THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS: AN EXAMINATIOIN OF THE UN'S EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN TRANSITIONING AND POST-CONFLICT STATES

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The United Nations and Democratic Deficits:
An Examination of the UN's effect on Democracy and Democratic Deficits in Transitioning and Post-Conflict States

By

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A Thesis submitted to the

School of Graduate Studies

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master's of Arts

Political Science

Memorial University of Newfoundland

June 2013

St. John's Newfoundland

Abstract

Can the United Nations aid in the creation of a deficit-free democracy in transitioning and post-conflict states? Or does international involvement, specifically the UN and its peace building missions, cause a deficit or even a double democratic deficit in these states? By examining two case studies, Nepal and Nicaragua, with the indicators of a democratic deficit (elections, low voter turnout and lack of visible representation of women and minorities) as well as the theory of the double democratic deficit (use of force), I argue that the UN and its missions cannot create a functioning, deficit-free democracy in post-conflict state. I propose that without feelings of democratic ownership in citizens of any given state, feelings that cannot be imposed, a democratic or double democratic deficit will exist.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my ever-patient supervisor, Dr. Miriam Anderson. Her guidance, encouragement, suggestions, and edits made this work possible.

I need to say a very large thank you to Dr. David Close. His help with my research on Nicaragua and editing ensured I finished this thesis. As well, a thank you to the ladies, Helen and Juanita, in the Political Science Department office at Memorial, as I would have been lost without their help.

I need to thank my friends for helping me through the years by feeding me, letting me sleep on their couches, and allowing me talk out my ideas to them (even if they had little or no interest in what I was saying): Candace Salmon, Emily Dodge, Sarah Adlam, Nicholas Donner, Kyle Turner, Megan Doyle, Sean Jackson, and Ken Bateman.

I am thankful for the support of my parents, Elizabeth Weir and James Stanley. Without their suggestions, edits, and ear when I needed it, I would not have made it through my youth, let alone this far.

Thank you to the peoples of both Nepal and Nicaragua. Without your struggle for and dedication to the idea of democracy, I would have had nothing to say. And a special thank you for the NDI-Nepal staff who allowed me to work with them for a year as a program assistant and showed me their amazing country.

Finally, I'd like to dedicate this to my Aunt Shelagh and Uncle David Wilkinson. Both of whom were and are a constant area of support and inspiration.

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List of Abbreviations

ALN	Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
CCMD	Canadian Centre for Management Development
CPN-M	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
CPN-UML/UML	Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FPTP	First-Past-The-Post
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)
IBL	Institutionalization before Liberalization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IED	Improved Explosive Devices
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
KGB	Committee for State Security (USSR)
LA	Liberal Alliance (Nicaragua)
MAP-ML	Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (Nicaragua)
MRS	Sandinista Renovation Movement (Nicaragua)
MUR	Revolutionary Unity Movement (Nicaragua)
NA	Nepal Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC	Nepali Congress

NDI-Nepal	National Democratic Institute-Nepal
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMKP/NWPP	Nepal Workers and Peasants Party
NSP	Nepal Sadbhavana Party
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
PC	Conservative Party (Nicaragua)
PCC	Christian Path (Nicaragua)
PCDN	Democratic Conservative Party (Nicaragua)
PCN	Communist Party of Nicaragua
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLC	Liberal and Constitutional Party (Nicaragua)
PLI	Independent Liberal Party (Nicaragua)
PR	Proportional Representation
PPSC	Popular Social Christian Party (Nicaragua)
PSC	Social Christian Party (Nicaragua)
PSN	Nicaraguan Socialist Party
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PUSC	Social Christian Unity Party (Nicaragua)
RNA	Royal Nepal Army
RPP	Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal)
SJN	SanyuktaJan Morcha Party (Nepal)
SMP	Single-Member-Plurality
UN	United Nations
UNO	National Union of Opposition (Nicaragua)

UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Missions for Rwanda
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
URNG	Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialists Republics
YCL	Young Communist League (Nepal)

Introduction

To what degree can the United Nations (UN) aid in the creation of a functional democracy in a post-conflict country? From the international support for the role of the UN in conflict resolution and in developing democratic governance structures one can infer that it plays a positive part. The sheer number of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations suggests that the international community, generally, accepts that United Nations facilitated transition to democracy is effective. In 2011 there were 25 major missions ongoing throughout the globe (UN, Year in Review: 2012). Soldiers, diplomats, and other specialists from various countries staffed these missions. These contributions are in the direct interest of the member state itself. If these missions were not thought of as successful there would not be as much global support or as many soldiers and workers involved.

This thesis considers a relatively under-researched topic in peacebuilding literature: To what degree does a democratic deficit or double democratic deficit occur when the UN aids in the creation of a democracy in post-conflict states? Does its involvement make less likely the development of a feeling of democratic ownership in these fledgling democracies? I argue that the UN's involvement in the creation of a deficit-free democracy in post-conflict or transitioning states may be at least partially responsible for reproducing the democratic deficits endemic in western democracies. Different paths to peace, as is discussed in coming chapters, may not eliminate democratic deficits in post-conflict countries. The UN's involvement creates a double democratic deficit, which is a government not functioning the way its citizens wish (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale, 2004: Pg. 4), as well as a lack of monopoly on the legitimate use of force within the state (Born and Hänggi, 2004). The UN's good intentions are not enough to ensure long-lasting democracy and peace.

Democracy and democracy building is extremely important to the UN, specifically because it is believed this form of governance leads to peace. The mandate of the UN is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles: Pg. 1).

It is simple for a state to say that it strives for intrastate and interstate peace but the concept of peace is more than a simple lack of physical violence occurring in any given geographical area or country. Peace can be divided into two categories: direct and structural. Oliver Richmond notes that peace literature, the general understandings, and concepts of peace "lack a research agenda" that may illuminate the complicated understanding and definition of peace (Richmond, 2005: Pg. 6). Direct peace is a more traditional understanding of peace. Simply, the lack of physical violence, overt, malicious discrimination in institutions and government, as well as the lack of open violence, no public killings, raping or mutilations though the threat of those may be very real (Pg. 7). This understanding of peace is necessary for a democracy to flourish but there is more to peace than a lack of physical violence.

Structural peace is peace that can be explained or achieved by institutions, policies, or specific initiatives. The UN, many states, as well as INGO/NGOs see democracy and democracy promotion as a way to achieve peace, both interstate and intrastate peace. Immanuel Kant proposed that the complex interdependence of democratic states makes them extremely unlikely to attack one another. Thus the democratization of states could help bring about international peace (Rosato, 2003: Pg. 585). Research by Robert Jervis and Nils Petter Gelditsch supports the theory that democracy with interdependence and international organizations reduces interstate conflict (2002; 2008). Economic interdependence

also encourages peace between states as these ties are advantageous to countries and conflict would hinder the benefits (Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, 2009: Pg.2; Polachek and Xiang, 2008). As these concepts involve the democratic system achieving peace this is considered structural peace.

This work uses Galtung's 1969 definition of peace. His definition of peace differs from some contemporary understandings of the term as he is concerned with the language of peace and inclusion of people within said language. Peace shall be understood as "social goals" that are "at least verbally agreed to by many" (Pg. 167). He also notes that while these goals "may be complex and difficult" to achieve, but not inconceivable. In addition, a lack of violence is a needed aspect of peace and will be included in this definition (Pg. 167). Peace in democracies requires a lack of the possibility of violence or the fear of backlash from authorities for undeserved activities, as citizens of a democracy should not fear their government.

What is the purpose of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions? Roland Paris defines peacebuilding as an endeavour that occurs in post-civil war or conflict environments to aid in the creation of a stable society with lasting peace and hinder the return of violence (Menocal, Kilpatrick and Paris, 2005: Pg. 767). These missions are one of the tools used by the international community to bring lasting peace and development to conflict-prone areas.

Liberal peacekeeping missions began in 1948 with the creation of the UN. These early operations were not as expansive as contemporary missions. They were designed with the purpose of aiding in peaceful resolutions of civil and interstate conflicts. During the Cold War these missions were centered on supporting the end of disputes themselves, violent or not. The fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the end of the Cold War created a new international environment and liberal peacekeeping evolved with the new security environment (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: Pg. 5). The original peacekeeping missions were much smaller and the UN did not originally conceive of this expansion of peacekeeping into expansive peacebuilding operations.

Conflict resolution now came to include understanding the underlying reasons for the war and working towards addressing those reasons to help ensure a longer lasting and comprehensive peace (Pg. 6-11).

Peacekeeping/building literature has two predominate camps. Contemporary literature and research has endeavored to discuss whether these types of missions are successful. The indicators of success vary between academics. First are those scholars who skeptically view the supposed positive impacts of these missions, questioning the intervention itself as well as the aid given to these societies to help them reconstruct homes, infrastructure, and government. Roland Paris (2004) notes the UN instituted peacebuilding operations from 1989 to 1998 focused on transforming war torn societies into free market democracies. Paris deems this "Wilsonianism," hoping that liberalizing these states will bring about peace because other long-standing market democracies are relatively peaceful. He explores this more thoroughly through case studies. He focuses on 11 case studies. These cases show varying degrees of success with many states falling back into civil conflict when the UN leaves, but argues that the method of implementation is to blame for the limited success of these missions. Paris believes an "Institutionalization before Liberalization (IBL)" (Pg. 7) strategy would prove to be more beneficial, a way for peacebuilding to evolve in the new political environment. This work is a good example of critical peacebuilding theory. Paris is critical of these missions and the perceived successes, but believes there is merit in the concept of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In the second group of academics are those who believe and argue that liberal peacebuilding missions are effective and an instrumental force for struggling nations. These missions aid in the procurement of peace accords, disarmament, and reconstruction of societies as well as the support of citizens through infrastructure building. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis' (2000) work covers this area. Their data set is comprised of 124 cases of conflict areas and the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions since 1944. Their cut-off for a case study is that the conflict must have been resolved by 1997 to show any measure of peace in subsequent years (Pg. 783). Their research shows a

positive correlation between ending of civil conflicts and peacebuilding missions. They note that peacebuilding missions do have positive effects on peace in the given area, but each mission needs to be specifically tailored to the area to ensure the most effective outcomes and the most comprehensive amount of peace (Pg. 795).

To date there has not been much attention given to the examination of the idea that the UN's involvement can create a democratic deficit in a post-conflict environment. It is safe to assume that if a conflict is occurring in any given area or state that there must be a type of deficit occurring. The meaning and manifestation of a democratic deficit differs among individuals and from state to state. The variety of deficits may be caused by the variations in western democratic systems themselves, such as differing electoral systems or appointed legislative bodies (Born and Hänggi, 2004: Pg. 15-16).

A government should be representative of its citizens to ensure it is accurately making decisions that follow the wishes and norms of the people. A democratic deficit occurs when the government is not wholly representational of its society. Pippa Norris (1997) noted that most governing bodies have "clear social biases" and underrepresent not only women and youth but also working classes (Pg. 280), and as such the government may not be operating the way its citizens wish it too (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale, 2004; Pg. 4). Democracies are supposed to be representative of their respective society. The under representation of significant portions of society may explain the dwindling voter turnout and feelings of dissatisfaction with governments (Norris, 1997; Decker, 2002).

Though a democratic deficit varies in its manifestation among stable, long-term democracies, there are still general indicators used in the examination of these deficits. The indicators of a democratic deficit used for this work are elections, the frequency, the number of eligible voters, and the degree to which they are free and fair; as well as the electoral systems, declining and low voter turnout, and a lack of visible government representation of women, minorities, and youth. These are some of the indicators used in democratic deficit research but they are not exhaustive.

Remedies to these issues are difficult and, like deficits themselves, vary among countries. An example of the Canadian democratic deficit is the electoral system and possible reforms, which is currently being debated. Canada uses a single-member-plurality system (SMP); this means a candidate does not require a majority to win, only the most votes, also called a plurality. This is also why the SMP system is referred to as first-past-the-post (FPTP) (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale: Pg. 58). As the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD) noted this electoral system is suitable for analysis because it can both produce stronger majorities and weaker oppositions in the House of Commons, disproportionate to the popular vote (Pg. 59).

In Europe, the European Union (EU) is facing a democratic deficit of its own. Since the EU is made up of 27 individual states, this deficit is multifaceted. It is argued that the institutions of the EU are to blame for the democratic deficit as they fail to be as democratically liable as national institutions (Goodhart, 2007). The EU faces accusations of not being answerable to its numerous citizenry as well as national parliaments because the European Commission (EC) is not elected. National governments do not hold negotiating powers when they work in Brussels, nor is the decision-making processes transparent to the states that make up the EU (Goodhart: Pg. 568-569). Not only do the states of the EU face individual deficits, as most democracies do, but they also have a deficit on a larger scale in the EU institutions themselves.

The two examples just discussed help illustrate the challenge of implementing change even in western democracies. Debate and discord show dissatisfaction with certain aspects of democracy. European academics see the EU's institutions as unaccountable to national legislatures, which are more answerable to its subjects. In Canada, the electoral system inflates or deflates party electoral winnings. Quotas are often proposed as a means of addressing under representation of women and minorities, often suggested as a remedy for part of the deficit. Quotas are discussed more in chapters one and four. If these western democracies are suffering from a democratic deficit and are the models for democracy

it can be assumed that post-conflict states can and are also suffering from this problem but in ways that are unique to each case.

Samuel Huntington (1991) argued that the world is experiencing a third wave of democratization. States are transitioning from non-democratic political structures to democracies and it is occurring on a large scale (Pg. 3). Transitioning can be difficult and marred with conflict. Nepal and Nicaragua are examples of this, both experiencing civil wars before transitioning to democracy. With this large shift of countries becoming democracies, violently in more than a few cases, the inclusion of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a state as an indicator of a democratic or double democratic deficit has become increasingly relevant. Without control over the use of force, a government cannot guarantee the safety of its citizens.

A government of a democratic state requires two factors when it comes to the legitimate use of force. First, it requires a monopoly on the use of force. Second, the government requires the legitimacy to use that force (Weber, 1979). This monopoly allows for two important factors. First, it ensues a state can protect itself both internally and externally from threats (Jachtenfuchs, 2005: Pg. 38). Second, it allows states to participate internationally in democratic organizations. If a country does not have a monopoly on its legitimate use of force, it is not able to be included in these international organizations (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008). The ability to participate in the international arena is an important facet of democracy in this globalized world.

In a post-conflict country, especially a state that has only recently obtained that status, the monopoly on legitimate use of a force can still be contested. Not only are these transitioning states working towards building a democracy, a difficult task, but they must also face the challenges of doing so from the ground up, though not in all cases. International involvement, specifically UN missions, can remove this monopoly on the legitimate use of force from the state, a monopoly that is required to function as an international body. Born and Hänggi's (2004) theory of the double democratic deficit is

used to explore this idea and will be examined further in the case studies themselves. They state that the U.S.' 2003 invasion of Iraq was a clear indication that the use of force is still a significant aspect of international relations (Pg. 3). Their work concentrates on parliamentary accountability and the use of force under international auspices, specifically UN missions ranging from monitoring/observing to peace enforcement (Pg. 3). Without authority, ability, and attitude of a government's officials, a country cannot have a functioning democracy, let alone a monopoly on the use of force, which is essential for any effective government and stable society. As a monopoly on the use of force can be contested in countries transitioning from conflict to post-conflict, this indicator becomes more important. This works expands upon the theory of a double democratic deficit from Born and Hänggi. They themselves note this is relatively unexplored area of research in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding literature (Pg. 4).

Though not completely ignored, what liberal peacebuilding literature overlooks is a discussion on the effects of UN peacebuilding missions in regards to democratic deficits. Creating an environment devoid of violence so that citizens do not fear their government or each other is the predominate concern of these missions. This allows for elections to occur, a democracy to flourish, and free market economics to exist. As liberal peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations attempt to implement a stable peace and a working democracy, a question arises as to if these democracies are truly functional. There is much debate in academia as to whether UN missions are successful or a positive international influence; yet, there is little research being conducted on the effects that the UN has on democracies they help create. If the UN aids in the creation of a democracy in a post-conflict state, should there not be research done as to whether this democracy functions?

To determine if there is indeed a democratic deficit or double democratic deficit in post-conflict states there must be a theoretical framework. The analytical components of this study are the research questions, theory, data collection and data analysis (King, Koehane and Verba, 1994: Pg. 13). They are

discussed in turn below.

The aim of this study is to examine if the UN's peacebuilding missions and aid in democracy creation cause a democratic deficit or double deficit in the host states. Concepts, specifically democracy, can be difficult to conceptualize. Case studies give "a detailed consideration of contextual factors," considerations which are common in case studies but difficult to achieve in statistical studies (George and Bennett, 2005: Pg. 19). The methodology of this study will be based on qualitative design, focusing on the two case studies of Nepal and Nicaragua. The conflict periods of both states are discussed but the primary examination occurs after the transition from conflict to post-conflict states. These case studies have similar experiences. Both of these cases had civil wars that begun with Communist insurgent groups, CPN-M and FSLN. As well, both Communist groups took power during the first post-conflict election. Though these cases both had international involvement, the type of involvement may be the key factor. Nepal had an extensive peacebuilding mission and was chosen for the test case. The involvement of the US in Nicaragua was not designed to aid its transition to a post-conflict democratic state.

Along with the case studies, the detailed outline of the literature and definitions that are used by this work were discussed above in this chapter. Though, as discussed above, democratic deficits manifest differently in the various western democracies, arguably because of the variety of democratic systems (Born and Hänggi: Pg. 15-16), there are indicators that are apparent in these cases. These indicators include declining and low voter turnout as well as a lack of representation of women, minorities, and even youth (Norris, 1997: Pg. 280). In other words, the government does not reflect the general makeup of society and these groups do not see themselves in their government (Stokes, 2005: Pg. 78). There are other indicators as well, such as feelings of disenfranchisement, though these indicators are found in research that uses surveys and interviews (Edwards, 2007) and are not included as such. The language barrier with the case studies made this too difficult to include, though these

feelings of disenfranchisement in the citizenry can be extrapolated from low voter registration and turnout and, thus, are not omitted completely.

Born and Hänggi propose the theory of the double democratic deficit. They postulate that accountability of the government and the legitimate use of force must be present to ensure a functioning democracy (Pg. 1-9). As the scholars note, this is a under researched area of international theory (Pg. 4). The monopoly of the use of force has become an important indicator specifically because of the recent increases in democracies worldwide, from 39 countries in 1974 to 123 countries in 2005 (Caramani, 2008: Pg. 111). As a good portion of these states are transitioning and new democracies, the monopoly on the legitimate use of force is important if these states wish to participate fully as democracies in the international arena.

Empirical data for this study was compiled from international election databases, such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and IPU PARLINE database on national parliaments. I initially wanted to use only government documents and publications on election and representational data. There was difficulty obtaining official data and documents because of the language barrier. English is not an official language of either state. Other information was compiled from academic articles relating to each section. All data sources and articles used are available in references.

As these case studies must have "a procedure of systematic data compilation" (George and McKeown, 1985: Pg. 41), both cases have the same indicators examined: international involvement, elections, voter turnout, women and minority representation, use of force and a discussion on the current reality of democracy. These are the indicators from the democratic deficit literature and the theory of the double democratic deficit. The independent variable is the presence of UN missions and the dependent variable is the level of democracy. Nicaragua is the control case as it has a negative value on the independent variable. As Nepal has a positive value on the independent variable, it is a

positive case.

These cases allow for an examination of election, voter turnout, and gender/minority representation statistics. As both cases had civil wars that removed the legitimate use of force from the government, their post-conflict experience and transition to democracy make them good cases to examine the theory of the double democratic deficit.

This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter of this work is a literature review. It expands upon the terms already discussed above and places them within the larger literature. The main concepts discussed are peace, violence, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, as well as the democratic deficit, the double democratic deficit, and democratic ownership. These concepts are used throughout the work.

The second chapter is a case study of Nepal. It examines in detail the transition from a state engaged in a bloody civil war to a country that invites the UN within its borders to help with the process of holding free and fair elections after the monarchy is dissolved. With the help of Born and Hänggi's theory, it delves into Nepal's elections, focusing on the Constituent Assembly election, as well as analyzing the voter turnout data, the statistics regarding women and minority representation, and the legitimate use of force. This chapter concludes by discussing the current state of the Nepalese democracy as well as final thoughts.

Chapter three is a case study of Nicaragua. Unlike Nepal, Nicaragua did not have a UN mission or international aid in its transition from conflict state to new democracy but there was a significant amount of negative international pressure placed upon the state during this period. This chapter examines the same aspects of the political system and history as chapter two. It begins by looking at the post-revolution elections in 1984, which were the first free and fair elections in decades. From there it examines the voter turnout, women and minority representation, and the legitimate use of force within Nicaragua. This chapter concludes by discussing the current state of the Nicaraguan democracy

as well as final thoughts.

The final chapter compares and contrasts the data from chapters two and three. It examines the case studies with the use of peacekeeping/building literature, Born and Hänggi's theory of a double democratic deficit, as well as work from democratic deficit scholarship and democratic ownership literature. It explores the statistical connections between Nicaragua, a post-conflict state without UN involvement, and Western, stable, long-standing democracies.

This work fits into the overall critical liberal peacebuilding literature. As well, it expands upon previous understandings of democratic deficits and, in addition, double democratic deficits. By comparing two case studies of post-conflict states, Nepal and Nicaragua, one which had UN assistance with the transition to democracy and one which did not, this work attempts to challenge the international norm that UN intervention is only a positive for struggling states by asserting that the reality is more complicated. Different paths to peace, with the aid of the UN or without, may not eradicate democratic deficits. If UN intervention cannot help create a democracy that continues to function when the UN leaves, then this global norm needs to be re-examined.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

"This thing called "democracy" is part of individual belief systems that vary in complexity" (Moreno in Camp, 2001: Pg. 29).

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are a significant aspect of modern international politics. Member states in conjunction with the UN offer varying forms of aid to countries involved in conflicts, whether intrastate or interstate. The 1994 mission in Rwanda, United Nations Assistance Missions for Rwanda (UNAMIR) involved only 2,400 troops; by 1999 when the UN aided Sierra Leone it had 20,000 UN troops backed by 2,000 United Kingdom Royal Marines. The number of UN troops continued to expand. Afghanistan received a record number of UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, 130,000 troops (Jones, 2011: Pg 2). Can these missions aid in creating an effective, functioning democracy? Contemporary literature and research has attempted to discuss whether these types of missions are successful, though the indicators of success vary. The literature has overlooked, but not fully ignored, the connection between liberal peacebuilding missions in recently post-conflict states and the degree to which they create a democracy devoid of democratic deficits. If Western states are plagued by democratic deficits and they are the archetype for states creating liberal democracies, then can it not be assumed that they are likely to reproduce the problems in their own democracies in these post-conflict countries?

This chapter focuses on outlining the important definitions for this body of the work, elaborating on the concept of peace, exploring the history of peacekeeping/building missions and the literature of liberal peacebuilding, the democratic deficit, and the theory of the double democratic deficit. First, the concept of peace and how it relates to peacebuilding is discussed. Next, a brief history of the origins of peacekeeping/building is examined as well as the major camps in

peacebuilding scholarship. Even with a uniform definition, the understanding and manifestation of a democratic deficit varies by democracy, as the many electoral and party systems as well as institutions affect the ways in which groups are either represented or underrepresented. Quotas have been suggested as a way to address feelings of under representation in government, both gender related and minorities. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of democratic ownership, both domestic and in the international donor community.

Case examples will vary throughout this chapter as well as the subsequent chapters. This is done intentionally in an attempt to reflect that there is no universal standard for democracy or post-conflict environments. Many states have a different standard for its emerging or long-term democracy.

The Concept of Peace

UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions occur in countries that are afflicted by full scale war or violence and strive to create a more stable, peaceful environment both in the specific states as well as globally. It can be difficult to understand the extent of the definition of peace. As Oliver Richmond notes the literature, discussions, and concepts of peace, like many concepts in political science, do not have a consensus on "a research agenda" that might help illuminate the concept of peace (Richmond, 2005: Pg. 6). Building on Johan Galtung's concepts of violence[1], peace can be divided into two

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1 There are three basic categories of violence as discussed by Galtung: direct, structural and cultural (Galtung and Höivik, 1971: Pg. 73). Direct violence, also called personal violence, is the traditional understanding of violence; an act of violence perpetrated against a person by another person, such as being struck in the face. Along with this, direct violence includes physical and mental. Physical violence is not limited to causing bodily harm by Galtung's understanding but includes restraining people from access to travel or disallowing them education (Pg. 171). Structural violence is a process that allows for avoidable suffering (Pg. 169), institutions and policies that are discriminatory, whether intentional or not. Examples of this are sexism or racism (Pg. 171). The concept of cultural violence is defined as features of any culture that are used to cause or legitimize structural or direct violence. There are many areas in which such violence can occur, examples include ideology and religion (1990: Pg. 291). Violence can be, unintentionally, part of an institution or

categories; direct and structural. Direct peace is a more traditional understanding of peace, simply the lack of physical violence and overt, malicious discrimination in institutions and government. Richmond's concept of peace falls into this category. He discusses that peace has come to be seen as the lack of open violence, no public killings, raping, or mutilations though the threat of those may be very real (Pg. 7). Though this understanding of peace is necessary for a democracy to flourish, there is more to peace than a lack of physical violence.

Structural peace is what this section focuses on. This structural peace can be explain or achieved by institutions, policies, or specific initiatives. Democracy and democracy promotion aid in the creation of structural peace. The complex interdependence of democratic states makes them extremely unlikely to attack one another and, thus, the democratization of states could help bring about international peace (Rosato, 2003: Pg. 585)[2]. The UN works to create democracy with the goal of global peace. This theory of democratic peace has been expanded on by many scholars, including Erik Gartzke who believes that instead of a democratic peace there is a capitalist peace, a peace ensued by economic ties, free markets, and similar interests that lead to diminishing the number of wars and militarized altercations (Gartzke, 2007: Pg. 166). As these concepts involve the democratic system achieving peace this is considered structural peace, though this theory can be considered a negative conception of peace as it avoids direct violence but does not, generally, address indirect or structural violence that may be unintentionally occurring.

Peacebuilding and peacekeeping build off a notion of 'peace' and it is essential to know what peace means, even if it means different things to different individuals. Roland Paris noted "'positive peace'" is composed of more than a simple lack of violence and embraces "freedom from various kinds

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government, Galtung's work illustrates this as well as showing that it should never be assumed that systems are flawless.

2 Immanuel Kant purposed the complex interdependence of democratic states makes them extremely unlikely to attack one another and, thus, the democratization of states could help bring about international peace (Rosato, 2003: Pg. 585). Research by Jervis and Gelditsch support the theory that democracy with interdependence and international organizations reduce interstate conflict (2002, 2008). Economic interdependence also encourages peace between states as "conflict is inconsistent with mutually beneficial economic ties" (Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, 2009: Pg.2. Polachek and Xiang, 2008).

of oppression and deprivation" (Menocal, Kilpatrick, and Paris, 2005: Pg. 767-768). Moreover, this understanding of peace informs the wider debate on human security and includes both development and security agendas (Pg. 767-768). Though his subsequent works expand on human security, they also discuss the issue of peace and the understanding of such a complex subject and structural peace. For the purposes of this paper the concept of peace will rely heavily on Galtung's (1969) definition of peace as he is concerned with language and inclusion of people with said language. Peace will be understood as "social goals" that are "verbally agreed to by many," if not by a majority (Pg. 167). These goals may be multifaceted and difficult to achieve, but are not wholly unattainable (Pg. 167). As well, a lack of physical violence is also included in this definition (Pg. 167) as peace is not the same for all individuals but the lack of physical violence is a step in the right direction.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions focus on removing the outward physical violence in order to have a foundation on which to build a democracy. This foundation of peace is necessary for citizens to feel in control of their government and allowing them to have a voice to address other types of violence that may be present within their state, such as institutional or cultural violence. A universal definition of peace is a necessity for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions as it ensures that all missions are working towards similar goals in all cases.

Brief History of Peacebuilding Missions

Liberal peacebuilding missions began in 1948 with the creation of the UN. These missions were designed with the purpose of aiding in peaceful resolutions of civil and interstate conflicts. One of the first missions the newly formed UN participated in was aiding Israel and the surrounding Arab states in

establishing borders, a partition plan (Neff, 1994: Pg. 27). In 1948, Israel won the Arab-Israeli War. The Israelis displaced 1.2 million Palestinian citizens from their original homes and took control of 77 percent of Palestine (Pg. 27). On July 20th 1949, the UN also helped implement the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) monitored this agreement. UNTSO's observer force had been established in April of 1948 to help with the negotiations and was comprised of military divisions from different states (Pg. 27).

During the Cold War these missions focused on supporting the end of the disputes themselves, whether violent or not. One such mission was the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) created in 1964. The purpose of this peacekeeping force was to mitigate the violence between Turkey and Greece. The hope was also to aid in returning to normal conditions through the reestablishment of law and order (Coufoudakis, 1976: Pg. 464). Another example is the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM). This mission was designed to help relieve tensions and avoid conflict between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The mission began in 1963 and its mandate ran out in 1964 (Martin, 1964: Pg. 194).

After the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, liberal peacebuilding efforts grew into a new entity, involving many additional aspects (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: Pg. 18-19). Conflict resolution now came to include understanding the underlying reasons for the war and work towards addressing them to help ensure a more long lasting and comprehensive peace. Peacebuilding expanded to include post-conflict reconstruction. One can see how aid for those affected by the strife would benefit the peacebuilding process; citizens are now receiving the support they require to begin to rebuild their lives and their families' lives after such an ordeal. This support has included, though not in all cases, health care, infrastructure rebuilding assistance, welfare assistance, and access to education (Pg. 8-9). As civil wars have been shown statistically to last longer than inter-state wars (Durch, 2006: Pg. 13), this new aid is even more significant in working towards a sustainable peace.

This evolution of the peacebuilding mission meant a more extensive role for the UN in these new endeavours. A broader range of staff for these missions is needed; soldiers are no longer the only members participating in liberal peacebuilding. Doctors, relief workers, election and political party experts, trainers and support staff, etc., are some of the personnel required in new peacebuilding and reconstruction missions (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: Pg. 7). As this new type of mission was never conceived of when originally designing the peacekeeping mission, as noted above, these new personnel began helping with implementing liberal peacebuilding missions. These missions differed from simple peacekeeping missions and have come to be a general work plan for interventions; implementing a free market economy and helping to liberalize newly formed governments and national policies is the foundation of these missions (Pg. 9).

Liberal Peacebuilding

To help examine if post-conflict countries that have been involved in peacebuilding missions have democratic deficits, it is imperative to understand what peacebuilding operations are and where they come from. Roland Paris defines peacebuilding as a post-civil war activity; designed to create an environment in which peace can prosper and hinder the resurgence of violent conflict (Menocal, Kilpatrick and Paris, 2005: Pg. 767). For the purposes of this work Paris' definition of liberal peacebuilding will be used, with one minor change.

Paris sees peacebuilding as an activity that takes place only in a post-war environment. This work sees peacebuilding as an activity that can take place in either a conflict or post-conflict environment. Individuals and groups can begin laying groundwork for a sustainable future peace, even

if violence is ongoing in the region. Groups working towards peace in a state involved in conflict create a foundation of peace; citizens demonstrating their desire for peace lay the groundwork for post-conflict peace. These individuals and groups are also an asset to peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions when they begin work in the area, a network of locals willing to work towards a stable future. Without this dedication to the idea of peace, conflict is more likely to occur again (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Peacebuilding can also include the role of a third party, whether the UN, another state or International Non-Government Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO/NGO), aiding in peacekeeping and/or conflict resolution, building towards peace talks. Contemporary peacebuilding has connections with liberal peace, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, peace support operations, as well as multidimensional peacekeeping operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Durch, 2006).

What this literature overlooks is a discussion on the effects of peacebuilding in regards to democratic deficits. The concern of these missions is creating an environment devoid of violence so that citizens do not fear their government or each other. This allows for elections to occur, a democracy to flourish and free market economics to exist. The literature lacks research into the possible development of a democratic deficit or double democratic deficit with the creation of democracy in post-conflict societies. As liberal peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations attempt to implement a stable, peaceful environment and a working democracy, a question arises as to if these democracies truly functional. This has not been completely ignored; some scholars have touched on this subject. Jarat Chorpa (1998, 1999), David Chandler (2002, 2004), Alejandro Bendana (2005), and others have discussed the problems of democratic governance under international peacebuilding missions. There is much debate in academia as to whether UN missions are successful or a positive international influence; there is research being conducted on the effects that the UN has on democracies they help create but there is much more that can be examined.

Within the context of liberal peacebuilding scholarship there are two predominant camps. First are those who argue that liberal peacebuilding missions are effective and important for struggling nations, helping to broker peace accords, disarmament, reconstruction of the society, and the support of citizens through infrastructure building. Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) work covers this area. Their data set is comprised of 124 cases of conflict areas and the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions since 1944. Their cut off for including a case in their study is that the conflict must have been resolved by 1997 to show any measure of peace in subsequent years (Pg. 783). Their research shows a positive correlation between ending of civil conflicts and peacebuilding missions. They state that peacebuilding missions do have positive effects on peace in the given area but each mission need to be specifically tailored to the area to ensure the most effective outcomes and the most comprehensive amount of peace (Pg. 795).

The second group are those academics that skeptically view the supposed positive impacts of these missions, questioning the intervention itself as well as the support given to these states to help them reconstruct homes, infrastructure, and government. Critiques of peacebuilding can be as mild as the debate of whether a market based economy should be introduced before elections (Newman, Paris and Richmond: Pg. 30-31) or as heated as whether or not the practice of peacebuilding is similar to that of western Imperialism (Bellamy and Williams, 2005: Pg. 12). This divide also includes the disagreement over the most effective types of peacebuilding, top-down or bottom-up, and even the degree to which the UN should be involved (Newman, 2007) or whether the whole system should be overhauled (Paris, 2004).

The nature of war has changed in the last couple of decades. In the 1990s, 90 percent of the causalities of conflict became civilians whereas 90 percent of the victims at the beginning of the 20th century were soldiers (Paris, 2004: Pg. 1). With the change of warfare peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations evolved. UN instituted peacebuilding operations from 1989 to 1998, focusing on the

transition from war torn society into a free market democracy. Paris deems this "Wilsonianism," hoping that liberalizing these states will bring about peace because other long-standing market democracies are relatively peaceful. Paris generally agrees with this, though his 11 case studies show varying degrees of success with many nations falling back into civil conflict when the UN leaves, but argues that the method of implementation is to blame for the limited success of these missions. Paris believes an Institution before Liberalization (IBL) (Pg. 7) strategy would prove to be more advantageous, a way for peacebuilding to evolve in the new political environment. His strategy compliments previous peacebuilding missions but feels recent post-conflict states should work on building up their society and governmental institutions before being pushed into an aggressive free market environment, with possibly hostile elections. Paris offers the international community a viable new option when considering peacebuilding operations. His approach is a middle ground; it has a similar look to contemporary peacebuilding missions as well as hoping and working towards obtaining the same goals of democratization and free market economics. Though this process is slower, it allows all members of the society time to adjust to the changes.

Scholars differ on how they approach peacebuilding. An example of this is David Chandler's (2004) work. He examines the notion of peacebuilding intervention in the international community differently than has been discussed. Chandler examines the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect,* as well as the realities the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11 have had on intervention in conflict areas. The international environment has shifted, allowing for states, western powers, to become involved in other states without as much fear of the backlash. Chandler notes this 'responsibility to protect' infers that states must "act as a 'moral agent'" (Pg. 62). He believes the restriction on the use of force "depended not only on the moral legitimacy of international law but also the balance of power during the Cold War" (Pg. 75). Without as many restraints or the ability to enforce decisions (the lack

of real enforcement power of the International Criminal Court or ICC is one example) Western powers can intervene in other countries under less and less restrictive conditions. Ethics have become important to allow for "the lacking framework of legitimacy" (Pg. 75). In other words, this ethical foreign policy gives states 'legitimacy' of intervention based on "interests of others rather than self-interest" (Heins and Chandler, 2007: Pg. 4). This allows for corruption, whether intentional or not. Though Chandler's work differs from the others in this section, it illustrates the changing international environment in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions operate, showing there is more to understand when looking at peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

That being said, not all scholars in this field fall in one of the two prevailing categories of those who see the positives of peacekeeping and building missions and those who are critical of the benefits. Some academics have found a middle ground between the two. Many cases of UN peace operations can be argued as a failure or as a positive. In other words, many of the peacekeeping operations have so many positive and negative outcomes that scholars can disagree about whether they were a success or failure. It can be a debate based on data, the state of the nation before, during, and after intervention, as well as personal opinion. A mission deemed a success may have many apparent failures and vice versa.

A Democratic Deficit

With the variety of democratic systems across the globe, a definition of democracy has been debated by scholars, policymakers, and individuals (Vanhanen, 2000: Pg. 251-252). Joseph Schumpeter argues that democracy is a mechanism for citizens to decide on leadership, choosing between competing political elites (Schumpeter, 1950: Pg. 269). This is a condensed definition that does not involve

individuals on a large-scale. Though it may be an appropriate definition for states transitioning from conflict to post-conflict, it is too simplistic for this work. For the purpose of this paper, democracy will be defined as a political system which allow for regular elections to change governing officials. Moreover, democracy allows the largest portion of the population possible to influence government's agenda by choosing among different individuals for political office (Pg. 252). This also legally ensures individuals of varying social and ideological groups to participate in politics and elections (Pg. 252). Differences in ideologies and values are not penalized but nurtured; citizens are free to believe and think what they wish (though not always protected when acting upon those beliefs). While many states do fall in between governmental categorizations, a common definition is useful.

The general understanding of a democratic deficit is that it includes feelings of disenfranchisement by citizens, deficient representation of women, minorities, and youth as well as feelings of lacking a voice in both the electoral process and the government (Norris, 1997; Edwards, 2007). The lack of visible representation of women, minorities, and youth is a significant portion of this deficit if the government is not representing societal demographics, as entire segments of the population are not being as proportionally represented in the decision-making process (Norris: Pg. 280). With the variety of "political systems even among established democracies, providing for strong and weak parliaments alike, the lowest common denominator tends to be at a point short of any parliamentary accountability at all" (Born and Hänggi, 2004: Pg. 15-16). This manifests itself in declining and low voter turnout as well as dissatisfaction with the government (Norris, 1997; Decker, 2002). The indicators of a democratic deficit used for this work are elections and the electoral systems, declining and low voter turnout, as well as a lack of visible representation of women, minorities, and youth in government. Though these are generally used indicators of democratic deficits, this is not an exhaustive list.

How does a democratic deficit manifest and why is it important to the study of politics? As a

government makes decisions for the population, a deficit occurs when said government does not function the "way the citizenry wishes it to" (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale, 2004; Pg. 4). A more detailed examination of this problem in the context of case studies will be presented below. As a deficit suggests dissatisfaction of citizens with aspects of their political process or politics as a whole, this is an important field of study. It is also a significant factor that should be considered in international development. Democratic deficit literature mainly examines various types of deficits, also discussed below, as well as theorizing solutions.

There are many examples of this deficit. Some of these manifestations of democratic deficits are evident through debate within governments and states. Examples include whether there should be changes made to the electoral system, moving from single-member-plurality (SMP) to proportional representation (PR), or if the Senate should become an elected body (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale: Pg. 64-76). These debates show dissatisfaction from societal groups about elections and governmental bodies. For states within the EU the democratic deficit has a more expanded connotation, suggesting that the institutions of the EU are to blame as they are not as democratically accountable as national governing bodies (Goodhart, 2007). The EU faces accusations of not being answerable to its various citizens and national parliaments because the EC is not elected, national governments do not hold high negotiating powers when they work in Brussels, nor is the decision-making processes transparent to the states that make up the EU (Goodhart: Pg. 568-569), and, thus, "whether these direct and indirect channels are effective in connecting the preferences of citizens to the outcome of EU decisionmaking" (Norris, 1997: Pg. 267).

The two above cases help illustrate the challenge of implementing change even in western democracies. European academics see the EU's institutions as unaccountable to national legislatures, which are thus more liable to their subjects. In Canada, the House of Commons and Senate are seen as not responsive to their citizens' wishes and needs. If these western democracies are suffering from a

democratic deficit, and are the models for new democracies, it can be extrapolated that post-conflict states are also suffering from this problem, but in ways that are unique to each case.

To date there has not been much attention given to a democratic deficit in a post-conflict environment. One can assume if a conflict is occurring, whether a civil war or a war with another state, than the governmental situation may not be stable. Liberal peacebuilding missions focus on building a stable society and a government in which the democratic process can take place. A democratic deficit may not be a concern as implementers may assume that if there is a deficit there must be a stable democracy. What good is creating a democracy if it cannot function or in its function creates a deficit? It cannot be argued that, given time, the states where peacebuilding has taken place will move to a more inclusive democracy as western states are facing the same deficit and have not managed to deal with it effectively.

Thus a major question remains: what is the relation between peacebuilding missions and democratic deficits? This work incorporates the theory that not only do these countries suffer from a democratic deficit but they may even face a double democratic deficit. Born and Hänggi elaborate this idea on in their 2004 work. They, and the other authors they have assembled for the book, postulate that governmental accountability and the legitimate use of force must be present to ensure a functioning democracy (Pg. 1-9). Their work concentrates on parliamentary accountability and the use of force under international auspices, specifically UN missions ranging from monitoring/observing to peace enforcement (Pg. 3). The UN, NATO, and the EU are the primary vehicles of Born and Hänggi's examination of the use of force and the double democratic deficit. They choose these three organizations because all three present for democratic accountability, specifically parliamentary accountability, when force is used under that authority (Pg. 8). In other words, international involvement in conflict, transitioning, and post-conflict states have expanded since the end of the Cold War but accountability of these missions to state governments and its need for a monopoly on the

legitimate use of force has not.

Parliaments are also examined extensively because they are the center of accountability for governments and governmental decision-making, especially concerning the use of force (Pg. 12). Born and Hänggi focus on three main areas of parliament: Authority, ability, and attitude (Pg. 13-15). They focus on these areas as a measure of the amount of deficit as well as the amount of democracy. Governments must have authority through legal and constitutional means, parliaments must have the ability to hold governments accountable and members of parliament must do their jobs because without dedication and the proper attitude to their work, nothing will be accomplished. No resources or amount of authority will do the job for politicians (Pg. 15). The deficit occurs when there is a lack of these three areas.

In a post-conflict country, especially where the conflict has recently ended, the legitimate use of a force can still be contested. Monopoly on the legitimate use of force is generally used as a factor in stateness, not democratic deficit literature. Scholars have argued that stateness is a "prerequisite for democracy" (Møller and Skaaning, 2010: Pg 1) and "thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: Pg. 17). Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning agree with Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan but argue that electoral rights and political liberties are more accessible to weaker or transition states while social rights "are much more intimately wedded to structural constraints such as stateness" (Møller and Skaaning: Pg. 1). Moreover, they note "in the contemporary era of 'liberal democracies' problems of stateness are more relevant for the thicker types of democracy (liberal democracy and social democracy) than for the thinner types of democracy (electoral democracy and polyarchy)" (Pg. 17). Transitioning states and new democracies face challenges that long-standing, stable democracies do not. A discussion on the monopoly of the use of force is deficit indicator for new, "thinner" democracies.

Quotas[3]

Organizations, political parties, and governments have long struggled with gender equity. Women are largely underrepresented worldwide. This has led many state and political party/organizations to institute quota systems as a way of addressing this issue (Dahlerup, 2008). The implementation of quota systems varies from state to state, government to government, and organization to organization. The recent widespread introduction of quotas worldwide, 46 states introduced legal quotas and in 60 other countries had voluntary quotas since 2008, has been called the "Fast Track to equal representation" (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Dahlerup, 2008: Pg. 323). Quotas are generally divided into three main types: political party, reserved seats, or legislative (Krook, Lovenduski and Squires, 2009: Pg. 781). Moreover, there is some debate amongst scholars about reserved seats. They are excluding them from comparative studies, as they do not affect the candidate nomination process (Krook, 2010).

Well-known cases of governmental quota systems include Norway, which has had a system in place since the 1970s, as well as Germany (Dahlerup, 2008) and Nepal. Along with this, many individual political parties throughout the globe have used voluntary quota systems. In other words, these parties institute a minimum number of women/minorities for themselves, not because of any law requirements (Krook, Lovenduski and Squires: Pg. 784). These are also called soft-quotas; they are usually set out recommendations and informal targets. As well soft-quotas rarely have punishments for any disregard of these targets (Pg. 784).

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3 Though this work wishes to use many differing case studies to illustrate the fact that not all democracies are the same and there is no set international example, rather many indicators of a functioning democracy such as elections, representation, etc, the Scandinavian states are generally left out of the discussion of the democratic deficit and women's representation. This is done because the Scandinavian states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) have spent the last 30 years introducing a widespread legal quota system to ensure the representation of women and in Norway's case a critical mass of women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). This is an example of the attempt to address the democratic deficit but is not yet the norm among other western democracies.

The fall of a government can open up the political sphere, as incumbents are forced out of office (Hughes, 2005: Pg. 178). Melanie Hughes also notes that the presence of international aid increases the chances of quota systems being adopted as those states would be more likely to create structures to increase the inclusion of women (Pg: 179). An example of this is the UN work in Bangladesh; they assisted in reinstating the lapsed quota system and extended the former quota percentages (Begum, 2007).

Arguments can be made for or against the use of quota systems. Drude Dahlerup makes the case that quotas are against the democratic principle of equal opportunity and does not ensure that the most qualified person gets the job. In other words, quotas may stop a better or more prepared candidate from taking office because of his gender. As well, the introduction of quotas is very disruptive to political parties and governments (Dahlerup, 1998: Pg. 94).

When making the arguments for quotas, Dahlerup makes the case the quotas should be put in place to remove the barriers that prevent women entering into politics (Pg. 95). Stokes notes that the experience of women and minorities in government is more important than employing experts (Pg. 79). The purpose of a government is to represent its citizens and their wishes/interests. A government that reflects the demographic of its citizens is more likely to be able to represent said wishes and interests. Stokes notes that quotas ensure that there will be more than one woman or member of a minority in office or on a committee and this reduces stress on the members (Pg. 79).

In Canada, 26 percent of men and 36 percent of women interviewed thought that the lack of representation of women in the House of Commons was a critical problem (Gidengil, 1996: Pg. 29). Along with this, only 32 percent of men and 45 percent of women were in favour of creating a party quota system, having political parties run equal numbers of men and women (Pg. 29). A party quota system was introduced in France in 2000. The legislative election results of 2002 shocked some academics, as the number of women elected only increased from 10.9 percent to 12.3 percent

(Fréchette, Maniquet, and Morelli, 2008: Pg. 891). Quota systems have both pros and cons. There is no consensus on the use of these systems.

Democratic Ownership

The term democratic ownership has two popular contemporary understandings. First, many long-term, stable, western democracies are said to be facing a democratic deficit, as was discussed previously. Traditional forms of representation in democracies make it difficult for governments, institutions, and policy to evolve as quickly as society (Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2006). Many theories and suggestions have been made by scholars to give citizens a more active role in the government and, thus, creating a sense of democratic ownership in citizens of western democracies.

Scholars have proposed institutional changes or new designs to help give citizens a stronger voice in their government and democracy. These suggestions include creating avenues for citizens and businesses to interact with governments, other new forms of citizen participation (Fung & Wright, 2003; Edelenbos, 2005), new techniques for opinion polling and interactive decision-making (Skelcher & Torfing, 2010: Pp. 74; Smith, 2005), as well as policy making and institutional design that include "new diagnostic tools in order to assess the conditions for citizen participation and measure the impact of participation on effective and democratic governance" (Skelcher & Torfing: Pg 74). These measures are theorized to allow citizens to see themselves in their government and institutions more visibly as well as allow governments to shape policies and laws that more accurately reflect changes in norms and society.

Second, this move by Western governments to alleviate democratic deficits by providing opportunities for citizens to voice their opinions though new institutions (Skelcher & Torfing, 2010)

and feel a sense of democratic ownership has taken hold in the international community, specifically donors and peacebuilding missions. Prominent international donors, organizations that fund NGOs and INGOs, have expressed an interest in INGOs/NGOs beginning to incorporate some of this work democracies have been implementing in regards to democratic ownership. This is evident by the 2005 Paris Declaration.

The Paris Declaration was signed in 2005 by over 100 signatories, both members of the aid community as well as developing states that are recipients of aid (Paris Declaration, 2005: Pg. 2). Specifically, the Declaration states that democratic ownership is when "partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions" (Paris Declaration: Pg. 9). Lise Rakner and Vibeke Wang (2007) noted that in the official dialog of the Paris Declaration that donors and the aid providers, INGO/NGOs, must allow the recipient, the state, to determine the use of the aid being offered (Pg.1). This removes some of the control that had been held by international donors over the use of aid as well as the important issues that needed to be addressed. As western democracies are the model for stable democracies and lasting peace, adopting Western solutions to deficits and working to create a feeling of democratic ownership in these new democracies will aid in fostering peace and stability.

Chapter 2: Case Study #1 Nepal

Recently thrust into the international spotlight due to a bloody civil war, Nepal's political system changed from one of the last monarchies in the world to a republic. The process for this small South Asian country to achieve its dream of democracy was long and arduous. This case study analyzes the recent change from a conflict country to a post-conflict state as well as the democratic deficit or double deficits that appears to plague the newly democratized nation. By examining the 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA), voter turnout from 1990-2008, women and minority representation, and the degree to which the state possesses the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, this chapter will attempt to determine the extent to which a democratic deficit exists within Nepal. Moreover, it will pose the question as to whether a UN mission or presence in a newly post-conflict democracy exacerbates the possible democratic deficit.

Helping to create a democracy in a post-conflict country using western democracies as models seems slightly misplaced, as these countries also suffer from a deficit. This chapter argues that the intervention of the UN causes a democratic deficit and double democratic deficit when attempting to ensure a lasting democracy in a post-conflict situation.

This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to Nepal and its recent history with civil war and the beginning of the peace process. From there, it will examine the nature of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). An analysis of the key aspects of a democratic deficit and double democratic deficit will follow. The elections from 1951 to present will be examined with a concentration on the latest election, the Constituent Assembly election. The next indicator of a democratic deficit that this chapter will examine is that of voter turnout. The last of the traditional

democratic deficit indicators that is analyzed is the representation of women and minorities. Next the legitimate and non-legitimate use of force is discussed, which is a gauge of the double democratic deficit theorized by Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi. The final sections are an assessment of the current political situation in Nepal and a short discussion. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary of given information with concluding thoughts.

Brief Introduction

Nepal has a rich, diverse culture with many different dialects spread throughout the country and its regions. Despite this, Nepali is the official language of the state. There are many different ethnic groups as well, such as the Teri and Mongols. This contributes to a rich political atmosphere, where many ethnic and religious groups lobby to be heard. Though Hinduism is the official religion of Nepal there is a significant Buddhist minority, and many other religions spread throughout the country. The caste system is still prevalent in Nepalese society, though it is slowly being removed from everyday practice.

With such a diverse group of peoples living within one state, conflict inevitably arises. In Nepal, the two regions where turmoil and ethnic conflict arise most frequently are in the mountains, known as the hilly area, and the Terai. The secluded nature of the hilly region has created a culture of its own. As well the Terai, which borders India, has developed its own sense of identity. These distinct areas have given their citizens a sense of community that they feel the need to protect. Ethnic groups in the Terai are willing to fight to protect their culture from any perceived threat (Waldman, 2004).

In 1990, a new constitution was written after decades of an absolute monarchy. This new

constitution continued Nepal's history as a monarchy but allowed for a democratically elected parliament and regular elections (Khadka, 1993: Pg. 44). The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M or Maoists) began an insurgency in 1996, which spiralled into a civil war (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal, 2006: Pg. 109). The Maoists used various tactics to gain power, including attempting to blow up the airport in Tumlingtar (damage was caused but it was minor). They began demanding money from travellers and citizens to fund "the people's government" as well as training younger Maoists to become members of a militia, known as the Young Communist League (YCL) (Adhikary, 2008).

In 2001, while the civil war continued, Crown Prince, Dipendra, killed King Birendra, as well as nine other members of the royal household before shooting himself in the head. After the murders, the brother of the murdered King, Gyanendra, came into power and was crowned King. Soon after his assent to the throne, in 2002, King Gyanendra dissolved parliament and informed the prime minister of his dismissal. In 2005, Gyanendra assumed direct control over the country, "restricted press freedom, and imprisoned hundreds, claiming that the country needed peace and security before it could have democracy" (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal: Pg. 109). In April 2006, a 19-day protest swept the country, centred in Kathmandu. Hundreds of thousands of Nepalese citizens protested the monarchy and its coup, demanding the King return democracy to the country. This movement caused the collapse of the monarchy and their military coup (Routledge, 2010: Pg. 1279-1280).

During this period the UN's intervened by creating an arena for talks between the monarch, the interim government led by the Nepali Congress (NC), and the CPN-M. UNMIN's initial mandate was an observation, monitoring, and disarmament mission. It began by separating the warring bodies into barracks and camps. UNMIN helped facilitate the disarmament of the Maoist army, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the YCL. It also worked to ease tensions between the Maoists and the Nepal Army (NA) who had been fighting each other for years. The NA was sent to its barracks and the

Maoist cadres were placed in camps to work towards disarmament (UNMIN, 2007: Pg. 7-9). The purpose was to create a more stable environment for the Maoist cadres to reintegrate into society and allow for a transition from a monarchy to a democracy. Moreover, this new stable environment would allow for the election of a new government. The Constituent Assembly would not only govern the country but was also tasked with drafting a constitution for the new republic. Civil conflict continued in this period despite the more stable environment that was created with help from UNMIN. An example of this is the murder of reporters by Maoist cadres (Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2007). UNMIN also assisted the interim Nepalese government in drafting the Elections Act as well as voter education programs. Both of these initiatives laid the groundwork for a functioning democracy in the near future, as an educated voter base and an internationally accepted Election Act are essential to the democratic process.

After three postponements, the Constituent Assembly election took place on April 10, 2008. The interim government, with the help of UNMIN, decided upon a mixed-member proportional system. This system uses both the single-member-plurality (SMP) model, also called first-past-the-post (FPTP) and the proportional representation (PR) model. These parties were contesting the 575 available seats, 240 FPTP and 335 PR (IPU PARLINE database, 2010: Nepal). The Maoists took the lead winning 220 seats, the NC was the next runner up with 110 seats, and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML) won 103 seats. The smaller parties won a few seats but the bigger parties held their overall majorities. On the 28 of May 2008, the Constituent Assembly met for the first time to begin writing the constitution that they had been elected to write and signed the papers that changed Nepal from a kingdom into a republic. Though conflicts continue to occur to this day, they are predominately non-violent.

United Nations Mission in Nepal

Peacebuilding missions undertaken by the UN vary, whether a strict peacekeeping operation or a peacebuilding mission. The fluidity in the structure of these missions allow for each operation to be tailored to a specific region based on its unique circumstances and needs. UNMIN was given a precise mandate that revolved around four specific areas:

> Monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Maoist army, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel. Assist in the monitoring of ceasefire arrangements. Provide technical assistance to the Election Commission in the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere (United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2011).

UNMIN established seven main Maoist containment sites spread throughout the country. These seven sites were where weapons from the PLA and YCL were kept and placed under 24 hour surveillance. As well, there were 21 satellite camps in which the former combatants were placed (OHCHR, 2011: Nepal). These camps received weekly visits from the UNMIN monitoring teams, at varying times to deter any inappropriate actions by camp members. Moreover, the NA was placed in its barracks and received visits from the UNMIN teams as well. In an attempt to bolster peace, the NA placed an equal number of their weapons under 24 hour UNMIN supervision (OHCHR: Nepal).

Though not initially part of its mission, electoral assistance became a large part of the UNMIN mandate. Nepal had little experience with democracy and elections. General elections were held only three times in the preceding decade, 1991, 1993, and 1999 (Baral, 1995; Carr, 2010). The Nepalese Election Commission requested aid in ten different areas of the electoral process: help in developing the legal framework for the elections, comprehensive operational planning for the elections including logistics and communication, voter registration, voter education, political party certification and candidate nomination help, aid regarding media campaign, campaign financing, observer accreditation,

training and capacity building as well as dispute resolution (UNMIN, 2011).

Although the UN began its mission under this mandate of monitoring/observation, the situation in Nepal caused UNMIN to evolve. By 2010, UNMIN expanded its mandate to include training and educating Nepalese security agencies in the proper monitoring, containment, and destruction of mines and Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs). Finally, they aided the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) in monitoring the tense security environment for human rights abuses (UNMIN, 2011) as security was serious issue before and after the CA elections, but to a lesser extent after the elections.

In early January of 2011, UNMIN gave its monitoring equipment and powers back to the government of Nepal. Included were closed circuit televisions, computers, generators, containers (which contained the arms and ammunition collected from the Maoist PLA and YCL) and, around, 40 vehicles. This equipment was to aid the new government in facilitating the continued monitoring and integration of Maoist cadres in Nepalese society. Originally only given a six-month mandate, it was extended seven times in order to continue its work on peacebuilding. UNMIN officially left Nepal on January 15th, 2011 (The Himalayan Times, 2011).

Elections

Nepal had a short-lived introduction to the democratic process in the 1950's. In 1951, the citizens of Nepal overthrew the oligarchy of the Rana family (Khadka, 1993: Pg. 44), and democracy was instituted shortly after that. The new democracy decided to restore the absolute monarchy to its previous position. The first election was held in 1959, where the NC won in a landslide. Nepal's initial foray into democracy ended quickly; in December 1960, King Mahendra dissolved the government and

instituted direct rule once again (Pg. 44). From then until the 1990's, Nepal was an absolute monarchy.

Though officially an absolute monarchy, the monarchy of Nepal said its system of government was a "partyless panchayat democracy" (Pg. 45). The panchayat system was initially designed as a four-tier organization, with villages as the base and the national government at the top. The Nepal system changed the makeup by having the monarchy as the top level and not the government (Khadka, 1986: Pg. 442-443). Some elections were held, informally, and on "a strictly nonpartisan basis" (Khadka, 1993: Pg. 45). Citizens were "elected" to aid the King in running the country under the panchayat democracy. The King had placed a ban on political organizations, making it illegal to be involved with a political party. The only political party allowed to operate openly in Nepal was the royalist party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) (Adams, 2005: Pg. 124). Despite the King having placed a ban on political organizations, two parties remained active, though their activities were significantly diminished under the panchayat system. The NC and some form of the Communist Party of Nepal continued to work and oppose the King's new form of government (Baral: Pg. 431).

In 1990, King Birendra finally gave into the demands of the citizens and agreed to reform the government of Nepal. Moving from an absolute monarchy, the country became a constitutional monarchy under the new constitution. Moreover, the ban on political parties was lifted (Khadka: Pg. 44). The NC and CPN called for more changes, a return to the democracy that had been won in the 1950's (Baral: Pg. 431). The unofficial political work that was done by these parties since the 1960's allowed elections to take place quickly after the introduction of the new constitution.

In May 1991, the first general election was held since the initial election of 1951. There were 205 constituencies (Pg. 432).

> On May 12, 1991, Nepal had its first general election in thirty-two years for a competitive pluralistic democratic system of government. The Nepali Congress won 110 seats in a 205-member House of Representatives. This party obtained 37 percent of the total votes cast. The Communist Party of Nepal (UML) won 69 seats, obtaining about 28 percent of the total votes cast, and became the main opposition party. Three other variants of Communist parties won some seats in this election. These are the SanyuktaJan Morcha (United Peoples Front or SJN), the Communist Party of Nepal (democratic) and the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (a local variant of a radical Communist party or NMKP [later took

> the acronym NWPP]) The party in power also faced opposition from the Terai- based party, called the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Nepal Goodwill or NSP) which won six seats. Ironically, two political parties, the National Democratic Party (Chand) and National Democratic Party (Thapa), comprised of the former members of the dissolved panchayat system, were able to win three and one seats respectively. However, by comparison, the former party (Chand) was able to secure 6 percent of the total votes cast and secured the third largest one (Khadka: Pg. 48).

Citizens above the age of 18 years were allowed to vote, though voter enfranchisement was not yet universal.

The Nepali Congress government, which was elected in 1991, collapsed and Nepalese citizens went back to the polls in 1994 (Baral: Pg. 426). Before the election in November, the Constituency Delimitation Commission changed the previous constituencies. Keeping the number of constituencies at 205 in total, the Commission changed the makeup of constituencies to be based on population of 90,200 on average. This gave Kathmandu and Morang seven constituencies while it limited the number in other districts (Pg. 431-432). When the election finished, the makeup of government had changed. The UML won with 88 seats, gaining 30.85 percent of the popular vote (Pg. 436). The NC was next with 83 seats but they received 33.38 percent of the popular vote. The RPP, the royalist party, gained 20 seats with 17.93 percent of the popular vote. The NWPP gained four seats, at .98 percent, while the NSP gained three seats with 3.49 percent of the popular vote. Finally, seven independent candidates won seats with 6.18 percent of the popular vote going to them (Pg. 436).

The 1999 election took place during the beginning years of the civil war. The Nepali Congress won the election with 111 seats and 37.2 percent of the popular vote. The UML was not far behind in second with 31.6 percent of the vote, 71 seats, and the RPP were third with 10.4 percent of the vote and 11 seats. The NSP and RJM were tied with five seats. The NMKP and SJN were tied with one apiece (Carr, 2010).

Elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on the 10 of April, 2008, after having been postponed three times. The UN, UNMIN, as well as INGOs and NGOs heavily aided the election. These groups did more than logistics support; they helped implement proper election procedures, such

as training local party observers for the polls, and provided 800 international election observers. UNMIN played a large role by working with the government on election type as well as security, voter registration, and education (UNMIN Election Report #1, 2008).

Nepal chose to implement a Mixed-Member-Proportional election system, as was noted earlier. This system used both SMP/FPTP, and PR. It was divided so that on Election Day a voter would cast two ballots; first, the elector would cast a ballot for her/his local candidate, which used FPTP. The second ballot cast was a PR vote; this ballot was for one national constituency and for the political party of the voter's choice, not any single candidate. Nepal has a closed-list PR system. These parties were contesting 575 available seats, 240 FPTP and 335 PR. The Constituent Assembly as a whole is made up of 601 seats, the last 26 seats being appointed by the government, after the election (IPU PARLINE database, 2010: Nepal). To help facilitate a more inclusive election environment in a country with high illiteracy, citizens cast their ballot with their finger print. As well, pictures of party logos and candidates were placed on the ballot.

Along with the Mixed-Member-Proportional system, a quota system was implemented. Each political party had to ensure at least 30 percent of the candidates they ran were women. As was noted in the introduction, Nepal is a diverse state. As such, quotas were also implemented for 59 marginalized groups (Nepal Election Act, 2008: Pg 8-9). These quotas will be discussed in greater detail in a later section.

There were 54 parties contesting this election, many small, regional ethnic parties. Over half of these parties won at least one seat (IPU PARLINE). Of the 20,886 polling stations in Nepal, 106 had to be re-polled. These 106 stations were in 21 different constituencies of 12 districts (IPU PARLINE).

Voter Turnout

Of eligible voters, 63.29 percent turned out to cast a ballot for the FPTP election and 61.7 percent voted in the PR race on April 10, 2008. Many of the Nepalese I spoke to when I interned at the National Democratic Institute-Nepal (NDI-Nepal) informed me this was the first election a large portion of the population was allowed to participate in and most were very excited to take part in the democratic process.

In the 1991 and 1994 Nepal elections voter turnout was over 85 percent. Over five million people participated in the election of an eligible 6 million with only 1.5 percent of the ballots cast being invalid (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010). Until 1999 election voter registration was not close to being universal. During the 1999 election, voter turnout fell to 65.79 percent, though the number of registered voters rocketed from just over six million to over 13.5 million with a 2.8 percent of the ballots cast being spoiled. With the help of UNMIN and many local and international NGOs the 2008 Constituent Assembly election ensured universal suffrage, all citizens over the age of 18 were enfranchised. This was a historic move as in previous elections many citizens were discriminated against because of gender and caste. The number of registered voters grew to over 17.5 million. Though the number of voters increased substantially and enfranchisement was universal for the first time in Nepal's history, voter turnout was at the lowest it has been since the Nepalese gained some semblance of democracy in the 1990's, 63.29 percent and 61.7 percent. These figures are similar to developed democracy electoral statistics; democracies that many academics, politicians and citizens argue are suffering from a democratic deficit. This shows that, on paper at least, Nepal is suffering from a classic democratic deficit.

The 1991 and 1994 voter turnout can be explained easily. Empirical voter turnout literature has found that those who are more educated, have substantial wealth and those with high incomes are more

likely to cast a ballot in the election (Lassen, 2005: Pg. 103). There was no universal suffrage for these elections. Only the elites had the vote. The members of the higher castes in Nepal were more likely to receive education and higher paying jobs. As they were more educated, members of the higher castes, and had more income, voter turnout literature explains the high turnout in the first few elections.

Many arguments can be made to suggest why voter turnout was so low in Nepal's 2008 election. The same arguments can be used to suggest why voter turnout is also low in western democracies. Some academics have argued that the excitement of democracy wears off after the first election, and thus, voter turnout declines (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Turner, 1993). This does not explain the Nepal experience. Prior to the Constituent Assembly election only the elite population was enfranchised, this theory would suggest voter turnout would be much higher in the Constituent Assembly election as it is the first election with universal suffrage. As this is not the case, it shows that something else is driving the voter turnout down, such as democratic deficit and a feeling of disenfranchisement.

Tatiana Kostadinova and Timothy Power (2007) noted that a recent study by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) found that there was no compelling evidence for the hypothesis that the voter turnout for the first election in a new democracy will be significantly different than the subsequent elections (Pg. 363). They also noted that their large N study of voter turnout in Latin America and Post-Communist countries found that the larger the margin of victory, the less likely citizens will cast their ballot (Pg. 372). The Nepal election did not have a clear leading party. Though most expected the three largest parties, CPN-M, UML, and NC, to gain the most seats, there was no clear perceived victor. Thus Kostadinova and Power's work cannot explain the low turnout in Nepal.

The statistics and voter turnout literature suggest that Nepal is facing a democratic deficit. The voter turnout rate is similar to most western democracies, excluding those countries with laws requiring

citizens to vote such as Australia. As was discussed above, other voter turnout theories do not effectively explain the Nepalese case. The amount of voter education, UNMIN as well as prominent organizations such as USAID and the Asia Foundation were instrumental in the dissemination of voter education, available to citizens and the newness of the election did not help to increase voter turnout passed general Western democratic levels. Citizens did vote but not as many as much of the voter turnout literature would suggest, leaving the impression that Nepal is suffering from a democratic deficit. This data, as well as the voter turnout data from chapter three will be examined in further detail in chapter four.

Women and Minorities

In an effort to ensure a voice for women and minorities in the Constituent Assembly election and subsequent Constituent Assembly, a quota system was adopted. The women's quota was 30 percent, meaning that all parties were required to run at least 30 percent women candidates. Moreover, parties were also obligated to ensure women gained 30 percent of the seats the party won. The PR list allowed for parties to compensate for low women representation from the FPTP election. Women won 30 seats out of 240 in the FPTP, which was only 12.5 percent. Women procured 161 seats out of 335 in the PR election, 48.6 percent. Women won 191 seats out of 575 but another six women gained seats in the CA from the government appointed seats. For a total of 197 out of 601 seats, women won 32.78 percent of the seats available in the new government. As women won only 30 of the FPTP seats, the PR and quota portion were necessary to ensure minimal women's representation. The FPTP race is a more accurate illustration of the Nepalese people's voting habits, which leans towards men. The quota system was crucial in meeting a minimal representation for women in the Constituent Assembly. As

Sharda Pokharel, a former member of parliament and now the head of the Women Security Pressure Group, noted in an interview, even though the women quota was extremely high, she feared that political parties were fielding weak female candidates to simply meet the legal requirements (Bhaduri, 2008: 'Nepal's Historic Vote').

As with women, it was deemed necessary to implement ethnic quotas. These group quotas reflect the diversity of Nepalese culture as table 1.1 demonstrates:

Table 1.1 (Nepal Elections Act, 2008: Pg. 57-58):

SN	Groups to be represented		Percentage of candidate
1	Madhesi	Women	15.60%
		Men	15.60%
2	Dalit	Women	6.50%
		Men	6.50%
3	Oppressed tribes/Indigenous tribes	Women	18.90%
		Men	18.90%
4	Backward region[4]: Achaham, Kalikot, Jajarkot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajahang, Bajura, Mugu and Humla Districts.	Women	2.00%
		Men	2.00%
5	Others	Women	15.10%
		Men	15.10%

These quotas clearly make up more than 100 percent, 116.2 percent, but the Election Act states that candidates can represent more than one group. A simple example of this is that of a woman Madhesi fills both the woman quota and the Madhesi quota. This act also classifies the group "Others" as "the group not clearly mentioned in this Schedule" (Pg. 58).

These quotas were implemented to aid Nepal in moving towards a more representative democracy. The reality of past elections showed the caste system and discrimination at work. As a

4 This is table is taken directly from the Electoral Law. The "Backward Region" is specifically written as such.

society that was still relatively new to democracy and still has an active caste system, Nepal's representation of minorities and women has been abysmal in past governments, due to the caste system. During the 1994 election the majority of the candidates running were from the two dominate castes, Brahmin and Chhetri. A startling 62 percent of the NC candidates were from these higher castes and 60 percent of the UML candidates. The NC only ran 12 female candidates and the UML ran only nine. Of these women, 37 were nominated in total, 54 percent of them were from the high castes. Of the RPP's candidates, 61 percent were either Brahmin or Chhetri and only 12 of those candidates were female. The only parties that represented minorities and ethnic groups were the ethnic based parties themselves, such as the NSP. They ran 94 percent Terai based candidates with only one percent Brahmin or Chhetri (Baral: Pg. 438). A little over 70 percent of Nepalese society is Hindu (Adams: Pg. 124). The caste system comes from Hinduism. Though the majority of these candidates were from the higher castes, Brahmins and Chhetris only make up a little over 28 percent of Nepalese population (Kathmandu Post, July 27 2010). This illustrates that there is a deficit in representation. A majority of citizens, both women and minority groups, are not being represented in an effective or visible manner. A minority of the population, the elites, held the majority of seats. When a large portion of the population is not adequately represented in its own government, this is an example of a democratic deficit.

The implementation of a quota system during the CA elections illustrates two key points. First, the government and citizens of Nepal recognize they have a democratic deficit. The implementation of these quotas is, arguably, an admittance of this deficit. The UN aided in designing this system by placing electoral advisers at the disposal at the Election Commission (OCHR: Nepal). As Stokes notes "quotas are acceptable only when the relative absence of women [and minorities] from politics is agreed to be a democratic deficit that requires redress through positive action" (Pg. 78). A 30 percent quota for women is, arguably, a critical minority. This will, at least, give them visible representation in the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, it will allow for women's voices to be heard. Though women are

certainly not one cohesive group, the critical minority of women in the government ensures that their opinions cannot simply be ignored. This can be said for the minority quotas as well. They are ensuring that their voices are heard and taken into account during the transformation of their society.

Second, like in many other democracies, there is talk about how to alleviate this deficit. These quotas are a step towards a system and society that does not require such a system. Though outright discrimination has been lessened, alleviation is still being sought all over the world. Even with the help of the UN and many international INGOs, they cannot help create what they themselves do not have, a deficit-free democracy.

Use of Force

An indicator of a functional state is that the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, usually associated with the armed forces or police force, is in the hands of the lawful government. Most measures of a democratic deficit do not include examining the monopoly on the use of force in any given state as an indicator. Most of the research being done on democratic deficits focuses on developed, industrialized democracies. These are countries that do not face the possibility of becoming a failed state. Transitions to democracy has increased globally and if democracy is truly participating in a third wave as Samuel Huntington (1991) argued, then legitimate use of force and a state's monopoly on that becomes a significant new variable for democratic deficit literature and new democracies. As Born and Hänggi (2004) note, this factor is a part of the double democratic deficit.

A government of a state requires two factors when it comes to the legitimate use of force. First, it requires a monopoly on the use of force. Second, the government requires the legitimacy to use that force (Weber, 1979). As Markus Jachtenfuchs notes the fundamental purpose to monopoly of the use

of force is "protection against external and internal threats" (Jachtenfuchs, 2005: Pg. 38). Without both of these elements, a state government cannot ensure the stability of the state or the security of said state and its citizens. Also without these elements, a state is considered a failed state or a conflict state (Pg. 37). Moreover, groups or individuals may use force or violence but they must get their legitimacy from the government (Weber, 1978).

The monopoly over the use of force has evolved since the Second World War. As the UN gained legitimacy, unlike the failed League of Nations, states began to accept and aid UN intervention missions, which beforehand would have resembled a breach of sovereignty. While states are still sovereign, though this is debatable with the interconnectedness of most of the world's countries through economic ties or organizations like the UN, most do give away some power to large international bodies, such as the EU or the UN. The UN routinely intervenes in states across the globe. This intervention varies from military intervention to disaster relief to brokering peace accords. Though states retain armies and are protective of individual borders, there have been changes to the accepted means of force, mostly seen with the UN (Jachtenfuchs: Pg. 42). This does not take away governmental monopoly of force. The concept of monopoly has evolved to encompass these new norms of UN interventionism to facilitate peace.

Before international assistance arrived, death rates were rising significantly in Nepal every year since 1996. Shikha Basnet's statistical analysis of the Nepalese civil war found from 1996 onward each year the number of deaths increased by 125, with an additional 30 in 2001 (2010: Pg. 17-18). Since 2006, the official end of the civil war and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 473 people have been injured by landmines, and 78 of those were fatal (BBC News, 2011).

With the requested intervention of the UN, control over the use of force was removed from the hands of the government. The Nepal Army was placed in barracks to help facilitate the disarmament of the Maoist PLA and YCL cadres. Legitimate monopoly of force was removed from the hands of the

Nepalese government. This did not create a failed state. As UN control over use of force, when requested, is now an internationally accepted norm. UNMIN's involvement created a double democratic deficit. This also allowed Nepal to move from being considered a conflict country to a post-conflict state, though the legitimate use of force was out of the government's control.

With the end of UNMIN's extended mandate, the UN returned control over the use of force to the newly elected government early in 2011. *Legitimacy* over the use of force is now in the government's hands but it has yet to fully exercise a monopoly on the use of violence. Ethnic based groups, primarily in the Terai, still use violence as a means of drawing attention to their causes. Moreover, the Maoist party, despite being part of the elected government, continues to threaten violence and institute general strikes and bandhs, the restriction of movement in urban areas, to ensure they receive what they want with the government.

No countries, not even democratic ones, are free from violence, as is seen in rising crime rates in developed democracies. The violence that exists in Nepal and other conflict countries is different. The political and ethnic violence in Nepal has decreased with the intervention of the UN and the Constituent Assembly election but there still exists a deficit in the government's monopoly on force. The government may have the authority over the use of violence, ethnic and political groups that have the potential to use force as a means for political gains, as they have in the past. This suggests that Nepal suffers from a double democratic deficit.

Nepal's Democracy

The Constituent Assembly election occurred relatively violence free. There were a few related deaths.

Though re-polling was needed in only a few places, the situation in Nepal has not progressed as hoped. Though declared a democratic republic in May of 2008, major impediments to the democratic process have occurred on a frequent basis. In June of 2008, only a month after Nepal became a republic, Maoist cabinet ministers resigned. They were displeased with the choice for head of state. A month later, Ram Baran Yadav from the UML was picked as Nepal's first president (BBC News, 2011: Nepal Timeline). The Maoists were given the prime minister's position. In August, the Maoists, under Prachanda, formed the government, a coalition, but they left the government in the same month (Nepal Timeline).

Almost a year later, May of 2009, Prachanda resigned over a disagreement with Yadav (Nepal Timeline). Along with this, the CPN-M left the government because the other political parties opposed the integration of the PLA into the NA. Near the end of the year, in December, four people were killed in clashes with Maoist cadres (BBC News, December 2009).

From June 2010 to February 2011 there was a stalemate in which Nepal had no true government (Nepal Timeline). While the government still officially held office and politicians still held their seats, nothing could occur in this time period because of continuous disagreements, Maoist resignations, and fear of continued violence (BBC News, May 2011). The deadlock made it difficult for any political advancement to be made (BBC News, 2011). Unable to write the constitution due to political disagreements, the Constituent Assembly was disbanded in May 2012 (BBC News, May 2012). The constitution has yet to be written and Nepal continues to use the Interim Constitution (Kharel, 2012).

It was in the UN's best interest to intervene in Nepal and help it build a peaceful environment and a fledgling democracy, to avoid the recurrence of conflict (Collier and Sambanis, 2002: Pg. 4-6). As long as Nepal stays, relatively, conflict free and the government can govern the country, sometimes; the UN has helped create a democracy and a more stable environment.

Nepal is a newly formed democracy. Transitioning from a conflict society into a democracy is

not possible overnight. The above information shows that Nepal is working on its democracy but does not yet hold a completely functional or representative government. This indicates a democratic deficit. Despite the strides being made, there are still significant issues, which is reminiscent of other democracies with deficits.

Discussion

One can argue that it was not UNMIN's mandate to create a democracy in Nepal; rather it was simply there to monitor and observe the disarmament process of the PLA and the reintegration of the civil war combatants into society. Though this is a fair argument, it is not wholly accurate. UNMIN's mission evolved to take on tasks of state-building which is evident with its participation in aiding the government in the election process, including voter registration and education. As Oliver Richmond noted, peace is not the lack of violence alone, as was discussed in chapter one, but many academics see peace "as arising from establishing the institutions necessary for permanent, liberal, governance of society, economy and politics" (Newman et al: Pg. 54). Born and Hänggi (2004) noted, that the end of the Cold War caused peace operations to become "an important instrument for maintaining international peace and for the protection of human rights", the UN taking a leading role in this new post-Cold War environment (Pg. 204). International and intrastate peace is achieved through democracy, or so many scholars and policymakers believe, especially those in the UN. Arguing that the mission in Nepal was not designed to help the government and citizens move to a functioning democracy is untrue.

Besides other mandated activities, the purpose of UN missions is to achieve peace through democracy. In extreme cases, as Nepal once was, democracy cannot always be achieved by a single

mission, no matter the mandate. In these cases, it can be argued, that the UN missions are there with the purpose of laying the groundwork for future peace and democracy. UNMIN's work with Nepal's Constituent Assembly election, and other activities, shows its commitment to creating a lasting democracy in Nepal. As the 2009 UN Secretary-General's report stated, the core purpose of peacekeeping missions are to aid and support national governments and political processes as well as helping to ensure the safety of citizens and security of the state (Johnstone, 2011: Pg. 11). The purpose of the UN's involvement, through UNMIN and other UN agencies present in Nepal, was to aid in the creation of a democracy, a society without a civil war and with a functioning, fully elected government. And this was, in part, achieved.

Nepal's civil war caused over 12,000 deaths in the nine years that it officially lasted (Bohara et al: Pg. 108). Brad Adams' 2005 work discusses in detail the events of the civil war and the trauma it caused to its citizens. He interviews the children who were orphaned by either Maoists or the NA (Royal Nepalese Army at the time) and police forces and their hatred for either side (Pg. 121). As well, Adams gives accounts of non-combatants being used as fodder for battles (Pg. 122). Research has been done on the effects of war-torn areas and the resulting trauma that occurs to the people that live in that environment. As Riva Kantowitz and Abikök Riak wrote, "simply because a period of overt war has ended does not mean that historical systems of marginalization and discrimination – often the structural factors that give rise to violence – have ceased" (2008: Pg. 7). Nepal's civil war was certainly traumatic for citizens, whether combatants or civilians.

Kantowitz and Abikök argue that a way to heal the trauma of these citizens is by participation in their governmental system and community (Pg. 8-9). This allows us to see two factors about the UN's involvement in Nepal. First, UNMIN's work in Nepal, in regards to the disarmament of combatants as well as the peacebuilding work with elections, has helped to heal the society because it gives citizens a direct venue to participate in their government and country. Second, UNMIN's work in both of these

areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding shows a commitment to create a democracy in Nepal. In order to create a democracy or any type of peace, both of which the UN and its peace missions attempt to achieve, there must be healing in society. Peace is created through democracy. Democracy is the end goal of UN missions and aid. UNMIN helped create a stable enough environment for democracy to take seed, and a double democratic deficit.

Summary

As Larry Diamond wrote, "democracy is the most widely admired type of political system but also perhaps the most difficult to maintain" (1990: Pg. 48). Before the intervention from the UN, Nepal had been in a civil war for the preceding ten years. Many citizens had died, both fighting and as innocent casualties of war. Two attempts at democracy were tried in the 1950's and 1990's, but both failed. This foray with democracy led to a more stringent monarchical rule. There were elections during this period and voter turnout was incredibly high, but it was not a functioning democracy. Parties ran a disproportionate number of high caste males, leaving out many, if not most, ethnic minorities and women. Enfranchisement was not universal. Moreover, these governments could not function without the imposition of the monarchy. The debilitating internal conflict in the 1990s made governing more difficult. With the caste system still being practiced, discrimination was apparent in society and government.

The intervention of the UN with UNMIN aided Nepal in moving from a conflict state to a post-conflict environment. With the demilitarization of the Maoists' army, the PLA, and their militia, the YCL, citizens began to feel safer. Ensuring the NA were kept in their barracks allowed Maoist members to move from terrorists on the American watch list to citizens of Nepal who wished to be

heard during the country's transformation from absolute monarchy to practicing democracy. The cataloging of weaponry and IED location and destruction created the post-conflict environment that could have elections and allow for a functioning government and the writing of a new constitution. Furthermore, UNMIN and INGO/NGOs aided the state in implementing universal enfranchisement, voter education and election training for political parties, election observers and citizens.

Measures of democracy and democratic deficits on the surface are clear. There is a very significant difference between long established, stable democracies, such as Great Britain or Sweden, and emerging democracies, such as Nepal or Rwanda. Nepal, on paper, has a democracy and a democratic deficit. Despite the work of the UN, international and local NGO's as well as activists, and politicians, there is still a deficit by the standard measures. Voter turnout in Nepal is around the average of developed nations, 60 percent or so, on par with the average voter turnout of western democracies, despite it being the first time many of the citizenry could cast a ballot and have a say in choosing their representatives. Though there was a concerted effort was made to ensure most citizens would have access to voter education programs, this did not increase the percentage of voters.

In an attempt to combat ingrained discrimination, instilled by the caste system, quotas were established for women and minorities. A 30 percent women's quota and a large ethnic quota sought to ensure a critical minority of representation for these groups in the newly formed government. The need for these quotas illuminates cultural discrimination as well as past injustices, illustrated with the breakdown of candidates from past elections and the extremely high proportion of high caste males. As in many western democracies, visible representation for minorities and women has been difficult to achieve. These quotas show a commitment to combat the under representation of women and minorities in their government and work towards a democratic deficit-free state.

As Weber argued, the monopoly on the use of force is required for a modern state. Born and Hänggi examine the use of a force in regards to a double democratic deficit that is plaguing newly

democratized and developing states. Though Nepal is not a failed state, it still does not have complete monopoly over the use of force. International norms have evolved to allow for some acceptance of a lack of monopoly on the use of force, with regards to UN missions as well as private forces. The use of force is significant because a state, especially democracies, requires the monopoly on the use of force to function. This measure of a monopoly on the use of force is unique to post-conflict democracies, as it is given in long established, western democracies.

The indicators of a democratic deficit fit Nepal. The problems of these governments are more complex than the current indicators of a democratic deficit address. These indicators over look many of the issues transitioning and post-conflict states face. With the third wave of democratization, states are transitioning from non-democratic political structures to democracies on a large scale (Huntington, 1991: Pg. 3). The indicators of democratic deficits have not caught up with the third wave.

As the UN's mandate states it wishes to ensure peace in the world; the natures of UN missions aim to help create a democracy or lay the groundwork for future democracies through peace operations. The types of democracies are based upon the Western style, of course with variations from case to case. These western democracies face democratic deficits. With the hope of creating, expanding or lay the ground work for a future democracy, can UN missions give a false impression of a more functional democracy than there is in the post-conflict state?

Chapter 3: Case Study #2 Nicaragua

Unlike the previous case study, the international intervention in Nicaragua was unwanted and uninvited. During the Cold War, the United States of America did not want another Marxist regime in Central America and in 1981 began funding an anti-Sandinista group in an attempt to topple the new government (Cupples, 2008: Pg. 112). The encroachment on Nicaraguan sovereignty by the U.S. so early after the revolution, arguably, strengthened the new democracy by giving them an enemy to unite them, an enemy to fight with the use of democracy. Though there was significant external pressure on the new Nicaraguan government to hold elections and ongoing international scrutiny over governmental decisions, the first free and fair elections since 1932 were held in 1984. The Nicaraguan democracy has had many ideological changes in its years, from left-wing to right-wing, and the process has been an organic evolution for Nicaragua. This process has not been artificially created or implemented with the help or interference of international bodies, such as the UN involvement in Nepal's transition to a democracy.

This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to Nicaragua and the civil war. This chapter will then examine the nature of the international involvement from the U.S., and will include an in-depth analysis of the key aspects of a democratic deficit and double democratic deficit. Elections are the first indicator of a deficit measured and voter turnout will follow. The last of the traditional democratic deficit indicators that will be analyzed is the representation of women and minorities. The legitimate and non-legitimate use of force is discussed, which is a gauge of the double democratic deficit theorized by Born and Hänggi. The last sections are an assessment of the current political situation in Nicaragua and a short discussion on healing after conflict. Finally, this chapter ends with a

summary of given information with concluding analysis.

Brief Introduction

The official language of Nicaragua is Spanish; though there are groups of English, Miskito, Sumu and Rama speakers throughout the country. Along with the diversity in language, the country is diverse ethnically though having a predominate population of Mestizos (Close, 1988: Pg. xii). The country is divided into three major areas, the Pacific Slope, the Central Highlands, and the Atlantic Coast (Pg. 2). Nicaragua is a predominately Roman Catholic country, with only a five percent Protestant population (Pg. xiv).

Like Nepal, Nicaragua has had a history filled with conflict. The Somoza military dictatorship took governmental control in 1936, when General Anastasio Somoza Garcia won the general election. He received 79.3 percent of the vote, though through a "fraudulent tally" (Remmer, 1999: pg. 342). The Somoza regime continued until 1979, at which time the Sandinista revolutionaries removed it from power.

Starting in 1978, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) revolutionaries began working towards political freedom and a more democratic state. On July 19, 1979, the FSLN entered the capital, Managua, and removed the leadership from power, ending General Anastasio Somoza Devayle's rule as well as the Somoza rule in Nicaragua (Close, 1999: Pg. 1). The FSLN took power and began making the changes they envisioned for the country. As Close noted "the Sandinistas set about creating a system that would pursue 'the logic of the majority', shifting power from the former elites and their overseas cohorts to the poor and the marginalized: small tradesmen, women, and

students as well as the peasants and workers" (1988: Pg. 1). There was hope now, a brutal regime had fallen and now a revolutionary group began the work towards democracy.

By July 1979, the FSLN had moved from a revolutionary movement to the government of Nicaragua (1999: Pg. 2). They changed their policies of revolt into a working democracy, with elections and political parties. In February 1990, the National Union of Opposition (UNO) took power, a conservative alternative to the socialist ideals of the Sandinistas. The new government was determined to change Nicaragua and, thus, began restructuring the political, social and economic systems (1999: Pg. 2).

International Involvement

Opposed to requesting an intermediary body to aid in the evolution from conflict into post-conflict, as Nepal did with the UN, Nicaragua was not given a choice. In the 1980s, after the election of the Sandinistas in 1984, a new battlefield for the Cold War was created. Though concerns began during the Carter administration, Reagan's administration was gravely concerned about the Marxist policies of the FSLN and their connections with the Soviet, Cuban governments, and the USSR's Committee for State Security (KGB) as well as the support for the FMLN in El Salvador (Cupples, 2008: Pg. 112).

Over the next few years, the U.S. embarked on actions that, it believed, would aid Nicaragua in moving away from being a Marxist country. The U.S. government began funding and aiding, as well as equipping and training, new revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary, groups that sought to remove the Sandinista government from office, the Contras (Cupples, 2008: Pg. 112). This group was backed by the Costa Rican government as well, which allowed the Contras to stay within its borders and aided the

U.S. in setting up a Voice of America radio station only forty miles from Nicaraguan border (Booth, 1989: Pg. 413-414). More significantly, Honduras, which had a military controlled government until the mid-1980s, supported the U.S.'s work to remove revolutionary groups from the area, including the removal of the FSLN in Nicaragua (BBC News, 2012; Thomspon, 2001: Pg. 572).

In 1984, Nicaragua took legal action against the U.S. by filing a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On April 9 the case began and a verdict was delivered on November 26 (Nicaragua v United States of America, ICJ, 1984: Pg. 7). Though Nicaragua's formal complaint against the U.S. was illegal mining, the support of counter-revolutionary forces by the U.S. was addressed. In its official claim against the U.S., the Nicaraguan government stated that not only did the U.S. train, equip and finance subversive military groups to undermine the elected government but this involvement caused the deaths of over 1,000 Nicaraguan civilians (Pg. 10-11). The U.S. denied these allegations, arguing that any pain and/or suffering were a by-product of protecting El Salvador (Pg. 143). The ICJ ruled in favour of Nicaragua, stating that the actions that the U.S. were taking against the Nicaraguan government was illegal (Pg. 7). As part of the Court's ruling, the U.S. was ordered to cease and desist its activities in and against Nicaragua. The U.S withdrew from the ICJ's jurisdiction after the decision was levied (Kirgis, 2005: Pg. 224), ignoring the ruling.

Unlike the UN involvement in Nepal, the U.S. interventionism in Nicaragua was not a positive presence. With no judgement on whether or not UN involvement is useful for struggling nations, it does attempt to be a positive influence. The U.S.'s intentions were not to help strengthen the new government of Nicaragua. The U.S. government attempted to undermine the Nicaraguan 1984 election by stating that it was "meaningless" (Guido, Dávila, Doña, Cerda & Reding, 1985: Pg. 555). The U.S. government also funded anti-government groups (Booth, 1989: Pg. 413-414). This involvement was never meant to be positive; it was a means to an end. The U.S. did not like nor approve of another Marxist government in Central America and actively decided to work on removing the perceived 'red'

threat.

This international involvement in Nicaragua came at a difficult period. The revolution had only just ended and the new government was attempting to build new institutions and work towards the future they had envisioned for Nicaragua. Unlike Nepal, this intervention was not requested nor was its purpose to give aid in working towards a functioning democracy within the early life of this post-conflict country.

Elections

Though elections had been held periodically during the Somoza regime (Walker, 1997: Pg. 4-20), these were neither free nor fair. The Somoza family benefited greatly from a "token opposition," which never was able to win any of the elections (Walter, 1993: Pg. 242). The conditions in Nicaragua were generally stable until the last Somoza, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. By the middle of the 1970's, the political opposition in Nicaragua had no choice but to become increasingly radical in order to combat the increasing cruelty by Tachito (Pg. 236).

The FSLN had taken control of the government immediately after the revolution, July 1979. The new government pledged to hold the first election five years after they took power, elections were proposed to take place in 1985. Due to extreme international pressure, the election was held in 1984 (Becker, 1984: Pg. 2).

Nicaraguan electoral law has evolved substantially since 1984. Throughout the years and many changes, Nicaragua has always had a unicameral legislature. As well, at least one seat has been reserved for a defeated presidential candidate (IPU PARLINE database, 2011: Nicaragua). On November 4, 1984, the Nicaraguan people went to the polls for the first free and fair election since the

Somoza military dictatorship. About 94 percent of the eligible citizens in Nicaragua registered to vote for the general and presidential election of 1984 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010). Becker (1984) noted the registration of voters was an incredible feat, as the registration of 1,486,140 citizens (IDEA) took place over only 4 days (Pg. 2). Of the 94 percent that registered, 75 percent turned out to vote on Election Day and of the total votes cast, 1,171,102, only 6.70 percent were invalid (IDEA).

The FSLN took power officially through the 1984 election. They won 67 percent of the total votes cast and 63 percent of the valid votes (Becker: Pg. 2). Comandante Daniel Ortega Saavedra won the presidential race with the FSLN. The Democratic Conservative Party (PCDN) won 14 seats with 13.9 percent of the vote, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) received 9.3 percent of the vote and won nine seats, and with 5.7 percent the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) gained six seats. The Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN) received two seats with 1.5 percent of the vote. The Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) also won two seats with 1.4 percent of the vote and finally, the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML) won two seats with one percent of the vote (IPU PARLINE).

The 1990 election was a dramatic shift for Nicaragua. The FSLN lost its majority and control over the government to the National Opposition Union (UNO), which was made up of a shaky alliance between 14 political parties that ranged from right to far left in the political spectrum (IPU PARLINE). Though UNO were from all areas of the political spectrum, it based its platform on being centre-right. This alliance had international support from the U.S. government (BBC: Nicaragua Timeline). A high number turned out for this election, 86.3 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. This totalled 1,512,107 voters of the 1,752,088 registered. Of the votes cast, 92,723 were invalid, leaving the total number of valid votes 1,419,384 (IPU PARLINE). Under the leadership of Mrs. Violeta Barrios de Chamorro the UNO received 764,748, which translated into 51 seats and the presidency. The former ruling party, the FSLN, received 39 seats and 579,723 votes. Nicaraguan Social Christian Party (PSC)

and Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) each won one seat. (IPU PARLINE).

This shook up the FSLN dramatically and led to the "Sandinista internal debates," which Salvador Marti i Puig notes, "initially took on violent and personal connotations" (2010: Pg. 86). This loss of power also meant that the social and economic work the Sandinistas had been doing in regards to the political structure of Nicaragua was lost (Pg. 86) but the constitution remained the same until 1995 (Prevost, 1996: Pg. 323). This loss also weakened the party organization and this led to a restructuring of the FSLN (Marti i Puig: Pg. 87-90).

In 1996, the voter registration increased from the previous election by 668,979, totalling 2,421,067. Voter turnout dropped from the previous election to 77 percent or 1,865,833 votes cast with 92,432 invalid votes (IPU PARLINE). The Liberal Alliance (LA) won the election, winning 42 seats. José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo won the presidential race. The FSLN lost seats from the previous election, bring the total to 36. The Christian Path (PCC) and Conservative Party (PC) won four and three seats respectively.

Voter turnout continued to decline, and by the time of the 2001 election, 75 percent of the registered voters turned out to cast their ballots. Though only a two percent drop this was the beginning of a trend. This equated to 2,256,770 citizens. Of those that cast a ballot 2,167,514 were valid while the remainder, 89,256, were blank or spoiled (IPU PARLINE). Liberal and Constitutional Party (PLC) under the leadership of Enrique Bolaños won the majority of seats in the National Assembly and the presidency. The PLC received 53.2 percent of the vote, which translated into 47 seats. The FSLN won 43 seats with 42.1 percent of the vote. The PC received 2.1 percent of the vote and two seats.

Election voter turnout continued its downward trend in 2006, when 66.7 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. Of the 2,445,682 votes cast, 208,000 were invalid, leaving 2,237,692 deciding the outcome (IPU PARLINE). The FSLN won the election, having received 37.59 percent of votes, which

translated into 38 seats. Of the FSLN's women candidates 12 won seats. The FSLN had ten more women parliamentarians than any other party. The PLC lost their hold on the government, acquiring only 592,118 votes or 26.47 percent of the ballots cast (IPU PARLINE), which translated in 25 seats. The Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) gained 26.72 percent of the votes and managed to gain 22 seats. Finally, the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), a party that was created by former FSLN members (IPU PARLINE, 2006), gained 86.9 percent of the popular vote or 194,416 of the cast ballots and five seats. Daniel Ortega became the president again with the FSLN.

Voter Turnout

Voter turnout has fluctuated greatly during the elections in Nicaragua since the revolution. During the first election since the revolution, in 1984, 94 percent of the eligible citizens registered to vote. Of the registered voters, 75 percent turned out to cast their ballot. Of that, only 6.7 percent of votes were invalid. In 1990, the percent of registered citizens voting increased from 75 percent to 86.3 percent. In 1996, voter turnout began its trend, slowly declining. This coincided with the 1995 constitutional changes (Prevost: Pg. 323). The 1996 turnout was 77 percent. In 2001, the percent continued to drop, reaching a low of 75 percent. By 2006 the percentage of voter participation was beginning to parallel western democracies; a record low of 66.7 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot.

As was noted in the previous chapter, academics have argued that the excitement of the new right to vote in a free election causes voter turnout to skyrocket in the first election but die off in subsequent elections (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Turner, 1993). Others have hypothesized that the margin of victory, or the perceived margin, will dictate the turnout (Kostadinova and Power, 2007: Pg.

372). The larger the margin of victory for one party, the lower voter turnout will be. This can be attributed to citizens feeling their vote will not make a difference either way, for or against the assumed majority.

These two theories can give some insight into the Nicaraguan elections. Turnout in 1984 was one of the highest of the post-revolution elections, but the FSLN was slated to win by a large majority. So while a free and fair election was exciting to citizens, the scale of the FSLN's speculated victory leveled out voter turnout at 75 percent. The 1990 election was highly contested, voter turnout increased to 83 percent. Voter turnout literature has noted that highly competitive elections will encourage a higher turnout of registered voters (Fraga and Hersh, 2010: Pg. 340).

From 1996, the percentage of voter participation began to decline, similar to the data from post-industrial democracies. Unlike Nepal, Nicaraguan elections were held without international aid, though international observers were accredited by the government and did participate in post-revolution elections, though this has lessened for recent elections (IPU PARLINE). Their election statistics for participation reflected western democracies: France and Finland both held national elections in 2007, turnout was 60.44 percent and 65.02 percent. These are states that allowed their democracy and elections to happen organically, without the aid of institutions like the UN. Though the statistics suggest that Nicaragua is facing a democratic deficit, with a continued decline in turnout, this deficit mirrors that of western democracies. This will be further discussed in chapter four.

Women and Minorities

Melanie Hughes (2009) notes that historically the gains that women make in conflict situations,

predominately civil wars, are difficult to consolidate in subsequent election wins (Pg. 174). Some scholars, such as Robert Putnam (1976), have argued that crises give rise to an environment in which women can make gains in political representation. Though women can make up a large number of guerrilla movement members, their mortality numbers are significantly lower than their male counterparts. Karen Kampwirth (2002) noted that during the Nicaragua civil war, women made up 30 percent of the members of the Sandinistas but only roughly seven percent of the combatants killed were women. Hughes postulates that as women are statistically less-likely to die in conflict situations and men are more likely to be imprisoned after the end of conflicts (Pg. 178), the women in post-conflict situations "may simply be better able to compete for political power" (Pg. 178).

Despite this, women continue to face challenges with regards to political representation. Moreover, though women participate in armed movements, when the conflicts end women are likely to return to traditional roles (Denich, 1981; Geisler, 1995; Goldman, 1982). To combat the return to traditional roles and expand the role of women in society, quota systems have been implemented in many post-conflict states, such as in Rwanda and Nepal.

Unlike Nepal, Nicaragua has never introduced a legal quota system, though parties have, on occasion, participated in soft quotas. Soft quotas are quotas that are not legally enforced and have no punishment for noncompliance, such as voluntary party quotas. This being the case, the visible representation of women in Nicaragua is similar to that of western democracies, such as Canada. In the 1985 Canadian general election 9.6 percent of the elected members of Parliament were women. In the 1984 Nicaraguan election 13.5 percent of candidates elected were women. In the 1988 general election Canada matched Nicaragua's 1984 numbers with 13.3 percent of women in the new government. The 1990 Nicaraguan general election upped the previous number of women to a percentage of 16.3. The number of women in the Canadian federal government remained the same in during the 1997 and 2001 elections, 20.6 percent. The number of women elected fell in the 1996 Nicaraguan election to 9.7

percent but increased in 2001 and were on par with Canada at 20.6 percent. The 2004, 2006, and 2008 numbers fluctuated in Canada from 21.1 percent to 20.8 percent to 22.1 percent (Elections Canada, 2012). Akin to Canada, women's representation in England also wavered in this period; in 2005 19.8 percent of the members elected were women and in 2010 that number increased to 22.0 percent (McGuinness, 2012: Pg. 6). Nicaraguan numbers also decreased in 2006, similar to that of to Canada, to 18.5 percent. A state closer to the Nicaraguan percentage of women is the United States. Currently the U.S. Congress has a total of 16.8 percent of seats filled by women; this number includes both the Senate and the House (Center for American Women and Politics, 2012: Current Numbers).

Evidence has also been shown that internal conflicts, specifically civil wars, may open more doors for women (Hughes: Pg. 196), as these "volatile situations" allow women to step out of their traditional roles (Conrad, 2003: Pg. 7). Though governments are intended, to an extent, to mirror their society (Norris, 1997: Pg. 280), Nicaragua does not accurately represent its citizenry. But neither do the majority of western democracies (an exception to this is Scandinavia; this will be discussed further in chapter four). The statistics, shown above, show that Nicaragua, just like western democracies, is suffering from a democratic deficit, which is evident by the lack of representation by women.

That being said, these statistics also show a general progression of women in governmental positions. This parallels the reality of western democracies, such as Canada, the U.S., and England. Nicaragua is not free of a deficit, but the increases and decreases in the representation by women in the government of similar to that of states, which are considered models for society, governments and democracy. So while Nicaragua has a deficit, it is an organically created deficit that shows the difficulties that arise when trying to create and maintain a functioning democracy. With no international intervention after the revolution (excluding the troubles with the U.S., as this was not meant to be a positive influence like UN missions), Nicaragua's democratic indicators are similar to western democracies.

Use of Force

Since the end of the civil war, the government has enjoyed an almost exclusive control over the legitimate use of force. Shortly after the end of the revolution relations between the U.S. and Costa Rica cooled. During the period 1980-1982 the Costa Rican government, under President Carazo, shifted support to the U.S. government and policies, to the detriment of relations with Nicaragua (Booth, 1989: Pg. 413). Costa Rican policymakers and members of the opposition party (the Social Christian Unity Party- PUSC), which had previously supported the Sandinistas during the revolution period 1977-1979, called the new Nicaraguan government "undesirable because of its Marxist ideology, its political organization, and its growing military power" (Pg. 413). In order for Costa Rica to be able to afford this stand against Nicaragua, it received increased financial support from the U.S. (Booth, 1999: Pg. 458). Along with this support, Costa Rica also allowed the U.S. to set up a Voice of America radio station, only forty kilometres from the Nicaraguan border (1989: Pg. 413-414). Finally, Costa Rica also allowed the anti-Sandinista troops, the Contras (Pg. 414), to be sheltered and operate out of its borders.

In 1981, the Honduras government supported the set up of U.S. run counterinsurgency training camps (BBC News, 2012: Honduras Timeline). Though there were camps of Contras in Costa Rica, the majority of the contras were in Honduras. The U.S. used Honduras as its base of operations for launching counter-revolutionary groups (UNHCR, 2008: Pg. 24). In 1982, the Contras in Honduras began their operations to bring down the FSLN in Nicaragua (Timeline). The majority of these training camps were shut down in1984 but the government continued to support the U.S. Government's work to

remove the Sandinistas from power. The Honduras government was given substantial financial assistance for this continued support (Timeline).

The end result of this was discussed above; Nicaragua took the U.S. to the ICJ. The final verdict was in favour of Nicaragua, instructing the U.S. government to cease and desist its support of the Contras (ICJ, 1984: Pg. 7). Relations were often strained but open warfare did not erupt between Nicaragua and the U.S. or the countries harbouring the Contras. Though the Contras were operating in Nicaragua during this time, it did not completely undermine the legitimate use of force because many western democracies have trouble with terrorist groups. This can cause significant strife but long established democracies continue to function.

As was discussed in chapter two, a government requires two factors in regard to its legitimate use of force. First, a state requires a monopoly on the use of force. Second, the government requires the legitimacy to use that force (Weber, 1978). A key purpose of the state's need for monopoly on the legitimate use of force is the ability to protect the state and the citizens from "external and internal threats" (Jachtenfuchs, 2005: Pg. 38).

A true democracy promotes the right to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Unarmed, non-violent disagreements with governmental policies does not affect the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and it just another means for citizens to inform the government of their displeasure. As article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states "everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion," which extends to the right to change those religions or beliefs, alone or in public, and "to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance" (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2012). This is echoed in most of the constitutions of the western democracies, including the Canadian Human Rights Act and the amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Konvitz, 2003).

In April 2005, the rising costs of living and fuel caused wide spread protests that occasionally

became violent, with street protests spreading across Nicaragua (BBC News: Nicaragua Timeline). The provisions discussed above ensure that freedom of speech and assembly allow for citizens to discuss in public venues issues that they have with the governing of the state as well as other issues that arise, such as the mass protests again the U.S. led war in Iraq as well as the recent Occupy Movement (BBC News, January 2007; Wood, October 2012). The protests in Nicaragua are similar to protest movements in western democracies; the assembly of a group to inform the government of their displeasure with an issue can occasionally turn violent. This does not take away from the monopoly on the use of force. While protesters are sometimes looked at with distrust, the "phenomenon of demonstrations meets with fundamental mistrust. It is perceived as an irritating, even alien, element in the harmonious concord between state and society, the governing and the governed" (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998: Pg. 190). Martin Winter argues that citizens themselves are "the subject of political change rather than the object of state actions" (Pg. 190). In other words, protests may be seen negatively by the government but it does not remove the legitimate monopoly on the use of force, in western democracies or Nicaragua, such actions serve to inform the government of the issues that are important to the citizenry. The protests in Nicaragua have turned violent on occasion but this is similar to western protests.

Unlike Nepal, the legitimate monopoly on the use of force was not taken from the government. When the revolution ended, the FSLN quickly took control over the government. Clashes with the Contras continued during this period. The involvement with the U.S. did not become out right warfare, thus keeping the monopoly of the use of force within the control of the Nicaraguan government but their support of the Contras led to a large loss of life, 31,000. The legitimate monopoly on the use of force was tested during this period but the government retained control. When the UNO took power, with the aid of the U.S. (Cupples, 2008: Pg. 112), the government continued to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

The transition to democracy was not completely smooth for Nicaragua. But the aid of the UN was not requested; nor did the UN feel the need to intervene[5]. Elections have taken place with regularity since the end of the civil war. The initial post-civil war elections met international election standards and were monitored by observers, both domestic and multinational. The removal of the use of force from the new government was not required. Some civil unrest or protest is necessary to inform the government when there is an inconsistency between what citizens feel is important and what the government is focusing on. This suggests that the Nicaragua managed to avoid the double democratic deficit, even after continued governmental change, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within the state.

Nicaragua's Democracy

Democracy in Nicaragua has been relatively stable since the end of the revolution. Cupples noted that for many of the people of Nicaragua, "elections constitute a source of hope that things are going to get better and they represent a chance to further strengthen their country's democracy" (2008: Pg. 111). As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. attempted to undermine the new Nicaraguan democracy. In 1982, the U.S. government sponsored a rebel group, the Contras, who proceeded to attack areas in Nicaragua. This led to a state of emergency being declared (BBC, 2011: Nicaragua Timeline). It continued until the FSLN government took the U.S. to the ICJ. The final decision was

[5] Peace processes in other Latin American countries were vastly different than in Nicaragua or even Nepal. El Salvador signed a peace agreement between the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a coalition of guerrilla groups, and the U.S. backed government in 1992. Guatemala signed a peace accord in 1996. This treaty was between the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), similar to the El Salvador FMLN as the URNG was a coalition of guerrilla forces, and the government (Spencer, 2004: Pg. 2). For a more detailed account see Cynthia Aronson's *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America,* and Jack Spence's *Peace and War in Central America.*

levied in 1986 in favour of Nicaragua. In 1990, the FSLN lost the election to U.S.-backed UNO (Cupples: Pg. 112). Though the ICJ ruled against the U.S. interference, the U.S. found alternative ways to ensure more favourable relations with Nicaragua through supporting parties running against the FSLN.

In 2002, the former president José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo, elected in 1996 as president and leader of the LA, was charged with embezzlement and money laundering during his time in office. His sentence was announced in 2003, he received a 20 year jail sentence, although, this was later changed to house arrest (Lacy, December 2006). Although Alemán's behaviour was starkly undemocratic, it did not affect the workings of the electoral democracy. Fraud occurs in democracies, though usually not to the scale of Alemán's. Other examples include the Federal Sponsorship Scandal in Canada and two scandals in the U.S. revolving around two members of the House of Representatives, Democrat Charles Rangel and Republican Tom DeLay[6].

In 2004 and 2005 much of Nicaragua's debts were forgiven. The World Bank dismissed 80 percent of the loans and debt owed to them from Nicaragua. Russia agreed to clear the Soviet era debts that Nicaragua still owed (Nicaragua Timeline). This was a significant step forward for the democracy. Though 2005 also saw impediments to prosperity, in April rising costs of living and fuel caused mass spread protests that occasionally became violent street protests (Nicaragua Timeline). Also political power struggles began in June. This turbulent environment continued until October, when the government agreed to delay political reforms in order to ease tensions (Nicaragua Timeline).

In 2009, FSLN leader and President, Ortega announced constitutional changes. Their implementation meant the reforms removed the limit on gaining a second consecutive term in office

6 The Canadian Sponsorship Scandal came to light in 2002, causing the Prime Minister at the time to call for an inquiry. The program was set up to promote federalism to Quebec citizens. The auditor general found that over 100 million dollars had been paid out for this program. Some speculate that it was set up as a reward for Liberal Party members (CBC News, October 2006). Charles Rangel was charged with violating the ethic rules of the House of Representatives, failing to disclosure more than half a million dollars in assets as well as improper fund raising and disclosure. He was found guilty of 11 out of 13 charges (De Vogue, April 2010).

(Nicaragua Timeline). This ensured that Ortega would be constitutionally able to run for more terms in office, which he did in 2011.

There can be a case made that the major impediments to Nicaraguan democracy have been natural disasters. In 1988 and 1998 massive hurricanes caused large-scale damage. Over 180,000 citizens were left homeless in 1998, after Hurricane Joan had joined with tropical storm Miriam (Yih, Boucher, Vandermeer, Zamora, 1990: Pg. 106-107). In 1998, Hurricane Mitch devastated Nicaragua, killing 3,000 people and left over 300,000 homeless in Nicaragua alone (Pg. 107). In between the Hurricanes that devastated Nicaragua, in 1992 there was an earthquake that left over 16,000 Nicaragua citizens homeless (Nicaragua Timeline). Such destruction of infrastructure, individual and communal properties as well as the economic impact would be a detriment to any newly developing democracy.

A correlation can be drawn between economic troubles and natural disasters' effect on democracy. Along with this, it was Alemán's government which was given charge of distributing disaster relief (Lacy, December 2006). These tragedies are difficult for any country, such as the case of Japan. System shocks like natural disasters show how fragile a state and democracy can be. After the Tsunami, the Japanese government has had significant trouble in returning the country to its former state as can be expected. The increase in taxes to aid in the cleanup and energy cost as well as the trauma suffered by the citizens has been extremely difficult for the Japanese government to deal with successfully (BBC News, March 2012).

Discussion

As was discussed in chapter two, civil war is traumatic for any society and its citizens, the healing

process is essential to move forward after such a conflict. Riva Kantowitz and Abikök Riak state that a way for a society to heal itself is through political and community participation (Hart, 2008: Pg. 8-9), and Nicaragua has done just that. Samuel Huntington (1991) argues that a test for a new democracy is in its ability to have at least two peaceful transitions to new governments through elections (Pg. 266-267) and the "only reliable indicator that they can be removed is that they *have* been removed" (Bratton, 2004: Pg.154). Nicaragua has done this. After the initial election of the FSLN in 1984, the composition of the government has continued to change, from the UNO to the LA and so on. Through all of this, the country has remained peaceful and maintained an acceptable electoral democracy.

The international involvement by the U.S. may have strengthened the sense of ownership for the Nicaraguan people over the democracy that was fought for with the revolution. One can extrapolate that the changes in government, from a Communist led FSLN to the Right-wing UNO and so on, show a commitment to democracy in two ways. First, as Huntington argued, the changes in the elected government must occur peacefully, and, in Nicaragua's case, it has. Second, changing elected governments is the will of the citizenry and, thus, values are evolving in the new political environment, "a liberal democracy lives from permanent disputation about the goals that are to be attained through political processes" (Fuchs, 1999: Pg. 142).

Voter turnout has declined since the revolution; women's representation in politics while improving and on par with western democracies is still small, as in under-represents women as a percentage of the total population. From this, it is possible to extrapolate that there is a democratic deficit present in Nicaragua.

Summary

Nicaragua has a democratic deficit. This deficit, though, is similar to that of western democracies. The elections that occurred post-revolution were free and fair with a significant portion of international observers. The continued political turnover is evidence for the open environment in which the Nicaraguan elections take place. As well, women's representation parallels that of western democracies, without a legal quota system, unlike Nepal that employed a legal quota system for the 2008 Constituent Assembly election. As the majority of democratic deficit research is conducted on western industrialized democracies, Nicaragua's deficit is similar to the available data. As this deficit is similar to western democracies, Nicaragua has managed to avoid a double democratic deficit, brought about by the removal of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force by an international body, such as the UN.

After the revolution, Nicaragua instituted universal suffrage and, after much international pressure, held its first post-revolution election in 1984. Voter turnout increased and decreased in the initial elections after the introduction of democracy. By 2006 voter turnout almost mirrored the international standard for participation in elections. Moreover, the percentage of women elected to government has also fluctuated since the 1980s, though it has changed similarly to the older, western democracies.

The monopoly on the legitimate use of force has remained in the hands of the government since the end of the civil war. This monopoly has been constant, even though the elections continually changed the government. Despite the international pressure that the U.S. applied on Nicaragua through third party means, the Contras, the FSLN accepted its election losses without violence following the 1990 Nicaraguan election when the U.S. backed UNO took power. Protests like the ones in 2005 over economic issues have continued. Protests have ended in violence but this occurs, occasionally, in other western democracies, such as with the Occupy Movement and the Iraq war protests, and does not

remove the monopoly of the use of violence.

The current state of Nicaraguan democracy follows that of many other countries, with or without democratic forms of government. In the last number of years economic troubles have effected many states. Greece, Northern Ireland, and Iceland have been near bankruptcy. Japan has faced the challenges of a natural disaster. All of these events or circumstances have an effect on democracies.

There will always be inequalities in any political system, despite attempts to address these issues. The difference between post-conflict democracies is the organic process in which a country moves away from its turbulent past. Nicaragua did not have international intervention like Nepal. The U.S. efforts directed at overturning the sovereignty and undermining the legitimacy of the new government of Nicaragua in the 1980s, with the aid of Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Contras, may have served to strengthen its democracy. As Tommy Douglas said in regards to the Canadian medical system "I want to say I think there is a value in having every family and every individual make some individual contribution. I think it has psychological value. I think it keeps the public aware of the cost and gives the people a sense of personal responsibility" (Fierlbeck, 2005: Pg. 123). The ownership of their democracy, the civil war that was fought and the lives lost to attain it gave the people of Nicaragua a sense of the importance of what they fought and died for; an organic democracy and the beginnings of an egalitarian state. This sense of ownership has allowed Nicaragua to move from a conflict state to a post-conflict democracy, but was unable to ensure a functional, deficit-free democracy.

Chapter 4: Results

Democracy promotion has taken centre stage in the international community since the Cold War ended. As such, the number of democracies has grown since the end of this period. In 1974, there were only 39 states globally that were considered to be democracies, 27.5 percent of all countries. By 2005, this number increased to 123 democratic states, 64.1 percent worldwide (Caramani, 2008: Pg. 111). In relation to this, Charlotte Ku (2004) found that from 1946-1989 peacekeeping and state building only accounted for 15 percent of UN missions, three in total, but from 1990-2000 it increased to 40 percent, a total of 23 missions. Traditional peacekeeping missions were 25 percent of the missions the UN undertook in 1946-1989 but decreased to four percent of 1990-2000 missions (Ku in Born and Hänggi: Pg. 37). This shows the evolution of UN missions, from focusing on monitoring/observation and peacekeeping to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations becoming more prevalent.

This chapter seeks to delve deeper into the indicators used to examine the democratic deficit and double democratic deficit in the chosen case studies. This chapter follows the format of the aforementioned chapters. First, the elections will be examined; voter turnout is the next indicator of the democratic deficit measured; and the last of the traditional democratic deficit indicators that will be explored is the representation of women and minorities. The next section is a brief analysis of the legitimate use of force within democracies and the post-conflict states examined. Finally, this chapter ends with a summary of given information with concluding analysis.

Elections

As was discussed in chapter one, democracy has three major criteria: free political competition, the ability of all citizens to participate if they wish to as well as a free, open society with a respect of universal rights (Howard and Roessler, 2006: Pg. 366-367). Elections are one of the vital means of competition and are a normal part of the political process in many countries. They determine the direction of growth for a state by choosing leaders and policymakers with specific values and political stances. A country that does not have regular, free elections is not considered democratic (Pg. 367). Elections are the mechanism citizens use to determine how they want their country governed.

Frequency of elections is not the only concern regarding this area of political participation; the type of electoral system is also subject to debate and disagreement. Some scholars, such as François-Pierre Gingras, have suggested that not all electoral systems are effective. Gingras noted that two-thirds of Canadians feel the electoral system is unfair (2005: Pg. 1). Feelings of dissatisfaction with the electoral system of any given state by its citizens can exacerbate an already existing democratic deficit.

Maurice Duverger (1963) argued that FPTP/SMP create a two-party system. He argues that this is because the FPTP system gives a disproportionate share of the votes to large parties and that this system causes strategic voting patterns, the fear of "wasting their vote" on candidates that may be preferable but unlikely to take office (Pg. 31). Despite Duverger's insightful theories, FPTP systems do not exclusively create two-party governmental systems.

Differing from SMP/FPTP is the PR system. It is possible for PR systems to be constructed to allow for even the smallest changes to be reflected in the elections (Abramson, Aldrich, Blais, Diamond, Diskin, Indridason, Lee, and Levine, 2010: Pg. 64). As such, elections ensure most parties receive seats and ensure representation for all "but the tiniest of parties" (Abramson et al: Pg. 64). These electoral systems usually have a larger number of political parties with seats in government.

Moreover, as this system allows for even small changes in citizen opinion it has been assumed that, unlike FPTP systems, there is no need for strategic voting. As well, there are few wasted votes in the PR system (Pg. 64-65). Despite this, like the FPTP system, there has been some evidence found that citizens still participate in strategic voting (Cox and Shugart, 1996; Cox, 1997).

There has been a continuing global decline in the satisfaction of democracy (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006: Pg. 31). Electoral reform has been suggested as a means of addressing this dissatisfaction, also known as a democratic deficit. In Canada, for example, electoral reform from a FPTP system to PR or a mixed system is highly debated. The arguments made for PR include having political parties become more competitive, national support for more parties, fewer wasted votes, higher voter turnout, as well as higher, visible representation for women and minorities (Aucoin, Smith and Dinsdale, 2004: Pg. 64). Though there is much support for electoral reform as a means of addressing the democratic deficit, it is uncertain whether or not electoral reform in and of itself is enough to usher in all the changes proposed by proponents of the PR system (Pg. 64).

As a democracy, Nepal has only had one national election since the intervention of UNMIN and the aid it received in creating a peaceful enough social and political environment to become a post-conflict state. With the counsel of UNMIN, Nepal chose a mixed-system for the election (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009: UNMIN). Each citizen cast two ballots, first a FPTP ballot for their individual constituent and a second PR ballot for their desired national political party (IPU PARLINE database, 2010: Nepal). The 2008 Constituent Assembly election was a landmark, hailed by international observers and the UN as a success (United Nations Department for Political Affairs, 2011: Nepal). The elected officials were charged with governing the new republic as well as writing the first constitution post-monarchy. Despite all the progress, political deadlock has made it difficult for much advancement to be made (BBC News, 2011). The Constituent Assembly never finished its mandate. Unable to write the constitution due to political disagreements,

the Constituent Assembly was disbanded in May 2012 (BBC News, May 2012). The constitution has yet to be written and Nepal continues to use the Interim Constitution (Kharel, 2012). Despite being unable to write the constitution, the CA disbanded legally and elections have been called (BBC News, May 2012), suggesting that Nepal has continued to function democratically. Time will tell what will occur in Nepal but a successful national election was a promising beginning for its democracy.

Nicaragua has had regular elections since 1984, after the 1979 fall of the Somoza regime, as was discussed in chapter three. During the initial elections international observers were dispatched to Nicaragua to ensure the integrity of the elections (Barnes, 1998). The National Assembly has 92 members. Of these 92 members, 90 are elected in a PR system. The other two seats are reserved for the outgoing president and the other for the losing presidential candidate. Seats are distributed by on the basis of national totals for political parties (LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2002: Pg. 51). These elections occur on a regular basis, occurring every five to six years. As well, international observers no longer monitor these elections as strictly.

Free, fair, and open elections are one of the most vital measures of a democracy. The most widely employed electoral systems continue to be FPTP and PR. Each election system has advantages and disadvantages. Electoral reform is a means of addressing a portion of an individual state's democratic deficit but this is only one piece of a larger problem. Under international supervision, Nepal adopted a mixed electoral system, both FPTP and PR. Nicaragua employs a PR system, which elects both the members of the National Assembly and the President. There has been a breakdown in the politics of Nepal. The 2008 elected Constituent Assembly was unable to reach consensus in regards to writing the new constitution. Elections have been called for but it is still unclear what will happen. Nicaragua has continued to have steady elections since 1984. Regular elections are an indicator of a functioning democracy. The steady occurrence of elections in Nicaragua and the beginnings of regular elections in Nepal is a positive indicator of democracy.

Voter Turnout

One of the more commonly examined indicators of a democratic deficit is the data on voter turnout. Citizen participation in elections, in democracies without compulsory voting, has been on the decline for some time. In the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections in France there was a 60.32 percent and 60.44 percent voter turnout. EU parliament elections in 1999 and 2004 saw only 46.76 percent and 42.76 percent of the eligible citizens cast ballots. Finland has only had a 65.02 percent voter turnout in the 2007 parliamentary election and only a 39.43 percent participation in the 2004 EU Parliament election, which was an increase over the 30.13 percent turnout for the 1999 EU election (IDEA). Canadian elections have not fared much better. The 2004, 2006 and 2008 general elections only saw a 60.9 percent, 64.7 percent and 58.8 percent voter turnout, though there was a slight increase in the 2011 election, a 3.1 percent increase (Elections Canada, 2011). Though this can possibly be attributed to the high competitive election environment that stemmed from controversies, such as the prorogation of Parliament, leading up to the election (The Economist, 2011: 'Groundhog Day').

Nicaragua has similar election statistics as western democracies. The following graph shows results from the United States Presidential elections, Canadian federal elections and Nicaraguan Parliamentary and Presidential elections since 1984, when Nicaragua held its first free and fair post-revolution election.

Graph 1.1



One can see from the graph, voter turnout in the 21st century is similar in all of the given examples. As was discussed in chapter three, high voter turnout in the first post-conflict explains higher voter turnout (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Turner, 1993). As well, the 1990 election's high turnout can be explained, in theory, by the uncertainty of the outcome (Kostadinova and Power, 2007: Pg. 372). As elections passed, Nicaragua's democracy strengthened and from this one can extrapolate that Nicaragua's voter turnout became statistically similar to long-standing western democracies. Moreover, the turnout is on the decline like other democracies, indicating a deficit.

Nepal is a difficult case for discussing voter turnout as a measure of democracy. Since the end of the civil war in 2006, there has only been one national election[7]. On April 10th 2008, 63.29 percent of the eligible voters turned out to cast a ballot for the FPTP ballot and 61.7 percent voted in the PR race (IPU PARLIN). As was discussed in more detail in chapter two, contemporary voter turnout

7 Previous elections held in Nepal did not have universal suffrage, as was discussed in chapter two, and thus are not included.

literature offers many theories. Excitement for democracy and the first election with universal suffrage since the 1950's (Khadka, 1993: Pg. 44) suggests high voter turnout (Turner, 1993). Though there has yet to be another election since the Constituent Assembly disbanded in 2012, there has been a call from citizens all over the country to have another election. This shows a commitment to the democratic process.

Women and Minorities

A measure of the democratic deficit is the representation of women and minorities in government and decision making bodies. Linda Trimble and Jane Arscott found that men hold four out of five political positions globally (2003: Pg. 12). Moreover, Myrtle Bell, Mary McLaughlin, and Jennifer Sequeira (2002) found that though women make up 50 percent of the U.S. workforce, women only held 30 percent of salaried managerial jobs, 20 percent of middle management jobs, and only five percent of high-level executive jobs (Pg. 65). As Mary Wollstonecraft wrote in the 18th century, if democracy is understood as equality, "then you cannot explain unequal outcomes in terms of 'natural' inequalities" (Stokes, 2005: Pg. 2). This deficiency in the visible representation of women and minorities worldwide is still a problem for democracy.

Many development programs have been designed around the concept of including women (and minorities) in the development and the decision-making processes of their state. This inclusion of women and minorities in post-conflict reconstruction is extremely important. Conflict allows women to participate outside of traditional gender roles (Sambanis, 2002). This type of participation can vary between countries, whether petitioning for cease-fires or taking over public roles like running

businesses (Hughes, 2009: Pg. 179). As conflict opened a new arena for women and minorities to participate in that had previously excluded them, the inclusion of these voices in development programs, government, and institutions is essential to create a more representative democracy (Pg. 179).

As was discussed in chapter two, UNMIN focused on observation and monitoring of the Maoist PLA and the NA as well as assistance with the Constituent Assembly election, the body which would govern and write the constitution after Nepal moved from one of the last monarchies to a republic. Quotas were instituted as a means to address the widespread gender gap in Nepalese politics. Though these quotas were not aimed at ensuring women and minorities gained a critical mass, 40-50 percent, it did give them visible representation (women and minority groups can see themselves represented in their government). Before the arrival of the UN and these changes were implemented to the electoral law in Nepal, only five percent of candidates were required to be women and were given constituencies they had no hope of winning (Dahlerup, 1998: Pg. 3).

The UN and its various missions have much support from states as well as individuals because it is believed that the UN ushers in positive change in a society. Melanie Hughes (2009) found focusing specifically on low-income states, "a greater number of INGO linkages do not increase women's parliamentary representation" (Pg. 196). In other words, the presence and work of the UN as well as international NGOs alone does not cause an increase in the representation of women in governments. Though Hughes' study does not include minorities, one can extrapolate from her findings that minorities do not gain as much from INGO presence as might be assumed.

Western organizations hold a huge amount of sway over the evolution of quotas in other countries. Moreover, "potential interventions by such actors in policy deliberations outside the West are likely to affect how concepts of representation are employed – and possibly reformulated – in the course of these debates" (Krook, Lovenduski and Squires, 2009: Pg. 803). Despite this, the Western-

focused lens used for gender development work, especially quotas, it is not always effective. Mona Lena Krook, Joni Lovenduski and Judith Squires (2009) found that ethnic, religious, and linguistic quotas promoted men more than women, while specific quotas for women tended to be more beneficial for women from dominant classes and races (Pg. 803). Work has been done that suggests despite the criticisms of quotas they can increase women's representation (Paxton & Hughes, 2007). Krook, Lovenduski and Squires conclude that though there are problems with quota systems this does not undermine the arguments for quotas but rather demonstrates how ingrained patriarchy is and there is a larger need for more research "both comparative and case-specific" on the type, introduction and aftermath of the gender quota policies (Pg. 803).

On the surface it is easy to compare the gender and minority quotas in Nepal to those of the Nordic democracies, due to the extent of quotas in both cases. The lack of representation of large groups of people needed to be addressed in a new way, leading to the implementation, in both cases, of expansive quota systems. In reality, these cases are not so easily joined. Norway began its journey to address the deficit of women within government in the 1970s when the Socialist Left Party introduced a party quota. The other parties followed suit, the last party adopted the quota system in 1989. The quota is a 40/60 ratio. As Hege Skjeie elegantly wrote on Norway, "gender quotas are not simply the result of a sudden recognition by party leaderships that women indeed constitute half the population," and "[quotas] are also an end product of a line of political arguments that have forcefully maintained that gender constitutes an important category that needs to be fully represented" (Skjeie, 1991: Pg. 236).

The Norwegian process was one that came from substantial debate among political parties and citizens. The Nepal case differs greatly from this. Though gender and minority equity was among the post-conflict discussions, it was not first and foremost in the debates. Conflict resolution, peace talks and the agreement to evolve from a monarchy to a republic took centre stage, with good reason. The

electoral system and foray into quotas came with much international counsel, the UN and other well-known INGOs (OCHA, 2009: UNMIN). Though there are immediate visible benefits to the implementation of a quota system, a "process of change" that can lead to a more balanced society for both men and women (Peschard, 2002: Pg. 4), the introduction to a recent post-conflict state and not a long time stable environment increases the pressure on an already fragile new democracy. That said, it is still progress in a state that before the use of the quotas only five percent of the candidates that ran for office were women, an even more severe deficit than the one that exists currently (Dahlerup: Pg. 3).

As was discussed in chapter three, Nicaragua has never introduced a legal quota system unlike Nepal and its help from UNMIN. In spite of this, some political parties since the 1979 revolution have introduced soft quotas, personal party quotas, without any legal requirements from the government. These soft quotas are used for selecting members for internal positions within the party (Peschard: Pg. 3). The status of women in Nicaragua is similar to many Western states. Currently, 42.2 percent of the elected members of the Nicaraguan government are women (IDEA, 2012: Nicarguan Election Results). Canada and England currently have 22.1 percent and 20 percent of women elected but the United States lags behind at only 16.8 percent (Elections Canada; McGuinness, 2012: Pg. 6; Center for American Women and Politics, 2012: Current Numbers). Nicaragua, a state that introduced democracy for itself in the 1980s, had similar numbers of women's representation as many western democracies, states that are known for having democratic deficits. Before the FLSN's direct initiative to improve women's representation, the National Assembly only had 18.5 percent women (IDEA, 2012: Nicarguan Election Results).

There is no democratic international standard for the inclusion of women in politics. As a significant portion of the world's population, about 50 percent, it is understandable that a lack of representation for a group this large is a deficit within democratic systems. Not all states agree on the best way to approach this matter. Quota systems have become a popular means of increasing the

representation of women and minorities quickly, but it is not without controversy. The Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, have participated in the use of quotas to rectify democratic deficits but it is not the only measure that can increase the participation of women and minorities. Nepal is still struggling to have a functioning democracy, even with 32.78 percent of women within its government. Nicaragua, though only soft quotas have been used until recently, has similar numbers of women's representation as western democracies, such as the United States, Canada, and England. Having a significant number of women in government does not automatically mean there is no democratic deficit in any given state. Nepal and Nicaragua still suffer from a deficit.

Use of Force

As Jean-Marie Guéhenno eloquently noted "we live in a world of sovereign states. It is states that are responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, for economic and social development, for guaranteeing the rights of their citizens— and states that constitute the international system" (Guéhenno, 2011: Pg. vii). The legitimate use of force is a requirement for a state to function, an international standard. Though legitimate use of force is important to any state, globalization has evolved the international environment slightly. Rosalind Eyben noted that because of this, globalization, no state is "an island unto itself" (2010: Pg. 3).

The promotion of democracy has become a facet of international politics. Interventionism and international aid still has rigid conditions under which it may participate in peace operations, with or without force. Sovereignty is still of the utmost importance. The UN and some scholars believe that UN military interventionism can help create a stable environment for transitioning states, as well as

contributing to peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Menocal, Kilpatrick and Paris, 2005: Pg. 767). This is simply not enough. Post-conflict states have a difficult relationship with the legitimate use of force but removal of that power of force by an external force leaves governments in a larger deficit.

Most, though not all, third-world countries have had a long history of authoritarianism. Embedded tradition can make change difficult. Moreover, though a state has made the initial transition to democracy does not ensure it will continue down the democratic path. Though the conflict may have ended, the "historical systems of marginalization and discrimination – often the structural factors that give rise to violence" have been dismantled (Kantowitz and Riak in Hart, 2008: Pg. 7). These systems and institutions can drag the state back into conflict.

Nepal gave control over its legitimate use of force to the UN in an attempt to create a stable environment for elections and democracy. This intervention can help contain an explosive situation in a conflict state, such as aiding in the transition from civil war to post-conflict. Though this lack of control over the legitimate use of force is a severe deficit in the new Nepalese democracy a significant factor has not yet been addressed, the Nepalese government still maintained control over the police force. This may seem arbitrary but as Albert Reiss (1971) noted "at law, the police in modern democracies such as the United States possess a virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of force over civilians" (Pg. 2). So while control over the army and Maoist cadres was placed into the hands of the UN, in an attempt to stabilize the conflict environment, there was still some legitimate use of force, in the police, held by the government. This shows that while a double democratic deficit occurred in Nepal there was still enough control to maintain a functional state and an emerging democracy.

Nicaragua has avoided this double democratic deficit as the international intervention that took place after the civil war was not intended to create a more stable democracy but rather to topple the new post-conflict state. Though the FSLN lost the 1990 election to the UNO, the change of governing parties in a democratic election is normal. The revolution did not overwhelm the government and

Nicaragua has continued to flourish in its democracy. Protests against policies and political figures occurred to show the displeasure of the citizenry. As Martin Winter (1998) argues that citizens themselves are "the subject of political change" (Winter in Porta & Reiter: Pg. 190), and this has not challenged the legitimate use of force of the elected government of Nicaragua. Citizens are comfortable enough with their democracy to vent their dissatisfaction, using protests.

Discussion

A difference that exists between Nicaragua and Nepal is the amount of time that each state has had in creating and flourishing under a democracy. Nicaragua transitioned in the 1980s, while Nepal only transitioned from conflict state and monarchy into a post-conflict republic in the 2000s. The data and current events suggest that it is not always a matter of time to create a democracy without a deficit but more essential is a stable foundation upon which that democracy is built.

In the new global era, states, governments, militaries and even citizens are all intertwined. At the top of this is the United Nations which functions as a forum for international discussion on all issues. This institution in and of itself is based upon bringing peace to the world. This peace is, arguably, achieved through the democratic process. As Kant theorized years ago, democracies do not fight one another; democracies are willing to compromise with one another. Democracies fight non-democracies. Thus, one of the simplest ways to ensure global peace is to promote non-democracies to adopt a democratic system.

Democracies are maintained through a sense of citizen ownership. Harry Boyte notes that new theorists on spreading politics suggest democracy should be seen as a commonwealth, "seeing citizens

as democracy's co-creators and democracy as a commonwealth, abundant in public goods" (Boyte, 2005: Pg. 543). This also means that democracies and the continued stability of those political systems require more consent than any other form of government (Diamond, Lipset and Linz, 1987: Pg. 7). This has shaped the concept of democratic ownership.

Democratic ownership has two general understandings. The first understanding is as a means of addressing the democratic deficit in long-term, stable western democracies by creating a sense of democratic ownership amongst citizens (Skelcher & Torfing, 2010). There are varying suggestions for instilling this in citizens, as was discussed in chapter one. The idea behind democratic ownership in western democracies is that if citizens feel they can effect government and policy they will no longer feel disenfranchised, part of the democratic deficit, and thus democracy will evolve more closely to societal changes (Fung & Wright, 2003). Second, this has permeated the international arena. Global donors, along with INGOs and NGOs, since the 2005 Paris Declaration, have sought to create a sense of democratic ownership in conflict and post-conflict states that they are active in (Foresti, Booth & O'Neil, 2006). The purpose is to create peace and functional governments. If citizens feel a sense of ownership over their government the hope is that this will create a more stable environment for society and the continued work with the government.

The most apparent difference in the development of democracy in Nepal and Nicaragua is democratic ownership, the democratic ownership that comes from citizens feeling they have a true say in their government and society. Nepal and Nicaragua have similar statistics for women and minority involvement in government. Election statistics and voter turnout data are difficult to compare, due to Nepal only having one election since the end of conflict.

Both civil wars were bloody and left each state needing to build a new government from the ground up. Where these cases differ dramatically is international involvement. Nepal requested UN intervention to broker a peace accord as well as remove the use of force from both the Maoist cadres

and the Nepalese army. UNMIN was also heavily involved in implementation and structure of the first post-conflict election, the Constituent Assembly election.

Nicaragua allowed international support only in terms of allowing international election monitors to ensure that post-conflict elections met international standards. Other involvement was not requested, such as the attempt by the U.S. government to undermine the new government, but Nicaragua did not fall to this and continued to hold frequent elections, as democracies do. The difference with Nepal is that Nicaragua's government and citizens kept control over the implementation and evolution of their democracy.

In the end, as Tommy Douglas stated, individual contributions give citizens a sense of ownership (Fierlbeck, 2005: Pg. 123). Whether this is a national medical system, as Douglas was arguing, or more generally a state's democracy, there is a need for citizens to feel they own and have a say in their government and society. The recent Paris Declaration, as discussed in chapter one, and shift in donor thinking suggests that for democracies to flourish in conflict and post-conflict states there must be ownership of the society and governmental changes. Good intentions alone from international involvement cannot make a democracy function (Born and Hänggi: Pg. 54) or evolve to fit the makeup of its society. International involvement may be pivotal to help create an environment able to make a change from conflict to post-conflict but to create a real democracy; a democracy capable of reflecting its citizens and society, citizens must have ownership.

The data suggests both cases have democratic deficits, with differing values on the independent variable. A democratic deficit may be a post-conflict inevitability. Peaceful states may be prone to democratic deficits. As the majority of democratic deficit research focuses on industrialized, western democracies this may be difficult to ascertain. Moreover, the UN's involvement may not be the catalyst to a democratic deficit in a new democracy but it can, as is argued, be the cause of a double democratic deficit. Further research is necessary to illuminate this issue.

Summary

While there is no strict international standard for a democracy, there are measures that academics can examine. A free and fair environment for competitive elections, voluntary participation in politics as well as respect for human rights, both internally and externally and legitimate control over the use of force within the state. Democracy as a system of government evolves to fit the norms of the specific society that it is representing. Because of this, democracies differ greatly from one to the next.

Elections in both Nicaragua and Nepal took place to international standards. Since the end of the Nicaraguan civil war, elections occurred every six years until 1996. Since 1996, elections have occurred every five years. These initial elections were scrutinized heavily by international monitors. Nepal's Constituent Assembly election met criteria of international standards, with many international monitors participating in the 2008 election. Unfortunately, this positive move forward for Nepal has yet to continue, as in 2012 the Constituent Assembly disbanded, before finishing the new Republic's constitution. There have been calls for another democratic election by the Nepalese people but no election has been scheduled. UN presence in Nepal was enough to secure the political environment for an election but did not create a citizen owned democracy.

Voter turnout in Nicaragua is slowly on the decline. Regular elections have taken place since 1984. Voter turnout is a measure of satisfaction with the democratic process, political officials and policy. Nicaraguan voter turnout has been declining as well, also a measure of a democratic deficit. Though Nepal had a high level of voter turnout for the 2008 no subsequent elections have occurred. The Constituent Assembly disbanded in 2012. The UN left Nepal shortly before this happened. Though there are not statistics to analyze regarding this, there is obviously a deficit in Nepal's

democracy, though a more severe one than other democracies are facing.

Women and minority representation in government is significant for the democratic process. These segments of the population are needed to give voice, not only in government but also in the creation of policy and laws. Women have many challenges in gaining access to political sphere. Conflict environments can allow women to act outside traditional gender roles (Sambanis, 2002). When conflict ends women have a better opportunity to participate in the new political reality, as previous incumbents no longer hold governmental seats (Hughes, 2008: Pg.179). Though not a single, cohesive group, women and minorities have unique opinions on government and governmental policy that governing elites may not have considered. This is makes the participation of citizens in the democratic process extremely significant, as these differing positions help mould a democracy that reflects the population. Nepal used hard quotas, legal quotas during the Constituent Assembly election, to ensure visible representation for women and minority groups, which was discussed in chapter two. Some Nicaraguan political parties used soft quotas, not legally required quotas, to promote women's participation in politics.

The Western democratic deficit does not encompass legitimate use of force but this is an integral part of democracy. As Eyben noted no state is completely alone in this globalized world (2010: Pg 3). Since 1979 in Nicaragua, the government retained legitimate control over the use of force, though trouble with groups trying to topple the new government continued until the late 1980s. Nepal required the aid of the UN to separate the army and the enemy combatants, removing legitimate use of force from the interim government; this led to a double democratic deficit in Nepal, the lack of control over the legitimate use of force.

While both case studies meet most of the general indicators for democracy, these measures do not encompass the whole picture. Most western democracies, the models for international democracy, also suffer from democratic deficits. These deficits extend to post-conflict states and newly formed

democratic countries. International aid, specifically the UN's, cannot create a deficit-free democratic environment. Democracies function and evolve by the participation and will of the citizenry. The people of any given democracy are the creators of norms in a society as well as the force for change. If citizens feel they have no control over the democracy being created, or feel alienated by international presence, that democracy is without a critical part. International presence in a post-conflict state can help calm tensions but if citizens do not feel in control of the changes to their society then democracy cannot be without a deficit.

Conclusion

The United Nations plays a leading role in international politics and global security. International norms suggest that the work the UN does in conflict resolution, transitioning and post-conflict countries is a means of creating a more peaceful world. This is supported by both the number of states involved with the UN as well as the number of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. But is conventional thinking correct? Is the UN and its missions as effective as the support for it suggests?

Can the UN assist in the inception of a deficit-free democracy in transitioning and post-conflict states? I have argued that this is not the case; the UN cannot assist in the creation of a democracy without a democratic deficit or a double democratic deficit, similar to that of Western states. Though these missions have commendable goals, aiding conflict countries in achieving peace and a stable democracy, the results, I would argue, are not as positive. How can the UN hope to create an inclusive, functioning democracy when the models upon which it is based, western democracies, are facing democratic deficits of their own? In reviewing the literature on democratic deficits and critical peacebuilding and adopting the theory of the double democratic deficit proposed by Born and Hänggi, this work examines whether the UN can create a deficit free democracy in post-conflict states. The conclusion reached is that the UN's involvement creates a double democratic deficit; this results from the removal of a monopoly on the use of legitimate force by the government (Born and Hänggi, 2004) as well as a government that not does not reflect the wishes of its citizens (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale, 2004: Pg. 4) and results in the removal of the sense of democratic ownership from citizens. It is suggested in this review is that the UN and its peacebuilding missions aid in implementing democracies with deficits that mimic that of Western democratic deficits.

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist's insurgency that began in 1996 brought Nepal to its knees with a civil war continuing until 2006 when a 19-day protest, centred in the capital Kathmandu, demanded the monarchy relinquish control of the government and permit expanded democratic institutions (Routledge, 2010: Pg. 1279-1280). The UN and its mission, United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), was asked to step in and help broker a comprehensive peace agreement between the interim government and the Maoists (United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2011), ensuring the disarmament of Maoist combatants, the monitoring of both Maoist cadres and the Nepal Army (NA, formerly the Royal Nepal Army) and the agreement to hold elections for a body which would govern and write the new constitution for post-monarchical Nepal (UNMIN, 2011). UNMIN operated in Nepal from 2006 until 2011 (The Himalayan Times, 2011).

Though the election was postponed three times due to conflicts between the Maoists and the interim government, with the aid of UNMIN and INGO/NGOs, Nepal held its first post-civil war election on the 10 of April, 2006 (BBC News, 2008: Final results declared in Nepal). This election was internationally monitored to determine if election standards were met and it was the first election that ensured universal suffrage. The election consisted of two ballots, one single-member-plurality (SMP) ballot, also known as first-past-the-post (FPTP), for the local candidate and one proportional representation (PR) ballot for the voter's party of choice. There were 54 parties that sought election to the 575 available seats, 240 FPTP and 335 PR. The entire Constituent Assembly is made up of 601 seats, the last 26 being appointed by the government, after the election (IPU PARLINE database, 2010: Nepal). As well, the Nepalese system incorporated a thorough quota system for the inclusion of women and minorities, as was discussed in detail in chapter two.

Although there was extensive UN support, not only for the election but voter registration and electoral education as well, it did not yield an excessively high voter turnout. Of the registered voters, 63.29 percent turned out to cast a ballot for the FPTP election and 61.7 percent voted in the PR race

(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010). These statistics match most western democracies (excluding countries with mandatory voting laws), and are democracies, which are suffering democratic deficits.

The legitimate use of force was removed from the interim government and the subsequently elected government by UNMIN. The purpose of this decision was to create an environment peaceful enough to hold elections for the Constituent Assembly. This is a double deficit, as the monopoly on the legitimate use of force is a necessary factor in a functioning state. As was discussed in chapter four, the government still retained control of the police force. This is an important distinction as the police force "possess a virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of force over civilians" (Reiss, 1971: Pg. 2). In other words, though the UN removed the traditional understanding of the monopoly on legitimate use of force, the army, Nepal was still able to have control and a functioning democracy, albeit one with a deficit.

Though much work had been undertaken to ensure the visible representation of women and minority groups through the electoral quota system, the Constituent Assembly disbanded in May 2012 (BBC News, May 2012: Nepal Protests as Constitution Deadline Expires), and was unable to write a new constitution for Nepal. Despite all the work undertaken by the UN and UNMIN did, it was not enough to secure a functioning, deficit free democracy for post-conflict Nepal. There have been calls for a new round of elections, which shows promise for the spirit of the Nepalese people and their desire for democracy.

To contrast the examination of Nepal and its UN assistance in transitioning from a conflict state to post-conflict democratic state, Nicaragua did not have this type of international help after its civil war. In 1978, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) began the final insurrection against the Somoza dynasty (Close, 1999: Pg. 1). In July 1979, the FSLN entered the capital, Managua, and removed the leadership from power, ending General Anastasio Somoza Debayle's rule (Pg. 1).

Unlike the UN involvement in Nepal, the U.S. interventionism in Nicaragua was not seen to be a positive presence. The U.S.' intentions were not to help strengthen the new government of Nicaragua. Nicaragua filed an action to the International Court of Justice against the U.S. On April 9 the case began and a verdict was delivered on November 26 (Nicaragua v United States of America, ICJ, 1984: Pg. 7). The U.S withdrew from the ICJ's jurisdiction after the decision was rendered (Kirgis, 2005: Pg. 224), ignoring the ruling. The U.S. argued that the 1984 elections were invalid (Leiken, 2003: Pg. 261-263). The U.S also funded anti-government groups (Booth, 1989: Pg. 413-414), which attempted to bring down the FSLN government. This involvement was never meant to be positive, as in the case of the UN and Nepal, it was a means to an end. The United States government opposed the prospect of another Marxist government in Central America and actively decided to work on removing the perceived 'red' threat.

Under intense international pressure, the FSLN held the first post-civil war election on November 4, 1984. Nicaragua has employed a unicameral system of government. The elections for the National Assembly utilized a proportional representation voting system with a closed list. The political parties submit candidate lists for the seventeen constituencies. There is also one nation-wide constituency, which elects 20 members for a total of 90 members. Elections for the president occur simultaneously with the parliamentary elections (IPU PARLINE database, 2011: Nicaragua). Previously six seats were set-aside for the party of any presidential candidate that received one percent of the vote but lost the election (Becker, 1984: Pg. 3). The number of seats set-aside has changed, currently there are only two.

Voter turnout has fluctuated since the institution of democracy. The 1984 election had a turnout rate of 75 percent of registered voters, 94 percent of the eligible to register (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010). The 1990 election had 83.6 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. The 1996 turnout dropped slight, 77 percent. By 2001 Nicaraguan voter turnout began to

decline, with a 75 percent turnout. In 2006 the lowest number of eligible voters cast a ballot, 66 percent (IDEA, 2010), on par with most western democracies. Without positive international aid, like that of the UN's, Nicaragua has managed to have regular elections with universal suffrage. Moreover, voter turnout has been on a decline similar to that of Western democracies, indicating a deficit, but Nicaragua has created a functioning, stable democracy that needs the same work on inclusion and evolution as do the Western democracies, which are seen as the international model.

Unlike Nepal, the Nicaraguan government has consistently retained the monopoly on the lcgitimate use of force, despite the international pressure from the US and its support of anti-Sandinista movements, the Contra war, around Nicaragua What Nepal lacked and Nicaragua had was a sense of democratic ownership, a sense of ownership over the political process and its governing bodies. The political and social work undertaken in Nicaragua was reflective of the citizens, not the UN. The shift in international INGO/NGO donor thinking towards this shows a new understanding that democratic ownership is essential for a sustainable democracy. And though the UN and its peace missions have good intentions, as Born and Hänggi noted, good intentions are not enough (Pg. 54). This evolution of thinking illustrates that the UN cannot provide this ownership to citizens in post-conflict states.

Democratic deficit and liberal peacebuilding literature lacks a discussion of whether the UN creates deficits in its attempts at implementing democracy. It is understandable that this is generally omitted in the effort to foster creation of peace and democracy in a conflict, transitioning, or post-conflict state, as this is difficult enough. But there is some consideration of this in the UN's missions. The use of mixed electoral systems, that of SMP and PR, as well as the use of quotas suggests these missions are aware of the deficits in western democracies and are attempting to alleviate this weakness in the new democracies. The fact many of these western countries use some form of PR suggest that these democratic deficits are entrenched.

Though some critical peacebuilding scholars have argued the extreme of UN peacebuilding

missions are akin to a form of Western imperialism (Bellamy and Williams, 2005) this work accepts that if the UN and its missions do nothing else other-than create an environment that is more stable than before it arrived, it has indeed had a positive influence. Despite this, this work is critical of the acceptance of the extent of the positive affect that the UN can have in the creation of a democracy. Like Paris (2004), there is hope for these missions and the democracy it endeavor to foster; however, there remains work to be done.

Should states transitioning from conflict to post-conflict be held to higher standards than established western states? The answer is not completely black and white. These states, such as Nepal and Nicaragua, are usually transitioning from very violent civil wars. Transitions take time. UN missions work to create the most inclusive and representational democratic system possible, such as with the use of mixed electoral systems, SMP and PR, as well as the implementation of extensive quotas, such as the ones used in Nepal. While an argument can be made that is to ensure that all groups have a voice in the new government, is that not what western democracies say they have already? Though transitioning states should not be held to higher standards than stable, long-term democracies, the UN's work aids these states in the formation of a government and democracy that takes into account the problems facing Western states and attempt to relieve them of similar deficits, though, as argued, not successfully.

Democratic deficit literature generally omits a discussion on the monopoly on the use of force. This is an area in which stable, western democracies do not have questions raised. The spread of democracy has become an important aspect of international relations and the UN's work since the end of the Cold War (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: Pg. 5) this is now an important variable that should be included in future democratic deficit work. Huntington (1991) noted, the third wave of democratization is occurring now and this is causing the increase of democracies worldwide increase. Though many scholars believe this ended after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S., the UN

is still promoting democracy as well as engaging in peacebuilding operations and democracy building. As Born and Hänggi stated the variety of democratic systems in and of themselves cause the different democratic deficits (2004: Pg. 15-16), this is simply a new variable that should be incorporated into the literature.

Democracies are supposed to be the most accountable and representative form of government, attempting to mirror their society to ensure the decisions being made are in the real interests of the citizens of that state. The democratic deficit demonstrates that citizens do not feel as though their government represents them. Low voter turnout across western democracies (not including those with mandatory voting laws), calls for election system reforms (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale, 2004: Pg. 58-59) and even quota systems (Dahlerup, 2008: Pg. 323) to address wasted votes and a lack of representation of women, minorities and even youth (Norris, 1997: Pg. 280) shows that these systems are not functioning as their citizens appear to desire (Aucoin, Smith & Dinsdale: Pg. 5). The democratic deficit is a serious problem for democracies, not simply as models for emerging democracies but for developed states as well. The plethora of literature and theories proposing institutional reforms from quota systems to democratic ownership in Western states (Norris, 1997; Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Fung & Wright, 2003; Edelenbos, 2005; Skelcher & Torfing, 2010; Smith, 2005) illustrates that the need and desire to address this problem.

This study is significant because it questions general understandings of international norms. International donors have already begun to re-evaluate its criteria for the implementation of aid, whether through the UN or other INGO/NGOs. Democracy demands that citizens are engaged in the political process. This study contends that while the UN and its missions do have admirable goals, there is much more to be done. This study's significant findings are relevant to political scientists, specifically those who focus on international relations and peacekeeping/building, as well as average citizens. Along with raising questions of the success of UN democracy mission it demonstrates the

need to incorporate more work on inclusion in western democracies. Complacency with the status quo will not in and of itself create evolution in institutions or thinking.

This study has a few overarching ideas. First, the world is an ever-changing environment but institutions and standards are slow to evolve. Changes to governments, institutions or policies are delayed, despite the mounting evidence of issues with given systems. These delays are not limited to new democracies but exist across the spectrum.

Second, while this study focuses on the UN as the major instrument for democratic transition in post-conflict states, it is not the only body. INGO/NGOs and regional bodies will need to evolve in order to facilitate the desire for democratic ownership of its citizens. This change is already evident in donor thinking.

Finally, western democracies are not immune to the issues discussed herein. The democratic deficit is, arguably, a pressing issue in these states. As models replied upon for transitioning and new democracies, the West should foster more programs and policies that would improve the reality and perception of democratic ownership. As societies are ever evolving so to must governments and policies.

Although this study has been carefully prepared, there are still limits to the research. It has been argued that with or without UN intervention post-conflict democratic countries have democratic deficits, the extent to which may be exacerbated by UN presence. There may be other independent variables that have not been considered, such as economic variables. Arguments have been made that the distribution of wealth among citizens and GDP are significant in the evolution of a state's democracy (Barro, 1999) and were generally not considered in this research. This is a small study; it consists of only two case studies, Nepal and Nicaragua. The inclusion of more case studies may illuminate this issue further. Future research would test these findings against other cases that have had similar UN peacebuilding missions.

As has been noted in this small study, which has only examined two cases, future research, I would suggest, should include a review of more cases of UN assistance in transitioning states. There should also be an examination of the degree to which these states have formed a functioning democracy and to what degree they suffer from democratic deficits. If there is more evidence for these deficits then there needs to be a discussion on the implications this has on international norms and, to a lesser extent, what is deemed a successful mission for the UN.

Traditional thinking regarding peacekeeping and building is slowly evolving. The UN is a major international presence. Born and Urscheler have argued that peace operations are certain to fail if they are only backed by good intentions (Born and Hänggi: Pg. 54) and as has been argued here, good intentions are not enough to create a functioning, deficit-free democracy.

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