SOME ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BRITISH INDIA AND TIBET FROM 1890 TO 1914

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Some Aspects of the Political and Commercial Relationships between British India and Tibet from 1890 to 1914

A Thesis

by

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THE EXAMINERS OF THIS THESIS ARE

1.

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Prior to 1890, the British in India had made very little contact with the Tibetan people but during the two decades which followed the British made many attempts to establish and improve their relations with the Tibetans. It is the aim of this thesis to contribute some historical insight into certain political and economic problems which were shared by both the British in India and the Tibetans between the years 1890 and 1914.

In the first chapter the geography of northern India and Tibet is discussed with particular reference to the main routes leading from India into Tibet. Also in this first chapter some consideration is given to the social background of the Tibetan people. The second chapter consists of a brief historical summary of the people of Tibet. Both of these introductory chapters serve as background to that period of time under analysis, namely; the twenty-four years spanning the turn of the present century.

The main body of the thesis is divided chronologically into six chapters which are based on the international agreements relative to India and Tibet which were signed between 1890 and 1914. In considering the causes and results of these agreements, many interconnected problems arise, among which two of the most significant are the relative importance of the political and economic motivation behind the British penetration into Tibet and a consideration of the international status of Tibet. Moreover, each chapter deals with the efforts of the British to establish efficient and consistent connections with Tibet from the time when practically no relations existed up to the time when such relations became relatively formulated and stabilized.

PREFACE

The main public official sources dealt with in this thesis are the three Blue Books: Cd. 1920 (Papers Relating to Tibet 1904), Cd. 2054 (Further Papers Relating to Tibet 1904) and Cd. 2370 (Further Papers Relating to Tibet 1905). These Blue Books were compiled from original sources found in the Public Records Office in London, in Nos. 1745 - 1756 of the series of bound volumes known as FO17 China. The copies of the Blue Books which I used are to be found among the microfilm collection of Memorial University of Newfoundland.

Unfortunately, I did not have access to many pertinent original sources such as, departmental minutes, the Curzon-Hamilton correspondence and the Ampthill Papers which are preserved in the India Office Library. Moreover, I also regret to say that I did not have the opportunity to delve into any primary sources of Chinese and Tibetan origin. Thus the judgments in this thesis are relative to my limited access to source material.

I am very grateful to my director, Dean L. Harris, Ph.D., for his learned criticism and encouragement of my research. I would also like to thank Professors G. Schwarz, D.Phil.; F. Hagar, Ph.D.; and W. Dobell, M.A. for their direction and guidance.

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In conclusion, I claim full responsibility for all judgements made in the pages of this thesis.

CHAPTER ONE

" The mountain range has to be crossed by passes of 15,000 to 18,000 feet, most of which lie to the north of the high crest of the Himalaya."

Hugh Richardson, Tibet And Its History, p.4.

The mighty Himalayan Range which runs along a great arc some 1,600 miles in length, varies in width from 150 to 250 miles, averages 19,000 feet in height and forms the continental border of India[1]. The Indus River on the West and the Brahmaputra on the East, mark for all practical purposes, the longitudinal extremities of the Range which presents a formidable barrier between India and Central Asia[2].

To understand the pattern of trade across this mountain barrier between India and Tibet as it was in the late nineteenth century, it is important to note the trading routes frequented by British subjects during that period and to examine the location and significance of the principal Tibetan towns to which they led. There were at least five prominent trade routes from India to Tibet: one from Darjeeling to Gyantse via Khamba Jong, one from Darjeeling to Gyantse via the Chumbi Valley, another from Simla to Gartok along the Sutlej River, one from Leh to Gartok through the Indus Valley and finally the trail through Assam to the towns of eastern Tibet via the Brahmaputra[3].

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[1]cf. O.H.K. Spate, India and Pakistan, p. 15

[2]cf. G. Berreman, "Peoples and Cultures of the Himalayas", Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 6, June, 1963.

[3]cf. J.G. Bartholomew, (ed.), Constable's Hand Atlas of India, and the maps at the end of this chapter.

THE KHAMBA JONG ROUTE[1]

Indian traders brought their goods up from Calcutta on the East Bengal Railway to Siliguri, the railway terminus of Darjeeling. One route from Darjeeling to Gyantse passed through the Sikkim Valley and the Tibetan border town of Khamba Jong. From Darjeeling through Sikkim the route followed along the banks of the Tista River. Approximately six miles from the Bengal-Sikkim border where the waters of the Rongni River merged into the Tista, a road branched off the main trail and led along the banks of the Rongni to the town of Gantok, the capital of Sikkim. The main road to Tibet, though, continued on up the Tista to the town of Chung Chang where the waters of the Lachen and Lachlung Rivers flowed into the Tista. From Chung Chang to Khamba Jong the route followed different tracks in summer and winter. In the summer, the yak caravans left Chung Chang and followed the banks of the Lachlung River till they reached the Tibetan border. In the winter, the traders used the Lachen Valley track, a shorter route to Khamba Jong which was impassible during the summer because of the precipitous ravines, the torrents and the absence of permanent bridges[2]. The following is an account of the terrain along the Sikkim-Tibetan border:

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[1]"'Jong' properly 'dzong' is a district headquarters and consists generally of a fort perched on a rocky hill. A 'jongpen' (properly dzongpen) is the district magistrate in charge." cf. Sir Frederick O'Connor, On the Frontier and Beyond, p. 35.

[2]cf. Douglas Freshfield, "The Roads to Tibet", The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, January-June, 1904, p. 79 ff.

> There are three passes...the Donkia, Giagong, and Lungnak-La. The latter is difficult and would probably be impassible for any large transport...Inside the Lonak valley the country presents no difficulties up to the frontier--east and north of the Giagong line the country appears to be an undulating plateau right up to the frontier, and at Phuchung-pang or Superbu-La it is an easy walk across the border into Tibet. From this point the road runs to Khamba Jong and Tinki Jong down very gradually sloping plains... Eastward up to Powhurari the frontier presents much the same character and affords an easy march over the Tibetan plains to Phari and Gyantse. The west side of the frontier is more difficult. The valleys on this side are described as being bounded to the north by an impregnable almost perpendicular wall of rock, and the only outlets to Tibet are the Naku-La, an easy pass, and the Chotennima-La, which is practically impassible and never used[1].

Khamba Jong, sixteen miles north of the Sikkim border, was the first Tibetan town of any consequence approached by travellers and traders who followed this route through Sikkim to Tibet. In 1879, an Indian venturer wrote the following description of the town:

> The fort of Khamba Jong is situated on the top of an isolated cliff. The fortifications rise in several stories from the northwest foot of the cliff till they reach the summit, which they entirely cover. This castle, second only to the Shigatse Jong, is one of the highest and grandest in Tibet, and a distant view of it from the south is most impressive. At the foot of the hill is the village of Khamba Jong famous for its mutton. Thousands of sheep are annually killed here in January and the carcassas are dried and sold at from eight annas to one rupee each. Khamba is also

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[1]C.R. Marindin, Commissioner of the Rajashahi Division to the Government of Bengal, Darjeeling, 6 September, 1902, Cd. 1920, No. 66, En. 16, An. 3, p. 172.

> famous for its carpets and blankets...There are about 300 houses in the town with a prosperous population of about 1,000 souls. Wheat and barley grow in the valley. The stream works a barley flour mill, an old one recently repaired[1].

From Khamba Jong to Gyantse the road was interrupted by several steep passes, especially La Nogi La (16,000 feet) and Lama La (16,800 feet). Many travellers who left Khamba Jong for Gyantse preferred to travel due north to Shigatse to pay homage to the Tashi Lama who resided there[2]. From Shigatse the caravans would then turn southward to the trading center of Gyantse. After Lhasa and Shigatse, Gyantse was the third city of Tibet. It was situated at the head of the Nyang Chu Valley which extended for seventy miles in the direction of Shigatse. The following is an eye witness account of the environs at Gyantse:

> The Nyang Chu Valley is one of the richest in Tibet...every inch of it is cultivated. Its great natural fertility, and its being so very favorable for the growth of different kinds of millets and pulses, has given the whole district the name of Nyang, or the Land of Delicacies. Flocks of wild geese and ducks were swimming on the river, and long billed crows were stalking about searching for food... In the village of Cyatski the people seemed very industrious, the women engaged with their looms or spinning, the men tending their sheep or collecting fuel from the fields[3].

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[1]Chandra Das as quoted by Douglas Freshfield, op. cit., p. 87.

[2]Because the Tashi Lama resided there, the town of Shigatse was often referred to as Tashilumpo.

[3]Douglas Freshfield, op. cit., p. 85.

The approximate distances from Darjeeling to Gyantse along the Khamba Jong route were: from Darjeeling to Gantok, 73 miles; from Gantok to Khamba Jong, 89 miles; Khamba Jong to Gyantse, directly, 90 miles; and Khamba Jong to Gyantse via Shigatse, 135 miles.

THE CHUMBI VALLEY ROUTE

The second route from the province of Bengal to Tibet passed through the Chumbi Valley through the towns of Yatung and Phari and from the latter place the road extended northwards across the plateau to the trading town of Gyantse. Traders, coming up from Calcutta, who were to take the Chumbi route, usually bypassed the town of Darjeeling. For Darjeeling was set on a hill at an elevation of 7,000 feet and rather than make an unnecessary climb, traders loaded their pack animals at Siliguri, the railway terminus, and thence travelled northwestward to Kalimpong, thirty miles distant[1]. From Kalimpong the road continued over a distance of about twelve miles to the village of Padong where the wheel road narrowed into a horse road. Approximately thirty-six miles from Padong, the post at Gnatong (12,000 feet) was situated. When traders arrived at Gnatong, they were only about twelve miles or one day's march from the frontier. The caravans ascended to the Tibetan border and

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[1]cf. C.F. Gullick, ed., Oxford Economic Atlas for India and Ceylon, p. 31.

passed over the Jelep La (14,000 feet), one of the most frequented passes leading into the Chumbi Valley. After a rough descent of seven miles, the path led to the trading town of Yatung (11,000 feet) situated "in the valley of the Yatung Chhu at its junction with Chamdi Chhu which runs down from the Natoi-La".[1] The situation of Yatung was most confined, being at the bottom of a narrow valley. Several miles up the valley from Yatung, the town of Chumbi was located. This town was typical among the several towns that occupied sites along the Chumbi River, the comparative density of the population undoubtedly influenced by the lush fertility of the valley. For, of the Chumbi Valley it was said:

> The valley is at an elevation of 9,000 feet, but the climate is warm and dry, and the finest weather prevails there while Darjeeling and Sikkim are flooded with rain and reeking with mist. The valley is about a mile in width, with the river and its numerous islets in the centre, eminently fertile everywhere, and highly cultivated with fields of corn and barley, while there are rich pasturages on the hill-slopes around it, dotted all over with clumps of fruit and other trees - a varied rich vegetation quite different from that of Sikkim. There is good fishing to be had in the river, and the whole valley is, in fact, a lovely bit of smiling landscape terminating on every side by snow clad mountain tops. Pervading it all is said to an air of affluence and bien etre to which the interior of Sikkim, rich as it is, can bear no comparison whatever[2].

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[1]cf. J.C. White to Rajahahi Division, dated Yatung, 9 June, 1894, Cd. 1920, No. 13, En. 1, An. 2, p. 26.

[2]M. Louis, Gates of Tibet, as quoted by Douglas Freshfield, op. cit., p. 82.

Most authorities contemporary with the author of the above quotation agreed with this enthusiatic description of the Chumbi Valley; indeed, it was estimated that the arable land of the Valley could support three times the population who lived there.

From the town of Chumbi, during all seasons of the year, mule caravans were accustomed to pass another twenty-six miles along the Chumbi Valley to Phari, a trading town where various tracks from all over southern Tibet converged.[1] The town of Phari, with the exception of Darjeeling, was the foremost "melting pot" along the whole Himalaya east of Nepal. For here Sikkimese, Bhutanese, Indians, Tibetans, etc., mingled and merged. The town of Phari was said to contain;

> Three hundred mud walled houses and many shops, where provisions and clothing of all kinds are obtainable. Tobacco, cloth, and fruit, which are brought in from Bhutan, are to be had in the bazaar, and fish are said to be plentiful. Vegetables are scarce but cattle are said to be very numerous. No grain crops ripen in the vicinity, but wheat is grown for fodder and sold in the bazaar at two rupees per maund[2].

North of Phari the rich, verdant farmland of the Chumbi Valley began to merge into bleaker terrain. The

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[1]cf. Capt. W. O'Connor, Diary kept during the Tibet Frontier Mission, Cd. 1920, No. 129, En. 33, p. 247.

[2]Douglas Freshfield p. 84, ibid.

region between Phari and Gyantse was an example of the typical Tibetan tableland. Small villages confined to the valleys of shallow streams were separated by bare, brown, rolling uplands unsuitable for farming but used for the grazing of sheep and yaks. The road from Phari to Gyantse covered fairly level ground over an approximate distance of eighty-nine miles. The total distance of the journey from Siliguri to Gyantse by the Chumbi Valley route was 313 miles.

THE SIMLA-GARTOK ROUTE

Whearas both the Khamba Jong and Chumbi routes led from Northern Bengal to Central Tibet, a third route led from Simla, a hill station in the Punjab, to Gartok in Western Tibet[1]. The road from Simla up to the Tibetan border followed along the banks of the Sutlej River and passed through the villages of Narkanda, Pangi, Jangi, Kanum, Poo and Namgia, the distance from Simla to Namgia being approximately 194 miles. From Namgia the road began to ascend the mountains to Shipki La (13,420 feet), a border pass between Bashahar State and Tibet and one of the lowest passes in the Himalayas. Two miles from the Shipki La on the Tibetan side of the frontier traders were accustomed to rest at the border village of Shipki, The road from Shipki

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[1]cf. F.J. Buck, Simla, Past and Present, p. 245. and Penguin Atlas of the World, p. 38.

for the next eight or ten miles continued to follow along the banks of the Sutlej. However, this road was not much more than a perilous path along the face of a cliff hundreds of feet above the foaming torrents of the river. In many places, the path was supported by shaky scaffolding and the cliff was cut into to make the track passible. From the town of Shipki the road made its way beside the south bank of the river for several miles to a spot where a bridge was built over the icy waters to the town of Korang. Four miles from Korang the small village of Tyak was located, "a village with a few fields and apricot trees"[1]. Here a pony path left the shores of the Sutlej and led about twenty miles to Nuk, a large city, almost as large as Gartok despite the prominence given to Gartok on the maps. From Nuk to Nursum was a distance of about sixty miles over a number of mountain passes averaging 15,000 feet in height. At Nursum, traders usually rested before they faced a bitterly cold wind in the ascent to the Ayi La (18,700 feet). Having gained the crest of the Ayi La, the caravans then began a 2,000-foot descent to Gartok, the capital of Western Tibet. From Nursum to Gartok over the Ayi La was a distance of thirty-five miles. The total distance from Simla to Gartok was approximately 320 miles. The following is a rather dismal description of Gartok:

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[1]Capt. R. Hammond, "Through Western Tibet in 1939", The Geographical Journal, Vol. 99, January, 1942, p. 11.

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> We halted only one day at Gartok; at that time we had seen more than enough of it. We were unanimous in looking on it as one of the most dreary inhabited places we had struck in our journey - a long, broad plain, absolutely bare with a dozen wretched hovels in the middle, constitutes at this time of year what is in summer the chief trading center of Western Tibet; but in summer traders are said to collect in large numbers, living in tents[1].

Quite possibly, the author of the above quotation might have had a much more favorable impression of Gartok had he visited the capital of western Tibet in the summer-time when traders from Kashmir, Lallakh, Yarkand, Khotan, Spiti, Lahul, and Simla gathered there for business and amusement. These nomadic peoples traded wool, horses, tea and other commodities and were also keenly prepared to exhibit their equestrian talents in the many polo matches held on the open plains.

THE LADAKH AND ASSAM ROUTES

Three major trade routes to Tibet and some of the towns which were of special interest to the British in India during the initial years of this century have briefly been described. However, there were trails of lesser importance in two other districts along the British Indian-Tibetan frontier which are also worthy of mention. These

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[1]Major C. Ryder, "Explorations and Survey with the Tibet Frontier Commission and from Gyantse to Simla via Gartok", The Geographical Journal, October, 1905, p. 367 f.

tracks were located in the province of Ladakh and the district of Assam.

Much of the foreign trade from Gartok in Western Tibet was transported along the banks of the Indus River to Leh, the capital of Ladakh, a province of Kashmir which was known as Little Tibet. In the Ladakh area, the Tibetan plateau extends from the east and thus the trail from Gartok to Leh was a fairly comfortable route through the Indus Valley with no formidable mountain barriers. The approximate distance between Gartok and Leh along the Valley route was 250 miles. As early as 1825, the trade between Leh and Gartok was thus described:

> Lei is a populous city.... The people of the place call the country Ladahg. In Cashmeer it is named Buten, and in Persian and Turkish it is called Tibet, the word Tibet signifying in Turki, Shawl-wool, which is procured here most abundantly and of the finest quality.... Merchandise pays duty so much a load, and four rupees are charged on every terek weight of Cashmeer shawls, when exported to Yarkand: eight hundred horseloads of shawl-wool go annually hence to Cashmeer, each horse load weight about twenty eight tereks: the wool is obtained from the hide of the goat, but is distinct from the hair; the original wool of Toos is yielded by a kind of a deer. Tea also pays a small duty. Shawl-wool comes to Lei from Rodek and Cha-yin Than, the former lies east by south from Lei and is a dependency of it. Chan-yin Than is the name of a district, the chief city of which is named Gerduk. It is fifteen stages east of Lei and belongs to Lhasa - Lhasa is the celebrated city east of Lei about two months journey[1].

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[1]Shri Anil Chandra Das Gupta, ed., op. cit. p. 78.

Approximately 1,500 miles to the east of Leh, in the district of Assam, the Brahmaputra River flows into India from Tibet and courses about four hundred miles to the eastern border of Bengal whence it turns to eventually merge with the Ganges. In the first decade of this century a strip of territory along the banks of the upper Brahmaputra, approximately fifty miles wide and 110 miles long, constituted an unadministered buffer zone between Tibet and Assam.

The British were not inclined to send trading missions through the jungles north of the Brahmaputra to the Tibetan tableland because of the entangling jungles of the foothills, the savagery of the local tribes and the fact that no major Tibetan cities were located in eastern Tibet. Nevertheless, a long standing local trade did exist between the tribes of north east India and the Kham region of Tibet and certain British officials were very anxious to develop the trade routes in this area. One of them wrote:

> To connect India with the borders of south-east Tibet by a good mule track as a beginning would be easy, could be carried out at no great cost, and should attract trade. The attention of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce was drawn to a trade route from Assam to Tibet over forty years ago...but in those days the hill tribes were unfriendly, which made all the difference.... The banks of the river would appear specially formed for a road.... It is a natural high-way into Tibet, and only requires the hand of man to render it easy and expeditious.

> At present trade is infinitesimal. The imports which pass up to Tibet from Assam through Miju traders amount to little, and of Tibetan exports there are none. But would these conditions continue if an easy and fairly expeditious route existed? I very much doubt it. At present south-eastern Tibet, or the Rong, as the country is known, has no industries, because she has no incentive for the development of her resources. She is cut off from convenient marts on all sides. Thousands of maunds of wool are wasted annually simply because there is no market, and that not only wool of the ordinary quality, but also of the costly variety called bashm from which shawls are made. Were communications improved along the natural outlet and the line of least resistance, viz. the Lohit valley, facilities for export would be brought within the reach of all. Once the Tibetan learned that every pound of wool had a marketable value in Assam, and that Assam could be reached quickly, comfortably, and safely, and that there he could purchase tea, clothing, etc., in return for his wool, commercial interchanges would be assured, and both countries would benefit to a considerable extent. Trade intercourse just now is impossible, as Tibet is a forbidden land to the trader. But a good bridle path from the limit of British territory to Sadiya, a place in close proximity to the terminus of the Bibru-Sadiya railway, would attract the Tibetan to trade with us[1].

Although the British were, indeed, interested in extending Indian trading interests into every district along the frontier, it so happened that at the turn of the century they decided to approach Western and Central Tibet from the Punjab and Bengal. Thus the trails from Assam and Ladakh continued to be of lesser importance as far as the British

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[1]Noel Williamson, "The Lohit-Bhramaputra between Assam & South Eastern Tibet, November, 1907 to January, 1908", The Geographical Journal, July-December, 1909, p. 382-83.

were concerned. The two trade routes from Darjeeling to Gyantse were to become the means of communication between Calcutta and Lhasa, the respective capitals of India and Tibet, whereas the track from Simla to Gartok provided the Indian Government vacationing at Simla with information about the Asian caravans when they converged on Gartok, the capital of western Tibet.

The nature of the trade which was conducted along the various routes and in the towns within Tibet in the closing years of the nineteenth century can perhaps be best described as "peddling". Everyone in Tibet, commoners, monks and officials, traded according to the peddler system. Under this system Tibetans were accustomed to travel great distances, together as families, with their goods piled on ponies and yaks to trade as they went along. Since the head of every family was a "traveling salesman" shops, as such, were almost unknown. As early as 1885, it was to be noted that the peddling system prevailed "from Cashmere in the west, from whence Indian goods and rupees are obtained, to Ta-tsien-lu, in China, on the east, and to the Shan States, east of Burmah"[1].

For decades, the Nepali, Bhutanese, Lepchas, Sikkimese, and Plains Indians shared in the peddling system

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[1]Charles H. Lepper, "Thibet", The Nineteenth Century, September, 1885, p. 413.

with the Tibetans. The Tibetans and their other Buddhist neighbours were accustomed to give the trade negotiations a religious sanction. A formal relationship was instituted to ensure hospitality and protection for traders in foreign countries. This relationship between the two parties who entered into it was called ingzong by the Lepchas, re-koo by the Bhutanese and mit by the Nepali. Literally, the name of the religious rite meant "like a younger brother" and thus each partner of the relationship was to be treated like a younger brother when he visited his neighbour's country.

For the formal establishment of the ingzong bond it was necessary to kill a pig and offer its intestines to the gods. In particular, the offering was made to Komsithing, the Lepcha spirit who supposedly invented the relationship. A feast was then held and after the pig was eaten the two contracting parties swore to help each other and never to think nor do evil to one another. Then an old, respected man prepared the rite of sakyoufaat, the sacrifice of butter. He filled the cup with strained chi (tea) and smeared four dabs of butter around the sides. Next the old man addressed the two ingzong and explained to them the seriousness of their responsibilities. Both the ingzong solemnized their vows by drinking out of the cup and eating two dabs of butter. If either of them thereafter broke his vow, it was said that Komsithing would send the devil, Sankyor moong, to punish him.

It was also said that Komsithing invented the ingzong in the early days of creation with all the foreigners; "with the Nepali for their pigs, with the Plains Indians for their copper vessels, with the Bhutanese for their fine cloth, with the Tibetans for their rugs, and with the Sikkimese for their oxen"[1].

Another aspect of the trade pattern between Tibet and its neighbours was that of monopolistic privilege enjoyed by certain of the border peoples. The Government of Tibet, after 1800, became ambivalent about its trade policy with its neighbours. The Tibetans wanted foreign goods but did not want to have any "contaminating contact" with peoples outside of Tibet. So they provided for a system of middlemen in the buffer zones. The Ladakhis were given the woolen monopoly between western Tibet and Kashmir; the Tromos were given a monopoly for general trade between Tibet and Bengal; Chinese coolies carried the tea trade from Ta-tsien-lu to eastern Tibet; the Mijus had the salt monopoly between eastern Tibet and Assam, and in the same area the Digaros held a cartel on Indian goods.

The Mijus were a tribe who lived along the Tibetan border due east of the town of Sadiya, in Assam. The Digaros

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[1]Geoffrey Gorer, AK5 Lepcha File, Microcard 91, p. 118, Human Relations Area Files, New Haven, Conn., 1956.

were a related tribe who inhabited the foothills from the British borders to about halfway between Sadiya and Rima. For generations the Digaros had come to trade at the Indian marts gathering all sorts of Indian and British goods which they brought back to the hills to trade with the Mijus for salt and other Tibetan products. The Digaros jealously guarded their "middleman" rights and prevented the Mijus from coming in and conducting their own trade in India[1]. Towards the close of the nineteenth century, however, other tribes in Assam had considerably weakened the trading syndicates of the Mijus and Digaros. By 1900, many tribes who lived along the southern slopes of the Himalayas from Bhutan to Burma were known to the British. The Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors, Mishmis, etc. preferred to live in the lower country, not higher than 5,000 feet, whereas the Tibetans did not wish to live below 9,000 feet of altitude[2]. Thus there was an uninhabited belt along the mountains. Yet the Assamese tribes had to obtain salt so they were accustomed to trade the products of their forests - skins, bamboos, canes and medicinal plants with the Tibetans for salt.

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[1] cf. F.J. Needham, The Geographical Journal, January-June, 1904, p. 400.

[2] cf. F.M. Bailey, China, Tibet, and Assam: A Journey, 1911, p. 142-3.

Personal trade negotiation observed along the Tibet-Assam border present an interesting picture of one aspect in the commercial life of the people.

> The people here bargain in a curious way which I have seen employed in Turkistan, more especially in the purchase of horses. The two bargainers join hands under their long sleeves and by holding certain fingers they make each other offers. Every now and then one of them will frantically withdraw his hand with ejaculations of disgust at the meanness of the offer made. The long sleeves prevent the interested spectators from knowing what offers are made[1].

Quite often trade in Tibet took the form of barter, for example, a horse might be exchanged for a number of sheep. But as the quantity of goods imported from British India to Tibet expanded, the custom of barter became very cumbersome. Likewise in eastern Tibet, it became necessary to establish some monetary standard for the Chinese-Tibetan trade. Tibet, then, came to follow a double and finally a triple standard currency system. Throughout the country hundreds of thousands of Indian rupees circulated till they made their way to Ta-tsien-lu. On the other hand, many bricks of different quality tea passed from China all the way to Kashmir. The tea was stamped with "gold leaf" patches and according to the quality they, too, were accepted as currency. Eventually the Chinese decided to assert their authority in Tibet and to substitute a Chinese rupee, a coin struck in Szechuan Province, for the Indian

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[1]F.M. Bailey, op. cit., p. 114.

rupee which was in wide circulation in Tibet. The Chinese rupee was similar in size, weight and almost so in pattern to the Indian rupee. The Chinese wanted their rupee to be of value equal to the Indian rupee but the British would not accept any but Indian currency coming out of Tibet and thus the Chinese rupee, in the districts bordering on India, fell in value to twelve annas (three-quarters of a rupee) much to the displeasure of the Chinese. On the eastern border of Tibet, however, the Chinese rupee was not influenced so much by British standards and the Chinese rupee thus had a higher value than the Indian coin. The following is a descriptive comparison of the Chinese and Indian rupees that were used in Tibet:

> The Chinese rupee is the exact size of an Indian rupee; on one side is the Emperor of China's head, on the other side a Chinese inscription which means: 'Szechuan Provincial Manufacture'.
>
> The ornamentation on the rupee and even on the Emperor's clothes is copied from the Queen Victoria Indian rupee. The people do not understand small change and would usually give a rupee's worth of small change together with some copper coins for a whole rupee. In the same way they did not like the new King George V or even King Edward Rupee, and would give some copper coins with these for a Queen Victoria rupee, to which they were accustomed. A rupee is frequently called a 'company' which takes us back many years. The Tibetans have curious names for the different rupees: the very old Queen Victoria coin without a crown is called 'two tails' referring to the way in which the Queen's hair is done; the crowned Queen is called the 'Old rupee'; King Edward's coin is called 'lama's head', as he

is supposed to have a shaven head; while King George V's coin is called 'Lopon's head'. Lopon Rimpoche is the Tibetan name for the Indian saint Padma Sambhava, who introduced Buddhism into Tibet; King George's crown resembles that on the images of this saint[1].

Having taken a brief glance at some of the practises and currencies native to Tibet, it is now time to consider some of the important products of the Indian-Tibetan trade. Tibet received from British India, grain and pulse, Indian and non-Indian cotton piece goods, dyeing materials, metals, silk, sugar, tobacco, woolen piece goods, looking glasses, beads, matches, pen-knives, etc.; the exports being wool, borax, gold, salt, yaks, ponies, mutton, and yak tails. But the chief import to Tibet was, perhaps, tea and that came from the western provinces of China[2].

The Tibetans were inveterate tea drinkers. During the first decade of the century it was estimated that the three million inhabitants of Tibet consumed twenty million pounds of tea yearly. The Tibetans were so enamored of tea that it was transported over 1,500 miles from China to the Tibetan tea gardens of Darjeeling and even farther still to the provinces of Ladakh and Kashmir. The Chinese made a brand of tea especially for the Tibetans. It was made from

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[1]F.M. Bailey, op. cit., p. 69.

[2]cf. G.G. Tsybihoff, "Journey to Lhasa", The Geographical Journal, January-June, 1904, p. 92-97.

the coarsest of leaves which were mixed with twigs. Once the tea was prepared, it was then formed into bricks and weighed carefully. The bricks were inspected and graded. The quality of tea was indicated by various wrappers of yellow and red paper which were then stamped with a wooden block with Chinese and Tibetan characters. Seals and patches of gold leaf were also attached to the outside to indicate the quality. When the bricks were finally wrapped, they were put into a bundle bound by a bamboo matting and were thus ready for transport to Tibet by coolie or yak. At the border town of Ta-tsien-lu the tea was unpacked to be sewn up into rawhide bundles for transport to Lhasa or farther. Such a bundle of tea was called in Tibetan, a 'cha-gam' or 'tea-chest' and as already mentioned, in certain districts they had the value of currency.

The families of Tibet prepared the tea in the following way. First, a block of "brick tea" was boiled, then butter was added and salt sprinkled according to taste. When the mixture was well churned, it constituted the favorite Tibetan drink. Tea was the chief beverage, so much so that it became a custom of the people to invite friends to come and "drink tea" when an invitation to dinner was really intended. Tea was also added to a type of parched, ground barley called Tsam pa or Tsang pa to produce a paste soft and moist. Moreover, this Tsam pa paste was the staple diet of Tibet.

The Tibetans shared a proclivity for tea with the British, an inclination that played a large part in Indian-Tibetan relations. Whereas the traditional supply depot for the tea consumed in Tibet was western China, the British source of supply was India. The tea plant was introduced to India from China in 1833 when experimental plantations were established in the district of Kumaon in the Himalayas. However, attention was soon directed to a tea plant indigenous to Assam as it was better suited than the China plant for cultivation in India. Nevertheless, the Indian plant, Thea Assamida, was thought to be a degenerate of the Chinese variety and it was not until after 1837 when huge tracts of wild Assamese tea were discovered that the first shipment was exported to Britain. Thea Assamica was accepted on the British market. By 1854, the largest plantations were under the control of the famous Assam Company and India was annually exporting 250,000 pounds of tea[1].

Plantations of Assamese tea were then started in Cachar and Sylet and the Darjeeling plantations went into operation in 1858-59. By 1906, India was producing a grand total of 221,068,000 pounds of tea per year[2]. Four-fifths

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[1] cf. H.A. Antrobus, History of the Assam Company, p.43.

[2] cf. W.G. Freeman & S.E. Chandler, The World's Commercial Products, p. 148 f.

of India's tea producing area bordered on Tibet and it was little wonder that India's tea producers wanted to enter Tibet and try to break the Chinese monopoly on tea.

In western Tibet, wool was by far the most important commodity as it passed across the lofty table-lands, through Ladakh and down to the weavers of Kashmir. The Tibetans gathered the flocks of small pashmina goats together and lifted the long black hair to collect soft, fine, white wool next to the skin. The harvesting was done in the summertime when the wool could be easily picked from the living animal for weaving into the pashmina cloth for which Kashmir was celebrated[1].

Kashmir was the great center of shawl production and for centuries the princes and nobles of India eagerly sought after the expensive Kashmir shawls. There were two main forms in the production of shawls. The pattern of the tili or kanikar shawl was elaborated on the loom; that of the amlikar was done by means of a needle. The shawl done in loom work was the more expensive though a profusion of needlework on a loom shawl was an indication of inferior workmanship. The shawl industry was at first confined to Kashmir state but colonies of weavers settled in Amritsar, Nurpur, Ludhiana and Lahore and thenceforth

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[1]cf. J. Duncan, A Summer Ride Through Western Tibet, p. 61.

shawls were produced at these centers. However, the weavers outside of Kashmir found it difficult to obtain the pashm wool of Tibet and they began to produce cheap imitations of the original shawl. Soft forms of wool were found in Persia and Australia and these substitutes for the true pashm were imported into Bombay and carried to Amritsar, Nurpur, Ludhiana, Lahore and even to Kashmir itself. The substitute wool was either mixed with a small amount of Tibetan pashm or used in its pure form to make shawls, piece goods, etc., and then it was sold in Britain and America, as well as in India, as true pashmina. Thus in all the 'cashmere' products sold outside of India only a small fraction of Tibetan pashm was used in their manufacture[1]. Nevertheless, the British wanted pashm and they were constantly in search of ways and means of obtaining this valuable product.

In almost all of the chief rivers of the Himalayas gold was found in small quantities and the sifting of gold provided a winter occupation for the inhabitants when farming was at a standstill. Many primitive cradles for gold washing were located on the Indus and its tributaries as well as along the Sutlej, but in the early nineteen hundreds, the results were too insignificant to raise the

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[1]cf. Imperial Gazeteer of India, Vol. 3, p. 212.

gold operations to the status of an industry. The gravels of the Brahmaputra and conjoining streams were also known to contain gold but no serious attempt had been made to exploit it[1]. Yet from antiquity the gold fields of Rudok and Thok Jalung had been worked and many fabulous tales concerning the wealth of these regions evolved.

Herodotus wrote of how the ants of Tibet which were "smaller than dogs but larger than foxes" mined for gold and this explanation was commonly thought of as a flight of the imagination[2]. But this account of Herodotus was discovered to be a very good description of the marmots, or rat-hares of Tibet, which throw out sand from their burrows with particles of gold mixed in it. Herodotus merely copied Megasthenes who once related that Indian ants dug gold out of the ground not for the sake of the metal but to make burrows for themselves, (Arrian, Indica, XV)[3]. And Pliny, in his fourth book, also recorded that, "The sands of the Indus have long been celebrated for the production of gold". Such references in ancient documents must have spurred the British on as they became increasingly interested in the hidden regions of Tibet. Yet, in 1907,

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[1] cf. S.G. Burrard & H. Hayden, The Geography and Geology of the Himalaya Mountains & Tibet, P. 355.

[2] J. Duncan, op. cit., p. 291.

[3] Megasthenes was an ancient historian of India. "About 302 B.C. Seleucus sent the Greek Megasthenes as ambassador to the Mauryan court; he wrote an account of the empire in his leisure moments". P. Spear, India., p. 54.

the real value of the gold deposits in Tibet was thus assessed: "the output of the Tibetan fields, however, is quite unknown, a circumstance to which the many stories of their fabulous wealth are no doubt to be attributed"[1]. Several years after the above statement was made, Lovatt Fraser expressed these sentiments concerning the wealth of the Tibetan gold fields:

> The saucer-like depressions amid the high places of western Tibet, produced by glacial action in the days when the mountains towered eight miles towards the skies, probably contain the richest deposits of placer gold in the world. A pannikin of soil washed anywhere in these cups reveals visible traces of flake gold. Riches beside which the wealth of Klondike would seem meagre lie in the heart of a vast inhospitable emptiness, rarely traversed by man[2].

Such optimism, as that expressed by Fraser with respect to gold, was typical of all British commercial interests in Tibet. The actual value of the wool, salt, and other minerals was of microscopic importance to the Indian economy as a whole. But the British persisted in the hope that they could make substantial gains if the Tibetans would buy Indian tea, if Tibetan gold was exported to India, etc. Thus it was the <u>potential</u> value of the Tibetan trade rather than its <u>actual</u> value at any time that incited the British to press for commercial advantages in Tibet.

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[1] Burrard & H. Hayden, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 355.

[2] L. Fraser, <u>India Under Curzon & After</u>, p. 94.

THE ROADS FROM SIKHIM INTO TIBET.



Journey through WESTERN TIBET

by Capt. R. Hamond

1939

Scale 1/1 250 000

0 10 20 30 40

Miles

Route —×—

Pass

Heights in feet

T I B E T

I N D I A

79° 80°

32° 31° 30°

Gargunsa

Gartang

Leo Pargial 22280

Shipki La

Shipki Kiuk

Tyak

Korang

Miyang (Ma Dzong)

Shiring La

Nuk

Luk

Ryder

Op

Kyinipuk

Tibu

Dunkar

Poor

Rawling & Bailey

Töling

Tseri La 14600

Mangnang

Mangnang Tsangpo

Dapa Dz.

Dapa Chu

Nershan P.

Jindu Chu

Sutlej

Ram Singh

Kamet 25447

Niti P.

Tun Jun La

Rim Kin P.

Bara Hoti

Niti

Chor Hoti P.

Malari

Dhauli

Surai Thota

Dunagiri 23184

Alaknanda

Tapoban

Rishiganga

Kuari P.

Kaliaghat

Nanda Devi 25645

Ramni

Trisul 23360

Ghat

Swiss Party

Kanol

Wan

Pindar

Baijnath

Ranikhet

Ramganga

Almora

Anari La

Tanga La

Somar G.

Dadu La

Op Chu

Kheri

Kheri Lapcha 14800

Tangtang

Tunjin Lapcha

Piridung Lapcha 14950

Rabgyeling G.

Dangi Lapcha 15100

Dupgarh La 15900

Lajungmal 15850

Dongpara 15400

Rupagong

Sangtong 15900

Raymik La 15400

Depchi Lapcha

Joktse

Tanglang Lapcha

Shangtse Lapcha

Shang Ft.

Debling La

Shangtse Dz.

Phalang Ralrol

Laoche La 18510

Nursum

Ayi La 18700

Dakdum La

Lalungkircha La 18000

Pialonglong La

Durcha Lapcha La 17425

Kiumba

Tsamba Gon Tso

Gartok

Bogo La 19220

Choko La

Zaskar Range

Kailas Range



A tracing from the Times Atlas of the World (1958) Vol. I, Plate 23, with additional information from the Survey of India's Map of the Northern Frontier, July 1905, Reg. No. 285–S.05, Sheet No. 14S.E.; and *ibid.*, August 1905, Reg. No. 310–S.05, Sheet No. 22N.W.

CHAPTER TWO

"May ye long enjoy the happiness which is denied to more polished nations!"

George Bogle as quoted by Peter Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa, p.51.

Historical records indicate that the Himalayas have never been a complete barrier to communication but only in recent times have military and political reasons led to their being traversed. Traditional penetration has been more apparent in cultural and trade movements. For example, about the first century A.D., Mahayana or Greater Vehicle Buddhism developed in Northwest India and thence it spread across the mountains into Central Asia. "Chinese Buddhist pilgrims journeying to India have provided historians with priceless information about India in the first ten Christian centuries"[1]. Just as India had contact with China even before the birth of Christ so did Europe have contact with Central Asia.

Considerable evidence exists to show that the West had made contact with Tibet long before the British made their celebrated efforts in the latter part of the eighteenth century. While Augustus directed the reconstruction of Rome, merchants transported China silks across a Himalayan trade route through India en route to the patrician villas of Rome[2].

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[1]P. Spear, op.cit, p. 66.

[2]cf. M.P. Charlesworth, Trade Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire, p. 99; R. Grousset, The Rise and Splendor of the Chinese Empire, p. 77.

Even before the Golden Age of Rome, the Greeks in Egypt knew of the Tibetans referring to them as Bautae, a name probably derived from the primitive Tibetan religion of Bod[1]. References to Tibet are also found in the writings of several travellers of the Middle Ages, Marco Polo, Odoric of Pordenone, Ibn Batuta and Rashid-eddin and others. Jesuit missionaries made attempts to establish Christianity in Tibet in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries[2]. The first Jesuits came to Lhasa by way of Peking in 1661 and set up a mission there which was later directed by the Capuchins until the project was dropped in the 1740's. During the following decades, Europe again lost contact with Tibet so that by the time Warren Hastings became Governor General of India in 1772, Tibet was well on its way to becoming the closed country it is today. Moreover, the closure of Tibet to the West can be measured in proportion to Chinese consolidation in that region.

In the seventh Christian century, Tibet experienced the fullest political ascendency in its history. Song-tsan Gam-po established his capital in Lhasa and the might of the Tibetan tribes was felt well within the present borders of China and India. Recognizing his power, members of the

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[1]cf. A.C. Das Gupta, ed., The Days of John Company - Selections from the Calcutta Gazette, p. 78.

[2]cf. John a Correia, Jesuit Letters and Indian History, p. 154.

T'ang dynasty of China (618-907 A.D.) thought it expedient to enter into alliance with Song-tsan and thereafter Chinese power gradually spread across Tibet. But it was probably not until the Mongols established the Yuan rule (1279-1368 A.D.) that China began to claim suzerainty over Tibet. Certainly not until the advent of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1644 did China have the practical means of effecting her rule in Tibet[1].

A bond of Sino-Tibetan relations was the Buddhist faith which had been transplanted from its birth place in the Indian Himalayas to Tibet where it was consolidated as the regional religion by Song-tsan Gam-po[2]. A religious reform was undertaken towards the end of the fourteenth century by Tsong Ka-pa who founded the reformed or Yellow Sect. This sect provided a system of incarnate lamas within the monasteries. The tribes of Mongolia readily adopted the religion of the Yellow Sect and thus a Mongolian chieftain, Altan Khan, at the end of the sixteenth century conferred on the lama of Lhasa the title of Dalai which means "the all embracing one"[3]. The Ch'ing monarchs recognized the power of the Dalai Lama and in their estab-

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[1]cf. K. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, p. 334.

[2]cf. Sir Charles Bell, The Religion of Tibet, p. 34

[3]Ibid. p. 115.

lishment of a Chinese protectorate in Tibet provided by a constitutional definition in 1751 that the Dalai Lama become the temporal as well as the religious ruler of Tibet[1]. In order to maintain Chinese control in Tibet, two Chinese residents, an Amban and an assistant Amban were appointed to reside, respectively, in the two major Tibetan cities of Lhasa and Shigatse.

The temporal authority of the Dalai Lama was thus restricted by the presence of the Chinese Ambans and also by the Tashi, or Panchen Lama who resided in the monastery of Tashilumpo near Shigatse. The Dalai Lama attempted to govern the country through his Chief Minister and a cabinet of four, the Khalons or Shapes, who were collectively referred to as the Kashak[2], There was no provision in the 1751 constitution for the temporal authority of the Tashi Lama. Yet in 1758 when the Dalai Lama died, the Tashi began to exercise a temporal control far beyond the immediate surroundings of Shigatse and his position began to threaten that of the infant Dalai Lama at Lhasa[3]. The Tashi Lama became well respected in the Court of the Chinese Emperor and it was mainly through the efforts of the Lama at Shigatse that the first British mission to Tibet was made possible.

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[1]cf. S. Wells Williams, The Middle Kingdom: China, Vol. 1, p. 255.

[2]cf. H.E. Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 21

[3]Ibid. p. 59.

The British mission to Tibet was prompted by several motives. The East India Company hoped to develop an overland trade route to tap the riches of western China, a route to contravene the restrictions on trade imposed at Canton[1]. Perhaps the chief attraction of the Tibetan market in the eighteenth century was the supposition that Tibet would continue to buy progressively more from India than it sold and that the balance would be offset by specie. The lure of precious metal was an intense attraction since the East India Company was constantly beset with the problem of finding the means to balance its own trade with Britain[2]. The foundations of Bengal trade with Tibet were sabatoged in the 1760's when the Gurkhas lead by Prithvi Narayan took control of the Newar states of Kathmandu in the Vale of Nepal. The people of the Newar states had close ties of religion and race with Lhasa whereas Narayan's tribes were Hindu. Thus the trade which passed along the traditional routes, from the Gangetic plain through Nepal to Tibet, experienced a marked decline and naturally the Bengal authorities looked for other possible and more favorable routes into Tibet. Thus, in 1771, the Court of Directors suggested that explorations be carried out in Bhutan and Assam with the hope of

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[1]cf. A.M. Davies, Strange Destiny, p. 346 and P. Moon, p.97 Warren Hastings and British India.

[2]In 1772, the Company had its application for a loan of a million pounds rejected by the Bank of England. Cf. E. Thompson & G.T. Garrett, Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India, p. 131.

finding new trade routes[1]. The following year Warren Hastings became Governor General of Bengal and soon directed the British occupation of Bhutan[2]. The Gurkhas who, perhaps, had similar designs on Bhutan sent a warning to the Tashi Lama of the British activities. Thus in March, 1774, a letter from the Tashi protesting the British expedition against Bhutan, a Tibetan dependency, reached Calcutta. Hastings saw this as a good chance of establishing firm relations with Tibet so he sent George Bogle out in May, 1774, on a friendly mission to the Tashi.

Bogle was instructed to pursue a fourfold objective. He was to secure a treaty of "amity and commerce" with Tibet with mutual trade passing between Bengal and Tibet. Secondly, Bogle was to note carefully the markets and resources of Tibet so that Bengal could plan her future commercial activities with the peoples beyond the mountains. Thirdly, B ogle was asked to examine Sino-Tibetan relations to see to what extent Tibet could be used to further British commercial and diplomatic interests in China. And lastly, Hastings asked that Bogle report on all aspects of Tibetan life to satisfy the Governor-General's own curiosity[3].

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[1] cf. Y.J. Taraporewala (ed.), Fort William-India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, p. 80.

[2] cf. Capt. L.J. Trotter, Warren Hastings, p. 71.

[3] cf. Y.J. Taraporewala, ibid., p. 658.

When Bogle arrived at Shigatse, he met the Tashi Lama and established a firm friendship with him during a five-month stay in Tibet[1]. This friendship had some important results. For although very little was done to open an alternate trade route through Bhutan, the Tashi approved of a British-Bhutanese Agreement signed in the Spring of 1775; a treaty of friendship between Bhutan and the East India Company that was signed subsequent to the British deliverance of the Raja of Cooch Bihar and the reclamation of his lands from the Bhutanese[2]. According to the treaty, the people of Bhutan, who lived in a perpetual state of civil war, promised to allow some trade to pass through their country between Bengal and Tibet. Although Warren Hastings did patronize an annual trade fair at Rangpur on the Bengal frontier, the rulers of Bhutan continued for some time to harass merchants passing through their country.

Perhaps the most significant feature of Bogle's mission to Tibet was that it reinforced Hasting's hope that Tibet might be a key to China for the British, especially since the Tashi Lama had some very close friends at the Court in Peking. The Court of Directors were unanimous in the belief that Bogle's visit to Tibet was only a preliminary to further Bengal relations with that country.

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[1]cf. F.E. Younghusband, India and Tibet, p. 24.

[2]cf. Earl of Ronaldshay, Lands of the Thunderbolt, p. 198.

Preparations were begun for a second Bogle mission to Tibet in 1779. The main purpose of this proposed trip was the furtherance of the British position in the Anglo-Chinese trade. Hastings hoped to exploit the Tashi Lama's friendship with the Chinese emperor and bring about a British mission to Peking. Hastings wrote:

> I am inclined to hope that a communication may be opened with the Court of Peking, either through his (the Tashi) mediation or by an Agent of the Government; it is impossible to point to the precise advantages which either the opening of new channels of trade, or in obtaining redress of grievances, or extending the privileges of the Company may result from such an Intercourse[1].

Certain facts account for the Governor-General's hope that Tibet would be the British gateway to China. For one, the purchase of Chinese tea was draining off profits from the Indian economy. If the British could increase their sales of manufactured goods to China, then the quantity of bullion needed to finance the tea trade would be reduced. The British desired, as well, to open direct communication with the Court of Peking for this added financial reason: Bogle estimated that the British merchants at Canton were then owed vast sums amounting to a total of between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 pounds[2]. Often the members of the Company were "harassed and

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[1]Alastair Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767-1905, p. 16.

[2]cf. W. Eberhard, A History of China, p. 286.

oppressed" and thus Hastings hoped, through his Tibetan contacts, to establish British representation at the Court of the Chinese Emperor in Peking.

Bogle's second mission to Tibet had to be postponed, however, when news was received that the Tashi Lama was preparing to go to Peking to present his respects to the Emperor. The Tashi Lama, though, promised to secure passports and send them to India so that Bogle could proceed to Peking by way of Canton. But the Bogle story was about to come to an abrupt and unfortunate conclusion for the British. In 1780, before he obtained the passports, the Tashi Lama died of smallpox in Peking. The following year, Bogle died and Hastings was deprived of the man who had the the most experience in Tibetan affairs and who was well liked by the government of that country[1].

Despite the setback incurred by Bogle's death, Hastings continued his efforts to improve the Company's relations with Tibet. In 1783, he sent his kinsman, Samuel Turner, to Tashilumpo to pay respects to the newly born incarnation of the Tashi Lama. Since the new authority at Tashilumpo was now controlled by a regent, Hastings and his colleagues were aware that the British would achieve no immediate advantage from the visit. The main purpose of

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[1]cf. H.E. Richardson, Op. cit., p. 66.

Turner's visit, then, was to cement the good relations between India and Tibet established by the Bogle mission of 1774-75[1]. The long range view was foremost in the Company's mind as reflected in Turner's words in 1784:

> Whenever a regular intercourse takes place between the agents of the Government of Bengal and the Chiefs of Tibet, I shall consider it to be the sure basis of an intercourse with China: and it will probably be, by the medium of the former, that we shall be enabled to arrive at Peking[2].

Turner's diplomacy at Tashilumpo was effective in that the safe passage of Indian merchants through Bhutan was guaranteed. In February of 1785, a caravan set out from India carrying cloth, clocks, snuff boxes, pocket knives, gloves, scissors, etc. which it hoped to exchange for gold dust, silver, yak tails (used as fly fans) and wool. As a result, a profitable trade seems to have taken place but by the time the caravan had returned from Tashilumpo with a report Warren Hastings had already set out for England.

In the years immediately following Hastings' departure from India, the British noted that there was an increased volume of trade between India and Tibet. There was a steady flow of letters of good will which passed from Tashilumpo to Bengal. To the Court of Directors, however, the local trade between Bengal and Tibet was of small

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[1]F. Younghusband, Op. cit., p. 27.

[2]A. Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia, The Road to Lhasa, 1767-1905, p. 18.

importance when compared with the chief British aim which was penetration into the Emperor's Court at Peking.

George Macartney was Governor of Madras from 1780-1785. In the latter year, he resigned his governorship because of an argument with the Bengal authorities. Nevertheless, the following year the Board of Control offered him the position of Governor-General in place of Warren Hastings. The offer was refused. But in 1791, Macartney who had been a diplomat to Russia, a Governor in India, and who had a wide circle of political friends and the trust of the Directors of the East India Company, was offered by the British Government the appointment of ambassador to China. Having accepted the position, Lord Macartney set out from England in 1792 to obtain an interview with the Emperor of China with a hope of establishing a British representative at Peking[1].

Simultaneously with Macartney's mission, the Gurkhas of Nepal invaded the Tibetan territory of the Tashi Lama for the second time within three years. In 1789, when the first invasion had taken place, the Tibetans remembered the friendship promised by Hastings' envoys, Bogle and Turner, and had requested aid from the British to repulse the Gurkhas. Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, preferred not to get

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[1]cf. J.L. Cranmer-Byng (ed.), An Embassy to China: Lord Macartney's Journal, 1793-94.

embroiled in a costly and difficult mountain war so he sent a declaration of neutrality to Tibet. In 1792, when the Gurkhas again invaded Tibet the British again received envoys from both the Gurkhas and their Tibetan-Chinese opponents.[1] This time the Tibetans and Chinese did not request aid from India but only a continued pledge of neutrality. It did not take long for the superior Tibetan-Chinese forces to crush the Gurkhas and peace again settled on the Himalayan lands[2]. But the luster of British friendship, so shining in the days of Bogle and Turner, had been tarnished in the Tibetan mind as a result of this mountain war[3].

Macartney's Embassy arrived at Canton in December, 1793. Thence he proceeded to meet the Emperor at Jehol but on the way he was greeted by a complete surprise. The Chinese were angry, accusing the British of collusion with Nepal in the recent Nepalese-Tibetan war. In his diary, on the 16th of August, 1793, Macartney wrote; "I was very much startled with this intelligence, but instantly told them that the thing was impossible and that I could take it upon me to contradict it in the most decisive manner"[4].

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[1]cf. Y.J. Taraporewala (ed.), Fort William - India House Correspondence, Vol. 17, p. 207.

[2]cf. G. Jain, India Meets China in Nepal, p. 104.

[3]cf. Capt. L.G. Trotter, Warren Hastings, p. 73.

[4]J.L. Cranmer-Byng, Op. cit., p. 86.

Macartney could not overcome the Chinese wrath and thus his mission ended in failure[1]. He was convinced that British India's interference in China's Himalayan border areas was a major factor in his failure to place a representative at Peking. The Ambassador was well aware of India's neutrality during the war but he was also quite conscious of Peking's sensitivity of any foreign activity within her borders, especially when those territories were thousands of miles removed from central authority.

The consequences of the Gurkha war with Tibet and the subsequent failure of the Macartney mission effected Britain's policy towards China, India's policy towards Tibet, China's policy in Tibet and Tibetan policy towards India for the following hundred years. Britain gradually ceased to regard Tibet as a possible key to China but came to regard it as a probable friction point in Anglo-Chinese relations. India's policy towards Tibet, as dictated by the Secretary of State, became a policy of non-interference in Tibetan affairs in deference to the overall design of imperial policy. The story of Thomas Manning's visit to Tibet, in 1811, is a significant example of this new trend in British policy towards Tibet.

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[1]cf. E.R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World, p. 15; and N. Peffer, China: The Collapse of a Civilization, p. 54.

During his university days, Thomas Manning had developed a passionate interest in the Chinese empire and resolved to see it for himself. He made his way to Canton where he stayed for three years. Then, in 1810, he obtained a letter of introduction from the Select Committee of Canton to Lord Minto, the Governor-General of India, with the hope that Minto would aid him to gain entrance to China by way of Tibet. The Government of India, however, now refused to sponsor any mission across the Himalayas due to the failure of Macartney's mission. Thus, without any official recognition, Manning, with a Chinese servant, set out for Tibet in the summer of 1811. Surprisingly, Manning's eccentric manners delighted both the Chinese and Tibetans; he was received wonderfully well and given an official escort to the court of the Dalai Lama. But Manning's mission was of little benefit to the British cause as he visited Lhasa as a private individual and not as a representative of the Indian Government[1].

After the Gurkha-Tibetan war of 1792, China began to exercise a firm control in Tibet and the threat of Chinese power became more widely recognized. Soon there were few lamas who would dare to act as independently of the Government as did the sixth Tashi Lama in his relations with Bogle and the Bengal traders. As for Tibetan policy

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[1]cf. F. Younghusband, Op. cit., p. 34.

towards India, it was the reverse, in 1800, of what it had been in 1775. Even when relations between the two countries had been most cordial Bogle had warned the British of the deep Tibetan suspicion of foreigners. He wrote:

> I was at much pains during my stay among the inhabitants of Bhutan and Tibet to remove their prejudices; but I am convinced that they can be effectually conquered only by the opportunities which a greater intercourse and more intimate acquaintance with the English may afford them of observing their fidelity to engagements, and the moderation of their views, and by an interchange of those good offices which serve to beget confidence between nations as well as between individuals[1].

Hastings, through Bogle and Turner, had accomplished a great deal in dispelling Tibetan prejudices against the British. But when the British, with sound reason, refused to take sides in a mountain war the good will of the Tibetans once again lapsed into a suspicion of white foreigners and their Indian Subjects. Thus the trade routes through Bhutan had to be abandoned by Bengal and, for a second time, the British looked to the trade routes through Nepal for contact with Tibet[2]. The British influence, however, which had penetrated into the heart of Tibet under the direction of Warren Hastings was not to be equaled again until the opening

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[1]C.R. Markham, Narratives of a Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa, p. 150-51 as quoted by A. Lamb, Op. cit., p. 11.

[2]cf. G. Jain, Op. cit., Appendix B: The Nepalese-Tibetan trade rights in the treaty of 1792, p. 159.

years of the 20th century when Lord Curzon pressed for improved trade relations with Tibet.

It is not true that a curtain was completely drawn between India and Tibet after the Nepalese-Tibetan war, for much trade continued to pass across the Indian-Tibetan frontier through Nepal, but more especially in the North West, in the Ladakh area. The kingdom of Ladakh became independent in the 15th century under a line of Tibetan kings who payed homage to the Grand Lama of Lhasa[1]. Ladakh territory bounded the Tibetan border from the Himalayas to Karakoram and separated Western Tibet from the Muslim, Sikh and Hindu states of India. Since Western Tibet was far removed from the commercial centers pf China the Tibetans in Western Tibet were more inclined to seek goods from Northern India[2]. Thus the traders of Ladakh became middle men in the passage of trade between India and Western Tibet. As early as 1680, the Government of Tibet had laid down the following principle in a memorandum to the Regent at Lhasa regarding the trading pattern with the buffer zones:

> commercial intercourse should not be stopped or interrupted. As traders travel at their convenience and pleasure at all

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[1] cf. G. Patterson, Peking vs. Delhi , and Zahiruddin Ahmad, "The Ancient Frontiers of Ladakh", The World Today, Vol. 16, No. 7, July, 1960, p. 316.

[2] cf. D. Fraser, The Marches of Hindustan, p. 124.

times and with no certainty, they should be allowed to pass freely after payment of the established customs duty on loads of goods and heads of travellers. There should be no restriction on the Khampa in passing through Tibet, which they generally do up to mid winter, but Kashmiri and Nepalese, when their governments cease to be friendly, should not be allowed admission into Tibet."[1]

The close relationship existing between Ladakh and Tibet was most manifest in the special trading mission which were exchanged between the two districts. Once every three years the Lapchak mission left Leh, the capital of Ladakh, for Lhasa headed by a monk or an abbot of Ladakhi or Tibetan nationality. The cleric was usually a prominent resident of Ladakh and was accompanied by a notable Ladakhi Muslim trader. The mission carried presents and letters from the Raja of Ladakh to the Grand Lama at Lhasa. It passed through Gartok, the central city of Western Tibet, and on the way to Lhasa in all the villages a lively trade was carried on. In return for the Ladakhi mission, the Dalai Lama authorized that an annual Chapba, or "tea man mission", be sent to Leh. The leader of this enterprise, a prominent Tibetan clerical or lay official was called the Chapba or Zungtson and as the Dalai Lama's personal representatives he visited Leh once during his three year term of office. The Chapba carried with it Chinese brick

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[3] C. Black, "New British Markets: II Tibet", The 19th Century, Vol.38, 1895, p.257.

tea for sale in Ladakh.[1]

There were other lesser connections between Ladakh and Tibet other than the Lapchak and Chapba. About every ten years, a special mission came to Leh from Tibet's great monastic centre, Tashilumpo. The garpons or governors of Gartok were also accustomed to trade with Leh. The commander of the fort at Rudok made an annual commercial visit to Ladkh. And several of the larger monasteries in Ladkh sent their missions to Lhasa every few years.

Although the official Tibetan mission to Leh was called the "tea man mission", the most important commercial product to pass from Tibet to Ladakh was shawl wool, or pashm. In 1816, this product made up almost half of the total trade. The Ladakhis had a firm monopoly on the transport of wool from the Gartok area to the Kashmir districts where it was woven into that type of shawl that became famous throughout Europe and America. In the second decade of the nineteenth century, the British began to show an avid interest in Tibetan wool and sent agents to investigate in Western Tibet, to secure some samples of shawl.[2]

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[1] cf. M. Fisher, L. Rose & R. Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, p.41.

[2] cf. R. Huttenback, "Gulab Singh & the Dogra State", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.No.4, Aug. 1961.

The Ladakhis were most careful that their monopoly be preserved and so they persuaded the garpon of Gartok to issue an edict forbidding the sale of shawl wool, on the pain of death, to anyone other than the Ladakhis.

In 1822, William Moorcroft, an official of the Indian Government, was authorized by Lord Hastings, the Governor General, to make a social visit to Ladakh during which the Gyalpo or Raja offered Moorcroft a treaty whereby Ladakh would become a British protectorate to save it from the rapid expansion of the Sikhs. Moorcroft was excited by the offer.

> "To Moorcroft, Ladakh and Western Tibet were not only the means of tapping the profitable trade in shawl wool, but also routes to the commerce of the whole of Central Asia, of which Tibet was but one small part."[1]

Since 1792, however, the Chinese had been in control of the Gartok area. They made it clear that if the British had any business to conduct with China they ought to go by sea to Peking, and not through Tibet to Peking. The Government of Britain, in turn, expressed the desire to avoid all entanglements in Tibet with either the Tibetan or Chinese authorities. Thus Moorcrofts message from the Gyalpo of Ladakh fell on deaf ears.

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[1] A. Lamb, op. cit., p.61.

The Raja of Jammu, Gulab Singh, through his general Zorawar Singh, conducted a successful invasion of Ladakh in 1834.[1] Gulab Singh conducted this attack with the tacit approval of the British. Evidently, the Dogra leader expected to benefit from the Ladakh carrying trade. But he was surely mistaken for the Tibetans opted to send shawl exports to the British states south of the Sutlej. Thus at Rampur, in 1837, there was nearly a 200% rise in imports over the 1834 figure.[2] Gulab Singh reacted by taking possession of Gartok, Rudok and the surrounding territories. This second Dogra military adventure quickly aroused British concern. The fear that the Dogras would cut the Rampur market was not an overriding concern since the woolen trade was only a tiny fragment of the fabric of the Indian economy. But Britain did fear, however, that China might, as she did in 1792 in regard to the Gurkha invasion of Tibet, consider that the Ladakh invasion was inspired and planned by Britain.

The Chinese reacted to the Dogra invasion when, in 1841, they sent 3,000 men to the aid of the Ladakhis. The Tibetans and the Chinese were handily defeated by Singh's forces and consequently the Lhasa Government sued for peace.

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1 cf. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.1, 1469-1839, p.279.

2 cf. R. Huttenback, op.cit., p.480.

There were three versions of the ensuing treaty; two were the Persian and Tibetan versions of an agreement between the Lhasa authorities and Gulab Singh and the third was the ratifying treaty between the Government of Lahore, in India, and the Emperor of China. Gulab Singh agreed to vacate the Rudok and Gartok areas of Western Tibet in return for the customary monopoly on trade between Ladakh and Tibet. These provisions were worded thus in the treaty:

> "We will carry on the trade in Shawl, Pashm, and Tea as before by way of Ladakh; and if anyone of the Shri Raja's enemies comes to our territories and says anything against the Rajah we will not listen to him, and will not allow him to remain in our country, and whatever traders come from Ladak shall experience no difficulty from our side. We will not act otherwise but in the same manner as it has been prescribed in this meeting regarding the fixing of the Ladak frontier and the keeping open of the road for the traffic in Shawl, Pashm, and Tea. This treaty was signed on about the 15th of August, 1842." 1

The Persian copy, quoted above, was in reality of peace from Lhasa, whereas the Tibetan version was a bilateral arrangement, the two contracting parties decided:

> "to sink all past difference and ill-feeling and to consider the friendship and unity between the two Kings re-established forever....
> The Ladakis shall send the annual tribute to His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, and his ministers unfailingly as heretofore and the Shri Maharajah Sahib (Gulab Singh) will not interfere with this arrangement. No restriction shall be laid on the mutual export and import of commodities - e.g., tea, piece goods, etc. - and trading shall be allowed according to the old fashioned custom. The Ladakhis shall supply the Tibetan Government traders with the usual transport animals and arrange for

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[1] As quoted by K. Panikkar, The Founding of Kashmir State, p.8

> their accommodations as heretofore and the Tibetans will also do the same to the Ladakhis who come to Tibet with the annual tribute. It is agreed that no trouble will be occasioned to the Tibetan Government by the Ladakhis." [1]

Finally, since the above treaties did not bind the suzerains of both the signees, another treaty was negotiated immediately, between the Government of Lahore and the Emperor of China. Once again trading rights were set forth:

> "Traders from Lhasa when they come to Ladakh shall, as of old, receive considerate treatment and a supply of begar (transport and labour). In case the Rajas of Ladakh should (desire to) send their usual presents to the Lama Guru Sahib of Lhasa, this will not concern us and we shall not interfere. From the other side (arrangements) shall continue in accordance with the old custom and the traders who proceed to Janthan (Cheng Thang) country shall receive considerate treatment and a supply of begar in accordance with the old custom and shall not be interfered with. The traders from Ladakh shall in no case interfere with the subjects of Janthan (Cheng Thang). Written on the second month month of Assuj, year 1899 (about the 15th of August, 1842.)" [2]

During the next forty years, the dual aim of the British in India was to improve relations with the people of Western Tibet to the end that they might break the Ladakhi monopoly of the wool trade and, that failing, to undertake road development from the British hill states to the Tibetan border. According to the 1842 treaty between the Dogras and the Tibetans, the wool monopoly continued to be held by the rulers of Ladakh. Then in 1845, the 1st Sikh War broke out during which Gulab Singh steered a cautious course of

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

neutrality and when the British annexed the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh, the government of these states was entrusted to Gulab Singh and his family in perpetuity. [1] Yet the British were afraid lest Gulab Singh might once again move into Western Tibet so they sent a frontier commission to work with Chinese officials for a settlement of the Ladakh-Tibetan frontier and to try and arrange a treaty to break the Ladakh wool monopoly. Lord Hardinge sent a letter to Hong Kong to be transmitted to Peking and thence to the Tibetan capital suggesting that Tibetan Commissioners be sent to the frontier to negotiate with British and Kashmir Commissioners. The Chinese Government chose not to send officials to its western frontier and thus the boundary was settled unilaterally by Britain and the Ladakh wool monopoly remained in force.[2]

The first part of the plan, to break the wool monopoly, having failed, the Dalhousie administration next turned to road building. In 1850, authorization was given to construct a road from the plains to the hill station at Simla with the intention of extending the road up the Sutlej to the Tibetan border. It was hoped that this Hindustan-Tibet road would induce merchants from Delhi and Amritsar to undertake the journey to Gartok in search of shawl wool.

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[1] cf. The Treaty of Lahore in The Annual Register or the Year 1846, p.309 and M.Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, p.7.

[2] cf. G.J.Alder, British India's Northern Frontier, 1867-95, p.21.

Lord Dalhousie looked "with interest to the political and commercial advantage likely to result from the opening of a line of communication with Tibet by way of China." [1] In 1858, however, this plan was practically abandoned in favor of the Grand Trunk Road. Thus neither the project to break the Ladakh wool monopoly by a British-Chinese treaty nor the plan to construct a road from India to Western Tibet succeeded and British interest in Western Tibet likewise receded. And twenty years later, when India again looked to Tibet, the impetus for action came from the district of Darjeeling rather than the valley of the Sutlej.

Early in the nineteenth century, it had been discerned by British merchants that there were four possible routes by which to tap the commerce of interior China. The easiest, by far, was the use of the treaty ports along the China coast where the great rivers meet the sea. Access to Chinese Turkistan was possible through Kashmir and over the Karakoram Pass. Lower Burma held a common frontier with the Chinese province of Yunnan. And lastly, India bordered on Tibet to the west of Nepal and also through Sikkim, Bhutan and across the mountains north of Assam. The economic prospects of these routes were considered enthusiastically during the 1870's. Plans were made for a survey of a Burma-Yunnan

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[1] Minutes and Correspondence relating to the Hindustan-Tibet Road, p.275, as quoted by A Lamb, op.cit., p.83.

road and in 1874 an exploring mission was sent to the border. While travelling in Yunnan in 1875, the interpreter for the mission, A.G. Margary was murdered and the British strongly suspected that his death was instigated by the Yunnan Government. A lengthy correspondence concerning the matter ensued between Britain and China and negotiations were arranged at Chefoo in the summer of 1876.[1] The outcome was the document known as the Chefoo Convention. In reparation for the hostility at Yunnan, China agreed to permit British missions to Chinese Turkistan and to Lhasa. The Tibetan mission was thus provided for in the following article of the Convention:

> "A Separate Article to the Convention: Her Majesty's Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year by way of Peking through Kan-Su and Koko-Nor, or by way of Ssu-Ch'uen to Tibet, and thence to India, the Tsung-li Yamen having due regard to the circumstances will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the high provincial authorities and to the Resident in Thibet. If the Mission should not be sent by these routes, but should be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsung-li Yamen, on receipt of a communication to the above effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident in Thibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take due care of the Mission: and pass-ports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsung-li Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed."[2]

For five years after the signing of the Chefoo Convention the British prepared themselves for an advance on Lhasa.

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[1] cf. Sir E. Herslets, (ed.), British & Foreign State Papers, Vol.71, 1879-80, pp.933-1129.

[2] Sir E. Herslets, (ed.), op.cit., p.759, The Tsung-li Yamen was the Chinese Foreign Minister.

In 1879, a cart road, over the Jelep La, was completed linking Darjeeling with the Chumbi Valley. The British had developed the tea industry in the foothills of the Himalayas and they believed that vast profits might be gained from the sale of Indian tea in Tibet. Local disputes between the Sikkimese and the Tibetans along the frontier resulted in certain stoppages of trade at Darjeeling in the early 1880's. So Colman Macauley, the Bengal Financial Secretary, was sent to investigate in 1884. Macauley's report was a very optimistic one for Indian merchants. He said there was a ready market in Tibet for English cloth, piece goods, cutlery and Indian indigo. As for Tibetan resources, "there appears to be little doubt that gold is really plentiful", and wool:" the quantity of wool available for export is known to be enormous."[1] Macauley corresponded directly with the Home Government and received permission to lead a commercial expedition to Lhasa according to the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention. Nevertheless, the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, was not so enthused about this Tibetan venture for his interest was then directed toward the Burmese situation. Because of the long standing complaints of British merchants in Rangoon and the fear of French intrigue

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[1] C. Macauley, Report on a Mission to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier, as quoted by A. Lamb, op.cit., p.157.

in Yunnan, Dufferin undertook the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886. When the Chinese realized the annexation, they expected that an annexation of Tibet might soon follow. So China was not inclined to issue passports for the Macauley mission to Lhasa. Peking argued that she could not guarantee the safety of the members of the mission once it entered Tibet and that since China did not want a repetition of the Magrary Affair, the Government thought it prudent not to issue passports for some time. The Chinese offered a permanent settlement in Burma in return for the abandonment of the Macauley mission. Lord Dufferin agreed without hesitation for he had no desire to entangle India in two border disputes with China. Thus the fourth article of the Convention relative to Burma and Thibet read:

> "Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances by the Chinese Government has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith."[1]

Thus Macauley's mission was abandoned and his plans were not realized until the first years of the twentieth century when the Younghusband expedition entered the holy city of Lhasa in 1904.

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[1] Sir E. Herslets, op.cit., "Convention between Great Britain and China, Relative to Burmah and Thibet, signed at Peking, 24 July 1886", Vol. LXXXVII, 1885-86, p.81.

CHAPTER THREE

" The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountains .... and .... a trade mart shall be opened at Yatung."

The Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893.

Although the mission provided for in the Chefoo Convention was forsaken by the British in return for a settlement of the Burmese question, Macauley's proposed mission was one important factor that precipitated an Indian-Tibetan crisis. The Tibetans became very uneasy about the British preparations for the mission, especially the road built through Sikkim up to the Jelep La. When the Government at Lhasa heard about the Macauley mission they considered it a first step to a general British advance. Thus in 1886 they decided to claim the crest of the mountains and make their stand at Longju should the British choose to advance on Tibet through Sikkim. For two years, the Tibetans stayed in the Longju district collecting taxes and controlling the administration as if it were part of the Chumbi Valley.

Because Sikkim had been a British protectorate since 1861 the Indian Government sent a force of 2,000 men, in March 1888, and this army easily drove the Tibetans out of Longju and back over the Jelep La. Nevertheless the Tibetans were stubborn and showed their determination by strongly attacking a British Garrison at Gnatong in Northern Sikkim. But at that place the Tibetans were also repulsed.

The Chinese, who claimed Tibet as part of their empire, were fearful that they might lose it so they asked the British for a settlement of the dispute. The Amban

came down to the Tibetan frontier to engage in negotiations with the British authorities. Subsequently on, 17 March 1890, Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General, and Amban Sheng Tai signed at Calcutta a Convention relative to Sikkim and Tibet.

The main purpose of the treaty was to delimit the Sikkim-Tibetan Frontier and to assess the British claim to "undivided supremacy" in Sikkim. Both of these points were made clear in the first two clauses of the Convention. Moreover, the fourth clause laid the ground work for discussions which the British Government hoped would lead to the regulation of trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier:

> "Article Four: The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers."[1]

Two other questions also reserved for further examination were pasturage of Tibetan herds and flocks on the Sikkim side of the frontier and the arrangement for officials of communication between the British and the Chinese authorities in Tibet. By the seventh clause of the Convention, two Joint-Commissioners were to be appointed, one by the British Government in India and one by the Chinese Resident in Tibet, to discuss the reserved issues of trade, pasturage and communication. On the

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1 The Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890, Cd.1920, p.7.

31st of December, 1890, the Viceroy notified the Secretary of State for India that A.W. Paul had been appointed British Commissioner.[1] The Chinese, in turn, appointed the Amban Sheng Tai, The Chief Resident in Tibet, who was to be accompanied by J.H. Hart, the Secretary to the Amban.[2]

In July 1893, the Government of India communicated to the Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, the results of nearly two and a half years of trade negotiations. The following is a sketch of the suggestions made and the compromises accepted during those negotiations.

On the 16th. of January 1891, Hart forwarded to Paul a first outline settlement containing the essence of Chinese claims which were formulated in terms of three basic suggestions: that Sikkim should enjoy the same pasturage privileges in Tibet that Tibet enjoyed on the Sikkim side of the frontier; that the Chinese officer in charge of trade in the Chumbi Valley should be the medium of communication between India and the Chinese Resident in Tibet; and that a mart should be opened at a site to be determined, with regulations and tarriffs later to be arranged.

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[1] India-Foreign to Kimberley, 4 July 1813, Ibid., p.8

[2] After the Anglo-Chinese Agreement was signed in 1858, the Chinese Government began the policy of employing in their Civil Service foreigners of several nationalities, the British outnumbering those of any other citizenship. J.H. Hart was one such official employed by the Chinese, cf. K. Latourette, op.cit., p.389.

The crux of the matter is contained in the first suggestion, from which it is clear that China was reluctant to surrender claims to that part of Northern Sikkim wherein the Tibetans had traditionally pastured their flocks. The Chinese sought some means of circumventing the Convention agreement which established a definite boundary. They realized that if the British Government permitted the Tibetans to continue to pasture their flocks in Sikkim, the Tibetans could later claim rights based on traditional occupation and thus the Chinese could maintain traditional control over Northern Sikkim, despite the Convention of 1890. To make such a suggestion more palatable to the British Government they offered a quid pro quo whereby the Sikkimese should enjoy similar pasturage privileges in Tibet. But the British were, of course, quick to note that such an agreement would be of little or no advantage to them because relatively few Sikkimese ventured into Tibet for grazing purposes. Furthermore, the British were primarily interested in maintaining their control of the whole of Sikkim south of the Himalayan crest.

The Chinese soon realized that the British were strong in their desire to enforce their control of Sikkim up to the crest of the Himalayas so they withdrew their claims for Tibetan pasturage rights in Northern Sikkim. The Chinese were forced to suggest that the Tibetans be given a limit of

time by the British Government to withdraw their cattle from Sikkim and that once the limited time expired the British Government would be free to extract taxes from those Tibetans remaining in Sikkim.

The British reaction to the other Chinese proposals as contained in the outline agreement was more favorable. The Government of India were willing to negotiate a trade agreement but they were determined to accept nothing short of free trade and free travel for all British Subjects throughout Tibet. The British felt justified in their demands for the Tibetans were already allowed to travel and trade anywhere in India. Moreover, the Government of Great Britain had officially been following a free trade policy since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and they considered it their duty to bring the benefits of free trade to Tibet and China. Whether or not this "official" reason was the only one is a moot point. Certainly the British Government were constantly concerned as to the security of the Indian frontier and wanted to be able to send into Tibet agents to watch for any indications of Chinese or Russian military activities along the Indian border.

The Government of India, acting on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, suggested to the Chinese Government that specific arrangements for trade should be made

along the following lines: that import and export duties against goods passing in either direction across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier be abolished except that in the case of arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs either of the two contracting parties should be free to impose any conditions that would be deemed necessary; that the trade mart should be located at the town of Phari and that all British Subjects should have free access to it; that British Subjects be allowed to travel freely without passport in the Chumbi Valley, but that no British Subject be allowed to travel beyond the mountains into Tibet Proper except with a passport issued by competent British Authority and countersigned by the Chinese Official at Phari; that British Subjects be allowed to sell their goods to whomsoever they pleased and to conduct their business in accordance with the local usage; that the Government of India be permitted to maintain an agent and his military escort at the town of Phari or at another town in Tibet south of Phari; that British subjects be allowed to acquire land in the town where the Agent resided so that dwellings, warehouses, shops, and other buildings might be erected; and that the trade regulations be open for revision ten years after they came into effect provided that either government gave twelve months notice.[1]

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[1]India-Foreign to Kimberley, 4 July 1893, Cd.1920, No.9, p.9.

It was most significant that the Government of India suggested that the proposed trade mart be located at the town of Phari. Phari was an important Tibetan trading town located near the crest of the Himalayas at the north end of the Chumbi Valley. Tibetans from all over Central and Eastern Tibet visited Phari to trade with merchants who came up through the Valley from India. At the same time the inhabitants of the Chumbi Valley visited Phari to obtain goods from all Tibet. Thus because of its commercial importance Phari would be the likely site for the proposed Indian-Tibetan trade mart. Moreover, the British realized that a good deal of political information might be gathered from the traders from many parts of Tibet who visited Phari. Perhaps, too, the British thought of the mart at Phari as the first step in the Indian annexation of the Chumbi Valley, an annexation that could be based on the watershed principle for though the Valley was administered by Tibet it did lie to the south of the Himalayan crest. Thus many British officials thought that the Chumbi Valley was geographically a part of India.

The Government of China was well aware of how the British had used the guise of trade in their advance across India and in their annexation of Burma and thus China was most reluctant to grant British India a foothold in Tibet. Since the British were insistent on a trade mart in Tibet

the Chinese offered the small town of Yatung as a site. Yatung was located at the foot of the Chumbi Valley only a few miles from the Sikkimese border. The Chinese were certainly not prepared to open Phari, a town which was a center of Tibetan life, to British traders and spies.

Indeed, the Chinese wanted to concede only the shadow and not the substance of Indian-Tibetan trade relations. This was clear from the tone of the letter sent by Sheng Tai, the Chinese Amban at Lhasa to Paul the British Commissioner.[1] Sheng said that he had already proposed to his Government that Yatung be opened for foreign trade and therefore it was impossible to consider Phari as a possible location. Sheng, of course, was simply side-stepping the issue for the Peking Government had no intention of allowing the British to penetrate deeply into Tibet. That is why the Amban insisted that Yatung be the site of the mart as Yatung was only a few miles across the border from Indian Territory. Moreover, the Chinese were obviously determined to limit British territorial rights at the new mart. Sheng insisted that though the British might be able to rent the buildings already erected at Yatung they would not be permitted to rent or buy Tibetan land for the erection of new buildings. Thus

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[1] Cd.1920, op.cit., p.10

the Chinese would not cede one foot of Tibetan soil to the British, even for trade purposes, nor would the Chinese even allow the British to rent additional land. In such a way the Chinese hoped to undermine the British foothold in Tibet by creating an impossible situation at Yatung.

When the British realized that the Chinese were determined to offer Yatung and no other place as the site of the trade mart the British agreed to accept Yatung. The Chinese had not been duped by the British Argument that the proposed mart be located deeply within Tibetan Territory solely for the purpose of advancing trade. The Chinese were well aware that the British would engage in political activities at the mart as well as settle commercial questions there. The British, then, had no choice other than to accept Yatung when they realized the Chinese were aware of the dual motivation behind the British desire to locate the mart at Phari. Convinced that half a loaf was better than no bread and faced with Chinese intransigence the British were forced to accept Yatung though its value was limited both from the commercial and political points of view. However, to avoid loss of prestige the British informed the Chinese that their acceptance of Yatung, though it would cut the British off from the Mochu Valley and easy access to Bhutan, was convincing proof to the Tibetans of British Indian good will towards them; which was

intended to mean, of course, that the British were only interested in the mutual economic advancement of India and Tibet.

Now that the site of the trade mart had been decided by both the British and the Chinese one more important question remained undecided. Throughout the year 1892, the trade negotiations between India and Tibet were deadlocked over the question of tea.[1] The Tibetans wanted to exclude Indian tea from their country yet they did not want the British to place any restrictions against Tibetan exports of tea and salt to Sikkim. The Indian Government could not agree to the exclusion of Indian tea from Tibet. Calcutta gave the following explanation to the Government in London:

> "Such an arrangement might not have seriously injured our tea industry, but the unfairness of the proposal was patent. The whole object of the negotiations was to facilitate trade, and to create it where it did not exist; and any such arrangement as that suggested would have almost certainly exposed us to well-grounded attacks by tea planters, Chambers of Commerce, etc."[2]

Colonel F.E. Younghusband put the case of the tea planters and the Government of Bengal in these words:

> "Speakers in Parliament scoffed at the idea of pressing tea upon the Chinese, but for the Bengal

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[1]India-Foreign to Paul, 4 June 1892, Enclosure 2, No.9, Cd.1920, p.16

[2]India-Foreign to Kimberley, 4 July 1893, Cd.1920, p.12.

> Government it is an important point. All along the low hills bordering Tibet there are numerous tea-plantations, affording both an outlet for British and Indian capital and employment for many thousands of Indian labourers. To a responsible local Government it is of importance to encourage and foster this industry. Now, just across the frontier are three millions of tea-drinkers. Tea is just the right kind of light, portable commodity most suited for transit across mountains, and it was perfectly natural, reasonable, and right that the Bengal Government should press for its admission to Tibet, that the Tibetans might at least have the chance of buying it or not, as they pleased. But the Chinese...remained obstinate."[1]

Certainly the Chinese remained obstinate for they did not want to endanger their own tea market in Tibet nor did they want to admit British traders and political agents into Tibet for fear that Tibet might fall into the British sphere of influence.

The Viceroy pressed the British position in Peking. He instructed Mr. (afterwards Sir Nicholas) O'Conor, the British Minister at Peking, to inform the Yamen that the British had made concessions by accepting Yatung and by agreeing to the Chinese prohibition on the purchase of Tibetan land within the area of the trade mart. In return, the Indian Government expected the Chinese to agree to the import of

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1 Younghusband, op.cit., p.52.

Indian tea into Tibet. The Chinese were reminded that the import of Indian tea was not forbidden under the terms of the Tientsin Treaty.[1] Actually, the British were asking for a quid pro quo for the concessions already made. In brief, the Chinese were informed that concessions had been made on other disputed points but the Government of India did not want to acquiesce in the exclusion of tea because of the pressures from tea planters which was in tune with the general British policy of free trade throughout the world.

In response to the British demands that Indian tea be admitted to Tibet the Chinese made the following compromise proposal,

> "Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at the same rate of duty as Chinese tea into England, say ten taels per picul; but trade in it shall not be engaged in during the five years other commodities are exempt."[2]

The Government of India agreed to accept the compromise.[3] Since a picul was the equivalent of 133-1/3 English lbs. and a tael equalled 4s, then the duty proposed

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[1] In 1860, England and France made war on China and when peace was made a treaty was signed at Tien Tsin, were opened to foreign trade, and three ports on the Y angtze River. cf. Eliz. Seeger, The Pageant of Chinese History, p.329.

[2] India-Foreign to Kimberley, 4 July 1893, Cd.1920, p.13.

[3] Durand to Paul, 22 May 1893, Enclosure 3, No. 9, Cd.1920, p.18.

amounted to approximately ¼d per lb. According to Colman Macauley's estimate of the China tea trade with Tibet, the commonest type of Chinese tea sold for 3 annas per lb. at Ta-tsien-lu, and for 8 to 9 annas per lb. at Lhasa, three months journey east of Ta-tsien-lu. Allowing for a duty of ¼d (4½ annas) on Indian tea, the good quality Darjeeling tea could be sold for a profit at Lhasa for 12½ annas. Such a price was reckoned to be nearly 43% cheaper than the "second best" tea in China. Thus the Indian Tea Association regarded the duty proposed by the Yamen as heavy but not restrictive. The Government of India regarded the Yamen's suggestion as one made in good faith and therefore Calcutta was finally disposed to terminate the negotiations of the Tibet-Sikkim question with the signing of a trade agreement.[1]

The trade negotiations between Great Britain and China with respect to India and Tibet were terminated by the signing of a set of Trade Regulations on 5 December 1893. By the signing of this document the questions of trade, communication and pasturage which in the Convention of 1890 had been reserved for future negotiation were finally settled. The signers were Paul on behalf of Great Britain and Ho Chang-Jung with Hart in assistance on behalf of China.[2]

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[1]Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 7 December 1893, Cd.1920, p.20.

[2]India-Foreign to Secretary of State, 21 February 1894, Cd.1920, p.21.

The agreement required that a trade mart be opened to all British Subjects at Yatung; that the British be allowed to conduct their business without any provocative restrictions; that either Government could restrict trade in arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs; that all other goods passing across the border be exempt from duties for a five year period, though thereafter a mutual tariff might be agreed upon; that during the five year period of free trade, Indian tea was to be excluded from Tibet and that thereafter it was to be imported at a rate of duty not exceeding that placed against Chinese tea entering Britain; that the British Government was free to make regulations concerning the grazing of Tibetan cattle in Sikkim after Yatung had been opened for one year; and that after five years, if a six month notice were given by either government, the Trade Regulations were to be examined for revision and/or amendment.[1]

The British Commissioner proposed an early date in January for the opening of Yatung. The Chinese Resident, however, reminded Paul that the passes into Tibet were usually blocked with snow until somewhere about the 1st. of April. Since this argument was irrefutable the date for

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[1] cf. British & Foreign State Papers, 1892-93, Vol. LXXXV. pp. 1235-37.

the opening was set for 1st. May 1894.[1]

The Trade Regulations of 1893 were actually a diplomatic victory for China. On the one hand, the British did gain what they were seeking i.e., the establishment of a trade mart within Tibetan territory that would be open to Indian merchants. But the Chinese had skillfully manouvered so that the trade mart was but a few miles from the Indian frontier far removed from the main stream of Tibetan life. Thus relatively few Tibetan traders were likely to meet with Indian political and trade officials at the new mart. In such a way China maintained Tibetan exclusiveness and kept the land free from British Indian political penetration. Moreover, the seclusion of Tibet was further guaranteed insofar as British subjects were allowed to travel only in that part of Tibet between the Indian frontier and the trade mart. Since Tibetan subjects were free to travel and trade in any part of India the British had tried to insist that they be given the same rights in Tibet. But the Chinese government remained adamant and would not allow the British to travel freely in Tibet. With regard to the importation of Indian tea into Tibet, the Chinese gained another advantage. China did agree to admit Indian tea into Tibet five years after the

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[1] Paul to India-Foreign, 9 December 1893, Enclosure 1, No.12, Cd.1920, p.21.

regulations had been in effect but not until a mutually satisfactory tariff had been agreed upon. This clause left the door open for the delaying tactics of long, arduous negotiations. In comparison to Chinese diplomatic gains, the interests of the British were hardly fulfilled. The only important advantage the British won was the establishment of a trade mart at Yatung and the promise of the Chinese that nothing would be done to obstruct trade there. Ten years after the Trade Regulations had been signed the British were to march an army into Lhasa to complain that trade was obstructed. But when the British did invade Lhasa most probably the motivation behind that action was not one of commercial interest but to keep a weather eye on the political climate of Tibet.

The full impact of the Chinese diplomatic victory in the Trade Regulations of 1893 was experienced by the British between the years 1894-98. The British soon discovered that Yatung was located between two steep hills and was a most unfavorable site for a trade mart; that the people of the Chumbi Valley had a transport monopoly and this discouraged other Tibetans from coming to Yatung; that the Phari Jongpen extracted heavy customs duties on imports and exports and thereby discouraged trade between India and Tibet; and that the Tibetans refused to trade with the British

because the Trade Regulations had been signed by both Great Britain and China without the expressed approval of Tibet. Thus, in 1898, the British Government showed concern over the state of Indian-Tibetan trade and asked the Indian Government for a progress report on the whole situation since 1894. The following, then, is an explanation of the implementation of the Trade Regulations of 1893 from the year in which they came into effect up until 1898. This explanation is primarily based upon the progress report forwarded by the Government of India to the Home Government in 1898.

John Claude White, the Political Officer for Sikkim, was deputed to Yatung in May 1894, to report on the opening of the trade mart, the facilities as regards to the treaty and trade.[1] White reported that the Yatung Mart was situated in a valley about eight miles from the Jelep border pass. As the location of Yatung was shut in on either side by steep hills there was very little hope of expanding the trade mart. Moreover, the sixteen shops, or godowns, provided for the traders were quite inadaquate for the storage of goods. White concluded his impressions of Yatung by saying that it was an inappropriate place for a mart and suggested that the site be moved a few miles further within Tibet to the vicinity

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1 India-Foreign to Secretary of State for India, 25 June 1894, No. 13, Cd.1920, p.26.

of Rinchingong where the land was much flatter and the valley broadened out.[1]

Certainly the site of the Yatung mart was exceedingly badly chosen but the attitude of the Chumbi Valley people was even more of a hindrance to the development of Indian-Tibetan trade. The people of the Valley were determined to keep their monopoly on the transport trade, to pay, so they said, for the expenses incurred during the Sikkim war of 1888. Thus, in the district of Phari, the Jongpen charged 10% ad valorem on all imports and exports. Any Bhutanese passing through Phari without a load was charged two annas. Moreover, the Tibetan merchants were virtually forced to sell their goods to the Phari Jong people who then carried them to Darjeeling or Kalimpong. Certainly this was a seeming violation of the trade agreement of 1893 and White therefore suggested that the Indian Government should take up the matter with the Amban at Lhasa.[2]

Though the tax at Phari was prohibitive, a small volume of trade passed through Yatung in the Spring of 1894. White gave this report as to the value of this trade:

> "The amount of trade for the month of May amounted to, imports Rs. 40,587, exports Rs.44,099, and this might have been very much increased if the merchants had come forward. This the Tibetans say they have

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[1] H.J.S. Cotton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 25 June 1894, Enclosure 1, No. 13, Cd.1920, p.26.

[2] P. Nolan, Rajshahi Division to Bengal-Political, 19 June 1894, Annexure 1, Enclosure 1, No.13, Cd.1920, p.27.

ordered them to do, but up to date none have come in. The trade in wool might be improved, and new trades, such as goats' hair and mules, might be opened up, and the traders helped in many ways, but I am afraid I shall not have an opportunity on this visit."[1]

White also informed the Indian Government of the attitude shown by the Chinese and Tibetan officials regarding the implementation of the Trade Regulations. The Chinese agreed that the Regulations were not being carried out and promised to inform the Amban about the restrictions on free trade at Phari. The Tibetans, however, argued that they had a right to impose whatever taxes they wished at Phari so long as goods were allowed to pass freely at Yatung.[2] It is clear that the Chinese, though they feigned co-operation with the British, were happy with the Tibetan interpretation of the Regulations. For the Chinese, like the Tibetans, did not want the British in Tibet and while the Chinese obeyed the letter of the agreement they broke it in spirit.

White sought some means to circumvent the difficulties which the Chinese had created. He thought that the Chinese might be made to see reason if he could break the trade monopoly of the Chumbi Valley. It was clear to White

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1 J.C. White to Rajshahi Division, 9 June 1894, Annexure 2, Enclosure 1, No.13, Cd.1920, p.28.

2 W.J. Cunningham, India-Foreign to Bengal, 9 August 1894, Cd.1920, p.31.

that the customs collection at Phari rendered the trade mart at Yatung relatively ineffective and thus he reconsidered his former suggestion that the mart be moved from Yatung to Rinchingong which was further up the Valley. Though there was a town at Rinchingong and the surrounding districts made it a favorable site for a commercial center, nevertheless Rinchingong was within the Valley and Tibetan merchants could still be taxed at Phari and prevented from going to the trade mart. White therefore offered an alternative suggestion that if the people at Phari Jong continued to obstruct the trade between Tibet and India, the trade mart should be moved from Yatung to the north of Sikkim, near or preferably at the Tibetan town of Khamba Jong. The opening of a new district might well increase the trade, he thought, and once the Sikkim-Tibet border district was opened the Chumbi-Jelap route could be closed. The reasons given by White for the diversion of trade up the Lachen road to the north of Sikkim were the following: the Lachen route led over only one difficult pass, the Superba, whereas the Chumbi route passed over the Tong-la and the Jelap-la and, furthermore, the Lachen route was shorter than the Chumbi; the Khamba Jong people had a tradition of friendship with British Subjects; the monopoly of the hostile Chumbi Valley people would be broken; and, finally, rather than lose the trade altogether the Chumbi people might consent

to establish a mart at a more suitable place in the Valley, preferably in the vicinity of Phari.

There are at least two important implications inherent in White's suggestion that the trade mart be moved from Yatung to the Khamba Jong district. White was the Political Officer for Sikkim and perhaps he wanted to channel the trade between India and Tibet through Sikkim to aid the development of Sikkim itself. Moreover, it is also conceivable that White, being a strong proponent of the Forward Policy, wanted to be in a position himself to direct British political intrigue in Tibet. Of course, if the mart was moved to the vicinity of Khamba Jong then he, as the Political Officer for Sikkim, would be the one to control British Indian political observation in Tibet.

From his observations at Yatung, White concluded that the Trade Regulations were not being carried out in a proper spirit; that the Tibetans actually repudiated the document because it had been signed by the British and Chinese Governments and therefore Tibet had nothing to do with it. The British began to realize that in a real sense both the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 did not improve relations between India and Tibet. The British remembered that after they had driven the Tibetans out of Sikkim in 1888 it had been the Chinese Government who had pressed for

a treaty settlement of the dispute because the Chinese had regarded Tibet as a self governing nation reliant upon China. Fearful they might lose Tibet, the Chinese had negotiated the Agreements of 1890 and 1893 with the British without the participation of the Tibetans.

Although China was the nominal overlord and protector of Tibet and though the Chinese had approached the British in 1890 and shared in the signing of the Convention of that year and the Trade Regulations of 1893, nevertheless Chinese power was weak in Tibet during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the Tibetans were relatively independent. In 1894 when the Trade Regulations came into effect, Chinese prestige in Tibet was dealt another blow because of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. When the British sent traders into the Chumbi Valley to trade at the new mart at Yatung the Tibetans were determined to exhibit their disapproval of the Agreements of 1890 and 1893. The obstruction of trade, as witnessed by White, was an illustration of the Tibetan disapproval of these Agreements signed on their behalf, without their consent, by the Government of China. The Chinese, however, were not totally displeased by this particular display of Tibetan resistance. Although the Tibetan recalcitrance embarrassed the Chinese who had to admit that they were unable to control the Tibetans, yet the Chinese were glad

of this Tibeten obstruction. For the Chinese could now claim full co-operation with the British and at the same time keep the British out of Tibet because of the Tibetan rejection of the Agreements of 1890 and 1893.

In reply to the suggestions made by White, the Government of India issued the following statement of policy: that the people of the Chumbi Valley were strictly within their treaty rights in refusing British Subjects access to Rinchingong for the Agreement specified that British Subjects might travel to and from Yatung but not in any other part of Tibet; that the levy of duty at Phari was unsatisfactory to the development of Indian-Tibetan trade but, nevertheless, the Government of India admitted that the Tibetans were within their treaty rights because the Regulations only stated "that goods entering Tibet from British India across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, shall be exempt, etc." Since Phari was located about fifty miles from the Jelap-La it could not be considered a border town and unless it could be proven that the duty levied there was a new one, the Government of India knew that it could not validly accuse the Tibetans of violating the Trade Regulations. It was also recognized that the utmost patience was necessary in dealing with the Tibetans and that Yatung had only been open a short time and ought to be given a chance. Therefore the Viceroy

concluded that the Government of India would not issue a complaint to the Chinese Government on the basis of White's observations. One of the major reasons why the Government of India did not complain to the Government of China about trade obstruction in Tibet was that the British Minister stationed at Peking was in competition with the Ministers of other Western Countries in the struggle for trading privileges in China. Thus the Indian Government was cautious lest a hasty revival of the Tibetan problem hinder British representations at Peking.

One year after White's visit to Yatung, in September 1895, Lord Elgin, the Viceroy, sent to the Home Government a comparative statement of the Tibetan trade during the preceeding ten years.[1] It is interesting to note the increase of trade between British Territory and Tibet after the opening of the mart at Yatung in 1894.[2]

Value of Exports from British Territory to Tibet		Value of Imports into British Territory from Tibet	
1892-93	Rs.2,29,117	1892-93	Rs.3,51,519
1893-94	Rs.3,31,613	1893-94	Rs.3,58,799
1894-95	Rs.4,47,802	1894-95	Rs.7,01,348

It is possible to conclude from these statistics that the trade mart at Yatung was in effective operation and that the mart

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[1] India-Foreign to Secretary of State for India, 3 September 1895, No.14, Cd.1920, p.42.

[2] India Office to Bradford Chamber of Commerce, 5 December 1895, Enclosure 2, No.15, Cd.1920, p.52.

had been the cause of a substantial increase in the volume of trade between India and Tibet during 1894-95. But this was not so. The rise in the volume of trade during 1894-95 as shown on the financial statement was probably because of a more efficient collection of statistics at the trade mart. But this point was overlooked by many British merchants.

When these figures were released in Britain they caused some hopeful excitement in certain commercial circles. The Bradford Chamber of Commerce, for example, communicated to the India Office certain observations. In effect, the Chamber suggested that since the people of Tibet lived at an altitude of about 15,000 feet they could certainly use some articles of British manufactures such as blankets and warm clothing. In return, Tibet could supply Britain with gold, silver, skins, furs and wool from the Tibetan goat, the latter being an article of particular significance to Bradford Commerce. The merchants of Bradford erroneously concluded that the Tibetans were eager to trade with the British because the above statistics 'showed' a rapid increase of trade at the small concession at Yatung. The merchants hoped that when the British established trade in the interior of Tibet, near Lhasa, then a flourishing and extensive trade might arise. Thus, the Bradford Chamber of Commerce petitioned

the British Government as follows:

> "The Council are firmly convinced that in Tibet will be found a 'new market' of great value to Great Britain, and they earnestly trust that Her Majesty's Government will do all in their power to further the opening up of that country, either by means of a Treaty with the Emperor of China or with the Grand Lama of Tibet direct, or by such other means as may be deemed expedient."[1]

The India Office, however, informed the Bradford merchants that although the British Government were desirous to develop Indian trade with Tibet, no possible revisions could be made to the Trade Agreement until after the five year period specified in the Convention had elapsed.[2]

John Claude White, the Political Officer of Sikkim, heard about the petition of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce to the British Government and he decided to supply the merchants with information as to the actual state of British Indian trade with Tibet. White collected specimens of the goods imported into Tibet from British Territory and intended to dispatch the samples to the Bradford Chamber of Commerce. White intended to inform the British merchants that English manufacturers contributed only a small share to the total imports sent into Tibet. Of the five specimens collected by White, the samples of wool were made in Germany, the merino

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1 Bradford Chamber of Commerce to India Office, 21 November 1895, Enclosure 1, No.15, Cd.1920, p.51

2 India Office to Bradford Chamber of Commerce, 5 December 1895, Cd.1920, p.51.

made in France, the broadcloth made in Germany, Holland, and Belgium. White wrote in the following letter an explanation of these samples:

> "I went into the bazar in Guntok and examined all the woolen goods in the different shops. The whole was made either in Germany, Holland, or France. The same goods are sold in Kalimpong, as those shopkeepers obtain the supplies from them or from the same agents in Calcutta. It is from Kalimpong chiefly that the Tibetan merchants obtain these goods. During the first three months of 1896 some 10,000 yards of woolen goods passed Yatung, and this trade is lost to England. I have taken samples of all the woolen goods sold in the bazar and propose sending them direct to the Bradford Chamber of Commerce pointing out that the trade is at present entirely in foreign hands."[1]

The Government of Bengal decided that White should not communicate directly with the Bradford merchants but that he should go through the proper channels and forward his samples to Darjeeling thence they would be sent to the Home Government through the Government of India.[2]

White further endeavoured to increase the sale of English woolen goods by sending samples into Tibet for the inspection of traders. But the British goods were not sufficiently warm nor durable for rugged Tibetan life and it was clear that trade would not be substantially increased till

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1 J.C. White to Commissioner of Rajshahi, 6 April 1896, Annexure 2, Enclosure 1, No.20, Cd.1920, p.70.

2 C.W. Bolton, Bengal-Political, to Rajshahi, 2 May 1896, Annexure 3, Enclosure 1, No.20, Cd.1920, p.70.

acceptable piece goods were sent into Tibet.[1]

Now it was mentioned earlier that the Government of India raised the question as to whether or not the duty levied at Phari was a newly imposed tax for the purpose of thwarting British trade. In November 1895, Patrick Nolan, the Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division, furnished the following information regarding the matter. Wool, yak tails, musk, and other goods from all over Tibet were sent to Phari for transhipment to Darjeeling or Kalimpong. On every maund, or bundle of wool a tax of one rupee was collected. On all other goods a duty of 10% ad valorem was extracted. Was this duty newly imposed? Nolan replied:

> "My information is that it had existed for a long time. Macaulay noticed it in 1884, and it was then high enough to make some traders prefer to avoid Phari altogether by taking the difficult route which leads into Sikkim over the Kangra Lama Pass. A similar impost is levied, according to the Tchedonay (the Amban) on the Nepal and Bhutan frontiers, but only from foreign merchants. At Darchendo, Mr. Macaulay states on good authority, a tax is taken on Chinese tea. He estimates the value of the tea consumed in Tibet at 11½ lakhs, and of the duty at 2½ lakhs, so that the tax in this case is more than double that on trade with India. I would, therefore, answer the question suggested by the Government of India by stating that the impost in question is neither special nor newly imposed." [2]

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[1] Bolton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 27 August 1898, No.24, Cd.1920, p.73.

[2] P. Nolan to Bengal, 24 November 1895, Annexure-Enclosure 1, No.18, Cd.1920, p.54.

From the report issued by Nolan to the effect that the tax levied at Phari was in accordance with custom and not levied to forestall foreign trade, the Government of India maintained its position that no vexatious restrictions had been imposed, and that a complaint concerning the contravention of the Trade Regulations ought not to be made to the Government of China.[1]

An estimate of the value of the Yatung trade mart was included in the annual report on Sikkim and Bhutan for the year 1895-96.[2] White informed the Government of Bengal of an increase both in exports and imports between British Territory and Tibet. But Bengal conceded that the continued increase had little to do with the opening of the mart provided for in the 1893 Regulations. In fact, Indian merchants who had visited Yatung during 1895-96 returned to India without doing business for the Tibetans were forbidden to trade with them. The complete failure of Yatung as a trading post was indicated thus:

> "The only person established as a trader at Yatung, or whoever sold anything there is Miss Taylor, a missionary who keeps a dispensary, though not with the object of making a profit."[3]

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[1] W.J. Cunningham, Government of India to Bengal, 4 March 1896, Enclosure 3, No.18, Cd.1920, p.58.

[2] P. Nolan to Bengal, 30 June 1896, No.21, Cd.1920, p.71.

[3] Ibid.

A major reason given by the Bengal Government for the failure of Yatung was that the Tibetans had never accepted the boundary line between Tibet and Sikkim as set by the Convention of 1890. As mentioned earlier, the Lhasa authorities were very much upset by the action taken by China and Great Britain as regards to the settlement of the frontier. As a sign of protest, Lhasa had resolved to boycott the trade facilities at Yatung and to permit Tibetan herdsmen to occupy that part of Northern Sikkim that had traditionally been claimed by Tibet. The Government of Bengal offered the following suggestion to placate the Lhasa authorities and to establish trade relations firmly between British Territory and Tibet.[1] The Tibetans might be granted their claims to certain sections of land on the Sikkim side of the watershed in return for the free passage of trade between British Territory and Tibet.

The Secretary of State for India took note of the suggestion offered by Bengal and subsequently the Home Government asked the Government of India for its assessment of the Tibetan boundary and trade situation. The Viceroy and His Council did not favour the evacuation of the Giagong area of Northern Sikkim which was claimed by the

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1 Secretary of State to India, 21 August 1896, No.22, Cd.1920, p.71.

Tibetans. Although the Indian Government recognized the wish of the Bengal Government to go to great lengths to increase trade between Tibet and Bengal the Viceroy-in-Council thought that the Tibetans might interprete the withdrawal as a sign of British weakness and thus Lhasa might press for further concessions along the Sikkim frontier. As regards to trade, the Government of India agreed that Yatung had not been the cause of the improvement of British trade with Tibet, nevertheless they reminded the Government of Bengal that the route from Darjeeling was not the only trail between British India and Tibet. And despite setbacks, the Government of India pointed to an increase in the volume of trade across the whole length of the Indian-Tibetan frontier:

> "The returns of trade with Tibet exhibit a marked improvement in the last three years. With the figures before him the Governor General-in-Council hesitates to accept the view that the results of the Convention and the Trade Regulations have so far been entirely disappointing and considers it admissable to hope that by the exercise of tact, forbearance and patience, our relations with the Tibetans may yet, before long be placed on a satisfactory footing."[1]

To support this position the Government of India issued the following figures to indicate the increase in the volume of

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[1] India-Foreign to Secretary of State, 23 December 1896, No.28, Cd.1920, p.72.

trade between 1892-96:

Totals of Imports and Exports

1892-93 ... Rs.5,80,636
1893-94 ... Rs.6,90,412
1894-95 ... Rs.11,49,150
1895-96 ... Rs.9,74,528 (possibly an understatement)[1]

In answer to the query made by the Secretary of State regarding the progress of British trade with Tibet, the Government of India said that no great advance in trade would be made across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier but, nonetheless, there was hope for gradual development once the boundary question was settled to the mutual satisfaction of Tibet and India and new trade routes were then opened up on the British side of the frontier.

During the next two years there was a gradual overall development of Tibetan trade as predicted by the Government of India. Though there was a decrease in exports from British Territory this was counterbalanced by an increase in imports. The decrease in exports was largely because of the reduction in the quantity of piece goods sent into Tibet since the British goods were not sufficiently warm and durable for the rigorous climate of Tibet. The increase of imports into India consisted mainly of blankets, woolen cloth and raw wool. The total increase in trade is shown by the following

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[1] Ibid.

figures:[1]

	Imports into British Territory	Exports from British Territory	Totals
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1893-94	3,58,799	3,31,603	6,90,402
1894-95	6,38,954*	6,16,756*	12,55,710*
1895-96	7,07,063	8,61,087	15,68,150
1896-97	7,90,634	8,88,017	16,78,651
1897-98	8,79,720	8,23,340	17,03,060

* Eleven months only

In 1898, the Government of India rationalized their failure to develop an effective trade between India and Tibet by pointing to the border difficulties they had experienced. They maintained that the Tibetans had never been happy with the Sikkim-Tibet border agreed between the Chinese and the British without Tibetan consent. The Government of India realized that Indian foreign affairs were under British control and that China claimed suzerainty over Tibet. Thus any agreement concerning India and Tibet had to be signed by Great Britain and China. But at the same time India wanted to placate the Tibetans and induce them to trade effectively with India. Thus the Government of India, in 1898, suggested to the Home Government that a new line of negotiation be opened between Great Britain and China to the effect that the

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[1] Bolton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 27 August 1898, No.24, Cd.1920, p.73.

part of Sikkim signed over to the British by the Chinese in the Convention of 1890 be returned to the Tibetans. In short, the Government of India proposed to transfer certain territories in Northern Sikkim back to Tibet in return for further trade advantages.[1] The following is a summary of the border dispute in question and of the settlement suggested by India, authorized by Great Britain and proposed to China in 1899.

The Sikkim-Tibet frontier had been officially delimited by the Governments of Great Britain and China in 1890. The watershed of the Tista River was to be the common frontier of Sikkim and Tibet. Once the Trade Regulations of 1893 had been appended to the Convention, the Indian Government sought to bring both the Chinese and Tibetan Commissioners together with the Indian Commissioners so that the boundary might be officially demarcated. Thus when White visited Yatung in 1894 he advised that Tibetan and Chinese officials meet with Indian officials in the near future to demarcate the boundary.

White further suggested that Frontier Officers should meet and travel along the border fixed by the Convention.

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1 It will be remembered that this plan had been originally proposed in 1896, by the Bengal Government and then rejected by the Government of India. Now the Government of India were willing to accept this policy. cf. p. 89 of this text.

The Chinese reminded White that the Tibetans objected to British Officers travelling within the Tibetan borders and this would be necessary if the Frontier Officers were to travel the length of the frontiers. In deference to the Tibetan objection White said that it would be sufficient to erect pillars only at the passes which could be approached from the Sikkimese side. Thus it was agreed that the Indian, Chinese and Tibetan Officers should meet at Yatung in the summer of 1895 and agree upon a date for starting on the work of demarcation.

When White set out for Yatung in May 1895, the Government of India thought that the prospects of settling the Sikkim-Tibet frontier were good but when he arrived he found neither the Chinese nor Tibetan deputy there. Instead all that awaited him was a letter from the Chinese deputy saying that the Tibetans had been obstinate in their refusal to supply transport to Yatung. Evidently the Tibetans had decided that they would not be a party to any changes of territory which they already regarded as theirs.

White and a Chinese major finally met at Yatung on May 19, 1895, and thence proceeded to the Jelap-la, the border pass on the road between Darjeeling and Yatung, where they fixed the site of a boundary pillar.[1] White and the

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[1] Cotton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 20 May 1895, Enclosure 8, No.13, Cd.1920, p.36.

Chinese Officer agreed that White should erect another pillar at the Donchukla, afterwards to be inspected by the Chinese, and that they should meet on the 1st of June at the Dokala.

Even though the British and the Chinese had begun to demarcate the frontier with a pillar at Yatung, nonetheless White received a letter from the Amban saying that the Tibetans were angry and full of suspicion and that until the Chinese dissapated some of this mistrust the Chinese Officer could not meet again with White. In short, the Amban asked White to postpone the demarcation. The Government of India then informed White that if he did not meet the Chinese delegate at the Dokala on June 1st, then he should return to Gantok, the capital of Sikkim.

Needless to say, neither the Chinese nor Tibetan delegates were present when White arrived at the Dokala. He soon afterwards reported to the Government of India that "the pillar on Jelap, site of which was fixed in the presence of the Chinese has been demolished by the Tibetans."[1] Immediately, the Viceroy brought this to the attention of the Amban who then replied that an examination would be made into the matter and that the people responsible for the destruction of the pillar would be severely punished. In the meantime,

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[1] Bengal to India-Foreign, 5 June 1895, Enclosure 11, No.13, Cd.1920, p.36.

because of Tibetan recalcitrance the Amban suggested that there was no immediate need to hurry the demarcation of the boundary and that settlement should be postponed until such a time as the treaty was revised. The Viceroy concurred with this view of the Amban and thus the final settlement of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was postponed at least until 1898 when the treaty would be subject for revision.

Once the five years had elapsed after the signing of the Trade Regulations, the Government of India looked about for some practical measures that might lead to improved facilitation of trade and communication between India and Tibet. Because the Tibetans had flatly rejected the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet as set down by the Convention of 1890 the Indian Government thought it would be to their advantage to concede to Tibet the Giagong piece of territory in Northern Sikkim in return for trade concessions. Thus a conference concerning the disputed boundary was opened at Yatung in November 1898 which was attended by White, the Political Officer of Sikkim, Li Yu Sen, the Chinese Boundary Commissioner, and a number of Tibetan Officials.

The Tibetans had refused to come to Yatung in 1894 because they knew at that time the British intended to demarcate the boundary to their own advantage following the Convention of 1890. But now the Tibetans did come and sit at the conference table with the British because they had made

it known that they might recognize Tibetan claims to Northern Sikkim.

At the conference the Lhasa Officials made the Tibetan position clear. They wanted an adjustment of the boundary as set forth in the Convention of 1890 because they thought that their traditional occupation of the Giagong territory gave them the right to that land. But the Tibetans did not want the British encroaching any further into Tibet than Yatung. Thus the Tibetan Officials maintained that they were Boundary Commissioners who had neither the knowledge nor the authority to deal in trade matters.

The British plan at the opening of the conference was to get the trade mart moved from Yatung to Phari, and to achieve this objective the British were willing to concede the Giagong area to Tibet. Ever since 1890 the British had wanted freedom to trade and observe at Phari and now they thought that the Tibetans might grant this privilege in return for grazing lands in Sikkim. However, the Tibetans refused to talk of anything other than the boundary question. Thus an impasse was reached.

In an attempt to surmount this impasse, Li Yu Sen, the Chinese Commissioner, offered the following compromise proposal: that the frontier should be settled to the full satisfaction of the Tibetan delegates and that once this was

done he would officially urge the Tibetans to move the Yatung Customs House to Rinchingong and to permit British commercial officers to visit the Tibetan customs officials.[1]

J.C. White and the Bengal Government differed in their reactions to this Chinese proposal. The crux of the matter was whether or not the British would first surrender territory in Sikkim in the hope that the Tibetans would later grant trade concessions. The British realized that if they conceded Giagong the Chinese only promised to use their influence to persuade the Tibetans to move the mart. Moreover, if in return for the Giagong area the Tibetans were persuaded to move the mart from Yatung to Rinchingong, what benefit would that be to the British? Though Rinchingong was farther in the Valley and perhaps a better site than Yatung, its location was far from ideal. For if the traditional tax at Phari was continued to be levied, then Rinchingong could be as isolated as Yatung had been. Upon considering these facts White was in favor of giving the Giagong area to Tibet on condition that the mart be moved to Phari and that British Subjects be allowed to deal freely and directly with the Tibetans.[2]

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[1] Wen, Amban or Imperial Commissioner to Tibet, to Elgin, 8 December 1898, Annexure 3, Enclosure 6, No.26, Cd.1920, p.85.

[2] White to Rajshahi, 18 December 1898, Annexure 2, Enclosure 6, No.26, Cd.1920, p.84.

Although White was partially inclined to test the Chinese compromise as better than nothing, the Bengal Government was adamant in its demand for a suitable quid pro quo for the surrender of the Giagong plateau. They were wary lest their hope in a Chinese promise would be futile and they agreed, that "if any fair exchange is to be got for the Giagong plateau, it is by a concession to native Indian traders to make their markets at Phari."[1] The Bengal Government forwarded their decision to the Indian Government and awaited their reply.

The Government of India supported the Government of Bengal as regards the exchange of Giagong for the right to establish a trade mart at Phari but added the condition that while they would not insist that European merchants be allowed to reside there, India wanted to have the right of sending a British Official to visit Phari and, if necessary, of stationing the Official to reside there.[2]

The India Office endorsed the proposal that the mart be moved from Yatung to Phari and that free access be granted to Native Indian Traders in exchange for concessions

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1 Bolton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 20 February 1899, Enclosure 7, No.26, Cd.1920, p.86.

2 India-Foreign to Secretary of State, 30 March 1899, No.26, Cd.1920, p.74.

on the frontier. However, the "forward" tendency indicated in the Indian proposal did not find favor with the India Office which did not agree that a British Official should be permitted to visit or reside at Phari since "it might cause complications and delay the settlement of the essential parts of the negotiations."[1] Moreover, the India Office wanted firmer guarantees than a mere oral promise from the Chinese and urged the Foreign Office to make representations at Peking to obtain from the Chinese a pledge that once the boundary was rectified then free access to Phari and freedom of trade there would be guaranteed.[2]

The Foreign Office agreed to exert diplomatic pressure at Peking despite the doubt that such negotiations on the subject of Tibetan affairs would lead to any good result. But the pressure that was exerted at Peking brought no results and thus the negotiations concerning the boundary ended in failure. So as the year 1898 drew to a close the problems of a restricted trade and an unsettled frontier remained unsolved.

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[1]Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 2 June 1899 No. 27, Cd. 1920, p. 99

[2]India Office to Foreign Office, 4 May 1899, Enclosure 1, No. 27, Cd. 1920, p. 100.

CHAPTER FOUR

" The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890."

The Lhasa Convention of 1904.

During the years 1893-1899 Chinese authority became nominal in Tibet mainly because the Manchu Government was fully occupied in meeting the challenges within China. The Tibetans maintained that the Chinese had no authority to act for them and so they repudiated the Convention of 1890 and the appended Trade Agreement. Therefore the British Foreign Office advised the Indian Government that overtures be made to induce the Tibetans to enter directly into negotiations with the Government of India on the questions of trade and the settlement of the frontier.[1]

The chief executive of the Government of India was, then, George Nathaniel Curzon who had become Viceroy of India in 1898.[2] Curzon, one of the last of the great British imperialists, was eager to enlarge the British sphere of influence in Asia, and particularly in Tibet. As Lord Elgin, his predecessor, Curzon officially maintained that India was interested in Tibet mainly for commercial reasons. Nevertheless, he was probably much more interested in the power vacuum existing there. In addition to the weakening of Chinese authority in Tibet rumours were received of Russian overtures to Lhasa.[3] Thus Curzon was more determined than ever that India should settle matters with Tibet.

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1 Foreign Office to India Office, 15 May 1899, Enclosure 2, No.27, Cd.1920, p.100

2 cf. L. Mosley, Curzon and G.N. Curzon, Speeches, 1898-1905.

3 cf. Captain F. O'Connor, op. cit., p.20 and p.28.

Five months after Curzon had assumed the Viceroyalty, he wrote:

> "the Lamas there (Tibet) have found out the weakness of China. At the same time they are being approached by Russia. There seems to be little doubt that Russian agents, and possibly even someone of Russian origin, have been at Lhasa, and I believe that the Tibetan Government is coming to the conclusion that it will have to make friends with one or other of the two great Powers. That our case should not be stated in these circumstances, and that judgement should go against us by default, would be a great pity. Inasmuch as we have no hostile designs against Tibet; as we are in a position to give them something on the frontier to which they attach great importance and we none; and as the relations that we desire to establish with them are almost exclusively those of trade, I do not think it ought to be impossible, if I could get into communication with the Tibetan Government, to come to terms."*[1]

During the Summer of 1899, the Government of Bengal also became aware of the fact that the Chinese Amban and the Dalai Lama were not on the best of terms. In order to capitalize on this dispute, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal thought it wise to try to open negotiations with Lhasa on the questions of the Sikkim boundary and British trade privileges in Tibet. The Bengal authorities chose a Bhutanese merchant, Ugyen Kazi, to be the instrument of Indian communication with Tibet. In recommending this man, the Lieutenant Governor wrote thus to Lord Curzon:

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[1] Curzon & Hamilton, 30 June 1899, as quoted in A. Lamb, op.cit., p.241.

* this part was underlined by the author of the thesis.

"It is advisable to use the services of Ugyen Kazi in this matter, as he seems to have gained the ear of the authorities at Lhasa. Although he is known as the agent of Bhutan, he holds considerable landed property in the Darjiling district. He is reported to be honest and intelligent; his only defect being that he does not speak English, and has little education. He proposes visiting Phari on his own business in August or September next."[1]

The Government of Bengal were not so optimistic as to think that Ugyen Kazi would create solid communication lines between India and Tibet. The Tibetans seemed to be sincerely attached to a policy of isolation. But Bengal wanted to make every attempt to open direct communication between India and Tibet even though the British continued negotiations with the Chinese. Lord Curzon agreed with the Bengal policy and confirmed the appointment of Ugyen Kazi as a British envoy to Lhasa. The Government of India suggested that Ugyen Kazi inform the Lhasa authorities that they were prepared to receive a Tibetan official if the Dalai Lama decided to send one; to make boundary concessions in return for additional trade facilities; to pay a substantial sum for trading rights in the Chumbi Valley up to Phari; and to convey a letter from the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama confirming these arrangements.[2]

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[1]Bolton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 8 July 1899, Enclosure 3, No.29, Cd.1920, p.107.

[2]India-Foreign to Bengal, 26 July 1899, Enclosure 4, No.29, Cd.1920, p.108.

Although Ugyen Kazi agreed to undertake this mission he did not believe that the Tibetans would ever open the road from Yatung to Phari except under compulsion. His reasons for taking this position were that two hundred families of the Tromos tribe had a monopoly on the carrying trade in the Chumbi Valley and the Lhasa Government had no intention of breaking it; and that the Tibetans believed that British traders would be the forerunners of British soldiers in the Chumbi Valley. In any case, the Tibetans had a strong dislike of foreigners and did not want to have them in their territory and while they already had ready access to Calcutta for their trading needs they had no need of making further concessions to the British. Despite these difficulties Ugyen Kazi promised to do all in his power to promote the Indian cause on his next visit to Tibet.[1] Ugyen Kazi did not, however, want to appear in Lhasa as the official agent of the Indian Government because he did not want to jeopardize his commercial interests in Tibet. However, he agreed to write a personal letter to the Lama suggesting that a Tibetan official come to the border to discuss frontier and trade questions. The Bengal Government accepted this stratagem and when Kazi left for Phari "to purchase some ponies"

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[1] Bolton, Bengal to India-Foreign, 13 September 1899, Enclosure 6, No.29, Cd.1920, p.110.

he carried this letter with him.

While Ugyen Kazi was in Tibet trying to draw the Tibetans into negotiations with India over frontier and trade matters an incident occurred which caused the British considerable anxiety regarding the security of India. Rumors of a possible Tibetan-Russian connection were confirmed in the Autumn of 1900. The Journal of St. Petersburg reported the reception by His Majesty the Emperor of one Aharamba-Agvan-Dorjief, described as "first Tsanit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet."[1] India was not certain of Tibetan-Russian communication but knew neither the content nor extent of those negotiations.[2] The Indian Government was thus more concerned than ever to improve relations between Lhasa and Calcutta; and thus the report of Ugyen Kazi was eagerly awaited.

The British were disappointed, however, when Kazi returned for his letter had received an unfavorable response in Tibet. The Indian Government then decided to forego any further attempt by way of the Chumbi route to open communication with the Dalai Lama. The British now considered sending an envoy to the Tibetan capital either

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[1] Hardinge to Salisbury, St. Petersbourg, 17 October 1900, No.31, Cd.1920, p.113.

[2] cf. J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century, p.291.

by way of Yunnan, Nepal or Ladakh.[1] However, the Indian Resident in Nepal suggested that no envoy ought to be sent from Nepal without the knowledge and consent of the Nepal Durbar. But the British did not want to inform the Durbar for fear that the Nepalese might act in their own interest and play the Russians against the British. The Resident in Burma, on the other hand, reported that the envoy chosen to take the Yunnan route was unsuitable. Thus, only the third alternative remained; the Government of India decided to try the Ladakh route as a means of communication with Lhasa.

Every three years, a trade mission called the Chaba came from Lhasa to trade at Leh, the capital of Ladakh. The Chaba was scheduled to visit Gartok, the capital of Western Tibet, in September 1900. Capt. R.L. Kennion, the Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir, suggested to the Government of India that the Viceroy might be able to contact the Dalai Lama by means of the Chaba.[2] The Viceroy accepted this suggestion and thus prepared a letter addressed to the potentate of Tibet:

> "Greeting, I write this friendly letter to Your Holiness in the hope that it will be forwarded by the Urkhu of Gartok, to whom Capt. Kennion,

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1 India-Foreign to Hamilton, Sec. of State, Simla, 25 July 1901, No.37, Cd.1920, p.118.

2 Ibid.

one of my Political Officers employed in the Kashmir State, has been instructed to deliver it. Your Holiness is doubtless aware of the desire, which has always animated the British Government, to enter into and maintain friendly relations with the authorities at Lhasa. The object of the British Government is to facilitate trade between India and Tibet, to the mutual advantage of both countries, and to foster that direct and friendly intercourse which should subsist between neighbours. It is an undesirable and unfortunate thing that two common interests, should not be drawn together by close and friendly bonds, but should be kept asunder, as though they were complete strangers. It is this condition of affairs which I would propose to modify. The British Government have no desire to interfere in any way with the internal administration of Tibet. That is a matter that concerns the people and the ruler of Tibet. But they are anxious that Tibet should feel confidence in their friendship and should be free from encroachment from any other quarter. I need not remind your Holiness that the regulations which were agreed to for the provision of increased facilities for trade had been attended with no fruitful result, and that the settlement of a small question regarding the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet has been long and unnecessarily delayed. This regrettable state of affairs is probably to be ascribed in a great measure to misconception on the part of the Tibetans to the aims and intentions of the British Government. I am confident that all difficulties and misunderstandings could be removed by direct communication between Your Holiness and My Government. I would, therefore, invite Your Holiness to depute to India a responsible official on behalf of the Tibetan Grand Council, whom I shall be pleased to receive, and in consultation with whom measures may be concerted for the mutual advantage, both commercial and political, of Tibet and India."[1]

The letter was sent to Kennion and he was

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[1] Viceroy to the Dalai Lama, 11 August 1900, op.cit.

authorized to go to Gartok in the autumn of 1900. The two governors, or garpons, of Gartok, promised to forward the Viceroy's letter to Lhasa. But in March, 1901, they returned the unopened letter with the reply that the Tibetan Government saw no need for any communication with the British. Apparently, the governors of Gartok had not dared to send the letter to Lhasa in view of the stringent regulations against the intrusion of foreigners into Tibet.[1]

This attempt by the Indian Government to open communication with Tibet via the Ladakh route failed. Thus Calcutta was inclined to try the Chumbi route again. A letter from the Viceroy addressed to the Dalai Lama was sent to Darjeeling. Thence, Ugyen Kazi carried it into Tibet in June 1901.[2] But again the Tibetans remained taciturn and refused to accept communication with India. The Viceroy reported:

> "My letter has been brought back by Ugyen Kazi with the seal intact. Ugyen Kazi reports that the Dalai Lama refused to accept it, stating, as his reason for so refusing, that he was bound by agreement not to enter into any correspondence with Foreign Governments without consulting the Chinese Ambans and the Council." 3

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[1]cf.P. Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa, p.34.

[2]Barnes, India-Foreign to Gengal, Simla, 8 June 1901, Enclosure 4, No.37, Cd.1920, p.121.

[3]Viceroy to Sec. of State, 3 November 1901, No.42, Cd.1920, p.125.

Between 1899 and the Spring of 1901, Lord Curzon had sent two official letters and had made one unofficial attempt through Ugyen Kazi, to open direct communication between Lhasa and Calcutta. But both of the dispatches had been returned with the seals intact and Ugyen Kazi's mission had failed. Even though the urgent necessity of communication between India and Tibet occasioned by the report of the Dorjief Mission to Russia had been allayed when it was discovered that that Mission had been of a religious and non-political nature[1], nevertheless, the Viceroy felt obliged to continue his efforts to contact the highest Tibetan authorities. The British desire for contact with Tibet continued to be strong because the fear of Russian intrigue in Tibet was never far from the minds of British Indian Officials. In the meantime, British and Indian commercial interests continued to harass their governments to take action to improve trade relations with Tibet.

The Indian Tea Association, in 1901, made an attempt to export tea to Tibet but that attempt was rendered fruitless by the impediments placed by Tibetan authorities.[2]

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1 Lansdowne to Scott, Foreign Office, 16 August 1901, No.39, Cd.1920, p.124.

2 India-Foreign to Hamilton, Sec. of State for India, Fort William, 13 February 1902, No.44, Cd.1920, p.125.

According to the fourth article of the Agreement of 1893, Indian tea was to be admitted to Tibet five years after the Regulations were signed. But the Tibetans were able to block supplies of tea by invoking the second of the general articles appended to the Agreement of 1893. This article stated that after 1898 the Trade Regulations were subject to revision by Commissioners appointed by Great Britain and China. The British Government thereby questioned their Minister at Peking as to the advisability of raising the matter of Indian tea with the Chinese Government. Here was his reply:

> "... I do not think that there is any chance of inducing the Chinese Government to modify the provisions of the Sikkim Convention in the direction of putting Indian Tea on a more favorable footing, except as part of a general re-arrangement of Sikkim-Tibet relations. No doubt a protest might be made against the non-fulfilment of the provision of that Convention for the admission of Indian Tea after a term of five years, provided that it can be shown that the Yatung Customs Authorities do in fact refuse to admit it, but I do not see that such a protest could help trade, for according to the Chamber's letter of 2 April, the duty leviable under the Convention would amount to a tax of from 150 to 200 percent ad valorem, which seems prohibitive. Possibly it might be worthwhile carrying on the trade at a loss for a time, in order to accustom the Tibetans to Indian tea, but there remains the difficulty of inducing the merchants to take the tea into the country. So far it seems they have refused to do so from fear of the Lamas, and as long as we have no means of protecting them against the latter, I do not see how they are to be re-assured. The Tibetans are accustomed to a certain

> class of Chinese tea which is imported by way of Tachienlu, and particulars of this trade are given in Mr. Rockhill's travels.[1] Perhaps it might be worth the while of the Indian tea-growers to attempt cultivating among the Tibetans a taste for Indian tea, which has a very different leaf from that of the Chinese leaf, by sending packages of it as presents into Tibet. This would, perhaps, not be more expensive than the advertisements resorted to in other countries for creating a favorable impression towards the Indian product. In my opinion, therefore, no useful step can be taken here at present.[2]

The British Government took the advice of their Minister at Peking and decided not to press the matter with the Chinese Government. But within a few months a new development occurred which made the British finally decide to take strong action against the Chinese and Tibetans over the question of Indian-Tibetan relations.

In the Chinese newspaper, the China Times of 18 July 1902, the text was published of an alleged Secret Agreement between Russia and China concerning Tibet.[3] Under the terms of the alleged agreement Russia was to gain control of Tibetan affairs and in return was to promise to support the weakening Chinese Empire against foreign intruders. The British

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[1] W.W. Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644-1908", T'oung Pao, Vol.XI, E.J. Brill, Liège, 1910, pp.1-104.

[2] Satow to Lansdowne, Peking, 6 October 1902, Annexure, Enclosure 3, No.63, Cd.1920, p.149.

[3] China Times, 18 July 1902, Enclosure 1, No.49 Cd.1920, p.140.

Government, however, let it be known that Britain would not tolerate the signing of such an agreement.[1] And the Chinese assured the British that the supposed treaty had never been discussed by Russia or China.[2] The Indian Government, though, continued to speculate on Russian-Chinese duplicity in the region of Tibet because the protection of the Indian frontiers was always foremost in the mind of the Viceroy.

Because of political and commercial compulsions, the Government of India now felt that it was imperative for the authorities in Calcutta and Lhasa to communicate and come to an agreement. For this reason Curzon decided that the time had come to do more than talk. He was reminded of the parallel situation in 1888 when, after British forces had driven the Tibetans from Northern Sikkim the Chinese had come to the conference table and negotiated the Convention of 1890.[3] Now the Tibetans were back in the territory from which they had once been expelled and not only refused to leave but even refused to negotiate. Thus Curzon determined to establish unilaterally the British position which the Convention of 1890

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[1] Lansdowne to Satow, 1 September 1902, No.52, Cd.1920, p.141.

[2] Satow to Lansdowne, Peking, 8 September 1902, No. 55, Cd.1920, p.143.

[3] cf. S.H. Kawaguchi, Three Years in Tibet, p.517.

had granted them. He therefore sent White and a detachment of troops into the Giagong area and expelled the Tibetans from that part of Northern Sikkim claimed by the British. Now Curzon determined to test the anticipated result of this mission by asking the Home Government for permission to call the Chinese and Tibetans to the conference table to discuss frontier and trade questions.

Calcutta received permission from London to suggest to the Amban that there be a meeting of Tibetan, Chinese and British Officials at the town of Khamba Jong as soon as such a conference was possible.

Curzon had advised the Home Government that the negotiations;

> "should include not only frontier and grazing questions, but also general and trade relations between India and Tibet, with special reference to the duty on tea and the 10 percent levied at Phari on trade in transit...Further it will be necessary to secure for British Indian Subjects the same freedom for trade and travel in Tibet as is enjoyed by the Kashmiris and Nepalese; and to insist that all British Subjects duly authorized by us should be allowed to proceed by recognized routes to Gyantse, beyond which a pass from the Tibetan Government would be required, but in case of a request being preferred by the Government of India the pass should not be refused."[1]

The political overtones of this letter are obvious. It is clear from what Curzon said that he was interested in gaining more than trade advantages in Tibet for he revived the British

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[1]Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 May 1903, No.89, Cd.1920, p.190.

policy of 1890 suggesting that British Indian Subjects be allowed freedom of travel and trade anywhere in Tibet.[1] Curzon was surely more interested in stationing political observers in all parts of Tibet than he was in expanding the volume of Indian-Tibetan trade.

The Home Government sanctioned the Indian desire of doing everything possible to promote trade facilities in Tibet and thus they approved of the proposed conference that would undoubtly produce a new trade agreement. Nevertheless, the Home Government made it clear that the negotiations should be:

> "...restricted to questions concerning trade relations, the frontier and grazing rights; ...that no proposal should be made for the establishment of a Political Agent either at Gyantse or Lhasa."[2]

This reaction of the Government of Great Britain indicated a realization that Curzon wanted to win more than trade concessions from the Tibetans. The Government in London, however, had already been assured by the Russians that they had no political designs on Tibet and for the sake of continued favorable relations with Russia the British Foreign Office strongly urged the Secretary of State for India to instruct the Viceroy not to interfere in the politics of Tibet. Thus,

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[1] cf. G. Bennett, The Concept of Empire, 1774-1947, p.205.

[2] Secretary of State to Viceroy, 28 May 1903, No. 95, Cd.1920, p.193.

in the letter quoted above, the Viceroy was told to negotiate only in matters concerning trade relations, the frontier, and grazing rights.

During the spring of 1903, through a series of letters, the Indian, Chinese and Tibetan Governments agreed to send negotiators to Khamba Jong. During the summer, the British treaty team under the leadership of Col. F.E. Younghusband took up residence there and awaited the arrival of their counterparts. But the summer passed and the Chinese and Tibetan negotiators did not arrive.

In the autumn of 1903, the party of British negotiators, who had withdrawn from Khamba Jong after their prolonged and frustrating stay there and had returned to Bengal, were sent across the Jelap la into the Chumbi Valley and prepared to advance to Gyantse despite whatever Tibetan resistance might be encountered. When they crossed the Tibetan border and advanced toward Yatung, the Tibetan Government severed trade relations with India and Nepal:

> "All trade from Tibet continues to be stopped. Wool from Gnathong on this side of the Jelap Pass is coming down in small quantities. It appears from the information received from the Colonel of Ilam District in Nepal that the Tibetans have stopped all trade with Nepal thru the passes between Tibet and Eastern Nepal. The export of salt being stopped has rendered salt scarce in Eastern Nepal, and the export of sheep being stopped will render it more difficult to obtain sheep for the Tibetan Frontier Commission.

> This stoppage of trade has been in force since the Nepal Government tried to send yaks from Nepal to Kampa-Dzong."[1]

Despite the severance of trade with India, the British Mission, under the command of Colonel Francis Younghusband, advanced to Phari, thence to Gyantse[2] and thence to the holy city of Lhasa itself where the celebrated Lhasa Convention was signed which was meant to put an end to the fourteen years of Indian-Tibetan bickering over trade rights.

Was the Younghusband expedition which advanced to Lhasa under the sponsorship of Lord Curzon primarily political or commercial in object? Certainly, the Indian Government was disturbed by the rumors of a Russo-Chinese treaty about Tibet and Curzon considered it his duty to "frustrate their little game while there was yet time"; and this despite the fact that when he had asked the Russian Government directly if the rumored Russo-Chinese treaty existed, the reply had been negative. For on 8 April 1903, the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff had officially informed Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary in the Conservative Balfour ministry:

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[1] C.A. Bell, Darjeeling to Government of Bengal, 17 November 1903, Cd.1920, No.140, p.198.

[2] cf. E. Candler, The Unveiling of Lhasa, p.138.

> "that there was no convention about Tibet, either with Tibet itself, or China, or with anyone else; nor had the Russian Government any agents in that country, or any intention of sending any agents or missions there."[1]

Indeed, Russia avowedly desired a continuance of the status quo in Tibet and recognized Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese Empire. Why then was the proposed mission carried out? The leader of the expedition explained thus:

> "Now that we were reasonably assured that Russia had no intention of interfering in Tibet, why should we still have thought it necessary to send a mission to the country? The answer is that we had not yet settled those questions of trade and intercourse which had existed years before the Russian factor had intruded itself into the situation; besides which we had always the consideration that, although it might be true enough that the Russians had no mind to have any dealings with the Tibetans, yet, the Tibetans might still think they could rely on the Russians in flouting us."[2]

In Great Britain there were those who believed that the prime purpose of the expedition was political and those who believed that the commercial factor was dominant. There were others who felt that political and commercial motives could not be separated. The Liberal Party immediately denigrated the Mission with Ripon, Rosebery and Fitzpatrick among others, who were anti-forward policy men of lohg standing,

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[1]Lansdowne to Scott, 8 April 1903, Cd.1920, No.83, p.187.

[2]Col. F.E. Younghusband, op.cit., p.83

FORCED FAVOURS.

The Grand Lama of Thibet. "NOW THEN, WHAT 'S YOUR BUSINESS?"
British Lion. "I'VE COME TO BRING YOU THE BLESSINGS OF FREE TRADE."
The Grand L. "I'M A PROTECTIONIST. DON'T WANT 'EM."
British Lion. "WELL, YOU 'VE *GOT TO HAVE* 'EM!"

["The advisers of the Dalai Lama, having ignored their obligations to us under the Convention of 1890, have now ignored the British Mission;" . . . "an advance is to be made into the Chumbi Valley on the frontier of Thibet."—*Daily Paper.*]

condemning the imperialism behind the expedition. Lord Rosebery remarked in the House of Lords in February 1904 that the Mission had political overtones for it was surely not "the whole object of the policy of the Indian Government. .... to make people drink Indian tea who did not like Indian tea and did not want Indian tea."[1] The action of the Government in supporting the Mission was condemned by the Marquess of Ripon who claimed that it was inspired by "an absurd fear of a Russian invasion over the highest mountains in the world, and as involving a wrongful attempt to develop trade by force."[2] Again, pointing to the imperialist designs of the Government of India Sir D. Fitzpatrick of the Council of India wrote, in April 1903, that the Tibetan trade was "not worth the very big candle, and I need not say that it is not of this trade Lord Curzon is thinking."[3]

Today, it is commonly accepted that the principle motive behind the military mission to Lhasa in 1904 was political rather than commercial, as is evidenced by this statement:

"The background to the Younghusband expedition

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[1] As quoted by A. Lamb, op.cit., p.282.

[2] The Annual Register, 1904, p.57.

[3] Ibid.

to Lhasa in 1904 is shown to have been an aspect of the "Great Game"; it pointed less to trade and the frontier than to fear of China and Russia, and especially to the fear of the reported Sino-Russian treaty of 1902 concerning Tibet."[1]

Though the British had actually committed an act of agression against Tibet by sending armed troops to Lhasa, the Indian Government placed the burden of responsibility upon the Tibetan Government.[2] Despite the admonitions of the Home Government Colonel F.E. Younghusband forced the Tibetans into a position whereby they would eventually have to surrender control of the Chumbi Valley to the Indian Government. In the sixth article of the Lhasa Convention, the Tibetans were forced to agree to pay an indemnity to the British Government to cover the expenses incurred by the Mission. Younghusband argued that these expenses had been brought on by Tibetan breaches of the Treaty obligations of 1893. Certainly, the Tibetans had obstructed the spirit of the Treaty of 1893 in order to keep the British out of their country and thus Younghusband felt justified in demanding the indemnity. He demanded that the Tibetan Government pay a half a million pounds - the equivalent of Rs.75,00 ,000 - to the British Government in seventy five annual instalments of one lakh of

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[1] A. Lamb, "Some Notes on Russian Intrigue in Tibet", Journal of Royal Central Asiatic Society, 1959, (46) (1), p.46 as quoted by E. Wright, Historical Abstracts, Vol.5, 1959, 2025.

[2] For the Reaction of the Indian National Congress, cf. B. Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy, p.50.

rupees per year. Until this indemnity was fully paid, the British were to occupy the Chumbi Valley. Obviously, this clause of the treaty was tantamount to an Indian annexation of the Valley.

In order to have a complete view of Tibetan political developments, Younghusband recognized the necessity of having a British Agent in Lhasa. Thus he added a note to the Convention that the British Trade Agent at Gyantse might visit the authorities at Lhasa to discuss treaty matters. Thus the matters of trade were again used as a cover for Indian political activity.

When the treaty was signed at Lhasa in 1904, the Tibetans agreed to pay the indemnity and allow the British Agent to come to Lhasa. But both of these clauses were considered as political dynamite by the Home Government for Whitehall feared Russian and Chinese reaction to such provocative measures. Thus when the Treaty was ratified in November 1904, by the Government of India, upon instructions from the Home Government, the indemnity was reduced to Rs. 25,00,000 and after the payment of the indemnity in three annual instalments the British agreed to cease their occupation of the Chumbi Valley provided that the Tibetans adhered to the other terms of the Convention.[1]

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1 cf.P. Landon, The Opening of Tibet, p.480.

CHAPTER FIVE

" The Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,000 lbs. - equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees - to the British Government."

The Lhasa Convention of 1904.

Another significant point about the Lhasa Convention was that it was an agreement between Great Britain and Tibet. The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Agreement of 1893 had been signed by Great Britain and China and from 1890 to 1904 the Tibetan authorities had very often refused to co-operate with India on the basis of British-Chinese Conventions. However, actual Chinese control in Tibet had declined by 1899. The suppression of the Boxer Rebellion by the Western Powers in 1900 had been a serious blow to the prestige of the Manchu Government. Moreover, Chinese troops stationed in Tibet were recalled to China to restore and maintain the power of the Empress throughout the land by quelling rebellions and riots throughout all the major cities of the Middle Kingdom. Thus only a semblance of Chinese power remained in Tibet in the person of the Chinese guard assigned to the Amban stationed in Lhasa. During this time the Chinese Amban in Tibet was actually powerless as Lord Curzon perceived when he commissioned Younghusband to go to Lhasa and negotiate with the Tibetans and to ignore the fiction of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet.[1]

Certainly the Tibetans had been severely shaken by the British incursion into the holy city of Lhasa.

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1 cf. G. Patterson, Tibet in Revolt, p.28.

During the negotiations of the Lhasa Convention two major ideas preoccupied the minds of the Tibetan authorities. First of all, the Tibetans wanted to insure the independence of their country at all costs. Secondly, the Tibetans weighed the intentions of the Three Great Powers about them, i.e., Great Britain in India, Russia, and China. Traditionally, China had asserted its power over the Tibetan Government. But Lhasa had never willingly accepted it. Now at a time when the Chinese Government in Peking was faltering India had sent an army into the Holy City. The Tibetans were told by the British that India was only interested in keeping the Russians out of Tibet. Such an argument, of course, was most acceptable to the Tibetans as they wanted to be free from all foreign control, Russian or otherwise. Since an armed British force was in Lhasa the Tibetans did not have much choice other than to agree to the demands of Younghusband and his advisors. But the British tried to encourage the Tibetans to sign the Lhasa Convention willingly by suggesting to them that this Convention would then guarantee the continued independence of Tibet as a self-governing nation separate from China. Undoubtedly, this aspect of the Lhasa Convention did have particular appeal for the Tibetans who were continually trying to throw off the yoke of Chinese supremacy. The ninth article of the Lhasa Convention guaranteed Tibetan independence from China and Russia, according

to the will of the British Government. The effect of this, of course was that the Tibetans by signing the Lhasa Convention signed over to Great Britain the control of Tibetan foreign affairs.

Not only in the ninth article but throughout the text of the Lhasa Convention Tibetan submission to British authority was to be found.[1] Under the guise of trade promotion, the British maintained their Tibetan foothold at Yatung in the Chumbi Valley and also won the right of free access to Gyantse, the second city of Tibet, and to Gartok, the capital of Western Tibet. According to the letter of the Convention, trade marts like the one at Yatung were to be erected at Gyantse and Gartok. Both the British and the Tibetans realized, however, that these trade marts were but excuses for Indian political observation posts. Provision was also made in the treaty for a possible network of such lookout points throughout Tibet wherein the British, while outwardly posing as trade agents, could freely observe the actions of both the Chinese to the east and, more especially, the Russians to the northwest. Thus the Tibetan Government was forced to consider the establishment of fresh trade marts if the future development of "trade" required it.

Again, the three trade marts in Tibet guaranteed by the Lhasa Convention were Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. From the

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1 China offered no opposition to the British because China was then threatened with foreign penetration and harassed by internal dissention. cf. Shen, T. and Lui, L., Tibet and the Tibetans, p.49.

Indian point of view there was particular commercial and political advantage attached to these three places. First, with regard to trade the British viewed the Yatung experiment, despite the difficulties besetting it which had arisen from Tibetan obstruction, as successful enough to warrant the continuance of the 1893 policy. Prior to the establishment of the Yatung facilities, the figures of imports in 1893-94 were Rs. 3,58,799 and exports Rs. 3,31,613. Once the trade mart was opened statistics showed imports at Rs. 7,01,348 and exports at Rs. 4,47,802.[1] A more efficient collection of statistics was reflected in this estimate but, nevertheless, it was clear that the volume of trade passing between Tibet and Bengal did increase slightly after the opening of the Yatung mart. Although this mart in the Chumbi Valley was a most insignificant part in the general picture of the Indian economy, nevertheless it was a slight asset; and because the commercial possibilities of Yatung were relatively unknown the British wanted to keep the mart open.

On the other hand, the immediate political importance of Yatung far out weighed its actual and even its possible commercial value. Since 1893, Yatung had amplified political happenings throughout Tibet and the British had eagerly picked

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1 cf. India Office to Bradford Chamber of Commerce, 5 December 1895, Enclosure 2, No. 15, CD. 1920, p.52.

up the sound waves. Besides, the mart at Yatung was a foothold for the British in the Chumbi Valley, the verdant Valley that many Indian officials considered to be rightfully a part of India since it lay to the south of the Himalayan watershed.

In addition to Yatung, the Lhasa Convention provided that two new trade marts be opened at the towns of Gyantse and Gartok. The Gyantse mart was the fulfilment of an objective sought by the Bengal authorities since 1894 when White inspected the facilities at Yatung and advised his Government that the mart should be moved to a town well within Tibet to draw Tibetan merchants to the market. Certainly, Yatung was too close to the border of Tibet to become the center of extensive trade relations while the British Government were never fully satisfied with Yatung as a place to observe political activities within Tibet. Therefore White had suggested the removal of the trade facilities to Phari, a town at the entrance to the Chumbi Valley.

White, a strong proponent of the Forward Policy, had seen two political advantages in moving the trade facilities to Phari. First, Phari was an important trading town, a center of Tibetan commerce. Thus traders from all parts of Tibet visited Phari and in addition to their normal commercial activities they talked about political happenings throughout the country. The British were particularly interested in listening

to the traders who were acquainted with activities along the Chinese and Russian borders. Besides being a listening post for Tibetan political developments, Phari was also the most important city of the Chumbi Valley. It was situated at the edge of the Tibetan tableland looking down like a sentinel into the Valley. People like White, who were caught up in the imperial design of extending the Indian frontiers, saw Phari as the key to Indian annexation of the Chumbi Valley. Such Indian officials believed that the British ought to establish a commercial position at Phari so that some day the Union Jack might be carried along trade paths beside the Chumbi River. Thus the Political Officer of Sikkim had suggested, in 1894, that the trade mart be moved to Phari[1].

However, White's proposal had been turned down by the Liberal Elgin Government. Now Lord Curzon, a supporter of White's Forward Policy, saw the opportunity to make an even greater advance into Tibet than White had envisaged. Curzon suggested, and the Conservative Government supported his views, that a trade mart should be established not at Phari but at Gyantse the home of the Tashi Lama, the second most important town in Tibet, a town which was a center of Tibetan commerce.

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[1] cf. India-Foreign to the Secretary of State for India, 3 September 1895, No. 14, CD. 1920, p.42

The British wanted to exert their influence over the Tashi Lama who was second only to the Dalai Lama in the guidance of the political destiny of Tibet. When the Dalai Lama had left Lhasa and headed north towards Mongolia at the approach of the Younghusband Mission the Tashi Lama became the most important figure in Tibet. Now, the British thought it wise to open a trade mart at Gyantse and gain the confidence of the Tashi Lama.

Gartok, the capital of Western Tibet, was selected by the British and granted by the Tibetans as the site of the third trade mart in Tibet. During the winter months Gartok, a windswept village on a barren plain, was inhabited by only a few Tibetan families. But during the summertime it became a bustling center of commercial activity with traders from all parts of Western Tibet, Turkestan, Ladakh, and Northern India gathered there. By the establishment of a trade mart at Gartok the British hoped to open the rich wool producing area of Western Tibet to Indian Commerce. But what was more important, the British hoped to use Gartok as a station to gain information about Russian activity from the traders of the Khanates of Central Asia, traders who took part in the commercial activities at Gartok every year.

Though the British publicly avowed that the trade marts in Tibet were to be a great boom to the Indian economy,

it is clear that the British primarily intended these marts to be political watch towers in Tibet. Thus, according to the Lhasa Convention, British agents to be stationed at the old mart at Yatung and the new marts at Gyantse and Gartok were to be there strictly in a commercial capacity but in reality the British used trade to conceal all the political intentions of the Agreement[1].

When the Lhasa Convention was received in London for ratification, the Home Government did not want to go as far as Lord Curzon in forcing the Tibetans to surrender territorial or political advantages to India. Whitehall was not particularly cautious about Tibetan reactions but the Government wished that nothing be included in the treaty that would be overtly objectionable to the Russian Government. In a subtle but real sense the Home Government was prepared to lose an opportunity of insuring the security of British India for the sake of the guaranteed security of Great Britain itself. The keystone of traditional British foreign policy, more especially since the Congress of Vienna, had been the maintanance of the Balance of Power in Europe. By 1900, Germany was fast becoming industrialized and imperialistic. The military tradition of Prussian Germany, the rising population, and the scramble for colonies in Africa made the other European countries fearful of the ambitions of the German nation.

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[1] cf. John Morley, Recollections, Vol.2, p.162

Although monarchical ties bound Great Britain and Germany, nevertheless, Great Britain opted to join in alliance with France and Russia in 1904 to maintain the Balance of Power in Europe. Because of such European developments the Government of Great Britain was most anxious not to irritate the Russians by permitting the signing of a highly tinged political treaty between Great Britain and Tibet.[1]

The official position of the British Government remained that the Lhasa Convention was essentially a trade agreement, though the measures leading up to it were partially the result of a fear that the Tibetan Government had become involved in political relations detrimental to the Indian Empire. Concerning the purpose of the Lhasa Convention, St. John Brodrick, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to the Government of India on 2 September 1904, as follows:

> All that we have demanded for ourselves apart from reparation for injuries in the past, is that the commercial facilities conceded to us in principle by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, should be placed on a satisfactory basis, and given such an extension as we are justified in claiming, having regard to the traffic on the existing trade routes, and to the position of India as the limitrophe country with Tibet on that part of her frontiers which is not coterminous with the Chinese Empire.[2]

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1 The British Foreign Secretary had assured the Russian Government on 2 June 1904, that so long as no other European Power intervened "Great Britain would neither annex Tibet, nor establish a Protectorate over it, nor attempt to control its internal affairs."
R.C. Majumdar (ed.) British Paramouncy & Indian Renaissance, p.1065

2 The Secretary of State to the Government of India, 2 December 1904, CD.2370, p.7.

Captain O'Connor was appointed t be the British Trade Agent at Gyantse in the early part of 1905 and he immediately began negotiations with the Tibetans concerning the actual operations of the trade marts. On the 13th of January, O'Connor had an interview with the Yutok, the senior of the four Tibetan Shapes,and during this discussion the following items were considered: customs regulations, building in the Chumbi Valley, and telegraph communication to the trade marts.

The Lhasa Convention had not included any specific trade arrangements concerning customs duties but both Governments had promised to appoint delegates to make the necessary amendments to the Trade Regulations of 1893[1]. Until these amendments were agreed upon the Tibetan Government promised not to levy any taxes on Indian goods coming into their country. Supposedly, the British wanted to eliminate the Tibetan habit of multiple taxation whereby taxes had been collected at Yatung and then at Phari. Once a tariff had been set for a commodity by the Lhasa authorities then the British hoped that the villages would forfeit their right to impose an additional tax. Thus O'Connor reminded the Yutok of the importance of coming to an agreement on tariffs and thus he was urged to come to Calcutta to discuss the tariff question.

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[1] Lhasa Convention, Article 4, CD.2370, p.2.

Moving from the question of tariffs, the Yutok Shape complained that the British were constructing a new building in the Chumbi Valley. O'Connor promised to look into this matter but he reminded the Yutok that since 1890 the Tibetans had continually offered the most dilapidated dwellings to British officials at Yatung and that they demanded more consideration as representatives of the Indian Empire. In the Lhasa Convention, no provision had been made for the accommodations of British trade officials in Tibet and so the Yutok's complaint was a portent of future difficulties between the Tibetans and the British.

A third significant point raised during the interview between O'Connor and the Yutok concerned the breakage in the telegraph wire between the trade marts and Indian territory. The Yutok surmised that the damage had probably been done by the extreme cold. But O'Connor retorted that lengths of wire had been bodily removed and so he asked the Yutok to issue strict orders to keep the telegraph facilities intact. The Yutok promised to take the necessary steps to prevent his countrymen from damaging the telegraph, but said it would be difficult to control all irresponsible people in the vicinity of the line. Thus the British continued to be in doubt as to whether the wire sabatoge was the work of isolated bandits or part of a

general plan of harassment conducted by the Tibetan Government[1].

On the 28th of February, 1905, the Yutok Shape returned to Gyantse for another interview with O'Connor. The ensuing conversation revolved around these topics: the telegraph line, taxes at Phari and trade representation at Gyantse.

The Yutok asserted that the telegraph line between Phari and Gyantse was a great inconvience to the Tibetans for at least two reasons; many of the poles were planted in the fields of peasants and these poles were obstructions to cultivation, and in addition, the peasants were plagued with fear of reprisals lest the line should be broken. Thus the Yutok Shape asked the British to arrange to do without the line at all. In answer, O'Connor said that the telegraph line between Phari and Gyantse was a permanent fixture. But he also recognized the inconvenience of the posts planted in the middle of the fields so he said he would try to avoid having them planted there.

Surely the major reason behind the Tibetan objection to the telegraph was that it was a sign of British political penetration into Tibet. Because of the telegraph the British Agent at Gyantse was able to report quickly

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[1] cf. Capt. O'Connor, British Trade Agent, Gyantse to the Government of India, 14 January 1905, Cd.2370, p.9.

to the Indian Government any changes in the activities of the Tibetan Government. The Indian Government was particularly interested in knowing the movements and actions of any Russian and Chinese 'visitors' to Tibet. Moreover, the Tibetans realized that the Trade Agent at Gyantse would use the telegraph to transmit political as well as commercial reports to India. But the Tibetans would not openly accuse the British of using the telegraph for political purposes and thus the Yutok claimed that the telegraph poles were a hindrance to Tibetan farmers and asked that they might be removed. The British, however, had no intention of surrendering such an important political and commercial advantage so O'Connor deftly replied that henceforth the Indian Government would try to avoid placing the telegraph poles in the middle of Tibetan fields.

Next, the Tibetan official asked if it might be possible for the Jongpens at Phari to continue to levy the usual tolls upon Indian merchandise until the new customs duties were arranged. According to the fourth article of the Lhasa Convention such taxes at Phari had been prohibited in deference to the newly proposed tax agreement. O'Connor said that he did not have the power to authorize such action at Phari but added that the question would be resolved as soon as the Tibetan delegates accepted

the Viceroy's invitation to attend a tariff conference at Calcutta.

The Yutok then noted that neither O'Connor nor he, himself, would be permanently stationed at Gyantse and that, perhaps, hostile successors might follow them to cause trouble over jurisdictional rights. Thus the Yutok suggested that provisions be made in the forthcoming treaty to provide for such an eventuality. Clearly, in making this suggestion, the Yutok was not concerned with personalities. What the Tibetans feared was a treaty filled with generalities whereby the British might attempt to claim jurisdictional rights in Tibet. Answering for the British, O'Connor agreed that specific jurisdictional rights should be spelled out in the treaty but added that he was not then authorized to make any definite arrangements with the Tibetan Government concerning this matter.

These two interviews served to indicate that although the Tibetans had signed the Lhasa Convention they had signed it under duress and were far from being in agreement with its provisions. The Tibetans wanted more specific restrictions about British activity in Gyantse, they objected to the communication line driven into the heart of their country, and they wanted a restoration of the decentralized tax pattern followed prior to the Younghusband Mission. The attitude of the Lhasa Government was reflected in Curzon's

dispatch to the Secretary of State for India, 3 August 1905:

> We have received following message from Trade Agent, Gyantse - Letter from Lhasa Government couched in strong and almost threatening terms has just reached me. They say, in reiterating complaint about our action in Chumbi, that a promise was given by General Macdonald as to the Phari Jongpen's exercise of full powers as in the past, and reproach us with a breach of faith calculated to interrupt friendly relations.... They complain of the line of telegraph to Gyantse, and request that it may be removed. They add that disturbances may follow if the above mentioned causes of difference are not satisfactorily adjusted.[1]

The British suspected that the Tibetan officials were fearful lest the Dalai Lama return from exile and punish them for compliance with British demands in the Lhasa Convention. B ut the British were determined to hold onto the advantages which they had gained at Lhasa in 1904. Thus the Indian Government suggested to the Home Government that India should rigidly adhere to the articles of the Lhasa Convention. The Secretary of State agreed with the Viceroy's suggestions, especially with regard to the prohibition of taxes at Phari and the insistence that the telegraph line beyond the Chumbi Valley to Gyantse was a necessity for the security of the Trade Agent at Lhasa. These views were forwarded by the Indian Government to the Government of Tibet.

In November 1905, the British tried to defend their position by offering the following arguments to the Tibetan Government. No customs duties ought to be levied at Phari

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1 India Office to Foreign Office, 15 September 1905, Cd.2370, p.21.

because with the advent of outside traders in the Chumbi Valley the poorer class of Tromos natives benefitted by the increasing demand for labour[1]. In addition, a removal of customs duties at Phari would mean a gain for the merchants there of not less than three quarters of a lakh of rupees annually which would help to stimulate trade on that important trading route between India and Tibet.

The British objection to duties at Phari and the Tibetan objection to the telegraph line were both overlooked when, in April 1906, a new international agreement was signed which was to change relations between India and Tibet. The background to this treaty, which came to be known as the Adhesion Agreement, is as follows.

Lord Curzon had hoped to do away with the fiction of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet with the signing of the Lhasa Convention - a treaty between Tibet and Great Britain. But the Chinese strengthened their position in Tibet during 1905 by military incursions into the eastern provinces and by offering to pay the indemnity owed by the Tibetans to the British as demanded by the amended sixth clause of the Lhasa Convention. Moreover, China disagreed with the ninth clause of the Lhasa Convention which said that

> The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government....
> (c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power

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[1] cf. C.A. Bell, Political Office, Chumbi, to Political Office, Sikkim, 17 November 1905, Cd.2370, p.36.

shall be admitted to Tibet; (d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraph, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power[1]."

This clause meant that China was to forfeit all her traditional claims in Tibet until the Emperor received permission from the British Government to have dealings with the Tibetans again.

In 1906, China was moving into Tibet with or withour permission of Britain so for the sake of prestige, to avoid an armed clash, and to facilitate mutual interests, Britain and China agreed to sign a treaty concerning Tibet.

By the signing of the Lhasa Convention both the British and Tibetans had ignored Chinese claims in Tibet. During the year 1905 there was a reassertion of Chinese authority in Tibet and the loss by the British of their dominant position secured by the Lhasa Convention. Once again, in 1906, Britain and China sat down at the Conference Table and signed an agreement concerning Tibet that was called the Adhesion Agreement. It is clear that the British signed this agreement because they were satisified that the Russians posed no immediate threat to India through Tibet: [2]the British had no intention of annexing Tibet and adding thousands of additional miles to their imperial frontiers while at the same time arousing the wrath of Russia: and finally, China offered Tibet a stable government as a buffer between Russia and India. With the signing of the Adhesion Agreement Britain recognized China as the superior power in Tibet but at the same time Britain demanded all its rights in

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1 The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, p. 112.

2 Partly because of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the British decided that Russia posed no immediate threat to India through Tibet. cf. P. Spear, op. cit., p. 333

Tibet that were part of the Lhasa Convention and the Agreements of 1890 and 1893. India wanted to increase her trade with Tibet and to continue to use the marts for political observation. But in 1906, the Chinese directed the mart at Gyantse and thereafter disputes arose between the British and the Chinese in Central Tibet.

CHAPTER SIX

" The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet."

The Adhesion Agreement of 1906.

" The Governments of Great Britain and Russia (recognize) the suzerain rights of China in Tibet."

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

" The administration of the trade marts shall remain with the Tibetan Officers, under the Chinese Officers' supervision and control."

The Trade Regulations of 1908.

Even before the Adhesion Agreement received ratification in London, Chang Ying Tang was appointed High Commissioner by the Chinese Government and was sent to inspect the various aspects of Indo-Tibetan trade. He proceeded to Simla in June 1906, intending to inspect the trade routes, trade regulations and customs connected with the trade mart at Gartok.[1] In September, Chang revised those plans and instead he made a personal inspection of the trade facilities at Yatung and Gyantse. Upon arrival in the Chumbi Valley, Chang endeavoured to secure supplies from the local inhabitants for which he refused payment and the British concluded that Chang's actions were intended to assert Chinese authority and ignore the British occupation. Since the Indian Government was publically committed to deal with Tibet in trade matters only "the regrettable incident" perpetrated by Chang was overlooked and British officials in Tibet were instructed to resume and solidify cordial relations with the Chinese. But the Chinese were determined to weaken the British position in Tibet. From December 1906, to the confirmation of Chinese ascendancy in Tibet as recognized by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 7 August 1907, Chinese officials in Tibet tried very hard to assert their authority over the Tibetans and to

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[1] Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 2 October 1906, Cd.2370, p.56.

nullify any advantages the British had gained in the Lhasa Convention of 1904.[1]

Soon after Chang had arrived at Gyantse in the autumn of 1906, he proceeded to appoint Gow, a Chinese official, as Chinese Commissioner, a Sub Prefect in charge of Chinese trade and the Diplomatic Agency at Gyantse. Early in December, Gow threatened to stop the supply of provisions from the Tibetans to the British Trade Agent at Gyantse. He claimed that in all transactions between the Tibetans and the British, he was to act as the intermediary. The British agent quickly informed Gow that direct communication between the Tibetans and the British had been insured by the fifth article of the Lhasa Convention. Within three weeks, the Home Government concurred with Lieutenant Bailey, the acting Trade Agent at the time, concerning his assessment of the situation and Peking was duly notified of this contravention of the 1904 Agreement.[2] Captain O'Connor, having returned to his post at Gyantse, telegraphed the following message to the Government of India, 11 January:

> "I have been informed officially by the Jongpens that, according to orders left here by Chang, Gow

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1 R.C. Majumdar, et al, An Advanced History of India, p.909.

2 Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan, 28 December 1906, Cd.2370, p.66.

is to be the medium through which all dealings between British and Tibetans are to be conducted. They are compelled therefore, even in the most trivial cases, to consult Gow and receive his instructions before they can comply with any request of mine, and they accordingly regret that they will not be able to continue, as hitherto, to settle all local matters direct with me."[1]

The Chinese persistently continued to refuse direct communication between the British and the Tibetans at the trade marts. In addition, certain Tibetan officials concerned with recent negotiations, e.g., Yutok Shape, were degraded and dismissed. The Chinese showed determination to disrupt the pattern set by the 1904 agreement and were, probably, trying to convert the trade marts into treaty ports. The Viceroy wrote thus to the Secretary of State for India;

> "Chang evidently takes the view that virtual recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was involved in signature of Adhesion Agreement, and that 'Chinese authorities in Tibet' should consequently be the interpretation placed on phrase 'Tibetan Government' wherever the latter occurs in Lhasa Convention."[2]

During the next few years the British determined, despite Chinese interference, to keep direct communication with the Tibetans according to the 1893 and 1904 agreements.

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1 Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 3 February 1907, Cd.2370, p.86.

2 Viceroy to the Secretary of State of India, 3 February 1907, Cd.2370, p.86.

Sir John Jordan, (the British Ambassador to China), was advised by the Home Government to inform the Wai-wu-Pu (Chinese Foreign Office) at Peking concerning the treaty violations perpetrated by Chinese officials in Tibet. Jordan invited the Chinese Government to review, especially, the second article of the Trade Regulations of 1893, according to which British subjects were at liberty,

> "to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexatious restrictions."[1]

When the Chinese Government had been thus advised, the Wai-wu-Pu contended that its officials must have misunderstood instructions owing to the condensed language of telegrams and issued an imperial decree calling upon Chang to investigate charges made against Government officials.[2]

Early in March 1907, the British Trade Agent at Gyantse reported that all local authorities had absolutely refused to deal with him, while referring to Gow as the proper channel of communication. O'Connor, in turn, would have no dealings with Gow, thus there was a complete deadlock at Gyantse.

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1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1892-93, Vol. LXXXV, pp.1235-37.

2 Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, Peking, 27 February 1907, Cd.2370, p.94.

In the meantime, the Wai-wu Pu sent a memorandum to the British, drawn from a dispatch from Chang based on a written report from Gow. Gow gave the details of an incident which had occurred in the autumn of 1906. Apparently, two Tibetan servants, the groom and the compradore of the British Agent were convicted of using threats of violence and thereby extorting supplies. Soon after, Gow sent a price list for the supplies purchased by the Agency but the Agent refused to accept the list. As the Chinese Government examined the contents of the dispatch from Chang, it became convinced that direct communication between the British Agent and the Tibetans had not been forbidden by Gow. Instead, the Wai-wu Pu requested that the British send instructions to their Agent at Gyantse to transact business matters in an amicable manner.

The Wai-wu Pu suggested, in April 1907, that in order to restore friendly relations, Captain O'Connor, as a newcomer to Gyantse, should call upon Gow. Considering this suggestion the Viceroy agreed but advised that the instructions of the Wai-wu Pu as to free communication between the Tibetans and the British should be put into effect before O'Connor made the visit; that until Gow retracted the accusations of robbery, high-handedness, and breach of treaty included in his discourteous letters to Major Bell and

Lieutenant Bailey, he did not merit a visit from any British officer; that the British Trade Agent held a position equivalent to that of a Consul in China. According to the Treaty of 1852 a Consul ranked with an Intendant of Circuit. Yet Chang reported that Gow only held the title of Prefect a position which did not entitle him to receive a first visit from Captain O'Connor. The Home Government supported the first suggestion of the Viceroy and notified Peking that O'Connor would visit Gow once direct communications between the British and the Tibetans were restored.[1]

According to the telegrams sent by O'Connor to Calcutta the situation at Gyantse during the month of May 1907, was as follows: 9 May, Gow returned from Lhasa and the next morning he stopped the supplies destined for the Agency. He also prevented the Tibetan Depon from visiting O'Connor; 14 May, The Lhasa Delegates upon their arrival did not call upon O'Connor and the Jongpens ignored any communication sent by him. A severance in direct communications between the British and the Tibetans continued and it was difficult to reconcile this fact with Chang's declaration that the instructions of the Wai-wu Pu were being carried out. At the

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1 Sir E. Grey to Sir J. Jordan, 19 April 1907, Cd.2370, p.104.

same time, O'Connor rejected the allegations that the British Representative at Gyantse had extorted supplies by force and unjust prices. 15 May, The supplies which Gow stopped were quantities of bhusa, a product already well stocked within the Agency. After that incident supplies began to flow as usual. What O'Connor began to fear was an attack by either the Chinese or Tibetans against the trade mart due to the increasing disregard for the British in Tibet.

In June, an incident occured at Gyantse which ultimately led to the dismissal of Gow from his Prefecture in Tibet. On the tenth of the month, four Indian traders arrived at Gyantse and applied to Captain O'Connor for accommodation. The Trade Agent, in turn, notified the Jongpens, requesting that suitable houses be offered for rent to the traders. The Jongpens refused to have a personal consultation with O'Connor to arrange the details. So the traders had to be lodged in two unsuitable servants' rooms. The Trade Agent immediately informed the Indian Government of this new impasse in British and Tibetan trade relations.

As soon as the Home Government became aware of the situation, Sir Edward Grey sent special instructions to Sir John Jordan in Peking. Grey admitted that the only logical solution to the deadlock would be to take the necessary

military steps required to force the Tibetans to comply with the trade arrangements. His Majesty's Government, however, had no intention of reinforcing the Trade Agent's escort by sending an envoy to Lhasa to try and solve the problem without Chinese co-operation. Jordan, then, was to make the following representations to the Chinese Government: according to the Lhasa Convention the Tibetan Government was required to pay an indemnity, annually for three years. The British Government later permitted the Chinese Government to accept that responsibility. If it became necessary the British Government would revise its attitude and require that the Lhasa Government make direct payment; a serious deadlock existed at Gyantse. But prior to the intervention of Chang and Gow there had been no serious friction between O'Connor and the Tibetans of the locality. Therefore it would be to the advantage of all concerned if Gow were to be entirely removed from all employment in Tibet.[1]

Jordan, consequently, went before the Board of Foreign Affairs and asked for the immediate withdrawal of Gow. 5 July, the Wai-wu Pu promised Jordan that Gow would definitely be withdrawn from service in Tibet. The Chinese Government had felt for some time that, perhaps, Gow was

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[1] Sir E. Grey to Sir J. Jordan, 27 June 1907, Cd.2370, p.114.

unsuitable for the post because of the constant friction between himself and Captain O'Connor. But whenever questioned Gow was able to refute the charges brought against him. Thereupon, Sir John Jordan expressed his conviction that someone in Peking had been inspiring a policy inimical to British interests formulated in recent treaties concerning Tibet.

The determination of Great Britain to remain aloof from Tibetan politics while protecting her trade rights was manifested in August, 1907, when Great Britain and Russia signed an agreement concerning Tibet.[1] By this agreement the British Government relinquished a major advantage which had been guaranteed by the Convention of 1904. They surrendered their exclusive right to control Tibetan foreign affairs when they recognized Chinese suzerainty in Tibet and made an agreement with Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and not to interfere in its internal administration. The British willingly nullified their political gains in Tibet, as secured by the ninth Article of the Convention of 1904, because they wanted to improve their relations with Russia. Indeed, in 1907, Great Britain, Russia and France joined in the Triple Entente to curb the ambitions

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[1] Sir C. Bell, Tibet Past & Present, London, 1924, Appendix IX, p.289.

of the Central Powers and, because the British were now more cautious than ever not to antagonize the Russians over the Tibetan question, they yielded the dominant position they had gained in Tibet in 1904.

Sir Edward Grey spoke thus of the Anglo-Russian Convention in the House of Commons on 17 February 1908:

> "We have no desire to annex Tibetan territory, nor to have any political representatives there provided other Powers are under the same desirability. That was the policy of the late Government and we have put it into this Agreement... Although Tibet is near to India and far from Russia it has to be borne in mind that the Russian interest in Tibet is a real one. Russia has many Buddhist subjects in Lhasa, and if we had pushed a forward policy in Tibet and had occupied a predominant political influence over the internal affairs of Tibet, we should have been in a position to make trouble with Russian subjects at a distance through our holding the centre. Therefore it was a matter of importance to Russia that we should give some undertaking of this kind, and as to give that undertaking was entirely in accord with the policy laid down by the late Government, I do not see why objection is taken to it...."[1]

Under the third Article of the Lhasa Convention, provision had been made for the revision of the Trade Regulations of 1893. This revision came up for consideration in December 1907. The issue was complicated, however, by the argument as to whether or not the seventh Article of the Lhasa Convention had been fulfilled. According to this Article

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[1] Sir Edward Grey, Speeches on Foreign Affairs, 1904-1914, Cambridge, 1932, p.71.

the Indian Government was to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity had been paid and until the trade marts had been effectively opened for three years, whichever date was the later. By 1st January 1908, the trade marts had been operating for three years but to many British officials it seemed that they had not been "effectively" opened for three years.

The Indian Government cited instances to indicate that the trade marts had not been in effective operation. They charged that the Tibetan authorities had recently failed to provide adequate accommodation for Indian traders except at extortionate rent; that invalid restrictions had been placed on trade passing along the traditional trade routes across the northern frontier of Sikkim, and across the frontier separating the United Provinces from the marts in Western Tibet; that since Chang's visit to Tibet further damages had been inflicted on the telegraph lines between the trade marts and India and that the postal communication to Gartok had also been interrupted. To the Viceroy, these incidents provided the Home Government with a strong argument to prove that by 1st January 1908, the trade marts had not been effectively opened for three years. The Indian Government thought that the threat of a continual occupation of the Chumbi Valley might be used as a bargaining point during the

proposed negotiations of the Trade Regulations as provided by the Convention of 1904.[1]

John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, did not agree that Britain should use the threat of a continued occupation of the Valley after January 1908.[2] At the time when the British Government heard of such incidents at the marts, they decided it was "not necessary at present formally to remind the Chinese and Tibetan Governments of such breaches of the Lhasa Convention as have occurred."[3] Because the British Government had kept silent at the time, Morley argued that the British Government would be open to a charge of bad faith if it chose to revive these incidents. Indeed, this argument was a typical excuse used by the Liberal Government against any form of expansionist policy along the Indian frontiers.

Morley further explained that it was also quite probable that the Chinese Government would become increasingly difficult to deal with if British troops remained

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1 Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 29 December 1907, Cd.2370, p.136.

2 John Morley was Secretary of State for India from December 1905 to April 1908. He was a Liberal and opposed any semblance of British "Forward Policy" in Asia.

3 India Office to Foreign Office, 2 January 1908, Cd.2370, p.137.

in Chumbi. The obstinacy of the Chinese Government might involve the British in a prolonged military stand in Tibet precipitating the involvement of Russia. China would also be able to argue that the proposed Trade Regulations involved practical commercial questions of great complexity involving the subjects of tea and tariffs, for example, the appointment of customs officials along the length of the Indian-Tibetan border, and that the settling of such complex matters were not essential to an effective opening of the marts. Since the word "effective" was ambiguous and could be interpreted to the advantage of either party, the British Government decided to evacuate the Chumbi Valley in January 1908, and avoid further tensions between the British and Chinese in Tibet.

Because the British were determined not to enter into lengthy controversy, the matter of revising the Trade Agreement of 1893 was quickly settled. Thus the Tibet Trade Regulations were signed at Calcutta, 20 April 1908, by E.C. Wilton, the British Commissioner, Chang Yin Tang, the Chinese Commissioner, and Tsarong Shape, the Tibetan Delegate.[1] Some of the contentious points arising from the actual operations of the marts during the past fifteen years were

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[1] Tibet Trade Regulations, Cd.2370, p.151.

solved by these regulations. British Subjects were permitted to lease lands for building sites at the trade marts. Tibetan officials were to be responsible for the administration of the marts. The Chinese were to supervise the Tibetans but were not to have any actual administrative control over the trade marts. The eleven resting houses built by Britain, at a cost of 22,778 rupees, which were located between the Indian frontier and Gyantse were to be purchased by the Chinese Government at original cost and then leased to the Government of India at a fair rate.[1] Britain agreed to consider the transfer of the telegraph line to China when the Chinese telegraph line reached Gyantse. Until that time, China assumed responsibility for the protection of the telegraph line from Gyantse to India and guaranteed the prosecution of any persons who damaged the wires. Couriers employed to carry the posts to the British Trade Agents were offered the same protection as those employed in carrying the Tibetan dispatches. British Subjects were to use only the established trade routes to the three Tibetan marts whereas natives along the Indian frontier were permitted to trade in Tibet elsewhere than at the marts according to traditional usage. British Subjects were to trade with whomsoever they pleased, hire transportation

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[1] India-Foreign to Sir J. Jordan, 24 November 1908, Cd.2370, p.165.

of any kind and in general to conduct their business without any oppressive restrictions. China was not to prevent British subjects from having direct dealings with the Tibetans. Although the Tibet Trade Regulations clarified many pressing issues, the negotiators at Calcutta were deft in side-stepping issues that might involve controversy. Thus the levy of customs duties and the export of tea from India into Tibet were reserved for future consideration. This apparently was a victory for the Chinese for they continued to shut out Indian tea merchants from the Tibetan market.

Several months before the Tibet Trade Regulations had been signed, the Indian Tea Cess Committee reminded the Government of India of the efforts which had been made to introduce Indian tea into Tibet.[1] Since the Tibetans consumed more tea per capita than any other people in the world and since the population of Tibet had been estimated as high as two million, obviously, Indian merchants had long wanted to enter the Tibetan tea market. The Trade Regulations appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 had specified the prohibition of Indian tea exports to Tibet for a five year period from 1 May 1894. Once that period had

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[1] Indian Tea Cess Committee to India-Foreign, Calcutta, 1 October 1907, Cd.2370, p.133.

elapsed Indian tea could be imported into Tibet at a duty corresponding to that levied upon the entry of Chinese tea into England. Thus from 1899, Indian tea could legally be exported to Tibet. But the Tibetans showed a distinct preference for the flavour of Chinese tea. To remedy this situation the Indian Cess Committee sent a Commissioner to the Province of Szechuan in China, in 1905, to inquire into the practical aspects of making tea similar in all respects to the Chinese article. Indian tea planters consequently had begun to produce a tea suitable to Tibetan tastes. But, even so, the Tibetans had not been induced to buy Indian tea, and as mentioned above, the Tibet Trade Regulations ignored the question of tariffs concerned with the importation of Indian tea into Tibet.

Soon after the Tibet Trade Regulations went into effect the practical question of the tea trade arose. Since 1899 India had been exporting a small supply of tea to Tibet. 22 September 1908, Captain O'Connor had lunch with Cheung, the Chinese Commissioner of Customs. O'Connor reminded Cheung that he had violated a treaty by detaining a supply of tea imported by an Indian trader.[1] Cheung replied that he had received orders from Peking not to allow Indian tea to pass until a fixed duty had been imposed. Cheung

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[1] Diary of British Trade Agent, Gyantse, for the week ending 26 September 1908, Cd.2370, p.162.

added that he did not wish to start a precedent on his own initiative by permitting the importation of Indian tea into Tibet. O'Connor quickly pointed out that since 1899 Indian tea had legal right of entry into Tibet and that during the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley a great quantity had been brought up openly to Gyantse. O'Connor protested against Cheung's acting on verbal orders in spite of a definite treaty right and Cheung said he would wire Peking immediately for further advice.

The four cases of Indian tea stopped at Yatung and sent back to India by the orders of Cheung created a flurry of protests from trader representatives of tea interests in India. The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State for India that the question of the importation of Indian tea together with the introduction of the tariff ought to be discussed as soon as possible at Peking. Lord Morley concurred with the Viceroy's proposal and suggested to Sir Edward Grey that the Ambassador at Peking might be consulted as to the opportune time for raising the question with the Chinese Government. Sir John Jordan replied to Sir Edward Grey, 22 February 1909 that he could not say that the present was the best moment for approaching the Chinese on the tea and tariff question.[1] Sir Edward Grey

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[1]Nos. 269, 272-76, 282-83, pp. 172-77, Cd.2370

then requested a full statement of the case from the Indian Government and instructed the Ambassador at Peking to bring the matter to the notice of the Chinese Government when he received the statement.

Upon reconsidering the whole situation, the Indian Government decided that the subject of a customs tariff ought not be brought to the notice of the Chinese Government. This decision was made partly in consideration of the enormous length of land frontier along the Indian-Tibetan border and the consequent cost of a regular customs service. China was not prepared to collect systematic customs for some years to come. On the single subject of tea, however, the Chinese themselves had forced the necessity of a fixed customs duty. Thus the Government of India felt that it was the opportune time to press for the settlement of a tea tariff at Peking. The Government of India now suggested that the tariff on Indian tea correspond to the tariff on Chinese tea entering India.[1] In 1909, that latter tariff was 5% ad valorem. The Indian Government, indicated though a willingness to consider a higher rate against Indian tea if it were necessary. The negotiations over the tea tariff were pending when the Tibetans ousted the Chinese

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[1] India Office to Foreign Office, 29 April 1910, Cd.2370, p.217.

authorities from Tibet in 1912.

Three outstanding violations of the Lhasa Convention were noted by Indian Officials after the Tibet Trade Regulations had gone into effect. The first series of incidents developed from restrictions placed on trade at Khamba Jong. According to the second article of the 1904 Convention the Tibetan Government undertook to place no restrictions against trade on the existing routes. Yet on the 8th of May 1908, the Political Officer at Sikkim reported that "the Sikkim traders of the Lachen and Lachung Valleys say that since one year the Khamba Jongpen has prevented them from going to Shigatse for trade."[1] When the Sikkimese Agency asked the Khamba Jongpen to explain his action, he replied that he had not restricted the Valley people from their usual trading in the Khamba Jong District yet he had no authority to permit them to go beyond that point.

The Political Officer at Sikkim conducted a tour of the Lachen and Lachung Valleys in February 1909, and observed the pattern of trade along the Sikkim-Khamba Jong route. Traders from Sikkim were not permitted to go beyond Khamba Jong to Shigatse. Moreover, the traders were

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[1] Political Officer, Sikkim, to India-Foreign, 22 March 1909, Cd.2370, p.179.

not permitted to trade with the Tibetans but only with the Khamba Jongpen himself who paid below the market for Sikkimese goods and charged about double prices for his own articles. For example, the Khamba Jongpen paid the traders a nominal price of 12 tankas per load of one maund of madder, in goods, at Khamba Jong whereas they could actually get 18 or 20 tankas at Shigatse in cash. In some cases, it was estimated that the Khamba Jongpen made about three hundred per cent profit on the purchase of Sikkimese goods.

The Sikkimese Agency suggested that the Government of India make representations to the Lhasa authorities regarding the actions of the Khamba Jongpen. Several months later, however, the Sikkim Agency reported that "the restrictions have now been withdrawn and a large number of traders from North Sikkim have visited Shigatse. It will not, therefore, be necessary to communicate with the Tibetan Government on this subject."[1]

The perplexing question of customs duties imposed at Phari arose again on 28 October 1908. The freshly re-imposed taxation was three-fold in nature: two annas were required of every person visiting Phari except the Bhutanese; five and a half annas (one tanka) were due on

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[1] Political Officer, Sikkim, to India-Foreign, 15 December 1909, Cd.2370, p.185.

each animal at Phari except for those coming from Bhutan; 10% ad valorem was imposed on all merchandise passing through Phari. In the opinion of the Political Officer at Sikkim, the new customs at Phari put a burden on the Tibetan trade of not less than one-and-a-half lakhs of rupees per year. Indian officials considered this a serious restriction on trade, a violation of the fourth article of the Lhasa Convention. The Government of India was requested to review the matter and, perhaps, notify the Lhasa authorities of this and other violations of treaty arrangements. But when the Khamba Jong affair was resolved, the Government of India chose to ignore the customs duties at Phari. Apparently, the matter was considered not to be of sufficient importance to merit an official protest to the Tibetan Government.

The third and most pressing violation of the Lhasa Convention was the establishment of monopoly buying on a grand scale by the Tibetan Government. The British Trade Agent at Gyantse reported, 24 June 1908, the existence of three monopolies at Phari.[1] The sale of rice and paper had for some time been restricted to only a few merchants appointed by the Tibetan Government. Then a new monopoly for the sale of gur was granted to the Dre-pung Chi Dzo-pa who was acting on behalf of the Dre-pung Monastery at Lhasa.

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[1] Political Officer, Sikkim, to India-Foreign, 15 December 1909, Cd.2370, p.185.

The Sikkimese Agent reported a significant step in the establishment of monopoly trade in Tibet, 10 July 1909. Apparently the Chinese, who were paying the wages of the Tibetan regular troops, had suggested the idea of monopoly grants to the Tibetan Government. To pay for the additional 5,000 Tibetan troops, the Lhasa authorities issued a proclamation, 26 May. The sole right of purchasing wool and yak tails in Tibet was granted to three merchants: to the Kun-sang family at Lhasa, to Pu-nye-chang of the Pom-do-tsang family and to Jim-pa, trader of Chema, or if the latter refused for fear of the Chumbi traders, to Garu-Sha, a Lhasa trader. These three merchants were to pay 800 do-tse (Rs. 88,900) yearly as a license fee as well as 10% per annum interest on the 1,800 do-tse (Rs. 2,00,025) lent to them by the Lhasa Government. The monopoly on wool came into effect on the 18th of July, while the yak monopoly began a year later. Another major monopoly, one for the purchase of hides was granted to one Ge-tu-tsang, an affluent trader from Eastern Tibet for Rs.20,000 a year. Monopolies were also proposed for the purchase of sheep, iron, copper, brass and silver.

Since the commodities of wool, yak tails, and hides constituted the greater part of Tibetan exports to India it seemed as if the whole Tibetan trade was to fall into

the hands of three men. This probability was reinforced by the fact that Tibetan coins were not accepted by Indian merchants. If the Tibetans could not obtain Indian rupees then their purchasing power would be greatly decreased.

Indian traders at Kalimpong were also seriously threatened by the Lhasa proclamation. Without the spur of competition the prices on Tibetan goods could be fixed at a higher rate. Also, to avoid the middlemen, it seemed likely that the monopolists would deal directly with Calcutta and that Indian traders in Northern Bengal who had given large advances on wool would not be able to collect.

The Sikkimese Agent suggested that this serious breach of the twelfth article of the Tibet Trade Regulations be brought to the attention of the authorities at Lhasa. But before such a protest could be fully considered, changes occurred in the political life of Tibet.

In the first months of 1910, a situation developed in Lhasa that was totally to disrupt for several months the pattern of Indian-Tibetan trade. This situation was the complete consolidation of Chinese military authority in Lhasa as a climax to a process of change that had begun in the Eastern provinces of Tibet soon after the Lhasa Convention was signed in 1904.

CHAPTER NINE

" The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province."

The Simla Convention of 1914.

When the Younghusband Mission approached Lhasa in 1904 the Dalai Lama fled. The Pontiff journied north and crossed over the border into Mongolia where the predominantly Buddhist population reverently received him. Thence he travelled westward, crossed into China and entered the "City of the North", Peking. The Supreme Pontiff of Tibet experienced censorious and slighting treatment at Peking. Nonetheless, the Manchu Government respected the power of Buddhist influence both in China and Tibet and when the Chinese regained a dominant position in Tibet after the Adhesion Agreement of 1906, the Manchu Emperor was disposed to restore the Dalai Lama to Lhasa as the 'loyal and submissive Viceregent bound by the laws of the Sovereign state'.[1] Towards the end of 1909, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa.

During the years 1905-10, the Manchu General Chao Erh-feng subjected to imperial power many of the border states in eastern Tibet that had long maintained a religious connection with the Dalai Lama. In February 1910, Chao led an army to Lhasa itself with the intention of converting Tibet firmly into an obedient province of China. Again, the Dalai Lama made his escape and fled from the Holy City.

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[1] H. Richardson, op. cit. p.97

But this time he took refuge in India.[1] The British sent a protest to Peking concerning the armed intervention and demanded that an effective Tibetan Government be maintained to fulfill the provisions of the Lhasa Convention and the Trade Agreement of 1908. The Chinese explained to the British that the troops had been sent to Lhasa to police the trade routes as provided under the Trade Regulations.

Thus, for the second time within five years the city of Lhasa had been invaded by foreign troops. In 1904, the British under the command of Younghusband had entered the gates of the Holy City and had forced the Tibetans to sign a treaty whereby Great Britain virtually took control of Tibetan foreign affairs. Then in 1910, the Chinese under the leadership of Chao marched into Lhasa, where an imperial proclamation was announced deposing the Dalai Lama and installing the Amban as the Chief Executive in Tibet.[2] On both occasions a similar argument had been used to justify foreign intervention in Tibet. In 1904 the British Government argued that the Younghusband Mission was necessary to settle matters of trade between India and Tibet

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[1] cf. V.B. Karnik, ed., China Invades India, p.107.

[2] cf. A. De Riencourt, Lost World: Tibet, Key To Asia, p.168.

that were occasioned by the Trade Regulations of 1893. In 1910, The Chinese Government defended the intervention of Chao by explaining that Chinese troops were necessary at Lhasa for the protection of the trade routes as provided by the Trade Regulations of 1908. In such a way, both Great Britain and China attempted to hide their political ambitions in Tibet behind a hedge of trade interests.

Although the troops of Chao Ehr-feng were militarily successful in Lhasa in 1910, the Chinese found it difficult to replace the Tibetan Government with their own administrative machine. No one in Tibet wanted to cooperate with the Chinese. The Dalai Lama and his leading ministers were in exile in India. The Tashi Lama refused to head a provisional government. The Tibetan National Assembly were sullen with the Chinese and kept in direct negotiation with the Dalai Lama. Soon the Chinese realized that perhaps they had too hastily deposed the Supreme Pontiff of Tibet so they made several attempts to restore him to power at Lhasa. However, His Holiness demanded that the British Government be a party to any settlement between China and Tibet but the Peking Government considered such foreign medicine worse than the internal disease.

When the Chinese consolidated their authority

in Lhasa in 1910 the British were at the same time confronted with an anomalous situation. After reaching India, the Dalai Lama had immediately appealed to the British Government for help. His Holiness reminded the British that according to the ninth article of the Lhasa Convention no foreign power was permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs without the previous consent of the British Government. To maintain prestige, then, the British in India thought they had to react to the Chinese military intrusion at Lhasa because of the 1904 Agreement. But the Home Government offered the following explanation to the Viceregal Government at Calcutta to be transmitted to the Tibetan Government, in exile. The British position vis-a-vis Tibet had been complicated by the Conventions of 1906 and 1907 with China and Russia respectively. In the Convention of 1906, the British had relinquished their veto power over Tibetan foreign affairs when they gave the Chinese an equal right in guiding the political future of Tibet. Furthermore, in the Convention of 1907, both Great Britain and Russia recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet and thus attempted to create a true buffer zone in Tibet wherein neither the British nor the Russians intended to interfere.[1]

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[1]cf. L. Albertini, The Origins of The War of 1914, p.189.

But the buffer zone of an independent Tibet was short-lived for, in 1910, the Manchus tried to incorporate Tibet into China proper. It seemed to the British in India that the Chinese had now made the Lhasa Convention inoperable since it was an agreement between Britain and Tibet. Moreover, many British officials believed that India should play a more active role by driving the Chinese armed guard from Lhasa and restoring the Dalai Lama. The British who advocated such a policy feared the build-up of an armed China along the Himalayan wall and they argued that continued Chinese obstruction of the Trade Regulations of 1908 was sufficient ground for an Indian support of the Dalai Lama and his advisors in exile. The Home Government, however, did not want an armed quarrel with China over Tibet for fear of disrupting British-Russian relations. Thus Whitehall dismissed the Chinese intrusion at Lhasa as a legal attempt by the Chinese to assert their suzerainty in that area.

Perhaps the British Government did not interfere with the Chinese supression of the Tibetan Government during 1910 because they were aware of the troubles besetting the Manchu Government in Peking. Perhaps the British realized that the Manchu Government was heading for a fall and thus the Chinese had little hope of establishing permanent

authority in Tibet. In any case revolution broke out in China in 1911 and the Tibetans were not slow in seizing the opportunity of ousting the Chinese from their land.[1] In many parts of Tibet, the Chinese garrisons were quickly slaughtered by the local people but the fighting in Lhasa and Gyantse was prolonged. Both the Chinese and the Tibetans asked the British to mediate but they refused because of 'treaty obligations'. Obviously the British were referring to the Anglo-Russian Convention whereby both the British and Russians had agreed not to interfere in Tibetan affairs.

The Nepalese Government was prevailed upon to act as mediator in the Tibetan-Chinese dispute. At the conference table both sides were persuaded to agree to the following solution. By the end of 1912 the fighting was to stop, the remaining Chinese troops in Tibet were to be disarmed, and transported back to China, by way of India. In June, 1912, the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet but he did not enter Lhasa until January, 1913, when the last of the Chinese troops had left Tibet.

But the collapse of Chinese power in Central Tibet did not mean an end to the fighting. The Tibetans

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[1] cf. K. Latourette, op.cit., p.441.

conducted a series of attacks on Chinese garrisons in the Eastern provinces of Tibet, in those provinces that had been subjugated by Chao Ehr-feng. On the other hand, the new Republican Government of China under the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai showed no signs of recognizing the independence of Tibet.[1] The new government fully intended to assert their authority throughout eastern and central Tibet.

At a time when the Chinese and Tibetans were clashing violently for control of eastern Tibet, the Government of India, under the direction of the Home Government, decided to take advantage of the situation by acting as mediator between Tibet and China in such a way as to guarantee the security of India. Proclamations of independence by the Dalai Lama were ignored by Calcutta. The British Ambassador at Peking notified the new Chinese Government that the Government of India desired that the internal automomy of Tibet under Chinese suzerainty be maintained, provided that the treaty obligations were fulfilled. India recognized Chinese suzerainty in Tibet but denied the right of China to interfere in the internal administration of the country. Actually, the position of the Government of India now expressed, was a reversal of the policy of 1910 and a return to the

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[1] cf. P.E. Roberts, History of British India, p. 574.

intentions of the Adhesion Agreement of 1906. The Government of India further notified the Peking Regime that the British were not prepared to recognize the new Chinese Republic until the Chinese agreed to the above conditions in a written agreement. Such conditions, then, became the basis of negotiations between the British, Chinese and Tibetans that culminated in the signing of the Simla Convention in 1914.

The Chinese verbally maintained their unconditional control of Tibet but upon the notification of British intentions the Chinese Government made two consessions; the Chinese Commander was recalled from the eastern frontier and the Dalai Lama was reinstated in a typical oriental manner. Though the Chinese had virtually lost control of Tibet yet the Government of China 'deigned' to restore the Dalai Lama's official Chinese rank.[1]

At this point it might be a cause of wonderment why the British would attempt to intervene in Tibetan-Chinese relations and risk incurring Russian reproaches. In 1910, the British had maintained a policy of non-interference with regard to Chinese-Tibetan affairs because of treaty obligations, i.e., the Anglo-Russian Convention. Now in 1912, the British

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[1]Tsung-Lien Shen and Shen-Chi Lui, op. cit., p. 51.

seemed oblivious of Russian sentiments. Why? The answer is simply that Britain had cause to believe that Imperialist Russia was again moving into Central Asia. Shortly after the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa in 1912, Dorjiev reappeared in the Holy City and rumor had it that he carried a message from the Czar. Indeed the Russians had taken advantage of the turmoil in China by establishing their influence in Mongolia and the Indian Government came to believe that Dorjiev visited Lhasa to negotiate a treaty between Mongolia and Tibet. Thus in the face of such possible Russian duplicity in dealing with Tibet, the Government of India decided to make it known to the Chinese Government, and indirectly to the Russians, that the British were serious in their desire to maintain an autonomous Tibetan Government as a buffer that separated India from China and Russia. The British position, as mentioned before, was drawn up into an agenda for talks that were begun at Simla, India, in October 1913.

The Chinese agreed in January 1913 to sit at the conference table with both the British and the Tibetans. They made strenuous efforts to have the negotiations take place in either London or Peking rather than in India and they also objected to attending a conference wherein they would be on the same footing as the Tibetans. The Chinese also demanded

that China's suzerainty over Tibet be recognized before the opening of the conference. The delaying tactics of the Chinese continued throughout the spring and summer of 1913 and finally the British issued an ultimatum to Peking that the Chinese were to be present at Simla by October 6 or else the British and the Tibetans would enter into bi-lateral negotiations. Thus the Chinese, the Tibetans and the British conferred at Simla in October 1913 and the talks resulted in the Simla Convention of 1914. The British Plenipotentiary was Sir Henry McMahon, the Chinese representative was Ivan Chen and the Tibetans were represented by Lonchen Shatra.[1]

At the Conference, the Tibetan delegate tried to secure the independence of Tibet as a country separate from China. He argued that the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 ought to be declared invalid because that treaty recognized the supremacy of China in Tibet. Only two years before the Anglo Chinese Convention was signed, Britain had dealt directly with the Tibetans and had not acknowledged the suzerainty of China in Tibet. Now Tibet wanted to ignore Chinese activity in Tibet between 1905-1910 and wanted to return to the spirit of the Lhasa Convention of 1904. More specifically, Tibet argued that a frontier be established

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[1] J.S. Bains, India's International Disputes, p. 141.

between Tibet and China, a frontier that would gather all Tibetans in the embrace of Lhasa. Such a frontier passed through the vicinity of Tachienlu and ran along the Koko Nor north of Burma.

The Chinese, at Simla, were mainly interested in guaranteeing their suzerainty in Tibet and in settling the frontier between Tibet and China. To maintain their control in Tibet the Chinese used the diplomatic ruse of demanding more than they hoped to obtain. For the first time China claimed that Tibet was 'an integral part of China' and the Peking Government also declared that they had the right to station an Amban at Lhasa with a military escort of 2,600 troops, an Amban who would direct the military and civil affairs of the country.[1] As a proof of China's suzerainty over Tibet, the Chinese referred to their country's conquest of Tibet during the reign of the Mongol Ghengis Khan. Moreover, the Chinese pointed to the Adhesion Agreement of 1906 wherein Great Britain had recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet. On the question of the frontier that separated Tibet from the rest of China, the Peking Government recognized the administration established by Chao Erh-feng during the years of turmoil, 1905-1910, and thus the Chinese set the Tibetan boundary only 60 miles to the east of Lhasa.

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[1] H. Richardson, op.cit., p.108.

To counteract the Chinese claims the Tibetans offered a surprising display of revenue records, agreements and charters to prove the traditional authority of the Lhasa Government in Tibet. Nevertheless, the Chinese did have the weighty argument of the Adhesion Agreement and the evidence of Chao Erh-feng's control of eastern Tibet.

Sir Henry McMahon found himself in the position of mediator between Tibet and China. He hoped that the conflicting claims of independence by Tibet and suzerainty by China might be settled by emphasizing another term, autonomy. McMahon's plan was that Tibet be recognized as an <u>autonomous</u> nation under the <u>suzerainty</u> of China. According to this formula, Tibet possessed the power or right of self-government whereas China held the right to exercise political control over Tibet. Such a solution, the British hoped, would settle the waves of contention between China and Tibet and would make the relations between the two countries similar to those existing before 1904. Thus Tibet would have a stable indigenous government having close relations with the British Government in India because the Tibetans would look to the British as the protectors of Tibetan freedom from Chinese interference. Both the Tibetans and the Chinese were induced by the British to accept this solution whereby Tibet was recognized to be an

autonomous nation under the suzerainty of China.[1]

The Tibetans, who had actually gained their independence, drove a hard bargain with the Chinese. Under pressure from Britain the Tibetans agreed to accept Chinese suzerainty in Tibet but only on the conditions that no Chinese officials were to be sent to Tibet other than one high ranking official; that no Chinese troops were to be sent into Tibet other than the official's escort; and that Tibet was not to be incorporated as a province of China nor was Tibet to hold a seat in the Chinese parliament. Moreover, the Tibetans demanded that there be no mention in the Convention of any Chinese right to interfere in the military or foreign affairs of Tibet.

As a further guarantee of Chinese non-interference in Tibet the Tibetan Government directed its plenipotentiary to press for the appointment of a British Resident at Lhasa. The Dalai Lama remembered that after the Lhasa Convention of 1904 the Chinese had made a concerted effort to enforce their authority in Tibet. His Holiness believed that the presence of a British Resident at Lhasa would discourage any similar designs after 1914. It will be remembered that Younghusband had attached a note to the Lhasa Convention to the effect that

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[1] cf. J. Ch'en, Yuan Shih-K'ai (1859-1916) p. 176.

a British Residency be opened at Lhasa. But the British Government then feared Russian reactions and the note was excluded from the treaty before they ratified it. Now, in 1914, the Tibetans were asking for the British Residency at their capital. Again, the Home Government was most anxious not to arouse the wrath of Russia but at the same time the British realized that the Chinese might well attempt to exact reprisals at Lhasa and enforce their control in the Holy City. Thus the British agreed to arrangements whereby a British Resident might 'occasionally' visit Lhasa to discuss matters arising from the 1904 Convention.

Besides the question of the political status of Tibet, the question of the boundary was also one of great difficulty. Certainly the Chinese claim to territory up to sixty miles outside of Lhasa was substantiated only by the imperial project of Chao Erh-feng during 1905-1910. Likewise, although the peoples from Lhasa to Tachienlu and Koko Nor were mainly of Tibetan stock, yet the Tibetan Government could not claim historically, that large areas of the eastern provinces had been subject to Tibetan administration. To settle the conflicting claims, McMahon devised a plan to create an Inner and an Outer Tibet.[1] Both the Chinese and the Tibetans accepted

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[1] V.B. Karnik, op. cit., p.108.

this scheme. Outer Tibet included the lands west of the Yangtse that were traditionally under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama. Indeed, Outer Tibet was to be an independent country to the extent of the limits placed on Chinese suzerainty in that region. On the other hand, Inner Tibet extended from the Yangtse River north to the Altyn Tagh range and east to the borders of Kansu and Szechwan provinces. Though the people of Inner Tibet were ethnically and religiously tied to Lhasa yet it was agreed that Peking was free to send officials and troops into that area provided that China did not convert Inner Tibet into a Chinese province.

Both the British and the Tibetans were satisfied with the creation of Inner Tibet. Although the Tibetans had extended their military control of that area after 1912, the Lhasa Government had never effectively governed the whole area and they could never hope to do so when confronted by a stable Chinese Government. Thus the Tibetans were willing to relax their grasp on Inner Tibet so that it might become a buffer zone between Tibet proper and China. Great Britain, in turn, was anxious to have an independent government in Outer Tibet so that Outer Tibet might be an affective buffer between China and India. The creation of Inner Tibet, as an administrative no man's land between Tibet and China, satisfied

the Tibetans who wanted a buffer between themselves and the Chinese.[1] And it also pleased the British who now had a buffer and a semi-buffer between India and China.

The Chinese representative, Ivan Chen, continually rejected the idea of Inner and Outer Tibet until it seemed that the British and the Tibetans were determined to make no concession on the matter. Then Chen finally joined with the British and Tibetans in initialling the treaty. The Chinese Government however, refused to ratify the Convention on the grounds that they could not accept the boundary settlement between China and Tibet.[2] China probably feared that if Inner Tibet were ever printed on the map, then some day Great Britain might come to the aid of Outer Tibet in an attempt to extend Lhasan administrative control over Inner Tibet. In addition, the provision that China was not to make Inner Tibet into a Chinese province was a great affront to the Peking Government, They were not prepared to surrender any territory formally, the Chinese Government repudiated the treaty.

The British warned the Chinese that unless they were willing to sign the treaty, it would be concluded between the British and the Tibetans. The Chinese retorted that they

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1 J.V. Bains, op.cit., p.142.

2 Ibid., p.109.

could not accept such unfair proposals, especially as regards the settlement of the Chinese-Tibetan frontier.[1] Thus on the 3rd of July, 1914, the Simla Convention was signed by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet respectively. The two plenipotentiaries also signed a document to the effect that all privileges in the treaty accruing to China be suspended until the Chinese Government signed the Convention.

What were the results of the Convention from the viewpoint of the three parties involved? By her refusal to sign the Simla Convention, China lost the advantages gained in Tibet by the Adhesion Agreement of 1906. China also lost the recognition by the British and Tibetan Governments of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet; the right to appoint an Amban and an escort at Lhasa; the right of exception to the ninth article of the Lhasa Convention; as well as the right to join Great Britain and Tibet in the negotiation of the Trade Agreement of 1914. What China won by refusing to sign the Simla Convention was the satisfaction of not bowing to the wishes and influence of Great Britain, while at the same time reserving the right to settle on its own terms and in its own

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[1] cf. The Sino Indian Boundary Question, p.11.

time with Tibet.[1]

By the Chinese refusal to sign the Simla Convention the Tibetans did not have to surrender part of their sovereignty in return for a limited independence and a settlement of the frontier. Until the Chinese Government signed the Convention, the Tibetans were not obliged to recognize the suzerainty of China over Tibet. The bi-lateral signing of the Convention thus restored relations between Britain and Tibet to the climate that had existed after the signing of the Lhasa Convention of 1904.

Another important advantage that came to the British in India from the Conference at Simla was the settlement of a substantial section of the frontier between Tibet and India. The so-called 'McMahon Line' set the boundary along the crest of the Himalaya from the Isu Razi pass in Burma to the north-east corner of Bhutan. A map of the McMahon Line, initialled by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries, was appended to the Simla Convention. The Chinese were informed of this settlement but were not called in during the negotiations, for their acceptance of the Indian-Tibetan frontier was not sought.

Why were the British and the Tibetans interested

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1 cf. S. Chawla, "Tibet: The Red Chinese Challenge to India", Current History, No. 37, Dec. 1959, pp. 354-361.

in settling the frontier between Indian Assam and Eastern Tibet in 1914? That particular story began around 1900.

Until the beginning of the 20th century British policy regarding the north eastern frontier of India was a policy of non-interference beyond the foothills. The possibilities for the development of the tea and timber plantation systems in Assam, together with tribal and Chinese activities in that area, served to change the British attitude. Indian tea planters looked with increasing interest towards the undeveloped tea tracts of the valleys. Moreover, the virgin forests of the hill country attracted the timber companies. Thus, faced with pressing requests from commercial interests the Indian Government seriously considered the extension of the Assamese frontier to the north. But more important still, the Indian Government was concerned with tribal and Chinese advances into India.

The British began to question their policy of leaving the hill tribes alone because of increasing series of tribal raids on British outposts located along the lower Bhramaputra. This is how one commentator described the situation:

> "Though for decades the local officers advocated a 'forward' policy with regard to the hill tribes of Assam, the Supreme Government was determined to remain "non-interventionist" on the ground that a policy of annexation might be

financially harmful and politically premature, and that any political disturbance on this frontier might seriously affect the supply of labour to the tea estates causing a great loss to the tea industry. But in the course of time, this policy had to be changed as the tribal raids could not be stopped." [1]

One person who began to re-model Indian tribal policy was Noel Williamson who became the Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya, in 1905. Williamson advocated that the tribes should be encouraged to settle in Indian-administered territory and that such encouragement should be carried to the tribes by British officers who would travel into the hill country to explain the benefits of British rule in India. Morley, Secretary of State for India vetoed Williamson's proposal in June, 1908. But before the official rejection reached Calcutta, Williamson had already started into Assam during the latter part of 1907. He went up the Lohit almost to Walong and became acquainted with many of the aboriginal peoples in the area. In 1910, Williamson made another trip up the Lohit and travelled over the mountains to the Tibetan town of Rima. The following year Williamson set out on a third trip, this time into Abor country accompanied by Gregorson the tea estate doctor. On the 30th of March, 1911, Gregorson and Williamson were murdered by Abor

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[1] B.C. Chakravorty, British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam, Since 1858. Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1964, p. 169.

tribesmen.[1] This incident prompted a more vigorous Indian Government policy regarding Assam, a policy that included the extension of the Assamese frontier to the crest of the mountains.

One of the major motives that had driven Williamson in his exploration of upper Assam was the increase of Chinese power in Tibet after 1905. In that year a rebellion began in Eastern Tibet in a region beyond the temporal control of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese entrusted the supression of the rebellion to Chao Erh-feng and he was so successful that by 1910 the rebellion had not only been quelled but the Chinese had extended their authority into Tibet Proper, had moved into Lhasa, and had forced the Dalai Lama into exile in India. Now with Central Tibet under control the Chinese became increasingly interested in excerting more power across the mountains down into the hill country of Assam.[2] The Indian Government considered it to be of urgent necessity to stake a claim to that portion of Assam on the Indian side of the watershed.

Once the Chinese had occupied Lhasa they began

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[1] G.Dunbar, Frontiers, p.108.

[2] Ibid, p.266.

to put into effect the policy of administering the territory occupied by the Abor tribes along the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. No one in India knew how far into Assam the Chinese intended to advance. Chao Erh-feng issued a directive to Chinese settlers to settle at Rima at the head of the Lohit Valley. By the Summer of 1910, the Chinese had stationed a detachment of troops near Rima and had erected boundary pillars in the vicinity of Walong. Following this, the Chinese began to assert their sovereignty over the Mishmi tribes. Now the British felt that it was absolutely necessary to take action since Mishmi territory made up a considerable part of what the British considered to be Indian-administered Assam. On 24 November 1910, Sir Lancelot Hare, Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal said, "It seems to me, in view of the possibility of the Chinese pushing forward, that it would be a mistake not to put ourselves in a position to take up suitable strategic points of defence."[1] Again, 12 January 1911, Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office wrote:

> "if anything goes wrong in Assam, there would be very voiceful public opinion against us. There are no European industries along the North West Frontier,.... But in Lakhimpur District there are over 70,000 acres of tea gardens turning out over 30,000,000 pounds of tea annually, and employing over 200 Europeans and over 100,000 Indians. The

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[1]India Office, Political External Files 1910, Vol. 13, as quoted by A. Lamb, The India China Border, Oxford Univ. Press, Toronto, 1964, p.137.

European capital risk in tea must be enormous, and there are other industries as well.... These gardens lie at the foot of the hills inhabited by savages; their defence rests with 1 battalion of native infantry and 1 battalion of military police (850 men). Think of the howl the planters would let out, and the rise in the price of tea!" [1]

Thus the exploration of Assam began by Williamson and directed by him until his death during the Abor Expedition was continued by other British officials between the years 1911-1913. The Miri Mission explored the lower reaches of the Subansiri; the Brahmaputra was explored all the way from the plains to the limits of Tibetan control; British boundary markers were placed beside Chinese Boundary markers in the vicinity of Walong; and two British Indian officials, Bailey and Morshead became the first Europeans to travel the Tawang Tract of Assam. All the while the Indian Government increased its pressure upon the British Government to extend the administrative frontiers of Assam. The Secretary of State finally yielded to the promptings of the Government of India and in 1912, the tribal country of Assam was divided into three administrative sections: (a) the Central or Abor Section (b) the Eastern or Mishmi Section and (c) the Western Section between the Tawang and Subansiri rivers. In the same year, Political Officers were

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[1] Ibid.

dispatched to two new outposts which afterwards were known as the Sadiya & Balipura frontier tracts. By 1913, a good map of the Assam Himalaya could be made by British Indian officials and though there were some gaps to be filled in by later surveys, the Indian Government had amassed considerable knowledge and had gained administrative control over upper Assam during the three year period following the Abor Expedition. Penetration into Assam had been prompted by Indian commercial interests as well as the British desire to check actual and possible tribal, Tibetan and Chinese advances. Thus the delimitation of the Assam-Tibet frontier was settled the following year, 1914. By the so-called MacMahon Line appended to the Simla Convention.

The failure of the Chinese to sign the Convention provided Britain with the right to deal directly with the Tibetans, to send a representative to Lhasa and to negotiate a more favorable set of trade regulations. Perhaps the British had intentionally directed the negotiations at Simla so that the Chinese could not possibly sign the treaty 'without losing face'. In any case, the fact that the Chinese did not sign the treaty made it possible for Britain to deal directly with Tibet as had been done in 1904. All that the British had gained in 1904 had been lost in 1906 and 1907. But now at Simla in 1914, a Convention was signed that inhanced

British influence in Lhasa. In 1904, Great Britain had momentarily taken control of Tibetan foreign affairs. Now in 1914, Britain became the protector of Tibetan autonomy. Moreover, the British regained control over the Post, Telegraph Lines and Rest Houses that they constructed in Tibet and im addition, they won territorial rights in Tibet according to the Trade Regulations that followed the Simla Convention.

Article Vll(a) of the Simla Convention cancelled the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 and the Tibetan Goverrnment agreed to negotiate a new trade agreement with the British Govermment to give effect to three articles of the Lhasa Convention. The second article of the said Convention permitted amendments to be made to the regulations whereas the fourth article warranted a mutually agreed upon tariff and the fifth article required that Tibetan representatives be stationed at the three marts to communicate with British Agents. From 1904 to 1914 no tariff had been mutually agreed upon by the Tibetans. Moreover, after 1905 British trade in Tibet had been hampered by the monopolistic privileges granted to a few people. Since unsettled tariffs and widespread monopolies hindered British trade in Tibet, the British wanted to settle commercial questions at Simla in 1914.

Indeed, during the years 1905-1910, the Chinese had continually obstructed British commercial interests in Tibet. The Chinese knew that the British wanted to expand their commercial activity in Tibet and to use this activity as a screen behind which they could observe Chinese and Russian political activities in Tibet. The Chinese thus prohibited the Tibetans from dealing directly with the British. Although this was a contravention of the Lhasa Agreement the Chinese defended themselves by asserting their suzerain rights according to the Adhesion Agreement. The Chinese also granted monopolies to some Tibetans so that only a 'trusted few' would have direct dealingswith the British. In such a way China hoped to check the commercial-political intrusion of Great Britain into Tibet. The tariff problem, especially the tea tariff, was not settled by the Trade Regulations of 1914 because the Tibetan Government could not bear the cost of a customs system along the length of the Indian-Tibetan frontier. To avoid the question of tariffs, the Tibetan Government agreed to allow British subjects to conduct their business transactions in conformity with the local usage and 'without vexations, restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever.' Thus British tea merchants did not win any new ground in their efforts to force the entry of Indian tea into Tibet.

The Trade Regulations of 1914 were definitely

a benefit to the British in India in relation to the problem of monopolistic privilege in Tibet. The sixth article of the Regulations provided that no rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry were to be granted 'to any official or private company, institution, or individual in Tibet.' This was a major gain for the British. Now the British could legally trade with any Tibetan merchant at the trade marts. Moreover, British Agents could gather information concerning the political climate of Tibet from a great number of sources.

The Trade Regulations of 1914 differed in some detail and principle from those of 1893 and 1908. No mention of Chinese supervision was to be found in the Agreement of 1914. Thus the British were free to deal directly with the Tibetans once again and a cause of constant friction at the trade marts between 1905-1910 had been removed.[1] The British were granted territorial rights in these trade rules inasmuch

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[1] By 1914, the British no longer had illusions of a lucrative Indian-Tibetan trade. However, for the sake of prestige, they wanted an effective trade agreement.
"The mountains which guard the Indian frontier on the north-west, north and north-east permit some trade across their passes. Compared with the sea-borne traffic it is of quite inconsiderable amount....The traffic with Afghanistan and Turkestan that follows the Khyber Pass does not amount in value to 1.5 million pounds a year: and this is six-fold the trade which Tibet affords to Indian markets".
Sir J.B.Fuller, The Empire of India, p.114.

as the series of rest houses in Tibet came under the 'exclusive control of the British Trade Agents'. This provision, of course, was a reversal of the sixth article of the Agreement of 1908 which stated that the rest houses be taken over by China and 'rented to the Government of India at a fair rate.' This in 1914, Great Britain secured a legal right, for the first time, to certain territories across the Indian border in Tibet, places that were outside the confines of the trade marts, places that led up from the Indian border into the heartland of Tibet.

In 1908, Britain had been prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines leading up from the Indian frontier to Gyantse once the Chinese telegraph reached Gyantse. But in 1914, the Government of India retained "the right to maintain the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to the Marts." There was no indication that this telegraph might be surrendered to China. The most obvious reason why Great Britain wanted to keep possession of the telegraph lines is that India wanted to have a secret line of communication with her agents in Tibet. IF any urgent political necessity developed in Tibet, British Agents would need a swift and secret means of communication with India.

It was also agreed upon, in 1908, that when

efficient arrangements had been made by China in Tibet for a postal service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents' postal service would be taken into consideration by Great Britain and China. But in 1914, it was agreed upon by Great Britain and Tibet that the trade agents might then and thereafter 'make arrangement for the carriage and transport of their posts to and from the frontier of India.' As with the question of the telegraph, the British wanted to use the posts as means of communication between Tibet and India and thus, in 1914, the British , mainly for political reasons, withdrew their intention of surrendering their postal service in Tibet to the Government of China.

Essentially, the Trade Regulations of 1914 recognized the expulsion of the Chinese from Tibet and also admitted the right of the British to deal directly with the Tibetans in commercial matters. Moreover, the Trade Regulations were a reiteration of the Simla Convention wherein Tibet fell politically within the British sphere of influence.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

"The British gained freedom of direct communication with the Tibetans."

Hugh Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p.116.

Conclusion

In the context of Indo-Tibetan relations, the Chefoo Convention of 1876 was particularly important. Because of that treaty, for the first time in nearly one hundred years the British were given permission from the Chinese Government to cross the Indian border and enter Tibet. But in defiance of the Chefoo Convention the Tibetans, who did not want their country penetrated, assumed the initiative and attacked the British in the Indian protectorate of Sikkim. Thus, in 1886, the British drove the Tibetans out of Sikkim and back into Tibet. Then the Chinese, who claimed Tibet as part of their empire, feared a full scale war along the Indo-Tibetan border so they pressed for settlement of the dispute with the British. The ensuing negitiations led to the delimitation of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier according to the Convention of 1890 relative to Tibet and Sikkim.

The Convention of 1890 was significant insofar as the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet was delimited as the watershed of the Teesta River. This Convention was the first step in the British drive to extend the north eastern frontier of India to the crest of the mountains. Therefore, during the 1890's and early 1900's Indo-Tibetan relations were marred by

directed against the security of India.

But it was the Chinese who really won a diplomatic victory by the Trade Regulations of 1893. The British had accepted Yatung as the site of the trade mart but Yatung was located in an uninhabited region of the Chumbi Valley only a few miles from the Indian border. Obviously, the British who visited Yatung were far away from the center of Tibetan life. Moreover, the Chinese advised the Tibetan Government to forbid Tibetan merchants to trade at Yatung. Besides, tea, the most important product the British wanted to sell in Tibet, was excluded until some later date when a mutually agreed tariff might be set.

By 1898, the British Government realized that the trade mart at Yatung was of little economic or political importance so the Home Government asked the Indian Government for a progress report on the situation. The Indian Government assessed Indo-Tibetan relations in the following way. Certainly, the uninhabited region of Yatung was not the place for a trade mart. Moreover, additional taxes levied at the Tibetan town of Phari prevented Tibetan traders from visiting Y atung. Thus the Indian Government proposed that negotiations be resumed between Great Britain and China for the purpose of moving the mart from Yatung to Phari.

The Indian Government hoped to gain certain economic and political advantages by moving the mart from Yatung to Phari. First of all, Phari was an important Tibetan trading town and the British hoped to gain real access to the Tibetan market by establishing a trade mart there. Again, Phari was in close contact with Lhasa and Gyantse so the British wanted to be at Phari to observe any political developments in Tibet that might threaten Indian security. In addition, since Phari controlled the entrance to the Chumbi Valley from the Tibetan tableland the British thought that their presence at Phari might foreshadow an Indian annexation of the Chumbi Valley to extend the frontier to the crest of the Himalayas.

The British then formulated a <u>quid pro quo</u> proposal to the effect that they would surrender the Giagong district of Northern Sikkim in return for privileges at Phari. But now the question was to whom should this proposal be offered. Chinese power in Tibet had dwindled so that Tibet was only nominally a part of the Chinese empire. The British knew that the Tibetans resented the Conventions of 1890 and 1893 because they had been signed by Great Britain and China without the consent of Tibet. Thus, because of the uncertain political status of Tibet, the British decided at this time

to deal with both the Tibetans and the Chinese as to the re-location of the trade mart at Phari.

When the conference opened the Tibetan delegates recited their traditional claims to Giagong but they would not even consider the removal of the trade mart from Yatung to Phari. They said that they had not been authorized by Lhasa to deal with economic matters. On the other hand, the British were not prepared to surrender Giagong unless they were granted access to Phari. The Chinese then offered a compromise proposal in that the British yield Giagong to Tibet and then the Chinese would urge the Tibetans to move the trade mart from Yatung to Rinchingong which was half way between Yatung and Phari. Ultimately the conference ended in failure because neither side would make any concessions.

Soon after the conclusion of the unsuccessful conference, Lord Curzon, who became Viceroy of India in 1899, set as one of his main tasks the institution of direct communication between the Tibetan and Indian Governments. First, Curzon sent Ugyen Kazi, a Bhutanese, to Lhasa to establish contact but the Lhasa authorities informed Kazi that they had no intention of communicating with the Indian Government. Next, Curzon sent a letter to the Dalai Lama by way of Western Tibet but this attempt was also futile. But Curzon was determined so

he sent another letter to the Dalai Lama through Ugyen Kazi but this letter was also returned with the seals intact. Thus these three attempts of Lord Curzon to open communication with the Dalai Lama failed. Now Curzon decided it was time to force the Tibetans to negotiate. So he sent a detachment of troops into Northern Sikkim which drove the Tibetans out of the Giagong area and back into Tibet. The effect of this encounter was the same as the effect of a similar encounter between the Indian army and Tibetan forces in Northern Sikkim in 1886. The Tibetans and the Chinese immediately agreed to meet the British in a conference at the Tibetan town of Khamba Jong to discuss frontier problems and trade matters.

Lord Curzon's determination to open communication between India and Tibet was strengthened because of rumors in the Journal of St. Petersburg and the China Times that the Russians were extending their influence in Tibet and therefore to insure the security of India Curzon felt compelled to open communication between India and Tibet. Moreover, Curzon, an extremely efficient administrator, was irritated because of the ineffectiveness of the Regulations of 1893 and he wanted to see economic matters settled at an Indo-Tibetan conference.

During the summer of 1903, Lord Curzon sent Colonel F.E. Younghusband and other British officials to the town of Khamba Jong to await the arrival of the Tibetan and

Chinese officials. But the summer passed and neither the Tibetans nor the Chinese came. So Curzon ordered Younghusband to leave Khamba Jong and to advance further into Tibet to the town of Gyantse to force communication with the Tibetans. But at Gyantse, the British and Tibetan forces clashed. And so the British, after defeating the Tibetans, moved on to Lhasa to deal directly with the Dalai Lama. But the Supreme Pontiff of Tibet had fled to Mongolia for refuge by the time the British reached Lhasa so Younghusband drew up a treaty with the Lhasa authorities whereby the British hoped to improve Indo-Tibetan relations.

Because of the success of the Younghusband Mission, Tibet was now under the domination of Great Britain so the Lhasa Convention, in effect, was formulated to serve British interests. Because there was no real Chinese authority in Tibet at this time the British believed that their best interests could be served by excluding the Chinese from the talks at Lhasa. Thus the Lhasa Convention was the first treaty ever signed by Great Britain and Tibet. Certainly, the British gained economic and political advantages in Tibet because of this treaty. Besides Yatung, two new trade marts were opened deep within Tibetan territory. Perhaps, because of a possible Russian threat to India, these marts were valued more for their

political rather than their commercial importance to Great Britain. The ninth article of the Convention was most important because therein the British ignored the imperial authority of China in Tibet and they even went so far as to assume the responsibility of directing Tibetan foreign affairs. The revision of the Trade Regulations of 1893 was postponed until a later date.

Without the approbation of the Home Government Colonel Younghusband wrote two clauses into the treaty that were later to be repudiated by the British Government. One article stated that the British were to have an agent in Lhasa to observe and direct the Tibetan Government. The other demanded that the Tibetans pay a heavy indemnity to the British in seventy-five annual installments. Until this indemnity was paid the British were to occupy the Chumbi Valley. Such a demand was tantamount to a virtual annexation of the Chumbi Valley. Because the British wanted to observe political movements in Tibet but at the same time did not want to break their relations with Russia over Tibet, the Home Government revised Younghusband's version of the treaty. The British Agent was not to visit Lhasa and the Chumbi Valley was to be occupied for three years instead of seventy-five.

As soon as the British forces, under the command

of Younghusband, returned to India the Tibetans resolved to break the spirit if not the letter of the Lhasa Convention. The Tibetans had agreed not to levy taxes on Indian goods until after a Tariff Conference. Yet they would not attend a Tariff Conference in Calcutta, and they continued to levy traditional customs duties at Phari. Moreover, the Tibetans began the practise of breaking the telegraph wires between Gyantse and Indian Territory. Finally, the Tibetans wanted to limit the rights of the British Agents at Gyantse and Gartok. It was evident the Tibetans, who had signed the Convention under duress, were not at all prepared to co-operate with the British.

By the ninth clause of the Lhasa Convention the British had assumed virtual control of Tibetan foreign affairs despite the Chinese claim of supremacy over Tibet. But during the year 1905, the Chinese decided to ignore the Lhasa Convention by sending a strong army into the provinces of Eastern Tibet. Convinced that the Russians posed no immediate threat in Tibet, faced with Tibetan intransigence, and confronted with Chinese determination, Britain decided to recognize the authority of China in Tibet. This recognition was further prompted by the British desire to improve relations with Russia to weaken the ambitions of an expanding Germany.

For these reasons, the British signed the Adhesion Agreement with China in 1906, and so accepted the supremacy of China over Tibet.

The Chinese immediately began to assert their authority in Tibet after the Adhesion Agreement was signed by prohibiting the Tibetans from dealing directly with the British. The British claimed that this was a direct violation of the fourth clause of the Lhasa Convention. Because of this conflict, there was a complete deadlock in relations between the British and Chinese at Gyantse by the summer of 1907.

As a further confirmation of Chinese supremacy over Tibet, the Anglo-Russian Convention Concerning Tibet was signed in August 1907. Great Britain wanted to join with Russia and France in the Triple Entente to offset the threat of the Central Powers. Thus for their mutual benefit both Britain and Russia agree to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and not to interfere in its internal administration.

In the closing months of 1907, a difference of opinion arose between the British Government and the Indian Government concerning their policy towards Tibet. The Indian Government was inclined to continue their occupation of the Chumbi Valley after 1 January 1908, even though the indemnity demanded by the Lhasa Convention had been paid in three annual

installments by the Chinese. The Government in Calcutta argued that the trade marts had not been opened "effectively" for three years; that a continued occupation of the Valley would be a strong bargaining point in the negotiations to revise the Trade Regulations of 1893; and that, perhaps, a continued occupation might lead to eventual annexation. The Government in London, however, insisted that the Chumbi Valley be evacuated in January 1908 because continued occupation might involve the British in a prolonged military stand in Tibet precipitating the involvement of Russia.

The Lhasa Convention had provided for a revision of the Trade Regulations of 1893 and this revision was made effective by the Tibet Trade Regulations of 1908 signed by Great Britain and China. According to these new regulations the British were allowed to lease land at the marts and this solved the vexing problem of accommodation that had annoyed the British since 1893. Moreover, the British were permitted to trade with anyone, without restriction, at the marts. This settled the deadlock that had arisen at Gyantse. In their turn, the British promised to consider the transfer of the telegraph to China once the Chinese telegraph reached Gyantse. Thus Britain was considering the surrender of a very valuable political instrument to China.

From the British point of view, the Tibet Trade Regulations of 1908 were not very significant insofar as the major problems of tariffs and Indian tea were still reserved for future consideration. Thus the Indian Tea Companies who had been trying to export tea to Tibet were still unsuccessful in their efforts. And these perplexing questions of tea and tariffs were still before the Chinese and British Governments when the Chinese invaded Lhasa in 1910.

In the months immediately following the signing of the Tibet Trade Regulations the British and the Chinese continued to clash concerning matters of trade. The Jongpen at Khamba Jong prevented the British from going to Gyantse to trade. Despite the agreement to drop tariffs until the tariff question was settled, customs duties were still being levied at Phari. Moreover, the Chinese suggested the idea of monopoly trading to the Tibetans and the Lhasa Government then granted monopolies to certain wealthy Tibetans. Thus the British were not allowed to trade with anyone in Tibet and this was a violation of the Trade Agreement of 1908. Despite these grievances the British preferred not to press these matters with the Chinese for fear of incurring the wrath of the Russians.

When the Chinese Army, under Chao Ehr-feng, invaded Lhasa in 1910 the Tibetans, now aware of the British attitude towards Tibet and Russia, asked the British for aid against China. The Tibetans argued that they had a right to assistahce from the British because by the Lhasa Convention the British had assumed control of Tibetan foreign affairs.

The British, however, refused the Tibetan request for military aid because they did not want to challenge the Chinese and run the risk of open disagreement with the Russians. Besides not wanting to weaken relations with Russia, the British were, perhaps, also alert as to the probability of a rapidly approaching Revolution in China and to the subsequent collapse of Chinese ascendency in Tibet. Quite possibly, the British viewed the invasion of Lhasa as one of the death throes of a dying Manchu Government. In any case, the British defended their decision to remain aloof from the Tibetan-Chinese dispute by referring to the Adhesion Agreement of 1906 wherein Britain had recognized China as the dominant power in Tibet. Moreover, by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the British had promised the Russians that they would not interfere in Tibetan politics.

During the Revolution in China, in 1912, the Tibetans drove the Chinese out of Lhasa and into the provinces

of Eastern Tibet where a deadlock developed between the Tibetan and Chinese forces. In 1913, the British decided to act as mediators and thus they sought a treaty with China and Tibet to improve British-Chinese-Tibetan relations. The British were prompted to interfere in Tibetan politics because the Russians had interferred in Mongolian politics during the first months of the Revolution in China in 1912. The British now wanted to sustain an autonomous Tibetan Government as a buffer separating India from China and Russia. Thus the British wanted the Chinese to promise not to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet as they had done in 1910. One of the major motives behind the British desire to create an autonomous Tibet was the British uneasiness about Chinese incursions into Eastern Tibet and of the Chinese relation with the hill tribes of Assam. Since Assam lay on the southern side of the Himalayan watershed, the British claimed the area even though the Indian Government did not administer much of the region. The new Chinese Government had enough domestic troubles without incurring the wrath of Britain when the British took advantage of the opportunity to demand a new treaty. So a meeting of British, Chinese, and Tibetan officials was held at Simla, in Northern India, which culminated in the signing of the Simla Convention of 1914.

In the negotiations at Simla the Chinese claimed Tibet as an "integral part of China" but their claim was rejected by the British and Tibetans. Britain, China and Tibet agreed to a solution whereby Tibet was recognized to be an autonomous nation under the suzerainty of China. But to weaken Chinese power in Tibet, the British and Tibetans agreed that Tibet be divided into two regions, Inner and Outer Tibet. The British and Tibetans admitted that the Chinese were to administer Inner Tibet but that they were to send neither troops nor officials into Outer Tibet. Because of this arrangement the Chinese Government refused to ratify the Simla Convention. In addition to the Inner and Outer Tibet settlement, the British and Tibetans agreed that the boundary separating North Eastern India from Tibet was to be set along the Himalayan watershed from Nepal to the border of Burma. Since the treaty was not ratified by China, the Chinese did not accept this delimitation of the frontier.

When the Tibetans saw that the Chinese would not accept the boundary definitions written into the Simla Convention, they wanted British protection from the Chinese. So the Dalai Lama asked the British to send an envoy to Lhasa "occasionally" and they agreed to send someone. In effect, the Simla Convention made the Tibetans as dependent upon the British

as the Tibetans had been in 1904. The difference was, however, that the Tibetans had refused to co-operate with the British once the Lhasa Convention had been signed; whereas British-Tibetan relations, after the Simla Convention, continued to improve because the Tibetans feared the Chinese and thus the Tibetans needed British friendship. At the same time, the British moved freely in Tibet but did not interfere with the internal administration of the country.

At Simla, the British were also determined to improve trade relations with Tibet so the seventh article of the Simla Convention of 1914 cancelled the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 and a new set of regulations were drawn up between the British and Tibetans in 1914. In this Trade Agreement of 1914, the Tibetans agreed to abolish the organized system of monopolies and thus allow the British a greater freedom of commerce in Tibet. But the questions of tea and tariffs remained unsettled. Indian tea was not allowed to enter Tibet and thus the efforts of Indian tea merchants remained unsuccessful. Whereas in 1908, the British had been prepared to surrender to the Chinese Government the rest houses, postal service and telegraph from the Indian border to the trade marts, the British now decided to maintain control of these facilities indefinitely. In fine, the clauses of the

Trade Agreement are indicative of the presence of British power in Tibet after 1914.

British-Tibetan relations cordially improved in the years following the signing of the Simla Convention and these relations were not seriously disrupted again until after the Chinese Communist take over in Tibet in 1953.

APPENDIX

CONVENTION OF MARCH 17th 1890 BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING TO SIKKIM AND TIBET (Ratifications exchanged at London, August 27th 1890) [1]

(English Text)

WHEREAS Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirious to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, His Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Landsdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor;

Who, having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:-

I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain-range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory.

II. It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I, and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

IV. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII. Two joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which, by the last three preceding Articles, have been reserved.

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1889-1890, Vol.LXXXII, pp.9-11

VIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this 17th day of March, in the year of Our Lord 1890, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 17th day of the second moon the 16th year of Kuang Hsu.

LANDSDOWNE.

Signature of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.

Regulations regarding Trade, Communication, and Pasturage, to be appended to the Convention between Great Britain and China of March 17, 1890, relative to Sikkim and Tibet. Signed at Darjeeling, December 5, 1893.[1]

1. A TRADE mart shall be established at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the 1st day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that mart.

2. British subjects trading at Yatung shall be at liberty to travel freely to and fro between the frontier and Yatung, to reside at Yatung, and to rent houses and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods. The Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation 1 to reside at Yatung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usage, and without any vexations restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their persons and property. At Lang-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and Yatung, where rest-houses have been built by the Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.

3. Import and export trade in the following articles: - arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs, may, at the option of either Government, be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government, on their own side, may think fit to impose.

4. Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in Regulation 3, entering Tibet from British India, across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, or vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years, commencing from the date of the opening of Yatung to trade; but after the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced. Indian tea may be imported into Tibet at a rate of duty not exceeding that at which Chinese tea is imported into England, but trade in Indian tea shall not be engaged in during the five years for which other commodities are exempt.

5. All goods on arrival at Yatung, whether from British India or

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[1]British and Foreign State Papers, 1892-1893, Vol.LXXXV, pp. 1235-1237.

from Tibet, must be reported at the Custom Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity, and value of the goods.

6. In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sik'kim and the Chinese Frontier Officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice, where there is a divergence of views, the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

7. Despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer, who will forward them by special courier.

Despatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese Frontier Officer to the Political Officer for Sik'kim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

8. Despatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the officers of each Government.

9. After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given of such Regulations.

General Articles

1. In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sik'kim and the Chinese Frontier Officer, each official shall report the matter to his immediate superior, who in turn, if a settlement is not arrived at between them, shall refer such matter to their respective Governments for disposal.

2. After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who shall be empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as experience shall prove to be desirable.

3. It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be

appointed by the British and Chinese Governments under Article VII of the Si'kkim-Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the final settlement of the questions reserved under Articles IV, V, and VI of the said Convention; and the Commissioners thus appointed having met and discussed the questions referred to, namely, trade, communication, and pasturage, have been further appointed to sign the Agreement in nine Regulations and three General Articles now arrived at, and to declare that the said nine Regulations and the three General Articles form part of the Convention itself.

In witness whereof the respective Commissioners have hereto subscribed their names.

Done in quadruplicate at Darjeeling, this 5th day of December, in the year 1393, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 28th day of the 10th moon of the 19th year of Kuang Hsu.

A.W. Paul, British Commissioner.
Ho Chang-Jung,
James H. Hart, Chinese Commissioners.

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet. Signed at Lhasa, September 7th 1904.[1]

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F.E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet:-

1. The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in Article 1 of the said Convention, and to erect

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[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1904-1905, Vol.XCVIII, pp. 148-151.

boundary pillars accordingly.

11. The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

111. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, A Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

Vl. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,000 l. - equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees - to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British

Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of one lakh of rupess each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

Vll. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

Vlll. The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

lX. The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government -

(a) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

(c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;

(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such Concessions being granted, similar or equivalent Concessions shall be granted to the British Government.

(e) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.

X. In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September, in the year of our Lord, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Thibet Frontier Commission.)
(Seal of British Commissioner.)

F.E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

(Seal of Council.)

(Seal of Dre-pung Monastery.)

(Seal of Sera Monastery.)

(Seal of Ga-den Monastery.)

(Seal of the Dalai Lama affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rinpoche.)

(Seal of National Assembly.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Thibet Frontier Commission.)

F.E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

(Seal of the Dala Lamas affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche.)

(Seal of Council.) (Seal of Dre-pung Monastery) (Seal of Sera Monastery.) (Seal of Ga-den Monastery.) (Seal of National Assembly.)

AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The Convention was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the 11th day of November, 1904, subject to reduction of the indemnity to Rs. 25,00,000 and a declaration that British occupation of the Chumbi valley would cease after payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity, provided that the Tibetans had complied with the terms of the Convention in all other respects.

Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet. Signed at Peking, April 27, 1906 (Ratifications exchanged at London July 23, 1906)[1]

(Signed also in Chinese)

WHEREAS His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires:

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognize the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of March 17, 1890, and Regulations of December 5, 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on September 7, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of

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[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1905-1906, Vol.XCIX, pp. 171-173.

Great Britain on November 11, 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:-

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland:

Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His said Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China:

His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi, His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and true form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:-

I. The Convention concluded on September 7, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

II. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

III. The Concessions which are mentioned in Article IX(d) of the Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article II of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

IV. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890

and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.

V. The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

VI. This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred and six, being the fourth day of the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign of Kuang-hsu.

ERNEST SATOW.
(Signature and Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary.)

Agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet amending Trade Regulations in Tibet, of December 5, 1893. Signed at Calcutta, April 20, 1908 (Ratifications exchanged at Peking, October 14, 1908.)[1]

TIBET TRADE REGULATIONS

Preamble

WHEREAS by Article I of the Convention between Great Britain and China on the 27th April, 1906, that is the 4th day of the 4th moon of the 32nd year of Kwang Hsu, it was provided that both the High Contracting Parties should engage to take at all times such steps as might be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Lhasa Convention of the 7th September, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, the text of which in English and Chinese was attached as an Annexe to the above-named Convention;

And whereas it was stipulated in Article III of the said Lhasa Convention that the question of the amendment of the Tibet Trade Regulations which were signed by the British and Chinese Commissioners on the 5th day of December, 1893 should be reserved for separate

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1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1907-1908, Vol. CI, pp. 170-175.

consideration, and whereas the amendment of these Regulations is now necessary;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: Mr. E.C. Wilton, C.M.G.;

His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire: His Majesty's Special Commissioner Chang Yin Tang;

And the High Authorities of Tibet have named as their fully authorized representative to act under the directions of Chang Tachen and take part in the negotiations, the Tsarong Shape, Wang Chuk Gyalpo.

And whereas Mr. E.C. Wilton and Chang Tachen have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form and have found the authorization of the Tibetan Delegate to be also in good and true form, the following amended Regulations have been agreed upon:-

1. The Trade Regulations of 1893 shall remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with these Regulations.

2. The following places shall form, and be included within, the boundaries of the Gyantse mart:-

(a) The line begins at the Chumig Dangsang (Chhu-Mig-Dangs-Sangs) north-east of the Gyantse Fort, and thence it runs in a curved line, passing behind the Pekor Chode (Dpal-Hkhor-Choos-Sde), down to Chag-Dong-Gang(Phyag-Cdong-Sgang); thence passing straight over the Nyan Chu, it reaches the Zamsa(Zam-Srag).

(b) From the Zamsa the line continues to run, in a south-eastern direction, round to Lachi-To(Gla-Dkyii-Stod), embracing all the farms on its way, viz., the Lahong, the Hogtsho(Hog-Mtsho), the Tong-Chung-Shi (Grong-Chhung-Gshis), and the Rabgang(Rab-Sgang), &c

(c) From Lachi-To the line runs to the Yutog(Gyu-Thog), and thence runs straight, passing through the whole area of Gamkar-Shi (Ragal-Mkhar-Gshis), to Chumig Dangsang.

As difficulty is experienced in obtaining suitable houses and

British subjects and persons of Chinese and Tibetan nationalities, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conferences between the British Trade Agent at the nearest mart and the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities of the Judicial Court at the mart, the object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and to do justice. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide. In any such mixed cases, the Offider or Officers of the defendant's nationality shall preside at the trial, the Officer or Officers of the plaintiff's country merely attending to watch the course of the trial.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects who may commit any crime at the marts or on the routes to the marts shall be handed over by the local authorities to the British Trade Agent at the mart nearest to the scene of offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the local authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Chinese and Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects at the marts or on the routes thereto, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese and Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

Should it happen that Chinese or Tibetan subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject before the British Trade Agent, the Chinese or Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative to the Judicial Court to watch the course of trial.

5. The Tibetan Authorities, in obedience to the instructions of the Peking Government, having a strong desire to reform the judicial system of Tibet, and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to relinquish her rights of extra-territoriality in Tibet, whenever such rights are relinquished in China, and when she is satisfied that the state of the Tibetan laws and the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warrant her in so doing.

6. After the withdrawal of the British troops, all the rest-houses, eleven in number, built by Great Britain upon the routes leading from the Indian frontier to Gyantse, shall be taken over at original cost by China and rented to the Government of India at a

fair rate. One-half of each rest-house will be reserved for the use of the British officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials, but the rest-houses shall otherwise be available for occupation by British, Chinese, and Tibetan officers of respectability who may proceed to and from the marts.

Great Britain is prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Lindian frontier to Gyantse when the telegraph lines from China reach that mart, and in the meantime Chinese and Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by the line constructed by the Government of India.

In the meantime China shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering in any way with them or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished by the local authorities.

7. In law suits involving cases of debt on account of loans, commercial failure, and bankruptcy, the authorities concerned shall grant a hearing and take steps necessary to enforce payment; but, if the debtor plead poverty and be without means, the authorities concerned shall not be held responsible for the said debts, nor shall any public or official property be distrained upon in order to satisfy these debts.

8. The British Trade Agents at the various trade marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the local authorities whose districts they traverse and shall be accorded the same protection as the persons employed in carrhing the despatches of the Tibetan Authorities. When efficient arrangements have been made by China in Tibet for a postal service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents' couriers will be taken into consideration by Great Britain and China. No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Chinese and Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from all lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the local authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen or conceal them.

9. British officers and subjects, as well as goods, proceeding to the trade marts, must adhere to the trade routes from the frontier of India. They shall not, without permission, proceed beyond the marts, or to Gartok from Yatung and Gyantse, or from Gartok to Yatung and Gyantse, by any route through the interior of Tibet, but natives of the Indian frontier, who have already by usage traded and resided in Tibet, elsewhere than at the marts be at liberty to continue their trade, in accordance with the existing practice, but when so trading or residing they shall remain, as heretofore, amenable to the local jurisdiction.

10. In cases where officials or traders, en route to and from India or Tibet, are robbed of treasure or merchandise, public or private, they shall forthwith report to the Police officers, who shall take immediate measures to arrest the robbers and hand them to the Local Authorities. The Local Authorities shall bring them to instant trial, and shall also recover and restore the stolen property. But if the robbers flee to places out of the jurisdiction and influence of Tibet, and cannot be arrested, the Police and the Local Authorities shall not be held responsible for such losses.

11. For public safety, tanks or stores of kerosene oil or any other combustible or dangerous articles in bulk must be placed far away from inhabited places at the marts.

British or Indian merchants wishing to build such tanks or stores may not do so until, as provided in Regulation 2, they have made application for a suitable site.

12. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities from whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexations restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever.

It being the duty of the Police and Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the marts, and along the routes to the marts, China engages to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts. On due fulfilment of these arrangements, Great Britain undertakes to withdraw the Trade Agents' guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet, so as to remove all cause for suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. The Chinese Authorities will not prevent the British Trade Agents holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the Tibetan officers and people.

Tibetan subjects trading, travelling, or residing in India shall receive equal advantages to those accorded by this Regulation to British subjects in Tibet.

13. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries as well as by the Tibetan Delegate; but if no demand for revision be made by either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

14. The English, Chinese, and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, and, in the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of these Regulations, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to be the correct sense.

15. The ratifications of the present Regulations under the hand of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the Chinese Empire, respectively, shall be exchanged at London and Peking within six months from the date of signature.

In witness whereof the two Plenipotentiaries and the Tibetan Delegate have signed and sealed the present Regulations.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta this 20th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1908, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 20th day of the 3rd moon of the 34th year of Kuang-hsu.

E.C. WILTON,
British Commissioner.

Signature of
CHANG YIN TANG,
Chinese Special Commissioner.

Signature of
WANG CHUK GYALPO,
Tibetan Delegate.

Convention between Great Britain, China, and Tibet. Simla 1914.[1]

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[1] Whereas the Simla Convention itself after being initialled by the Chinese Plenipotentiary was not signed or ratified by the Chinese Government, it was accepted as binding by the two other parties as between themselves.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia Ho;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:-

ARTICLE 1

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ARTICLE 3

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue

of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

ARTICLE 4

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

ARTICLE 5

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

ARTICLE 6

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX(d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term 'Foreign Power' does not include China.

Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 7

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.

(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the

British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE 8

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

ARTICLE 9

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet shall be, as shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.[1]

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

ARTICLE 10

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

ARTICLE 11

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

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[1] Published for the first time, by the Government of India in An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India, 15 January 1960.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Initial[1] of the Lonchen Shatra. (Initialled) A.H.M.
Seal of the Lonchen Shatra. Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.

Schedule

1. Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March 1890.

2. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.

3. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:-

1. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.

2. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.

3. It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

5. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

6. The Government of China is hereby released from its

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[1] Owing to the impossibility of writing initials in Tibetan, the mark of the Lonchen at this place is his signature.

engagements under Article III of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

7. The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of representatives of the three signatories to this Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.

Initial of the Lonchen Shatra. (Initialled) A.H.M.
Seal of the Lonchen Shatra. Seal of the British Plenipotentiary.

Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations-3rd of July 1914

Whereas by Article 7 of the Convention concluded between the Governments of Great Britain, China and Tibet on the third day of July, A.D. 1914, the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were cancelled and the Tibetan Government engaged to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of 1904;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir A.H. McMahon, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I.:

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje;

And whereas Sir A.H. McMahon and Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form, the following Regulations have been agreed upon:-

I. The area falling within a radius of three miles from the British Trade Agency site will be considered as the area of such Trade Mart.

It is agreed that British subjects may lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the Marts. This arrangement shall not be held to prejudice the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside the Marts for their own accommodation and the

storage of their goods. British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Tibetan Trade Agent. In consultation with the British Trade Agent the Tibetan Trade Agent will assign such or other suitable building sites without unnecessary delay. They shall fix the terms of the leases in conformity with the existing laws and rates.

II. The administration of the Trade Marts shall remain with the Tibetan Authorities, with the exception of the British Trade Agency sites and compounds of the rest-houses, which will be under the exclusive control of the British Trade Agents.

The Trade Agents at the Marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence with one another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

III. In the event of disputes arising at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts between British subjects and subjects of other nationalities, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference between the British and Tibetan Trade Agents at the nearest Mart. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects, who may commit any crime at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts, shall be handed over by the Local Authorities to the British Trade Agent at the Mart nearest to the scene of the offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the Local Authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects, shall be arrested and punished by the Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Should it happen that a Tibetan subject or subjects bring a criminal conplaint against a British subject or subjects before the British Trade Agent, the Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative or representatives of suitable rank to attend the trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly in cases in which a British subject or subjects have reason to complain against a Tibetan subject or subjects, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative or representatives to the Tibetan Trade Agent's Court to attend the trial.

IV. The Government of India shall retain the right to maintain the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to the Marts. Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by these lines. The Tibetan Authorities shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the Marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering with them in any way or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished.

V. The British Trade Agents at the various Trade Marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transport of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the Local Authorities whose districts they traverse, and shall be accorded the same protection and facilities as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Government.

No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights, to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the Local Authorities according to law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen them.

VI. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private company, institution, or individual in Tibet. It is of course understood that companies and individuals, who have already received such monopolies from the Tibetan Government previous to the conclusions of this agreement, shall retain their rights and privileges until the expiry of the period fixed.

VII. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexations, restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever. The Tibetan Authorities will not hinder the British Trade Agents or other British subjects from holding personal intercourse or correspondence with the inhabitants of the country.

It being the duty of the Police and the Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property

of the British subjects at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts, Tibet engages to arrange effective Police measures at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts.

VIII. Import and export in the following Articles:-

arms, ammunition, military stores, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs.

may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IX. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries; but, if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

X. The English and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

XI. The present Regulations shall come into force from the date of signature.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Seal of the
Dalai Lama.

A. HENRY MCMAHON,
British Plenipotentiary.

Signature of the Lonchen Shatra.

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra.

Seal of the British
Plenipotentiary.

Seal of the Drepung Monastery.

Seal of the Sera Monastery.

Seal of the Gaden Monastery.

Seal of the National Assembly.

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