at the Marystown shipyard. The company executive also asked government to investigate the possibility of using heavy-lift helicopters to transport homes.  

Roberts’ allegation of class discrimination may have been based on the ordering of housing in the subdivision. Shipyard management, many of whom were from the UK, occupied the largest homes at low rental rates. They were set along a street well away from apartment buildings housing plant workers. Adjacent to the apartment blocks were clusters of row houses that encompassed three floors with a small backyard covered in concrete. Detached bungalows were purchased, or rented, by teachers and other professionals in the town. Most preferred to live some distance from the blocks where the tenants formed an underclass of unemployed and underemployed workers. The cars on blocks in front of apartment buildings gave the subdivision a slum-like atmosphere.

The Director of Resettlement was aware of the critical housing shortage in fisheries growth centres. Harnum informed Sametz that housing was the main obstacle to recruiting workers for Burin Peninsula plants. The Director recommended that C&SD should take steps to solve the crisis by permitting infilling, assembling land, assisting with financing where necessary, and possibly hiring its own planning consultant to provide a simple layout appropriate to the reception centre. Harnum recommended constructing houses below national standards as a way to reduce cost. Aware plant

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90 Roberts to Vivian, 3 January 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
91 Personal observation.
92 Harnum to Sametz, 1 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
employees could not afford homes built to CMHC standards, he proposed C&SD encourage town councils to participate in a “realistic plan” that took into account tenants’ wages. In 1967 government and industry understood that the movement of coastal people into industrial fisheries bases on a large scale depended on solving the housing crisis. In 1968 the motorized government barge went into service in Placentia Bay to salvage homes from abandoned communities.

In response to memos from Harnum and complaints from company executives, Sametz met with Atlantic Fish managers to discuss the labour shortage. Roberts reminded Sametz of the terms of the lease agreement which placed onus on the province to develop a town site large enough to ensure Atlantic Fish 650 trained workers. At the end of 1967 the company was short 200 workers, and critically short of cutters, 80 percent of whom commuted. Roberts gave the Deputy Minister an ultimatum: “Either we get the workers or we have to close the doors.” He told Sametz that Atlantic Fish was losing money and, unlike Fishery Products and John Penney & Sons, had no intention of getting into the housing business. Atlantic Fish, headquartered in Toronto, made it clear it was a problem for government to solve.

Shortly after the meeting with executives of Atlantic Fish Processors, Sametz proposed the following: NLHC make available on a subsidized rental basis housing for Atlantic Fish staff, and, to avoid further charges of discrimination, government should adopt a consistent subsidization policy for employees of the shipyard and the fish plant;

93Harnum to Sametz, 1 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.

94Memorandum from Sametz to Aidan Maloney, Minster of Fisheries and Community and Social Development, “Re: Marystown Community Development,” 8 January, 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, The Rooms.
that NLHC must either induce the town to set up a trailer park or undertake one immediately; the temporary bunkhouse should continue to exist as a shelter for single workers, or as a temporary shelter for married workers; that the land freeze should be lifted and land assembled to permit housing to be built to adequate Newfoundland standards, possibly prefab or shell housing; and an interdepartmental committee be established to co-ordinate the effort.\textsuperscript{95}

In March 1968 the Provincial Planning Office presented C&SD with a residential infilling plan for Marystown.\textsuperscript{96} Harnum was anxious to have the lots prepared immediately to receive houses from Petit Forte, Monkstown, Southeast Bight and Port Elizabeth. He feared these communities would move into smaller growth centres with fewer opportunities for employment than the industrial towns of the Burin Peninsula.\textsuperscript{97} C&SD, anxious to dissuade the householders of Port Elizabeth, the majority of whom intended to move to Red Harbour, convinced cabinet to order NLHC to set aside at Marystown land “on the basis of infilling, to accommodate houses relocated from communities under the FHRP.”\textsuperscript{98} The executive order loosened the log jam. Between January and October of 1968, the FHRP assisted 50 household moves to Marystown.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{95}Sametz to Maloney, 8 January 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, The Rooms.
\textsuperscript{96}Memorandum from J. T. Allston to Community and Social Development “Re: Marystown Residential Infilling Scheme, 1 March 1968.” GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, The Rooms.
\textsuperscript{97}Harnum to A. Vivian, 5 September 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
\textsuperscript{98}Minute 747-68 of the Executive Council, 24 September 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
\textsuperscript{99}Marystown, Staff, “Marystown Triples Population in Two Years,” \textit{Daily News}, 11 October 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL. The mayor told the
But until the land freeze was lifted, the authority to approve building permits for Marystown resided in St. John’s.

The Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing denied reports that it was responsible for slowing rate of resettlement at Marystown. Vivian informed Sametz that the NLHC had assembled sufficient serviced and unserviced land, but few householders were willing to pay $500 for an unserviced lot. He reminded Sametz that in a span of 18 months 70 families had relocated to Marystown, 50 of whom received assistance under the resettlement program. He hinted that lack of information in the sending communities prevented resettlers from making informed decisions on choice of growth centre. The NLHC CEO contended that the Resettlement Division needed to eliminate confusion in the sending communities by making applicants more aware of the opportunities available in the major growth centres. He reported that all NLHC rental units were occupied as soon as they became available, but did not indicate how many tenants were resettled fish plant workers.

*Daily News* that most of the population increase resulted from the inclusion of Creston, Little Bay and Mooring Cove.

100Vivian to Sametz, 27 September 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
102E. J. Evans, Administrative Assistant to A. Vivian, to Community and Social Development, 8 November 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL. Evans referred to need to eliminate the confusion between NLHC and the resettlement division.
By mid-1969 the press reported that the construction boom arising from the new industries was about to collapse. After the Marystown Marine Works completed the last two trawlers for Atlantic Fish, work at the yard dwindled to refit and repair. Shipyard workers faced an uncertain future. Reports persisted that the plant remained unprofitable due to soft markets. When rumour of the sale of two of the company’s trawlers to BC Packers surfaced, it created so much anxiety that the President of the Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen visited Marystown to reassure workers.

There were signs that the Marystown economy had crested. The Evening Telegram reported that 100 of 260 housing units were vacant in the summer of 1969, the highest vacancy rate per capita in Canada. An NLHC spokesperson explained that the high turnover rate in the rental units resulted from a policy that allowed each householder up to 18 months from the moving date to apply for resettlement grants. Presumably, some householders, who were unprepared for the expenses of urban living such as rent, mortgages, and municipal taxes, or the monotony of assembly line work, left Marystown. Other families used resettlement grants and lot supplementaries to construct or purchase homes.

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104 David Butler, “Marystown Boom Falls Short of Expectations,” Evening Telegram, 4 July 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
105 The Marystown shipyard was owned by the Newfoundland government and managed by Newfoundland Marine Works, Ltd., a consortium of fish companies. “No Date Set for Christening,” Daily News, 16 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
106 David Butler, “Marystown Boom Falls Short of Expectations,” Evening Telegram, 4 July 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, Marystown File S263, v. 1, 1965-8, PANL.
108 “Enough Low-Rental Units at Marystown ... But Other Burin Peninsula Towns Suffer,” Evening Telegram, 4 July 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. II, 1965-8, PANL.
The high vacancy rate at Marystown caught the attention of mayors and industry leaders. Reports indicated all units at Fortune, Grand Bank and Burin were occupied and there was a waiting list. At Burin the 20 NLHC houses and the 12 units built by Fishery Products were occupied.\textsuperscript{109} The barge also transported six houses to Black Duck Cove from Port Elizabeth. Port Elizabethan families, who left a community wherein people had a reputation for industriousness and independence, found themselves living in the midst of a welfare community. The town council of Grand Bank informed the \textit{Telegram} that the NLHC units in their town only satisfied half the demand. He declared that the barge was confined to Marystown while serviced lots at Grand Bank remained empty. The council denounced government for constructing surplus units in Marystown while labour shortages at Bonavista Cold Storage hampered the firm’s efforts to maximize production.\textsuperscript{110} The decision of the towns of Fortune and Grand Bank to pass by-laws to bar salvaged houses from the towns’ subdivisions, at a time when fish companies were hiring high-school students to bolster production lines exacerbated the labour problems of Booth Fisheries and Bonavista Cold Storage. The town councils’ assurance that they would continue to welcome new settlers rang hollow.

It would be an oversimplification to argue that affordable housing was the only reason for shortage of labour in the plants. That was also partly due to gender bias in the organization of production.\textsuperscript{111} Until the mid-1970s packaging was the domain of female

\textsuperscript{109}“Enough Low-Rental Units at Marystown,” \textit{Evening Telegram}, 4 July 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, v. II, 1965-8, PANL.

\textsuperscript{110}“Enough Low-Rental Units at Marystown,” \textit{Evening Telegram}, 4 July 1969.

workers who were valued for their digital dexterity.\textsuperscript{112} Males monopolized the cutting room and all jobs that involved the use of machinery and knives. Social norms, which management and unions accepted in the 1960s, defined women’s work as unskilled and restricted female access to skilled work. Union leaders and plant managers were complicit in negotiating gendered spaces and reserving the highest paid jobs for the male breadwinner. In the 1960s the notion of giving a knife to a female to fillet or trim fish required a commitment by management to trespass into the masculine sphere. Consequently female skills remained undervalued and underutilised in a workplace where an all-male management team and male union heads continued to consider women temporary workers whose careers as a paid workers would end at marriage.\textsuperscript{113} Low pay, a lack benefits and mind-numbing work, performed in a cold, wet environment while standing at a station for the full eight to ten hour shift six days per week, contributed to the high turnover of workers. Ray Guy described horrendous working conditions in a shrimp plant in Port au Choix where women did most of the processing.\textsuperscript{114} Guy was struck by the “acrid smells of formaldehyde” and the hot steamy environment in which workers laboured. After leaving the Dickensian atmosphere of the plant, he observed women spreading fish on a flake in the wholesome gulf air. He questioned why fisheries

\textsuperscript{112}For a discussion on the attitude of industrial managers towards women in the workplace see Ruth Pierson, “They’re Still Women After All: ” The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood,” (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).

\textsuperscript{113} According to Bernice Drake who worked in the Marystown plant 1976-84 management hired women trimmers when a large shipment of unprocessed frozen product arrived from Germany. She convinced the plant manager to give her a tryout by telling him she would quit after a week if her production was not up to par. Her husband had worked in the St. Lawrence mine and when it closed she had to go to work to support her six children. Telephone interview with Bernice Drake, Burin, 10 September 2014.

planners, who condemned work on the fish flake, condoned women toiling in the hot, steamy environment of a shrimp processing plant: “This is the soul-destroying drudgery ... the backbreaking dehumanizing slavery out of which we are to be dragged kicking and screaming.” He wondered “what would you call the rows of shrouded women sitting amid the acrid formaldehyde hour after hour, day after day in the shrimp plant at Port au Choix ... if this is the future let the devil come and take us now.”

The men who toiled on the decks of draggers chopping ice from the superstructure and battling hurricanes had a dangerous workplace. The cruellest trick of all was not played by nature but by a regime that sent the offshore fisherman back to his family without a pay cheque. Knowledge of these conditions was enough to keep the sons in the trapskiff and his daughters out of the plant. Predictably, many householders shunned the dragger and the plant. They chose a destination in which they could continue to live in their own houses, fish old grounds, and send their children to school to prepare them for a career outside the fishery. In this sense education became a barrier as few high school graduates crossed the threshold of the plant as full-time permanent production workers. Male graduates of technical colleges entered the plant as engineers, electricians, quality control technicians and office workers. These trades were dominated by long-time residents of growth centres and newcomers had limited access to more specialized jobs. Wright pointed out that graduates of the Fisheries College, who were mostly male, opted to work aboard non-fishing vessels where they were guaranteed a pay cheque and decent working conditions.  

116 Miriam Wright, A Fishery for Modern Times, 146.
trades did not encourage females to enter trades programs at either the College of Fisheries or District Vocational Schools. In the 1960s most women worked in fish plants to bridge the gap between school-leaving and marriage. As a married woman she was expected to trade the world of wage labour for the private sphere of unpaid labour.

Civil servants, captains of industry, and spiritual leaders, who promised everything from social and economic rewards to greater access to God, failed to dissuade households from moving to the nearest reception centre that offered little more than a road connection to the provincial highway system. After a thorough study of community resettlement files, the author can state, with confidence, that a majority of shore fishermen had no intention of switching to the offshore fishery after the move. Most petitioners wished to move to a familiar place, close enough to the old community to fish the old grounds utilizing abandoned fishing rooms.117

Government commissioned studies of coastal regions affirmed householders’ reluctance to enter the world of North American consumerism. W. A. Black’s study of the northwest coast, suggested lack of desire for consumer goods and services left the people content with their meagre lot and reduced their expectations.118 Black concluded that mechanization and a switch of production from family processing units to vertically integrated companies was the only way to transform a relief dependent industry into a viable commercial enterprise. Sociologist Peter Sinclair suggested that a population “resigned to a life of unchanging toil” was more likely to remain committed to an

117This conclusion is based on the author’s extensive examination of petitions submitted to the Resettlement Division of the provincial Department of Fisheries (1965-7) and the Department of Community and Social Development (1967-70).
economy based on domestic commodity production. He argued that uneducated domestic commodity producers lacked the skills to compete for jobs in a capitalist economy while Sinclair and Mannion contended they were not prepared to break with tradition.  

Copes proposed a very simple solution to the productivity problem that plagued the Newfoundland industry: reduce the number of inshore fishermen by transferring them to the offshore sector, and after a period of orientation to the market economy, resettle them to the mainland. Bates, the Walsh Report, Cheeseman, Black and Copes agreed antiquated methods must be discarded, and a highly capitalized and mechanized corporate fishery must be developed in its place. They proposed a program of specialization and modernization, but more specifically they believed it was necessary to change habits and attitudes toward work. The Pushie Royal Commission Report quoted a recommendation an international development agency made for economic development in Kenya:

The most important factor in the process is the speed with which people adapt themselves ... to changing conditions. A bulldozer can move trees and earth but not ideas and habits. Development will not take place unless enough people and their leaders are prepared to make changes in their habits, attitudes and thinking necessary to achieve the end.

Cold statistical data supported the arguments of economists, but humans are complex beings who refuse to have their lives reduced to a balance sheet. Families accustomed to surviving in a pluralistic economy, propped up by social welfare

119 Peter R. Sinclair, From Traps to Draggers: Domestic Commodity Production in Northwest Newfoundland, (St. John’s: ISER, 1985), 48. See also John Mannion, Point Lance in Transition.


121 Quoted in Webb, Observing the Outports, 295.
programs, were not willing to become year-round fishers aboard deep sea draggers or accept low-paid, demeaning work in a fish plant. They did not share the values of the architects of the FHRP and when resettlement bureaucrats came calling they rejected their pleas to join the ranks of industrial workers who toiled daily to rise above the poverty line.

Iverson and Matthews concluded that one of several obstacles that inhibited the implementation of the FHRP was the ingrained values of the subjects. The sociologists and Black agreed that inshore fishers possessed neither the ability, nor the ambition, to break out of a peasant subsistence economy which lent itself to poverty and unemployment. Experts tended to paint in broad strokes and ignore local differences. Taken together the ethnographic studies created a distorted picture of life in a rural Newfoundland village.

In There’s No Better Place Than Here, Matthews defended the traditional outport economy. He stressed the importance of assessing a community’s social vitality, and adopted a gentler tone than appeared in the co-authored government commissioned study, Communities in Decline, in which he described outport people as apathetic and powerless. In the latter study Matthews described socially vibrant and proactive communities that challenged patriarchal power structures. Gerald Pocius debunked the simplistic dichotomous image of the outport family in his work on Calvert. The folklorist argued the outports were not always static, conservative havens weighed down by tradition. Pocius found in Calvert a forward-looking population that embraced the most

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122 Mannion, Point Lance in Transition, 52.
123 Iverson and Matthews, 96-7.
124 Matthews, “There’s No Better Place Than Here.”
modern styles in furniture, glassware and flatware as soon as it became available and they had the means to buy it.¹²⁵

Resettlers of Placentia Bay made decisions based on the limited information they knew about the growth centre and the industrial fishery. The majority of them said “no” to the company manager and the bureaucrat who tried to put them on the deck of a trawler or on a production line of a fish plant. In the mid-1960s the average age in the communities rose and the average level of education fell due to an exodus of high school graduates and young families who were assisted by the FHRP or the Canada Manpower Mobility Program. The out-migration of the most educated undermined the social integrity and long-term economic viability of coastal communities. The older residents, although unsettled by the departure of the young people, did not wish to abandon the life that they knew, or forfeit real property to the crown. The FHRP covered the cost of moving equipment to the new community, but the resettlers knew it was futile to move fishing gear, accumulated over a lifetime, into a subdivision without storage space or access to harbour facilities. Places such as Rushoon, Red Harbour, and Arnold’s Cove were logical choices for older inshore fishermen who would find it difficult to compete for job in industrial centres.

My thesis challenges the usual narrative that the state hounded relocatees into submission. I argue that the people used foot dragging and evasion in addition to more proactive measures to negotiate moves. Resettler strategies of resistance did not ignite riots or incite people to do violence to state officials or property. Rarely did they make news headlines, but their low-key tactics were effective. Coastal people proved they were

¹²⁵Gerald Pocius, A Place to Belong.
still a strong political force despite the declining population. Copes theorized that fishermen held the balance of power in many districts and Smallwood regularly altered district boundaries to ensure that fishermen’s vote continued to decide elections.\textsuperscript{126} If the Premier knew coastal people were his power base, then evacuation of outports was akin to political suicide.

Shortage of alternative employment kept householders in a trade that reports of several enquiries and commissions denounced as unproductive, medieval or archaic. These studies gradually, along with the decline of the salt fish trade, made the existence of many outports appear irrational and strengthened the conviction of planners that centralization and modernization of the fishery was necessary. The appearance of foreign fishing fleets, supported by factory freezer trawlers forced Ottawa to increase the Canadian fleet in order to capture a larger share of the catch off Canada’s Atlantic coast, and amass a labour force to make the industrial offshore sector viable.

By the 1960s intense fishing in the Northwest Atlantic proved catastrophic for the expanding inshore sector. Fisheries planners in St. John’s and Ottawa introduced programs to modernize the offshore and the inshore fisheries. Modernization of both sectors required centralization. While Newfoundland has a heavily indented coastline, few harbours could accommodate draggers or longliners without expensive harbour improvements. Due to the limited number of ports suitable for handling larger vessels, longliner crews were under pressure to relocate to a larger centre thus diminishing the viability of the home community. When the remaining families concluded that they had

to leave a dying community, they pressured government to approve moves that fisheries planners and the resettlement division considered counterproductive. But to the householders of Point Rosie who chose Garnish over Grand Bank, or the families of Oderin who opted for Rushoon over Marystown, it all made sense.

The superordinate goal of the FHRP was to amass labour in offshore fisheries bases, but it was challenged and contested by coastal people who forced planners to compromise. For example, when the FHRC approved moves from Tack’s Beach to Arnold’s Cove and Harbour Buffett to Arnold’s Cove and Little Harbour East, communities with poorer resources and fewer opportunities for employment than the abandoned communities, they did so at the insistence of the relocatees. The assisted moves from the islands to Arnold’s Cove were so poorly planned that they attracted criticism from many sources. The backlash that flowed from the Isthmus of Avalon produced ripples that influenced decisions in Great Harbour Deep, Fogo Island and Southeast Bight. Cognizant that too much direction would lead to accusations of excessive force, the Resettlement Division lost control over a program which had as its principal goal the creation of a centralized productive fishery.

Copes and Brox, who disagreed on fisheries policy, agreed that coastal communities seconded local merchants, municipal leaders, MHAs and MPs to their cause, and pawned their votes to hijack moves to major fisheries growth centres. Resettlers’ fondness for home ownership was deeply ingrained, and knowledge that they could not own a home in an industrial town drew them to the smaller reception centres where land was cheap and they could build a house without concern for national building

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127 Brox, *Newfoundland Fishermen in the Age of Industry*, 56.
codes. The moves from Oderin to Rushoon and Merasheen to Southern Harbour demonstrate the degree to which fishing households forced resettlement planners to accept new priorities.

The high cost of housing was the greatest single deterrent to resettling to an industrial centre, but other forces were in play. The monotonous, highly regulated working environment of fish plants did not appeal to families accustomed to regulating daily activities. Furthermore the inshore fishery, compared to the offshore, was a relatively safe occupation that kept a fisher in daily contact with his or her family. In contrast a trawlerman spent on average two days out of every 10-14 ashore. Company executives begrudged them a short respite at Christmas. Dragger crews faced the hazards of winter storms while inshore fishers enjoyed the comfort of home. Inshore fishers could not be easily morphed into deep sea trawlermen, and they told industry executives and government officials that they were not interested in changing occupations.

Gendered definitions work and women’s role in society exacerbated recruitment efforts. Women were not expected to make careers out of plant work. Management and unions devalued women’s work by classifying it as unskilled. By denying women jobs that required use of a knife or machinery, and failing to recognize the leadership potential of female workers in the 1950s and 1960s, management overlooked a partial solution to the labour crisis. Managers restricted women to the packing line while recruiters scoured the bays for fish cutters. Discriminatory labour contracts, negotiated by male union executives, locked women into the lowest paying jobs that required only digital dexterity.

There were many obstacles in the road to modernity. The lack of affordable housing, which resulted from bureaucrats’ insistence on building houses to national
standards in tandem with low earnings of plant workers, was the main obstacle. Town
councils that barred entry of houses recovered from evacuated communities contributed
to both the housing and labour crises. Working conditions ashore and on the water
discouraged resettling householders from moving to a major fisheries growth centre.
Mannion’s study of Point Lance revealed traditional fishers were not interested in deep-
sea fishing and considered work in fish plants to be demeaning women’s work. Attitudes
toward women’s role in society prevented managers from placing women in skilled
trades. There were many reasons why resettled people refused to move to the industrial
towns of the Burin Peninsula, but ultimately they made choices that they believed best
met their needs.

Conclusion

Most communities of Placentia Bay rejected the overtures of company executives,
resettlement officials, clergy, municipal leaders, and MHAs to persuade them to move
from the inshore sector to the offshore industrial fisheries bases. The were motivated by a
desire to continue to own mortgage-free homes, a desire to protect capital investments in
the inshore fisheries, and desire to operate in a comparatively safe environment. Over
forty families of Tack’s Beach ignored the efforts of the plant manager and the FHRC to
convince them to relocate to the Burin Peninsula. Instead they chose to resettle in the
small fishing village of Arnold’s Cove, place with very limited resources and minimal
space for expansion Similarly, the community of Oderin chose Rushoon over Marystown
because they could continue to fish traditional grounds and avoid the expenses associated
with modernity. Those resettlers who joined the industrial workforce opted to commute
during the milder months and return to subsistence activities in late fall. Workers who
migrated to Grand Bank from Fortune Bay each spring identified housing as the major barrier to taking up residence and full-time employment in the plant. Low wages and the high cost of living in industrial fishery bases made recruitment of labour from inshore fishing communities problematic.

Plan managers, union leaders, and the state, undervalued women’s labour and restricted them to the lowest paying positions. Women, who later proved they were as adept at filleting fish as men, were not considered capable of operating a machine or even trusted with a knife. The College of Marine and Fisheries offered trades in navigation, engineering and food technology courses which males dominated. The socially constructed definitions of femininity and masculinity in the 1960s strengthened the glass ceiling to the detriment of the industrial fishery in the 1950s and 1960s.

The managers of the FHRP attempted to overcome the labour shortage in the offshore sector by increasing grants. The 1967 Agreement authorized the FHRC to assist individual household moves to fisheries growth centres and also introduced lot supplementary grants to make housing more affordable in the industrial centres. The state wished to assert the economic principle of the FHRP when outport families threatened to convert into a social welfare program. The subjects who used the plan to improve access to social services were agents of change.
Chapter IV

Trials and Tribulations in the Transition to Modernity:
Life in Two “Approved Organized Reception Communities”

Introduction

Given the failure of the FHRP to direct families into one of the eight major fisheries growth centres, this chapter examines the experiences of resettled households which moved into small inshore fishing communities, Category 6 “Approved Organized Reception Centres.” The resettlement experience in every category of growth centre was remarkably similar. Housing shortages, overcrowded schools and unemployment were common grievances. Furthermore, the rapid influx of new settlers into communities with a population of less than 200 downgraded the quality of life of long-time residents by overtaxing the local infrastructure and overcrowding facilities. The most immediate problem confronting resettled householders was a lack of affordable housing and serviced lots. The great discrepancy between the value of vacated houses, for example, and the cost of housing in the new centre caused mental stress. The average cost of replacing a home in Arnold’s Cove was eight to 20 times greater than the average value of abandoned houses in Tack’s Beach.\(^1\) The older generation felt neglected, materially dispossessed, and severed from a way of life. Smallwood, as well as the politicians and bureaucrats in the 28 government departments and agencies involved in administering the FHRP, stressed the benefits of resettlement for the younger generation, especially education. The premier proclaimed that children should not be “trapped in a one-room

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school ... you’ve got to give ... at least the young people a chance ... to take the part they should in the modern world.”

But sometimes resettled children found themselves in worse facilities than in the old community. Overcrowded poorly equipped one or two-room schools without flush toilets, proper ventilation, or safe drinking water was an unhealthy environment for any student, whether newcomer or long-term resident. It is not surprising that the first study of the FHRP identified lack of suitable, affordable housing as a major inhibitor of the program. Growth centres such as Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour, to which many families gravitated, lacked the infrastructure and employment opportunities to make moves successful.

In this chapter I examine the conditions in two reception centres, located on the isthmus of the Avalon, Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour. It sheds light on how moves from the islands of Placentia Bay altered the lives of relocatees. Any meaningful study of resettlement must consider the conditions subjects encountered in their new environments. In places such as these there was a deep divide between the promise and reality of modernization. Fishing families suffered from loneliness and mourned the loss of property and a way of life. Donald Savoie, Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development in 1992, considered separation from family, friends, institutions, landscapes, climates and loss of a sense of belonging and knowing how to behave in a particular society as important as material losses.

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2 J. R. Smallwood, “Centralization: Giving Young People a Chance,” an address delivered to a meeting of the St. John’s Lion’s Club. A. G. Stacey Collection, Binder 1, ACS, Memorial University.
3 Iverson and Matthews, Comminites in Decline An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland, (St. John’s: ISER, 1968).
4 Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 10.
Resettlement is not costless even if all the houses, schools, and churches were moved free of charge along with the people. Matthews compared the trauma of resettlement to the effects of an earthquake.

Arnold’s Cove

The tsunami of resettlement that swept populations from the islands into the bottom of Placentia Bay caught everyone off-guard. It had tragic consequences for both resettler and long-time resident. It overcrowded infrastructure, increased competition for scarce resources, and subordinated the economic objectives of the FHRP. However, it was not powerful bureaucrats and politicians who pushed people into Arnold’s Cove. The bureaucrats were able to persuade and induce relocatees to abandon homes, but failed to direct them into industrial fisheries centres in which there was a demand for workers. Coastal people hijacked the program by pressuring the Resettlement Committee to approve moves to the Newfoundland mainland, a customary practice under the Centralization Plan. The rationale for evacuating coastal communities evaporated and the intention to bring them to improved services was frustrated when the burgeoning population overloaded infrastructure. The FHRC bowed to political pressure and designated small inshore fishing communities as growth centres.

Smallwood, who was also Minister of Economic Development, equated urbanization with progress, and used executive powers to override bureaucratic decisions. In Ottawa and St. John’s centralization was accepted as the means to reduce dependence on public welfare and eliminate the cost of bringing services to the people. Fisheries economists and scientists, whose main objective was to reorient the industry, mistakenly believed resettlement grants would entice coastal households into offshore fishing bases.
They underestimated the householders’ attachment to the shore fishery and its concomitant lifestyle. The majority chose to relocate to the isthmus of the Avalon and occupy abandoned premises on a seasonal basis.

In 1965 Arnold’s Cove was an inshore fishing community of 33 households served by a small Anglican church and a two-room school. Cod, lobster, and herring fisheries, supplemented by subsistence activities and social welfare benefits, formed the basis of the economy. Local fishers occupied fishing berths for so many generations that they became, in practice, private property. Consequently, when fishers arrived from the islands, only the most marginal land and marine spaces were available. Newcomers soon outnumbered the original inhabitants five to one, overcrowded roads, school, church and hall. In return they faced the rancour of a community unprepared to accept the large number of migrants who came mainly from the Anglican communities of Placentia Bay. The disorderly nature of the moves soon caught the attention of the media, and turned Arnold’s Cove into a symbol of all the deficiencies of resettlement. National and local television crews and the press produced horrendous stories on the conditions at Arnold’s Cove that threw into question the efficacy of the FHRP.

The negative press, which threatened to derail the program, caused a stir in St. John’s and Ottawa. Sametz, dispatched two rural development officers (RDO), Donald W. Burry and Lance C. Shirley, to investigate the problems arising from the rapid abandonment of communities in Placentia Bay and to mediate tensions in the reception

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centres. Burry and Shirley spent several days in Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour assessing the socioeconomic conditions of the two recently approved growth centres. The RDOs identified overcrowding of the harbour front and facilities, especially the school, as a significant source of discontent. Burry and Shirley alleged that overcrowding not only interfered with the quality of instruction, but also posed a health threat. The local school boards lacked the resources to construct additional classrooms or renovate existing structures to ameliorate conditions resulting from resettlement.

The benefits that planners claimed would accrue to the younger generation after the move must have seemed farfetched, when children accustomed to healthy, safe environments, found themselves in overcrowded, unventilated buildings in a growth centre. Iverson and Matthews reported that the pupils of the four-room school at Tack’s Beach, which had no difficulty attracting university-trained teachers, were now being taught by emergency-supply teachers with a probationary licence. In the new community recreational activities were confined to a muddy gravel parking lot. House suggested that the government-imposed land freeze, which is discussed more fully later, delayed designation of Arnold’s Cove as a reception centre and contributed to the overall state of unpreparedness. While the rector struggled with the school crisis, the merchants, Freeman Wareham and Kevin Wadman, accused FHRC of trying to divert prospective relocatees into Marystown.

Donald J. Ryan, control officer for the Department of Municipal Affairs, informed his superior, J. T. Allston, that one resettled householder, having purchased land on

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6Shirley and Burry, “Placentia Bay Study, 1. GN39/1, File S83, The Rooms.
7Iverson and Matthews, Communities in Decline, 57.
8Freeman Wareham to Harnum, 24 March 1966. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
which to build a house, discovered he could not get a building permit.\(^9\) Stymied by the freeze, he purchased a house erected on ground that was too swampy for safe installation of a private water and sewer system. The well water was unfit for human consumption. Ryan alleged resettled people were being “fleeced of their grants and savings by local speculators.”\(^10\) He recommended that government introduce an education program to advise resettlers on the intricacies of purchasing land and houses, and that government help resettlers recover money they “wasted through ignorance and through unscrupulous dealings by the above named parties of Arnold’s Cove.”\(^11\) Harnum cautioned one contractor to supply invoices bearing the householder’s signature certifying satisfaction with the service provided before requesting payment for moving persons, real property and chattels.\(^12\)

The Minister of C&SD asked Sametz and Harnum to investigate these very serious allegations. They failed to uncover any evidence of fraud.”\(^13\) Harnum assured Rowe that the number of householders who had been wronged “have been very small [and] the great majority are grateful to the government. After the initial phase the most general comment heard is that we should have done it years ago.”\(^14\) Harnum and Sametz interviewed the alleged victims of fraud in their home, and concluded their bitterness

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\(^9\)Donald J. Ryan to Director of Urban and Rural Planning, J. T. Allston, 6 December 1966. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
\(^10\)Ryan to Allston, Director of Urban and Rural Planning, 6 December 1966. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
\(^11\)Ryan to Director of Urban Planning, 6 December, 1966. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
\(^12\)Harnum to Alberto Wareham Ltd., Arnold’s Cove, 26 September 1966. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
\(^13\)Memorandum from Harnum to Minister, “Re: Ryan Report to the Director of Urban and Rural Planning,” 16 January 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
\(^14\)Harnum to Minister, “Re: Ryan Report to the Director of Urban and Rural Planning.”
arose from making a bad deal. For example, when householders sold their dwelling in the evacuated community for $400 and paid ten times that amount for a house in Arnold’s Cove, they felt cheated, especially if their former house was larger and in better condition. Harnum concluded that there was no basis for allegations of fraud, but deference to authority could prevent a resettler from making allegations of fraud against a prominent member of the community to senior government authorities. Ryan’s report did alert the FHRC to the need to locate rural development offices in various headquarters throughout the island to facilitate the program and mitigate problems.\footnote{15} 

John Crosbie, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, suggested that the case at Arnold’s Cove was symptomatic of the problems arising from the way the FHRC implemented the program. Did Sametz and Harnum, the two top administrators of the FHRP, intentionally gloss over the conditions at Arnold’s Cove in an effort to counter negative reports on resettlement in general, and Arnold’s Cove, in particular? One can only speculate what their motives were when they reported that the great majority of families were “grateful to the government” and “wished they had moved years ago.”\footnote{16} 

MP Richard Cashin reported that in spring 1967 former residents and newcomers alike were discontented with the management of resettlement. One can only conclude that Sametz and Harnum deliberately omitted from their report the deplorable conditions in the resettlement subdivisions and the unhappiness of settlers reported by Ryan, Shirley, Burry, and Cashin.

\footnote{15}{“Statement of Principles of New Resettlement Program, Part D: General Provisions,” A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 1.04.004, ASC, Memorial University.}

\footnote{16}{Harnum to F. W. Rowe, 16 January 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, File S32. PANL.}
Cashin, as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, was responsible for administration of the FHRP at the national level. He informed F. W. Rowe, then Minister of Education and the Department of Community and Social Development\(^{17}\) that he was alarmed “over the magnitude of the problems facing these two communities.”\(^{18}\) He described the local roads in the settlement area as the “most deplorable” he had ever seen and suggested there was a general unhappiness with overcrowded schools and lack of fishing facilities. Cashin hoped to convince the Department of Public Works to construct a wharf and two community stages to accommodate inshore fishermen. He noted that doubling of the population in 1966 had strained local infrastructure and facilities, especially schools. The MP urged Rowe to make special funds available to address the schools crisis.

The Resettlement Committee conceded that there was a real problem keeping pace with the demand for new schools in growth centres.\(^{19}\) The Committee recognized that resettlers who had exhausted most of their savings and resettlement grants in efforts to establish homes could contribute little toward the cost of providing new schools.

Government assisted 919 persons to move to Arnold’s Cove between 1966 and 1968. Unfortunately there was no provision in the Resettlement Agreement for underwriting the cost of salvaging of schools, halls, fishing property, churches or community stages from

\(^{17}\)F. W. Rowe held two portfolios for a few months. His replacement was Aidan Maloney who retained the fisheries portfolio. In 1968, William (Bill) Rowe, son of F. W. Rowe became Minister Responsible for Resettlement within the Department of C&SD. C&SD had two ministers, both of whom administered the FHRP.

\(^{18}\)Richard Cashin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, to F. W. Rowe, Minister of Community and Social Development, 26 April 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.

\(^{19}\)Minutes of Federal-Provincial Fisheries Household Resettlement Committee Meeting, 4-5 April 1968. A. G. Stacey Collection 065, File 1.05.004, ASC, Memorial University.
evacuated outports. The FHRC acknowledged the problem but could only recommend a change of policy. Rowe refused to deviate from the 70-30 formula, create a special fund for new schools or write off mortgages on abandoned schools. Local boards had a responsibility to raise 30% of the cost of adding new classrooms from long-time residents and resettlers whose grants had been used to relocate.  

Rev. Edward House informed Harnum that classes met in makeshift classrooms in the Orange Hall. He estimated that the community needed four additional classrooms and an auditorium to meet the educational needs of Arnold’s Cove. He asked C&SD to underwrite the cost of new school construction in growth centres. House suggested neither native resident nor newcomer should be penalized. The householders of Tack’s Beach and Harbour Buffett left behind schools that were larger and of a higher standard than the schools on the isthmus. In their opinion, the FHRP created the schools crisis so it was the government’s responsibility to address it. Ottawa sidestepped the issue by pointing out education was a provincial responsibility. Cashin confined his actions to advising provincial ministers to make a special grant available to assist school boards to acquire more classrooms.  

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Memorandum to File “Re: School at Arnold’s Cove, 28 February 1968.” GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.

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Richard Cashin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, to F. W. Rowe, Minister of Education, 26 April 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. The FHRP compensate the church for schools and churches in the vacated community or assist new construction in the reception community. Following the move parishioners discovered they were not only responsible for outstanding loans on abandoned buildings, but had to take on additional debt to construct or expand school and church facilities in the reception centres. From 1968 the province made the government barge available free of charge, but
responsibility of the Minister of Education and forwarded requests for extra funds to the Minister of Education. It was a game of pass the parcel.

The crisis in education, coupled with housing issues and high rates of unemployment, attracted criticism from many quarters. Much of the controversy swirled around the need for more affordable housing in all categories of growth centres. House informed Harnum that Wadman Bros. had charged $4,000 to float the rectory and teacher’s residence from Harbour Buffett to Arnold’s Cove. He estimated it would cost an equal amount to rewire it, install water and sewer and a new heating system and set it up on a new foundation.  

House asked for enough assistance to bring the Arnold’s Cove school up to the standard of Harbour Buffett and Tack’s Beach schools which bureaucrats had deemed to be substandard. Householders, whose low level of compensation forced them into substandard houses, felt aggrieved when the high cost of relocation became apparent. The grants were insufficient to compensate for fishing capital and homes left behind, or the investments in halls, schools and churches. Burry informed the Director of Field Services that families were being placed “in a new environment without the basic tools of their trade, namely, fish stages, wharves, and fish plants.” He recommended that a plan be drafted by the province, in consultation with councils and householders, to ameliorate conditions. Merchant and contractor Freeman Wareham, who made a business

the cost of labour and materials associated with launching and setting up buildings were subject to private negotiation between the church and the barge operator.

23Edward House to Harnum, 21 November 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. House alleged the rectory which cost $18,000 had been paid off only two years before Harbour Buffett resettled.

24Donald Burry, Rural Development Officer, to Ed Nugent, Director of Field Services, C&SD, 9 April 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
out of relocating families, claimed the resettlement grant was insufficient to cover the cost of developing a lot.

Tensions in the settlement area intensified when the government introduced lot supplementary grants on a go-forward basis. Most of the families from Tack’s Beach who moved in the fall of 1966 and before 1 April 1967 felt cheated and protested vociferously. The new policy caused bitterness among relocatees and intensified jealousy between all community residents. Disgruntled relocatees presented Cashin with the names of 38 householders who failed to qualify for lot supplementary assistance. The MP asked the Minister of C&SD to explain why a family moving to Little Harbour East did not qualify for the additional $1,000 grant while those who moved to Southern Harbour received it.25 In a memorandum to Cashin, Maloney explained that Southern Harbour was an approved growth centre, and the subjects of the query knew in advance of the move that they did not qualify for the lot supplementary grants.26 But Maloney did not provide the criteria the FHRC used to differentiate between Southern Harbour and Little Harbour East. The minister simply stated he would not set a precedent by extending supplementary assistance for anyone to purchase lots outside growth centres.

Nonetheless, families who resettled to the isthmus prior to 1 April pressured government MHAs to make the supplementary grant retroactive to 1965.27 MHA G. A. Frecker warned Maloney that “too much hard drawing of lines is going to create general

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25Richard Cashin to Maloney, Minister of Fisheries and Community and Social Development, 14 November 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
26Maloney to Cashin, 7 December 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
27Eric Bolt to Richard Cashin, 4 November 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
dissatisfaction.” Since the policy affected resettlers in many growth centres, Frecker advised the minister to bring the issue to cabinet to head off a potentially “serious problem for the government,” and implored the minister to bring the issue to cabinet “before the situation creates an unwholesome reaction among the people.” Maloney directed Sametz to prepare notes for cabinet to determine if the Resettlement Agreement provided a solution.

In response to pressure from Cashin, Frecker, resettlers, and media reports on the wretched conditions in Arnold’s Cove, cabinet granted conditional approval of lot supplementaries retroactively to a specific group. Only households who moved to Arnold’s Cove between 1 April 1966 and 31 March 1967, and paid at least $300 for a building lot, qualified. Thirty-six householders who moved from Tack’s Beach to Arnold’s Cove 1967 benefited. The cabinet decision denied thousands of householders, who moved in the same period to other growth centres, equal consideration. By making the lot supplementary retroactive for the households of Tack’s Beach, Smallwood and his ministers set a precedent that was sure to provoke outrage in other growth points. Resettled householders at Placentia complained bitterly when they learned that only resettlers from Tack’s Beach qualified. They had a right to demand equal treatment. C. D.

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28 G. A. Frecker, Minister of Provincial Affairs, to Aidan Maloney, 24 November 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
29 Frecker to Maloney, 16 January 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
30 Memorandum from Maloney to Deputy Minister Sametz, 23 January 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
31 Harnum to Maloney, 7 May 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
32 Memorandum from Sametz to Maloney Re: Retroactive Application of Supplementary Assistance. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. Sametz informed Maloney that 38 householders at Arnold’s Cove qualified. The number for the Placentia area had not been determined.
33 Harnum to Maloney, 7 May 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
Reynolds, Assistant Director of Field Services, reported that relocatees in the Placentia area who were content prior to the introduction of a lot subsidy, felt aggrieved over the discrimination that had crept into the Agreement. Reynolds did not agree with grandfathering in any group. He wrote that “if the Agreement had not been amended there would be no complaint.”

In all but two instances, in Placentia the grant had covered the cost of house and land, while at Arnold’s Cove land and house in a subdivision cost $10,000.

While householders battled authorities over lot supplementaries, private contractors undertook the task of developing subdivisions in Arnold’s Cove without paying much attention to the environment. In winter 1968, J. T. Allston, Director of Urban and Rural Planning, raised concerns about pollution in the Arnold’s Cove subdivision. Allston warned the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Arnold’s Cove not to issue new permits to occupy for houses without sewer connections. The nine houses currently occupied without connections to the main sewer line, endangered the health of all. Allston ordered the Board to connect the occupied houses immediately, but offered no funding. In Phase Two of the subdivision there were 14 dwellings without sewer connections as there were no mains to connect onto. Allston advised the Board of Trustees to compel the developer to install a sewer main before spring thaw worsened the pollution of the land and contamination of wells. His fear that it would create an epidemic

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34 C. D. Reynolds to Harnum, 21 June 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
35 There were three subdivisions in Arnold’s Cove created by private developers: the Wadman, Wareham and Hollett subdivisions. Memorandum from Lloyd Powell, RDO Clarenville to Harnum, “Re: Arnold’s Cove.” GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
36 J. T. Allston to Norman Ash, Chairman of Local Improvement District, Arnold’s Cove, 26 February 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
was so great that he threatened to withhold permits for any development until the issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the Department of Health. Allston asked C&SD to delay payment of the $1,000 lot supplementary, which had been assigned to the developer, until Wareham or Wadman installed the sewer line and homeowners connected their houses.\(^{37}\) Acting on Allston’s directive, C&SD denied 18 applications for supplementary assistance.

When the District Health Inspector, N. Gosse, visited Arnold’s Cove 10 months after Allston had issued his ultimatum, the situation remained unchanged.\(^{38}\) In some instances elevation levels prevented a hook-up and in other cases no branch line existed. In still other cases poverty blocked progress. Widows, disabled persons and welfare dependents could not afford to connect.\(^{39}\) When Gosse inquired into the situation, Kevin Wadman, town clerk and subdivision developer, informed him that a few householders had approached him to get connected, but suspecting some were unwilling to pay the hook-up fee, Wadman refused to carry out the work. Consequently, families living in homes with fully equipped bathrooms carried pails of human waste to the saltwater daily as many of them had done before they accepted the government’s promise of modern amenities. The health inspector ordered the Board not to issue any additional permits to occupy before houses were connected to the main. He strongly recommended that

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\(^{37}\) Memorandum from Allston to Sametz, Re: Arnold’s Cove Subdivision, 26 February 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.

\(^{38}\) N. Gosse to Board of Trustees, Local Improvement District, Arnold’s Cove, 12 December 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.

\(^{39}\) W. N. Rowe to Stephen Neary, Minister of Public Welfare, 17 June 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. Rowe informed Neary that the resettlement grant did not provide enough money to allow these groups of people to connect to services and requested special assistance from Neary’s department to cover the expense.
occupied homes be connected without delay since some were disposing of human waste and other matter by carrying it to the land wash, and warned that the difficulty of making the trip in winter could cause the householders to dump human waste within the subdivision. The inspectors concluded that there was “no necessity, or justification in a planned subdivision where a sewer system exists” for people to live in such awful conditions.  

When health inspectors, J. M. Graham and H. Powell, accompanied by O. Bowering, public health nurse for the area, inspected the Arnold’s Cove subdivision in April 1969 they identified 30 homes without connections to a sewer system. The water of two wells, used by 30 families, was unfit for human consumption. The inspectors attributed the contamination to improper construction and use of contaminated buckets. The report described the situation at Arnold’s Cove as a catastrophic health risk, but went on to state that, except for the possible outbreak of an epidemic, conditions in the subdivision were “of a very good standard and people indicated a reasonable degree of contentment in their new environment.” The health inspectors reported that much of the criticism of the subdivision was unfair. The only solution to the water problem was to develop a municipal water supply at a cost of a half million dollars. The report ended with a familiar refrain: “All dwellings should be connected to the main as soon as practical.” The health team recommended that the Board of Trustees request special

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40 J. M. Graham, H. Powell, and O. Bowering, “Health Inspection Division Report, 15 April 1969.” GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
41 Health Inspection Division Report,” 15 April 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
42 Health Inspection Division Report,” 15 April 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
43 Harnum informed W. N. Rowe that the Department of Municipal Affairs had calculated that the cost of constructing water and sewer services to be $440,000. Harnum to W. N. Rowe, 23 December 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
assistance from the Department of Welfare to connect hardship cases and run a line to the saltwater for houses with elevation problems.

J. L. Seymour of NLHC informed the FHRC that topographical conditions pushed the cost of providing minimal services beyond the capacity of most resettlers. Seymour warned of the consequences of permitting growth on anything but serviced land. He also warned that unless a more orderly scheduling of moves was adopted and assistance was made available for relocating schools, churches, halls and recreation centres the managers of resettlement could expect already deplorable conditions to worsen. The FHRP managers had lost control, and the reports of other departments and agencies were more attuned to the weaknesses of the program than the senior bureaucrats who were responsible for running it. When the FHRP was first considered, the Rural Development Branch of ARDA envisioned “well-planned communities” and saw the centralization program as “a golden opportunity to plan for economic and pleasant settlements.” Arnold’s Cove was the antithesis of a well-planned economic and pleasant community.

Donald Burry felt that more accurate demographic data could allay some of the problems arising in reception communities. He suggested a demographic survey to gather relevant data should precede the movement of families into growth points. Burry cautioned planners against concentrating too many resettlers into any one area to avoid the creation of enclaves of unemployment that the media referred to as welfare ghettos.

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45 Blake, *Lions or Jellyfish*, 129.
46 Donald Burry to Ed Nugent, 9 April 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
The FHRC did not investigate the employment opportunities in the Arnold’s Cove area, or assess its potential for growth before approving it as a growth centre. In Burry’s opinion the failure to plan ahead resulted in unemployment, overcrowding of community facilities, and increased friction between new and native residents. By sheer force of numbers, the balance of power switched to the newcomers and long-time residents became powerless bystanders as the resettlers began to exert control over political organizations and demand a fair share of local resources. In larger growth centres, such as Harbour Breton, Placentia, and Trepassey, relocatees settled in clusters, refusing to join community organizations. Two resettled merchants, Freeman Wareham and Kevin Wadman, dominated commercial activities, controlled political organizations, and erased the old power structure.

The influx of new settlers altered more than the balance of power. It increased the competition for fishing berths and scarce construction and service jobs. Following a visit to the once prosperous commercial centre of Harbour Buffett, Ray Guy contended the “real jobs [were] wasted and destroyed for imaginary jobs. And dole piled on top of dole.”47 The prosperity of Spencer’s Cove, Tack’s Beach, Harbour Buffett, and Bar Haven depended on fishers from the surrounding communities supplying Alberto Wareham, Ltd., H. C. Brown, W. W. Wareham, Ltd. and Wadman Bros., respectively, with salt cod, lobster and herring. When communities in the hinterland resettled, jobs in the herring packing plant, lobster pools, salt fish plants, and collector boats disappeared. Guy proclaimed that “the death of Harbour Buffett wasn’t a sacrifice of the old

Newfoundland toward bringing in the new. It was senseless murder." People of the islands left real jobs for imaginary jobs on the isthmus. Journalist Ron Crocker postulated that “assisting the movement of 2,000 wage-earners per year from areas of underemployment into semi-urban areas already beset by chronic unemployment is what resettlement has done.”

Competition for jobs, shore space, fishing berths and control of local government led to increased tension in the community of Arnold’s Cove. While households suffered the former merchants of Spencer’s Cove and Bar Haven developed profitable transport and real estate businesses. Freeman Wareham and Kevin Wadman used their vessels and a barge to transport houses, chattels, fishing gear and equipment, and resettlers to the various growth points and chartered vessels to civil servants. When they added subdivision development to their other enterprises, their status increased substantially and the newcomers elected them to top positions in the local government. Long-time citizens resented the power of the resettled elites who dominated business and civic affairs. The merchants led the fight to organize Arnold’s Cove into a Local Improvement District against the wishes of the old residents. And when elections were held they were elected to the two key positions. Charges of election rigging were debated in the House of

50 Donald Burry to Ed Nugent, 9 April 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. To illustrate the degree of resentment Burry informed Nugent: “The former townspeople are calling the resettled people the people of “Peyton Place” and the merchant who moved in with the people Mr. Peyton, and the resettled persons have formed a council against the wishes of the former townspeople and are imposing taxes on them as well as the resettled
Assembly but when a protest petition reached the floor of the House of Assembly, Smallwood dismissed it and declared the process legal. The long-time residents accused settlers of forcing local government and taxes on them. They felt usurped.

The conditions at Arnold’s Cove garnered local and national media attention and dissuaded some relocatees from moving to the reception centre. A native of Woody Island informed the Minister of C&SD, William Rowe, that he would not relocate to Arnold’s Cove due to health and safety concerns.\(^5\) He advised Rowe to stop development. The CTV public affairs program W-5 created a stir that reverberated in the corridors of Confederation Building and prompted the citizens of Arnold’s Cove to defend the town. The Anglican rector and several high school students came to the town’s defence. In letters to the *Evening Telegram* they accused the W-5 program of focussing on disease and mud while ignoring the positive features of the community. The W-5 documentary had compared conditions in Arnold’s Cove to those in a medieval town during the Black Death. The students charged the reporter ignored the fact that 85 percent of homes had water and sewer and that wells passed health inspection. The sensational documentary encouraged politicians to visit and make “erroneous statements” when they left.\(^6\) The town’s defenders attributed the disorganized state of affairs in the town to growing pains, asked critics to give them time to get organized and suggested that no one should “expect a utopia overnight.”

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people.” Author’s Note: “Peyton Place was a popular soap opera in the 1960s. It was set in the town of Peyton Place which was controlled by the old patriarch, Mr. Peyton.\(^5\) Beaton Williams to W. N. Rowe 6 December 1968. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. \(^6\) “CTV W-5 Program April 1969,” Letter to the Editor, *Evening Telegram*, April 18, 1969.
House admitted there was room for improvement, but denied conditions were as bad as the W-5 documentary alleged. He claimed the program focussed on “mud and medicine and threw the community into the political arena without regard to truth or sanity, or morale. Here is the real injustice!” In the House of Assembly the Premier attacked the W-5 program for depicting his administration as a “criminal government” that was trying to “murder an unspoiled way of life.” In the same speech he launched an attack on academics who studied resettlement and warned the Opposition not to be deceived by their “useless” studies and reports. Smallwood argued “economic” and “natural” forces pushed people to leave behind a primitive lifestyle where they lived without benefit of radio, television, electricity or roads in a malnourished condition. In typical rhetorical style he charged: “Only a fool, only an ignoramus, or a complete romantic would think that it was wrong to help them move out.” In his rant he chose not to mention that in the communities of Merasheen, Tack’s Beach and Harbour Buffett there were lobster pools, fish plants, electric lights, television, and other modern amenities, many of which had been recently installed. Nor did he mention the large homes, the fine churches and schools equipped with grassy playgrounds that could not be reclaimed, except at the expense of resettlers who were now asked to pay the cost of constructing new halls, schools, churches and recreational facilities.

The reports by journalists and academic researchers provided the Opposition in the House of Assembly and the House of Commons with ammunition to attack the

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53 Rev. E. House to Harnum, 11 April 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
FHRP. Walter Carter, MP, met with 29 resettled householders of whom all but six spelled water in buckets. In an effort to relieve the pressure, Municipal Affairs Minister John Nolan announced an agreement had been signed between his department and the Arnold’s Cove Board of Trustees for the completion of water and sewer services. The provincial and federal governments had assisted families into a centre with insufficient services and infrastructure to handle the growth, and now expected the Local Improvement District, which had been born in controversy, to assume responsibility by incurring a debt that could only be repaid by increasing the municipal taxes on all householders. Long-time residents resented paying taxes to what they considered an undemocratic local government that had been forced on them by “outsiders.” A proposal to change the structure of municipal government was debated in the provincial legislature. Opposition leader Gerald Ottenheimer alleged voters had been forced to disclose their identity on the ballot. Smallwood declared it was not a referendum, but a petition circulated by the town to determine the form of local government they wished to have. According to an *Evening Telegram* article, residents returned only 25 percent of

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56Walter Carter to W. N. Rowe, 30 July 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL. The Dictionary of Newfoundland English defines “spell” as a to carry for a short distance before stopping to rest, have a “spell”. G. M. Story, W. J. Kirwin, and J. D. A. Widdowson, eds., Dictionary of Newfoundland English (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
57“Question of Arnold’s Cove Answered,” *Evening Telegram*, 18 April 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
58“What form of government for Arnold’s Cove?” *Daily News*, 30 April 1969. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
ballots, 90 percent of which favoured continuing with the Local Improvement District. Once more it was a battle of wills between natives and settlers.\(^{59}\)

In 1970 it was clear that many of the problems that plagued the FHRP would take time to resolve. House appealed to the Minister of Education to provide financial assistance to construct a gymnatorium for 265 students enrolled at St. Michael’s school. House estimated that the population of Arnold’s Cove had increased five-fold since 1966 forcing the board to add four classrooms to the school at great expense to parents who had to pay 30 percent of the cost.\(^{60}\) The pastor reminded Rowe that many of them had left behind adequate schools without compensation. House argued that the province had a duty to provide recreational facilities and spaces. He reminded F. W. Rowe that school and recreation facilities government forced parishioners to leave behind at Harbour Buffett and Tack’s Beach were superior to those in Arnold’s Cove.

P. J. Hanley, Deputy Minister of Education, informed members of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee that most resettlement took place in Arnold’s Cove between 1965 and 1967, a time when inadequate schools created much dissatisfaction among all parents.\(^{61}\) He advised the Committee to slow the pace of resettlement and establish a special fund to rectify the problem. Hanley stated that parents moved to improve the education of their children, and “one can imagine their disappointment to

\(^{59}\)“Arnold’s Cove Can Have Council,” *Evening Telegram*, 1 May 1969. Speaking in the House Smallwood said it was a petition, not a vote. Frecker also defended the procedure and added that Arnold’s Cove was a victim of unfair publicity and declared it was “one of the most progressive [communities] in the province.

\(^{60}\)E. House to F. W. Rowe, 1 May 1970. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.

arrive at a reception centre and find poorer facilities or none at all. The Department of Education feels strongly that people should not be moved until adequate educational facilities have been provided in the receiving town.”

In Hanley’s view the success of the FHRP depended on the will of the Committee to slow the pace of resettlement to give the parties time to put in place adequate schools and housing. E. P. Weeks, Assistant Deputy Minister of DREE, emphasized the importance of not approving moves that strained the absorptive capacity of the reception centre and the financial capacity of governments. The bureaucrats wanted a more cautious approach. They realized that the Resettlement Committee, two thirds of whom represented the province, had lost control. The Deputy Minister of Public Welfare conceded that resettlement may not help the parents or the grandparents, but it was the “only salvation of the children.” Ray Guy, who spent his formative years in Arnold’s Cove, claimed the Minister responsible for resettlement declared “the old must suffer for the sake of the young.” The Arnold’s Cove example demonstrates that parents and children suffered the effects of ill-advised moves.

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63 The Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) took over the resettlement program 1 April 1970. Soon after Ottawa agreed to fund new schools, locally known as DREE schools.


The case of Arnold’s Cove provides insight into the effects of relocation on children. Peter M. Godfrey, a Social Welfare student at Memorial University, surveyed and interviewed students to determine the effects of resettlement on children. Godfrey found that half of those surveyed had not wanted to move. Their desire to stay stemmed from friendship ties and concern about starting over in a new school. Friendships were also an important part of adjusting to new environments. Most reported they had close friends who had moved to the Cove at about the same time. Church gatherings and weekly dances, and movies brought them together. Asked if they would like to return to the old community, over half believed it would be hard to get used to living that way again. Although students were mostly content, nearly two-thirds wished for more recreational facilities. They thought governments should give more consideration to recreation facilities in growth centres before the move.

Throughout the fall of 1970 youth attempted to effect change by appealing directly to politicians and engaging in letter writing campaigns. Helen Best wrote W. N. Rowe to request funds to build a school gymnasium. The former resident of Tack’s Beach pointed out that one objective of FHRP was to bring people from areas of disadvantage to centres with better services, especially education and recreation. Best charged there were no recreation facilities within the school walls and outside there was only a “parking lot and a bog.” Another informed Rowe that her family moved from

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67 Helen Best to W. N. Rowe, 23 September 1970. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
Woody Island to find better opportunities for education and recreation. The students made it clear that the school and environs were substandard and the government had a moral responsibility to keep its promise. The Minister shifted blame to householders who “insisted on moving ... before adequate provision could be made for schools.” But government ministers and their agents who approved petitions had a responsibility to control the pace of settlement and ensure services were in place in the reception centre. The FHRC approved and assisted all moves, and were responsible for managing the centralization plan which Guy referred to as “Smallwood’s blitzkrieg destruction of communities.”

Geographer Howard Brown, a son of the main merchant of King’s Island, provided a snapshot of life in Tack’s Beach in the 1960s. The 450 residents worshipped in a church that could seat 400, children attended a four-room school, and Orangemen met in a new hall. Communication services included a radio telephone, a post office, and a public wharf. Mail arrived twice a week by coastal boat. In addition to the retail and supply trade, herring packing plant, salt cod plant and lobster business, H. C. Brown operated a private ferry capable of making the 12 mile crossing to Arnold’s Cove in less than two hours. The hospital ship Lady Anderson called bi-weekly and doctors treated emergency cases at Come-by-Chance. The general store, church, hall, and many homes were powered by private generators. Taking advantage of electrification seven

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68Marilyn Williams to W. N. Rowe, 22 November 1970. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
69W. N. Rowe to Debbie Williams, 10 December1970. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
71Howard Brown, “Tack’s Beach: A Reconstruction” (Student paper, Maritime History Archives, Memorial University, 1966).
households purchased televisions and several had electric washing machines. Those without televisions crowded into neighbours’ homes to watch popular programs like wrestling.\textsuperscript{72}

The migration of young people pushed the average age upward, but it remained a large community with 47 household heads employed in the inshore fishery. The next largest group worked aboard government-owned vessels and Great Lakes ships. The balance of the labour force worked in service jobs in the community. The fishermen enjoyed near year-round employment harvesting lobster from April to June, cod from July to October, and herring in late fall and winter months. It appeared to be one of the most stable communities in the Bay, but its Achilles heel was the 17 household heads who worked off the island.\textsuperscript{73}

Although Tack’s Beach appeared to have a viable economic base, there were warning signs. The decline of the inshore fisheries and the evacuation of nearby settlements undermined the economy and the morale of the community.\textsuperscript{74} Matthews claimed that rumour followed by visitations from resettlement officials and the Burin plant manager led to the community’s extirpation. I argue that Arnold’s Cove fit the bill for those with secure jobs outside the community, fishermen who did not want to change occupations, and the retired who wished to be near medical services. Furthermore, the

\textsuperscript{72}See Rex Brown, \textit{Out From the Harbour} (St. John’s: Flanker Press, 2014) for an early 1960s study of life in Tack’s Beach, Best’s Harbour and Broad Cove. Government considered all three to be one community.

\textsuperscript{73}Aubrey Penney to Harnum, 2 March 1966. GN39/1, Box 32, File H1925, PANL. Penney believed that “the old people and government employees who knew where their cheque was coming from prevented fishermen from moving to fisheries growth centres to find work.”

\textsuperscript{74}Iverson and Matthews, \textit{Communities in Decline}, 59.
age structure of the population was trending upward. According to Brown most young people left before celebrating their twentieth birthday. Older residents began to feel lonely and persons who commuted regularly to Come by Chance for medical treatment found the trip financially onerous.\textsuperscript{75} The aging population, increasingly concerned about access to health services wanted to relocate to a place with a road connection and in close proximity to a hospital. By shifting to the isthmus seamen and loggers could cut expense and reduce travel time.\textsuperscript{76} Brown contended that the resource base could provide 47 fishing families with enough employment to qualify for Unemployment Insurance, but not enough to earn a good living.\textsuperscript{77} The decline in cod and herring fisheries at a time when expectations were rising also came into play.

Government announcements of new industries stimulated interest in moving. A few families left King’s Island unassisted, but a land freeze on the isthmus delayed the evacuation of the community. Furthermore Arnold’s Cove was not yet selected as a growth centre, nor did the FHRC intend to designate it as one of the organized reception centres until the majority of householders in Tack’s Beach insisted on moving into the small village. They rebuffed all attempts to relocate them to Burin where there was a labour shortage.\textsuperscript{78} When the Committee approved moves to Arnold’s Cove the flood gates opened. Households from Port Anne in the west to Harbour Buffett in the east and

\textsuperscript{75}M. Elaine Duggan, “Resettlement of the Isolated Newfoundland Community,” Unpublished paper, Memorial University, 1970, 8.
\textsuperscript{76}Aubrey Penney to Harnum 2 March 1966. GN39/1, Box 32, File H1925, PANL.
\textsuperscript{77}Howard Brown, “Tack’s Beach,” 11.
\textsuperscript{78}Aubrey Penney to Harnum, March 2, 1966. GN39/1, Box 32, File H1925, PANL.
Penney wrote Harnum re a visit by the Burn plant manager to recruit fish plant workers and trawler crews. A delegation appointed in a public meeting visited Burin to investigate the housing and school situation. They brought back a favourable report that persuaded only a few families to move to Burin.
Woody Island to the north rushed to the isthmus before the necessary infrastructure was in place to handle the influx.\textsuperscript{79} Responding to the expressed concerns of the students, Rowe admitted the planners had been caught off-guard by the number who opted to relocate to communities on the isthmus.\textsuperscript{80} The Resettlement Committee seemed to have lost control over the process of identifying growth centres and directing resettlers into offshore fisheries bases.

Wretched conditions and high unemployment rates in many growth centres led to allegations that government forced people out. In response Harnum outlined the process that was followed at Tack’s Beach.\textsuperscript{81} On 11 February 1965 P. J. Canning presented a petition in the House of Assembly on behalf of residents who were seeking financial assistance to relocate. Canning said just over 80 percent signed the petition. In June Rev. House wired Newfoundland’s Minister of Fisheries seeking information on the FHRP and Lane replied that details on policy had not yet been formalized. In October, House chaired a public meeting that elected a local resettlement committee, and shortly thereafter the local committee reported that 90 percent signed a resettlement petition which the FHRC rejected because the majority of householders indicated they wished to move to Arnold’s Cove, a community under a land freeze. Subsequent correspondence indicated residents were anxious to move. House wrote: “Personally I do not think the people of Tack’s Beach should be forced to remain on the Island longer than this year.”\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{79}Only 10 of the 76 households who were assisted to move from Tack’s Beach resettled to a fisheries growth centre, 2 to Fortune, 6 to Burin, 1 to Grand bank, and 1 to Catalina. See “This is how resettlement happens,” GN39/1, File S64, PANL.
\textsuperscript{80}W. N. Rowe to Debbie Williams, 10 December, 1970. GN39/1, Box125, File S2, PANL.
\textsuperscript{81}Harnum, “This is How Resettlement Happens,” GN39/1, File S64, PANL.
\textsuperscript{82}Quoted in “This is How Resettlement Happens,” GN39/1, File S64, PANL.
When the Resettlement Committee approved the Tack’s Beach to Arnold’s Cove move, it set in motion events that brought the FHRP into disrepute.

F. W. Rowe’s contention that the people moved too quickly has merit, but there were other factors in play. According to Iverson and Matthews, lack of official information and counselling allowed rumour to take root. Especially disconcerting were rumours that services were about to be downgraded or eliminated. The evacuation occurred so suddenly that in September three of four classrooms remained closed. Iverson and Matthews interviewed only one householder who claimed to have left because the school was substandard. Many respondents said they left because they feared the school would close. Iverson and Matthews wrote: “The decision to abandon Tack’s Beach was accompanied by uncertainty, animosity and dismay - magnified by rumour.” Matthews reported four of the 16 households surveyed gave the following reasons for leaving: “forced out,” “had to leave,” “too few left,” “others were leaving,” or “no other choice.” In his PhD thesis Matthews concluded that most left because they were tired of an isolated way of life and transportation was too expensive. In an address to the Canadian Institute of Planners he claimed that the quick evacuation of Tack’s Beach resulted from inadequate counselling services which allowed gossip and rumour to create

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83 Iverson and Matthews, *Communities in Decline*, 59.
84 Iverson and Matthews, *Communities in Decline*, 59.
85 Ralph Matthews, “Communities in Transition,” 360. Matthews reported that Tack’s Beach, Best’s Harbour and Broad Cove was the largest community to be resettled under the FHRP. The combined population of the three settlements, which government treated as one, was about 500. Of the 16 people Matthews interviewed none were under 30 years, nine were over 50, one in the 40 - 50 range, six were in the 30 - 40 age bracket. Education level ranged from no schooling to grade six.
panic in the population. Matthews alleged that when the director of resettlement followed up a request for information with a personal visit, he added to the “collective hysteria.” The sociologist suggested that overzealous bureaucrats described life in growth centres in “glowing terms leading to unrealistic expectations” and ignored the 20% unemployment rate. Furthermore, the carriers of the petition became purveyors of misinformation. Overzealous locals convinced householders that anyone refusing to sign the petition when it was circulated would be denied assistance when the Resettlement Committee approved the move. Fear of being left alone in an abandoned community without services placed reluctant voters under duress.

Fisheries policymakers believed in the benefits of centralization and considered the mixed economy of rural Newfoundland to be antiquated and drafted legislation to reform it. Legislation is rarely neutral and usually incorporates the biases of those who write it. The Act stacked the deck by permitting householders who had left the outport to sign the petition if the move took place after 1 April 1965 or within 18 months of the petitioning date. By offering the grant retroactively to relocated households, the legislators tilted the scales in favour of resettlement. Occasionally, the actions and votes of ex-residents decided the fate of communities. The Tack’s Beach merchant tried to salvage the community by assuring the people his store and the school would remain open, but the arrival of officials with promises of a good life in growth centres

88 Matthews, “The Outport Breakup,” 2442.
undermined his once respected position. When the merchants left, the rest were likely to follow.

Disillusioned fishers competed for limited jobs in growth centres, or returned to the abandoned communities, former grounds, facilities and perhaps houses, often without the comfort and benefit of family. In 1969, 95 percent of the salt cod produced in Placentia Bay was caught by men returning from growth centres. Harry Wareham, who relocated from Harbour Buffett to St. John’s, informed Guy that he received calls from fishermen begging for credit to obtain supplies to return to the islands. At Isle Valen Guy encountered a crew living aboard a longliner. The fishermen complained of nothing to do on stormy days, “not like in the past when gardens could be tended, fences and property repaired.” With no alternate employment available, they were one crew among many to choose isolation over welfare.

Arnold’s Cove attracted criticism from all sides - locals, resettlers, politicians, print and electronic media, and social scientists. The problems that arose in this reception centre demonstrate the social upheaval that resulted from lack of planning. Because of the

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90 The Resettlement Act (1965) gave the province’s Minister of Fisheries the discretionary authority to approve seasonal use of fishing rooms in vacated communities. The Evacuated Communities Act prohibited permanent occupancy. Resettlement which had promised householders a better life forced many resettled families to maintain two homes and to live apart for the duration of the fishing season in a place without services.
93 When I visited Port Anne in August 2010 there were two longliner crews present. Both had substantial wharves and stores in excellent condition. I chatted with Mr. Pevie who spent April to November in the abandoned community which was now lined with cabins equipped with indoor plumbing, electricity, VHF radios, cell phones and internet access. He said he and his son returned to Port Anne every year since it was resettled in 1966. It was resettled after the petition was referred to the Minister for approval.
goals of the program were contradictory, relocatees were able to negotiate moves to less viable centres from which they could more easily commute to wage employment or return to fish old grounds. Matthews, Brox, and Wadel suggested the state forced outport people into designated growth centres, but in many instances the tail wagged the dog and households set the terms. Households of Tack’s Beach made a sudden exit, but the majority made it plain that they were not going to resettle into offshore fisheries bases. After receiving multiple petitions FHRC relented and approved the move.\textsuperscript{94}

**Southern Harbour**

Southern Harbour is another example of how things can go awry when the FHRC approved moves without a study. Only after households had moved from the islands to the Isthmus did C&SD send two field officers to investigate conditions in Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour and to survey attitudes toward resettlement in the remaining settlements of Placentia West. It was a case of moving people first and attempting to resolve problems after the fact. When the Resettlement Committee approved Southern Harbour as an organized reception centre there was little evidence of organization. Receiving communities rarely had any form of municipal government at the time of designation. Southern Harbour had limited means to tackle water and sewer projects or build new schools without special funding from Ottawa or St. John’s. Burry and Shirley reported on the deplorable condition of the school at Southern Harbour. Here a small two-room chapel served 117 pupils and four teachers on a rotating basis. In a single

\textsuperscript{94}Households from Brookside, Brule, Davis Cove, Harbour Buffett, Haystack, Kingwell, Monkstown, Paradise, Port Anne, Spencer’s Cove, and Woody Island all contributed to the explosive growth of Arnold’s Cove, but the arrival of 45 householders from Tack’s Beach within the space of a few weeks created a crisis. Freeman Wareham of Alberto Wareham Ltd. led the exodus from Spencer’s Cove to Arnold’s Cove in 1964.
academic year enrollment doubled and children were forced to learn in an overcrowded, unsanitary structure that the field workers condemned. The school under construction at Southern Harbour had all the modern conveniences, including an auditorium, but only one classroom. In reality the town needed four or five classrooms to accommodate the burgeoning population. Shirley considered the old school unfit and recommended against reopening it in September. Furthermore, the impetus for municipal government came from the newcomers. John Wadman, a former Bar Haven merchant, chaired the Board of Trustees of the local improvement district of Southern Harbour. The council had a small tax base to fund water and sewer projects and roads without assistance from the provincial or federal governments. The province attempted to resolve the problem by assigning lot supplementary grants to the municipality. It was a strategy the provincial government employed to get the federal government to pay 70 percent of the cost of municipal infrastructure as I will demonstrate in a later chapter.

Both levels of government had much to gain from the close-out of rural communities. The post office, Canadian National Telegraph (CNT), Canadian National Railway (CNR) coastal boat service, and harbours came under the purview of the national government. It was customary for federal ministers to consult with the province before investing in new infrastructure. When G. E. Knight, District Engineer, Department of Public Works asked the Director of Resettlement if the FHRC planned to resettle Southern Harbour, Harnum assured Knight that Southern Harbour was a community with a future. He stated 25 families were in the process of moving into Southern Harbour and

was confident many others would follow. This exchange between the two bureaucrats indicates the degree to which resettlement officials could influence development in a coastal community. A negative response to a federal inquiry could doom a settlement. By virtue of its location near the Trans-Canada Highway and its proximity to medical facilities, and the site of a proposed industrial complex, Southern Harbour met the requirements of a growth centre. While governments approved of plans to build wharves, they made little effort to prepare for the anticipated influx of relocatees. J. F. Rogers, Assistant Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs advised the Deputy Minister H. U. Rowe that Southern Harbour and Arnold’s Cove were in no position to install a community water and sewer system.

In 1968, G. A. Frecker, MHA for Placentia East, informed Harnum that resettlement had transformed Southern Harbour from a very small village into a large town. To alleviate financial hardship for the 24 resettled families awaiting approval of their applications for assistance, Frecker asked the FHRC to designate Southern Harbour a growth centre. Frecker touted the community’s strategic location near the Long Harbour Electric Reduction Company (ERCO) plant and the proposed paper mill and petrochemical industries at Come-by-Chance. The chairman of the Board of Trustees of Southern Harbour, John Wadman, listed nine reasons why the Resettlement Committee should approve the request: excellent harbour; small fish plant; proximity to Long Harbour and Come-by-Chance; a new school; a new church planned; and a new

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96 Harnum to G. E. Knight, 24 June 1966. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
97 J. F. Rogers, Assistant Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs to H. U. Rowe, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, 29 May 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, The Rooms.
98 John B. Wadman to G. A. Frecker, 1 August 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
subdivision being laid out by Municipal Affairs. Wadman stated the number of households had increased from 33 in 1964 to 90 and 20 others were in the process of resettling. Frecker, in concert with the Local Improvement District, wanted the FHRC to approve Southern Harbour as an Approved Organized Reception Centre to qualify resettlers for grants and lot supplementaries. Frecker’s intervention illustrates the degree to which politicians interfered with the program at the instigation of local groups.

Late in 1968, the FHRC classified Southern Harbour as an organized reception centre. Harnum reported he had visited the community to meet with Board of Trustees and check on the subdivision being laid out by the Division of Urban and Rural Development. Cognizant of the media reports alleging growth centres were welfare ghettos, he reported that only two resettled households were on able-bodied relief. All families that moved after 1 April 1967 were eligible for lot supplementary grants provided they connected to the town water and sewage system. But settlers, who had spent the resettlement grant to relocate homes, could not afford to hook up to water and sewer mains until FHRC approved the lot supplementary. Letters poured into the Resettlement Division and the Office of the Premier from residents complaining of contaminated wells. Mrs. Henry Hickey wrote:

We were moved to this dirty dive of a Southern Harbour with not a drop of water of any kind always going around with a bucket trying to Beg [sic] a drop of water from the few people here that got a drop and no one had very much. There is six of my family after having Hipatitis [sic] this winter from the dirt of the water. They are sick most all winter. Not a drop of water to wash the Bed [sic] Cloths [sic] not a drop to wash your floors not a drop to flush the toilet and there are some people on this hill with no toilet.

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99 Wadman to G. A. Frecker, 1 August 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
100 Harnum to Sametz, 19 November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
Earl Hickey, formerly of Petite Forte, also complained to Smallwood:

My problem is that I moved from Petite Forte to Southern Harbour. My reason for moving was to get school for my children as I was told there would be no school at Petite Forte. Mr. Premier I may have made it better for my children as far as school goes, but worse for myself and my wife. We have no water and sewerage, my wife have [sic] to bring a pail across the high road down to a beach where men are working, she is getting fed up with it all. We don’t have any water. We have to go to a neighbour to get a bucket of water to drink and our neighbour have [sic] very little for himself.  

A year later Hickey informed the Premier that he still “had not a drop of water, only in a bucket from a friend” and his circumstances were now worse than they had been in Petite Forte where he had plenty of water and a toilet. Hickey contended his family was in a worse state than before the move. He wrote: “It was a terrible mistake on someone’s part to put people in these kind of places [and he did not] want to spend the last of [his] years in misery begging for a bucket of water.”

John Whiffen, who moved to Southern Harbour from Bar Haven, also appealed to the Premier for a safe, reliable water supply. He had resided in the Blind Hill subdivision for five years. Whiffen, who was unable to move his house, spent all resettlement money and savings buying land, building a home and replacing fishing premises. The

102 Earl Hickey to Smallwood, 19 May 1970. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.016, ASC, Memorial University.
103 Hickey to Smallwood, 19 May 1970.
104 Earl Hickey to Smallwood, 2 May 1971. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.019, ASC, MUN. Because Petite Forte was not a “designated outport” Hickey did not qualify for the $1,000 lot supplementary.
105 Earl Hickey to Smallwood, 2 May 1971. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.019, ASC, Memorial University.
106 John Whiffen to Smallwood, 13 May 1971. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.019, ASC, Memorial University.
provincial government had drilled an artesian, but did not supply a pump. Peter Mulrooney, who was also from Bar Haven, had similar complaints. Others advised Smallwood there were no facilities to accommodate new fishermen. One relocatee suggested that if government would not improve facilities at Southern Harbour, it ought to shift them back to their old communities where they would be less dependent. Gerald Murphy wrote that he lived without water and sewer on a very windy hill, in a “mud puddle” and condemned the Smallwood government for resettling people to places where they were forced onto welfare. Since all the letters included similar complaints, one can assume that the writers had legitimate grievances.

As deplorable as the conditions in the Blind Hill subdivision were, a dozen households from St. Joseph’s, Placentia Bay, were in worse circumstances. These families used the basic resettlement grant to cover moving expenses. They anticipated using lot supplementary grants to pay for land which they now occupied. Families found themselves in a predicament when they learned that the FHRC could only provide supplementary assistance after the homeowner connected to sewer mains and, in this case, the local road. The town’s Board of Trustees attempted, without success, to pressure the FHRC to assign the lot supplementaries to the town. Meanwhile the landowners were threatening to evict the trespassers. The settlers were in a Catch-22 situation. The

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107 Peter Mulrooney to Smallwood, 13 May 1971. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.016, ASC, Memorial University.
108 Gerald Murphy to Smallwood, 11 February 1971. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.021. ASC, Memorial University.
109 Murphy to Smallwood, 11 February 1971. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.29.021. ASC, Memorial University.
110 John Wadman, Chair of Local Improvement District of Southern Harbour, to Harnum, 11 December 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
vendors alleged that they could not afford to extend sewer mains or the road. Both parties were caught up in bureaucratic red tape.

Lloyd Powell, RDO and D. Ryan, Urban and Rural Development met with John Wadman, chair of the Local Improvement Committee, to try to end the stalemate. They hoped to mitigate the crisis by asking the town to install the services and later recoup the cost from lot supplemental grants. C&SD agreed to ask each family to assign their $1,000 supplementary grants to the town to finance the project, but the Board of Trustees balked, fearing the project would overburden taxpayers. In the meantime the families were fenced off from the community and the salt water, the traditional place to dispose of waste. The rights of social citizenship which entitled people to a decent standard of services did not apply to those families from St. Joseph’s.

Municipal Affairs argued that since the Board of Trustees had issued occupancy permits, it was up to the local government to resolve it. How the Board would solve the situation, Allston had no comment. He asserted the province of all responsibility for the families who were not only forced to live without services, but also had to contend with a hostile landowner who threatened to evict them. Neither the local government, settler, nor vendor had the means to rectify the problem. The Resettlement Committee, unwilling to set a precedent, allowed a dozen families to live with a constant fear of expulsion. The end to isolation and the dream of “the good life” appeared more distant than ever.

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111 Lloyd Powell to Harnum, 29 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
112 Powell to Harnum, 29 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
113 Robert Ryan to W. N. Rowe, 6 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
114 Augustine Whiffen and Alfred Whiffen to Harnum, 16 December 1968. Malcolm Best sold lots for $650.00 and while Augustine Whiffen sold lots for $400 each. The town sold serviced lots for $1,000 per lot.
stranded householders opined that they were worse off than before the move “because now we only got our house.”\textsuperscript{115}

Matters became worse when council split on the issue. Two councillors who opposed buying the land and servicing the lots circulated a petition to have council dissolved and called for a public meeting to discuss the “evils of council.”\textsuperscript{116} At the heart of the dispute were the high taxes all residents would have to pay to purchase and service the disputed land. The matter had reached a stalemate. One of the landowners said it was another example of government discriminating against rural Newfoundlander. No one in St. John’s, he allowed, would be expected to have houses hauled up on their land and be waiting a year for payment.\textsuperscript{117} He insisted that he would not undertake construction of a road, or provide any services, until he received payment in full for the lots. Whiffen warned that any attempt by any other party to install them, before he received payment, “could result in very serish [sic] truble [sic] and if the Wadmans is [sic] doing any bluffing all you have to do is send they [sic] along to me and I will handle them.”\textsuperscript{118} He claimed his lawyer advised him “to order them off his property [and] tear down the houses.”\textsuperscript{119} Whiffen blamed resettlement officials for “putting them [the relocatees] on the bum,” by which he meant impoverishing them.\textsuperscript{120} Harnum tried to placate the landowner by promising that as soon as the homeowners became eligible for

\textsuperscript{115}Robert Ryan to W. N. Rowe, 6 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{116}Powell to Harnum, 21 February 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{117}Whiffen to Harnum, 11 March 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{118}Augustine Whiffen to Harnum, 10 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{119}Whiffen to Rowe, 5 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{120}Whiffen to Rowe, 5 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
supplementary grants the issue could be resolved amicably.\textsuperscript{121} The Director hoped to persuade the householders to assign lot supplementaries to the community council. The FHRP was already under siege and the minister wished to avoid the public furore that moves to Arnold’s Cove had stirred up. By May, 1969 a resolution appeared likely.\textsuperscript{122}

A resolution could not come soon enough for the resettlers. Robert Ryan, one of the resettlers, described how stressful the experience was for the families who lived under threat of eviction.\textsuperscript{123} The landowners added to the stressful situation by fencing them off from the saltwater and the rest of the community. The households who moved to escape isolation were more isolated in the growth centre than they were before the move. To illustrate the hardship, Ryan described the arduous task of getting heating oil to his home. The delivery process began by placing drums at the end of the road. From there two or three men rolled the drums, with considerable difficulty, down a steep grade to the houses. Robert Ryan sympathized with the unfortunate landowner and chastised the minister for holding up payment of the supplementary grant which he had been promised before he agreed to move.

One cannot overlook the irony of the situation. The state encouraged families to leave ancestral homes by extolling the virtues of modernity. At Southern Harbour a dozen families found themselves more isolated than before the move, fenced off from the community and the sea, under threat of eviction. The resettlers argued it was unrealistic for government to expect a poor man to allow an unhappy situation to continue until the

\textsuperscript{121}Harnum to Whiffen, 2 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{122}Powell to Harnum, 5 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
\textsuperscript{123}Robert Ryan to Rowe, 6 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
landowner, who had not been paid, serviced the land. They felt that if government did not assume responsibility for correcting the mess that they were shifted into, no one would.\textsuperscript{124}

Lloyd Powell reported in September 1970 that four houses had sewage connections and wells, four others had sewage connection but no wells, while four had neither sewage nor water connections. In his report, Powell stated the council charged $1,000 for each sewer hook-up but refused to dig wells or purchase water pumps.\textsuperscript{125}

Although the regulations required connections to water and sewer before the FHRC could approve lot supplementaries, the town received the grants. The Resettlement Division was willing to leave households without water to flush toilets, but they would not risk driving a growth centre into bankruptcy by withholding supplementary grants assigned to the town. The bureaucrats feared that the burden of debt might ruin the newly formed council and expose the FHRP to more negative publicity. Harnum recommended that C&SD provide debt relief for the municipality, but offered no further relief to the beleaguered families.\textsuperscript{126}

The Director of Resettlement remained silent on the matter of wells and water pumps for families.

**Conclusion**

The Fisheries Household Resettlement program attracted widespread criticism when the Resettlement Committee approved moves to growth centres in which there were few amenities or opportunities for employment. Reports appended to the Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Federal - Provincial Advisory Committee identified problems in

\textsuperscript{124}Harnum to Whiffen, 18 June 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.

\textsuperscript{125}Powell to Harnum, “Re: Report on Lot Supplementaries, Southern Harbour,” 14 September 1970. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.

\textsuperscript{126}Harnum to W. N. Rowe, 9 July 1971. GN39/1, Box 126, File S60, PANL.
reception centres as the major cause of criticism of the FHRP. The administrators succumbed to political pressure groups and lost control over the pace and direction of resettlement. Municipalities granted permits to occupy before water and sewer systems were complete thus precipitating reports from health inspectors warning of possible epidemics of typhoid, diphtheria or hepatitis. Overcrowded schools without indoor plumbing or sufficient ventilation, also threatened student health. When school boards requested extraordinary funding for new schools, the Minister of C&SD informed the board that he was passing the request on to the Minister of Education. The Education Minister, who was father of the Minister of Community and Social Development, informed the school boards that, since the FHRP created the overcrowding, C&SD should provide additional classrooms. When the conditions in the reception centre caught the attention of local and national media, it created a public relations nightmare for the federal and provincial governments. The exaggerated reports spurred Reverend Edward House and some high school students to mount a public defence of their community, but more privately they wrote letters to the Premier, ministers of the crown and resettlement officials complaining of inadequate, or non-existent, facilities and services.

The conditions at Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour had parallels in other reception centres as well as the industrial fisheries growth centres. Department of Health inspectors told resettled householders at Rushoon to dig pit toilets to reduce pollution in

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the unserviced subdivision.\textsuperscript{128} Induced by resettlement grants and lot supplementaries, families moved into growth points with a paucity of modern amenities and few opportunities to change occupations. Many householders became welfare recipients. Inexperienced and divided local governments, with a limited tax base, could not meet the needs of burgeoning populations. Government moved households and then abandoned them. The Department of Municipal Affairs left housing to private developers who had no experience in real estate. The rapidity of the moves from the islands of Placentia Bay surprised the resettlement officials, but the FHRC approved the moves and the destination. To relieve the housing crisis the province purchased a motorized barge in 1968 to salvage houses from evacuated outports, but by this time most householders had moved into the isthmus. Some hired private barges which added to the cost of relocating and sometimes left families in dire straits.

Reports appended to the Minutes of the Federal - Provincial Advisory Committee meeting illustrate how unprepared the FHRC was to deal with troubles in the growth points. Four years into the household resettlement program the Committee realized the need to pay more attention to integrating households into reception centres. Among the most pressing concerns identified in the report was the need to redress the educational problems brought on by the unanticipated pace of resettlement. One report recommended that, where possible, the FHRP should underwrite the cost of transferring schools from the evacuated communities to reception centres as a less expensive alternative to building new classrooms. Adopting a policy of moving schools required an admission on the part

\textsuperscript{128}J. J. Barry, District Health Inspector, to J. M. Graham, Assistant Director of Health Inspection, 28 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S168, PANL.
of resettlement planners that schools in some vacated communities had not been as substandard as the resettlement officials had suggested. The Committee adamantly refused to underwrite the cost of moving buildings which they labelled social capital. The well-maintained schools at Harbour Buffett and Tack’s Beach could have been dismantled and rebuilt as we shall see in Chapter VIII. The school boards’ requests for a special funding formula to build additional classroom only resulted in government ministers passing the buck. Resettlers remained responsible for mortgages on abandoned buildings while they shared the cost of new schools in the new community. The Committee should not have approved reception centres until services and facilities were in place, and refrained from saturating the area with new settlers. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to expect inexperienced local councils to deal with the fallout. Municipal governance was in an infant state and lacked the resources, the unity of purpose, and the expertise to address problems foisted upon them by the FHRP. The federal and provincial governments, which had entered into a resettlement agreement to improve the welfare of a disadvantaged population, failed to keep their promise to improve their well-being.

Nonetheless, bureaucrats continued to embrace the program. V. P. Rossiter, Task Force Director, Federal Department of Fisheries, reported that the centralization plan was a basic component for development of a viable and dynamic twentieth-century Newfoundland fishing industry.”\(^{129}\) Rossiter considered the FHRP to be “an essential vehicle” for the transfer of a large portion of human resources from an inefficient inshore fishery into more productive employment in one of the offshore fishing centres or another

\(^{129}\)V. P. Rossiter, Task Force Director Newfoundland Program, “Capsule Notes: Newfoundland Fisheries Resettlement Programme, 30 January1970. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 104.005, ASC, Memorial University.
industrial town. He admitted housing and education were two major problems, but maintained the program was effective. Rossiter ignored the anguish of families who struggled to establish homes in a polluted environment that made children ill. The Task Force Director tied success of the program the numbers evacuated. He reported that to 30 January 1970, 98 communities had been evacuated under the joint program and 50 others were in the process of moving.\textsuperscript{130} While civil servants might accept these numbers as proof of progress, statistical data do not reveal the trials and tribulations endured by the householders. Resettled people bought the official line that government was assisting them to a place that offered better opportunities for employment, better opportunities for education of children, and better medical services for all ages. Resettlers agreed to forfeit to the crown all rights to ancestral homes and land in return for the promise of a better life for their children, jobs and modern amenities. However, the “good life” remained a distant prospect as they emptied slop pails in a subdivision.

It is easy to blame officials in distant offices for the pain of resettlement, but in some cases coastal people pressured the FHRC to approve moves that offered better access to medical services and an easier commute for those who worked on CNR coastal boats. It also held out the possibility of home ownership after the move. Interventions by politicians, who responded to requests from constituents in reception and growth centres, undermined the authority of the Resettlement Committee. Rural development officers warned of the dangers of concentrating too many people in one area, but their warnings went unheeded. Dr. A. W. Needler was wrong when he told the Federal/Provincial

\textsuperscript{130} Rossiter, “Capsule Notes.” A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll 065, File 104.005, ASC, Memorial University.
Advisory Committee that no one could have predicted the housing crisis. The social and economic that arose in Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour were predictable and the people suffered the consequences of government ineptitude.
Chapter V

Segregation and Social Alienation in Growth Centres: Placentia, Trepassey, Harbour Breton, and Stephenville - St. George’s

Introduction

A study of the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program should include intangibles. Statistics on the number of families moved and communities evacuated do not measure the psychological or social trauma resettlers endured in reception centres. This chapter examines the forces that shaped resettlers’ lives in four urban growth centres of Placentia, Trepassey, Harbour Breton, and Stephenville. I selected Trepassey and Harbour Breton, two major fisheries growth centres, and Placentia and Stephenville, two towns whose growth was fostered by the railway and US military bases. Fishery Products Ltd. converted its seasonal plant in Trepassey to a year-round plant supplied by offshore draggers in 1966 while BC Packers of Harbour Breton wanted additional workers to expand production of frozen fish in this period. While the two offshore fisheries bases were short of labour, the economies of the two service towns were shrinking due to the downsizing of US and CNR operations.

Quality of life, satisfaction with the move, and whether a household felt alienated in a new environment are as important as economic security in weighing the success of FHRP. Studies of resettlement identify lack of counselling in sending and receiving communities, before and after the move, caused unnecessary trauma for both resettlers and long-time residents. The Resettlement Committee, which concentrated on evacuating outports, ignored the psychological and social impact of moving families from household production to a market economy. There were no regional field offices in place...
before C&SD took control of the program in 1967. A. W. Needler, chairman of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee advised the Committee that fisheries development was the primary reason for federal government’s involvement.¹ The goal was to raise incomes of rural households, and to benefit the next generation. Needler preferred to stress the objectives of the program and ignore the social cost, particularly for the elderly. However, E. M. Gosse, Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Newfoundland, declared that the mechanics of moving people and laying out subdivisions was a “simple process” compared to making resettlement centres viable.² He asked the Committee to consider the benefits of revitalizing the inshore fishery through a process of diversification and modernization and to decrease the pace community evacuations.

In the previous chapter I discussed moves to two minor reception centres wherein the underemployed resettled fishing households could choose to join the ranks of the unemployed in the growth centre or return each year to the old community to prosecute the fishery as before. In this chapter I examine how resettlers integrated into urban environments. It brought about a radical change in the lifestyle for all ages, but for the older generation and those who left houses behind, it was especially painful. The older generation longed for the social connections that were lost in the transition to modernity. The social, cultural and economic fabric of the ancestral community became a painful memory for those who were unable to adjust to an economy that devalued their skills and forced them to accept the responsibilities and expenses of urban life. This chapter

¹Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee, Confederation Building, June 1969. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, File 104.005, ASC, Memorial University.
²Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee, June 1969. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, ASC, File 104.005, Memorial University.
examines how resettled households in four urban reception centres managed cultural change.

Placentia

Placentia, once the capital of the French fishery in Newfoundland, was transformed into a service centre by a railway construction boom in the late nineteenth century and construction of US military bases at Argentia in the 1940s. At the time the Household Resettlement Committee, in response to political pressure, approved Placentia as a growth centre the two main employers were laying off workers. Placentia is a prime example of how politicians interfered with the selection of growth centres. The Placentia East Association of Towns and Community Councils saw resettlement as a means to get federal and provincial governments to improve infrastructure in the area and reverse the economic downturn. At a meeting of the Association G. A. Frecker and Richard Cashin promised support for the Association’s proposal to make the Placentia area a reception centre for the Placentia Bay East outports. Frecker made a case for approving the Association’s request in a letter to F. W. Rowe. Frecker pointed to plans for a new regional high school, the existence of several clubs and organizations in the area, the area’s water and sewerage system, and the town’s proximity to the TCH and Long Harbour, the site of the Electric Reduction Co. as reasons why the FHRC should give serious consideration to the proposal. Frecker was preaching to the choir since Rowe and Cashin had informed Harnum that they were anxious to have the Placentia area

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3Meeting of Placentia East Association of Towns and Community Councils, 10 March 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S70, PANL.
4G. A. Frecker to F. W. Rowe, 5 April 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S70, PANL.
designated a growth centre.\textsuperscript{5} When an application had the backing of a provincial cabinet minister and the Parliamentary Secretary to the federal Minister of Fisheries, it placed a lot of pressure on the FHRC to ignore economic realities and approve growth centres. The Committee approved moves from Port Anne, Great Paradise, Little Paradise, Southeast Bight, Red Island, Port Royal, and Merasheen to Placentia, Dunville, Jerseyside, and Freshwater.

The Rural Development Branch of ARDA encouraged a “carrot and stick approach,” but reminded resettlement administrators that “many people would be unprepared sociologically and psychologically to live [where] they [would] be strangers to their own neighbours and where they [would] have new commodities they [had] never dreamed of.”\textsuperscript{6} The Rural Development Branch suggested the Interdepartmental Committee on Centralization should send social animators and counsellors into sending communities to prepare residents for life in the new centre. Nonetheless, resettlement proceeded with minimal counselling before or after moves.

M. Elaine Duggan, a social welfare student at Memorial University, conducted a questionnaire-interview study of 27 resettled households at Placentia.\textsuperscript{7} The majority of resettlers interviewed felt content before resettlement. Three out of four respondents said they were satisfied to live out their lives in the old community if the resettlement program had not intervened. Discontentment among the older generation began to set in with the

\textsuperscript{5}Memorandum From Assistant Deputy Minister to Minister of Fisheries, 17 January 1967. GN39/1, File S50, PANL.
\textsuperscript{6}DREE, Memorandum From Rural Development Branch, ARDA, to Interdepartmental Committee on Resettlement, no date, quoted in Blake, \textit{Lions or Jellyfish}, 129.
\textsuperscript{7}M. Elaine Duggan, “Resettlement of the Isolated Newfoundland Community” (Memorial University, student paper, 1970), Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University.
departure of the young people when assistance was offered. Resettlers identified
difficulty recruiting teachers, removal of parish headquarters from the islands, rumours of
post office closures and the departure of merchants as push factors. Seventy-four percent
of the sample interviewed felt compelled to relocate. They reported that they felt “real
scared” when the merchant closed shop. Not surprisingly, respondents who were unable
to move homes experienced the greatest social disconnect.8 The loss of churches, schools,
and halls haunted them. They now worshipped in a place that had no connection to their
past. Weddings, baptisms, and funerals had taken place in another setting. People could
be moved around, but the sense of community was lost in growth centres where
neighbours were strangers. Many householders commented on the loss of gardens and the
significant increase in the cost of living. Others regretted being forced to live away from
family during the fishing season. Lack of harbour facilities at Placentia forced resettled
fishers to return to old fishing grounds. Loyola Pomeroy and his wife, the last household
to leave Great Paradise, returned each April to the old community. Asked by a CBC
reporter why they returned each year, Mrs. Pomeroy replied:

I mean to leave a place where you can earn plenty for your family and go to some
place where you can’t do that it’s frightening [sic]. Can’t you understand that?9

Several Great Paradise families removed their children from school in April and
remained in the old community until November. Concerned that this practice disrupted
their children’s education, they asked government to reopen the school.

8Duggan, “Resettlement of the Isolated Newfoundland Community,” 40.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, NL Television Archives, St. John’s, undated.
The households who moved to Placentia competed with townspeople for jobs in a declining economy. The two biggest employers were scaling back operations as resettlers were moving in. Duggan reported 70 percent of householders interviewed at Placentia were on social assistance. Householders felt that resettlement offered more opportunities for the young people, but did not feel the parents gained anything. A former resident of Davis Cove reported that his children had benefited from the move, but he was 100 percent worse off himself. Many respondents found the people of Placentia unfriendly. They felt a “coldness” and “loneliness” in Placentia that they had not heretofore experienced. To buffer the hostility relocatees generally resettled in clusters, which Duggan described as welfare ghettos. Only about a quarter of households interviewed considered resettlement a success. The remainder identified lack of counselling as the cause of their distress. All subjects claimed that “no one helped them to prepare to meet the many difficulties encountered in adapting to a different way of life.”

Duggan concluded that if officials had treated the people more humanely much of the bitterness could have been avoided. Rev. Philip Lewis, former parish priest at Merasheen and a strong advocate of resettlement, alleged government put families into very poor homes in Placentia. Duggan concluded that government should have taken a more active role in providing decent housing.

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10 Ronald Hefferan to Smallwood, 14 February 1970. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.29.016, ASC, Memorial University.
Parzival Copes claimed the lack of counselling services resulted in moves to centres with fewer opportunities for employment than the community they abandoned.\(^{15}\) Perhaps politicians feared that more direct intervention was likely to intensify attacks on the program, but lack of information created unhappy people who blamed government for placing them in such circumstances. Most of the interviewees stated that they felt more isolated and less happy than before the move. Some questioned the rationale for evacuating communities a short time after constructing a wharf, a community stage or installing a diesel generator. A fish plant, a public wharf, and a power plant lost its utility when the FHRC approved the evacuation of Merasheen. Evacuations often occurred suddenly and caught the householders unprepared for life in a new community where they struggled to find jobs and decent housing. While welfare recipients were the most likely to claim government forced them to move, unemployment reduced the morale of all resettlers. Some unemployed fishers informed Duggan that they felt “useless.” Others expressed anger at the government for misleading them. They blamed themselves and the government for their ignorance of conditions in Placentia. Duggan concluded respondents felt a degree of isolation and alienation unknown in the old community.

There was political pressure from Cashin, F. W. Rowe and Frecker, who were under pressure from the Placentia East Association of Towns and Community Councils, to persuade the FHRC to designate the greater Placentia area a growth centre. The port was an unlikely choice. It did not have a fish plant, community stage or any facilities to accommodate inshore fishers whose stages were still in the old community and could not accommodate longliners. Cashin wanted to improve the facilities at Southern Harbour,

\(^{15}\)Copes, *The Resettlement of Fishing Communities*, 168.
Arnold’s Cove, and Jerseyside by salvaging community stages from Oderin, Merasheen, and Harbour Buffett. A bitter pill for the fishers, who had resisted relocation, to swallow. If life on the islands was substandard, the Duggan study demonstrates that unless planners carefully appraised the assets of the sending community and the potential of the reception centre, the move was unlikely to benefit anyone. Resettlement officials needed to get to know the people before deciding if they ought to be moved, and having determined that they could benefit from resettlement, ensure they had enough information to make rational decisions. In most cases the resettlement official made a hasty visit, talked to the elite classes, and left it up to the local committee to organize the move. Counsellors needed to work with families for several months before the move and follow them into growth centres to help them adjust to the new environment. It was equally important for field workers to prepare the growth centre for the influx. In 1967 C&SD began to set up Regional Development Offices (RDO) to mediate the transition.

Unemployment was the greatest single problem facing uprooted families at Placentia. Some sought relief by commuting seasonally or weekly between Placentia and the old community. When vandals, thieves, and/or rodents destroyed buildings and gear, fishers lost the opportunity to return to the old community to work. Resettled families were not only the victims of an ill-managed fisheries modernization program, but also victims of crime. Burry advised Harnum to request the RCMP to patrol abandoned harbours in order to discourage vandalism. Some families lost so much gear

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16 Cashin to Maloney, 14 November 1967. GN39/1, File S154, PANL.
17 Donald Burry to Harnum, 28 November 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
and equipment that they faced mortgage foreclosures and eviction from homes.\textsuperscript{18} The Department of Public Welfare refused to assist families that moved under the FHRP. Burry advised Harnum to meet with Welfare officials to sort out the problem.\textsuperscript{19}

Approximately 200 fishing households moved into the Placentia area from 21 different outports. The greatest number came from Merasheen (20), Bar Haven (12), Red Island (15) and Harbour Buffett (10).\textsuperscript{20} The Placentia Fishermen’s Development Association worried that unless the Department of Fisheries built a breakwater and a community stage equipped with cutting lines, the resettled people would become chronic welfare cases.\textsuperscript{21} F. J. Evans, Director of Rural Development, identified three categories of fishermen at Placentia, each with their own special needs: longliner fishermen who would be selling their catch fresh to a plant at St. Bride’s; the fishers of Placentia who used local grounds; and the resettled fishermen who had premises on the islands. A real drawback for the latter group was lack of access to gear during winter months when gear maintenance normally occurred.

\textsuperscript{18}Burry to Harnum, 6 December 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
\textsuperscript{19}Burry to Harnum, 6 December 1967. 114 resettled families lived in Placentia in December of 1967. The main sending communities were: Bar Haven - 12; Harbour Buffett - 10; Merasheen - 20; Red Island 15; Tack’s Beach - 8; Isle Valen -9; Little Harbour West - 8; and Clattice Harbour - 7. The other 25 households moved from Davis Cove, Flat Rock, C. Bay, Oderin, Petite Forte, Port Anne, Port Royal, St. Joseph’s, St. Kyran’s, St. Leonard’s, South East Bight, Presque, Great Paradise, and Kingwell.
\textsuperscript{20}Memorandum from F. W. Cook, Assistant Director of Rural Development, to F. J. Evans, Director of Rural Development “Re: Visit to Placentia Area For a Meeting With the Fishermen’s Development Association,” 9 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
\textsuperscript{21}Cook to Evans 9 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
Some of the 200 fishers who moved to Placentia were older and incapacitated men, but most were able fishermen hobbled by lack of facilities. Harnum felt “everything possible must be done to utilize the fish resources of the [Placentia] Bay for the benefit of the people of the area and the province.” It was galling for fishers who moved from communities in which public wharves, breakwaters, fish plants and collector stations existed, to listen to officials suggest that they should volunteer their labour to build new facilities and plants. They reminded Evans that government had moved them and it was government’s responsibility to make facilities available. Harnum warned Sametz that unless corrective measures were undertaken soon, independent, productive fishers would be forced into dependency and become social outcasts.

Trepassey

Most problems at Placentia were related to the high rate of unemployment as CNR and the military base downsized, but in the case of Trepassey employment was not an issue for relocatees. The fish plant needed their labour. In 1966 Fishery Products Ltd. converted the Trepassey plant from a seasonal to a year-round operation and was anxious to acquire a stable workforce for the plant and trawlers as well as increase the number of inshore fishers fishing into Trepassey. Gus Etchegary informed Aidan Maloney that 90 percent of plant workers and inshore fishermen selling fish to the plant lived outside

22 Harnum to Sametz, 21 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
23 Harnum to Sametz, 21 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
24 “Placentia Fishermen Want Fishery Aid,” Daily News, 5 March, 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
25 “Placentia Fishermen Want Fishery Aid,” Daily News, 5 March, 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, PANL.
26 Harnum to Sametz, 5 March 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S70, PANL.
Trepassey. The company vice-president hoped to correct the imbalance by recruiting employees from all parts of the province. Harnum met with Father F. J. Mullowney, parish priest, and Gordon Shea, plant manager, at Trepassey. During the meeting Mullowney offered church land for a housing development and Fishery Products agreed to build 35 houses. The province agreed to develop 115 lots to accommodate relocated families. Meanwhile, some workers, unable to locate suitable accommodations, quit the plant and the town. Initially interest in company houses was high, but when resettled families learned a lot supplementary grant would soon be available they delayed making a commitment. Edgar Hoskins, Herbert Oram, Robert Crocker, Thomas Young, and Darius Crocker wanted the Resettlement Agreement amended “to allow families to be together in areas where work is available and decent homes in which to live.” Etchegary warned Albert Vivian that uncertainty over supplementary grants put the whole centralization program at risk.

In February 1968 Cashin announced that CMHC and NLHC were assembling land for the proposed Fishery Products development. By November 1968 21 families occupied company housing, 13 of which were Protestants from Hampden and Change

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27 Augustus Etchegary to Aidan Maloney, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, 23 July 1965. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
28 Report on Visit to Southern Shore - Trepassey, GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
30 Edgar Hoskins, Herbert Oram, Robert Crocker, Thomas Young, and Darius Crocker to E. J. Evans, NLHC, 26 September 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
31 A. A. Etchegary to Albert Vivian, Commissioner of Housing, Department of Municipal Affairs, 2 May 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
32 Etchegary to Vivian, 2 May 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
Islands. Field worker L. N. Woolfrey was not impressed by the size or quality of the company houses. He predicted the three bedroom bungalows were unlikely to last longer than five years due to poor grade of materials. Leaky roofs accounted for some of the discontent among resettlers, but much of their dissatisfaction can be traced to the workplace.\textsuperscript{34}

Working conditions in the plant were far from ideal. Workers stood for ten hour shifts six days a week earning minimum wages. After working more than 50 hours a trimmer netted little more than $50 and women earned considerably less on the packing line. Male filleters or ‘cutters’ were at the top of the wage structure. They were considered the most skilled and the discharge hands who toiled in the hold of the dragger shovelling fish were an underclass. Work in the fish factories was gendered and hierarchical while the pluralistic family-based and more egalitarian. The fishermen-loggers accustomed to less structured workday had difficulty adjusting to the monotony of feeding the industrial machine. When the company introduced an incentive program, some were unable to maximize bonuses. Management, when possible, demoted them to lower paying jobs where maximum performance bonuses were lower than for cutters. Introduction of an incentive program boosted productivity in the plant, but it widened the gap between the classes of workers. The pay differential between cutters and discharge hands and the difference between the earnings of males and females broadened. The increased efficiencies allowed management to reduce hours of work, eliminate overtime

\textsuperscript{34}Woolfrey to Harnum, GN39/1, Box 126, File S 70, The Rooms. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
and keep hourly wage rates minimal. Rent, which was deducted from employees’ pay cheques at source, remained unchanged. Left with little disposable income, workers became demoralized and quit their jobs and the town. The rural development officer alleged Fishery Products saved $150 per worker per month by adopting the incentive program, but it created tensions in the workplace and undermined workforce stability.

Resettled families considered returning home. Some typical comments Woolfrey heard were: “Plan to get out of this place in the spring and not coming back; can’t save a cent; worst [sic] off than before; would stay here if I was getting enough money; we’re working for nothing, just able to feed the family; the water here is not fit to drink, but we have to drink it, and every family here have had children sick with diarrhea and vomiting; I’m satisfied with the house now, but it’s not going to stay that way - it’s built poorly.”

The allegations regarding unsatisfactory drinking water were confirmed by Department of National Health and Welfare inspectors.

Woolfrey found fault in the character of the people. He attributed their financial predicament to weak moral character, singling out their propensity to spend money on alcohol and cars rather than invest in houses. He failed to mention that the plant was 15 kilometres from the subdivision and the company offered no alternative transportation.

He alleged that many of problems arose from a long history of dependence on able-

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35Woolfrey to Harnum, November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
36The author personally observed employees working through their morning and afternoon break to improve performance.
37Woolfrey to Harnum, November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
38Woolfrey to Harnum, November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
39Department of National Health and Welfare to D. A. Strong, 6 January 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
40The author who worked as a Frontier College teacher-labourer at Trepassey May to August, 1969 boarded with a family in the subdivision.
bodied relief which challenged householders’ ability to cope with the routine of industrial employment and their ability to cope in a cash society. He surmised that years of living on relief orders and merchant credit left them unprepared for integration into a cash economy. Woolfrey did not question why they were not more prepared or why Fishery Products had to recruit 90 percent of its plant employees from areas outside Trepassey.

Protestants found living in an all Catholic community troublesome. A typical comment heard from them was along these lines: “There’s no church and we’re not going to stay without a church. No church is ok for so long but not for a lifetime.” Religious differences could account for some discontent in a province in which denominationalism remained so entrenched that it divided communities and influenced hiring of public servants long after the practice had been supposedly abolished. The Catholic settlers from Placentia and St. Mary’s Bays adjusted more easily to life in Trepassey. The transition from outport to growth centre was less traumatic was left out of the equation. The families from Change Islands and Hampden had to send their children to a school in which Protestant children, labelled infidels, remained outside classrooms during morning prayer. The overcrowding of schools interfered with the education of all students.

Shortage of classroom space plagued all categories of growth centres. Trepassey was no exception. The baby boom alone overtaxed many community schools in the

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41 Woolfrey to Harnum, November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
42 Woolfrey to Harnum, November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
43 Alex Hickman informed the author that when he was Minister of Justice the St. John’s fire chief arrived in his office to ask for two men, one Anglican and one Roman Catholic. Hickman said he put a stop to the sectarian hiring practice within the fire department.
44 See Brian Peckford, The Past in the Present (St. John’s: Harry Cuff, 1983). Peckford, the son of a welfare officer stationed in Marystown recalled his experience as a Protestant pupil in a Roman Catholic school.
1960s. Mullowney, who recorded 163 births from 1967 to 1969, contended that centralization without provision for schools created a serious problem for the local board and the centralization program.\textsuperscript{45} The priest noted that children attended classes in inadequate schools, condemned buildings and a parish hall without bathrooms. Mullowney stated that in September 1970 there would be no space for 40 children. The frustrated priest asked government to support construction of a new elementary school.\textsuperscript{46} If the Catholic board was unable to accommodate all students, it could be assumed that the board would give priority to Catholic children. It was unfair of Woolfrey to fault resettlers for moving back to Change Islands or Hampden where their children were guaranteed a place in the school system. The second five-year federal-provincial Household Resettlement Program approved only communities with sufficient classrooms as growth centres and DREE constructed new schools in urban centres. Sametz urged the Deputy Minister of Education, John Acreman, to complete the half-finished school at Trepassey and remove what he considered to be a hindrance to development.\textsuperscript{47} 

Schools and housing were impediments to resettlement in all growth centres. Fishery Products Ltd. invested in new home construction and bunkhouses in Burin and Trepassey. The bunkhouse at Trepassey was a single room with two tiered iron cots and a single bathroom for all. It was designed to house male workers only. Young women were expected to board in a private home or commute. All of the company houses were identical three-bedroom prefabricated bungalows. The subdivision resembled a

\textsuperscript{45}F. J. Mullowney, “Centralization for Trepassey - Re: School Problems,” 9 June 1970. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
\textsuperscript{46}“Lack of Funds Halts School Construction,” \textit{Evening Telegram}, 14 August 1970 in GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
\textsuperscript{47}Sametz to John Acreman, 11 August 1970. GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
temporary camp set in a barren, gray landscape. I lived in the subdivision for four months in 1969 and was struck by the sameness and lack of colour throughout the neighbourhood which was shrouded in fog on most days. It was a colourless place for people accustomed to brightly painted homes. Throughout the neighbourhood there was not even an alder to break the monotony. There were no playgrounds for children or a common area for neighbours to mingle as they had in their home communities. Men and women, who had put in a mind-numbing ten-hour shift at a noisy, stinking plant, were confined to their homes. Segregated from the main community, and cut off from their pastor, tensions within families sometimes boiled over into disputes that required RCMP intervention.48

A few resettled families purchased homes but most continued to rent. Fishery Products hoped families would buy houses, and become permanent citizens and employees. Woolfrey observed that “as long as the householders lived in rental units and remained strangers, they could easily throw off the frustration of an insecure job and return to the security of a familiar environment.”49 Some threatened to give back the resettlement grants and return home. Religion played a significant part in keeping the new settlers strangers. If Protestant and Anglican families from Hampden, Bear Cove and Change Islands had stayed they might have overcome their sense of alienation. Catholic families from St. Mary’s and Placentia Bays suffered less trauma but former residents Merasheen regretted having to leave a fine church building and way of life behind.50 Religious affiliation played a significant role in relocatees’ choice of reception centre.

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48 Woolfrey, “Report on Families Assisted to Move to Trepassey.” GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL, no date.  
49 Woolfrey, “Report on Families.” GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.  
50 Woolfrey, “Report on Families.” GN39/1, Box 126, File S71, PANL.
But the Protestant and Anglican families who resettled to the predominantly Anglican Harbour Breton also had difficulties adjusting so one should not place too much emphasis on religion. The settlers from the northern bays had the option of returning to the old community but the Resettlement Act barred relocatees from permanent residence in vacated outports. Tension in Harbour Breton resulted more from competition for jobs than religion.

**Harbour Breton**

Education and housing crises were present in every category of growth centre and Harbour Breton was not exempt. Rural Development Officer L. C. Shirley identified housing as the biggest hurdle. He reported that families were living in trailers on the BC Packers parking lot, and estimated 40-50 new homes were needed immediately, but NLHC had no plans to construct any in 1967. Mayor Coady and Rev. Edward Marsh favoured moving houses from evacuated communities into a land assembly area, but Shirley doubted the older homes could survive the rigours of the launch. BC Packers manager, W. R. Murdoch, invited representatives of NLHC, Community and Social Development and Municipal Affairs to visit Harbour Breton to discuss resettlement with householders wishing to make permanent moves. Murdoch hoped the housing crisis could be resolved through new construction, relocation of existing houses, and provision of subsidized rental units.

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52 Shirley, “Report on visit to Wreck Cove and Pool’s Cove Area,” 5 September 1967. GN39/1, Box 130, File S261, PANL.
53 Murdoch to Sametz, 7 November, 1967. GN39/1, Box 130, File S261, PANL.
The shortage of classrooms in the Anglican school was particularly acute due to the prevalence of Anglican communities on the south coast. Rev. Edward Marsh, notified F. W. Rowe that overcrowding of the Anglican school system in Harbour Breton had reached a critical point.\textsuperscript{54} He, like other priests, asked for special funds to offset the cost of providing healthy classrooms for all children.\textsuperscript{55} One of four teachers assigned to the church basement notified Marsh that due to being required to work in an unhealthy workplace he would be resigning.\textsuperscript{56} The Society of United Fishermen, a Protestant fraternity, also requested special funding for new school construction.\textsuperscript{57}

The arrival of new families not only overcrowded community schools, but also created a surplus of labour in the plant. Plant workers from Harbour Breton questioned why the government was bringing new workers into the community when townspeople were capable of processing all fish landed. Tension between the long-time residents and resettlers intensified when fresh fish markets declined in the late 1960s. The union president, Lawrence J. Mahoney, described that the labour situation at the plant as “desperate.”\textsuperscript{58} He contended the influx of settlers depressed wages and reduced hours of employment. He claimed that workers had earned only $45 over a two week period and the labour leader anticipated that when the company reduced its trawler fleet and

\textsuperscript{54}Edward Marsh to F. W. Rowe, 2 April 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.19.006, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{55}Marsh to F. W. Rowe, 2 April, 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.19.006, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{56}Edward Marsh to F. W. Rowe, Minister of Education, 2 April, 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.19.006, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{58}Lawrence J. Mahoney to A. C. Wornell, 29 October 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.19.006, ASC, Memorial University.
concentrated on harvesting ocean perch, hours of employment would decline even further. Mahoney warned that conditions were certain to deteriorate unless the company procured more trawlers or the government intervened to provide alternate jobs for the new arrivals.\(^5^9\) The message from the union was clear: the labour market is saturated, so stop relocating outport families to Harbour Breton.

Disillusionment and discontent among the resettled families arose from a feeling they had been misled by government officials who promised them more money than the resettlement program allowed. Some householders alleged resettlement officials gave them false information about the lot supplementary allowance.\(^6^0\) A householder from Jersey Harbour named three field workers who promised residents the maximum supplementary grant of $3,000 if they moved to Harbour Breton. Under the Agreement a householder was limited to the cost of a lot plus cost of installing services. Nonetheless resettlers appealed to the Premier to intervene on their behalf.\(^6^1\) They accused the field workers of using fraudulent tactics and misinformation.\(^6^2\) It is likely that confusion arose when overenthusiastic and inexperienced functionaries felt their supervisors would rate their effectiveness by the number of communities resettled.

The Anglican Parish of Harbour Breton included several designated outports and the rector was concerned by the “great problem of resettling families on the south

\(^{59}\) Mahoney to Wornell, 29 October 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.19.006, ASC, Memorial University.


Edward Marsh wanted assurances that when the communities of Red Cove, Little Bay West, Sagona Island, and Jersey Harbour were evacuated, the transition from outport to growth point would take place “systematically and with as little inconvenience as possible for those involved.” He stressed the importance of transporting houses from these places to minimize the capital and social cost for the affected families, and contended many houses were in good condition and built to a higher standard than most houses in Harbour Breton.

W. R. Murdoch, BC Packers manager at Harbour Breton, also hoped for a resolution to the housing problem. Like plant managers at Burin, Grand Bank, and Fortune, he questioned how NLHC could construct 350 units at Marystown and neglect other growth points. Murdoch advised Vivian that the Harbour Breton plant might be forced to operate at less than maximum capacity unless the housing authority cleared the bottleneck. In May 1968 BC Packers met with representatives from Community and Social Development, Canada Manpower, and the Housing Commission at Harbour Breton to discuss problems that interfered with recruitment of plant workers and trawler crews. Murdoch was aware that the Lake Group of Companies, John Penney and Sons, and Fishery Products were competing with BC Packers for the same labourers. Etchegary was especially eager to recruit workers for the Trepassey plant. He informed Harnum that there were houses available in Trepassey for families who wished to resettle from south

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63 Edward Marsh to Harnum, 26 February 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.  
64 Marsh to Harnum, 26 February 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.  
65 Marsh to Harnum, 26 February 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.  
66 W. R. Murdoch to Albert Vivian, 1 April 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.  
67 A. Maloney to George Lace, 8 May 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
coast settlements.\textsuperscript{68} He did not consider religion or the school situation at Trepassey to be a deterrent.

Nonetheless, the schools crisis was discussed at a meeting of division heads in Confederation Building. Harnum informed the group that schools in Harbour Breton and all growth centres were “becoming a real problem and threatened to become more acute in the next couple of years if planning did not start immediately.”\textsuperscript{69} Fred Kirby, Superintendent of Education, proposed construction of an amalgamated high school to accommodate Anglican and Roman Catholic students.\textsuperscript{70} Kirby also proposed a new funding arrangement in which the province would pay 90 percent of the cost rather than the usual 70. But it was not until the governments entered into a second household resettlement agreement that Ottawa began to finance new school construction. Ed Nugent, Director of Field Services, noted the hospital was inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population and the absence of a facility to care for the aged.\textsuperscript{71} The senior bureaucrats met at Harbour Breton with an elite all-male group. In attendance were Father Grace, Rev. Marsh, the plant manager, the mayor and other local leaders. It was clear to all that the labour shortage could not be corrected until adequate schools and affordable houses became available. Evans reported that NLHC was preparing an initial 50 lot layout and had plans to develop another 120 lots in the second phase. With no serviced building lots available, the Town Council, adopting the attitude “that people must have somewhere to live,” turned a blind eye to the construction on lots that would

\textsuperscript{68}Etchegary to Harnum, 2 August, 1967. GN39/1, Box 129, S201, PANL.
\textsuperscript{69}Memorandum “Re: Meeting Concerning Planning Visit to Harbour Breton.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{70}Memorandum “Re: Meeting Concerning Planning.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{71}Memorandum “Re: Meeting Concerning Planning.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
be difficult to service in the future. The shortage of carpenters contributed to the construction of houses that were of a lower standard than the well-kept houses left in places such as Miller’s Passage. Within a few months of the visit, cabinet authorized NLHC to construct 20 subsidized rental units at Harbour Breton.

When the visiting delegation met with representatives of the Anglican school board, Marsh informed them that the local board was operating a school in a condemned building and classes met in spaces that were poorly lit and poorly ventilated. The plant manager considered the situation to be so dire that he offered to donate $25,000 to the two school boards to help resolve the classroom shortage that was hindering recruitment of workers from Sagona, Red Cove, and Miller’s Passage. The provincial delegation visited the three communities and at Sagona met with 11 Catholic householders whose children had no teacher. Parents informed the officials that the Anglican teacher refused to admit them to the one-room school. The meeting with the distressed families in Sagona affirmed bureaucratic convictions that families must be moved for the sake of the children. It is also an example of inefficiency and unfairness of the denominational school system. A remote community could possibly attract one teacher but not always one for each denomination.

In many instances families moved without improving their condition. The fishery, regardless of the sector exploited, had historically produced uncertain incomes due to vagaries of the catch, markets and weather. During the winter of 1968 BC Packers

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72 “Visit to Harbour Breton, May 1-4, 1968.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
73 Minute of Executive Council 746 - ‘68, Community and Social Development 9 - ‘68. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
74 “Visit to Harbour Breton, May 1-4, 1968.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
75 “Visit to Harbour Breton, May 1-4, 1968.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
purportedly had a labour shortage, but in the fall of 1968 the union leader alleged a surplus of labour created by the influx of resettlers caused underemployment and depressed wages.\textsuperscript{76} The company was down to a three-dragger operation and evacuation of neighbouring outports would lead to a further reduction of incomes. Sametz replied that Harbour Breton was a designated fisheries growth centre and the resettlement committee had authority to assist households who wished to move from any designated outport. The Deputy Minister attempted to appease Mahoney by alleging that the householders moving from neighbouring communities intended to continue fishing in the traditional way and were moving to Harbour Breton to take advantage of superior services.\textsuperscript{77} There was an admission that the industrial offshore fishery needed the inshore fishery to survive and this gave the people in designated outports a degree of control over moves.

Aidan Maloney doubted that Harbour Breton had greater potential for growth.\textsuperscript{78} In fact, production numbers indicated the BC Packers plant was in decline. Bill Rowe informed the town that the Resettlement Division no longer supported moving additional families into Harbour Breton.\textsuperscript{79} He argued static wages and declining production figures for the plant precluded assisting more moves to the town. Harnum and Sametz disagreed with Rowe. In June 1970 the Director of Resettlement and the Deputy Minister proceeded with plans to resettle Jersey Harbour into Harbour Breton as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{80} The

\textsuperscript{76}Mahoney to Wornell, 29 October 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{77}Sametz to Wornell, 20 November 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{78}Maloney to W. N. Rowe, 21 January 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, File S261, v.1, PANL
\textsuperscript{79}W. N. Rowe to Town of Harbour Breton, 29 January 1970. GN39/1, File S261, v.1, Box 130, PANL.
\textsuperscript{80}Harnum to Sametz, 26 June 1970. GN39/1, File S261, v.1, Box 130, PANL.
divergence of opinions among ministers and bureaucrats indicated that people in the halls of power operated at cross purposes and sent conflicting messages.

It was easy for a deputy minister with responsibility for reducing the number of coastal communities to dismiss problems in the fishery as temporary and to forge ahead with resettlement of families from marginal communities. A cost-benefit analysis of the FHRP presented to the Annual Meeting of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee Newfoundland Household Resettlement Committee 12 June 1969 purported that relocatees had little idea of the cost of living in the reception centre.\textsuperscript{81} A. L. Robb and R. E. Robb identified lack of information as a major concern. Some interviewees alleged government officials provided misleading information. They suggested that people should be counselled on the cost of housing, employment support, moving costs, and about government’s obligation under the program. They also suggested moving too many too quickly into a reception centre could create a catastrophic situation similar to Arnold’s Cove. Ralph Matthews, Iverson, and Copes agreed.\textsuperscript{82}

The town manager emphasized the necessity of solving the housing shortage, but residents contended disorderly development created a new set of problems. One complained that the construction boom destroyed hay meadows and vegetable gardens


which had sustained the older residents for generations. The Branch Manager of CMHC criticized the town council for allowing householders to construct houses in “a haphazard way on unserviced lots” while serviced lots remained vacant. But chaotic development occurred mainly because the resettlers arrived before the province had completed a municipal plan and the inexperienced council was left to respond to the crisis on an *ad hoc* basis. Settlers claimed they had traded comfortable homes for a dilapidated house in Harbour Breton. To expect low-income workers to construct houses to CMHC standards was unrealistic, and the resettlement planners knew it. The chaos was not created by locals inexperienced in local governance but by short-sightedness of planners in Ottawa and St. John’s who had no plan except to close out as many settlements as possible as quickly as possible. Resettlement planners reacted rather than led.

The 79 householders who moved into Harbour Breton to the end of 1969 were accustomed to building homes without permits or bank financing on a site selected by the homeowner. Traditionally the aim of most was “to have a cheap house on cheap land and nothing owed.” They valued freedom over order and refused to succumb to the dictates of modernist planners who James Scott purported preferred straight lines and grids. Town plans, permits and building inspectors were foreign to outport people. Deborah Jackman, former of Grole, recalled how her mother always worried about money to pay

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83 G. W. Porter, “Raw Deal for the Coast,” *Daily News*, 8 July 1969 in GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
84 J. P. Ryan to Vivian, 18 December 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
85 Iverson and Matthews, *Communities in Decline*, 123.
the school tax, water tax, property tax and all the additional expenses.\textsuperscript{87} She believed resettlement officials never realized the full impact of uprooting families to a place wherein the cost of living was so much higher and subsistence activities were curbed by regulations and lack of farmland. Jackman’s parents, unable to find employment and unfamiliar with the fishing grounds in the area, survived on social services.\textsuperscript{88}

G. W. Porter, a native of Harbour Breton, described the Household Resettlement Program as a “topsy turvy affair” and not an economic development program.\textsuperscript{89} He argued that Harbour Breton had been permitted to grow without a co-ordinated plan. He advised MP Donald Jamieson that the 40 households who were about to move to Harbour Breton should be resettled at Deadman’s Cove, a location close to fishing grounds. Porter suggested that government supply the newcomers with charts of local grounds, rather than expect them to rely on landmarks as local fishers did. Here was an opportunity to modernize the inshore fishery by allowing fishers to specialize in harvesting. Inshore fishers could supplement the catches of offshore vessels, increase the profitability of BC Packers, and increase incomes of plant workers. The manager of the Booth Fisheries recognized the importance of preserving a viable shore fishery to reduce dependence on highly capitalized offshore trawlers.\textsuperscript{90} Porter outlined the advantages of Jersey Harbour over Harbour Breton, but the Director of Resettlement remained convinced that the


\textsuperscript{88}Stuckless, “In Search of a Better Life,” 79.

\textsuperscript{89}G. W. Porter to Don Jamieson, Minister of Transport and MP for Burin - Burgeo, 16 June 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.

\textsuperscript{90}“Deep-sea Fishing Activity Costs Double: Increased Activity Could Hurt,” \textit{Evening Telegram}, 8 November 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S20, PANL.
moves to Harbour Breton were successful.\textsuperscript{91} He did not address the other issues such as distance from fishing grounds, financial and emotional stress or the low incomes of plant worker.

Dan Tate, a Frontier College worker at Harbour Breton, informed Sametz that the people of Harbour Breton viewed “the program with suspicion, and ask[ed] why people are moving here when there are not enough jobs for the town’s citizens.”\textsuperscript{92} If people were as ignorant of the resettlement plan as Tate professed, then Harnum’s assertion that householders voluntarily petitioned is questionable. Letters to the CBC and the \textit{Burin Peninsula Post} professed “the resettlement program was the centre of inquiries and the centre of confusion - en masse” at Harbour Breton.\textsuperscript{93} The authors demanded a full-time field worker to answer the many questions raised by the relocatees daily. Harnum’s urgent request to the Power Commission to extend electrical service to lots before families arrived from Jersey Harbour provides insight into just how mismanaged the FHRP was. Despite Rowe’s assurances to the town that his department would not be resettling more people to Harbour Breton, in the summer of 1970 it was business as usual. CMHC manager, J. P. Ryan, was anxious to fill unoccupied lots in the land assembly.\textsuperscript{94} Nonetheless, he advised Harnum that “a potentially dangerous health hazard” existed if families moved into a subdivision without water and sewer services or electrical connections.\textsuperscript{95} With 20 households en route he demanded immediate attention.

\textsuperscript{91}Harnum to Porter, 28 July 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{92}Tate to Sametz, 24 July 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{93}Jerry Kelland to William Rowe, 21 July 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{94}J. P. Ryan to Harnum, 22 April 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
\textsuperscript{95}Ryan to Harnum, 22 April 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
G. J. O’Reilly, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives felt the evacuation of Jersey Harbour was rushed. O’Reilly felt the community’s potential for agricultural development was superior to Harbour Breton where the 25 to 30 acres of farmland had been used for housing, and municipal by-laws prevented animals from roaming inside town limits. Owners had to shoot horses and sell off sheep and cattle. The Deputy Minister believed that the fishery would remain the mainstay of the south coast economy, but warned Newfoundland’s herring fishery might be short-lived due to overfishing. The closure of the herring fishery would have a devastating effect on the south coast, particularly Harbour Breton, Burgeo and Isle aux Morts where herring reduction plants were a major employer.

Jean Marchand, Minister of DREE, issued a directive to W. N. Rowe: “I strongly urge that the Resettlement Committee approve no more moves to Harbour Breton until the capacity of educational facilities have been examined.” The Anglican rector, William Noel, informed Rowe that the Resettlement Division was responsible for a desperate school situation that had dragged on for three years. Noel contended that centralization had “upset the order of things,” and created much “concern and frustration” for the people of Harbour Breton, especially for the school board which was forced continue to accommodate some children in a church basement without

96 G. J. O’Reilly, Memorandum “Re: Visit to Harbour Breton,” 26 October 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
97 O’Reilly, Memorandum “Re: Visit to Harbour Breton,” 26 October 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
98 Marchand to Rowe, 7 January 1971. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
99 William Noel to W. N. Rowe, 12 January 1971. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
windows.  The rector informed Marchand that the resettlement program created a high rate of unemployment in the town and wretched conditions for resettled families.

By 1970, 500 people had been assisted from Grole, Jersey Harbour and Little Bay West to Harbour Breton. A. Godwin, town clerk, claimed the high price of CMHC lots consumed lot supplementaries leaving resettled families with no money to cover the cost of water and sewer connections. Godwin argued that the cost of removing bog, surveying lots, and correcting elevation problems increased lot prices from $2,350 to $3,000, thus absorbing the full amount of the lot supplementary. Embarrassed by mistakes committed by government planners, the province agreed that C&SD should cover the cost of connecting relocated houses to water and sewer mains.

In 1971 field worker, Sharon Driscoll had a mandate to assess “the degree of social adjustment among families who resettled into Harbour Breton and to determine some of the social problems they may have incurred.” Driscoll, whose study took place from 15 May to 15 August, aimed to measure the degree of social integration that had occurred by comparing the degree of religious involvement before and after the move, and by examining resettlers’ attitudes towards Harbour Breton and whether length of residency affected attitudes. She noted that of the 674 who moved to the town from 1965

100 Noel to Rowe, 12 January, 1971. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
101 A. Godwin to W. N. Rowe, 24 March 1971. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
102 Godwin to W. N. Rowe, 24 March 1971. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
103 Dan Tate, Frontier College, Harbour Breton, to Sametz, 24 July 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL. Tate emphasised the need for a field worker to clear up misunderstandings of resettlers who were not properly informed about the resettlement program.
104 Rowe to Godwin, 7 May 1971. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL.
105 Sharon Driscoll, “Field Worker’s Report, Summer, 1971.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261 v. 3, PANL.
- 72, just under half moved prior to 1969, and the balance resettled thereafter. Resettlers constituted one-quarter of a total population of 2,600. The post 1969 group moved houses onto lots in a land assembly located about a kilometre from the main town. Driscoll selected 20 householders for the study: 10 from 1965-8 cohort whom she labelled long-time resettlers (LTR); and 10 from the 1969 and 1971 group whom she classified as short-time resettlers (STR). She discovered that no one in the long-time group exceeded the age of 59 while 30% of the subjects selected from the 1969-71 cohort were over 60 years old, an indication that older householders were the most reluctant to leave.

In her effort to determine if length of residency influenced attitudes, Driscoll asked which place they considered home. Three-quarters of the STR cohort named the sending community, while half the LTR group named Harbour Breton. About half of all resettlers stated they would move to another town if given the opportunity. One third of LTR said they disliked living in Harbour Breton compared to half of STRs. When Driscoll asked what the relocatees liked best about Harbour Breton there was a marked difference in the responses given. Sixty percent of LTR chose “increased school facilities” compared to only 30 percent of the STR selected education as the most important reason for moving into the town. One-third of both groups considered increased medical services to be the most important. Surprisingly only five percent of STR and 10 percent of the LTR said they moved for economic reasons. One-third of STR linked increased cost of living to dissatisfaction with life in Harbour Breton. The long-time resettlers identified difficulty integrating into the town as the greatest handicap. Half of all the LTR cohort said they experienced difficulty while none of the short-time resettlers considered integration to be a concern, likely because they lived in a land
assembly a half mile from the main town where they formed a separate community. All of them were of the Anglican faith, and even though they moved into a predominantly Anglican town, church attendance of STR declined from 100 percent attendance in the old community to 30 percent in Harbour Breton. Attendance among LTR fell from 100 to 80 percent. Driscoll reported membership in church groups also declined for the two cohorts of Anglican resettlers. One woman, who said she had been an active member of her church prior to resettlement, felt “she didn’t fit in” due to cliquishness of the congregation.

In the sending communities the church and affiliated organizations such as the Anglican Church Women’s Association (ACWA) and the Society of United Fishermen (SUF) formed the core of social life. The sense of pride welled up in a place when the congregation, which often meant the community, worked collectively to cut the timber, organize fundraisers, and come together as a team to build their church, schools and halls. In their new setting they felt they were strangers and outsiders.

Driscoll reported that none of the relocatees joined the local Lion’s Club, the only secular men’s social organization in town. Their reluctance to participate in any group activities created a rift between townspeople and resettler that was as real as the half mile of road that separated the subdivision from the main community. Outside school there were few opportunities for the younger generation to intermingle. There were very limited recreational activities for youth. A softball league provided the only organized recreational activity for youth. Driscoll concluded that Harbour Breton was a socially

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106 Driscoll, “Field Worker’s Report, Summer, 1971.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261 v. 3, PANL.
segregated town in which there were several communities, or clusters, which seemed to physically separate themselves from the total community.\textsuperscript{107}

Driscoll reported that the first four households who had arrived from Sagona Island felt no more at home in Harbour Breton than when they moved there in 1967. Lance C. Shirley, Director of Field Services, alleged families moved from Sagona due to poor educational and medical services, and downplayed the role of the sole merchant, C. W. Keeping. Keeping was eager to leave but would not leave before the FHRC designated Sagona an evacuated outport.\textsuperscript{108} He offered to move the process along by closing out his business and demolishing the buildings.\textsuperscript{109} In the end approval was obtained by less drastic, if irregular action. On 5 November 1968, Harnum informed RDO Carl Evans that the Resettlement Committee had declared Sagona an evacuated outport without calling a public meeting or circulating the resettlement petition.\textsuperscript{110} In fall 1967 “well equipped independent fishermen” traded “comfortable homes” for uncertain employment and expensive housing in Harbour Breton.\textsuperscript{111} Here they confined their activities to a single neighbourhood and clung so strongly to each other that Driscoll declared: “the nucleus of Sagona Island [had] been maintained to the exclusion of Harbour Breton.”\textsuperscript{112} She believed it would take at least a generation to subdue feelings of alienation.

\textsuperscript{107}Driscoll, “Field Worker’s Report, Summer, 1971.”
\textsuperscript{108}Shirley, “Report of Visitation,” 19 August 1967. GN39/1, Box 127, S 146, PANL.
\textsuperscript{109}Keeping to Harnum, 10 July 1968. GN39/1, Box 127, S 146, PANL.
\textsuperscript{110}Harnum to C. Evans, 5 November 1968. GN39/1, Box 127, S 146, PANL.
\textsuperscript{111}Keeping to Harnum, 10 July 1968. GN39/1, Box 127, S 146, PANL.
\textsuperscript{112}Driscoll, “Field Worker’s Report, Summer, 1971.” GN39/1, Box 127, S 146, PANL.
Each cluster refused to fraternize with other clusters of resettlers, or become members of the community at large. Conditions at the plant, where competition for jobs was keen, did little to encourage fraternization. The union executive blamed resettlers for depressing wages and reducing hours of employment in the plant. The townspeople ignored weak US markets for cod blocks and attributed underemployment to the influx of new settlers. The situation was exacerbated by the existence of several community clusters, each group intent on preserving lifelong social connections. Introversion stymied social integration of newcomers and townspeople and kept relocatees bound to a cluster. Driscoll purported that only a full time field counsellor could dissipate feelings of personal and social alienation among the new residents of Harbour Breton. In 1972 Community and Social Development appointed her as rural development officer for the area.

The sharp rise in population taxed the human, financial and physical resources of towns that were in the process of forming municipal governments. The Harbour Breton council had little time to prepare for the influx of resettlers. The arrival of 650 settlers over a five-year period in a one-industry town overwhelmed facilities and increased competition for jobs. Historically, surrounding communities shared a negative attitude toward Harbour Breton. After they resettled they saw no reason to change their opinion. The union executive, which ignored the contribution shore fishers made to the viability of the plant and the town viewed the settlers as a liability. It was a sentiment found in other growth centres. Nor was Harbour Breton the only place in which resettled

113 Driscoll, “Field Worker’s Report, Summer, 1971.”
114 See Mahoney to Wornell, 29 October 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, The Rooms. See also Dan Tate to Sametz, 24 July 1970. GN39/1, Box 130, S261, The Rooms.
households identified difficulty integrating into the new community as the greatest drawback to resettlement.\textsuperscript{115} Growth centres became places of resentment and, sometimes, hostility.

\textbf{Stephenville-St. George’s}

Resentment against resettlers in the receiving community discouraged integration and kept newcomers strangers. In the St. George’s Bay region the old residents felt the people from the small settlements had inferior moral standards and work ethics. Clyde Smith, the RDO at Corner Brook, commented on the resentment of Robinsonians to the settlement of “undesirables” from Fischells and Heatherton into Robinson’s.\textsuperscript{116} Smith summed up the relationship: “The true Robinsonian has a reputation for being above average in terms of efficiency and ambition and inclined to look down his nose at this less proud and prosperous folk from Fischells and Heatherton.”\textsuperscript{117} The RDO stressed the importance of alerting department field staff to the sensitivities of the people in receiving communities. Smith also felt that awareness of community attitudes by field staff and greater interdepartmental co-operation in the resettlement process could deflate tensions and resolve problems before conflict damaged relations between newcomers and residents.\textsuperscript{118} In 1968 C&SD did not have regional offices across Newfoundland to facilitate moves. The Fischell’s River to Heatherton move demonstrated the need for a trained field staff. An inexperienced rural development officer, R. L. Loder, unwittingly informed the community that householders relocating to Heatherton were eligible for lot

\textsuperscript{115} Driscoll, “Field Worker’s Report, Summer, 1971.”
\textsuperscript{116} Clyde Smith to E. P. Nugent, 16 May 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, S191, PANL.
\textsuperscript{117} Smith to Nugent, 16 May 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, S191, PANL.
\textsuperscript{118} Smith to Nugent, 16 May 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, S191, PANL.
supplementary assistance. The RDO’s assurance tipped the scales in favour of leaving. After the move householders learned that the FHRC had refused their applications because Heatherton was not a designated growth centre. Following a disappointing meeting with Harnum, a group of very irate relocatees stormed Loder’s office demanding he honour his commitment to them. One householder and his spouse hired a Corner Brook law firm and threatened to haul the civil servant before the court. Sametz, who reviewed the case, concluded the resettlers were “well justified” and placed the blame squarely on Loder’s inexperience and lack of training:

Unfortunately Loder was new and had not realized that Heatherton had not been designated as an approved organized reception centre for purposes of supplementary assistance. Since the people undertook commitments on the basis of this information, the Department is vulnerable. Accordingly we must live up to the commitment and indicate to the people that we will cover the commitment as a special case without establishing precedents because of special needs.

The FHRC approved Heatherton as an organized reception centre for Fischell’s River only. The case of Fischell’s River may not have set a precedent but it is another example of how people at the margin, whether from Tack’s Beach or Fischell’s River, forced the FHRC to designate a growth centre. Mrs. Donald Whelan and her legless husband stood up to the state, demanded what the state had promised, and forced the bureaucrats to meet their commitment to the householders of Fischell’s River.

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119 R. L. Loder, to Harnum, August 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, S192, PANL.
120 Loder, to Harnum “Re: Residents of Fishell’s River Who Petitioned for Resettlement Assistance,” 21 August 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, S192, PANL.
121 J. F. Robbins, Memo to File Re: Donald Whelan, Fischell’s River - Heatherton, 2 October 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, S192, PANL.
122 Sametz, Handwritten notes in the margin of J. F. Robbins, Memo to File Re: Donald Whelan Fischell’s River - Heatherton, 2 October 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, S192, PANL.
The Gallants to Stephenville move is another example of the mixed feelings in a sending community. The Stephenville RDO commented on the “apprehensiveness” of those who wished to remain. Loder reported rumour was taking its toll, and the questions uppermost in the minds of the 50 at the meeting were: “Are we forced to move?” and “Will services be discontinued?.” Some informed him that they had signed the petition to support their neighbours who wanted to move, but they did not wish to resettled. Loder reported 16 households opposed moving while 23 voted to go. An earlier petition recorded 25 of 31 householders in favour moving. Apparently those who signed to help out neighbours decided to withdraw their support. The softening of support for resettling might also be due to Keough’s opposition to the move. The MHA made his position known to Bill Rowe. Keough informed Rowe that there was a danger the householders would be moved to places of unemployment. James Collier Sr., who owned the grocery store, a woods contracting company and the school bus and operated the post office, was firmly opposed to the move. Loder encouraged the move on humanitarian grounds. He admitted most were employed but their jobs were in Bowater’s woods camps and required a difficult weekly commute. He also pointed out that the nearest medical services were at Stephenville, a distance of thirty miles. It was common for residents of

123 Loder, Stephenville RDO, to Harnum, “Memo Re: Resettlement of Gallants under the Household Resettlement Program,” 23 April 1970. GN39/1, Box 129, S245, PANL.  
124 Loder to Harnum, “Memorandum Re: Resettlement of Gallants under the Household Resettlement Program,” 23 April 1970. GN39/1, Box 129, S245, PANL.  
125 Petition Requesting Assistance to Resettle from Gallants to Harnum, 3 March 1970. GN39/1, Box 129, S245, PANL.  
126 W. J. Keough to W. N. Rowe, 14 January 1970. GN39/1, Box 129, S245, PANL.  
127 Memorandum From Loder to Harnum, “Re: Petition for Assistance Under Household Resettlement Program from Residents of Gallants,” 19 March, 1970. GN39/1, Box 129, S245, PANL.
Gallants to walk five miles to the TCH to get the CN bus to the lumber camps or medical services. The only telephone for the whole community was located in Collier’s store. Keough suggested a community with only a few welfare cases should not be resettled. He hinted the RDO was anxious to begin removing houses before the benefits of moving were known. Loder admitted that there was full employment, but argued the logging camps were closer to Stephenville and the loggers could commute daily. He was convinced the “many fine expensive homes” could be moved down the road.  

J. A. G. Macdonald, an engineer with the Department of Highways, confirmed the houses were suitable for relocating by road to Stephenville. Loder advised Harnum that there were no obstructions blocking the route to a site on the outskirts of Stephenville. The town council, enthusiastic at first, balked at the idea of a subdivision filled with relocated houses of questionable quality. Loder assured the council the town staff had the right to inspect the house before locating them in the subdivision. The Stephenville council invited Loder and the welfare officer to a special meeting to discuss the move. In the meeting the council adamantly opposed admitting any new resettlers into the town, especially a subdivision that would require the extension of the town’s water and sewer mains. During the meeting councillors advocated shutting the doors to all resettled families. Municipal governments of Fortune, Grand Bank, and Stephenville were beginning to exercise greater autonomy within their jurisdiction.

Municipal objections to filling subdivisions with salvaged houses in Stephenville may have been motivated by a desire to cut capital costs, but one can speculate they were aware of problems that arose in growth centres when large numbers of relocated households were concentrated on a town’s perimeter. The Stephenville council decided to defer the matter until they had consulted with Community and Social Development. It stressed that “from a sociological point of view it would not be good planning to place all the new entrants to the town in the same neighbourhood.”\(^{131}\) According to Loder, they preferred the infilling option over “pocket concentration” which encouraged segregation. Stephenville’s experienced municipal government had the confidence to proceed more carefully than a newly elected Board of Trustees. The town council was aware of sociological problems that emerged in Harbour Breton when settlers were concentrated on the perimeter. The FHRC seems to have been more preoccupied with closing outports than helping coastal people integrate into the new community.\(^{132}\) Municipal leaders had different priorities.

The resettlement programs attracted criticism from clergy, municipal governments and some rural development specialists when it assisted moves to centres without planning. Inevitably tensions arose in reception centres wherein newcomer competed with old residents for scarce jobs and resettled children overcrowded schools. Resettlement created a distressful situation which benefited neither resettlers nor

\(^{131}\) Loder to Harnum, “Re: The Movement of Homes from Gallants to the Town of Stephenville,” 8 June 1970. GN39/1, Box 129, S245, PANL.

\(^{132}\) Jersey Harbour and Sagona, two communities that resettled into Harbour Breton, provide examples. When Harnum and Sametz realized that one section of Jersey Harbour unanimously favoured moving and another area known as The Bottom was opposed, they considered treating them as separate entities. Sagona was evacuated without a public meeting or a petition.
townspeople. The inflow of new people created a surplus of labour which increased underemployment and unemployment and kept wages stagnant. All too often relocated householders, who were promised a better life, found themselves mired in conflict living in polluted subdivision in a town in which they were strangers.

**Conclusion**

A goal of the FHRP was to create a modern, industrial fishery by transferring labour from small coastal communities at lowest economic cost. The planners accepted the subdivision model of development and seemingly learned little from past mistakes, perhaps because resettlement involved so many government departments and agencies. Bureaucrats in C&SD and Municipal Affairs ignored the trauma resettlement created for the older generation and gambled that a better educated and trained younger generation would transform the rural economy. C&SD continued to use the development models used in Harbour Breton and elsewhere with very questionable results. Governments expected coastal people, accustomed to a lifestyle based in household production, to adjust to life in subdivisions with minimal services. Separated from extended family and traditional activities, householders drifted into dependence in a sometimes unfriendly, alien environment where they competed against resentful townsfolk for limited employment. Not surprisingly, they confined social relationships to those resettlers with whom they shared a common history.

The FHRP attracted criticism from clergy, municipal governments and some rural development specialists when it assisted moves to centres without any plan. Inevitably tensions arose in reception centres wherein newcomers competed with long-time residents for scarce jobs, and resettled children overcrowded schools. Resettlement
created a distressful situation which benefited neither settlers nor townspeople. The inflow of new people created a surplus of labour which increased underemployment and unemployment and kept wages stagnant. Too often a householder, who was promised a better life, found himself living in polluted subdivision in a town in which he remained an outsider.
Chapter VI

Church and State: Detractors and Promoters of Resettlement

Introduction

Throughout Newfoundland and Labrador’s history as a colony, country and province churches exercised great influence over spiritual, social, educational and political institutions. Historians who explored sectarian themes contended the Roman Catholic and Anglican bishops controlled political parties in the nineteenth century and influenced the vote on Confederation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹ When Newfoundland joined Canada, the negotiators enshrined a century-old denominational school system in the constitution out of deference to church hierarchies. In so doing the negotiators weakened the foundation of small communities that supported two or three denominational schools. An amendment to the British North America Act guaranteed the Anglican, Roman Catholic and the Salvation Army churches control over education.

As chairs of school boards, male clergy had the power to approve new school construction or close a school, which often meant the closure of a settlement. By virtue of their position as rectors of parishes and chairs of school boards, priests controlled the institutions that, to a large degree, determined the social vitality of a community. In post-Confederation Newfoundland political leaders and parents accepted education as the key to progress and the good life. A threat to education was a threat to the community, especially for those who saw education as a means for the next generation to break the

cycle of hardship and dependence. It freed children from dependence on a declining, marginal industry and gave girls an alternative to going into domestic service. Educational success depended on the efforts of clergy to recruit teachers for remote schools. In the post-war era, Newfoundland had the highest birthrate in Canada and recruitment of teachers for one-room all-grade schools was especially difficult. A rumour that there was no teacher hired for September was enough to destabilize a settlement, particularly when a centralization program made moves to centres with better schools possible.

Rural sometimes encompassed a half dozen points. Since these settlements were seldom linked by road to parish headquarters, it is not surprising that the priest took advantage of the state-sponsored centralization programs to consolidate far-flung parishes. Reports of school closures and movement of parish headquarters to the mainland struck at the core of island communities. Reduction of church services rumours of school closures created a state of uncertainty and anxiety that intensified when these events were followed by a visit from the Director of Resettlement. The church, which was a very gendered space, had the power to control the fate of communities. One resettler proclaimed: “Nar one of us didn’t want to move but we never had no other

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2H. R. V. Earle, MHA, to Hamum, 6 September, 1966 and L. Shirley, RDO, Community and Social Development, Report on Visit to Point Rosie, 24 August, 1967. Point Rosie, GN39/1, File S143, Box 127, PANL. Earle informed Hamum, who had completed a visit to Point Rosie two days previous to Earle’s arrival, that the majority supported resettlement, “especially the majority of women who wished to move for the sake of the children.” Shirley also acknowledged the importance of education shared by the parents in Point Rosie. He reported that “no teacher hired for September and this may force them to resettle in the fall.”
choice. Young Steve was a year and a half without school. We had no other choice. We couldn’t get no teachers.”

Sociologist R. L. Dewitt contended the clergy played an important role in shaping attitudes of Fogo Islanders towards centralization. He maintained that applicants relied more on relatives and clergy than on government officials when choosing a reception centre. The Anglican clergyman discussed the move with individual households, chaired meetings, and discussed resettlement at informal gatherings. According to Dewitt he advised high school graduates to leave the island. The Roman Catholic priest found himself at odds with his congregation when tried to consolidate parish communities. He was a founder the Fogo Island Improvement Committee (FIIC), a group that promoted consolidation island communities as opposed to relocating households to the near mainland. The United Church minister, a newcomer to the province and member of the FIIC, tried not to influence parishioners’ choices. This chapter investigates the role Roman Catholic, Anglican, United Church, and Apostolic Faith hierarchies played in resettlement.

The Roman Catholic Church

In 1957 the clergy, along with welfare officers, school supervisors and teachers, and medical personnel, assisted in the compilation of a list of outports that they believed ought to be evacuated. Eight years later Rev. Philip Lewis, Roman Catholic parish priest, recommended the evacuation of St. Leonard’s, St. Kyrans, Red Island and Isle au Valen

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to Maresheen, his parish headquarters. Lewis recommended the wholesale evacuation of Placentia West as a cost-saving measure for government, but was aware of the benefits of consolidating parishes. To speed up the process, Lewis proposed government reduce the 90 percent requirement to 50 and increase monetary assistance to $10,000 per household to speed up resettlement. The archdiocese promoted centralization of parishes to reduce costs and ease the burden on parish priests.

The parish priest at Bar Haven was also a centralization enthusiast who endorsed Lewis’ recommendations. Father W. P. Collins suggested the government should concentrate on persuading key people to relocate in order to get the remainder moving. Collins informed Harnum that people would soon leave poor places like Clattice Harbour Northwest and Clattice Harbour Southwest if government accepted the clerics’ advice. Citing humanitarian concerns, he informed Smallwood that he had vacated Iona (The Rams), Indian Harbour, Toslow, Big Brule, and Island Harbour on his own accord and with great sensitivity. In one instance Collins claimed he rescued a family from an evacuated outport and purchased a house at parish expense. But in the same letter the priest described a less humane mission. When Prowston refused to evacuate, Collins tried to force people out by refusing to visit the community and threatening to close the

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5 Philip Lewis to Ross Young, 6 April 1965. GN39/1, Box 125, File S11, PANL.
6 Lewis to Young, 6 April, 1965.
7 W. P. Collins to Harnum, 28 November 1965. GN39/1, Box 125, File S11, PANL.
8 Collins to Harnum, 28 November 1965. GN39/1, Box 125, File S11, PANL.
9 W. P. Collins to Harnum, 28 November, 1965. GN39/1, Box 125, File S11, PANL.
school for a year. In the end, the Minister of Fisheries approved the move on humanitarian grounds.

In outer Placentia Bay, Rev. Denis P. Walsh expressed some concerns with respect to the FHRP, but offered conditional support. Walsh’s main concern was compensation for abandoned church buildings. He wrote to Harnum from his new parish headquarters at Rushoon:

I think you realize that in this position I can hinder or further the cause [of resettlement], and it would be in the best interests of all concerned for me to further the cause of centralization when the reasons for the same are plainly evident.

Walsh, who had recently moved parish headquarters from Oderin to Rushoon, ministered to seven communities, most of which were petitioning to resettle. The church stood to lose schools, halls and church buildings without reimbursement. Walsh advised Harnum the FHRP should provide a minimum $1,000 in compensation per building. He proposed to use these monies to relieve the financial burden imposed on his parish by the joint centralization program. Collins, Lewis and Walsh’s support for resettlement was strong when it accorded with the objectives of their church, namely to enhance parish efficiency and viability through consolidation.

Lewis and Collins hoped to persuade the FHRC to designate Bar Haven and Merasheen organized reception centres for communities within their respective parishes. Collins, who had been willing to deny a congregation the sacraments of the church and

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10 Collins to Harnum, 28 November 1965.
11 Memo from A. G. Stacey to Harnum. Subject: Approval to Evacuate Prowseton, 25 March 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S47, PANL.
12 Rev. Denis P. Walsh, Parish of Rushoon, to Harnum, 29 March 1967. Box 125, File S11, PANL. Parish headquarters was recently moved from Oderin to Rushoon.
withhold a teacher to promote centralization of his parish, was anxious to get the Premier to construct a road to the Burin highway to encourage settlers to move to Bar Haven. He predicted that if Smallwood kept his promise to build a road to Monkstown, Presque Arm and on to St. Kyran’s families from the islands would move into the area.13 Collins also argued the road would make Merasheen a viable reception centre. Collins and Lewis were willing to close communities to consolidate parishes, but accused the Resettlement Director of using propaganda to lure people out of the region. They favoured centralization of parishes, but opposed wholesale evacuation of Placentia Bay, which, if it occurred, would make the priest redundant.

Father Desmond (Des) McGrath, best known as a co-founder of the Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied Workers Union (NFFAWU), was so anxious to move his New Ferrole congregation into parish headquarters at Port au Choix that he protested the construction of a power line and road to that community.14 McGrath suggested electrification and improvements in transportation would encourage householders to stay and interfere with his plan to consolidate the parish. Furthermore, Fishery Products Ltd. was constructing a seasonal fish plant at Port au Choix to process

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13 Collins’ message of 22 November 1965 was in response to a public meeting chaired by the merchant, John Wadman, 21 October. Although the priest’s message stressed Bar Haven’s economic viability, Harnum stated the Division of Resettlement had received a petition signed by 30 householders requesting assistance to resettle. See Harnum to Collins, 23 November, 1965. GN39/1, S95, PANL. See also Memorandum from A. G. Stacey, Secretary Fisheries Household Resettlement Committee, to Harnum, 3 December 1965, “Re: Approval to Evacuate Bar Haven.” GN39/1, S95, PANL. Stacey informed Harnum the Committee had approved household moves to Dunville, Placentia, Freshwater, Holyrood, Marystown, Long Harbour and St. John’s. Stacey directed Harnum to ask five undecided householders to choose a reception centre.
material supplied by inshore fishers. Harnum, who visited New Ferrole, reported that a majority of the 15 households might be prepared to move, but not to Port au Choix. Nonetheless, McGrath and his predecessor, Father Murphy, were determined to evacuate New Ferrole. The rationale for the priests’ actions was the same on the northwest coast as it was in Placentia Bay. When the interests of the church merged with state policy, the threat to rural communities intensified.

The case of New Ferrole demonstrates how overbearing clergy could be. Father Murphy and his replacement, McGrath, resorted to extreme measures to consolidate the Parish of Port au Choix. Catherine Hynes explained to the Premier why her family was resisting the move to parish headquarters. She and her husband and their seven sons shared a new three-story home that they were not willing to dismantle or abandon. Rather than forsake a viable family fishing enterprise Hynes vowed to defy her priest and live on berries and fish in New Ferrole rather than move to Port au Choix. She alleged Father Murphy threatened to close the school for the next three winters. Hynes claimed Murphy moved seats and stove from the New Ferrole school to Bartlett’s Harbour. She informed Smallwood that Murphy’s promise to supply a teacher for the summer was not practical due to the employment of older children in the fishery. It was customary for older children in the outports to help process and cure the catch. The traditional salt cod fishery had relied on the unpaid labour of women and children from the 1830s onward.15

Hynes asked Smallwood to intervene “because we are not shifting out of it [New Ferrole] until God takes us” and charged that “our parish priest are [sic] all for money in

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15 Catherine Hynes to Smallwood, 7 March 1967. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
big settlements that is why he wants us to move to port au choix [sic].” She promised that her husband and seven sons were not going to tear down their home and stage to move to Port au Choix where there was no space for gardens. She declared she would challenge anyone, including the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, to defend her family’s right to live in New Ferrole. She vowed priests would never force them to abandon their homes and independent life to become slaves in Port au Choix.

Smallwood referred the Hynes letter to Harnum. In his reply to Hynes, Harnum ignored Hynes’ allegations of clerical misconduct and focussed on the right of anyone, who wished to relocate, to apply for assistance to move to an approved growth centre. The premier, whose views on resettlement of outports were well known, was silent. With church and state arrayed against it, New Ferrole was on shaky ground. According to Hynes requests for a community wharf and breakwater had been ignored as had a request for a water system that would end the practice of trucking water from sources located miles from the community. Catherine Hynes is an outstanding example of how women fought for the survival of their community and the preservation of the family home, the family fishing enterprise, and the right to continue subsistence farming.

Despite Hynes’ impassioned appeal to the Premier, the evacuation of New Ferrole appeared imminent. In the fall of 1968 the Northern Regional Development Association (NORDA) asked C&SD to make the dumb barge available to transfer nine of the fifteen

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16 Hynes to Smallwood, 7 March 1967. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
17 Hynes to Smallwood, 7 March 1967. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
18 Harnum to Catherine Hynes, 10 April 1967. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
houses in New Ferrole to Port au Choix. Sametz informed the Development Association
that the barge was unavailable, and the road was too narrow to permit land transport.

Harnum asked L. N. Woolfrey to assess attitudes towards resettlement and
compare the physical aspects of the communities in question to the designated reception
centre. His report on the physical attributes and services in the town cast aspersions on
Port au Choix. Woolfrey reported that unless one understood Port au Choix as a
reception centre, one could never understand the attitude of the residents of neighbouring
settlements towards resettlement. He described Port au Choix as a backward place run by
an inexperienced, inefficient council which the majority of townspeople disparaged.

The town had no public water and sewer system and the majority of homes were not
connected to a private septic system; telephone service was restricted to five-party lines;
no television service; and a low standard of education due to shortage of teachers and
classroom space. Woolfrey recommended against resettling more fishers into the growth

19Martin Lowe, Northern Regional Development Association (NORDA), to Sametz, 1
October 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL. A year later a report prepared by
Peter Hoddinott for NORDA advised against the resettlement of Bartlett’s Harbour,
Castor’s River North and Castor’s River South to Port au Choix. Hoddinott argued the
move would hurt them financially. The report encouraged government to provide
assistance to develop the fishery in their current communities. Hoddinott suggested that
resettlement would destroy their initiative and bring “untold hardship” to many of them.
It added that there was no evidence to support an opinion that the people would be better
off financially or socially in Port au Choix. He proposed incorporating Bartlett’s Harbour,
Castor’s River North and Castor’s River South into a single entity. NORDA, “Report on
Relocation of People from Bartlett’s Harbour, Castor’s River North and Castor’s River
South” to J. R. Chalker, Minister of Public Works. GN39/1, Box 131, File S280, PANL.
20Sametz to Martin Lowe, 2 October 1968. GN39/1, Box 131, File S280, The Rooms.
21L. N. Woolfrey, “Report on Visit to Northern Peninsula, December, 1968.” GN39/1,
Box 131, File S280, PANL.
GN39/1, Box 131, File S280, PANL.
23Woolfrey to Harnum, “Report on Visit.” GN39/1, Box 131, File S280, PANL.
centre. There was not enough electricity or water to supply the new fish plant and the inshore fishery was declining. Woolfrey’s report on Port au Choix was as damning as the Burry and Shirley report on Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour. When the resettlement planners ignored the advice of field they exposed households to unnecessary risks.

It is little wonder that Catherine Hynes and her neighbours defied the representatives of church and state when they tried to force them into a growth centre where the pluralistic economy would cease or be restricted. Woolfrey recommended giving the small communities of the region time “to let rational thinking overcome sentimental attachment to their community and to proceed with caution.”

His advice went unheeded. When 70 percent of householders applied for assistance to resettle to Port au Choix, the FHRC asked the minister to use discretionary power to designate New Ferrole an evacuated outport. The residual population would then be forced to choose between living in a place in which all normal services provided by the state would cease or submit.

James Chalker, Minister of Public Works and MHA for St. Barbe North, and Jack Marshall, MP, inquired about the evacuation of New Ferrole. Harnum informed them that resettlement officials had discussed the matter with the community council and “especially Father McGrath, who was involved in their decision-making.” One can assume from this communication that the priest not only exerted great influence in his parish, but also with Mahoney who approved the evacuation of New Ferrole when only

24Woolfrey to Harnum, “Report on Visit.” GN39/1, Box 131, File S280, PANL.
26Harnum to James Doyle, Sr., New Ferrole, 23 December 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
27Harnum to J. R. Chalker, MHA, 26 June 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
70 percent of householders signed the petition. The main stumbling block was finding a way to transport houses. While awaiting the arrival of the barge, the nine householders who had voted to leave reconsidered the move. Consequently when Harnum arrived in September 1969, the households who had voted to move in June informed him that they no longer wished to resettle anywhere and now stood in solidarity with those who wanted services, not resettlement.

Despite the considerable effort of church and state to resettle New Ferrole, the community survived. The pole line that McGrath so strongly opposed is an outward symbol of their success. Their victory is evidence that coastal communities were building up immunity to the moving fever that had swept through Placentia Bay in the first two years of the joint resettlement program. But the wolf was still at the door. In February 1970 Harnum informed G. E. Knight, Director of Public Works, that a barge was available to move houses, and that McGrath still wanted to move New Ferrole to Port au Choix. The will of the people to resist resettlement would again be tested when water and sewer systems were completed in Port aux Choix and the “dumb” barge was available to move houses.

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28 Father Desmond McGrath organized the fishermen of Port au Choix into a union which McGrath and Richard Cashin turned into the Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied Workers Union with Cashin as president. The union represented inshore and offshore fishermen as well as plant workers throughout the province. The union’s successful fight for a collective agreement with Spencer Lake, plant owner and mayor of Burgeo, made Des McGrath a household name.

29 Harnum to W. S. Reid, Deputy Chairman of NL Power Commission, 22 September 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.

30 Harnum to G. E. Knight, District Director, Department of Public Works, 9 February 1970. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.

31 Harnum to G. E. Knight, 9 February 1970. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL.
The Anglican Church

The Anglican Church hierarchy supported resettlement in principle, but expressed concerns about the way was administered. Like their Roman Catholic counterparts, Anglican ministers felt the program should provide compensation for church buildings, halls and schools which bureaucrats termed social capital. The controversy arising from efforts of the Parish of Burin to salvage a church to meet the needs of the resettled community in Marystown illustrates the complex nature of the FHRP. NLHC’s refusal to approve a site in the subdivision to accommodate delayed the move. Approval was eventually obtained to place the church on crown land adjacent to the NLHC subdivision.32 C&SD agreed to provide the motorized barge free of charge, but informed Rev. Owen Coffin that the parish was responsible for all other related expenses. Coffin argued C&SD should cover all costs from launch to setup from resettlement funds, particularly since the congregation consisted mainly of resettled families.33 When Coffin claimed that the barge operator had overcharged, Rowe dismissed it as a civil matter and advised him to launch a civil suit to enforce the oral agreement and denied government moved social capital free of charge.34 Rowe did admit there were “some shortcomings and inadequacies” in the resettlement agreement but alleged the federal partner was

32Rev. Owen Coffin to William Rowe, Minister of Community and Social Development, 15 July, 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL. Coffin sent a copy to Premier Smallwood who asked Rowe for a full report.
33Coffin to William N. Rowe, 15 July 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
34Rowe to Smallwood, 21 August 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
responsible.\textsuperscript{35} The Minister of Resettlement and Housing considered free use of the barge fulfilled governments’ obligation to the parish.\textsuperscript{36}

To suggest that clergy were interested only in capital losses is misleading. In the bishop’s charge to the Anglican Synod in 1969, Bishop Seaborn recognized the human cost of resettlement and appealed for special assistance to replace structures left behind as well as increased funding to replace houses.\textsuperscript{37} Seaborn contended the resettlement program should provide sufficient funds to allow relocatees acquire houses equivalent to those abandoned in terms of size and quality.\textsuperscript{38} Rev. Edward House spoke of the trauma arising from the abandonment of rectories, churches, halls, schools, and teacher residences.\textsuperscript{39} The Newfoundland Churchman “Viewpoint” columnist opined the attitude of government planners was “cold, callous, and hard-hearted” in respect to the movement of people.\textsuperscript{40} He claimed resettlement officials showed up in a community and made empty promises to entice people to sign petitions. After they resettled they received no guidance from government bureaucrats who retreated to their offices where “they stick another pin in [the map] to signify the great achievement of creating another ghost town.”\textsuperscript{41} O. W. C.’s assertion that except for services of clergy, councils, and citizens of growth centres, the resettlers were bereft of support or guidance is supported by the findings of several studies. Perlin, who commented on the Churchman article, denied the

\textsuperscript{35} Rowe to Coffin, 14 November 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
\textsuperscript{36} Rowe to Coffin, 14 November 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
\textsuperscript{37} R. L. Seaborn, “Bishop’s Charge to Synod, 1969.” In Herbert L. Pottle, 
\textit{Dawn Without Light} (St. John’s: Breakwater, 1979), 58.
\textsuperscript{38} Seaborn, Bishop’s Charge to Synod, 1971. In Pottle, 
\textit{Dawn Without Light}, 59.
\textsuperscript{39} Edward House, Parish of Harbour Buffett, to Smallwood, 26 September 1966. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.30.024, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{40} O. W. C., “Viewpoint,” 
\textsuperscript{41} O. W. C. “Viewpoint,” 
FHRP was sinister, but agreed with O. W. C. that arbitrary resettlement officials created unnecessary problems by treating people and families with indignity. Perlin was very critical of the manner in which Tack’s Beach was resettled. He accused officials of wearing down householders’ resistance by circulating several petitions. In fact the FHRC delayed approval of the petition because the majority of householders insisted on moving to Arnold’s Cove which was not a designated growth centre and in which the government had imposed a land freeze.

Rev. R. Hatcher, rector of the Anglican Parish of Grand Bank, accused government of ignoring a Synod resolution on resettlement and continuing to ignore the needs of transplanted families. Hatcher used the experience of Rencontre West families to illustrate the cavalier treatment of relocatees. He claimed a party that included “one mentally deficient woman, one half-blind woman, a man with one hand, [and] a woman 7 months pregnant arrived in Grand Bank late at night without accommodations or anyone to greet them.” The government had not moved their homes to Fortune as promised. The pastor accused government of using deceptive practices to lure people from remote communities. Hatcher, who claimed he was writing on behalf of the Parishes of Grand Bank, Burin and Harbour Breton, rebuked the authorities for treating “people as pawns in the great sinister game of resettlement,” and asked them to treat people with honesty and dignity.

43Rev. R. Hatcher to W. N. Rowe, 19 October 1970. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
44Hatcher to Rowe, 19 October 1970. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
45Hatcher to Rowe, 19 October 1970. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
Bill Rowe contended his officials were making an effort to eliminate the most offensive features of the FHRP.\textsuperscript{46} A departmental report, prompted by Hatcher’s letter and the \textit{Churchman} article, refuted many of the allegations.\textsuperscript{47} Rowe provided Hatcher with a chronology of the Rencontre West move which deflected blame away from his department and onto the town of Fortune and the resettlers. The report explained that arrangements were made to relocate several houses to a land assembly in Fortune, but in the middle of the move, the town decided to place an embargo on salvaged houses. C&SD offered to relocate the homes to Grand Bank but the families arrived before arrangements were complete. He alleged the resettlers’ decision to visit relatives in Fortune created the need for Hatcher to work late into the night arranging transportation to Marystown. Furthermore, Rowe maintained that it was the duty of clergy to work with other local leaders and counsellors to help families adjust to new environments.

Seaborn appointed a diocesan committee to prepare a report on resettlement for the 1969 Diocesan Synod. The Synod committee considered adjustment to life in growth centres was especially problematic for the elderly and disabled. The \textit{Churchman} published the report, together with a National Film Board photo. The subjects in the photo were a group of small children and a senior citizen reading a newspaper. The caption posed the question: “They will adjust to their new surroundings ... BUT CAN HE?”\textsuperscript{48} Rev. Mark Genge, rector of the Parish of Burgeo-Ramea led a discussion on resettlement. Genge pointed to the need for government to make available special grants for the disabled and the elderly, two groups that found it most difficult to replace houses.

\textsuperscript{46}Rowe to Hatcher, 2 November 1970. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
\textsuperscript{47}Rowe to Hatcher, 3 December 1970. GN39/1, File S349, PANL.
left behind due to inability to work or build homes. Owen Coffin spoke of the plight of people in growth centres whose source of income disappeared. A lay delegate, who was also Deputy Minister of Welfare, identified ending isolation and the improving opportunities for education as “the most powerful reasons for resettlement.” Following the discussion Synod passed a resolution calling for additional grants for the aged and disabled and an in-depth assessment of employment opportunities in growth centres. The delegates asked government to maintain services throughout the moving period to ensure the children’s education was not interrupted.

The Synod resolution, *The Churchman* article, and Hatcher’s letter drew a sharp response from Bill Rowe. He replied that hiring too many field workers, “who found themselves with too much free time on their hands,” could lead to “an overzealous attempt to persuade people to resettle, perhaps against their own wishes.” He proposed that the onus was on teachers to help the children to adjust to the new schools. Rowe suggested female church groups could help women integrate into urban environments. He denied resettlement officials “lured” people out of the small communities and suggested that the biggest problem was preventing households from making irrational moves. Implicit in his patriarchal statement is an assumption that expert knowledge is superior to local. On the other hand patriarchal clergymen underestimated the degree to which relocatees resisted moves to industrial growth centres.

In 1971 the Diocesan Council for Social Services presented a Resettlement Survey Report to the Synod. The report was based on responses to questionnaires

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50 Rowe to Hatcher, 3 December 1970. GN39/1, Burin Peninsula File S349, PANL.
51 Rowe to Hatcher, 3 December 1970. GN39/1, Burin Peninsula File S349, PANL.
distributed by rectors to collect data on services and facilities that existed in the sending communities prior to resettlement and problems resettlers experienced after the move.
The diocesan committee received reports from 39 sending communities. Five had a school with more than three rooms, 31 received mail less than three times per week, 17 had no telephone service, and 37 were without a road connection. Respondents to the survey declared that very few wished to move, and when asked why they had moved they were uncertain. The report attributed the confusion to the lack of counselling and to poor communication between the many government departments and agencies responsible for administering the program. In addition to the housing and unemployment problems, the Council listed: insufficient compensation when everything was left behind; placing new families in parts of town where it was difficult to integrate into the receiving community; not recognizing that older people, who were used to a freer way of life, would have a greater difficulty adjusting; and moving people from more viable communities to less viable reception centres; and failing to provide sufficient counselling before and after the move.\

The Diocesan Resettlement Committee made six recommendations to overcome some of the most undesirable aspects of the Household Resettlement Program: first, before evacuating a community, the inhabitants should be fully informed about all aspects of the program and be psychologically prepared for the move; second, people should be moved to centres where they could find work; third, the growth centre should

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be equipped in advance with adequate services and facilities to accommodate the increased population; fourth, the assistance being given should be under continuous revision to ensure that it met the needs of the household involved; fifth, the sending community and the character of the inhabitants should be evaluated thoroughly before a decision is made to resettle; and, sixth, the committee offered support for resettlement if government addressed concerns identified in the report. Implicit in the recommendations was an assumption that resettlers were unable to cope with, or adapt to, change without expert guidance.

Perhaps influenced by the Iverson and Matthews study, the Synod report highlighted the need for affordable housing and offered an opinion on the layout of subdivisions. The authors feared development of apartment blocks and row housing would create ghettos and stigmatize the occupants. The report condemned ribbon development along highways and “shack development” on the fringe of growth centres. The Council maintained that such development projects that isolated and stigmatized settlers should be discontinued. The Synod promised wholehearted support for resettlement provided government addressed social justice issues, most notably housing and employment.

The Anglican rector at Burgeo was a political and social activist. Mark Genge lobbied on behalf of his parishioners for improvements in communication, transportation, medical, education and recreation services. Genge, fresh from ministering to congregations on coastal Labrador, was shocked by the paucity and low quality of public
Attributing backwardness in the region to government negligence, the rector engaged in a political action campaign. He helped community groups prepare briefs and petitions, and participated in meetings with the Premier. Genge was involved in political action from the day he arrived in Burgeo. He supported the people of Small’s Island, who were seeking a bridge to connect them to the town. He reminded Smallwood that the families on Small’s Island resettled to Burgeo from Red Cove for the sake of the children, but their children lost weeks of school when inclement weather and ice made crossing the narrow tickle unsafe. The families, having moved once, did not wish to move again.

Smallwood, who admitted that the southwest coast had received the least benefit from Confederation, agreed to provide a bailey bridge to connect them to the town.

Throughout his term at Burgeo, Genge remained a committed social activist. Most of his parishioners lived in Burgeo and Ramea, but his parish also included Grey River. Genge favoured resettlement, but felt government had an obligation to provide necessary

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53 Rev. Mark Genge to Smallwood, 17 November 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.021, ASC, Memorial University.
54 Genge to Smallwood, 17 November 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.021, ASC, Memorial University. The Evening Telegram reported Burgeo is situated on an island five kilometres long by two kilometres wide and at the narrowest point was only 30 metres from the mainland. Burgeo Fisheries, Ltd., with Mayor Spencer Lake as Managing Director, employed 310 workers in the plant and four steel trawlers. There were 61 housing starts in 1966-7. A causeway and road linked the plant and community to a water supply. The mayor informed the Telegram that other developments including local road widening, a new Roman Catholic school, a $60,000 renovation of the Anglican church, a public library, and a herring plant were planned. “Future Bright for Burgeo,” Evening Telegram, 17 May 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, File S186, PANL. On 19 August, 1969, the Daily News reported that the herring plant, a joint project of Burgeo Fisheries, National Sea and the Clyde Lake Group, would begin operation 1 November of that year. “Erection of Herring Reduction Plant Begins,” Daily News, 19 August 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S186, PANL.
55 Smallwood to Genge, 20 April 1966. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.021, ASC, Memorial University.
and humane services to all communities.\textsuperscript{56} In an effort to place attachment to place in context, he suggested that the federal government would support moving the population of the underdeveloped Atlantic region to central Canada, but Atlantic Canadians’ identification with place bound them to a region characterized as backward in Ottawa. Knowing Smallwood’s opposition to assisting Newfoundlanders to leave the province, Genge’s analogy was poignant. Genge argued intra-provincial migration was just as painful for people as the alternative. He wrote: “I appreciate your good intentions about relocating the people on the south coast, but I do disagree with your methods and philosophy.”\textsuperscript{57}

Genge supported the residents of Grey River who called on government to improve services. The community requested restoration of the doctor’s clinic, introduction of a ferry service, lights, and installation of new telegraphic equipment. The elimination of these necessary and humane services made residents question government’s motive for closing the medical clinic, and issue a declaration that they would not be forced out. Resident spokesperson, Frank Young, advised Smallwood that Grey River was an ideal site for the inshore fishery and the people had a right to better services.\textsuperscript{58} Like Fogo Islanders they wanted development, not resettlement.

Genge, dissatisfied with the quality of services in Burgeo and Ramea, felt that until these growth centres were adequately equipped with schools and other infrastructure

\textsuperscript{56}Genge to Smallwood, 30 September 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.021, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{57}Genge to Smallwood, 22 October 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{58}Frank Young to Smallwood, 19 September 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
the resettlement program could not be considered successful. It was crucial to develop a water system and mitigate the housing crisis in both centres. J. C. Penney & Sons, operated by Marie Penney, initiated a housing program at Ramea, an island town with an historic connection to deep-sea fishing. There were no resident medical personnel to respond to an industrial accident aboard trawlers or in the processing plant and no doctor had visited in more than a year. The doctor’s boat that served Ramea and Grey River was no longer in service. Genge opined: “Is there any surprise writers like Harold Horwood and Farley Mowat should take up the cause of these forgotten places?”

When Smallwood replied that it was more difficult to persuade doctors, nurses, and teachers to serve in remote locations, the clergyman implored Smallwood to provide a ferry to bring patients to the doctor. He also reminded Smallwood that Mowat’s new book on the southwest coast would be soon released and advised Smallwood that he had “left himself open for any criticism he [Mowat] may make, about your policy on centralization. You know it is not sufficient to get people to move, they still have to live afterwards.” He believed the lack of recreational facilities in Burgeo, which left children with no place to play except on the roads, was bound to lead to increased vandalism. The children had at least space to play in their old communities.

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59 Genge to Smallwood, 18 August 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
60 Smallwood to Genge, 22 September 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
61 Genge to Smallwood, 30 September 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
62 Genge to Smallwood, 13 July 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
63 Genge to Smallwood, 31 May 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
warned Smallwood that if funding for a playground was not approved within a week, he would be “taking further steps.”\textsuperscript{64} He was a forceful advocate.

Mark Genge’s actions caught the attention of Walter Hodder, MHA for Burgeo-La Poile. Hodder attributed the public furore over the lack of services in Burgeo to statements made by the Anglican rector. Hodder advised the Premier to visit Burgeo, Ramea and Grey River to restore confidence in the government and bolster Liberal support. The MHA alleged Genge’s remarks were so inflammatory that the community council was threatening to resign en mass. Hodder also asked the Anglican rural dean at Port aux Basques to reign in the troublesome priest. Hodder asked the Premier to visit Burgeo and reassure the people of Burgeo-La Poile that the Liberal government had not abandoned the people of the south west coast.\textsuperscript{65}

The release of “A Productivity Study of the Frozen Fish Industry in Newfoundland” prepared by Inbucon Services Ltd. fuelled discontent.\textsuperscript{66} The Inbucon Report recommended dismantling and relocating fish plants at Burgeo, Ramea and Gaultois to the Burin Peninsula where more productive plants operated.\textsuperscript{67} Angered by the proposal, Genge accompanied a delegation to St. John’s to present a brief to the Premier refuting the Inbucon Report. Industry leaders Marie Penney and Spencer Lake assured Smallwood that the populations of Burgeo and Ramea had increased rapidly in the

\textsuperscript{64}Genge to Smallwood, 5 June 1968. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{65}Walter Hodder to Smallwood, 1 November 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.022, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{66}“A Productivity Study of the Frozen Fish Industry in Newfoundland,” Inbucon Services Ltd., 1968.
\textsuperscript{67}Genge to Smallwood, 18 March 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.024, ASC, Memorial University.
previous five years, and advised Smallwood that neither the Lake Group plants at Burgeo and Gaultois, nor John Penney & Son’s operation at Ramea suffered from a shortage of experienced workers as the Inbucon Report suggested. The population of the three growth centres was sufficient to supply companies with skilled workers ashore and afloat. The brief also alleged local companies were better equipped to respond to crises in the fishery than the multinational food corporations whose boards were located in distant cities. They argued that companies embedded in the community were more likely to ride out the rough periods than transnational corporations. The delegation contended that a road link to the TCH would attract medical personnel and teachers while the removal of the plants from Burgeo, Ramea and Gaultois would precipitate a mass migration out of the region. Whether a road to Burgeo was the ultimate solution region’s problems is debatable, but the dismantling of the plants would surely speed up out-migration from the area.

Churches were much concerned over the way governments were implementing the centralization program. The Anglican clergy questioned government policy and issued reports that identified areas of concern and put forward recommendations to address them. The Bishop of the Diocese of Newfoundland and parish rectors demanded resettled families be treated with dignity and respect. They participated in committees, helped prepare written briefs, accompanied delegations to St. John’s and denounced government for not providing adequate schools in the growth centres. Both the Anglican and United Church clergy drew attention to the need for more counselling.

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68“A Brief to Accompany the Petition from the Towns of Burgeo, and Ramea.” J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.05.024, ASC, Memorial University.
The United Church

Rev. J. Burke, the United Church pastor at Burgeo, expressed concern that rumours that had caused a mass exodus from the islands of Placentia Bay were now taking root on south west coast. Burke evinced the need to counter rumour with factual information to enable householders to make rational decisions about their future. The Burgeo council requested a field worker who would work with municipal councils to prepare the growth centre for the influx of people. The clergy and council stressed the necessity of providing affordable housing and the need to enlarge or construct new schools to allow householders to integrate into a new setting with minimal stress. Along with Dr. Ann Calder, Deputy Mayor of Burgeo, they complained that neither C&SD nor the Department of Municipal Affairs were providing sufficient funds to develop affordable housing to accommodate the resettled families.69

The United Church (UC) viewed the centralization movement as an effort by people to seek a better standard of living and better services for the family. The report on centralization presented to the Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Newfoundland Conference of the United Church of Canada recognized that resettlement affected very differently members of the three-generation family - children, parents, and grandparents.70 Each cohort faced its own challenges. The parents moved to a growth centre to enhance their children’s education, and when the wage earners and their

dependents moved, the elderly were forced to follow because the sending community could no longer maintain essential services. In the new location the wage earner found it necessary to acquire a whole new skill set and cope with setting aside past experience and parents had to cope with financial demands that are beyond their means. The grandparents found themselves severed from the church, lodges and places they gathered to reminisce. In the reception centre the long-time inhabitants had to tolerate overcrowding of facilities and adjust to living next door to strangers.

The report asked the Conference to reflect on the role of the church in all of this “social change and turbulence occasioned by resettlement.” The authors suggested that clergy and laity must step outside their normal role as spiritual leaders and extend it to include concern for the “whole man.” The report recommended Sunday school superintendents and teachers take on responsibilities outside the church walls by asking:

How can we help our people to realize that reasonable standard of living? To improve their situation in life? To realize for their children that equal opportunity; that sense of belonging to a new community? To experience for themselves a greater sense of fulfilment and to acquire a sense of worth in the scheme of things? The questions raised in the report did not challenge resettlement policy. The focus was on how members of the United Church could ease the transition of resettlers into a new cultural milieu. The authors knew the shortcomings of the household resettlement program, but, nonetheless, alleged that it had benefited the majority of people. The Conference urged government to continue and extend the program. The United Church considered that changes brought about by resettlement created adjustment difficulties for

\footnotesize{71}“Reports,” 139.
\footnotesize{72}“Reports,” 139
only a minority of resettlers, and saw it as another opportunity for expanding social
ministry. The report called for a greater role for the church in the advising and planning
phase to reduce the trauma of leaving home. The Conference urged governments to
maintain services in communities that were designated evacuated outports. The delegates
expressed concern for the families who continued to live in abandoned communities
deprived of church, school or communication services.73

The UC Conference Report on Resettlement was less critical of the centralization
program than the report of the Anglican Synod Committee. The United Church
commended government for assisting household moves and recommended extending the
resettlement program. The authors felt counselling programs run by church groups could
overcome many of the difficulties in reception centres. At the same time that Bishop
Seaborn was taking government to task for providing inadequate services and housing for
resettlers, the UC Conference commended government for its efforts and advocated
expansion of the resettlement program where possible. The UC, although it
acknowledged the trauma brought on by resettlement, saw it as an opportunity to enter
into a new era of evangelism to make the church more relevant. The 1960s was a decade
during which many questioned the relevancy of organized religion.74 The UC responded
by engaging in outreach programs to help resettlers and the citizens of receiving
communities to adjust to a new reality.

73“Reports,” 139.
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965).
Apostolic Faith Church

While the Newfoundland Conference of United Church focussed primarily on easing the anxiety of resettlers through outreach ministry, Booth Reid, a woods contractor and Apostolic Faith pastor, directed the move from Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm. Reid was a powerful political and spiritual presence in the district and the patriarch of Hooping Harbour. The pastor first tried to convince the FHRC to approve Hooping Harbour as a growth centre for the area, and when he was convinced that appeared unlikely, Reid decided to apply his energy to moving the community en masse to a site at the head of Bide Arm. Reid controlled not only his followers, but also exercised considerable influence over the whole community. His company built the local road, constructed the pole lines for electrification, and supplied the equipment to install the community water and sewer system. Reid was pastor, contractor, and unchallenged patriarch of Hooping Harbour, a community of 200 souls located in White Bay North electoral district. His reputation as a man who could deliver the vote for the Liberal Party gave him access to the Premier, and through Smallwood, access to ministers and senior bureaucrats.

At first Reid put his energy into modernizing the community. In 1968 Hooping Harbour had more services than most organized reception centres. Residents enjoyed the benefits of electrification and a water system. Located close to good grounds, it was one of the more prosperous and progressive inshore fishing communities in the province.

Booth Reid had an aggressive personality which he used to advantage in Hooping Harbour and St. John’s. W. Maynard, a Rural Development Officer who visited Bide Arm 22 December 1969 reported that after meeting with Pastor Reid for four hours he was still unable to determine which households were eligible for lot supplementary mortgages. Maynard suggested that Reid was not “as aggressive as during the last visit, still appears to have the secret deal with the government.” W. Maynard, “Report on Visit to Bide Arm, 22 December 1969. GN39/1, Box 132, File S365, PANL.
Throughout 1966-7 Reid led the fight for a community stage and a road connection to the Roddickton Highway.\textsuperscript{76} He insisted that Hooping Harbour had potential for expansion and had the capacity to accommodate the residual populations of Little Harbour Deep and Williamsport. He was so persistent that the Director of Resettlement opined: “Reid cannot be convinced that Hooping Harbour is not approved as a reception centre.”\textsuperscript{77} The pastor believed that government should permit people to move to a place of their choosing without penalty. He purported the FHRC forced families to live in poverty in government selected growth centres while the planners overlooked the benefits of resettling households to Hooping Harbour.\textsuperscript{78} Reid emphasized the industrious character of the people and refused to accept Harnum’s assessment that Hooping Harbour was just one of 650 communities with less than 200 persons.\textsuperscript{79} The major drawback was limited communication and transportation services. Mountainous terrain interfered with telecommunication and made a road connection a very costly project. When rumours reached Ottawa that Hooping Harbour was on a list of communities to be resettled, federal bureaucrats questioned whether government should invest in harbour improvements and telecommunications. When Edward Roberts, MHA, asked Canadian National Telegraph (CNT) whether it planned to install a telephone service for Hooping Harbour, J. A. Donich replied that he understood the community was “slated for

\textsuperscript{76}Reid to Charlie Granger, April 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S22, PANL.
\textsuperscript{77}Harnum to Granger, 15 February 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S22, The Rooms.
\textsuperscript{78}Reid to Granger, 30 June 1966. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, File 2.01.025, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{79}Harnum to Simon Randell, 29 June 1966. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, File 2.01.025, ASC, Memorial University.
resettlement.”  

The MHA assured Donich that the people of Hooping Harbour were adamantly opposed to moving in the next few years and in the meantime were entitled to rudimentary services. They families vowed to live in isolation rather than live on welfare in Englee or St. Anthony. Roberts assured Reid that he was in full support of a community stage and a road to the outside. But Roberts knew it would be a difficult task to persuade his cabinet colleagues to approve expenditure for a road that would only serve 200 persons.

When several families applied for assistance to relocate residents feared the community would dwindle away. The residual population, fearful of the future, raised a storm of protest that reached Confederation Building. Roberts contacted Harnum to see what had caused the brouhaha. The pastor and the local roads committee feared that this was the beginning of a decline that the government would use to justify denying requests for a road connection. Harnum assured Roberts that C&SD made no attempt to encourage or persuade the applicants, or any other householders, to apply for resettlement grants. The applicants had identified inadequate medical services and isolation as the main

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80 See. Knight to Harnum, 17 February 1967. GN39/1, Box 125, File S22, Memorial University. See also J. A. Donich, Superintendent of Canadian National Telegraph to Ed Roberts, 12 July 1967. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, File 2.01.026, ASC, Memorial University.
81 Roberts to Donich 19 July, 1967. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, Hooping Harbour File 2.01.026, ASC, Memorial University.
83 Roberts to Reid, 18 July 1966. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, Hooping Harbour File 2.01.026, ASC, Memorial University.
85 Harnum to Roberts, 5 October 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S22, PANL.
reason for moving.\textsuperscript{86} Government would not commit to a road, but did enter into an agreement with Reid for construction of the community stage, which Reid insisted on calling a herring plant.\textsuperscript{87} The pastor was aware that if Hooping Harbour had a fish plant, the FHRC would be more likely to approve it as organized reception centre. But when it appeared the community might die a slow death, Reid decided to lead his congregation to Bide Arm.

When the FHRC agreed to assist the move, Reid proceeded to turn resettlement into a make-work project. All adults were guaranteed employment building barges, relocating houses and building a new community on the shore of Bide Arm. All members of the local resettlement committee benefited financially from the move.\textsuperscript{88} In addition to the economic benefits, Reid was able to keep his congregation intact and operate a school independent of the UC school board. By orchestrating the move to a new community he would be in full control of church and school.\textsuperscript{89} When the UC householders objected to relocating the Hooping Harbour school to Bide Arm, Reid constructed a new school at Bide Arm despite warnings from F. W. Rowe that government would not fund it.\textsuperscript{90} Reid kept the children out of school for a year before Education Minister relented. Rowe agreed to pay $20,000 toward the cost of the school after he learned government had

\textsuperscript{86}Freeman Compton to Department of Fisheries, 19 August 1967. GN39/1, Box125, File S22, PANL.
\textsuperscript{87}Roberts to Max Randell, 29 May 1968. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, Hooping Harbour File 3.01.013. ASC, PANL.
\textsuperscript{89}“Facts Relating to a Request of a School at Bide Arm,” no date. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, Hooping Harbour File 4.01.001, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{90}Reid to Smallwood, 30 January 1970. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, Hooping Harbour File 4.01.001, ASC, Memorial University.
promised to provide for resettled families all the services that they had enjoyed in Hooping Harbour.\textsuperscript{91} It was a extraordinary agreement that paid relocatees resettlement grants plus a daily wage.\textsuperscript{92} “Concerned” wondered why government rewarded the relocatees with wages and grants, but ignored the needs of the 12 United Church householders who “had poor regard for the Apostolic Faith Group.”\textsuperscript{93}

The abruptness of the move caught resettlement planners by surprise. The Department of Community and Social Development had little time to attend to problems of the residual population of Hooping Harbour. A flustered Sametz wrote: “unfortunately this is another case of an almost instant move, where we have little prior indication of intent, yet when the community suddenly decides to move, it expects everything else to be instantly ready.”\textsuperscript{94} Reid assured Sametz that due to his experience moving houses from Williamsport and Little Harbour Deep, he could have two barges ready to commence moving houses in May. He asked Municipal Affairs to act immediately to prepare a lot layout so that the community could be resettled while offshore pack ice made inshore waters safe for towing houses.\textsuperscript{95} Reid informed the Premier that the people were anxious to start moving and he was willing to start work on the strength of a telegram from

\textsuperscript{91}F. W. Rowe to Pastor Reid, 23 April 1970. ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{92}Rudolph Randell to Roberts, 5 June 1969. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, File 4.01.015, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{93}Letter to Editor, \textit{Evening Telegram}, 1 August 1969, signed “Concerned.” GN30/1, Box 132, File S365, v. 1, PANL.
\textsuperscript{94}Sametz to Harnum, Re: Hooping Harbour Resettlement, 31 January 1969. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, File 4.01.015, ASC, PANL.
\textsuperscript{95}It was later confirmed that houses could be floated safely from Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm from June to November.
Smallwood. He asked the Premier to arrange financing with the bank so he could pay the men bi-weekly and “stamp books.” Approximately 50 men who received wages during the construction season which extended into December, earned higher incomes and unemployment insurance benefits than the fishers who stayed in Hooping Harbour.

Reid challenged any person who stood in his way. Bureaucrats in the Provincial Planning Office (PPO) were among the first casualties. Two planners from the PPO recommended a go-slow approach. They stressed the importance of careful site selection, thorough evaluation of the cost of developing a water system, and the importance of doing a proper survey and lot layout so that the relocation of Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm could proceed in an orderly way in spring 1970.

J. T. Allston, Director of Urban and Rural Development, agreed. But Reid was too bullish and impatient to heed expert

96 Reid to Smallwood, 25 April 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.49.010, ASC, MUN. W. N. Rowe sent a telegram to Reid authorizing the building of rafts, ownership of which would reside with the province, and to begin cradling houses. See Rowe to Reid, May 1969. GN30/1, Box 132, File S365, v. 1, PANL.
97 Reid to Smallwood, 13 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.49.010, ASC, Memorial University. The “stamp book” was a record of employment. The employer placed a stamp in this book for each week worked and it was proof that the employee qualified for Unemployment Insurance benefits.
98 Reid to Smallwood, 13 August 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.49.010, ASC, Memorial University. Carl Hussey, Rural Development Officer, reported those resettlers employed on the moving project at $12 per day would be eligible for unemployment insurance and at a higher rate than fishermen’s benefits. Hussey visited Hooping Harbour to compile an inventory of household effects and fishing equipment. He reported that stages were substandard and flakes were so deteriorated “they defied valuation.” See Carl Hussey, RDO Deer Lake, to Harnum, 17 July, 1969. GN30/1, Box 132, File S365, PANL.
100 Memorandum from J. T. Allston to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, “Re: Hooping Harbour - Englee Resettlement,” 28 April, 1969. Ed Roberts Collection, Coll-078, File 4.01.015, ASC, Memorial University. Allston hired a firm to study the viability of five possible sites for relocating the population of Hooping Harbour: The
advice. By August he had houses, a church, and stages on the beach at Bide Arm awaiting expropriation of private land. He urged Smallwood to secure the co-operation of each department involved so the land ownership issue could be speedily resolved and allow the men to begin moving houses from the shoreline onto assigned lots.\(^\text{101}\)

Reid’s refusal to heed the advice of expert planners, and his insistence on moving the community as an entirety into the wilderness, created unnecessary hardship for the resettled families. E. P. Nugent, Director of Field Services, C&SD cautioned the Director of Rural Development that while Booth Reid gave “the impression no project was too complex for him to undertake there was a need to broaden the leadership base.”\(^\text{102}\) In a confidential memo Sametz lamented: “We have conducted a large number of successful resettlement operations … but none have posed the difficulties of this move.”\(^\text{103}\)

While many of the difficulties of this community relocation can be traced to the impatient, aggressive nature of Pastor Reid, a memo from Sametz to Bill Rowe indicates senior bureaucrats overruled the Director of Urban and Rural Planning.\(^\text{104}\)

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\(^{101}\) Reid to Smallwood, 13 August 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.49.010, ASC, Memorial University.

\(^{102}\) E. P. Nugent to F. J. Evans, 27 August 1969. GN39/1, Box 132, File S365, v.1, PANL.

\(^{103}\) Confidential Memo to William Rowe, Minister, from Z. W. Sametz, Deputy Minister, “Re: Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm,” 27 January 1970. GN39/1, File S365, v.3, PANL.

\(^{104}\) Memorandum from Z. W. Sametz to Minister, “Re: Hooping Harbour,” 2 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 132, File S365, v.1, PANL.
indicated that since C&SD had agreed to provide the resettlers with all the services they enjoyed at Hooping Harbour, the province would have to extend water and sewer services to every householder in Englee at great cost to the province. By allowing the move from Hooping Harbour to “North Englee,” which was the official name of the new community, to proceed, the majority of the cost of developing water and sewer systems was transferred to the federal government. By eliminating the need to construct a road to Hooping Harbour the province saved millions of dollars according to engineers’ surveys.\textsuperscript{105} On a cost-benefit basis the move made sense. Sametz calculated houses, school, two churches, herring factory, and power supply could be moved, and roads constructed at Bide Arm for less than $300,000, most of which would be paid by the Canadian government.

Wick Collins, an \textit{Evening Telegram} journalist, compared the suddenness of the evacuation to the speed of “fire through dry brush.” The reporter was disturbed by eagerness of resettlers to condemn Hooping Harbour and everything in it.\textsuperscript{106} How had this complete reversal of attitude come about? Perhaps it can be attributed to the influence of the businessman/fundamentalist sect leader, who had run the Apostolic Faith mission and dominated economic life in Hooping Harbour for a dozen years. When Collins questioned workers about future employment they replied “You’ll have to ask Pastor Reid.”\textsuperscript{107} They seemed to have blindly followed their pastor, who the journalist said

\textsuperscript{105}Memorandum from Z. W. Sametz to W. N. Rowe, Minister Responsible for Housing and Household Resettlement, “Re: Hooping Harbour Settlement to ‘North Englee,’” 22 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 132, File S365, v.1, PANL.
considered himself a modern-day Moses leading his people from bondage into the promised land.\(^{108}\) The settlers left Hooping Harbour without any plans beyond resettlement employment. When Collins asked if they would return to old grounds, they were evasive. They did not know whether they would return to Hooping Harbour to fish, try fishing from Bide Arm, or look for woods work in Roddickton.

Collins thought Reid was motivated by profit and the desire to maintain spiritual leadership. Hayward Canning, who was still at Hooping Harbour, told the reporter that at first some families intended to move to Englee, others to Roddickton and St. Anthony, but “Pastor Reid told us we have been together for a long time now and if we all go to Bide Arm we can stay together as a flock.”\(^{109}\) When Collins interviewed Reid in Corner Brook, the pastor insisted the committee decided.\(^{110}\) Regardless of who made the decision, Bide Arm seemed to have little to commend it. The Arm froze a month earlier in the fall than Englee and remained frozen one month later in the spring, thereby shortening the fishing season. In addition the site chosen for the new community was distant from fishing grounds where fishermen would have to compete with locals whose knowledge gave them a comparative advantage over the newcomers.\(^{111}\) Wesley Pollard, a fishermen, who had no intention of moving from Hooping Harbour, told Collins that Bide Arm was no place to fish. The well sheltered Arm was home to millions of flies that made life almost unbearable, and the lack of wind made it difficult to cure fish. The modern amenities that existed in the old community would not be available in the new

\(^{110}\) Booth Reid was away at the time Wick Collins visited Hooping Hr. and Bide Arm.  
\(^{111}\) Fishing grounds utilized by Hooping Harbour fishermen were approximately 30 kilometres distant from the community at the head of Bide Arm.
settlement for some time. But despite these drawbacks, those interviewed were more interested in condemning their former community than questioning the pastor’s judgement. They seemed to forget that Hooping Harbour was a good fishing port inhabited by an industrious people who were their neighbours. Reid succeeded in keeping his congregation together, resettlers earned wages and received resettlement grants and lot supplementaries, and accumulated enough “stamps” to collect unemployment insurance benefits for two winters. The province saved the price of a road to connect Hooping Harbour to the highway. Everyone came out a winner except the Government of Canada which paid 70 percent of the cost, and the 12 United Church households who forced out of the evacuated outport.

Conclusion

The decision to entrench the denominational education system in the Terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland gave churches control over the province’s schools. The clergy, who chaired the local denominational school boards, decided whether a community school would survive or be closed. When a priest decided that a community was no longer viable, he was sometimes prepared to use the full force of his spiritual power and civil authority to deny necessary and humane services to the people of that community. In Placentia Bay and Port au Choix, Roman Catholic priests used civil authority to pressure congregations into parish headquarters. New Ferrole and Prowseton are two extreme examples of abuse of church authority.

Reid was expected to develop a compact subdivision to accommodate fifty houses. Instead of limiting the size of the community he relocated, or constructed new houses, on lots throughout the 108 lot layout which inflated the cost of materials and labour to install a water and sewer system. He considered the relocation of Hooping Harbour to be a make-work project and was determined to keep it going as long as possible.
Church leaders were a diverse group who responded to local conditions. Most clergy favoured resettlement, and fought for a more humane approach. Church leaders battled ministers of the crown and resettlement planners to get adequate and affordable housing for resettlers, and new and larger schools staffed by professionally trained teachers to provide children with the very best educational experience. Rev. Mark Genge openly challenged the premier’s policy and philosophy of resettlement by organizing citizens’ committees and accompanying delegations to St. John’s to meet with Smallwood and senior bureaucrats. Genge fought as hard to improve and restore services in Grey River and Ramea as he did to get adequate schools and recreational facilities, and infrastructure for Burgeo. In direct contrast the Roman Catholic priests of Placentia Bay proposed amendments to the Resettlement Agreement that, if adopted, would have left half the population of settlements stranded in evacuated outports. In the examples discussed in this chapter, the Roman Catholic clergy favoured centralization as long as it accorded with their efforts to consolidate and preserve parishes.

The Newfoundland Conference of the United Church of Canada called for a more humane program that considered the impact of resettlement on all age groups and disabled persons. The UC Conference Report on Resettlement shared many of the concerns raised in Anglican Synod reports but preferred to view centralization as an opportunity to implement outreach programs to make the church more relevant in a secular world. The authors of the report suggested the conditions in growth centres provided lay and ordained leaders an opportunity for social ministry. While the Anglican bishop and clergy reprimanded governments for not according resettlers the respect and
dignity they were entitled to, the Newfoundland Conference of the United Church commended government and called for an expanded centralization program.

Booth Reid provides the most extreme example of a clergyman using his spiritual, economic and political influence to direct his congregation into a new community. When he realized that a road would not be forthcoming, and the province was unlikely to connect Hooping Harbour to the Roddickton Highway, Reid decided to lead his congregation, as he informed Wick Collins, into the Promised Land. He used his political influence to negotiate a special deal with C&SD. that turned resettlement into a make-work project financed largely by the federal government. As the sole contractor on site, Reid profited personally as did the other two members of the local resettlement committee. His control over the resettlers was so complete that when Collins asked what they would do after the move was finished the men replied that he would have to ask the pastor. Bide Arm is above all a testimony to the determination, power and political influence of a charismatic leader. The Hooping Harbour - Bide Arm move exposed the ambiguities and contradictions in the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program that allowed community and church leaders to orchestrate moves that contradicted the principles of the program.
Chapter VII

Bucking the Trend: Choosing Development

Introduction

Rumours that the government had a list of communities slated for resettlement caused considerable anxiety in the outports and raised a storm of protest that resonated in the House of Assembly and the House of Commons. In Ottawa Opposition Member of Parliament for Gander-Twillingate, John Lundrigan, accused government of maintaining a blacklist of outports destined for resettlement and using that list to determine which outports would receive funding for capital works. In Newfoundland the issue became a headline story and Smallwood asked the Director of Resettlement to investigate. Harnum reported that when the FHRP was in the planning stage the Provincial Working Committee agreed to prepare a list of communities that should be given every encouragement to move to designated growth points where employment was available.\(^1\) F. W. Rowe, the first Minister of Community and Social Development, confirmed that “the sub-committee drew up a list of 100 settlements that in all probability were places whose populations might wish to be moved, but it was never approved.”\(^2\) The Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee believed the decision to resettle ought to be left to the people to make and opposed blacklisting.

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\(^{1}\) Harnum to J. R. Smallwood, 28 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.

\(^{2}\) F. W. Rowe to Smallwood, 29 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.
Whether a list existed is uncertain, but it was not unusual for ministers of the crown to consult the C&SD before inventing in infrastructure in places like Southern Harbour. In May 1970 the *Evening Telegram* reported that a list existed.\(^3\) In the early stages of the resettlement program such rumours often created enough panic to destabilize a community. Four years into the program coastal communities were more likely to organize resistance, especially the larger outports with community councils. Reacting to Lundrigan’s allegation that Fisheries Minister Jack Davis turned down a request for a public wharf, the Beaumont council sent the following message to the Premier:

People of the community will never agree to resettlement. John Lundrigan announced publicly he understands the people of Beaumont and Lushes [sic] Bight would be relocated whether they like it or not. Please rush your comments.\(^4\)

The Minister of C&SD and the Premier’s Office assured the townspeople that there were no plans to evacuate Beaumont or Lushes Bight.\(^5\) However, the announcement of the closure of a post office in central Beaumont made the Premier’s reassurances less credible.\(^6\) Smallwood informed concerned residents that the closure of the Post Office was in no way connected to a plan to evacuate Beaumont. The Post Office had made a business decision and nothing more.\(^7\) Resistance to centralization increased over time and

\(^4\)Edwin Short to J. R. Smallwood, 9 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Coll 075, File 1.15.030, ASC, Memorial University.
\(^5\)William N. Rowe to Short, 13 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Coll 075, File 1.15.030, ASC, Memorial University.
\(^7\)Smallwood to Burton, 24 September 1969. J. R. Smallwood Coll 075, File 1.15.029, ASC, Memorial University.
this chapter discusses how it played out on the ground by examining several communities.

An examination of the communities of Fogo Island, Paradise Sound, Harbour Deep, and Point Lance demonstrates the effectiveness of resistance as well as their determination to develop local resources and acquire modern services. When Fogo Island residents were given a choice between evacuating the island or development the islanders chose to assess their strengths and enlisted the aid of outside agents to help them build a viable community. They challenged models of development and proved that co-operative enterprises could succeed in areas from which corporate enterprises had withdrawn. Similarly, three communities in Paradise Sound and Harbour Deep refused to heed the voice of the naysayer. They identified the possibilities for resource development and economic diversification while residents of Point Lance rallied behind the merchant and rebuffed the efforts of their MP to resettle them to St. Bride’s.

Fogo Island

In 1966 Fogo Island, home to approximately 4,500 residents, living in ten communities scattered along its perimeter, experienced an economic downturn in the 1960s due to the collapse of the Labrador fishery and decline of the local cod fishery. Eric Jones, MHA for Fogo District, stated that the collapse of the Labrador fishery, the decline of the inshore fishery, and the closure of fish plants and the departure of the main merchant supplier, reduced the island’s economy to such a distressful state that resettlement of Fogo Island seemed the only option. The closure of the Fishery Products Ltd. fish plants at Seldom and Joe Batt’s Arm aggravated an already serious economic recession that would have demoralized a less resilient population. The future of Fogo
Island depended on the ability of local groups to rehabilitate the economy and curb the migration of educated youths. Jones praised their willingness to act co-operatively “to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps,” but predicted much of the population would leave.\footnote{“Problems of Fogo,” \textit{Daily News}, 6 May 1968. GN39/1, File S200, PANL.} For a time it appeared Fogo Islanders would choose resettlement over development. One householder feared his three children would “never get a chance to become of [sic] what god [sic] intended them to become here” due to the poor state of the economy.\footnote{Andrew Cull to Smallwood, August 14 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.10.020, ASC, Memorial University.} Fifty-four families had moved, or were in the process of shifting, in April 1968.\footnote{Gregory Butt to Smallwood, July 27 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 1.10.020, ASC, Memorial University.} Jones, admitting that a core of inshore fishermen would stay, did not foresee a time when Fogo Island would be completely depopulated, but predicted that half the population would leave within a decade.

But the people of Fogo Island ignored the pessimistic musings of the Minister of Highways. In March 1967 the Fogo Island Improvement Committee (FIIC), which had been formed in 1964 to lobby for improved roads, asked MUN Extension Services to convene a conference to discuss the future of Fogo Island communities.\footnote{Cadigan, \textit{Newfoundland and Labrador}, 256-7.} Out of this conference came a proposal to establish the Fishermen’s Co-operative Movement under the umbrella of the United Maritime Fishermen Ltd. (UMF).\footnote{Norman Anthony, Secretary Fogo Island Improvement Committee, to Fisheries Development Authority, 4 April 1967. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.10.020, ASC, Memorial University.} The UMF agreed to process and market fish if the Fisheries Development Authority transferred the government-owned plants at Seldom and Joe Batts Arm and three community stages to
the UMF. The Improvement Committee also requested the services of a field officer for the island to assist in fisheries development. The *Fogo Star*, published by the FIIC, reported Smallwood had given Fogo Islanders three choices: “1. Drift along as many of us are doing at the present time; 2. Take advantage of the FHRP; [or] 3. Modernize our fishery and develop any other natural resource in our community, thus becoming self-sufficient again.”¹³ The editor noted that while some had chosen the second option, others were choosing the third. Eric Jones praised the efforts of the shipbuilding Co-operative, “a project unique in the history of Newfoundland.” He suggested that it could possibly be a way to get larger boats into the hands of the fishermen.

The formation of co-operatives was a big step toward creating a united community, but internal jealousies and rivalry between communities stymied co-operative efforts. An examination of the moves from Nippard’s Island and Leveret Island, two islands in Deep Bay, reveals how committed the residents were to retention of community identity. Harnum visited the two islands and advised them to resettle to Fogo, Seldom or Joe Batt’s Arm, but the households insisted on relocating to nearby Deep Bay rather than integrate into one of the larger places on the island. In 1966 neither Fogo, Seldom, or Joe Batt’s Arm were approved reception centres. Gander Bay, Carmanville and Lewisporte were the nearest designated growth centres. Regional Development Officer, Lance Shirley, sympathized with the older generation whom he anticipated would experience great difficulty integrating into industrial towns.¹⁴ He reported that one

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¹⁴ Shirley to Nugent and Harnum, GN39/1, Box 128, File S200, PANL.
couple had lived for seven decades in a comfortable home in which they raised four children, and in the twilight of their lives were expected to abandon a life’s work and memories to start a new life among strangers. In Shirley’s opinion, Seldom or Fogo offered a modest improvement in services with minimal trauma. He felt people over 45 years old were concerned they would be considered “misfits” in a growth centre. Shirley felt these fears could be assuaged if the FHRC approved moves within Fogo Island. The experience of living in Fogo or Seldom would prepare the next generation for entry into the modern world.  

The development officer proposed that government pay the cost of moving houses from Nippard’s and Leveret Islands to Deep Bay and then pay householders the full resettlement grant when they resettled to Fogo or Seldom. He recommended designation of Fogo and Seldom as organized reception centres for the smaller settlements of Fogo Island. Shirley purported that they had more modern amenities, adequate harbours, fish plants, a business history, an available supply of fresh water, and potential for expansion. Shirley advised the Director of Field Services, Ed Nugent, against moving more settlers into Gander Bay and Carmanville due to the high rate of unemployment.  

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15 A letter from Roland Freake of Joe Batt’s Arm indicates that even within the largest community on Fogo Island there was much angst about the future of Fogo Island. One household who wished to build a new home at Joe Batt’s Arm asked the Premier if Fogo Island was “listed in the resettlement program.” Roland Freake to Smallwood, 8 May 1969, J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.10.028, ASC, Memorial University. In letters dated 27 May and 2 June 1969 Smallwood reassured Freake that resettlement was voluntary. Smallwood to Freake, 27 May 1969 and Harnum to Freake, 2 June 1969, Coll 075, File 1.10.028, ASC, Memorial University.  

16 Shirley to Nugent and Harnum, 12 December 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, File S156, PANL.
In 1969 the FHRC designated Fogo as an organized reception centre for the communities of Fogo Island. Householders who were in the process of moving from Leveret’s Island and Nippard’s Island agreed to go to Fogo, but expressed concerns over adequacy of harbour facilities, overcrowded classrooms, and shortage of housing. They questioned why they should have to move to Fogo when Deep Bay had a community stage and space for private stages whereas Fogo could scarcely accommodate resident fishers. Shirley proposed that the Resettlement Committee withhold approval of applications until improvements in school and harbour facilities were completed.

Meanwhile, the Deep Bay community council and the FIIC intervened on behalf of the households that had moved from Leveret and Nippard’s Islands to Deep Bay without assistance. The Committee outlined the rationale: the Fogo Island Producers Co-operative operated a community stage where fishers could sell their catch and family members could find employment; the fishermen had moved to improved circumstances, i.e., Deep Bay had electricity, the hospital and central school were nearby; and the resettlers were content. While Harnum continued to advocate the growth pole approach, government and local organizations agreed that centralization within Fogo Island was the best option.

The drive to reverse Fogo Island’s fortunes began with the formation of the Fogo Island Improvement Committee in 1964. Throughout the winter of 1965 the FIIC held meetings in each settlement to discuss development options and to elect community

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17 Shirley to Harnum, 12 November 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S156, PANL.
18 Raymond Heath to Smallwood, 30 March 1971. GN39/1, Box 128, File S156, PANL.
19 Stan Kinden to Harnum, 13 September 1971. GN39/1, Box 128, File 156, PANL.
20 Harnum to Minister Aidan Maloney, 6 March 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, File156, PANL.
21 *The Fogo Star*, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1968), 2.
representatives. The September Issue of the *Fogo Star* may have singled out 1967 as the year of greatest advances, but the FIIC had been active since 1964.\(^{22}\) In that year the Committee recruited two medical doctors, and in 1965 successfully lobbied for electricity for the all communities and telephone services for Fogo, Joe Batt’s Arm, Tilting, and Seldom. Efforts to include Fogo Island membership in the Straight Shore Agricultural and Rural Development Association failed, but the Committee convinced Smallwood to commit to a development plan, part of which was the Fisheries Conference of March 1967. Personnel from Memorial University Extension Services served as conference facilitators while the National Film Board recorded the proceedings. In September Fogo Islanders succeeded in getting government support for a ship-building co-operative which oversaw construction of a modern yard for building longliners. They also formed the Fogo Island Producers Co-operative to reopen the fish plants.\(^{23}\) Owned by community shareholders, the Co-operative was prepared to play a high-stakes game from which private capital had withdrawn. The gamble paid off. On 18 October 1968 the Fogo Islanders celebrated the launch of four fifty-foot longliners at Shoal Bay.\(^{24}\) The decision not to wait to see what government was going to do for them, or wait for private capital to invest, seemed to be the correct one.\(^{25}\) The Fogo Island Experiment became a model for community development in the regions surrounding Chicago and San Diego and the

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\(^{24}\) D. Roberts, Manager Fogo Island Shipbuilding Co-op, to J. R. Smallwood, 18 October 1968, J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.10.028, ASC, Memorial University.

Canadian Press reported that the experimental use of film in rural development had caught the attention of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).26

The FIIC also set about reorganizing education on the island. In 1967 the Department of Education approved a request from the United Church, Anglican, and Pentecostal clergy to amalgamate schools. In 1969 Rev. Ivan Jesperson lamented the lack of progress made by the Amalgamated School Board to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Education and Youth.27 It would appear that denominational bigotry, opposition to community school closures and disagreement on where to locate schools impeded consolidation. The Commission, chaired by Memorial University Professor Philip Warren, recommended that the school system should consist of no more than five elementary schools and one regional high school.28 Reform depended on closure of several community schools and a willingness of all religious denominations to share a common goal. Clearly, there was much work to be done before people thought of themselves as Fogo Islanders.

The three-day March conference brought together federal and provincial cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats and experts in the field of rural development. Some pundits contended that the development program which emerged from the meetings saved Fogo Island and downplayed the role of the Improvement Committee. Mayor George Oake raised the resettlement issue at the conference. He wanted to know whether

26 “US Adopts Plan from Newfoundland,” Evening Telegram, 8 October 1968, 12.
27 Ivan Jesperson to J. R. Smallwood, J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.10.028, ASC, Memorial University.
28 Jesperson to Smallwood, 5 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.10.028, ASC, Memorial University.
the government had plans to evacuate Fogo Island. 29 Robert Hart, Assistant Director of the Industrial Services Branch of the federal Department of Fisheries replied: “I can tell you unequivocally that there is no plan to evacuate Fogo Island.” 30 He added, there was a greater need to evacuate the 500 communities having less than 30 families. 31

Smallwood’s failure to implement a $3 million scheme for paved roads, water and sewer services, a retraining program for fishers, and a plan for construction of fishing boats contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty. Jesperson reminded the Premier that he had given them the option to develop and asked him to consider the possibilities for tourism on the island. The FIIC member touted the benefits of developing tourism and handicraft industries. 32 Other delegates to the three-day March 1969 conference called for opening small multi-specie processing fish plants. Fogo Islanders wanted to be included in all stages of planning new enterprises. The Daily News reported that the enthusiasm expressed at the conference by the over-40 cohort bucked the trend of social thought which has been more in favour of evacuating offshore islands than in developing viable communities on them. 33 The reporter, A. B. Perlin, contended that the challenge for Fogo Islanders would be to keep young people on an island, no longer a port of call for the CNR coastal boat, located 12 miles from the mainland and frequently isolated by ice.

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30 “Fogo Residents Won’t be Moved,” Evening Telegram, 6 March 1969. GN39/1, Box128, File S200. PANL.
31 “Fogo Residents Won’t be Moved,” Evening Telegram, 6 March 1969.
32 Presently Zeta Cobb, a successful corporate executive who was born in Joe Batt’s Arm, is operating a luxury hotel, promoting the handicrafts industry and local culture of Fogo Island. She is attracting an elite clientele.
There was also the question of how to generate enough wealth from seasonal activities to keep families in a comfortable lifestyle. Perlin saw Fogo Island as “a symbol of a society in transition” and what happened there might well determine what would happen in other places that had flourished when cod was king.  

Fred Earle, a MUN Extension worker who grew up on Change Islands, appealed to islanders to avoid criticizing either the Improvement Committee or the Fogo Island Co-operative unfairly. He noted that the NFB would be continuing the film program which he considered an important communication link between the policymakers and communities. The films improved lines of communication between local organizations and government planners, and provided a medium through which communities could share ideas, and think of themselves as Fogo Islanders. Earle noted Co-operative membership had increased to 400 members who pledged 5% of their earnings. Earle exhorted them to stick together and above all “do not tolerate rumours - just abide by the truth.” The *Fogo Star* appealed to readers to join the co-operatives, especially the Producers Co-operative. Roger Carter contended that the Fogo Island Co-operative was formed in 1967 but most communities had been involved in the co-operative movement for decades. Carter also noted that the Premier was not very supportive of the co-operative model at this juncture.

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34.“Wayfarer,” 14 March 1969, GN39/1, Box128, File S200. PANL.
Nonetheless, Smallwood promised that no effort would be made by his government to evacuate the island as long as the people did everything possible to help themselves. Jones assured Sametz that consolidation of communities within the island also conformed with federal plans for fisheries modernization. Late in 1969 the province requested federal funding to build a wharf and breakwater at Fogo to accommodate longliners. He alleged that without the port improvements longliner owners would have to operate out of the port of Twillingate and the shipyard would close. Until facilities at Fogo were complete, the future of the whole island remained tenuous.

Opposition MP John Lundrigan, an outspoken critic of the FHRP, accused the provincial government of adopting “a deliberate hands-off policy,” and of trying to starve the people off the island by withholding government services. He alleged that the FHRP was part of a deliberate scheme to force the people to accept the idea of resettlement. He alleged:

Government officials throw up their hands at the suggestion of force in the administration of the program, giving the impression that the only kind of force is police batons and bullwhips. [In the administration of the Resettlement Program] force often took the form of denying or neglecting public services and sometimes involved holding up a tempting offer of money to entice them to move without much thought of the future. If Fogo became a designated outport, it would mean the evacuation of 5,000 people with little chance to continue an independent life in another community.

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39. Eric Jones to Don Jamieson, 12 November 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S200, PANL.
42. “The Future of Fogo Island,” Evening Telegram, 14 August 1969. GN39/1, Box 128, File S200, PANL.
Lundrigan contended that the only way resettlement could be avoided was through government investment in the fishing industry and community infrastructure. The Premier’s 1967 announcement of a special program to rehabilitate the Fogo economy was an important part of discussions at the March 1969 conference.

While resettlement officials favoured concentrating Fogo Islanders into two or three centres, Father J. K. Barker wondered if the closure of post offices was part of a resettlement plan. Why, he asked, would government wish to move people from Deep Bay and Island Harbour, settlements with schools and community stages, into Fogo, a place with overcrowded schools and inferior facilities. Lance Shirley and Harnum contended community consolidation within the island was the best option for creating a viable community. Centralization would stem the tide of out-migration, encourage government investment, and improve quality of life. There was no logical alternative. Barker informed Shirley that Roman Catholic schools in Fogo could accommodate more students, but he and his parishioners firmly opposed resettling Island Harbour into Fogo, a mostly Protestant town.

The FHRC also slowed consolidation by their reluctance to designate any Fogo Island town as a growth centre, perhaps because they secretly wished to evacuate the island. But by this time opposition to resettlement was too strong. By August 1970 the town council asked the FHRC to approve Fogo as a growth centre, and the Department of Public Works had issued tenders for construction of a breakwater and fishermen’s wharf at Fogo, and the Terra Nova Integrated School Board had approved construction of a new

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43 Shirley to Harnum, 18 December 1969. GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
44 Harnum to Shirley, 22 January 1970, GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
regional high school.\textsuperscript{45} In a spirit of unity the Roman Catholic School Board expressed interest in the creating a non-denominational school system for Fogo Island. A new sense of community was emerging.

The Director of Infrastructure, F. J. Evans, recounted how events unfolded on Fogo Island.\textsuperscript{46} The downturn came with the departure of the Earle Company followed by the closure of the Fishery Products Ltd. plant at Joe Batt’s Arm and the Yellow Fish Company plant at Seldom in the early 1960s. When these firms closed shop, the Improvement Committee approached government for marketing assistance. The Premier then paid a visit the island where he gave the people three choices: resettle, develop, or stagnate. Shortly thereafter, the Committee asked the Rural Development Division to put in place a special program for Fogo Island.\textsuperscript{47} The first step focused on improving productivity by moving fishers into longliners to increase mobility and range. Accordingly rural development officials, in consort with the FIIC, decided upon a cooperative approach as the strategy for developing the economy. The Newfoundland Co-operative Services agreed to create the corporation and oversee its operation. As production increased through the use of longliners, the Producers Co-operative took over the government-owned plants abandoned by private enterprise.\textsuperscript{48} The report acknowledged the role of provincial and federal governments, but understated the role of

\textsuperscript{45}Shirley to Harnum, 24 August 1970. GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
\textsuperscript{46}F. J. Evans to Director of Infrastructure, 16 March 1971. GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
\textsuperscript{47}The program was later referred to as the Regional Activation Program (RAP).
the National Film Board and MUN Extension Services, and the FIIC and local leaders in reviving the island’s economy.

In contrast Evans, Shirley credited the success of the Fogo Island project to locals. He informed Sametz that the success of the Regional Activation Program resulted from the effectiveness of “local people’s initiatives and ability to implement, maintain, expand, and modify the programs.”

On Fogo Island the process had started with the formation of the FIIC and takeover of the community stage at Deep Bay along with the plants at Seldom and Joe Batt’s Arm by the Producers Co-operative. Through co-operative action fishers took control of the catching, processing and marketing. The Producers Co-operative assumed all the responsibilities of a highly capitalized integrated trawler-processing company. In 1972 the Fogo Island Producers Co-operative pressed the Moores government to construct a modern diversified plant in a central location. Shirley professed that the Fogo Island Shipbuilding and Producers Co-operative had successfully challenged the capitalist model of fisheries development, and had now reached the stage where it would have to prove it could operate completely on its own.

The jury was still out on the Fogo project. Selby Moss informed the Director of Social Assistance, M. J. Vincent, that he was less optimistic about the future of Fogo than he had been several years earlier. According to Vincent, a native of Fogo, the co-operative had a debt and cash flow crisis that was “strangling” it after only two years in

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49 Memo from L. C. Shirley to Z. W. Sametz, D. W. Mercer, and F. J. Evans, 17 May 1972. GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
50 Shirley to Z. W. Sametz, D. W. Mercer, and F. J. Evans, 17 May 1972. GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
operation. Failure of the longliner fishery in 1973 contributed to his growing pessimism. Moss informed Vincent that if the fishery failed again in 1974 there would be many householders applying for assistance to move away. Vincent replied that from 1966 to 1971 only 31 households had applied for assistance to resettle off the island.

Lance Shirley felt social development had progressed in step with economic improvements, thanks to the efforts of local organizations such as the Lions Club, school boards, and municipal councils, but most of all through the work of the Fogo Island Improvement Committee. The Committee organized conferences, workshops, student exchanges, and lobbied for road construction, a ferry service, a community park, improved medical facilities, and a regional high school. The Lions Club sponsored a variety of community projects including a student exchange with a school in Montreal. In an address welcoming the Montreal students to Fogo, Stan Kinden described the exchange as a “milestone in our road to success.” The student exchange might have gone unnoticed in a larger community, but in Fogo it was an instrument of progress that not only exposed the students of Fogo Island to the culture and life of a large Canadian city, but also created an awareness that Fogo also offered the urban students an equally valuable cultural experience. The students and the wider island community learned that the way of life in a rural space was not less important, or less valuable, than the urban spaces in Canada. But the high school graduates continued to leave rural areas for the industrial urban centres of Newfoundland and Labrador and Canada.

51 Moss to Vincent, March 7, 1974. GN39/1, Box128, File S200, PANL.
Great Harbour Deep

Author Jack Fitzgerald quipped in an article published by the *Newfoundland Herald*, an entertainment magazine, that it would be cheaper to buy every resident of Great Harbour Deep a helicopter than to construct a forty-mile road to link to the St. Barbe highway. The effects of isolation were so severe that a boy was unable to draw a modern car.\(^{53}\) Although Fitzgerald listed some of the community’s redeeming qualities, such as the willingness of the people to engage in communal projects, his allegations of backwardness raised the ire of some residents. Chesley Pittman, a prominent merchant, informed the *Herald*’s readers that residents travelled regularly for medical services, employment, business and pleasure.\(^{54}\) Nonetheless, he conceded the mountainous terrain that separated Great Harbour Deep from the nearest highway interfered with radio-telephone communication and blocked television signals completely. Isolation became more severe when weather prevented mail delivery.\(^{55}\)

The school principal, an outsider, observed that the people were not apathetic but [were] “continuously met with frustration.”\(^{56}\) Neither the reports of meetings nor letters to politicians and bureaucrats suggest they were a defeated population. In 1971 Harbour Deep sent 14 students to Memorial University and they were eagerly awaiting the opening of a new school. Residents believed a road connection to Hawke’s Bay and a

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\(^{54}\)Chesley Pittman to Editor, *The Newfoundland Herald*, (10 September 1969). Edward Roberts Collection 078, File 4.01.014. ASC, Memorial University.


\(^{56}\)Duncan to Smallwood, 3 February 1970. Edward Roberts Collection 078, File 1.10.028, ASC, Memorial University.
forestry access road would ensure a prosperous future for the community. Ed Roberts believed that without a road link and access to timber stands, the rights to which had been conceded to Price (Nfld.) Ltd., Harbour Deep would die.

When a rumour spread that Great Harbour Deep was slated for resettlement, the residents contacted provincial politicians and their federal MP to request services.\(^{57}\) The local merchant, Pittman, lobbied for electricity and a road connection. He invited Roberts to a public meeting to tell the people “straight” whether the government intended to improve communication and transportation services or if they planned to vacate the community in the next four to five years.\(^{58}\) The Anglican minister, Eugene Abbott, and merchant wanted reassurance that the thousands of dollars raised for the new school would not be wasted. Pitman charged that all too often new public wharves and buildings wasted away in abandoned harbours. The merchant had much to lose if the community dispersed since the FHRP did not reimburse merchants for buildings, wharves or inventory. He appealed to Roberts to assist fishers to acquire gillnets, larger boats, and engines to make the fishery more productive.

Roberts believed that Great Harbour Deep could not survive without a road to Hawke’s Bay.\(^{59}\) Nathaniel Cassel, a community leader, concurred. He considered building a house in a community without a road to be as senseless as “putting a new

\(^{57}\)Hezekiah Cassell to Ed Roberts, 7 August 1967. Edward M. Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.

\(^{58}\)Chesley Pittman to Ed Roberts, 11 February 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.

\(^{59}\)Roberts to Pittman, 3 April 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022.ACS, Memorial University.
lining in an old coat.” Roberts warned that only if a company was found to develop timber stands would the federal government subsidize construction of a road link. With timber rights already ceded to Price (Nfld.) Paper company, the odds of attracting private capital was minimal.

Fogo Islanders organized local development committee and were the beneficiaries of National Film Board and MUN Extension expertise, but residents of Harbor Deep and most outports were left to their own devices and perhaps the support of a sympathetic MHA. The community of 300 lacked the political clout of Fogo Island which had a population of 4,500, enough voters to determine district elections. The Local Roads Board was the community’s single civic body. Most of the residents just wanted to end the uncertainty. One attempted to embarrass politicians by listing unfulfilled election promises: electricity; a new school; a special grant for the local road; and a road connection to the St. Barbe coast. Roberts informed a public gathering at Harbour Deep that their community was too prosperous to be resettled and advised them to continue to fundraise for a new school. In his letter to Smallwood, Maxwell Pollard alleged Roberts promised electrification, a shipyard, and a canning factory, and pointed out the potential for developing a woods industry. Pollard assured residents that government would not

60 Nathaniel Cassel to Roberts, 2 March 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022. Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.

61 Roberts to Pittman, 3 April 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022. Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.

62 Maxwell Pollard to Smallwood, 4 September 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.
ask them to leave their “good” houses. The people of Harbour Deep asked Smallwood for reassurances.\textsuperscript{63}

Resettlement formed the content of all conversations. Pollard accused government of persecuting the people and forcing them into a condition comparable to the Great Depression and predicted that unless an element of certainty was injected into the community “in another year half is here will be mental and everything gone to ruin, because they are losing interest in everything.” He declared it was not a privilege to move to Englee, but “slow murder.”\textsuperscript{64} It was an emotional appeal to a man whom most coastal people believed had rescued Newfoundland from the jaws of hunger and poverty. The people questioned why a government, led by a man who had promised jobs and prosperity to all, would introduce a fisheries development program that forced people from communities with good potential for development into growth centres where they would be forced to live on welfare. Like the householders of Petite Forte, the people of Great Harbour Deep were in limbo. They did not know whether they should build or renovate homes or attend to the upkeep of fishing rooms.\textsuperscript{65} Only a desperate man would compare resettlement to slow murder or suggest it would be more humane to bomb a community than keep people in a state of suspense until they cracked.

Harbour Deep had only the local road board and the merchant to fight for improved services. Distance from the capital and isolation compounded the difficulty of

\textsuperscript{63} Pollard to Smallwood, 4 September 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{64} Pittman to Ed Roberts, 11 February 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 2.01.022, ACS, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{65} Mrs. Philip Cassell to Roberts, 21 October 1967. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 3.01.010. ASC, Memorial University.
attracting the attention of government officials and non-governmental agencies. The welfare officer made only infrequent visits during the shipping season. Isolated communities looked to the local merchant, who was their chief contact with the outside world, for leadership. The Anglican priest, whose headquarters was 40 miles distant by water, visited infrequently. He did not engage in political action like the rector at Burgeo, but was concerned over the consequences of building a new school in a place with an uncertain lifespan.

When a clergyman did intervene he caused an uproar. Pastor Booth Reid persuaded the Department of Community and Social Development officials that Great Harbour Deep was ready to relocate and to send a petition and applications for assistance. Reid convinced C&SD he could accommodate all households of the Harbour Deep at Bide Arm. Householders, who had expressed no interest in resettlement, demanded an explanation. Samuel Cassell objected strongly to an “outsider” meddling in their affairs. He assured Roberts that residents were capable of running their own affairs and challenged the notion Harbour Deep was a declining community. Young families were building homes, school enrollment was increasing and the people were satisfied with the level of medical services. What Harbour Deep needed were improved roads and communications. He neglected to mention that youth who left to get post-secondary training seldom returned.


67 It is perhaps of some import that Booth Reid, a pastor of the Apostolic faith, intervened in the affairs of an all Anglican community. They may have seen his intrusion as an effort to not only recruit settlers for Bide Arm but also new converts.
Chesley Pittman also accused government of sending Reid to engineer the relocation of Harbour Deep to Bide Arm.\(^6^8\) Pittman alleged that Reid had informed a “certain party” that 90% of Harbour Deep was in favour of moving. He informed Roberts: “If government intends to root us out, or ask us to move, some responsible person should be sent here to outline what the government has in mind.”\(^6^9\) Roberts denied there was any plan to evacuate Harbour Deep, but suggested assistance was available if a family wanted to move. He vowed to fight any government or person who tried to force them out.\(^7^0\) The MHA, who had served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Premier and was then Minister of Health, reminded Pittman that government had recently installed diesel generators. He restated his commitment to building a road to Hawke’s Bay and considered the debacle to be a “misunderstanding” that arose from a meeting between the Apostolic Faith pastor and C&SD to discuss the relocation of Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm.

Harbour Deep took pride in the number of youth who went on to post-secondary institutions. Unfortunately, few of them returned to staff schools or nursing stations.\(^7^1\) But the youth who stayed continued to exploit the resources of the land and sea, get married, build homes, and raise families. They believed that if government built forest access roads, upgraded communications, and modernized the inshore fishery, Great

\(^6^8\)Chesley Pittman to Ed Roberts, 21 March 1969. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 78, File 3.01.022, ASC, Memorial University.

\(^6^9\)Pittman to Roberts, 21 March 1969. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 78, File 3.01.022, ASC, Memorial University.

\(^7^0\)Ed Roberts to Hedley Pollard, 26 March 1969. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, File 4.01.014. ASC, Memorial University.

\(^7^1\)Ed Roberts in conversation with the author, April 2010. Ches Pittman’s daughter was a registered nurse. Pittman told Roberts he did not educate her “to come back here to work.”
Harbour Deep could prosper. There was plenty of timber available and the people had the skills to build larger vessels. The principal pointed out the accomplishments of school graduates and suggested these young men and women would be building up the economy at home if they had opportunity to stay. He advised Smallwood that the town had a greater potential for economic growth than any community of similar size. Duncan introduced the notion of establishing Great Harbour Deep as a service centre for longliners. He alleged a fish storage unit could enhance an already good cod and salmon fishery and give impetus to the development of a crab and herring fishery. Duncan also proposed relocating the Williamsport whaling station to the port. The school principal conceded optimism alone was not sufficient to keep the community alive and households knew survival depended on development of forest resources, a road link to Hawke’s Bay, and improved communication services. In 1971 Roberts presented a petition to the House of Assembly for installation of a dial telephone service. The petitioners believed that a dial service would ease isolation and improve employment opportunities to keep youth in the community. The people of Harbour Deep challenged the ideology of rural development agencies that considered centralization as the only solution to rural poverty. The citizens of Harbour Deep survived the FHRP, but decided to relocate in 2002 when the province introduced a new resettlement plan.

Paradise Sound: Petite Forte, South East Bight and Monkstown

While the FHRP resettled most isolated communities in Placentia West in just two years, communities of Paradise Sound resisted. In 1972 Petite Forte, Southeast Bight, and

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Monkstown were the only communities without roads that were occupied year-round. Altogether thirty communities resettled between 1965 and 1970.\textsuperscript{73} When rumours spread throughout Placentia Bay that government was going to resettle isolated settlements, communities that had never considered relocating disappeared within a few months.\textsuperscript{74} The surviving communities lived in the grip of uncertainty, afraid to build a new home, repair the existing one, or repair a fence.\textsuperscript{75} Although Petite Forte, Southeast Bight, and Monkstown were on the Newfoundland mainland they were separated from the Burin highway by 20 kilometres of rugged terrain. The highway, which follows the spine of the Burin Peninsula, was not conveniently located to serve the outports of Fortune or Placentia Bays. Commission Government wanted to connect the largest towns to the provincial highway system at the lowest cost so the road by-passed coastal communities on either side. A motorist today can drive a distance of over 100 kilometres from Swift Current to Marystown without passing through a single community. The province responded to demands for branch roads, improved communications and electrification by encouraging people to relocate to growth poles.

\textsuperscript{73}Harnum to Jamieson, 1 March 1972. GN39/1, S148, PANL.
The ideology of the MHA sometimes determined the fate of coastal communities. Placentia West MHA, Patrick J. Canning, favoured resettling all of the islands and isolated communities of his constituency. “Constituents considered Canning to be a weak representative, but continued to elect him because he was “Joey’s man.” Dissatisfied” alleged Canning told the people of Paradise: “You will never get a road to this God-forsaken place,” and Canning advised them that government policy prohibited constructing roads to communities with fewer than 50 households.76 James Dray, Secretary of the Fishermen’s Local of Little Paradise, informed Smallwood that rumours were circulating that the people of “this section of the Bay are going to be shifted to some other part of the province, and that economic sanctions will be imposed on them.”77 Due to the prevalence of rumours, some householders stopped improving their property. When Public Works delayed wharf repairs, disappointed residents lamented “no work will be done here, as the people are all leaving here.” Dray asked the Premier to bring an end to speculation and rumour.

Canning contributed to the uncertainty by refusing to encourage government to build roads to the isolated communities in Placentia West. He asked the Minister of Highways to slow the construction of a bridge across Bay de l’Eau River as a tactic to encourage the evacuation of St. Joseph’s and Little Harbour.78 Canning hoped that all the people in this general area would be swept up in the centralization programme and moved

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76 Dissatisfied to J. R. Smallwood, 1 December 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.30.024, Memorial University.
77 James J. Dray to Smallwood, 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.30.023, ASC, Memorial University.
78 Eric Jones to Ed Roberts, Parliamentary Assistant to the Premier, 3 October 1966. Coll 075, File 1.30.024, ASC, Memorial University.
to the Marystown area. He predicted that in a few years all the little settlements would be emptied.\textsuperscript{79} Rev. W. P. Collins alleged that the absence of roads to Davis Cove and Petite Forte was forcing people of the region to move elsewhere without guarantee of a job.\textsuperscript{80} Collins suggested a road connection would make communities more viable and attract settlers to them. However, in some instances roads in became roads out, but Canning denied them that option.

One could argue that the completion of the Burin Highway increased the sense of isolation in Placentia West. Construction of a branch road to one community fomented discontent in neighbouring settlements. Collins claimed government contributed to the agitated state by circulating a map showing a road to Presque Arm, Monkstown, and other communities.\textsuperscript{81} Election propaganda raised false hopes and when promised roads did not materialize the people felt abandoned and betrayed. Increased demands for roads and other services contributed to the decision to move people to public services. No doubt the per capita costs of a road to the Davis Cove-Monkstown area and Petite Forte would be excessive. Assuming a population of 1,000, including Isle au Valen and Merasheen, the cost per family would be $7,000 or a total cost of $1.7 million. The average cost of moving households under the resettlement program was $2,200 and the provinces share of that amount was about $700. Smallwood informed Collins that it was more feasible to encourage people to take advantage of a federally funded program to move people, of their

\textsuperscript{79} Canning to Harnum, 16 November 1965. GN39/1, Box 127, File S95, PANL.
\textsuperscript{80} Rev. W. P. Collins to Harnum, 23 November 1965. GN39/1, Box 127, File S95, PANL. Copy of telegram in J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 130.023, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{81} Collins to Smallwood, 5 July 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 130.023, ASC, Memorial University.
own volition, to the services. Consequently 90 percent of the communities of Placentia West relocated, but not always to centres with better services or employment opportunities. High unemployment rates in the growth centres on the isthmus ensured evacuated communities were never completely abandoned. Some fishers returned the year following resettlement and were still present when the author visited Port Anne and Oderin in 2010.

In 1967 two C&SD field workers surveyed 15 Placentia Bay settlements to determine if they were viable communities and to assess their reaction to the resettlement program. Lance C. Shirley and Donald W. Burry investigated problems arising from resettlement and attempted to establish a closer liaison between the government departments and the outports with respect to resettlement. Burry and Shirley interviewed householders, school teachers, and merchants in all 15 communities. They gathered data on population, number of schools, school enrollment, number of pre-school children, and quintals of salt fish produced. Burry and Shirley also compiled information on transportation and communications services and port facilities.

In Monkstown they visited thirty-four householders, 90 percent of whom were opposed to resettlement. Only two families had relocated prior to May 1967. It was a stable community with an unusually diverse economy. Only half of adult males were fishermen, the remainder were employed in lumbering and boatbuilding. No one wished to

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82 Smallwood to Collins, 13, July, 1965. Coll 075, File 130.024, J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 130.023, ASC, Memorial University.
83 D. W. Burry and L. C. Shirley, “Placentia Bay Study (1967).” GN39/1, Box 127, File S83, PANL.
84 D. W. Burry and L. C. Shirley, “Placentia Bay Study (1967).” Appendix, Table 1. GN39/1, Box 127, File S83, PANL.
leave despite not being a port of call for the CNR coastal boat and reliance on mail service via Davis Cove, a community contemplating evacuation. They hoped to persuade the CNR to make Monkstown a port of call if Davis Cove resettled. The possible reduction of services did not shake community morale. Shirley and Burry recognized the potential for further development of fisheries, logging, and tourism in Paradise Sound. They advised the Resettlement Division that the lobster, salmon and cod fisheries could be expanded and pointed out the possibility for developing sports fishing. With two large salmon rivers and schools of tuna in Paradise Sound, and a profusion of wildlife in the area, Monkstown could be marketed as a prime destination for sports fishing and hunting. If the proposed paper mill for Come By Chance became a reality then local stands of timber could be harvested and sold for pulpwood. Although the Shirley and Burry exuded optimism over the potential of this community, they remained convinced it could not survive without a road.

The Salvation Army Officer at Monkstown took a more optimistic view.\(^{85}\) The pastor also highlighted the tourist potential of Paradise Sound and asked government to build a road and approve Monkstown as a growth point for nearby communities. He described the torturous trip to Come By Chance hospital. Patients first travelled over a rough road to Davis Cove, then took the coastal boat to Argentia and completed the journey by taxi. In addition to being circuitous, the journey was expensive.\(^{86}\) Lieutenant Hiscock asked for a crude gravel road but Smallwood explained that a gravel road was

\(^{85}\) Lorne Hiscock to Smallwood, 9 November 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.30.023, ASC, Memorial University.

\(^{86}\) 1965 Fisheries Statistics in Burry and Shirley, “Placentia Bay Study (1967),” Appendix. GN39/1, File S83, PANL.
cost prohibitive and the residents of Monkstown and Davis Cove should not expect a road.  

The women of Monkstown dismissed Premier’s dictum. Women joined in the fight for better services and economic development. Hattie and Laura May invited Smallwood to visit Monkstown so he could see the resources and hear firsthand reasons why Monkstown was a place with potential for growth. The Mays repeated the Salvation Officer’s arguments against resettlement and his proposals for development, and added that faithful support of the Liberal Party had left them living like people did in 1930 with kerosene lamps and horse and slide. The women drew attention to the unfairness of a government that installed three diesel generators at Port Elizabeth while Monkstown received none. They sharply criticized their MHA and asked the Premier to fire Canning, who won every election from 1949-71, for incompetence. They assured the Premier of their continued support, but informed him they had no faith in Canning. With no other representative to turn to, Monkstown asked Canning to present their petition for electricity and a road.

The activities of the Mays demonstrated that women in small, remote locations engaged in political action in 1960s. A letter written by Mrs. W. Butler confirms women’s involvement in the political affairs of Monkstown extended beyond the May sisters. In 1969 Butler warned Smallwood that the householders of Monkstown were committed to

87 Smallwood to Hiscock, 23 November 1965. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.30.023, ASC, Memorial University.
staying.\textsuperscript{89} Reports identifying health risks in some growth centres had received widespread publicity and Butler was aware of them. Butler said Monkstown was a healthy place where there was not one reported case of tuberculosis. She advised the Premier that families lived in good quality homes equipped with electricity, water and sewer systems. They were satisfied with the school and teachers, and the two stores that supplied all the groceries and clothing they needed. Butler again highlighted the potential for turning Monkstown into an important tourist destination if it had a road connection to the provincial grid. Like so many other letters from outport people to Smallwood, Butler’s ended with a promise to continue to vote for the Liberal Party.

Monkstown women took leadership and acted as spokespersons for the community. Men led the fight to save Fogo Island and Harbour Deep, but in Monkstown women were at the centre of the struggle. They stepped outside boundaries that confined them to the private domestic sphere to circulate petitions and write letter demanding political leaders provide the necessary infrastructure to enhance the economic viability of Monkstown and the welfare of its industrious citizens. When Frank Moores promised to bring services to isolated communities, the voters of Placentia West elected Leo Barry, the candidate who promised Monkstown a road. By 1975 a branch road to Monkstown was completed, and the community was connected to the provincial electrical grid, which was later extended 12 kilometres to South East Bight.

South East Bight showed some signs of decline in the 1960s. Population increased from 90 to 112 between 1961 and 1967 but the number of inshore fishers decreased from

\textsuperscript{89}Mrs. W. Butler to Smallwood, 6 June 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.30.024, ASC, Memorial University.
15 to 12 in the same period. In contrast to Monkstown, only three persons were employed in non-fishing occupations.\textsuperscript{90} Despite problems in the inshore fishery only one household moved out during the period. Thirty-two children were enrolled in the two one-room schools, one of which doubled as a chapel. Nearly half the population was under sixteen years old and one-third of householders were disabled or retired, but there were several industrious young fishing families to anchor the community. South East Bight had a post office, a CNT office, mobile telephone, and was a port of call for the CNR coastal boat. Two merchants operated two small grocery stores. With these services in place resettlement was a hard sell.

Father P. J. Lewis believed South East Bight was unlikely to get larger, but felt it would not resettle because “there are some good fishermen and some young fishermen who will be harder to convince they should leave because they are fairly independent.”\textsuperscript{91} Carmelita McGrath, who conducted a questionnaire-interview study of the economic lives of the women in South East Bight in the 1990s, quoted an elderly woman who recalled a visit from Father Lewis:

They were all going out except for a few. Even the priest came to the door one day and said to me, “Oh, you’ll leave too. When the old rooster goes, the old hen will follow.” And I said, “Well this is one old hen that’s staying.” Now my husband he was inclined to go along with them [government officials] and leave, but I talked him out of it.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{90}Burry and Shirley, “The Placentia Bay Study,” 17. GN39/1, File S148, PANL.
\textsuperscript{91}Rev. P. J. Lewis to Ross Young, NFDA, GN39/1, File S148, PANL.
Women not only convinced husbands to stay, but also played a key role in keeping the community alive. They organized committees whose greatest achievement was to convince the provincial government to connect the community to the provincial power grid. They succeeded in keeping the school open and persuaded government to install a telephone service. When the established merchants left new stores opened, and some families who had left drifted back after discovering that government’s promise of a better life had little substance.\textsuperscript{93} When the local resettlement committee circulated a petition in 1967 only eight householders signed. The families who favoured resettlement had 35 children in total while there were 19 in the opposing households.\textsuperscript{94} Burry and Shirley advised Sametz it would be advisable to approve South East Bight for resettlement because the two teachers were leaving. In their opinion the community would not have any teachers in September.

The experience of William Goldsworthy likely discouraged some from relocating. Goldsworthy, who moved to Freshwater, Placentia purchased a house on which the vendor owed taxes. The town council refused to issue a permit to occupy until the outstanding taxes were paid. Unable to pay the tax bill and with no means to force the previous owner to pay, Goldsworthy found himself homeless. A bad situation was made worse when he heard his neighbours planned to petition council to banish him from the community.\textsuperscript{95} Goldsworthy returned to South East Bight where Burry and Shirley found him living in “dire circumstances, in a dilapidated shack covered with bags and boughs.”\textsuperscript{96} When this

\textsuperscript{93} McGrath, “Women’s Economic Lives,” 312.
\textsuperscript{94} Burry and Shirley, “The Placentia Bay Study,” 18. GN39/1, File S148, PANL.
\textsuperscript{95} Burry and Shirley, “Placentia Bay Study” GN39/1, File S148, PANL.
\textsuperscript{96} Notes on South East Bight, GN39/1, File S148, PANL.
story circulated throughout Paradise Sound, it must have discouraged others from resettling to an allegedly hostile place. Despite reports that resettlement was not living up to its promises some households moved out of the region. But others moved from nearby settlements to South East Bight and some former residents returned to give the settlement renewed life.

Petite Forte, situated at the mouth of Paradise Sound, approximately twenty kilometres from Monkstown, is the terminus for the South East Bight Ferry. Rev. P. J. Lewis described Petite Forte as a proud community, but added that, since it had no hope of ever getting a road, it was destined to die.97 Leslie Harris, a president of Memorial University and native of St. Joseph’s, Placentia Bay, noted that Petite Forte was “distinctive for its entrepreneurial spirit” and a higher than average number of fishermen owned schooners.98 J. H. Robbins, Division of Resettlement, who considered Petite Forte “ahead of most communities in the area,” reported the fishing premises and homes were in a good state of repair.99 During his visit, Robbins outlined the policy of resettlement and left behind all the necessary documents. Robbins felt there was definite interest in resettlement, but the people were undecided on where to go. Concern over cost and availability of housing in Marystown dampened interest in that growth centre, but residents of Petite Forte sent delegations to Marystown and Trepassey to investigate availability of land and inshore fishing facilities. Etchegary was keen to attract new fishers as well as plant workers to Trepassey. Robbins suggested that only after the households

97P. J. Lewis to Ross Young, 6 April 1965. GN39/1, Box 127, File S56, PANL.
99J. H. Robbins to Harnum, 7 December 1965. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
were convinced government would never build a road link or extend electricity and telephone services would householders vote to resettle.\textsuperscript{100}

Patrick Canning wished to relocate Petite Forte households to Marystown which, by this time, had all the modern amenities and services Petite Forte residents were demanding. During a radio interview Canning commented that he had promised Petite Forte nothing during the election, and now that he was re-elected, he would do nothing for them.\textsuperscript{101} During the 1966 election campaign he told the community that they would not get electricity, telephones, water, roads or teachers.\textsuperscript{102} The MHA contended a road was not feasible due to the rough terrain, and it certainly is rugged. Residents asked for an engineering survey to get a cost estimate. They suggested that a road would turn Petite Forte into a service centre for Port Anne, South East Bight, Little Paradise, and Great Paradise. The residents wanted development, not resettlement. Robbins admitted that if Petite Forte had a community stage, a bait depot and a road connection other communities might be interested in moving there.\textsuperscript{103}

In 1968 a counselling team consisting of representatives from C&SD, Canada Manpower, and Atlantic Fish Processors, visited Petite Forte, St. Joseph’s and South East Bight to recruit workers for the Marystown plant. The team left the community convinced the households had no desire to resettle, but surmised residents would soon succumb to the lure of modernity. The visiting team based its conclusion on two developments. First, the

\textsuperscript{100} Robbins to Harnum, 7 December 1965. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
\textsuperscript{101} Earl Hickey, Gerald Hann, William Pearson and James A. Flynn to Smallwood, 13 September 1966. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 1.30.024. ASC, PANL.
\textsuperscript{103} Robbins to Harnum, 7 December 1965. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
main merchant and supplier, James Flynn, had purchased premises at Placentia and intended to move there by fall, and secondly, the resignation of the two teachers left the future of the school uncertain. The recruiting team felt the government should make a concerted effort to persuade householders to move to a major fisheries growth centres of the Burin Peninsula, preferably Marystown.\textsuperscript{104} The province had made a commitment to Atlantic Fish to supply the Mortier Bay plant with a large stable workforce.

Harnum asked Gerald Barry, a resident of Petite Forte, to make a list of householders who had resettled along with a list of those who wished to resettle. Barry listed 28 families who had either moved or were contemplating moving.\textsuperscript{105} But when Barry circulated a petition, only 10 householders signed and most of them were living elsewhere. These resettled families had a financial stake in the outcome. The maximum lot supplementary grant households from a non-petitioning outport could qualify for was $1,000. If Petite Forte petitioned to resettle, all households moving to fisheries growth centres would be eligible for lot supplementaries to a limit of $3,000. Harnum occasionally advised those who had made individual moves to let family and former neighbours know that by refusing to sign they were possibly penalizing them. One can safely assume that these reminders generated dissension within families and placed the residual population under duress.

The departure of the merchant sometimes triggered community evacuations. Bar Haven and Spencer’s Cove are two examples where people followed the merchants

\textsuperscript{104}Memo Re: Visit to Petite Forte, 26 July 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
\textsuperscript{105}Gerald Barry to Harnum, 19 September 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
Wadman and Wareham to Southern Harbour and Arnold’s Cove. Flynn’s forthcoming move to Placentia gave the resettlement director encouragement the fishers of Petite Forte would follow their example. But instead of leaving the fishers found a new supplier in Port Elizabeth. Harnum informed Flynn that when the householders who wished to move were combined with those who had moved the total was nearing 80 percent. The Director asked Flynn to submit detailed information on the householders who opposed evacuation. He wanted name and occupation of household heads, number in the family, and age structure of the families. Presumably, he was preparing a case to take to the minister. If community resistance could not be worn down through repeated petitioning, then he was prepared to ask the minister to use powers accorded to him by the Resettlement Agreement.

Spring 1969 Harnum informed Donald Burry, the RDO at Marystown, that FHRC approval of 18 individual household moves to Marystown brought the number moved and desiring to move to 70 percent. He wrote: “it would seem that the time is ripe for the community to become designated and we further think it is advisable that you visit with a view to having a petition completed.” He instructed Burry to make sure the people understood that their refusal to sign could result in a lower supplementary grant for resettled households.

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107 Harnum to James A. Flynn, 2 October 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, The Rooms.
108 Section 3(d) of the Resettlement Agreement (1965) states in part: “In cases where the ninety percent requirement is, in the view of the [Fisheries Household Resettlement] Committee, impractical imposes unfair or prejudicial treatment of the householders concerned, the petition shall be listed for discretionary consideration by the Province.”
109 Harnum to Don Burry, RDO Marystown, 22 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
110 Harnum to Burry, 22 May 1969. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.
While Harnum strongly supported evacuation of Petite Forte, Newfoundland’s representative in the national cabinet was not convinced. Don Jamieson contacted the Minister of C&SD, on behalf of his constituents in Petite Forte, to request electrification. Bill Rowe informed Jamieson that the population had dwindled from 183 in 1965 to 41 in 1971 and was 60% evacuated. The carrot and stick approach that governments had used to evacuate the 29 communities of Placentia Bay failed to persuade the householders to leave, but left it more vulnerable. The MHA’s allegations that they would never get a road link, electricity or telephone service were harmful, but not fatal. People were there to welcome former residents when they returned to fish old grounds.

Peter Gard, a Canadian Geographic journalist, reported that those who stayed did as well as those who moved. Gard contended that if resettlement officials had listened to dissenting voices, they would not have reduced fewer communities to seasonal fish camps. Earl Hickey, who relocated to Southern Harbour, returned to Petite Forte each year to fish because the promise of the good life and better employment opportunities never materialized. He told an Equinox reporter that he left because “they were saying the coastal boat was going to be taken. They were going to take the school, we’d be left with nothing. They were more or less driving you out.” Petite Forte, South East Bight and Monkstown survived because they refused to be worn down by Harnum, Smallwood or Canning. The three settlements of Paradise Sound insisted on their right to modern services in the place in which they resided. South East Bight did not get a road, but it has a

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111W. N. Rowe to Don Jamieson, 17 August 1971. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL.  
ferry and a connection to the hydro grid. When I visited the community in 2013 there were longliners moored to a large public wharf and smaller craft tied to a floating dock and homes were connected to the provincial power grid and telephone network. Local roads were paved with concrete to accommodate all terrain vehicles.

In 1972 Premier Frank Moores introduced rural development initiatives. When the Placentia West Development Association came into existence, Petite Forte became a chartered member. The Association built a community stage, a wharf and a medical clinic at Petite Forte. Community spirit survived. Residents began to build houses and repair property. The population increased from a low of 41 in 1971 to 120 year-round residents in 1982. In 1977 government installed three diesel generators and in 1980 telephone service was extended to the community. According to the criteria set out in J. H. Robbins 1965 report, all that Petite Forte needed to qualify as a growth centre was a road link to the Burin Highway. Today a motorist can traverse a paved road to Petite Forte and catch a ferry ride to South East Bight.

Point Lance

Politicians frequently injected themselves in resettlement debates. The federal MP for St. John’s West targeted Point Lance, a St. Mary’s Bay community with a population of 135. Resettlement was a non-issue until Richard Cashin decided to invest several million dollars in harbour development in St. Bride’s, a Cape Shore settlement. Cashin wished to boost the population of St. Bride’s to head off criticism of the project. In December 1964, when the FHRP was still in the discussion phase, Cashin asked

Smallwood to use the provincial centralization program to move households from Point Lance into St. Bride’s to demonstrate that St. Bride’s had the capacity to become a growth centre for the Cape Shore and St. Mary’s Bay. Cashin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Fisheries Minister H. J. Robichaud, was convinced the people of Point Lance, a port with a good beach but no harbour, would be better off at St Bride’s where there was a fish plant.\textsuperscript{115} He felt Point Lance met all the criteria of a declining community, and entreated Smallwood to undermine the marginal community by assisting individual household moves. Cashin volunteered to go to Point Lance to persuade all householders it was in their best interests to move. He assured Smallwood that he was prepared to use his political influence to the fullest possible extent to evacuate the village.”\textsuperscript{116}

In February, Newfoundland Deputy Minister of Fisheries, E. M. Gosse, advised Cashin that his representation on behalf of Point Lance had been favourably received by the joint Resettlement Committee, but residents did not share the Committee’s opinion.\textsuperscript{117} The regional development officer, R. Loder, attended a public meeting in Point Lance and concluded that there was little interest in resettlement.\textsuperscript{118} Nonetheless four families were assisted to relocate to St. Bride’s. According to John Mannion, Point Lance householders’ attitude toward plant work was that it was a low paying, demeaning occupation fit only for women and children. Accustomed to working on shore and inshore activities they expressed no interest in switching to deep-sea trawlers.\textsuperscript{119} A second public meeting called by Loder and attended by Harnum confirmed that the majority opposed relocation.

\textsuperscript{115} Cashin to Smallwood, 4 December 1964. GN39/1, Box 126, File S44, The Rooms.
\textsuperscript{116} Cashin to Smallwood, 4 December 1964. GN39/1, Box 126, File S44, PANL.
\textsuperscript{117} E. M. Gosse to Cashin, 22 February 1965. GN39/1, Box 126, File S44, PANL.
\textsuperscript{118} Loder to Benedict Careen, 22 November 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S44, PANL.
\textsuperscript{119} Mannion, \textit{Point Lance in Transition}, 52.
Householders who were interested indicated they would not resettle unless everyone left.\textsuperscript{120}

The meeting demonstrated how divisive the resettlement issue could be. In Point Lance it divided the community and families.\textsuperscript{121} One man said he was willing to move, but his wife declared she would not be leaving her home under any circumstances. The wife of the mail carrier, Richard Careen, said she was willing to go, but Richard was dead set against it. A 48 year old fish plant worker with fourteen children said he wished to move to a centre where his sons would find employment. The 62 year old merchant - patriarch of Point Lance stood four-square against moving. Joseph Careen owned the grocery store, the school bus and the trucks used to transport fish to the plant at St. Bride’s. Careen stood to lose his livelihood and all capital invested in real property and transportation equipment. Loder was convinced that if merchant agreed to resettle, 90 percent of the families would go with him, but until he agreed to go the community would die a slow death.

When the author visited Point Lance in 2012, it had the earmarks of a modern, prosperous settlement. The community boasted comfortable well-kept houses, a new community centre, and a large church wherein a wedding was in progress. The fishers overcame the restrictions of a poor harbour by beaching smaller vessels and mooring longliners at St. Bride’s. In 1969 outsiders owned half the vessels fishing out of St.

\textsuperscript{120}Loder, RDO, to Harnum, Re: Point Lance St. Mary’s Bay, 19 December 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S44, PANL.
\textsuperscript{121}Loder, RDO, to Harnum, Re: Point Lance St. Mary’s Bay, 19 December 1968. GN39/1, Box 126, File S44, PANL.
Bride’s.  Most non-resident boat owners lived in Placentia or Point Lance, but fishers from Placentia West also used the port and landed catches at the fish plant.

Joseph Careen was undoubtedly a key actor in the drama, but the other householders played a part. One should not underestimate their attachment to comfortable mortgage-free homes and a slower pace of life. Home ownership was a form of security in a society that balanced market and subsistence activities. As elsewhere, resettlement created tensions between generations and within households. In *Point Lance in Transition* Mannion observed the older generation had an antipathy towards deep-sea fishing and fish plant work while the younger cohort had no interest in participating in the industrial offshore sector or the pluralistic economy. They were not interested in occupations that offered long work days and uncertain returns. When they graduate from high school they follow a well-trod path to the city. In the words of Mrs. Careen “As soon as the finish school, they’re gone.”

**Conclusion**

The communities of Fogo Island, Harbour Deep, Paradise Sound, and Point Lance survived by using a variety of strategies. Few places faced a bleaker future than Fogo Island. The Labrador fishery, on which the island communities were so dependent, came to an end in the mid-1950s. A decade later Earle Brothers, who supplied fishers, and bought and marketed their production, wound up their business and Fishery Products abandoned government-owned plants at Seldom and Joe Batt’s Arm. Fogo Island was a

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123 Mrs. Careen in conversation with author, spring 2011.
community in decline that refused to surrender to adversity. When offered a choice between resettlement and development, Fogo Islanders created a rural development model that melded local knowledge with outside expertise. The National Film Board, Memorial University Extension Services, and the Fogo Island Improvement Committee initiated a program of development which caught the attention of government and non-governmental agencies around the world. The Fogo Experiment, as it is known, broke down community barriers and enabled residents to conceptualize the Island as a single community, ready to take on projects normally left to companies with deep pockets. The new sense of community that came out of the experiment broke through intra-community rivalries and opened up new possibilities for consolidating social services. A non-denominational regional high school and a hospital were constructed in a central location. Improved transportation and telecommunications overcame geography. Through co-operative action and self-help, Fogo Islanders created a new framework of rural development and fended off resettlement.

Harbour Deep was more remote and lacked the political influence of Fogo Island, but its industrious population was just as determined to survive as a community. When resettlement documents arrived in the community, it aroused the ire of all. Letters of protest flooded into Confederation Building. The signatories asked their elected representatives for an explanation. They persuaded Roberts to publicly confirm that government did not plan to resettle them, and residents, in turn, informed Roberts they had no intention of leaving. Like Fogo Island and other places, Harbour Deep chose development over stagnation or evacuation. They demanded roads to resources and a road connection to the provincial highway system. Community leaders implored government to
assist development of land and marine resources. They argued that Harbour Deep had
greater potential for development than Englee, the nearest designated growth centre. They
persevered because the residents took a united stance against outside interference.
Residents refused to abandon large comfortable homes until 2002 when the province
offered a more lucrative resettlement package.

The MHA for White Bay North was less bullish on centralization than Canning.
Roberts assured his constituents that government had no plan to evacuate Harbour Deep
unless the people wished to leave. The MHA for Placentia West, on the other hand,
offered no such assurances to his constituents. During the 1966 election campaign
Canning announced that the communities of Petite Forte, Monkstown, South East Bight,
and other places without a road, should not expect improved communication or
transportation services. The people of Paradise Sound refused to heed the warnings of an
unpopular, yet oft elected, politician. The women and men of Monkstown wrote letters
circulated petitions, and participated in public meetings to preserve the communities. In
South East Bight, the woman of the house told her priest not only had she decided to stay
but also had converted her husband. The actions of these women refute the thesis that
mothers were the strongest advocates of resettlement. Petite Forte rebuffed Harnum’s
attempts to wear them down by circulating multiple petitions, rejected the overtures of
plant executives and senior bureaucrats and defied their MHA. The communities of
Paradise Sound made it clear that a road, telephone service, and electricity were the only
acceptable prescriptions for isolation and underemployment. The ability to stand together
as a community and present a common front was key to community survival. When
community integrity collapsed, evacuation soon followed.
Chapter VIII

Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour: A Contest of Wills

Introduction

Critics of resettlement insist that ruthless bureaucrats and politicians forced families into reception centres. The examples in the previous chapter, and the case of Port Elizabeth, demonstrate how resettlers resisted relocation. The Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour move is a prime example of the inability of state planners to direct labour from the inshore sector to the offshore. Port Elizabethans, with the support of the main merchant, pressured the federal and provincial ministers of the crown to reopen an evacuated community. When the planners named the new community Riverview the relocatees refused to accept it. Regardless of the reason for attempting to rename the new community, the fact remains that the residents of Port Elizabeth not only forced provincial and national governments to create a new reception centre, but also coerced them into creating a new community on the site of an evacuated outport.¹

Offers of supplementary assistance and the promises of employment and educational opportunities enticed young families to one of the industrial fisheries bases, but the older fishers, many of whom had little formal education, with sizeable capital investments in the shore fishery, refused to abandon fishing gear and vessels. The younger, more educated cohort was better prepared to compete in the industrial labour

¹Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm bears some similarity. The Household Resettlement Committee approved the construction of a new town to receive resettlers of Hooping Harbour and nearby communities. See Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078, Files 4.01.001, 5.01.001, and 6.01.001, Bide Arm, 1969-71, ASC, Memorial University. See also Coll 078, Files 2.01.025, 4.01.015, and 5.01.012, Memorial University. Red Harbour was the only resettled community reopened by the FHRC.
market. Doubtful of the benefits of resettling to Marystown, Burin, Grand Bank or Fortune, the majority of householders petitioned to move to a place where they could live out their days as independent fishers in the company of kin. Port Elizabethans fought against becoming just another dispersed community in a growth centre wherein the sense of community and culture could not be reconstructed.

In order to preserve their community in another place, the families challenged the principal goal of the FHRP and the Evacuated Outports Act (1961) which prohibited the reoccupation of abandoned outports. They overcame the opposition of bureaucrats and political leaders who could cite statutes to justify their actions. Port Elizabethans were willing to forego lot supplementaries and the comfort of entering a community with established schools and churches. They demonstrated a determination, unmatched in the annals of resettlement, to remain independent producers and avoid the victimization that marred resettlement. The move from Davis Island to Red Harbour, a distance of three miles, is a prime example of the difficulties resettlement planners faced when they attempted to direct people into industrial fisheries bases. A core of 45 inshore fishing households repulsed bureaucratic efforts to disperse them into the major towns of the Burin Peninsula where their production would be closely monitored by corporate managers. They turned down promises of guaranteed employment and dismissed the warnings of government agents and cabinet ministers that they were about to exchange a life on an island equipped with many modern amenities and services for a sub-standard existence in an abandoned community.
Port Elizabethans Resettle Themselves

Port Elizabeth belies the theme of persecution that haunts the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. The narrative in which a helpless rural population were forced from their homes by politicians and bureaucrats, gained traction in the 1960s and became hegemonic through media, the arts community and academic works. A series of community ethnographic studies conducted by graduate students and published by Memorial University’s Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) were very critical of the Household Resettlement Program. These sociological and economic studies, especially the Iverson - Matthews report, fuelled media attacks on resettlement that rose to a frenzy in 1968. Both the academics and the media reserved their harshest criticism for the growth centres wherein families, crowded into subdivisions, risked death by disease and/or fire as they descended into dependence.

Accounts of appalling conditions in Arnold’s Cove, Southern Harbour and Rushoon strengthened Port Elizabethans’ resolve to avoid such traps. These reports were reinforced by householders who returned to former settlements that were rapidly becoming seasonal fish camps. Resettlement spawned a new type of migratory fishery which Port Elizabethans sought to avoid. They resolved to relocate as a viable entity to Red Harbour wherein they could have lifelong friends as neighbours and fish on familiar grounds. Red Harbour was a familiar place. In the nineteenth century, when it was customary for settlers to leave blustery headlands for the shelter of wooded valleys, Flat Islanders resorted to winter tilts on the banks of Red Harbour River. In the post-

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2See Webb, *Observing the Outports* for a discussion on the creation of ISER and how its studies influenced policy.
Confederation era it was a place to switch from skiff to motor cars when they availed of the medical and commercial services in Marystown and Burin. When Davis Islanders decided to resettle they did so without breaking with the past.

How much negative reports influenced Port Elizabethans’ decision to construct their own growth centre is a matter of conjecture, but one can assume contact with disillusioned resettlers, negative news reports and televised documentaries raised doubts about the honesty of officials who promised a better life. In 1968 when Port Elizabethans were considering resettlement, a furore arose from the release of Communities in Decline. The Iverson and Matthews report attracted the attention of other social scientists, journalists and novelists who were equally critical of the FHRP. To calm the wave of protest Smallwood appointed a second Minister of C&SD, William (Bill) Rowe. Journalists were using words like “murder,” “genocide” and “blitzkrieg” to describe the way resettlement ravaged the outports. A half century after accepting the cabinet portfolio Rowe wrote, “[resettlement] had many opponents and some St. John’s and mainland media denounc[ed] it as akin to the heinous forcing of people into concentration camps.”

The provincial Centralization Plan oversaw evacuation of 115 outports without placing any restrictions where the households could resettle. There were no designated growth poles and little evidence of coercion. Several families relocated to Port Elizabeth in the early 1960s when Fishery Products Ltd. operated a floating fresh fish plant and G&A Buffett, a Grand Bank firm, operated a salt fish plant. The two companies employed many townspeople and imported others from neighbouring communities. In peak season

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up to fifty persons lived in company bunkhouses. The future of the island seemed secure, but many Port Elizabethans still found it necessary to occasionally work off the island.\(^4\)

When catches began to decline, some sharemen who had very low capital investment in the shore fishery made permanent moves to one of the industrial towns of the Burin Peninsula. But despite the closure of the plants in the mid-1960s and the decline of the inshore fishery, the population remained fairly stable and services continued to improve.\(^5\)

The shore fishery was concentrated in a core of independent, industrious, and well-equipped fishers who showed little interest in changing occupations.\(^6\) It appeared Port Elizabeth would survive the tsunami that wiped out so many Placentia West communities. Port Elizabeth was an incorporated community with a functional council, a strong community sense and a sound commercial base. H. E. Senior & Son supplied the region’s fishermen and marketed their production. Port Elizabeth shared much in common with Merasheen, Tack’s Beach and Harbour Buffett. It had telephones, houses equipped with electrical appliances and running water, a post office and CNT office, and it was a port for call for the CNR coastal boat on the east and west run from Argentia to Burin. In addition to these services, it had a new public wharf, a three-room school and a power plant.\(^7\)

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\(^4\)Melvin Smith, “A Community Study of Port Elizabeth, Placentia Bay,” student paper presented to Keith Matthews, History Department, Memorial University, 1976. MHA, Memorial University.

\(^5\)Population of Port Elizabeth declined from 434 in 1935 to 300 in 1966. *Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth Report*, Rural and Urban Planning Division, Department of Municipal Affairs, 1968. The decrease can be attributed to the Commission Government’s land settlements scheme and to voluntary, unassisted migration of people.

\(^6\)Rev. Gerald G. Sacrey to Harnum, 19 October, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.

families possessed electric washers, electric ranges, furnaces, radios and television sets.\textsuperscript{8} Car owners parked their vehicles at Red Harbour which was a short commute from Marystown which was, by the late 1960s, a thriving commercial and industrial centre.

A Department of Municipal Affairs Report described Port Elizabeth as a relatively prosperous fishing settlement, but noted that the population had fallen from 434 in 1935 to 300 at the time of incorporation in 1962.\textsuperscript{9} The Municipal Affairs report listed the following community assets: 80 homes, a church, a three room school, a community hall, a public wharf, a community stage, and a diesel generating plant. The inshore fishery was organized around a relatively small number of prosperous, well-equipped individuals who employed sharemen from Port Elizabeth and nearby communities. At the request of the Director of Resettlement, Rev. Gerald Sacrey, the United Church pastor completed an inventory of fishing equipment together with the estimated value of each item.\textsuperscript{10} He reckoned there were 1,200 lobster pots, 400 gillnets, 40 codtraps, 1,200 trawl lines, and a large number of caplin, mackerel and herring seines. Fishers possessed a variety of vessels: seven longliners, 11 punts, 70 dories, and nine trapskiffs. Sacrey speculated that none of the boat owners, most of whom were in the 45 and 65 year age range, wished to abandon shore fishing or quit the community. Resettlement was a more attractive option for sharemen who had the least to lose in terms fishing gear, rooms and boats, but Municipal Affairs felt it was unlikely Port Elizabeth would relocate since “business people and the most substantial fishermen have banned together to ensure that the rest of the

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\textsuperscript{8}Walter Kenway, Chair Community Council, to Smallwood, 30 April, 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-075, File 1.30.027, ASC, Memorial University.
\textsuperscript{9}Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth Report. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{10}Sacrey to Harnum, 19 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
community moves as a viable unit.” Sacrey informed Harnum that if these fishers were forced to move, all the accumulated wealth would be lost, and the fishers, who had fished since childhood, were likely to drift into dependence. He confidently predicted that if the FHRC approved the move to Red Harbour transplanted Port Elizabethans would remain models of industry.

In 1969 Davis Island and Woody Island were the only permanently occupied islands in Placentia Bay and two communities were weighing their options. When the governments began to assist individual moves from non-petitioning communities to major fisheries growth centres, it weakened the sending community. The introduction of lot supplementary grants made land more affordable and the introduction of a government-owned motorized barge made movement of houses safer and more efficient. In 1968 nine Port Elizabethan families applied for assistance to relocate to Burin. Alex Hickman, whose constituency included Burin, Fortune and Grand Bank, informed Aidan Maloney Minister of C&SD and Fisheries, that while 80 percent of Port Elizabethan householders had no desire to relocate to a fisheries growth centre 40 older fishers had applied for assistance to move to Red Harbour. He advised Maloney that Willard Senior, owner of H. E. Senior, was “strenuously persuading” the people to remain on the island. The Burin MHA informed Maloney that representatives of Fishery Products Ltd. who had visited Davis Island concluded that most people favoured moving, but were reluctant to disclose it to their neighbours. To avoid social isolation householders guarded their intentions to

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11 *Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth.* GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
13 Alex Hickman to Aidan Maloney, 12 August, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
leave until plans were firmly in place. Reports that families were contemplating leaving, the loss of the hospital ship, *Lady Anderson*, and rumours of a reduction in coastal boat services created anxiety even in this stable community. Port Elizabethans who took pride in the educational success of their children began to fear the quality of education would suffer as the population declined.

It is difficult to gauge the impact of media reports describing third world conditions in Arnold’s Cove, or the comments of disgruntled resettlers who alleged the managers of the FHRP lured them into centres that offered fewer services and opportunities for work than the old community. Port Elizabethans who watched the W5 host describe the squalor and unhealthy environment in the Arnold’s Cove resettlement area, could not have been impressed by what they saw, heard and read About 50 householders, the community council, and the merchants Willard and Lottie Senior opposed resettlement into any existing growth centre. They resolved to move to Red Harbour without government approval, if necessary. Here they would continue to enjoy the comfort of kin, the company of old neighbours, and worship together as a faith community. By moving as a unit into a new community they would avoid the trauma of relocating to an unfriendly town.

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14 Memorandum From R. L. Loder Re: Community of Pass Island to K. Harnum, 31 August 1972. GN39/1, Box 128, File S197, PANL. Loder reported that people remaining in Pass Island resented those who were leaving since each departure undermined community viability. He wrote: “Because abandonment or resettlement of a family is viewed with cynicism, those remaining to date want to escape this form of social isolation and withdraw any notion of publicly announcing their intention of leaving until all plans are finalized and firm.”

They received support from Federal Transport Minister, Donald Jamieson. The Burin-Burgeo MP, prompted by letters from Willard Senior, requested resettlement grants for three families who had moved to Port Elizabeth from Red Harbour in 1965.\textsuperscript{16} Jamieson felt the community possessed most of the attributes of a growth centre. He considered Port Elizabeth too prosperous, and its fishers too productive, to be resettled to anywhere. Furthermore, the FHRC had already set a precedent when it designated Ramea, an island community, as a growth centre. Jamieson pointed to the significant government investments in the school, wharf, diesel power plants and power lines, phones, and post office to make a case for making Port Elizabeth an organized reception centre for the region. He contended that it made no sense to vacate a community in which various provincial and federal government departments had invested so much in infrastructure and services. Funding for a new bait depot for Davis Island was already approved on the strength of the character of the people and their performance in the fishery. The MP assured Harnum the proposed bait depot would help ease the minds of older fishermen who did not wish to move into the larger towns where they would experience difficulty competing for limited industrial jobs.\textsuperscript{17} Harnum remained unconvinced.

Port Elizabethans also received tacit support from Donald Burry and Lance Shirley, who undertook a study of 15 Placentia Bay communities to assess their viability. Burry and Shirley’s decision to omit Port Elizabeth from their itinerary is significant, and can be viewed as a vote of confidence. Similarly, Father Philip Lewis, who compiled a list

\textsuperscript{16}Jamieson to Harnum, 20 April 1967. The three families referred to were most likely families that had moved from Red Harbour to Port Elizabeth in 1965. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.

\textsuperscript{17}Jamieson to Harnum, 20 April, 1967. File S140, PANL.
of communities likely to resettle or which ought to be evacuated, also omitted Port Elizabeth. The reports of the priest and the two bureaucrats gave silent testimony to the economic and social viability of Davis Island. But the FHRC, which was not in the business of preserving island communities by approving them as reception centres, denied Jamieson’s request.

The Resettlement Committee, which did not share Jamieson’s positive outlook on Port Elizabeth, was prepared to write off private and public capital investments. Savings on coastal boat services, closure of post offices and the shutdown of the diesel electric generating plant would cancel out losses. No doubt they also considered the expense of providing a ferry service if CN phased out coastal boat services in Placentia Bay. Under the FHRP movement of fishing premises remained the responsibility of the owner, and C&SD was prepared to let Port Elizabethan fishing families take a $600,000 loss on vessels and equipment by moving them to Marystown. Port Elizabethans had no desire to abandon expensive gear or familiar fishing grounds. Fisheries planners who considered the traditional shore fishery to be a dying industry never factored in the economic cost arising from the abandonment of fishing grounds. The FHRC ignored the industriousness of the people and the public investments in infrastructure that made Port Elizabeth a more attractive place to live than Rushoon, Arnold’s Cove or Placentia.

The Resettlement Committee ignored the Ramea precedent and refused to designate Port Elizabeth a reception community. Ramea had a fresh fish processing plant supplied by deep-sea trawlers. Harnum seemed to see Port Elizabeth as nothing more than an outport where people clung to an archaic industry that could never produce sufficient returns to allow investors to live in comfort. The inventory of fishing gear and vessels,
which included 400 gillnets and seven longliners, indicates fishers were modernizing. Bureaucrats, who accepted the industrial fisheries model as the blueprint for improving incomes of rural Newfoundlanders, ignored the character of the people and the social vitality of communities like Port Elizabeth.

When the Resettlement Committee approved individual household moves to Burin, other households began to consider relocating. The loss of young families reduced school enrollment and bred rumours of reduced medical, transportation and communication services. Youth went off to colleges and careers outside the fishery with the blessing of parents who encouraged them to take up a career outside the fishery. The community that recently had salt and fresh fish plants competing for fish began to consider their options. Usually at this stage a field worker arrived, a public meeting was called to elect a local resettlement committee, a petition was circulated, and the inhabitants dispersed into several growth centres. The main difference here was that the majority proposed to resettle, not to one of the designated reception centres, but to an evacuated community. Port Elizabethans, who accepted resettlement as inevitable, decided that Red Harbour presented the best option and least disruption. Having fished from childhood many fishers knew no other life.

However, it would be erroneous to conclude that six householders who requested assistance to move to Burin intended to change occupations. They preferred to move to relocate their homes to a waterfront site to continue shore fishing.\(^{18}\) This fact did not diminish the desire of the MHA, municipal council or Fishery Products management to

\(^{18}\)Letter from Bert Butler, Hedley Butler, Ralph Butler, Albert Butler, and Gordon Frampton to Harnum, 19 July, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
have these families resettle to Burin. Even if the parents refused industrial jobs, there was a possibility their children might join the industrial workforce in the future. Fishery Products, anxious to solve the labour crisis, offered to donate waterfront land to receive the houses. However, the government engineer estimated cost of developing the site would be excessive. Until 80 percent of Port Elizabethans petitioned to move, householders could only qualify for a maximum supplementary grant of $1,000, making the waterfront lots, in the opinion of planners, too expensive. Yet C&SD, fearing the interested families would join the 50 households who intended to relocate to Red Harbour, rushed the six households onto more expensive lots at Black Duck Cove without knowing how much lot supplementary each would receive, or who would pay the difference if the price of a lot exceeded the supplementary grant. The town and the company had lobbied hard to recruit workers, and recognized resettlers were more likely to become plant workers and crew trawlers if government directed them into subdivisions where there was insufficient space to meet the needs of inshore fishers. The need to solve the labour crisis at Fishery Products took precedence over the needs of shore fishers.

Harnum was at least prepared to investigate the possibility of relocating houses on the site selected by the families. He asked Municipal Affairs to do a survey and an

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19 T. Alex Hickman to Aidan Maloney, “Re: Resettlement of Residents of Port Elizabeth to Burin,” 12 August 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
20 S. G. Dyke, Government Engineer, to Deputy Minister, 6 September, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, The Rooms. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
21 Harnum to Maloney, Memo Re: Burin from Port Elizabeth, n.d., GN39/1, File S5, PANL.
22 Memorandum from K. M. Harnum to File Re: Burin, N.D. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
estimate of the cost of developing the site. Sametz also appeared conciliatory when he recommended funds from C&SD’s Community Amenities Fund be used to develop waterfront lots. The minister refused. Maloney declared that the Black Duck site was the only one that should be considered, and if the Burin Municipal Council and Fishery Products wished to have the Port Elizabeth families settle in their town, they should encourage them to settle in the Black Duck Cove land assembly where they could qualify for a $3,000 supplementary when the community petitioned to move. In rather highhanded fashion he advised the town and the company “not [to] distract them with other alternatives.” He pointed out that the federal government, which paid 75 percent of the cost of assembling land, would never agree to cost-share development of a new site while lots at Black Duck remained empty. As a former manager of the fresh fish processing plant at Ramea, the minister had firsthand knowledge of the labour shortages in the plants and was anxious not to let anything distract him from the goal of transferring labour from household enterprises to the corporate fishery. While Maloney correctly predicted that Port Elizabeth was ready for the petition, he underestimated the determination of the inshore fishers to avoid major fisheries growth centres. Few predicted Port Elizabethans would convince the provincial cabinet and the Federal Fisheries Minister to approve a move to an evacuated outport in contravention of the principles of the Federal-Provincial Resettlement Agreement (1965) and in violation of the Newfoundland Evacuated Communities Act (1961).

23Harnum to H. U. Rowe, 23 August, 1968. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
24Sametz to H. U. Rowe, 26, August, 1968. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
25Maloney to Hickman, 12 September, 1968. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
The administrators of the FHRP were anxious to avoid past mistakes. The main goal was to turn fishers into plant workers or trawlermen. To counteract the householders’ disposition to choose small reception centres, Harnum recommended that the C&SD field staff ask members of the local resettlement committee to pass names of persons willing to Resettle into a major fisheries centre along to a plant manager, clergy and community leaders in the reception centre. The community leaders would then make the prospective resettlers aware of the services and opportunities available in the fisheries growth centres. Harnum proposed that it would be useful for people in leadership positions to visit the petitioning community to advise them of the employment opportunities, availability and price of land, as well as the availability and prices of consumables.26 This recommendation was put into effect, but the majority of residents of Port Elizabeth proved immune to the pleas of plant managers and town mayors.

Throughout 1968 the Resettlement Division tried to convince families to move into Burin or Marystown. Ed Nugent directed the RDO at Marystown to assemble a counselling team to visit Port Elizabeth to determine how many families might be interested in moving to a designated growth centre. The Director of Field Services asked Burry to provide all hoseholders with complete information on lot supplementaries, availability of unserviced lots outside land assemblies, and the amount of assistance each householder would receive if 80% of householders voted to move. In addition Nugent wanted Burry to remind fishers that they had a right to seasonal occupation of former

26 Memorandum From K. M. Harnum to the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, 21 February 1966. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL.
fishing rooms. Nugent’s precise instructions indicated government was aware that lack of information had caused settlers to make some poor choices.

While Burry was in the midst of canvassing Port Elizabeth, a high level meeting took place at Confederation Building. Present at the meeting were Aidan Maloney, G. A. Frecker, Alex Hickman, the mayor of Burin, the Burin plant manager, Harnum, Albert Vivian, Chair of NLHC, the NLHC manager at Marystown, and two representatives from Port Elizabeth. The ministers and bureaucrats, together with the town mayor and plant manager hoped to move the Port Elizabeth households to Burin without delay. The NLHC manager at Marystown informed the meeting that lots would be ready in two or three days, and Maloney advised Vivian that they must proceed with the move as soon as possible. The premier was advised immediately of the decision and the barge operator, when contacted, agreed to begin moving houses within a week. The move was being fast tracked although Burry’s community survey was only half complete and it was not yet known how many intended to move or to where they would settle. No one considered what would happen if less than 80% of householders voted to go or if the majority continued to insist on moving to Red Harbour. The Resettlement Agreement stipulated that until 80% agreed to move to a designated growth centre, the maximum lot supplementary was $1,000 and the Evacuated Outports Act prevented the FHRC from approving any assistance for households moving to Red Harbour. Maloney, Hickman and Frecker were willing to roll the dice in a high stakes game. They were prepared to relocate

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27Edward P. Nugent, Director of Field Services, to Don Burry, Rural Development, Marystown, “Re: Procedure on Counseling and Procuring Information in Port Elizabeth,” 19 September 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.

28Minutes of Meeting Re: Port Elizabeth, 23 September 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
families from a secure environment into the Black Duck subdivision without the homeowners knowing how much assistance they would receive or what their obligations would be. Harnum informed the meeting his department had received a petition with 36 signatures and expressed confidence that the Resettlement Committee would soon designate Port Elizabeth an evacuated outport. At that point all householders would be eligible for maximum assistance.²⁹ It was an example of what Ray Guy termed “blitzkrieg” and it produced chaos.

Despite Harnum’s assurances that the move to Black Duck Cove would go smoothly, it turned into a fiasco. The cost of the lots for the six Port Elizabeth householders exceeded the lot supplementary by $1,200 to $1,700. Sametz attempted to persuade NLHC to reduce the price per lot to match the price of lots across the street that were selling for as much as $1,500 less than the lots occupied by Port Elizabethans.³⁰ James G. Reid, Minister of Community and Social Development, asked the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Val Earle, to adjust the price of the lots to match the lot supplementary. Reid later advised the new Minister of Municipal Affairs, Brian Peckford, to explain that after five years of occupancy the families should now be eligible to receive title to their land. He asked Peckford set a price no higher than was charged for other lots in the subdivision.³¹ Reid also referred the minister to the minutes of the divisional directors’ meeting during which “a calculated risk [was] taken in telling the people from Port Elizabeth to move onto the land assembly in Burin while awaiting a petition and

²⁹ Memorandum to File From K. M. Harnum, “Re: Burin,” n. d. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
³⁰ James G. Reid, Minister of Community and Social Development, to Val Earle, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
³¹ James G. Reid to Brian Peckford, 21 October 1974. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
supplementary mortgage assistance.”

Reid stressed that the householders had acted in good faith and the government’s willingness to gamble had created the debacle which prevented Port Elizabethans from getting clear title. The lot supplementary was in reality a mortgage that was reduced by 20% per year for five years, so that after five years of uninterrupted occupancy the householder was eligible to apply for title to the land.

Sametz identified two reasons to act quickly. First, the householders in question wished to move before school opened, and secondly the labour shortage at the fish plant needed immediate resolution. His report overlooked the householders’ desire to move into a waterfront location where they could continue to prosecute the shore fishery utilizing gear that they had accumulated over a lifetime.

Minister Maloney was prepared to sacrifice individual needs when they conflicted with state policy. He claimed that the province and CMHC had invested taxpayers’ money in a land assembly at Black Duck Cove and the householders should be moved there.

Harnum also proposed that if four householders could be relocated to a Marystown subdivision, as many as 20 others would follow. Maloney suggested that the federal government would never agree to cost-sharing another land assembly at Burin until Black Duck was filled. Port Elizabethans had made their preferences clear, but their desire to continue working in a traditional fishery clashed with the goals of the FHRP. The resettlement planners believed the economic

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32 Minutes of Divisional Directors Meeting, 17 September 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
33 Sametz to Harold Rowe, 26 August 1968. GN39/1, File S5, PANL.
34 Maloney to Hickman, 12 September 1968. GN39/1, File S5, PANL.
35 Harnum to Vivian, 21 January 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
goals of the resettlement program could be achieved only if the households settled in the Black Duck subdivision without access to the waterfront.\footnote{Through personal observation, the author determined that the houses in question were located on a hill overlooking the cove. With no waterside premises and a 50'x100' lot the fishermen were barred from prosecuting the fishery from that location.} 

The rush to relocate the families to Black Duck Cove arose concern that if the families were not moved quickly, they might join the group moving to Red Harbour.\footnote{Minutes of Meeting Re: Port Elizabeth, 23 September 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} When the local committee circulated the petition, 53 of the signatories indicated they intended to relocate their homes to Red Harbour.\footnote{Petition from Householders of Port Elizabeth to the Household Resettlement Committee, 10 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} Those who hoped fast-tracking household moves to Burin would entice others to follow, underestimated their determination to preserve a way of life and community identity. Instead of gambling on a better life in an industrial town, they opted to pressure the Premier, their MHA, and C&SD to assist them to move as a unit to a convenient location on the Burin Peninsula highway from which they could continue to fish old grounds or opt to commute to the industrial centres. The stage was set for a contest of wills. Leading the charge were the merchant, the community council and the pastor. The council chair set out the case for moving to Red Harbour. The proximity to traditional grounds made it easy for middle-age men, “who knew nothing else,” to continue to utilize a half million dollars’ worth of vessels and gear that would go to rot if they were forced to move to Marystown or Burin.\footnote{Walter Kenway, Chair Port Elizabeth Community Council, to Harnum. 19 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} The UC minister expressed concern that middle-age fishermen who could not compete for
jobs in industrial towns would drift into dependency. He highlighted the industriousness of the people and their strong community sense which could be retained if they resettled as a viable unit. The council highlighted the advantages of the new site: it was in close proximity to the hydro power line; had plenty of fresh water; and after Red Harbour was designated a receiving community, it might attract settlers from Monkstown, South East Bight and Petite Forte. Both clergy and lay leaders believed Port Elizabethans had the industry and moral fibre to thrive if the government would approve the move. They were bent on relocating church, school, businesses, and fishing stages into the new community with minimal disruption to economic and social life. They believed it was achievable if the Resettlement Committee approved the petition and granted assistance. At Red Harbour families could continue to live in their own houses, keep fishing crews intact, consort with kith and kin, worship together as a faith community, and send their children to a community school. No other community in Placentia Bay insisted on constructing a new community to preserve an economy as well as the intangible assets that constitute a community.

When the federal and provincial governments approved the Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm and the Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour moves they did so with knowledge that they contravened the goals of the FHRP. Resettlement was launched on the premise that the industrial fishery could generate enough wealth to improve the quality of life for all. Blocking this policy was a shortage of affordable housing which could only be rectified

40 Rev. Gerald G. Sacrey to Harnum, 19 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
41 Walter Kenway, Chair Port Elizabeth Community Council, to Harnum. 19 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
42 J. M. Roberts, Manager of NLHC Marystown Office, to A. Vivian, Chair of NLHC, 3 January 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
through a program of subsidization, or by forcing fish companies to pay higher wages. Everyone, including the administrators of the FHRP, realized the housing crisis in industrial fisheries centres was putting the new fisheries development policy at risk.

J. M. Roberts of Atlantic Fish Processors, Ltd. informed NLHC, that control over development and refusal to grant permits to low income people to construct their own homes, diminished the benefits of resettlement to his company.\(^43\) Harnum acknowledged that few households from the 80 designated outports had relocated to Marystown. Shortage of building lots in Burin and Marystown limited the usefulness of the barge. Roberts linked the labour crisis to the housing bottleneck. Harnum recommended building houses to Newfoundland standards and reserving lots for relocated houses would encourage people, who desired to move away from isolation, to relocate to fisheries growth centres. He added that unless NLHC made 30 lots available at Marystown for families who intended to transport houses by barge, Port Elizabeth would move to Red Harbour.\(^44\) Harnum also hoped to direct the populations of Petite Forte, Monkstown, and Southeast Bight into Burin and Marystown. Planners, who were committed to evacuating settlements, found the notion of assisting the construction of a new inshore fishing community abhorrent. Rev. Sacrey’s assertion that Red Harbour had social advantages was of minor import.

Political support for relocating to Red Harbour also came from outside Port Elizabeth. John J. Lake, Secretary Treasurer of Local 150 of the Federation of Fishermen,

\(^{43}\)Roberts to Vivian, 3 January 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, PANL.
\(^{44}\)Harnum to A. Vivian, 5 September 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, PANL.
pledged to support the Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour move. Lake informed Harnum that unless H. E. Senior and Son re-established his business in the vicinity, the fishery of the region would suffer a setback. He claimed that without Senior’s supply and marketing business, the fishing grounds between Petite Forte and Port Elizabeth would be abandoned. Like Sacrey and the community council, Lake stressed the opportunity cost of dispersing Port Elizabethans into urban centres. The union leader maintained the diaspora would have disastrous consequences for the fishery. He enclosed a petition bearing the signature of 49 Rushoon fishers to press his case.

Throughout October 1968 the case of Port Elizabeth continued to attract media attention. The *Evening Telegram* reported that the island had lost half its population in the previous two years to Burin, Marystown and Grand Bank. Without editorializing, the reporter wrote the remaining residents wished to resettle to Red Harbour in order to continue to use the same fishing grounds. The *Daily News* noted that a delegation from Port Elizabeth was meeting with provincial officials to request assistance to move to Red Harbour, a place vacated under the old Centralization Plan. The *News* informed its readers, without sensationalising, that 70 families wished to resettle there as an entity. Neither article stirred up much controversy.

On 25 October Sametz informed the Department of Municipal Affairs that 25 families had already moved and 30 others intended to resettle in the Burin - Marystown

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45 John J. Lake to Harnum, 26 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL. H. E. Senior was the founder of H. E. Senior and Son and operated it with his son Willard.
46 Clippings of both articles can be found in the Port Elizabeth Resettlement community file GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
area, but 47 had signed a petition to establish a new community.\textsuperscript{47} The petition was supported by letters from clergy, the people of Rushoon and a local of the Federation of Fishermen, but Sametz was not convinced it was the right move. The deputy minister was concerned that if H. E. Senior and Son dissolved after the move, the resettled families, who were completely dependent on Willard Senior, might be forced into dependency\textsuperscript{48} This was a very real possibility. Sametz also pointed out that a breakwater was necessary to make Red Harbour a safe port for longliners and the federal government had not yet agreed to cost-share the move. Nonetheless, he asked Municipal Affairs to do a cost estimate of preparing 50 to 70 serviced lots, but advised H. U. Rowe to prepare a negative report to discourage resettlement to Red Harbour. The Director of Urban and rural Planning condemned the site on the grounds that there was no provision in the Burin Peninsula Study (1967) for the reactivation of Red Harbour, and, furthermore, the site was too small to accommodate 50 houses. J. T. Allston proposed that C&SD should not contemplate reactivating Red Harbour as a habitable community under any circumstances. Sametz and Allston believed that Port Elizabethans should be settled in the Burin-Marystown area.\textsuperscript{49}

While the governments opposed reactivating an evacuated community, Ian Watson, a Member of Parliament, suggested Smallwood should consider tourist

\textsuperscript{47}Sametz to H. U. Rowe, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, 25 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{48}Sametz to H. U. Rowe, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, 25 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{49}Report on a meeting attended by Harnum, H. U. Rowe, and J. Allston, October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
development as an alternative to resettlement.\textsuperscript{50} Watson informed the Premier that during his visit to Davis Island centralization was the major topic of conversation. Although he conceded resettlement might be the only possible long-term solution for most of Newfoundland’s coastal people, he wondered if government would permit temporary occupancy of abandoned homes for tourism.\textsuperscript{51} If the province agreed to it on an experimental basis, Watson promised to promote Port Elizabeth by radio, television and print media. J. G. Channing acknowledged that the idea of preserving an outport for tourism had been considered for some time, and Sametz conceded that while many places were unsuited to year-round occupancy, they might be useful for seasonal operations in fishing and tourism.\textsuperscript{52} He listed several communities that had a potential for tourist development, but omitted Port Elizabeth because most of the attributes Watson assigned to Port Elizabeth applied more correctly to Red Harbour. Sametz informed Channing that under no circumstances would Community and Social Development approve settlement in vacated communities on a permanent basis.

Year round occupancy of a vacated community was exactly what Port Elizabethans intended. The community council notified Maloney that at a public meeting attended by every household in Port Elizabeth, “it was finally and definately [sic] decided that through our community council they would inform [the] provincial government of their intention

\textsuperscript{50} Ian Watson to Smallwood, 29 October 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{51} Watson to Smallwood, 29 October, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{52} J. G. Channing, Deputy Minister, Office of the Premier, to Watson, 1 November 1968; Z. W. Sametz, Deputy Minister of Community and Social Development, to J. G. Channing, 14 November 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
to request assistance to Red Harbour.”

At this meeting they agreed to move the school using volunteer labour, but planned to leave private fishing premises and the bait depot on the island for future use. The relocated school could adequately meet the needs of elementary grades while older pupils could be bussed to the central high school in Burin. The council assured the minister that their decision was final and promised Maloney that they would make “every effort to make relocation a success and justify the expense entailed.” They advised the minister that if he wanted clarification of the reasons for choosing Red Harbour he could consult MHA Patrick Canning. He was present during the meeting and was fully apprised. Canning informed the press that the residents had carefully planned the move and were “hoping to avoid the mistakes of others.” He opined that it was “the best planned centralization move to date.” He told the News that he had attended a public meeting at Port Elizabeth and came away convinced that resettlement was the best option.

Allston advised Deputy Minister H. U. Rowe that the move was “counterproductive,” “uneconomical,” and “contrary to the aims of the regional plan and

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53 William Jarvis and Walter Kenway to Aidan Maloney, Minister of Community and Social Development, 27 November 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
54 Sametz to Maloney, 8 January 1968. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, PANL. Atlantic Fish Processors Ltd. personnel records revealed 80% of cutters commuted from outside the area. Sametz reported that management were warning that unless the government increased the workforce to the level promised in the lease agreement “we have to close the doors.” The company leased the government owned plant.
56 “Port Elizabethans Resettle Selves,” Daily News, 2 December 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
the resettlement program.”  

He wrote “to my mind the right places for the population to resettle from Port Elizabeth are Marystown and Burin where lots have been prepared by the town councils and NLHC in conjunction with Urban and Rural Planning.”  

He alleged 55 families had already been assisted from Port Elizabeth to Burin Peninsula growth centres, while only 47 wished to move to Red Harbour. Harnum’s response was more muted. He informed Willard Senior that C&SD could not approve the move until it was known if the relevant federal and provincial departments agreed to the project, but assured Senior of his full support. On the same day he asked NLHC if 24 lots could be found in Marystown for 24 Port Elizabethan householders, although only four indicated an interest in moving to Marystown. Harnum did not explain why he thought another 20 families would soon join them. The promise he made to Senior appears to have been insincere for he was still actively pursuing the Marystown alternative. The game was on and the stakes were high for both sides. At stake for the residents of Port Elizabeth was the right to self-determination, the right to have some control over where and how they would spend the rest of their lives. On the other side were Sametz, Harnum and Allston.

Harnum came away from a meeting with the community council convinced that 40 families would not resettle anywhere other than Red Harbour. The older fishers considered Marystown and Burin unsuitable ports from which to carry on a small-boat fishery. Harnum informed Port Elizabeth delegation that the federal government would not accept responsibility for moving the bait depot, the salt fish plant, or build a breakwater at Red

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58 J. T. Allston to H. U. Rowe, 6 December 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
59 Allston to H. U. Rowe, 6 December 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
60 Harnum to Willard Senior, 21 January 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
61 Harnum to Vivian, 21 January 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
62 Harnum to Sametz, 5 February 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
Harbour. The community representatives said fishers would continue fishing out of the old community as other resettled households did. A frustrated Harnum assured Sametz that he had “personally made every effort to persuade the people to (sic) some other centre.”

Undeterred by the opposition within the government departments and agencies, the community council insisted they would not go elsewhere. When the Household Resettlement Subcommittee met on 13 March, the chair informed members that the province had accepted Red Harbour as a reception centre and the Committee now had authority to assist householders into the new community. On 7 May the provincial cabinet gave conditional assent to the move. Cabinet minute 305 - 69 reads:

Ordered that the residents of Port Elizabeth be permitted to relocate at Red Harbour on the understanding that there will be no obligation on the Government of Newfoundland as a result of such move, to provide new or extended public services for them in the latter community.

The province agreed to the move them but would not commit to any services unless the federal government agreed to help build the new community.

Bill Rowe laid out the conditions that cabinet had applied to the move: households were ineligible for the lot supplementary grants; Community and Social Development would not assume responsibility for providing water, electricity, telephone, telegraph, school bus services, fishery facilities, church, school and other community buildings; enactment of these services would be left to the community council to negotiate with the various departments and agencies responsible for providing those services and facilities; and if any private land was required it would be the responsibility of the individual

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63 Harnum to Sametz, 5 February 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
64 Cabinet Minute 305 - 69, 7 May, 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
needing it to negotiate with the owner.\textsuperscript{65} It was a very intimidating letter from a minister of the crown. The province was protecting itself in the event the federal Minister of Fisheries refused to approve Red Harbour as an organized reception centre.

Rowe’s second letter to the council appeared more conciliatory, but it was no less intimidating or condescending in tone. He assured the chair of the community council that the reluctance of the Resettlement Committee to approve their petition to move to Red Harbour “was out of concern for the burden constructing a new community would place on householders.”\textsuperscript{66} Rowe added that neither the Resettlement Committee nor the government wanted Port Elizabethans to undertake a project that would result in a diminished standard of living. The minister assured the council that both he and the Premier were in sympathy with their desire to move as a community to a new site, but then reiterated the conditions and responsibilities outlined previously. It is obvious that the second letter was meant to ensure council fully understood the responsibilities that they, and the people they represented, were assuming. Undaunted the Community Council telegraphed the minister to inform him that they had selected a site at Red Harbour and were preparing to move in the spring.\textsuperscript{67}

At the end of March the council again contacted the Minister. The council secretary advised Rowe that households were ready to move and the barge was on stand-

\textsuperscript{65}W. N. Rowe, Minister of Community and Social Development, to Chair of the Community Council, 14 February 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{66}W. N. Rowe to Walter Kenway, Chairman of Community Council, 17 February 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
\textsuperscript{67}William Jarvis, Secretary Community Council, to W. N. Rowe, 3 March 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
but Municipal Affairs had yet to complete a lot layout and survey. Harnum expressed concern that “a regular plan is not being prepared” and that the site would not adequately meet the needs of 50 households “especially considering services.” Rowe wired the council that representatives of the Department of Highways and Municipal Affairs planned to meet at Red Harbour on 14 April and shortly thereafter work would commence on the lot layout and local road. Perhaps frustrated by the struggle and the delay in preparing a land assembly in Red Harbour, six families decided to move to Marystown where unserviced lots could be purchased for $370 and the $1,000 lot supplementaries would cover the cost of land and private water and sewer installation. Despite the attractiveness of the Marystown offer, Port Elizabethans informed Smallwood that they preferred to accept the conditions as outlined in the minister’s letters dated 14 and 17 February 1969.

Just when it appeared the move was imminent, Municipal Affairs questioned the suitability of the site and the cost of developing a 50 lot layout equipped with basic services. Allston dismissed the move as counterproductive and suggested Port Elizabethans would be better off staying on Davis Island. He advised Maloney to use every means available under the Resettlement Act to direct the 50 households of Port

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68 William Jarvis to W. N. Rowe, 31 March 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
69 Harnum to Sametz, 1 April 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
70 W. N. Rowe to William Jarvis, 1 April, 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
71 Vivian to Sametz, 27 March 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
72 Walter Kenway, Chair of Community Council, to Smallwood, 30 April 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
73 Allston to Maloney, 28 April 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
Elizabeth into Burin, Marystown, Grand Bank or Fortune. The Director of Municipal Planning suggested moving older inshore fishers to Little Bay, Mortier Bay, where there was ample land, a good harbour and a community stage. There they could continue fishing until they retired. The proposal had merit and might have worked if it had not required a United Church community to move into an all Roman Catholic community in which most resorted to work in offshore fisheries. Men displaced from the traditional bank became trawlersmen. Little Bay was a more convenient location than Black Duck Cove, but Port Elizabeth fishers did not consider Mortier Bay a suitable place from which to prosecute the shore fishery. Besides denominationalism was still so embedded in rural communities that people of different sects preferred to live on “their own side” of the harbour. It would be hard to convince an all Protestant community that they would be better off in a growth centre surrounded by Roman Catholics and without a church or school to call their own.

Despite warnings that the move to Red Harbour would diminish their standard of living and the severe conditions imposed by the cabinet, Port Elizabethans continued to insist on moving to Red Harbour to preserve their sense of community and culture. While community leaders appeared to accept the conditions set out by Rowe in February and by a minute of cabinet in May, in the midst of the relocation they began to make demands. First the council demanded electrification either through connection to the grid or by

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74 J. T. Allston to Minister of Municipal Affairs, Aidan Maloney, 28 April 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
75 Gordon Handcock contended that the failure of Commission Government’s land settlement scheme was due, in part, to the Commission’s decision to ignore religious affiliation.
transferring generators from Port Elizabeth. Secondly they insisted settling in a site that
the Provincial Planning Office considered unsuitable.\footnote{Walter Kenway, Chair of Community Council, to Smallwood, 30 April 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.}

A report on Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour move prepared by the Department of Municipal Affairs, found the Port Elizabethans were not only insisting on reopening an abandoned community but insisted on a specific location along the highway. When the Director of Urban and Rural Planning accompanied by three of his staff visited Red Harbour they formed the opinion that the site was too small and the risk of pollution was high.\footnote{Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth Report, Rural and Urban Planning Division, Department of Municipal Affairs, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} Allston and a team from the Provincial Planning Office reported that the site was underlain with bedrock to such an extent that it prevented safe installation of private septic systems or pit toilets. Allston ignored the advantages of the roadside site such as easy access to the Burin Highway and focussed instead on the high cost of servicing the site.\footnote{Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth Report. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} An engineering study commissioned by Municipal Affairs maintained that everything from construction of house foundations to installation of water and sewer services would require excavation of solid rock.\footnote{Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth Report, “Part III: Engineering Services Report,” 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} The engineers reported that crowding 50 households in the highway site would preclude construction of sheds to store gear, private sewage disposal systems, and, assuming that each householder used a generator to light their home, the noise level would be intolerable. The engineering report questioned whether there was sufficient space to manoeuvre houses, and identified fire and avalanches as potential safety hazards. They estimated it would cost $150,000 to install a municipal
water and sewer system, plus $35,000 for constructing roads throughout the subdivision. The Power Commission estimated the cost of relocating the power plant to be $20,000 and a connection to the main hydro grid would cost $45,000.80 The estimated total cost of providing water, sewer and electrical services to approximately 50 household was $225,000, a large capital expenditure for a government opposed to the building of a new community to incur. Consequently families arrived in a community with a crude road and no water and sewer or electrical services. The bureaucrats’ warnings that the householders would find themselves living in a community with fewer services than they were accustomed to on Davis Island became, by design, a self-fulfilling prophecy. From the outset Sametz and Allston had opposed the move, not only to the evacuated outport, but also to the highway site that Port Elizabethan families had selected.

The stage was set for a battle between the municipal council and the various departments and agencies responsible for resettlement. First, the council addressed a letter of protest to Sametz who passed their concerns along to the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs. Sametz advised H. U. Rowe that the community council were not satisfied the engineers had thoroughly “explored and examined fully the possibilities of the highway site.”81 Sametz, perhaps wishing to get the matter resolved, reminded Deputy Minister Rowe of the Premier’s directive to Municipal Affairs to prepare, “in full consultation and agreement with the council,” an extended layout to accommodate the Port Elizabeth families and when the layout was completed the Department of Highways was to construct

81 Sametz to H. U. Rowe, 6 May 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
“a rough road” throughout the site. Sametz stressed the urgency to get the layout completed as the people were ready to launch houses.

Shortly after the dispute over the townsite was resolved, another issue arose. The barge operator claimed that due to bog, rock, and steep slopes it would be very difficult to place houses on lots. When the Minister of C&SD learned of the alleged problem, he decided to send W. P. Serrick, manager and chief engineer of Engineering Services Ltd., to Red Harbour, to assess the situation. Serrick determined that there would be no difficulty to locate houses in the lot layout contrary to the first engineering study. Serrick contended the highway site could accommodate up to houses. He informed the Minister that most resettlers should be able to get a “reasonably good lot.” With the dispute over the suitability of the site settled, the householders began to move houses.

In July the issue of a community school came to the forefront. The Port Elizabeth United Church School Board ignored Bill Rowe’s warning that government would not commit to any expenses with regard to transporting and setting up community halls, churches, or schools and asked him to provide funds to relocate the school. Regrettably, the Resettlement Agreement made no provision for the reclamation of what officials termed “social capital.” The same policy applied in all evacuated outports, but usually

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82 Sametz to H. U. Rowe, 6 May 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
83 W. N. Rowe to Sametz, 6 June 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
84 The route of the new Burin Peninsula Highway was about a kilometre inland from the old highway which passed through Red Harbour.
85 W. W. Serrick to Harnum, 10 June 1969. GN39/1, Box 130, File S263, PANL. The new highway was a kilometre inland from the old highway along which the new settlement was constructed.
86 Benjamin J. Butler, Treasurer of the United Church School Board, Port Elizabeth to Minister of Community and Social Development, 2 July 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
households moved into growth centres with schools and other social facilities, albeit often inadequate to meet the needs of the rapidly increasing population. Initially Port Elizabethans agreed to move the school using volunteer labour, but Benjamin J. Butler, chair of the school board, explained that due to the hurry of the fishery and the rush of resettlement, householders could not possibly dismantle the school and have it ready for September. According to Butler the barge operators were willing to move the three-room school for the sum of $12,000 plus the cost of reassembling and replacing materials damaged in the moving process.\footnote{Butler to W. N. Rowe, 14 July, 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} Bill Rowe advised Butler to contact the Burin Peninsula Integrated School Board (BPISB).\footnote{W. N. Rowe to Benjamin J. Butler, 1 August 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.}

The BPISB were astonished to learn that government had assisted families into a new community without making arrangements for the education of the children. Ironically, the Premier has always maintained that he entered int the resettlement agreements primarily for the benefit of the children. Governments should anticipated the problem and realized how unjust it was to expect parents, who were busy fishing and re-establishing homes, to set up a school. The BPISB feared that school would be in session before the red tape was ironed out, and without special funding, the board could not have a school ready for September.\footnote{C. H. Leaman, Business Manager Burin Peninsula Integrated School Board, to F. W. Rowe, Minister of Education, 4 August 1969. Leaman informed Rowe that the issue had been discussed by the BPISB at the 30 July meeting. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.} Requests for assistance elicited the usual response from the Education Minister, F. W. Rowe, father of the C&SD Minister Bill Rowe. F. W. Rowe advised the Integrated School Board that the Department of Education had not created the
problem and there were no special funds to solve it. Bill Rowe insisted it was up to the Board to relocate the school from Port Elizabeth or bus the students to Burin. The Minister of Community and Social Development reminded the settlers of the conditions they had agreed to in February and stated again that C&SD was not willing to make any further concessions to Port Elizabethans. In the end, the Board agreed to move the school.

On 20 August 1969 Harnum submitted a progress report on the Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour move to the federal Department of Fisheries, along with a request for federal assistance to complete the project. In the report Harnum declared that the Resettlement Committee and the provincial cabinet had approved a request from the residents of Port Elizabeth to relocate, about half to growth centres and the remainder to Red Harbour. By 20 August more than 40 households were living in Red Harbour. The province had to date prepared sites and connected the community to the electrical grid and the Burin Highway. Hoping to influence Davis, Harnum described the move as very successful.

On 6 November Davis informed Bill Rowe that:

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90 F. W. Rowe to C. H. Leaman, 11 August 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
91 Harnum to Leaman, 29 May 1970. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
92 C. H. Leaman to Harnum, 8 May 1970. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
93 Riverview was the official name of the new community.
94 Harnum to V. Rossiter, 20 August 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
95 The Resettlement Committee expressed concern over the tendency of settlers to continue to refer to the new community by its former name. The Committee insisted that the residents “must abide by the decision to name the new community Riverview and not revert to Red Harbour.” Z. W. Sametz agreed to investigate. Minutes of Meeting of Household Resettlement Sub-Committee, 16 December 1969. A. G. Stacey Collection, Coll-065, File 1.05.005, ASC, Memorial University. The people of Port Elizabeth refused to name their new community Riverview and the name of the old community survived.
In the light of representations which I have received from the Hon. Don Jamieson, I have made a further review of the Riverview settlement project on the Burin Peninsula [and due to its] rather special and unusual circumstances have approved the Federal grant and supplementary assistance for Riverview.  

Sametz recommended that the Committee approve applications for assistance for households who moved from Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour and designate Port Elizabeth an evacuated outport. Up to this point the province was on the hook for the total cost of the move. In the 16 December meeting of the FHRC designated Port Elizabeth an evacuated outport and approved Riverview (Red Harbour) as an organized reception centre. The reclassification not only lightened the financial responsibilities of the province but also eased the financial burden of the families who had left island homes not knowing if they would receive any financial assistance to rebuild in the new village which today is called Red Harbour.

The community council, which had fought hard to win government approval of the move, was not ready to rest on its laurels. In May 1970 the council requested the Premier’s help to procure development funds from the Department of Regional and Economic Expansion (DREE) and to secure the release of $50,000 in lot supplementary grants to finance water and sewer systems. The council chairman was anxious to relieve the hardship of women who were forced to fetch water from the river and carry pails of human waste to the saltwater. On 27 August Smallwood informed the council that government had approved the water and sewer project and engineering designs were being

96 Jack Davis to William N. Rowe, 6 November 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
97 William Jarvis, Secretary, and Walter Kenway, Chairman of Red Harbour Community Council, to Smallwood, 3 July 1970. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll - 075, File 3.21.018, ASC, Memorial University.
prepared, a common delaying tactic. A year later the MHA for Burin District raised the issue in the House of Assembly. Hickman, now in opposition, told the House that “it was immaterial whether it was a good or bad move, they moved there with government approval and were entitled to services provided in other resettled areas throughout Newfoundland.”

When Hickman asked the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Eric Dawe, whether tenders had been called for installation of water and sewer, the minister said Red Harbour was on a list of communities slated to receive water and sewer services in the next few years. When Dawe added government was under no obligation to provide services to residents of Red Harbour, Hickman accused the Smallwood administration of leading the people of Red Harbour “down the garden path.” In reality the province had clearly outlined the conditions under which Port Elizabethans could move to Red Harbour.

Port Elizabeth households were capable of championing their own causes. The 50 households who insisted on moving to Red Harbour stared down the bureaucrats and politicians who opposed the move and according to one newspaper headline resettled themselves. When bureaucrats offered to assist them to move to a major fisheries growth centre they had the confidence to say “No.” Resistance to the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program had solidified since the first resettlement officials toured Placentia Bay holding meetings with community leaders aboard chartered vessels. No

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outport exhibited greater resiliency than Port Elizabeth. They accepted resettlement, but were determined to resettle en masse into a harbour that government had evacuated four years earlier. They selected a site to which they had an historical attachment, and built a successful fishing port. Their strong sense of community was tested when individual households began to depart, but a determined corps of inshore fishing families demanded the right not to be dispersed in a major fisheries growth where all the equipment they had acquired over a lifetime would go to rot along with the moral fibre of a proud community. Port Elizabethans ignored the entreaties and warnings of senior bureaucrats and cabinet ministers who played up the benefits of resettling into industrial growth points and warned them that if they moved to Red Harbour they would have to accept a lower standard of services than they enjoyed on Davis Island. When the Urban and Rural Planning Division condemned the highway site, the merchant and the community council pressured the Minister of C&SD into hiring an engineering firm to provide a second opinion. Shortly after the engineer’s report reached the minister’s desk, the barge began to move houses.

Undismayed by the minister’s assertion that fishing premises did not come under the aegis of the FHRP, the fishermen attached barrels to stages and using their fishing boats towed them across the three mile strait. During the winter they went into the woods and cut timber to shore up stages and build wharves. When the Minister of Community and Social Development and the Minister of Education suggested that all students should be bussed to Burin, the parents convinced the BPISB to establish a community school for elementary students.

101William Jarvis Secretary, and Walter Kenway, Chair of Red Harbour Community Council, to Smallwood, 3 July 1970. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll - 075, Box 257, File 3.21.018, Memorial University.
The story of the relocation of Port Elizabeth is unique in the history of the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. Port Elizabethans faced the demise of their island home stoically, but not passively. When young families resettled, the older generation took a proactive approach and decided to fight to keep the community alive albeit in a new location, which happened to be an evacuated outport closed to permanent settlement. Their strength lay in the shared sense of community, the character of the people, a merchant who was prepared to move with them and operate his business as before, and the support of the community council and clergy. Port Elizabethans succeeded in enlisting the support of Jamieson, their federal MP and Newfoundland’s cabinet minister. They refused to play by rules set out in statutes ordained by the Parliament of Canada and the provincial House of Assembly, and successfully pressured governments in Ottawa and St. John’s to approve the move from Port Elizabeth to Riverview.

Conclusion

The Port-Elizabeth to Red Harbour move is the best example community resistance to state-controlled migrations. On a broader scale it exemplifies the effectiveness of everyday forms of resistance. When confronted by a well-organised community agents of the state were unable to direct fishers from the inshore to the offshore or to provide a stable workforce to the corporate fishery by closing out coastal communities. Port Elizabethans, who had invested over half a million dollars in vessels and gear, were determined to protect their investment by resettling in a place where they could continue to fish the same grounds. They succeeded through collective resistance. Municipal councillors, merchants, and clergy supported the idea of resettling together as a community to Red Harbour where they could enjoy the company of extended family,
worship together as a faith community, and where children could attend the community school. The spirit of the old settlement survived in the new. Few have heard of Riverview but the spirit of Port Elizabeth lives on at Red Harbour. The relocated houses arranged along the road bridge the gap between the old and the new and the stages lining the harbour remind the visitor of their struggle to preserve a traditional way of life. The longliners tied to the new public wharf are proof that the fishery remains an important industry, and the wharf is a reminder of the victory Port Elizabethans won over the bureaucrats and cabinet ministers who had “ordered that the residents of Port Elizabeth be permitted to relocate at Red Harbour on the understanding that there will be no obligation on the Government of Newfoundland as a result of such move, to provide new or extended public services for them in the latter community.”\textsuperscript{102} Ironically, the fish plants at Burin and Marystown are shut down and the offshore trawlers dispersed from Peru to Viet Nam.

\textsuperscript{102}Cabinet Minute 305-69, 7 May 1969. GN39/1, File S140, PANL.
Chapter IX

Conclusion

In Newfoundland, resettlement of the outports has been a *cause celebre* for half a century. The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program (1965-70), the second of two state-sponsored centralization plans, drew an emotional response from scholars, journalists, novelists, songwriters, poets and playwrights who created a narrative of cultural genocide. Premier Joseph Smallwood never escaped the pall of resettlement. He was, and in many quarters still is, blamed for uprooting thousands of families from hundreds of coastal communities. The urban cultural elites constructed a mythic outport in which happy people danced, sang and went mummering. At the other end of the spectrum policymakers pronounced the pluralistic economy archaic and identified the rural lifestyle with dependence, poverty, illiteracy and disease. Modernists and romantics espoused a dichotomous world view. Modernists depicted society as modern and progressive or traditional and backward. Romantics believed the *folk* could only live in remote spaces and therefore felt resettlement threatened Newfoundland’s cultural heritage.

There were many actors in the drama, and in some ways the tragedy, that unfolded in the second half of the 1960s. At the federal level some of the key policymakers were Jack Pickersgill, H. J. Robichaud, Jack Davis, Richard Cashin and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson supported by bureaucrats within the Department of Fisheries, A. W. Needler and W. L. Mackenzie. At the provincial level some of the cast were politicians John T. Cheeseman, C. Max Lane, Patrick J. Canning, Aidan Maloney, William N. Rowe, F. W. Rowe and Alex Hickman supported by Ken Harnum, Zeman W. Sametz, J. T. Allston, H. U. Rowe, and E. M. Gosse. Executives of integrated trawler-processing companies such as
Augustus (Gus) Etchegary and Arthur H. Monroe of Fishery Products Ltd., Spencer Lake of Burgeo Fisheries, H. Maugher of Booth Fisheries, and J. M. Roberts of Atlantic Fish Processors pleaded with government to remedy the labour crisis that threatened the viability of the industry. The mayor of Burgeo and CEO of Burgeo Fisheries, Spencer Lake, and the town councils of Burin, Grand Bank, Marystown and Fortune encouraged resettlement and participated in labour recruitment. The parish priests of St. Kyran’s- Bar Haven, Merasheen and Rushoon were strong supporters of centralization and used their influence to persuade congregations to abandon the islands, and, when communities balked urged Smallwood and Harnum to institute more coercive measures. Reverend Edward House, who moved his headquarters from Harbour Buffett to Arnold’s Cove, chaired public meetings and participated fully in the evacuation of Tack’s Beach. Pastor Booth Reid, convinced that Hooping Harbour would not get a road, insisted on moving his congregation en masse to Bide Arm. Professional teachers preferred jobs in large regional schools to teaching in one and two-room schools in remote outports. Merchants like Freeman Wareham and Kevin Wadman encouraged their clientele to follow them into Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour. And workers who worked outside the community wished to eliminate the inconvenience of a long commute.

Centralization of coastal communities can be framed in the context of global and national developments. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the migration pattern was from rural to urban and the economic trend was marked by a shift away from household production to factories. Western development experts considered traditional societies and pluralistic economies to be impediments to progress. In the post-World War II era, governments of Western countries assumed a more active role in managing
economies and introduced a variety of social welfare schemes to improve the quality of life of all citizens. In Canada rural development programs focussed on centralizing and mechanizing family-based enterprises to improve productivity and increase incomes. Governments of Western nations believed injections of capital, mechanization and applications of technical expertise would transform rural dwellers into productive citizens. Modernization was couched in terms of improved health services, roads, communication, and education, all of which Newfoundlanders in all parts of the province were demanding.

As expectations rose requests flooded into the Office of the Premier from all parts of the province for roads, electricity, telephones, new schools and improved medical services. Rural people were no longer content to accept the status quo after Smallwood promised fishermen a fair share of the “good things of life.” Having voted for Smallwood and his cause, they expected him to make good on his promises. Eaton’s and Simpson Sears catalogues awakened within the rural population a desire for the latest clothing fashions and furniture styles. Employment on military bases and post-Confederation construction boom helped create a class of workers who were dissatisfied with the status quo. Newfoundlanders, even those in the most remote corners, wanted modern amenities. They threw out homemade tables and sold their iron kettles and spinning wheels to antique dealers. Extension of roads and telecommunications to the larger centres of the region contributed to the sense of isolation in the hinterland and heightened demands for more equitable services.

Critics of Smallwood’s modernization programs have concentrated on failed small-scale manufacturing industries of the 1950s and the giveaways of the 1960s, but credited advances in education, medical and other fields to federal transfer payments. After World
War II the national government introduced programs to reduce poverty and unemployment of the slow-growth regions. In Newfoundland several royal commission reports from Amulree to Pushie linked rural poverty to domestic commodity production. Bates, Gushue, Walsh, Cheeseman and Pushie investigated and reported on the Atlantic sea fisheries that prescribed centralization, mechanization, and switching production from low capital enterprises in dispersed communities into capital-intensive operations located in a few strategically located ports. In the 1944 Dunn and Stewart Bates and several post-war fisheries committees maintained that Newfoundland should concentrate on developing a fresh fish trade with the United States as a means to raise incomes and bring services and amenities closer to North American standards. In the 1950s the Canada - Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee, the South Coast Commission, and the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects (1956) recommended switching production out of family-based enterprises using manual methods to assembly lines in capital intensive trawler-processing plants operating year round. Although Smallwood created a Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives in 1949 his commitment to the co-operative model soon waned.

The Premier, who purportedly had told fishermen to burn their boats and join the march to progress, accepted a model of fisheries modernization that predated Confederation. In 1953 he introduced the Centralization Program to assist householders to move from isolation on the proviso all families must leave, but the state applied no other restrictions. Although the province invested heavily in the corporate fishery, the provincial government made no attempt to direct households into industrial fisheries centres or extend extra compensation to the families that did. The provincial plan, which
concentrated on moving people to social services to avoid the cost of providing infrastructure, more closely resembled a welfare program than a fisheries modernization strategy. The federal-provincial Fisheries Household Resettlement Program incorporated principles that characterized rural development plans designed to reduce poverty in other less developed regions of Canada by rationalizing, or eliminating, semi-subsistence economies through assisted migrations. The FHRP is an example of state-controlled relocation of marginal communities in which the inhabitants were not too marginalized to resist. They countered with tactics that ranged from foot dragging and avoidance to offering an alternative development model.

By the 1960s the offshore fishing fleets had reduced per capita productivity in the inshore sector. Once the haddock stocks were destroyed in the early 1960s, the draggers switched to harvesting cod. The demise of Labrador fishery pushed families from the islands of Bonavista Bay to the near mainland, and the termination of the salt bank fishery undermined the viability of isolated south coast communities that supplied most of the manpower. A national economic recession in the late 1950s coincided with a decrease in demand for fresh fish in American markets. Thousands of unemployed construction workers turned to the shore fishery as an employer of last resort. The introduction of seasonal unemployment insurance benefits also proved irresistible. By the 1960s Smallwood realized he had to explore ways to modernize the industry he had neglected since Confederation. The Premier invited the federal Minister of Fisheries and senior fisheries bureaucrats to St. John’s to explore possible ways to revive the salt cod trade, but the initiative sparked little interest in Ottawa. The minister’s absence from the conference and the cancellation of experiments aimed at creating artificial drying methods
that replicated sun-curing suggests that Ottawa had given up on the inshore seasonal fishery. When the landings 200 offshore trawlermen surpassed the landings of 15,000 full and part-time inshore fishers, the demise of the traditional shore fishery was imminent. Reports ranging from the Newfoundland Royal Commission Report (1933) to the *Royal Commission on the Economic State and Prospects of Newfoundland and Labrador* (1967) recommended reducing dependence on domestic commodity production and the transfer of excess labour to the industrial sector as quickly as possible. But the major sticking points the demographic and economic realities of Newfoundland. The fishery had kept Newfoundlanders dispersed into over 1,200 communities without few options for no-fishing employment.

Modernization was a costly process and the province lacked the fiscal capacity to centralize and consolidate the industrial fishery and at the same time to extend credit and subsidies to small-boat fishers to upgrade gear and vessels. Small local fish companies also required government intervention in the form of guaranteed loans, loans and subsidies to expand trawler fleets and processing facilities. Modernization was a burden that the Newfoundland government shouldered with minimal assistance from Ottawa. When Smallwood requested special funding for fisheries development, Nova Scotia claimed that Newfoundland was trade competitor and objected to Ottawa providing programs to one province that were not available to others. St. Laurent, in the vein of classic federalism, was unwilling to participate in development programs that he considered to be within the purview of the province. The Prime Minister ignored how primitive Newfoundland fishery was in comparison to Nova Scotia’s more centralized and capital-intensive industry. Canada had not yet articulated mechanisms to address regional disparities.
In 1957 Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, a native of Saskatchewan, recognized that not all regions or citizens shared equally in the wealth of the nation and signalled a more co-operative approach to regional development. The Agricultural and Rural Development Act (1961) reflected an ideological shift in Ottawa. ARDA funded federal-provincial rural development initiatives across the country. Although the cabinet voted down Smallwood’s request for the federal government to assume the full cost of centralization and modernization, but in a spirit of co-operative federalism agreed to use ARDA funds to fund research projects designed to solve the productivity problem in the Newfoundland fishery.

Between 1957 and 1966 the federal government introduced a number joint programs to aid development of areas where economic development lagged behind the wealthier regions. Many of the slow-growth economies were characterized by a proliferation of family-based enterprises utilizing manual methods of production. In the mid 1960s the federal government entered into agreements with the provinces to reform pluralistic economies through applied scientific research and programs that were aimed at centralizing, consolidating and mechanizing industries. The planners felt the labour-intensive primary industries using centuries old technology was archaic and the pluralistic economies needed infusions of capital to raise the standard of living in the region. projects in rural parts of Canada. By 1965 the government of Canada was prepared to enter into joint agreements with the provinces to cost-share infrastructure development, centralization programs and training programs to increase labour mobility. In addition to these measures, the Canadian government provided aid to private companies to modernize and expand production. In Newfoundland the Pearson administration introduced a
program of subsidies, bounties and loans to aid fresh/frozen fish processors to acquire modern stern trawlers and expand processing capacity. The governments of Newfoundland and Canada constructed a shipyard to build and new trawlers and refit older vessels. While Pearson wanted Canada to have a greater share of North Atlantic fish stocks, he also wished to show the flag to reinforce Canada’s efforts to extend the three mile territorial limit.

In 1965, the federal and provincial fisheries ministers signed the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement to assist fishing families to move to centres with improved opportunities for employment and modern amenities. The FHRP offered larger financial incentives, the majority of which was underwritten by Canada, to increase the tempo of fisheries modernization and centralization. The joint program was more radical and interventionist than the provincial than the old Centralization plan in several ways. On the strength of a petition signed by 90%, later reduced to 80%, of householders the Resettlement Committee designated the petitioning community an “evacuated outport.” It also directed householders into one of the designated growth centres, preferably an industrial fisheries base. The Agreement underwent several modifications that led to charges of coercion that resonated in the outports. Lot supplementary grants and provision of assistance for individuals relocating major fisheries growth centres intensified state direction and highlighted the economic goals of the program. The amendments were also an indication of the degree the subjects were resisting state control and direction.

The focus of this work is not federal-provincial relations or formulation of state policy, but how fishing families responded to, and reshaped, government policy. Chapter II discusses the obstacles to modernization and centralization of the fishery. The greatest
material impediment to centralization proved to be the shortage of affordable housing in the offshore fisheries bases. For outport families engaged in household production home ownership represented more than shelter from the elements. Factored in with earnings and subsistence activities, home ownership made it possible to survive and be more independent. Resettlers realized that in growth centres most in-kind incomes would disappear and that the wage of a fish plant worker could not meet a resettled family’s basic needs. Outport families were generally averse to renting. When resettlement officials, industry and church leaders attempted to direct the shore fishermen into one of the major fisheries growth centres, most declined. They opted instead to resettle from the islands and remote outports to places where home ownership and continuance of a familiar lifestyle were possible. Shore fishermen of Placentia Bay resisted relocation to Marystown, Burin, Grand Bank, or Fortune, for the same reasons Hooping Harbour resettlers said no to Englee, and the families of New Ferrole and Currant Island objected to moving to Port au Choix. Most Currant Islanders felt they would be worse off working for low wages in a fish plant than if they moved their houses across the tickle to Forrester’s Point while New Ferroleans insisted they were not going anywhere. Resistance intensified when church and state authorities tried to push them into centres which settlers considered disadvantageous to their financial and social well-being. The residents of two of the most viable communities in Placentia Bay, Harbour Buffett and Tack’s Beach, chose the small fishing settlements of the isthmus of Avalon rather than a fisheries growth centre. Home ownership, access to old fishing grounds and desire to live in a familiar environment trumped wage labour.
Lack of counselling in sending and receiving communities created tensions between newcomer and longtime resident. Reception centres such as Arnold’s Cove and Southern Harbour were unprepared for the influx of resettlers that overcrowded local infrastructure and polluted community wells. There were similar problems in every category of growth centre. Competition for limited jobs, lack of affordable housing, overcrowded schools created resentments. Community and Social Development ignored the advice of field workers who advised against concentrating too many households in one area to the detriment of everyone. Both groups demanded government action on such matters as overcrowded classrooms and pollution which threatened the health of every person. Neither Arnold’s Cove nor Southern Harbour had local government before the resettlers arrived. When elite relocatees organized Arnold’s Cove as a local improvement district animosity between resident and resettler intensified. Financing new school construction also widened the gap between the two groups. The long-time residents felt their two-room school had been adequate before the resettled households arrived while the newcomers why the fine schools in the abandoned communities could not be moved. Others drew attention to the injustice of paying off mortgages on abandoned school buildings. The Education Minister, F. W. Rowe and the minister responsible for resettlement denied requests for special funding and shifted responsibility to and fro.

Ironically, the Resettlement Committee, which had reluctantly approved moves to the isthmus at the insistence of the applicants, found itself under attack. The national and local media descended on Arnold’s Cove, garnered some local comments, shot pictures of muddy subdivisions and filed stories on the horrific conditions in the resettlement subdivisions. The Resettlement Division assigned two field workers, Lance Shirley and
Donald Burry, to investigate conditions in the two growth centres. They too prepared a very negative report. Burry and Shirley considered the school at Southern Harbour a health risk and recommended its permanent closure. Many outport schools lacked plumbing, but the Resettlement Committee should have established some objective criteria for designating growth centres. At Southern Harbour a dozen householders found themselves in a desperate situation without access to a road or the salt water. They believed that they experienced a greater degree of isolation and loneliness in the growth centre than they had known in their old communities.

Matthews noted the trauma induced by the resettlement programs was similar to that experienced by the survivors of a natural disaster. None of the households interviewed for their study admitted to resettling voluntarily while Duggan found that three of four households she interviewed at Little Harbour East and Placentia were content with life in the old community and if the FHRP had not intervened they would have been satisfied to remain there. They identified several push factors: the departure of young people caused discontent among the older generation who began to consider moving when assistance was offered; difficulty getting teachers; the removal of parish headquarters to the mainland; and the departure of the merchant was a deciding factor. Duggan reported that the families who transported homes to growth centres felt less estranged than the householders who had been unable to relocate houses. The forced abandonment of churches, schools, and halls was also traumatic and represented a material loss.

Resettlement into Placentia, which took place when the town’s two major employers were downsizing, was especially disruptive. Deprives of harbour facilities, many families returned to live in the old community from Monday to Friday and returned
to Placentia each weekend or at the end of the fishing season. Mrs. Loyola Pomeroy, who returned each year to fish at Great Paradise, summed up the anguish she and her husband experienced. Looking up from the bow of her fishing boat, she explained to the CBC *Land and Sea* host why families returned to the old homestead:

> I mean to leave a place where you can earn plenty for your family and go to some place where you can’t do that, it’s frightening. Can’t you understand that?

Many resettlers had to choose between welfare and establishing a seasonal fishing camp in the old community. Most resettled households, who had been underemployed in the sending community, became unemployed and welfare dependent in the new. Families, who resettled from Kingwell and Harbour Buffett to Little Harbour East, informed Duggan that they had to return to Long Island to earn a decent living. Those households who left houses behind had little choice but to move into abandoned substandard military units in an area of Placentia that Duggan described as a ghetto. These were the resettlers most likely to claim they had been forced to move, rather than admit they had made a bad choice. But the government had succumbed to political pressure and designated Placentia a growth centre.

Resettlers in major fisheries growth centres, including Harbour Breton and Trepassey, who lived in subdivisions separated from the main town site, felt isolated and disoriented. Householders, who had been community leaders before moving, withdrew from participation in church activities and organizations. Protestant families who settled in Trepassey felt especially isolated. They had no church or school to call their own. Relocatees complained they were worse off than before the move due to low wages and high rents which Fishery Products deducted at source. Meanwhile relocatees from Roman
Catholic communities adjusted quite well. Counselling in the sending community would have reduced disillusionment after the move. Woolfrey alleged years of living on merchant credit and in-kind relief left settlers without the skills necessary to transition to industrial life. Unused to managing money, they wasted it on liquor and cars rather than invest in home ownership. Woolfrey preferred to berate the people, rather than fault the program. It was a common practice with a long history to blame economic problems on the character of Newfoundlanders.

At Harbour Breton tension arose due to a downturn in the US markets. BC Packers responded to poor markets by downsizing its trawler fleet and shortening the work-week. The local union and community leaders attributed underemployment and low wages to the surplus of labour generated by the resettlement program. Sametz attempted to ease tensions by reassuring the union that fishers who were contemplating moving from neighbouring communities were motivated by a desire to move to improved social services rather than an intention to change occupations. Overcrowding of the schools made the deputy minister’s allegation that they were moving to better services questionable. Children received instruction in unventilated, poorly lit classrooms in buildings that were never intended to house students.

Resettlement was often an unhappy experience for parent and child. While children attended poorly equipped schools, parents worked in a hostile workplace in which the union executive blamed them for low pay rates and reduced hours. Newcomers labelled the larger community cliquish and restricted social relations to a cluster of resettlers who originated from the same sending community. The people of neighbouring outports shared a negative opinion of Harbour Breton before resettlement, and saw no
reason to change their mind after relocating. According to Sharon Driscoll, a C&SD field worker, half of the resettlers interviewed alleged they would leave if the opportunity arose. Driscoll’s study corresponded with reports of the Anglican clergy and the Frontier College worker.

Tensions were present in growth centres in all parts of the island. Centralization in St. George’s district suffered a setback when the Stephenville town council opposed creating new subdivisions to receive houses C&SD planned to transport from Gallants. Some councillors proposed shutting the doors to all resettled families. The council suggested, for sociological reasons, it would not be in anyone’s best interests to concentrate all resettlers in one neighbourhood. The town council favoured infilling over “pocket concentration,” which had slowed or blocked completely the integration of the settlers in other growth points. By 1970 municipal governments were rebelling against the urban and rural planners who wished to concentrate resettlers and their salvaged houses in land assemblies that the press described as ghettoes and the Anglican Churchman called shack towns. The town councils and clergy were more sensitive to the needs of settlers than the bureaucrats in the capital. If municipal governments had existed in designated growth centres and the outports much of the trauma associated with the relocations could likely have been avoided. Few opposed resettlement in principle, but many opposed the way Household Resettlement program was implemented. Bill Keough was an exception. The MHA, who had been a co-operative field worker for St. George’s Bay region during the Commission Government era, firmly opposed the relocation of Gallants to Stephenville.
Church leaders were ambivalent. While church hierarchies supported resettlement in principle, they criticized the FHRP for not covering the cost of removing church property, and condemned governments for not treating families with respect, dignity, and humanity. The Anglican and United Church called on government to treat resettled families humanely by ensuring that they received housing at a reasonable cost and offering counselling to smooth the transition from rural to urban life. The Roman Catholic priests in Placentia Bay parishes advocated a more radical program that would close out the most marginal communities. Collins, Lewis and Walsh were motivated by a desire to centralize their parishes. The Anglican rector of Burgeo organized pressure groups, chaired meetings, and pressured Smallwood to maintain and improve services in the community. Edward House participated in the resettlement of Tack’s Beach and Harbour Buffett. The rector moved the parish headquarters to Arnold’s Cove and in so doing encouraged parishioners to settle beside him. He chaired public meetings and advised Harnum that the former parish headquarters should be evacuated in a timely fashion. The RC priest at Port aux Choix advocated cutting services to New Ferrole as a means to resettle the congregation to Port au Choix. He was not breaking a new trail. On the eastern side of the Great Northern Peninsula, Apostolic Faith Pastor Booth Reid, first lobbied the FHRC to approve Hooping Harbour as a growth centre, and when that failed, he pressured government ministers to approve the move to Bide Arm and then proceeded to manage every aspect of the move. He chaired the local resettlement committee, oversaw the circulation of the petition, employed householders to build barges and roads, install a water and sewer systems, and construct a school at Bide Arm. He forced the province to pay the full cost of the community school and deviate from the 70-30 formula. The Hooping
Harbour to Bide Arm move demonstrates the contradictions within the resettlement program and how determined local leaders manipulated the process.

By 1969 opposition to the FHRP coalesced. Coastal people in every part of Newfoundland began to question the benefits of moving to a growth community when the described the horrendous conditions in the growth centres. Households returning to the evacuated communities to fish confirmed the media reports. Communities in Paradise Sound, Fogo Island, the Port au Port Peninsula as well as Great Harbour Deep rejected resettlement. When Smallwood gave the settlements of Fogo Island three options: do nothing and stagnate; resettle; or develop the local economy, Fogo Islanders chose the latter and enlisted the aid of MUN Extension Services and the National Film Board. Through co-operatives and self-help programs, they not only survived resettlement, but in the process helped create an experiment in rural development that was adopted internationally. The Fogo Islanders constructed a shipyard to build longliners for a modern fishery and a fresh fish processing plant. In the process they proved the co-operative approach to development was a viable one. By banding together the communities benefited both economically and socially. Under the leadership of elite males Fogo Islanders accepted a definition of community that included the whole island. After much debate the communities agreed on a location for a regional high school and medical complex. The Fogo Island Producers Cooperative established a viable multi-species plant in line with local needs and bucked an ideological trend that had more to do with evacuating islands than creating viable communities on them.

Great Harbour Deep, a White Bay North community of 300, also demanded resource development and services instead of resettlement grants. They lobbied the
province for a road connection to the St. Barbe highway, or at least a resource road to give them access to timber stands. Parents, who took great pride in the accomplishments of their children, demanded a new school to replace one which was allegedly so poorly equipped children had to bring chairs to school. Unlike Fogo Island, wherein residents enlisted the aid of outside experts, Harbour Deep and the communities of Paradise Sound were reduced to circulating petitions, letter writing and holding public meetings to fend off efforts to resettle them. One resident of Harbour Deep informed Smallwood that relocating families to Englee, St. Anthony or La Scie was not a privilege but slow murder, and that rumours were driving people “mental.” However, the social integrity of the community held fast. Unlike the MHA for Placentia West, the White Bay North MHA promised to support development of resources and to improve communications. The householders voted unanimously against moving to Englee, La Scie or St. Anthony where they feared they would become dependent.

In Paradise Sound the people of Monkstown, South East Bight and Petite Forte believed in the region’s potential for development. The economy of Monkstown ranked among the most diversified economies of any rural Newfoundland community. Residents were employed in fishing, lumbering and boatbuilding. Led by women activists, who wrote letters to Smallwood and circulated petitions to prove there was no interest in resettlement, the community of Monkstown demanded an end to isolation. Burry and Shirley were impressed by the diversified economy and the potential for improvements in fisheries, lumbering and tourism development. There were no dissenting voices. Women, who took on a leadership role, received unanimous support from all householders as they battled the Placentia West MHA who was determined to close all communities without a
road connection to the Burin Peninsula highway. Canning asked the Minister of Highways to delay constructing branch roads to encourage resettlement of St. Joseph’s and Little Harbour West. The women of Monkstown asked the Premier to replace Canning. At South East Bight women also organized against resettlement and challenged not only the state but their priest, a member of an all-male organization who professed that if the husband (the old rooster) decided to leave, the wife (the old hen) would surely follow. Resettlement was not always a masculine controlled event.

The future of a community often depended on the character of the people. Burry and Shirley commented on the industriousness of the people of Monkstown, Father Lewis recognized a similar trait in the fishers of South East Bight, and Leslie Harris commented on the entrepreneurial spirit of the people of Petite Forte. Salvation Army Lieutenant Lorne Hiscock and several women pointed out the economic diversity that currently existed and the potential for improvement if the community had a branch road. Hiscock advised the Premier that scenic Monkstown, with its two salmon rivers and abundant wildlife, only needed a crude road to become a popular tourist destination. He was backed up by Mrs. W. Butler who assured the Premier the people were happy with their two-room school, had no trouble recruiting teachers, and the two stores in the community met all their basic needs. Hattie and Laura May, too, lobbied for a road and electricity. They asked Smallwood to support their effort to convince CNR to make Monkstown a port of call for the coastal boat if Davis Cove resettled. Mrs. W. Butler informed the Premier that they intended to stay in their healthy community, road or no road. They identified Canning as their enemy and asked Smallwood to get rid of him. The Mays enclosed a petition signed by every householder to prove they had the full support of the community.
Monkstown survived because voices of local church leaders, merchants and women were heard, and heeded, in the capital.

Petite Forte survived due to the determination of a core of inshore fishing households who were convinced they had a better life in Petite Forte than Southern Harbour, Rushoon or Marystown could offer. They opted to live in limbo for eight years rather than succumb to “wearing down” tactics. Harnum directed the local resettlement committee to circulate the petition several times to try to get 80% of householders, including those who had already relocated, to vote for resettlement. Petite Forte held out until Leo Barry defeated Canning and Frank Moores replaced Smallwood. Barry promised to bring services to Monkstown, Petite Forte and South East Bight and Premier Moores announced his administration would end community evacuations.

Port Elizabethans did not object so much to abandoning Davis Island as they did to relocating to Marystown and Burin. They preferred to resettle as an entity to Red Harbour with a minimal amount of social and economic disruption. The push factor came mainly from within the community as the population slowly declined. At one point Donald Jamieson, Member of Parliament for Burin Burgeo and Minister of Transport, asked the FHRC to designate Port Elizabeth a growth centre for the isolated communities of the region. The idea of turning the last occupied island in Placentia West into an organized reception centre for Monkstown, South East Bight, and Petite Forte was more sound than one might expect. It had a municipal council, and in the first half of the 1960s the salt and fresh fish plants employed workers from neighbouring communities, and a well-equipped group of inshore fishers operated successfully. Several families were assisted to Davis Island under the provincial Centralization Plan. When a half dozen families indicated
interest in moving to Burin and householders who worked at Grand Bank decided to make
the moves permanent, the idea of saving the community by relocating as a viable unit to
Red Harbour gained traction. It was opposed by Aidan Maloney, Minister of C&SD and
Fisheries, who insisted on moving the families into the Black Duck Cove subdivision at
Burin. Government attempted to head off a general community migration to Red Harbour
by fast racking individual moves to Burin. The planners feared a delay would cause them
to join the group who were insisting on moving to an evacuated outport. C&SD was so
strongly opposed to reopening the evacuated outport of Red Harbour that Sametz asked
the Department of Municipal Affairs to condemn the highway site preferred by Port
Elizabethans. The Provincial Planning Office subsequently reported that insufficient space
and steep and rocky terrain precluded development of the site. When Port Elizabethans
received this report, the merchant and council pushed back. They pressured Bill Rowe,
Minister of Resettlement and Housing, to order a second engineering study. The
engineer’s report confirmed that the highway site could accommodate the relocatees from
Davis Island.

In the end, a group of industrious Port Elizabethan householders forced the
provincial cabinet to approve the move to Red Harbour, albeit without a commitment to
provide services. But this did not deter relocatees, who were in the midst of moving, from
demanding assistance to move the school before September. C&SD stood firm, but
eventually the parents, with the help of the United Church minister pressured the school
board into paying the cost of dismantling, transporting and rebuilding the community
school. Within a brief period the Power Commission connected Red Harbour to the grid
and the Department of Highways constructed a branch road to the Burin Peninsula
highway. The province assumed the cost of building a road throughout the community while the federal government, which designated Red Harbour a growth centre for the communities of Placentia West, constructed harbour facilities. Fishers, who at first intended to return to Davis Island to fish, relocated stages without using the government barge. In 1970 the community council lobbied the Minister of C&SD for lot supplementary grants to finance the construction of water and sewer services. The Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour move was the best organized and most successful of any community relocation in Placentia Bay despite the opposition of bureaucrats and ministers of the crown. Sametz, who had adamantly opposed the move, touted it as a success story, but neither bureaucrats nor the district MHA could take credit for it. It was due to the resilient nature and industrialism of Port Elizabethans.

Resistance to resettlement took many forms and the FHRP was contested in many arenas in multiple ways. The decision to give the province control over implementation of the program made it vulnerable to political pressure. Ten of fifteen members of the Federal – Provincial Newfoundland Resettlement Committee were provincial appointees and the Resettlement Agreement imbued the provincial minister with discretionary powers to approve community evacuations without the of 80 percent requirement being met. Ken Harnum, who had been Director of Resettlement under the provincial program, retained this influential position under the new plan. By securing control over the process, the province to was able to continue the practice of relocating households from one unviable community to reduce the cost of bringing services to them. Since the federal government underwrote most of the cost, it was expedient to give into resettlers’ demand for grants to move to a site that seemed irrational to planners but made sense to the subjects.
The drama of the Newfoundland resettlement program had a large cast of actors that included politicians and bureaucrats, merchants, clerics, and town mayors, and central to the production were the coastal people themselves. Although male household heads organized public meetings to elect the community resettlement committee to carry the petition to the people, the pro-active role of the women of Monkstown, South East Bight, New Ferrole and Point women is evidence feminine voices were heard and respected. The signatures of female household heads were critical, particularly in very small outports. The female voices either extolled the virtues of the semi-subistence economy in which they were equal partners, or bemoaned the hardships of isolation.

People’s decisions to abandon a coastal community and a way of life that had survived since the early eighteenth century, resulted in part from attacks on the traditional economy by powerful political leaders and bureaucrats in St. John’s and Ottawa. In the mid-twentieth century the state accepted the industrial vision as the best option for fisheries development. Governments assumed that a highly capitalized and centralized industry producing cod fillets and cod blocks to an expanding American market could generate enough wealth to enhance the quality of life in coastal Newfoundland.

Modernization and growth pole theory may have shaped the ideology of planners and political leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, but a study of the resettlement of Newfoundland outports must consider other forces in play in the mid-twentieth century. The traditional economy was in decline by the 1960s. The great Labrador and schooner banks fisheries ended in the mid-1950s. The invasion of the Grand Banks by factory-freezer trawlers began shortly after Confederation and intensified thereafter causing a decline in production inshore, forcing shore fishermen to rely more heavily on social
services. In the same period subsistence activities were no longer being pursued with as much intensity as in the pre-confederation era.

Furthermore, individual families responded to the FHRP according to their own circumstance. A person employed outside the community, reacted differently than the fishers who had their life savings tied up in capital equipment and gear. The large welfare dependent family, who had little invested in the fishery, seized the opportunity to get a large grant to relocate to a growth centre with minimal financial setback. Disabled and sick residents who found the expense of frequent medical trips prohibitive benefited from resettlement grants. Families with young children shifted to give their children better educational opportunities. High school graduates joined in a natural migration to urban centres and when younger families and youths left, a sense of loneliness infected the community and seniors responded by moving to reunite with family. Older householders, who could not compete for jobs in the industrial wage economy, either refused to resettle, or insisted on moving to a reception centre from whence they could continue to fish old grounds. The success of the moves often depended on the absorptive capacity of a growth point, for it was in the growth centres that the drama of resettlement played to an audience who too often considered themselves victims of a modernization scheme orchestrated by Premier Joseph R. Smallwood.

My dissertation acknowledges that aspects of the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program were coercive. People who did not want to leave had limited options when a community petitioned to relocate or the minister used his discretionary authority to approve the petition. The critics of centralization looked at the conditions in Arnold’s Cove and concluded government had forced the people from the islands into a
welfare ghetto. However the archival record shows that the householders insisted on moving to the isthmus and resisted the appeals of fish plant executives, mayors and clergy as well as government bureaucrats and political leaders who wished to relocate them to fisheries growth centres.

The FHRP was not so much coercive as poorly managed. The resettlement division was flooded with enquiries about the program before the program was properly organized and criteria for designating outports and growth centres only vaguely defined. The program proceeded without benefit of independent study to determine the viability of either the sending or receiving community. It resulted in moves that social scientists and some economists described as irrational. Goals were not clearly defined and the FHRC approved some moves that contradicted the aims of the program. Political interference caused the Committee to approve Placentia, a community that was in decline, as a growth centre. By refusing to adopt a policy that would provide resettlers with houses equivalent to ones left behind the governments created the most serious impediment to resettlement and burdened the resettled household with debt. The needless concentration of people into one small growth centre produced a storm of protest that affected resettlement everywhere in the province.

Migrations, whether voluntary or directed by agents of the state, are always traumatic. Iverson and Matthews, after studying several community moves under the provincial Centralization Plan and the joint Fisheries Household Resettlement Program, concluded that the amount of trauma experienced by the households was the same for both programs. The FHRP was similar to rural development programs that took place in other parts of Canada. But in Newfoundland it involved a dozen government departments and
dozens of agencies who operated without a careful study of local conditions or a co-
ordinated plan. When plans went awry charges of coercion followed.

In 1970 the governments of Canada and Newfoundland signed a new resettlement plan known as the Household Resettlement Program (HRP). To distinguish the new centralization program from its predecessor, and perhaps free it from the controversy that swirled around it, the government of Canada shifted responsibility for the HRP to the Department of Regional Economic Expansion. In St. John’s the Department of Community and Social Development retained control. Under the new program DREE covered the full cost of assembling and servicing lots and financed the construction of schools in Burin, Marystown as well as other industrial centres, including St. John’s. There was no longer an emphasis on moving fishers to offshore fishing centres. By constructing well-equipped schools and making more affordable housing available, the governments hoped to remove the most serious impediments to resettlement. The second five-year agreement focussed more on assisting individual household moves, but community moves were encouraged until Smallwood was replaced by a Progressive Conservative government led by Frank Moores. In 1975 the governments chose not to sign another joint five-year-agreement and in 1977 the joint Resettlement Committee met for the last time to finalize moves approved under the second agreement.

My study of the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program necessarily touches on policy and policymakers in St. John’s and Ottawa but the spotlight is on the coastal people of Newfoundland and their response to a state-directed migration as a rural development strategy. My work gives a voice to the fishing families and demonstrates how the subjects reshaped the program’s goals and outcomes. It also exposes
ways clergy, merchants, executives of fish companies, and government field staff were involved in resettlement before and after the move. It also gives a voice to the women who engaged in the resettlement debates and took a proactive role in the process of preserving communities, contrary to popular opinion that women were primarily interested in moving to better services. Resistance was not violent but the strategies resettlers engaged in were effective. Letters, petitions and political action forced governments to compromise and modify goals and eventually to end community evacuations.
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