







**The Victims of Substantive Representation:  
How "Women's Interests" Influence the Career Paths of MPs  
in Canada (1997-2011)**

**by**

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## ABSTRACT

Since 1997, Canada has entered into an interesting new phase of gender equality in Parliament. The prominence of this issue has now come and gone on the political agenda, regardless of the fact that women still only account for about a quarter of the seats within Parliament. Furthermore, when we look more closely at the careers of MPs, it becomes clear that as the prominence of the position in the House of Commons increases (with more power, more prestige), we find fewer women, indicating that women are facing a post-election barrier that makes it more difficult for them to enter the highest ranks of power and prestige.

This study builds on previous research on women in legislatures and analyzes the impact of committee membership on the opportunities offered to male and female Members of Parliament. It asks whether women who substantively represent women are less likely to receive positions of high status. It finds that in the period of 1997 – 2011, only one woman received one of the “pipeline” – or highest ranking – cabinet posts. Additionally, women who were prominent within their parties, and those that ran for the leadership, were less likely than the average female Member to be involved in “women’s interests” or the committee work related to the Status of Women. Substantively representing women, therefore, does seem to have an impact on the eventual success of these politicians and may help to explain why women are still not frequently found in high status cabinet positions—positions that remain almost entirely exclusive to males.

**For my parents**

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Women have been sitting in the Canadian House of Commons for nearly ninety years. Despite the fact that women have broken through many glass ceilings in the past number of decades, they are still largely absent from the powerful centre of the government: the executive. The ministry appears to be the last spoke in the wheel of female representation. Recent research around the world is turning its attention to the highest levels of office to understand why there are so few women in positions of power, both as leaders as well as in key government posts.

Cabinet portfolios are frequently referred to as "scarce political resources" by those studying the rise (or stall) of women in power (Heath et al., 2005; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Trimble and Arscott, 2003). These resources are the precious and rare entranceways to prestige and power in government. It is through these positions that future prime ministers emerge from common Members. These pathways are limited; prime ministers allocate portfolios strategically, intricately balancing opportunities for caucus members. Furthermore, portfolios are not all equal and a handful of positions are much more prestigious than the others. The fact that these positions are hierarchical in terms of status complicates the prime minister's strategic calculations, and may also have an influence on women's representation in these ranks. The more prestigious positions are often doled out as a means to appease existing competitive dynamics within the party. Thus, those who already dominate the political field are rewarded, and others may be denied the opportunity to advance to the highest levels of power. Generally, female cabinet members tend not to hold highly prestigious portfolios. Scholars have found that more often, they hold less prestigious positions or have no portfolio at all (such as the position of


"Minister of State"). Heath et al. (2005) describe this tendency as a "hoarding" of the political resources within the "dominant group" (420).

This may be problematic when it comes to women's capacity to substantively influence policy. Trimble and Arscott (2003) state that "policy is made by the executive; thus, women who make it to the cabinet table will have significantly more policy-making power than their female counterparts on the backbenches or the opposition ranks" (134). The Canadian experience demonstrates the difficulty women may have in influencing policy: in Canadian recent history, only 34 different women were appointed to cabinet from 1997 to 2011 (comprising the 36<sup>th</sup> to the 40<sup>th</sup> sessions of Parliament). In these fourteen years, only 34 women achieved a higher level of power than the average MP. Given that in this same time period there were a total of 628 MPs, the proportion of women in cabinet is quite low.


While women's presence in cabinet is important, the type of portfolio they hold is also critical for women's advancement. The portfolios of Finance, Justice and Attorney General and Foreign Affairs are considered to be "Pipeline" cabinet posts. These are the most esteemed cabinet positions in Canadian federal politics, and the types of portfolios often held by former prime ministers. Of female cabinet ministers, only one has held one of these three most prestigious cabinet positions: Anne McLellan held the posts of Justice and Attorney General. No woman has ever held the position of Minister of Finance in Canada, which is one of the most prestigious cabinet positions in this country. Women have rarely been placed into these powerful posts in Canada, a trend that is visible globally as well. The executive and the power therein remains largely dominated by men, despite the presence of women in governments for many decades.

The period of 1997 – 2011 was preceded by a period of high visibility by female politicians. The early 1990s saw an increase in the descriptive representation of women (more women were elected to Parliament), and more focus on “women’s issues” during campaigns and within the Legislature (Trimble and Arscott, 2003; Bashevkin, 2009). In this period, Kim Campbell also became the first Canadian female Prime Minister in 1993. However, soon after this high point, the tide changed. Scholars studying women in Canadian federal politics have used a number of words to describe the current state of gender parity in Parliament. Trimble and Arscott (2003) describe it as a “plateau”, a “near standstill”, a “stalling” and a “levelling off” (36); Bashevkin as a “stalemate,” “stagnation,” and “outright decline” (2009: 6). Whichever term is employed, the basic premise remains. With the exception of the jump to about 25% in the most recent (2011) election, the progress of equality in Canadian federal politics has not recently experienced an upward trend. Bashevkin (2009) suggests that this early success may have actually had a negative side-effect: the effect of convincing the population that equality has been achieved in Parliament, thus shifting concern away from gender equality. Arguably, this perception is echoed in Parliament. Activities and committees associated specifically with women are not considered to be terribly prestigious. Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2 illustrate the proportion of MPs that were female from 1922-2011 and 1997-2011, respectively.

**Figure 1 - 1:**  
**Proportion of MPs That Are Female, 1922 - 2011**



**Figure 1 - 2:**  
**Proportion of MPs That Are Female, 1997 - 2008**



This thesis examines the impact of women's involvement in "Women's Interests" in the House of Commons (whether through committee work or in cabinet): are women who take on these responsibilities and roles penalized in their political careers, given that these roles tend to be less

prestigious? Are they less likely to achieve "success," defined narrowly in terms of a) appointments to other, more prestigious "Pipeline" cabinet portfolios; b) length of career in Parliament; and/or c) becoming leaders of their party. For the purposes of this study, I suggest that when these three factors - longevity, leadership, and "Pipeline" portfolios - are combined and achieved, a Member of Parliament can be considered to have achieved a very high level of "Success" in the House of Commons. Existing scholarship suggests that women's ability to achieve this level of "Success" may be hampered by a variety of factors: not only are they associated with and assigned to less prestigious "women's issues" (Studlar and Moncrief, 1997; Moon and Fountain, 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Heath et al., 2005; Reynolds, 1999), but before they even get to the stage where they are working in the House of Commons, they face a number of barriers to electoral success, including a variety of issues noted by scholars to affect whether or not they even put themselves forward as candidates (Dolan, 2005; Elder, 2004; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Thornton et. al, 1983; Bashevkin, 2009).

While much is known about the barriers faced by women on the road to Parliament, less is known about the barriers that may exist once they are elected, and this study aims to take steps towards better understanding the political career paths of male and female MPs. A number of important questions guide this research: which portfolios lead to success? Does "substantively" representing women have a negative impact on the career prospects of female MPs? What is the effect of representing women's issues on men's "Success"? Are there differences across political parties? Are left-leaning parties, such as the NDP, more female-friendly? This research is unique in that it assesses the career paths of Members of Parliament, in an effort to understand how female MPs can best become "Successful" in Canadian federal politics, and what changes may be necessary to ensure that more women gain access to the route to success.

This research has important normative implications: if women tend to be placed most often on committees related to "Women's Interests" and these positions are considered to be less prestigious, this sends a fairly clear message about the role of women in politics. First, it suggests that women's issues are not important. Second, it indicates that gendered standards still exist within Parliament, and that certain roles (i.e. the prestigious positions) are simply not appropriate for women. Third, the data indicate that representing women by focusing on women's issues appears to penalize female Parliamentarians. Female Members of Parliament who avoid women's interests and instead become involved with committee work related to more prestigious issues and portfolios are more likely to take on leadership roles within parties. This group is a minority, however: the majority of female MPs are placed on committees associated with women's issues.

Although the relationship between the sex of a politician and the likelihood of receiving a highly prestigious cabinet position has been examined both at the provincial level in Canada (Studlar and Moncrief, 1997) as well as in other regions of the world (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Heath et al., 2005; Reynolds, 1999; Moon and Fountain, 1997), a study based on Canada's federal Parliament has not yet been undertaken. In order to understand the effect that representing women has on the career paths of both women and men, I employ data gathered from the Parliament of Canada regarding the careers of Members of Parliament from the most recent sittings of the House of Commons (1997-2011). I find that when women represent women they are less likely to reach higher levels of success and when they ignore "women's" issues and instead focus on "Pipeline" issues, they are more likely to reap the political rewards.

This thesis proceeds as follows: first, I explore various conceptions of representation, what representation means and why it is necessary for the public to be both "descriptively" and



"substantively" represented. Second, I then assess the existing literature and traditional explanations for women's underrepresentation as candidates, as elected representatives, in prestigious positions and as party leaders. I then explain the data I collected as well as the study's methodology and findings. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of potential avenues to improve the representation of women in politics, and the implications if measures are not taken to rectify the current imbalance.

## CHAPTER II

### WOMEN IN CANADIAN POLITICS: A BACKGROUND

#### 2.1 The Representation of Women

In her foundational and groundbreaking book *The Concept of Representation* (1967), Hanna Pitkin differentiates between four types of representation. The first, *Formalistic Representation*, encompasses the institutional arrangements surrounding representation. The second, *Symbolic Representation*, refers to how the representative "stands for" the constituents: what it means to be a symbol for that district, and how the symbol is accepted by the population. The last two types of representation she explores, *Descriptive* and *Substantive*, tend to be the biggest focus in the literature on women's representation, and will provide the foundation of the research presented in this thesis.

Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which members resemble the groups that they represent. When we study the proportion of women in legislatures, for example, we often do so with the idea of comparing this to the proportion of women in the population. The more closely the proportion of women in Parliament matches the proportion of women in "the real world" the more that Parliament is said to descriptively represent women. In contrast, substantive representation is less about the physical attributes or ethnocultural backgrounds of legislators, and more about the actions taken when in Parliament. Substantive representation requires that the needs and interests of the group being represented be heard and acted upon (Poggione, 2006). In academic research, substantive representation is often studied by examining the rate at which

policy is presented and adopted within legislatures. For example, whether or not women's issues and interests are addressed through policies, regardless of "who" introduces those policies. Arguably, neither form of representation is sufficient on its own, although both have their individual merits. If "equal" representation is a goal (and I argue that it should be), then no group can be systematically excluded from decision-making roles (thus descriptive representation is necessary), and the interests of the group must be addressed within the decision-making body (thus substantive representation is important). This section explores these two types of representation in particular - substantive and descriptive representation - and their implications for Canadian women.

### **2.1.1. Descriptive Representation and Critical Mass**

Descriptive Representation suggests that representatives should resemble the group for whom they stand. In this way, the legislature resembles a microcosm of society: if half of the population is constituted by women, then, half of its representatives ought to be women. A lack of descriptive representation, what is known as a skewed Parliament (Kanter 1977), can have a number of negative consequences for the group in larger society. First, it can implant the perception that some members of society are not capable of being decision makers. Second, some suggest that if a group does not occupy a certain proportion of representatives, a "Critical Mass", it is difficult to have enough support in the legislature to address the issues and needs of that group (Kanter, 1977; Dahlerup, 2006; Childs and Krook, 2006; Gray, 2006; Arscott and Trimble 1997).

Critical Mass Theory has been advanced within discussions of descriptive representation. According to this theory, if a group does not constitute a certain percentage of representatives (usually suggested to be somewhere between 15% and 30%) the group will face barriers to formulating and passing relevant legislation (Kanter, 1977; Dahlerup, 2006; Childs and Krook, 2006; Gray, 2006; Arscott and Trimble 1997). Kanter first proposed the concept of critical mass in her 1977 article on the behaviour of organizations. She basically states that, if a group's proportion of a minority remain below a level where they achieve critical mass, they do not overcome a "token status" within the organization. They subsequently constitute something of a novelty. While she was not speaking of legislatures in her initial work, her ideas have been employed widely by scholars of political representation. Indeed, her theories have important implications for women in Canadian Parliament. There are simply not as many women as men in Parliament therefore there are fewer women to represent all Canadian women.

According to critical mass theory, if women constitute a small percentage of Parliamentarians, women's issues do not easily gain support. As men constitute the vast majority of sitting members, women (who tend to be more likely to initiate policies on behalf of women) must recruit a large proportion of men to support and pass legislation. Researchers have found evidence that a higher proportion of women in politics are better able to substantively represent women than they can in smaller numbers. Thomas (1991) argues that,

Women in states with the highest percentages of female representatives introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children, and families than men in their states and more than their female counterparts in low representation legislatures (958).

An increased number of female representatives are better able to achieve a higher level of substantive representation. Therefore, descriptive representation leads to substantive representation.

Increasing the number of women in Parliament can have a number of benefits for the representation of women. However, scholars have noted that numbers are not everything. The “types” and diversity of women elected also matters. Bratten (2005) argues that:

Even in extremely skewed state legislatures, women are generally more active than men in sponsoring legislation that focuses on women’s interests ... a “critical mass” is not necessary for substantive representation on the part of individual female state legislators, but that *increased diversity may indeed bring about changes in policy outputs that reflect the interests of women* (97, emphasis added).

There are two significant points within Bratten’s quote. First, women are most likely to act on behalf of women and second, increased diversity can bring change. Additionally, since generally women represent women’s interests more often than men, an increase in women creates a basis of support that allows for more success for women’s interest legislation. It is not simply the *numbers* of women that are important, but the *types* of women that are elected. As Murray (2008) states:

More recent research has started to move towards the idea that it is not a critical mass of women that determines the possibility of achieving women’s substantive representation so much as the actions of certain individuals, described as ‘critical actors’, who are able to influence the policy process and mobilise other actors into representing women’s substantive interests (476).

These “critical actors” are essential for change in Parliament. The proportion of women that are sitting in Parliament must include those who fight for women’s interests to be represented. This is what necessitates not only studying how many women are in Parliament (or, descriptive representation) but also their activities while sitting as representatives (substantive

representation). Women's presence is important but not sufficient: it is not enough that women be in government, but it is crucial that these women act. This is what is meant by substantive representation. As scholars of critical mass note, women are more likely to act when they appear in larger numbers. Thus descriptive representation is the first step to substantive representation.

Furthermore, scholars have noted that female Parliamentarians are largely appointed to committees related to women's issues, therefore allowing them less energy and time to pursue higher prestige portfolios. Alternatively, they might occupy a Parliamentary double-shift, dedicating more time and energy in order to represent women as well as being involved in other interests in Parliament. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) find that "women are more likely to receive high-prestige cabinet posts from leftist presidents and *when the percentage of women in the legislature increase*" (§29, emphasis added). This indicates that when women increase in number, governmental elites place them in higher ranking positions. Thus, critical mass both increases the representation of women's interests **and** broadens the opportunities available to female politicians.

### **2.1.2. Substantive Representation**

There has been a range of research regarding the substantive representation of women in politics. Much of this research centres on one main question: do women represent women while in office? Substantive representation requires just that: a focus on the interests and issues that are significant to the group. This concept of representation of women is based on the idea that there are issues and interests that are specifically related to women. Many political researchers have

found that indeed, women's interests are distinct from men's interests and that women tend to be more likely to represent women substantively, both in Canada and abroad. Whether it be the UK (Childs and Withey, 2004), New Zealand (Curtin, 2008), the United States (Mansbridge, 1999) or in Canada (Tremblay, 1998; Trimble and Arscott, 2003) scholars have shown that women are likely to represent the interests of women. What is not necessarily clear, however, is exactly what is encompassed in the term "Women's Interests". A substantial body of research has explored the meaning of "women's interests," and the types of things that fall under this heading. This section explores what is meant by "Women's Interests", and how this affects the substantive representation of women.

#### *What Are "Women's Interests"?*

Women and men continue to have separate responsibilities in society, and therefore, maintain unique sets of interests. The two sexes continue to be socialized differently and to hold unequal responsibilities within the family structure with women still undertaking a higher proportion of the unpaid domestic work (Elder, 2004; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Thornton et. al, 1983). Consequently, issues such as welfare and social benefits affect women more than men (Poggione, 2006). As a result, the interests and priorities of men and women can differ.

There is some agreement throughout the world as to what constitutes "Women's Interests" in politics, usually based on the types of posts women tend to hold. In his international study, Reynolds (1999) finds that:

The most popular portfolio to be handled by a woman worldwide is Health (48, or 14 percent of the total), which is closely followed by Women's Affairs (47, or 13 percent),

Education (32, or 9 percent), Culture/Arts (32, or 9 percent), and Family/Child Affairs (30, or 8 percent) (565).

Reynolds' findings regarding the portfolios that women dominate are supported by others.

Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) identify "culture, education, environment, family, health, women's affairs" (829) as women's interests in their study of Latin America. Similarly, Krook and O'Brien (2011) include "children, education, health, and women's affairs" as "Women's Interests" in Canada (13). In Canada, Tremblay (1999) argues that "Women's Interests" tend to be "health care, care of the elderly, education, housing and the environment" (440). Tremblay makes a further differentiation between "Women's Interests" and "women's rights". Tremblay's "women's rights" resembles what other scholars have referred to as "women's affairs". The Canadian equivalent of a "women's affairs" committee is the Status of Women Committee. Not only are certain committees associated with women, "Women's Interests" such as health and environment, but there is often also a committee dedicated specifically to "women": "women's affairs" or "women's rights". However, all committees associated with "Women's Interests" and "women's rights" tend to be undervalued in prestige and therefore, substantively representing the interests of women can have a unfortunate effect on the careers of these politicians<sup>1</sup>. This is not to say that these committees or interests are, in fact, unimportant, but instead that they do not have the same fluidity into power as more prestigious positions (such as the "Pipeline" positions). If indeed, these interests are more important to women than this indicates that "women's interests" are not considered as valued *within*

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<sup>1</sup> Although "Women's Interests" are considered, generally, to be low prestige, their significance can shift depending on the political circumstances. The importance of issues on the political front changes through time. For example, Health has at times, been of higher prestige and Environment has reached a higher level of importance in the most recent decade than previously.



*Parliament* and thus, illustrates an example of inequality that may hamper gender equality within the political realm in Canada.

The consequences of being female and then focusing on women's interests within Canadian Parliament has been shown to have a strong but varied relationship. Tremblay and Trimble (2004) argue that "gender continues to act as a causal variable shaping the characteristics and careers of federal politicians, but its effects are complex and multi-dimensional" (98). The relationship between sex and career path is both complicated and very strong. The opinions and paths of male and female politicians continue to vary. Lovenduski and Norris (2003) find that:

On the values most directly related to women's interests – namely the affirmative action and the gender equality scales – women and men politicians differ significantly within each party, even after controlling for other common social background variables that explain attitudes, such as their age, education, and income (84).

Indeed, although female legislators resemble their male colleagues more than the average woman, they still differ significantly from male Parliamentarians in their Parliamentary involvement (Poggione, 2006; Trimble and Arscott, 2003). However, these women's interests are still undervalued. Studies find that women are being delegated to traditional women's interests and these are not the interests that the studies define as being high in prestige (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Heath et al., 2005). Furthermore, Heath et al. (2005) argue that, "where a women's issues committee exists, women are less likely to sit on power and economics/foreign affairs committees" (425), indicating that the mere existence of committees such as the Status of Women committee encourage leaders to appoint women to token positions. In Canada, the effect remains; women infrequently receive "top jobs" and women's interests are "largely ignored in Parliament" (Trimble and Arscott, 2003:139). Simultaneously, women

remain shut out of most leadership roles, especially in governing parties. When it comes to women's underrepresentation, it may be descriptive representation that is the problem. It is not that women are not representing women; it is that women cannot represent women in Parliament if they have not run for office.

## **2.2. Women's Presence in Legislatures**

Men still greatly outnumber women in governments throughout the world. Why does this gender gap persist after years (and indeed, many decades) of political participation of women?

Explanations are usually divided up into two categories a) the remaining societal differences between men and women; and b) the gendered political environment that still exists. The participation of women in Canadian Parliament has lingered around the 20% mark since Kim Campbell's short stint as Prime Minister in 1993 (although many scholars of gender and politics in Canada were pleased to see the number rise to 25% in 2011, largely as a result of the NDP's electoral success). Generally speaking, the number of women running for office (and subsequently, becoming elected, holding prestige positions, and leadership) has been maintained at a slow simmer. A number of factors have been demonstrated to affect women's decisions to get involved in politics.

### 2.2.1. Running for Office

"The primary reason for women's underrepresentation is that women are significantly less likely to choose to run than men" (Elder, 2004: 27).

Women sit in Parliament at a much lower proportion than men, and the progress towards equality in Parliament has reached a standstill (Trimble and Arscott, 2003; Bashevkin, 2009). Elder (2004) argues that the main explanation for this is found at the electoral level. Women simply are not running for office. If women do not offer themselves as candidates, there are only a small number of women in the electoral pool originally. Less of these nominees become elected politicians and thus, there are even fewer to choose from for higher positions. There is no singular explanation as to why women decide to run, or not to run, for office. Yet, as Elder states, they are still much less likely than men to consider running. What makes women distinct in this aspect? There are a quite a few possible explanations. Primarily, women and men still experience a different socialization and family life that ultimately impacts this decision (Elder, 2004; Fox and Lawless, 2005; Thornton et. al, 1983; Bashevkin, 2009). Additionally, the female experience of campaigning can also be more negative than the male experiences, potentially discouraging women from running for office (Gidengil and Everitt, 2000).

*Gendered Media Coverage on the Campaign Trail*

Research has found that women face different barriers than men when campaigning. Women are judged more harshly than their male counterparts; this criticism ranges from focusing on their tone of voice to their physical appearance (Bashevkin, 2009; Gidengil and Everitt, 2000; Medermott, 1998; Plutzer and Zipp, 1996). Women must fit into both the stereotype of a politician, and a woman (Bashevkin, 2009). Gidengil and Everitt (2000) found that in the 1993 Canadian federal election "coverage of female political leaders [was] more filtered than men's" (105). They argue that,

Political coverage tends to marginalize women when they fail to conform to traditional masculine norms of political behavior but will over-emphasize the behavior counter to traditional feminine stereotypes when they do behave combatively (105).

As a result, women must be militant in adapting their behaviour, and they operate in a more regulated environment than males who are also campaigning. This creates a setting in which female politicians are not only assessed on their capabilities as a politician, but also as a traditional female. This acts as a deterrent for women considering running for office. Women often have to make the choice to face an extra level of criticism of their personal life, above and beyond that of the average male politician.

*Stereotypes about Women's Roles*

The negative stereotype women face while campaigning is exaggerated once voters reach the polls; studies (McDermott, 1998; Alexander and Anderson, 1993) have found that when voters have little other information about candidates, they rely on gender to infer vote-determining information. When gender is associated with certain characteristics, for example, when males are associated with more ambition (Larimer et al., 2007), deciding a vote based on the gender of the candidate can have the unfortunate effect of attributing a characteristic to a candidate simply because of their gender. The result is that politicians continue to face barriers because of gender stereotypes even after the campaign has ended. However, it is not only the gender stereotypes on the campaign trail that are impacting a woman's decision to run, but the gender role distribution in the greater society also has this effect.

Stereotypes regarding gender-appropriate work influence the likelihood that a woman will decide to run for office. Women still hold a larger proportion of family responsibilities and have less leisure time than men (Bashevkin, 2009: 7). Women are more likely to still face the double shift at home and at work, and therefore have less free time than men to explore and dedicate to other endeavours – such as running for office. If they do decide to run for office, their responsibilities are compounded. Yet, it is not simply their increased responsibilities, but the view – both of the larger society and their own self-perception – regarding women in politics that keeps women from running in larger numbers.

A variety of factors impact the view of what constitutes appropriate “women's roles” in society. Thornton et al. (1983) attributes “youth, labor force experience, and educational attainment ... to

the formation of egalitarian views of women's roles, while church attendance and a fundamentalist Protestant religious identification tend to preserve more traditional outlooks" (211). Younger, well-educated, members of the population with job experience are more likely than their religious, older, traditional counterparts to support egalitarian roles in society. Therefore, these factors are likely to impact how a female politician is regarded, by herself and by larger society.

### *Self-Perception and the Decision to Run*

Society's views of appropriate roles for women impact the opportunities for those women to have political roles. These viewpoints influence the stereotypes women face while running for office and their own opinions about whether or not they are suitable candidates. It is this self-perception that often causes women to decide not to run in an election. Women are less likely to view themselves as a potential politician, and consequently, are not throwing their hats into the political arena. Fox and Lawless (2005) argue that:

A general sense of efficacy as a candidate, as well as a politicized upbringing, motivate well-situated potential candidates' inclinations to run for office. Alternatively, status as a member of a group historically excluded from politics depresses the likelihood of considering a candidacy (642).

Women, therefore, are less likely to believe they would make a good candidate. Their past as a member of a politically excluded group – as a woman – further decreases their chances of presenting themselves as a potential political representative. This can be compounded depending on their "politicized upbringing" (or lack thereof) and their additional "status as a member of a

group historically excluded from politics", such as an ethnic group. Elder (2004) agrees with Fox and Lawless (2005), arguing that, "political gender role socialization, a lack of political confidence" (27) contribute to the chances that a woman will present herself as a candidate.

Contributing to this relationship is what Verba et al (1997) describe as a disengagement from politics – more women than men feel distanced from the political realm, "Women are less politically interested, informed, and efficacious than men and that this gender gap in political engagement has consequences for political participation" and that "gender differences in political interest, information, and efficacy" must also be considered to explain the gender gap in political participation (1051). Although, Elder highlights self-selection as the most important factor explaining why women are not running at the same rates as men (why they have a lower descriptive representation) this is not the only factor that impacts the relationship. Elder (2004) expands the explanation to include "family responsibilities and the relatively few numbers of visible women role models in politics" (27). These factors combined contribute to an unwelcoming environment for potential female candidates evaluating a decision to run in an election. It is much less appealing to decide to run for office when you are aware that your personal life will be scrutinized. Additionally, with so few women in Parliament, it is difficult for the existing women to set a precedent – and act as a role model – for future, aspiring politicians.

### *The Role Model Effect*

The availability of female political role models is a significant factor in encouraging women to run for office. Without female leaders and politicians to look up to the job of politician becomes viewed as a male profession. This is an example of a "chicken or the egg" scenario; women are more likely to run if women already sit in Parliament – but female political role models cannot exist without first running. If women do not see other women holding political positions, they are less likely to envision themselves as potential candidates (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004). However, the benefits of having female role models are not limited to this encouragement. Role models can also increase the chances of voters choosing a particular party and of the likelihood of candidates focussing on "Women's Interests" while campaigning. The lack of role models can help explain the recent plateau in representation of women in Parliament – women are less likely to run without role models and candidates are less likely to focus on "Women's Interests" if women are not a large proportion of candidates.

Elder (2004) argues that this role model effect is a particularly noteworthy factor for encouraging women to run for politics, and that:

women are significantly less likely to choose to run than men....due to a multiplicity of factors including political gender role socialization, a lack of political confidence, family responsibilities and the *relatively few numbers of visible women role models in politics all contribute to why women don't run* (27, emphasis added).

Young women look to these role models as a guide – to see which opportunities that will be available to them when they become women. In Canada, this situation is particularly dire – we have only had one female Prime Minister – for short period of six months. Few women hold



positions of prestige within the executive – only one woman (A. Anne McLellan) has held a “Pipeline” cabinet post since 1997, and no woman has ever held the position of Minister of Finance. Without these role models to refer to, the self-doubting cycle continues and fewer women are encouraged to become politicians in Canada.

While women are more likely to run when they can envision themselves in the role, this effect is not limited to adult women. Studies have found this relationship to exist among young, adolescent girls. Changes in press coverage effect the information girls receive about female politicians, and thus, the acceptability of women as strong political leaders. Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) found that:

Over time, the more that women politicians are made visible by national news coverage, the more likely adolescent girls are to indicate an intention to be politically active. Similarly, in cross-sectional analysis, we find that where female candidates are visible due to viable campaigns for high-profile offices girls report increased anticipated political involvement (233).

Considering the role-model cycle, it is clear that, as less women occupy high profile positions – fewer girls vicariously envision themselves in these positions.

The role model effect exists on other levels of political life as well. The gender of high-profile politicians has been found to impact the substantive representation of women and party perception by voters. O’Neill (1997) found that a female party leader resulted in:

A larger share of women voters recruited by each party, particularly the Conservatives. This differential recruitment pattern appears due to differences in leader evaluations, and less to differences in beliefs regarding the need to improve the status of women and in support of feminism (105).

The existence of a female party leader persuades voters to support their party. In this way, role models also increase the electoral chances of a party. O'Neill (1997) does not believe this is due to increased substantive representation - "the need to improve the status of women and in support of feminism" (111) - but instead, an increase in descriptive representation (the voters tendency to positively evaluate the party leaders). This lends additional support to the necessity of descriptive representation.

Additionally, other studies find that if a strong candidate exists, it may lead to an increased focus on women's issues - if these issues could potentially hold a benefit electorally. Murray (2008) states:

The mere presence of a strong female candidate may increase the substantive representation of women... if being female appears to confer an electoral advantage, this might lead to a 'policy contagion' effect, with male rivals feminising their own agendas in order to compete with a woman ...women's presence can have a positive effect on the substantive representation of women, regardless of whether or not women succeed in winning office (476).

The environment regarding women's issues changes if those issues become salient for other candidates - thus, allowing a focus on women's interests. In this event, strong female candidates become agenda setters for their district. On the other hand, if strong female candidates are not running for office - there is less pressure on other candidates to address women's issues. It is better to have a strong female running, who does not become elected, than to have no strong female candidate at all. Not only can role models encourage women to run for office, but strong female political role models can have the additional benefits of recruiting female voters and increasing the focus on women's interests.

### 2.2.2. The Impact of Political Parties

One factor that impacts a woman's experience in Parliament is the political party to which she belongs – and there are a number of explanations for this. First, women have been found to be more left-leaning than their male counterparts (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson, 2005; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Gidengil et al., 2003; Wirls, 1986; and Conover, 1988). This might suggest that these parties are more female-friendly – or that women tend to relate to the issues that leftist parties are likely to adopt. Regardless, their inclination towards left parties can be to their advantage, as these parties are more likely to promote and reward women with political opportunities.

In their 2005 study of Latin America, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) found that leftist governments were more likely to appoint more women and to increasingly prestigious positions. Studlar and Moncrief (1999) came to a similar conclusion regarding female politicians in Canadian provincial politics. It is likely then, that leftist parties on the federal level would appoint women to more prestigious positions than the more right-leaning parties. However, this basic relationship has been unexplored at the Canadian federal level.

It has been established though, that the experiences of women within the parties vary (Trimble and Arscott, 2003; Bashevkin, 1993; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993). This might be because federal political parties have differed in their approach to female inclusion. Throughout history, each party has adopted different approaches and mandates for appealing to women and increasing women's participation; consequently, each party has met with varying results. Measures such as nomination quotas, for example, have been adopted briefly (by some parties)

as a means to increase participation by women at the electoral level. Secondly, the atmosphere of political parties and their level of openness, affects the experience of those women.

The NDP, particularly, possesses a unique "third party" status in Canadian federal politics – this distinctive role in the political realm has the potential to broaden the definition of "Success" within that party (and subsequently, the path to success) so as to be more inclusive to traditional women's interests. If the priorities and platforms of these parties resemble "Women's Interests", success within such a party has a different meaning. This study aims to uncover what and how political party influences the experiences of Members of Parliament and whether or not they are more likely to become successful in a particular political party. The NDP, as the "third" party, has an unusual position within the Canadian federal realm. Primarily, the fact that the NDP has never been a federal governing party allows them an independence from the limitations faced by the governing parties. Bowler and Lanoue (1992) posit that Duverger's Law pits the NDP as a "peripheral actor" (485). In that way, the NDP is able to somewhat circumvent traditional party competition to operate within independent standards. They can focus on issues not adopted by traditional parties – or traditional issues in a unique way.

Although Young (1996) argues that the "cohesive, impermeable character of Canadian parties and a three-party system have prevented the Canadian [feminist] movement from developing an exclusive relationship with any one party" (229) and the Canadian feminist movement has had a "growing apartisan orientation since the mid-1980s"(229), the NDP is still considered to hold valuable ground with Canadian women. Erickson and O'Neill (2002) argue that Canadian women are more likely than men to vote for parties on the left, in particular, the NDP.

Furthermore, of the three women to lead electorally viable federal parties in Canada – two headed the NDP: Audrey McLaughlin from December 1989 to October 1995 and then, Alexa McDonough from October 1995 to January 2003. The third was Kim Campbell, the first (and only) female Prime Minister of Canada who served a short six months as leader of the Progressive Conservatives - June to December 1993 (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 72 – 73).

Women seem to penetrate leadership roles with the NDP more frequently, and for longer periods of time, in a way that is unprecedented within the other federal political parties. It is yet to be determined if the same effect will exist for the Green Party, and leader Elizabeth May, elected as an MP in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election.

Studlar and Moncrief (1997) argue that at the provincial level, it is the proportion of the *governing caucus* that is composed of women that is more likely to influence the proportion of women in cabinet, rather than the proportion of female members of the legislature as a whole. In Canada specifically, parties with more women are likely to promote women to cabinet. This suggests that the lack of women in Canada's governing parties is directly related to the level of power that women are able to achieve – yet again, we see that descriptive representation affects the substantive capabilities of female politicians. The female-friendly atmosphere of left-leaning parties, including their voluntary nomination quotas, help to increase support from female voters and to support gender equality in Parliament. Measures such as these have the potential to overcome inherent gender barriers in Canadian politics that remain despite years of political participation by women.

### 2.2.3. Quota Systems and How They Can Increase the Representation of Women

One measure in particular has consistently shown to increase the number of women in governments – quotas. Adoption of such quotas, therefore, has the potential to jumpstart female participation in Canada's Parliament and circumvent the existing barriers to women's descriptive representation in government. As a result, examining possible quota implementation in Canada – and adopting such measures – could allow women an increased presence in Parliament without major societal change. More women in Parliament could result in increased opportunities for women, as well as more support – and thus, more attention given to – women's issues. If women constitute a larger proportion of the seats in Parliament, a larger pool of women will exist to choose from for high-ranking positions and a critical mass will exist to bring increased support for the issues introduced by women. However, quotas have only been employed in Canada on a voluntary level by two parties, the Liberals and the NDP, with the former abandoning these measures shortly after their adoption.

Heath et al. (2005) identify a number of institutional factors as influencing an increase in the descriptive representation of women. First Past the Post electoral systems, as well as leader-based committee and cabinet appointment structures (both of which Canada has) can disadvantage women politicians. In order to encourage gender parity in Parliament, Bashevkin (2009) and others recommend the adoption of quotas. Research on quotas for women in politics has increased in the past couple decades (Krook, 2009). This is partially due to what Krook (2009) describes as a "surge of interest in political representation" (3). The adoption of quotas has increased exponentially since the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing:

Between 1930 and 1980, only ten countries established quota provisions, followed by twelve states in the 1980s. Over the course of the 1990s, however, quotas appeared in more than fifty countries, which had been joined by nearly forty more since the year 2000. As a result, quotas now exist in more than 100 countries around the world, but more than three-quarters of these measures have been passed within the last fifteen years (Krook, 2009: 4).

Quotas are becoming a fast growing trend in politics and political research (Krook, 2009: 4).

Krook lists three types of gender quotas. First, reserved seats require that a set number of seats are set aside for female candidates and politicians. This type of quota functions differently depending on the electoral system of the given area (6). Second, legislative quotas provide the newest genre of quota policy. This type of quota generally takes the form of legislation passed by national assemblies that requires parties to nominate a certain number of women in elections (8). Third, party quotas are similar to legislative quotas except that they are adopted voluntarily by parties themselves. Parties can suggest that they aim to reach a certain proportion of females within their nominees (7), and often place these policies directly into their party constitutions. Party quotas have been implemented in varying ways in Canada, with differences across provinces and parties.

Female nomination quota targets were introduced in the in the 1993 and 1997 elections as an attempt to increase the number of women nominated by each party (Trimble and Arscoff, 2003: 60). The Progressive Conservatives did not introduce such measures; however, the Liberal Party and the NDP both attempted to fill more candidate spots with females – a 25% goal for the Liberals and a 50% goal for the NDP. Each party met with some success – 28% of the Liberal candidates were female in the 1997, up from 22% in 1993. Similarly, the NDP nominated 39% females in 1993, and 36% in 1997. Despite this success, the Liberal Party did not renew this commitment for the 2000 election. The NDP continues to attempt to reach gender parity in its

nomination process. An adoption of a quota system can encourage the party to increase its focus on equality in Parliament and help encourage women to run for office – therefore, increasing the focus on women's issues – and the number of women in Parliament. More women in Parliament may then lead to more women in the higher ranks of power.



## CHAPTER 3

### CABINET PORTFOLIOS, WOMEN'S ROLES, AND CANADIAN POLITICS

The representation of women in legislatures (or lack thereof) has a distinct effect besides just the representation for women's interests. It can also lead to a gender specific (male-dominated) organizational structure. It has been suggested that the gender of participants affects the way in which organizations function. Women have been found to operate differently in committees than men (Kathlene, 1994; Rosenthal, 1998). Rosenthal (1998) states that, "compared to their male colleagues, women committee chairs on average also report a greater reliance on collaborative strategies in the management of their committees" (847). Kathlene (1994) states that "as the proportion of women increases in a legislative body, men become more verbally aggressive and controlling of the hearing. Women legislators may be seriously disadvantaged and unable to participate equally in legislative policymaking in committee hearings" (560). Cabinet and committees continue to operate in a male-dominated sphere.

In fact, Heath et al (2005) argue that "to achieve full incorporation into the legislative arena, newcomers must do more than just win seats. They must change the institutions that allow the traditionally dominant group to hoard scarce political resources" (420). For women to be underrepresented in politics is to perpetuate a male-centred political structure that will continue to disadvantage women and continue to be impenetrable for women politicians and leaders. An organizational structure generated by one gender disproportionately more than the other, is to have a political structure determined by inequality.

Women's presence is important for substantive representation, but their presence is important symbolically as well. As discussed above, women's presence in legislatures has an important role model effect, and normatively, demonstrates that the legislature is inclusive and represents the population. However, the symbolic importance of women's presence extends beyond simply attaining seats in the legislature. The nature of legislative activity and leadership roles of members of Parliament is also important. Only a minority of politicians are able to enter the upper levels of power – of these, few are women. Studies have shown that women tend to be delegated positions associated with women's interests and that these positions are not generally considered to be prestigious. Thus, for "traditionally dominant male political leaders" to "distribute scarce political resources" to females represents a conflict – there are limited seats and women frequently receive the positions of lower status (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005).

Members of the political executive – the cabinet – form the governmental elite. To be placed in cabinet is to achieve a level of political prestige and power that is beyond the level afforded to the average politician. As Studlar and Moncrief (1997) state, "a cabinet position is a much stronger position from which to wield power in an executive-centered and party-disciplined Parliamentary system" (67). Thus, in order for women to gain substantial power within government, it is important that they are represented within cabinet. Furthermore, Atchison (2009 - and others, see Thomas, 1991) finds that having women in cabinet does make a difference – they are better positioned than females in legislatures to successfully pass female-friendly policy. Curtin (2008) adds to this by arguing that, "the descriptive representation of women in cabinet is a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve women-friendly policy

outcomes. Rather, substantive representation of women by women political leaders also requires women's political activism" (490). When women are placed in cabinet, they tend to pursue substantive representation for women – and they are able to do this more effectively when they are in positions of power, as in the executive. However, when in the executive, women are often placed in positions of lower prestige and power. As the level of prestige increases, women's presence is less common.

Research also points to the importance of a critical mass – a mass that supports women's interests. The ability of women to make a difference while in cabinet is further influenced by whether or not they are supported by their peers. Thomas (1991) states that "women do indeed make a difference and that their capacity to do so is related to the level of support from colleagues" (958). Curtin specifies that an "influential *feminist* reference group is a necessary supplement to women's executive presence" (490, emphasis added). Thus, not only must women be chosen for these positions but a support system increases their chances of being heard while in cabinet. A critical mass – of critical actors – must accompany women in order to most effectively make a difference.

In order to best influence policy, women must be considered for important positions when power is distributed amongst politicians, as most power is particularly concentrated in a small number of positions. Thus, it is not simply the *appointment to the cabinet* that matters, but to which the *portfolio* matters, as well. Cabinet members do have a higher level of power than a Member of Parliament – which is accompanied by an increased ability to influence policy-making.

### 3.1 Determining the Prestige of Cabinet Portfolios

While being appointed to cabinet is a significant indicator of a legislator's importance and position within the governing party, there is another important distinction to be made within cabinet itself, between regular portfolios and "top jobs." These "top jobs" are roles that come equipped with the highest levels of prestige and power. Globally, women tend to not be appointed to these high prestige posts (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Heath et al., 2005; Reynolds, 1999). Additionally, portfolios associated with women are generally not considered to be prestigious. Which positions are top jobs? According to Trimble and Arscott (2003) "top jobs" are defined by the fact that they confer status and leadership (184). Worldwide, portfolios related to finance and foreign affairs have been shown to hold power and influence within governments. In the Canadian context, the Minister of Justice is an additional "top position" (Bashevkin 2009: 130). Canadian female politicians hold a disproportionately low number of these "top jobs" (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 3).

There are a variety of methods for measuring the prestige of portfolios. Everitt (2011) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005), distinguish roles as "high, medium and low prestige" – indicating a scale of importance. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) describe high level ministries as those that "exercise significant control over policy, are very prestigious, and are highly visible" – including "Finance and Economy, Foreign Affairs, Government/Interior, and Public Security and Defense" (833). Medium-prestige ministers, on the other hand, "control significant financial resources, but lack the prestige of top posts: Agriculture, Construction and Public Works, Education, Environment and Natural Resources, Health and Social Welfare, Industry and Commerce, Justice, Labor, Transportation,

Communications and Information, and Planning and Development" (833). They include all other portfolios (many that could be classified as traditional women's interests) as "low- prestige and offer few resources for patronage" (833). These include: Children and Family, Culture, Science and Technology, Sports, Tourism, Women's Affairs, ministers for reform of the state, temporary and transient ministries, and ministers without portfolio (833).

Moon and Fountain (1997) utilize a method that groups portfolios based on their type - "defining, physical resources and social" - which is based on a definition by Rose, 1976. Moon and Fountain (1997) describe these categories as encompassing particular portfolios:

The first category is *defining* activity, which encompasses defence of territorial integrity, maintenance of internal order and the mobilisation of finance (Rose 1976, 250). The second category relates to the mobilisation of *physical resources*, comprising 'building canals, roads and railways, or creating a postal and telegraph service ...' (1976, 258). The third category is *social* activity described as attending to the 'well-being of citizens' (1976, 258). We included the following portfolio types as social activity: education; labour; health and social welfare; leisure; social identity (462).

What is generally associated with traditional women's interests are identified by Moon and Fountain (1997) and Rose (1976) as "social". Laver and Hunt (1992) advance one step further to confer rankings onto these portfolios.

The positions of *Finance* and *Foreign Affairs* are consistently found to be prestigious in a variety of governments - from Latin America to Australia (Heath et al., 2005; Moon and Fountain, 1997). In Canada, these portfolios are also prestigious, and in addition, *Justice* is usually considered to be a top job. According to Laver and Hunt (1992), the highest ranked portfolios in Canada (with 1 constituting the highest ranking and 10 as the lowest ranking) are: *Finance* (1.50), *External Affairs* (3.05), *Trade* (3.85), and *Justice* (5.31). Bashevkin's (2009) categorization of top jobs also includes *Justice*, but excludes *Trade*.

What are the implications of this definition of "Pipeline" posts? If only three to four positions are considered highly prestigious, only a small number of politicians can gain access to these keys to power. Furthermore, none of these prestigious portfolios overlaps with "traditional women's interests" – indicating that "Women's Interests" are not similarly equipped with prestige. By extension, focusing on activities related to these interests will not increase prestige for the MP – and indeed can keep the MP from being involved in interests that are more prestigious: time and resources are limited. MPs cannot do everything.

*Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Office-Seeking Tendencies*

The Canadian political environment and the factors influencing career advancement may affect why "top jobs" are more prestigious than "Women's Interests". Laver and Hunt (1992) found that Members of Parliament in Canada tend to be regarded as "office-seeking" more so than "policy-seeking." They state that these cabinet positions can be:

Seen simply as rewards of office in and for themselves, intrinsically valued payoffs of the government formation game (the office-seeking motivation). Or it may be that they are seen as instrumentally necessary roles that must be filled in order to have an impact on public policy (the policy-seeking motivation) (70).

On this scale (1 as policy-seeking, 9 as office-seeking), Laver and Hunt (1992) rank Canada at 5.23; this means that Canadian MPs are slightly more office-seeking than policy-seeking (163). Cabinet positions in Canada are considered to be rewards of forming government rather than as a means to create policy. Cabinet positions, therefore, are allocated based on who should receive the "valued payoffs" instead of who would be the most effective policy-maker. Thus those who are more competitive contenders – who Heath (2005) refers to as the "traditionally dominant

group" – tend to receive these positions as a payoff, or a means to appease the competition. This "dominant group" is almost entirely composed of men.

Cabinet portfolios and committee positions are a limited resource and their allocation results in political consequences for the executive. The number of positions is not infinite, and the prestige of each position varies. There can only be one Finance Minister at any given time, for example, and only one MP receives the prestige and power accorded to the position. In this way, success is a limited resource, divvied up throughout the party by the Prime Minister. The PM allocates these positions in a strategy of what Laver and Hunt (1992) describe as the "government formation game". Portfolios are allocated based on what is most strategically beneficial for the executive. This relationship is especially strong when the PM allocates these positions, rather than a committee. Reynolds (1999) and Heath (2005) find that when government leaders or the executive control appointments, as the Prime Minister does in Canada, women are less likely to be appointed to these positions. Reynolds (1999) argues that "absence is not merely a sign of disadvantage and disenfranchisement, but the exclusion of women from positions of power also compounds gender stereotypes and retards the pace of equalization" (549). Furthermore, the positions that women are likely to be allocated to tend to be considered lower status. This consequently impacts the chances of women rising in power.

*Women and Cabinet Portfolios*

One persistent fact regarding women in the executives of legislatures across the world is that they tend to receive "women's issues" cabinet posts, and these posts are not generally considered to be prestigious. In their Latin American-concentrated study, Heath et al. (2005) found "that women tend to be isolated on women's issues and social issues committees and kept off of power and economics/foreign affairs committees" (420). Moon and Fountain (1997) observed a similar result in Australia where "women ministers are overrepresented in social portfolio areas and underrepresented in defining and physical resource mobilisation areas" (455). "Women's issues" are not synonymous with "high profile" positions. Thus, while it is desirable to have women in cabinet, for women to be appointed to portfolios pertaining to traditional women's spheres is to prohibit them from holding higher ranking positions.

In the Canadian context, Clarke and Kornberg (1979) and Trimble and Arscott (2003) have observed a similar effect (as have Studlar and Moncrief (1997) at the provincial level). Women in Canadian politics are still largely focused on "Women's Interests" and remain excluded from "top jobs." In her 1999 article, Tremblay identifies "health care, care of the elderly, education, housing and the environment" (440) as women's interests. However, the effect that the adoption of these interests has on the "Success" of female MPs is largely unexamined. If women are less likely to receive prestigious portfolios when they focus on women's interests, then what women currently face in Parliament is a glass ceiling that is even less perceptible than previous glass ceilings. The next frontier in equality in Parliament is to be fought on the frontlines of the executive.



### 3.2 Party Leadership: No Women in the Driver's Seat, Who's Driving the Car?

*"Women have their foot in the door and can sit among the country's leading political decision-makers, but they are not positioned to assume leadership of political parties, regardless of their personal qualities" (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 159).*

Running for the leadership of a political party is an indicator of support from party members and becoming leader confers a level of prestige and power, a level of power that has been almost entirely been awarded to male Parliamentarians. Apart from a few exceptions, women have rarely fronted a federal Canadian political party and only once has a woman led a governing party. Kim Campbell's career as Canada's only female Prime Minister was markedly short (six months) and did not survive the election. As Bashevkin (1993) states, "the higher, more powerful and more competitive political positions remain overwhelmingly in the hands of men" (89). This is a feature of what Trimble and Arscott (2003) describe as the "revolving door" of female leadership (women as party leaders are generally short-lived positions): "female leaders serve, on average, only two years in the post" (183). Women often do not hold these positions, and even less frequently hold them long-term.

If women are not present in these positions – or rarely, and for short periods of time – this indicates that women are not raising in status within parties to the same degree as men. This, along with their absence from prestigious portfolios within cabinet, illustrates that women are still not reaching levels of power comparable to what is available to men. For this reason, it is important to consider leadership—including leadership bids—when considering the nature of political careers and the extent to which success may vary according to variables such as sex. While becoming the leader of a party is more difficult and demonstrates a higher level of prestige

and success than simply running. Therefore, running for the leadership of a party is also important and indicates more status than what is afforded to the average MP.

While the number of female party leaders (and Presidents and Prime Ministers) around the world is limited, their presence in these top jobs has increased over time, making it increasingly possible to study not only barriers to success, but also the pathways to success. The lack of women in leadership roles exaggerates an atmosphere that is less than welcoming to women. By studying the ease with which women can reach high levels of power is to study not only their impact on women's representation, but also the opportunities they have to influence the basic structure and environment of politics. More women in politics not only can change the *issues* that are addressed, but the *way* in which they are approached and discussed. This factor has the potential to influence the total experience of involvement in politics – a shift possibly from confrontational methods to collaborative – therefore also encouraging more women, and more types of women, to become involved in politics.

### **3.3. Representational Plateau: Why Study the Period of 1997 – 2011?**

As of 1993, Canada was experiencing its own effects of the “Year of the Woman” – the boom in female political participation that America had witnessed in 1992 (Dolan, 1998; Delli Carpini and Fuchs, 1993; Plutzer and Zipp, 1996). Not only had Canada sworn in its first female Prime Minister, but it was at its “high water mark” for federal female leadership (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 70). The future appeared to be bright for gender equality in Parliament. Unexpectedly, things began to change (or actually - remain the same) as the percentage of elected female MPs

reached a plateau and hovered around 20% (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 30). No woman has since reached comparable levels of power to Kim Campbell. This timeline, therefore, presents an interesting case study as it represents a unique period of history. "Women's Interests" were once prominent on the political forefront and later decreased in political significance. What remains is a plateau for gender equality. This results in a new experience for women in Parliament, and a fresh need for innovative solutions to break through the lingering obstacles.

### *Explaining the Plateau*

What accounts for the apparent stagnation? Academics have proposed a number of theories regarding women's participation in politics. One explanation is the shifting attitudinal perspective in North America regarding female political participation or "current complacency with the status quo" (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 160). Bashevkin (2009) explains this further, demonstrating that the public feels that equality has already been achieved: "the seeming success of past decades has ironically come to form yet another barrier ... we assume that progress has already been made" (8). Support for feminism has been a leading indicator of how the public feels towards gender parity in Parliament (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Conover, 1988). A number of factors impact the strength of support for feminism: particularly, work and family life (Plutzer, 1988; Thornton et al., 1983); indeed, even the priority one places on materialism plays a role (Steel et al., 1992). According to this perspective, women are now at a plateau in government, fuelled by the public's belief that equality has been achieved. However, there are a number of political realms in which women are not equal to men. These are less visible than in other

decades. It is not that women are not sitting in the House, but that they are less likely to have opportunities within parties and the executive.

Public parties respond in kind to public complacency, with their own inaction. The attention that political parties devote to gender equality is certainly not at its peak. Trimble and Arscott (2003) argue that there was a:

Short 20-year span in which the underrepresentation of women in politics received attention as an identifiable problem on the public agenda worthy of policy solution, that is, from roughly the mid to late 1960s to the mid to late 1980s (160).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the federal political atmosphere has changed considerably. Gidengil et al. (2003) assert that the 1993 election marked a “re-emergence of significant gender gap in support of the new party of the right: women were much less likely than men to vote Reform” (140). Gidengil et al. (2003) argue that this trend persisted through the 1997 and 2000 election, even after the rebranding of the Reform Party to the Canadian Alliance in the 2000 election (140).

This gender gap remains with Harper’s government – with men preferring Harper – “He was ten percentage points weaker among females in early June of [2004]” and that gap remained in 2008 (Bashevkin, 2009: 134-5). Harper’s government introduced other social measures that aid the explanation as to why progress has stalled. His government has consistently opposed child-care programs introduced by the Paul Martin government in 2004 and social programs introduced during the Mulroney years have been slowly “shredding” (Bashevkin, 2009: 133-5). As a result, Canadians have increasingly more household responsibilities, and because women are responsible for more unpaid work than men, this results in unequal responsibilities in the private sphere (Bashevkin, 2009: 7). Harper has appointed a small proportion of women to his cabinets

and no woman in the recent Conservative party has held "top positions comparable to those held by women of the Mulroney years and following, such as deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, or minister of justice" (Bashevkin, 2009: 130). It appears that progress in women's advancement within the legislature is not only slowing, but slowly reversing.

Based on earlier decades, one could assume that women from 1997 to 2011 would be offered more opportunities, and more prestigious positions, than ever before. However, the opposite is true; women have been offered fewer prospects. If this is not addressed, and the trend continues, women will not be able to achieve positions with higher levels of prestige, and their opportunities may actually decrease. This is the first time since women entered Canadian politics that their predecessors have had more opportunities than those who are now entering. Women in this period had few possibilities to progress to higher levels of success, even those who focus on committee work related to the prestigious "Pipeline" issue areas.

## CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

### 4.1. Data and Measuring Careers in Parliament

The goal of this study is to understand the effect that career paths and committee membership has on the “Success” of Parliamentarians. It examines whether committee work is correlated with cabinet posts and particularly investigates whether focusing on “Women’s Interests” affects the likelihood of becoming “Successful” in Parliament. Specifically, I ask whether politicians who substantively represent women (through “Women’s Interest” committees) are less likely to receive “Pipeline” cabinet posts, less likely to remain in Parliament for a significant period of time, or less likely to become leader of their party?

To begin to answer this question, I assembled a dataset on committee memberships and cabinet posts for men and women MPs in the 36<sup>th</sup> to 40<sup>th</sup> sittings of Parliament (1997-2011). My primary source of information was the Parliament of Canada website, which features profiles for each Member of Parliament in Canada. There were 628 individual MPs in the period studied – 495 of these MPs were men (78.8%) and 133 were women (or 21.2%).

#### 4.1.2. Independent Variables

In order to understand how involvement with “Women’s Interests” affects the career paths of politicians, I first needed to quantify the substantive representation of women. One way to conceptualize substantive representation is by analyzing the Member’s involvement in

committees and cabinet posts<sup>2</sup>. These activities indicate the areas in which politicians expend their efforts and energy. However, as these positions and memberships are appointed by the executive or party leaders, the selection of members can also be analyzed to understand which types of politicians are placed on which committees.

I break the substantive representation of women into two distinct indicators (traditional "Women's Interests" and the "Status of Women"), both of which are based on Tremblay's (1999) study, "Do Female MPs Substantively Represent Women? A Study of Legislative Behaviour in Canada's 35<sup>th</sup> Parliament". In this research, Tremblay defines "Women's Interests" bills as separate from "women's rights" bills.

#### *Women's Interests*

Tremblay (1999) points to other scholars who identify women's interests as those that "reflect women's roles as caregivers both in the family and society" (440). Specifically, she links this with involvement in "health care, care of the elderly, education, housing and the environment". Thus one of the independent variables in this study, "Women's Interests", includes an involvement in committees or cabinet posts related to these fields (see Table 4-1).

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<sup>2</sup> This is not to say committee involvement is the only, or even the most effective test of Substantive Representation, but instead, one way of measuring the activities of MPs and how they are able to substantively represent interest groups.

Table 4-1

What are "Women's Interests" committees?

"Women's interests" include involvement in committees and/or cabinet positions that correspond with Tremblay's definition of "traditional women's interests" – those related to "health care, care of the elderly, education, housing and the environment". Committees that relate to this include:

**Environment**

**Status of Persons with Disabilities**

**Health**

**Human Rights**

These committees reflect this definition of "traditional women's interests".

The "Women's Interest" variable is binary: if a politician was involved in a "Women's Interest" committee or cabinet post, their involvement with "Women's Interests" was coded as 1 (while those without such involvement were coded as 0).

#### *The Status of Women*

According to Tremblay (1999), "women's rights" are distinct from "women's traditional interests". "Women's rights" are "those that are feminist in intent and that deal with issues having a direct impact on women" (439). Therefore, the committee equivalent to "women's rights" bills is involvement with the committee for the Status of Women. To test the effect of substantive representation related to "women's rights," participation in legislative activity related to the Status of women was included as a separate variable. This variable is also binary: if an MP



was involved in the Status of Women Committee (as either a member or as the Minister) they were coded as 1, if not, they were coded as 0.

*Hypotheses: the Expected Impact of Substantively Representing Women*

There are a number of hypotheses I propose. First, as Heath et al. (2005) have found that the existence of a "women's affairs" committee decreases the chances that a woman will be promoted to high prestige positions, I hypothesize that legislators will be less likely to achieve "Success" if they are involved in women's interests and women's rights.

*H1a: Participation in activities related to "Women's Interests" and the Status of Women leads MPs to achieve less "Success".*

Secondly, I hypothesize that women will constitute the majority of members on these committees. I expect that we will see fewer men on these committees than women.

*H1b: Females have a higher tendency to be in "Women's Interests" and the Status of Women committees.*

I expect that hypotheses 1a and 1b will be directly related. Since women are more likely to represent women's interests in committee membership, they will therefore face the consequences of pursuing interests that are in fact, less prestigious. This will lead them to be less likely to have long careers, less likely to have high status positions in cabinet, and less likely to run in leadership conventions. Involvement in these types of committees, however, is not the sole factor that impacts whether or not a woman will become "Successful", but one factor that affects this result; for the purposes of this study, committee membership is the main variable to be examined to understand the impact on "Success".

It is important to note, in the Canadian context, that only the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party (or one of its predecessors, the Progressive Conservative Party) have been governing parties. For the period of 1997-2011 only the Liberal and the Conservative Parties were in power. Clearly, only these two parties could have produced cabinet ministers, and only these parties were potential governing parties. Thus, their role within Parliament differed from that of non-governing parties. Given that not all parties formed government at this time, we should expect the influence of substantively representing women to be different on women's career "success." Furthermore, as women are found to be more left-leaning, and left-parties tend to promote more women than others, the relationship between women's success and their adoption of women's interests could potentially differ from that of the traditional governing parties. Two hypotheses stem from the differences across parties in their capacity for government formation:

*H2: Members of non-governing parties, such as the NDP, are more likely to branch out in their interests and thus focusing on women's issues may be less of an impediment to "Success" within this type of party.*

Thus, the potential may exist for women within the NDP party to branch out and also be successful. Therefore, "Success" differs across parties. The experiences of women in different parties may vary depending on the goals of the party, and subsequently, their welcoming atmosphere for women.

#### **4.1.3. Dependent Variables**

In order to test these hypotheses, I formed a concept of "Success" that was specific to Canadian federal politics. There are three components to this definition of success: a) leadership; b) longevity; and c) prestigious positions in cabinet ("Pipeline" portfolios). Each component was coded into a variable of its own, and then an additive index of all three was also created. Creating

a concept of "Success" such as this one, allows for a multi-faceted understanding of what it means to reach these levels within Canadian federal politics. In order to be successful then, one must not only be able to remain popular electorally (continue to win re-election), but also within their parties (by receiving high-profile positions and running or gaining leadership). This definition acknowledges that although a MP may make strides within individual areas within this concept, in order to rise within Parliament to levels of high power, generally all three aspects are necessary. Furthermore, it highlights the fact that women rarely (or in this study, never) gain all three of these facets. This definition, therefore, allows for both a combined and separate analysis of where women are absent. Through this, it can be better understood how and why women, or those who substantively represent women, fare within Parliament. It attempts to further the exploration into which factors impact women's rise into power and therefore, strengthen the understanding of why so few women are present in higher levels of power.

### *Leadership*

The first variable, leadership, is broken down into four categories: becoming Prime Minister was coded (3), achieving party leadership (2), running for leadership (1) and all other (0). It was coded this way to reflect the different levels of leadership: running for leadership indicates a higher level of success and status than not running, but winning the leadership contest illustrates a high level of support from the party. Similarly, becoming Prime Minister represents a level of support from the party (and usually, the country as well). Since this is the most prestigious position in Canadian politics it was coded higher than the other levels of leadership. To become Prime Minister of Canada is to achieve a high level of success in Parliament.

However, it is only a very small number of politicians who become Prime Minister. This dataset includes only four MPs who had become PM (Jean Chretien, Stephen Harper, Paul Martin and Joseph Clark – and in the case of Joe Clark, his term as PM came prior to the 1997-2011 period), but it is not only these four members that could be considered to be “Successful” in Canadian politics. Arguably, there are plenty of other “Successful” MPs in Canada. Thus, the other indicators of success are also important – such as career length (longevity) and being appointed to a high profile cabinet position.

### *Longevity*

The second factor, longevity (or a long career in Parliament) illustrates that the MP has been able to maintain support within his or her riding and has been able to skirt controversy that might expel them from power, therefore playing the political game sufficiently to remain a politician. Longevity alone does not necessarily indicate a high level of power and prestige in Parliament, as backbenchers may also remain in power for long periods of time. However, paired with the other elements of “Success”, longevity provides an important component, illustrating that the MP has been successful enough to remain a politician. This variable was coded into terciles based on the length of an MP’s career: short careers, medium careers, and long careers. The total number of MPs were divided into three groups based on the length of their career: those that fell within the lowest third was coded as “short careers”, “medium careers” were the middle third and those that fell into the highest careers were “long”.

*Cabinet Portfolios: Pipeline versus Other*

The third component of the "Success" achieved by a Member of Parliament is constituted by whether or not the MP has held a seat in cabinet—and more importantly, whether or not he or she has held what is considered to be a "Pipeline" post. As I suggested earlier in this thesis, this study employs a conception of "Pipeline" post (or, "top job") that is based on the existing literature about the prestige and importance of cabinet portfolios. In particular, the ranking of portfolios advanced by Laver and Hunt (1992), the position of posts worldwide according to Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005), and Bashevkin's (2009) definition of "top jobs" in the Canadian context all impact the classification of "Pipeline" posts in this thesis.

The positions of *Finance* and *Foreign Affairs* are consistently found to be prestigious in a variety of governments from Latin America to Australia (Heath et al., 2005; Moon and Fountain, 1997). In Canada, these portfolios are also influential, and in addition, *Justice* is also identified as a top job (Bashevkin 2009). According to Laver and Hunt (1992), the highest ranked portfolios in Canada (with 1 constituting the highest ranking and 10 the lowest ranking) are: *Finance* (1.50), *External Affairs* (3.05), *Trade* (3.85), and *Justice* (5.31). Bashevkin's (2009) categorization of top jobs also includes *Justice*, but excludes *Trade*. Given Bashevkin's local knowledge and research on Canada specifically, for this study, I have also opted to exclude *Trade* from my list of prestigious "pipeline positions". Thus three positions (*Finance*, *Justice* and *Foreign Affairs*) will be considered prestigious "Pipeline" posts at the exclusion of all others (see Table 4.2).

There are a number of benefits from using this measure. This distinction allows a clear division between ministers achieving "Success" or "not achieving success"; if MPs receive one of these

cabinet portfolios then they have been successful. This measure is also specifically Canadian, and identifies what is prestigious within Canada's legislature in particular.

Table 4-2
What are "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts?
<p>Pipeline cabinet posts are posts that carry high prestige and may lead to leadership. In Canada, these include:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Minister of Finance</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Minister of Justice and Attorney General</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Minister of Foreign Affairs</b></p> <p>Committee membership of these portfolios is also studied as "involvement in pipeline interests". This is an inclusive term that includes involvement in committee membership, but also cabinet posts as well.</p>

These positions are considered prestigious in Canada specifically, and therefore conceptualizing pipeline posts in this way has the potential to illustrate the extent to which politicians reach high levels of status within the Canadian legislature.

Not all cabinet portfolios are pipeline portfolios. In addition to the top jobs, I also incorporate an assessment of other types of cabinet posts. In particular, cabinet posts related to "Women's Interests" are included as a means to understand whether women dominate cabinet posts that are

associated with "Women's Interests", and to understand whether women who focus on substantively representing women in committee are likely to be appointed to these cabinet posts.

Table 4-3
What are "Women's Interest" Cabinet Posts?
These are the interests defined by Tremblay (1999) to be of particular interest to women. These include "health care, care of the elderly, education, housing and the environment". Of these, two correspond to cabinet posts in Parliament: Environment and Health. Therefore, the posts of,
<b>Minister of Environment</b>
<b>Minister of Health</b>
are considered to be "Women's Interests" cabinet posts. Involvement in women's rights, or the Status of Women, constitutes another, separate variable.

Table 4-3 describes what is considered to be a "Women's Interest" cabinet post. There are fewer cabinet posts related to "Women's Interests" than committees related to similar issues as a smaller number of cabinet positions correspond to the definition of traditional women's interests (such as Human Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities). Therefore, the posts of Minister of Health and Minister of Environment are the two portfolios examined.

#### 4.1.3. Control/Intervening Variables

While the main purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of committee work on success in the House of Commons, much of the basis of this research is about the impact of committee work on women's careers in particular. I therefore include sex as a control variable. I expect that the careers of women and men may not be affected by committee work equally, and that they will not be offered the same opportunities in Parliament. I suspect that women will be more likely to adopt women's issues and that they will be less likely to be appointed to high prestige positions. In addition to including sex in the analysis, I also control for political party. As different parties have varying approaches to the inclusion of women, as well as policy platforms that may or may not appeal to women, I hypothesize that women's experiences within these parties will vary. I expect that both of these variables (sex and party) will influence the relationship between the focus on "Women's Interests" and "Success".

In order to assess the impact of the substantive representation of women on legislative careers, I conduct a series of bivariate analyses to assess the links between the variables of interest. This method enables me to discover whether or not a relationship exists between the substantive representation of women (by analyzing their involvement in committees and cabinet posts) and their subsequent success (longevity, leadership and "Pipeline" posts). Before I do that, I will discuss the careers of women who gained some level of "Success" as defined in this thesis. In this way, I can paint a picture of which women were able to maintain some facet of this "Success" and what their careers were like.



## CHAPTER 5

### NOTABLE WOMEN IN THE 36<sup>TH</sup> TO THE 40<sup>TH</sup> PARLIAMENTS

Although many of the women well-known in federal Canadian politics preceded the time period of this study, this thesis does not intend to argue that female MPs did not, in some capacity, reach notoriety in Canadian federal politics during the time period of 1997-2011. This section explores the careers of some of the most prominent women who sat in Parliament throughout this time, and the extent to which they reached "Success" as defined in this study. By doing this, it is possible to see how, and under which circumstances, female MPs do achieve levels of "Success". Thus, this section attempts to help with isolating the factors that advance gender equality in Canadian politics. Clearly, many of the women who were first to hold prominent positions – the first elected (Agnes McPhail), the first to sit in cabinet (Judy Lamarch), and the first female Prime Minister (Kim Campbell) – sat in Parliament years and decades before 1997. However, that does not mean that notable women were absent from the more recent sittings of Parliament. From the 36<sup>th</sup> to the 40<sup>th</sup> sittings of Parliament, women were prominent across all parties, including running for the leadership of each major political party. However, the number of women to sit in cabinet, especially in prestigious positions, is limited. In fact, many of the women who sat in cabinet had the position of "Minister of State" – a cabinet position without a portfolio. Women are therefore often receiving cabinet positions that are more ceremonial than effectual.

This section examines the careers of a select number female MPs in depth, as a means to illustrate what a "Successful" female politician looked like in the period from 1997 to 2011. I

chronicle details about their party affiliation, their posts in Parliament. Specifically, I recorded whether or not they were on a committee or cabinet position related to a "Pipeline"/top job issue area, or if they held posts or responsibilities related to "Women's Interests" – as well as noting whether or not they ran for leadership of their party. This section highlights women who reached the highest levels of "Success" within this period, and illustrates what their careers looked like (particularly, how each differed from the average female MP). These notable women have been involved in a range of different parties – Liberal, Conservative, NDP and the Bloc Quebecois. It includes women who have received a high level of public attention – all have reached some level of "Success" as defined in this study<sup>3</sup> – whether a lengthy career, a leadership bid, or holding a "Pipeline"-related post. However, none of these women achieved all three in this period of time. The most successful women, therefore, still did not reach of the highest level of "success," the level of success that only men achieved during these years in the House of Commons. The women included in this section are Anne McLellan, Sheila Copps, Belinda Stronach, Martha Hall Findlay, Diane Albouzy, Francine Lalonde and Alexa McDonough.

### **5.1 Anne McLellan**

Anne McLellan differs from the other prominent women discussed in this section in a number of ways. First, she is the *only* woman to have held a "Pipeline" cabinet post (Finance, Foreign Affairs or Justice) from the 36<sup>th</sup> – 40<sup>th</sup> sittings (although many were involved in "Pipeline"-related committees, none of the others were appointed to "Pipeline" positions in cabinet). Consequently, she is also the only female to have held both a traditional "Women's Interest"-related cabinet post (Health) and a pipeline post (Minister of Justice and Attorney General). She

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<sup>3</sup> See methodology section for more detailed explanation of conceptions of "Success" for the purposes of this study.

is the only woman to have held a cabinet post in a pipeline-related area while 15 men held pipeline-related cabinet posts in this same period of time.

Table 5-1

A. Anne McLellan

- Elected to the 35th, 36th, 37th and 38th Sittings
- Liberal Party
- Minister of Justice and Attorney General  
(1997.06.11 - 2002.01.14)
- Minister of Health  
(2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11)
- No involvement with the Status of Women
- Did not run for leadership

Additionally, McLellan is the only woman in this section to not have run for the leadership of her party. However, it should be noted that Sheila Copps ran for the Liberal leadership during McLellan's career, and this could have potentially influenced her decision to run (as Copps was criticized and a two-woman ballot would have been unprecedented). McLellan had no involvement with the Status of Women or with any committees related to "women's interests."

## 5.2 Sheila Copps

Sheila Copps is described by Bashevkin (2009) as being "among one of the most memorable women in the Canadian House of Commons during recent decades" (39). Bashevkin further notes that, "Copps distinguished herself as a feisty 'Rat Pack' debater who shouted, heckled, and consistently peppered Conservative ministers with tough questions" (39). She ran for the Liberal leadership on two occasions (1990 and 2003). She was criticized as being both too young and too aggressive (Bashevkin, 2009: 64 and 39). In this way, she was unconventional. However, she was appointed to the post of "Minister of Environment" a traditional "Women's Interest" cabinet portfolio. Even her bid for the leadership did not lead to a promotion to a "Pipeline" cabinet post.

Table 5-2

Sheila Copps

- Elected to the 33rd, 34th, 35th (by-election), 36th and 37th Sittings.
- Liberal Party
- Minister of Environment (1993.11.04 - 1996.01.24)
- No involvement with the Status of Women
- Leadership candidate twice (1990, 2003)

Copps is unique amongst this group of notable women in that she had no involvement in "Pipeline"-related issue areas or cabinet portfolios at all. She was appointed as the Minister of Environment by Jean Chretien after he defeated her in the 1990 leadership election. She also had no involvement in committees related to the Status of Women, as many women discussed in this section do not. This might indicate that women who achieve high levels of success are often not involved in traditional women's rights committees.

### **5.3 Belinda Stronach**

Belinda Stronach was also a frequent topic for the press which often focused on her personal life. She was the second woman to run for the Conservative leadership, Flora MacDonald was the first to run for the job in 1976 (Bashevkin, 2009: 39). She ran for the position before becoming an MP (she later ran - and was elected - as an MP in Newmarket-Aurora) (Bashevkin, 2009: 75-6).

Table 5-3

## Belinda Stronach

- \* Elected to the 38th and 39th Sittings
- \* Conservative (2004 - 2005.05.16), and then crossed floor to Liberal (2005.05.17 - present)
- \* Member of the Status of Women Committee (2006.04.03 - 2007.09.14)
- \* Member of the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee (2004.10.04 - 2005.11.29)
- \* Ran for leadership of the Conservative party (2004)

Stronach then famously switched to the Liberal Party to become a Liberal cabinet minister (Bashevkin, 2009: 76). Although she had no involvement in traditional "Women's Interest" committees or cabinet positions, she has the distinction of being the only woman discussed in this chapter to have been involved with the Status of Women Committee. Although she ran for the leadership of the Conservative Party, she did not succeed at securing it. Furthermore, even though she was involved in the committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, she was never appointed to a "Pipeline" cabinet post. Stronach retired from politics in 2007 (Bashevkin, 2009: 77).

#### 5.4. Martha Hall Findlay

Martha Hall Findlay had a relatively brief career in federal politics, sitting for only part of the 39<sup>th</sup> sitting, the full 40<sup>th</sup> sitting, and was subsequently defeated in the 2011 Canadian Federal Election. She became the second woman to run for the leadership of the Liberal Party in 2006 (the first of course being Sheila Copps). As women rarely run, running for leadership is an important indicator of success.

Table 5-4

**Martha Hall Findlay**

- Elected to the 39th (2008 By-Election) and 40th Sittings
- Liberal Party
- No "women's interest" committee involvement
- No involvement with the Status of Women
- Assistant Critic to Finance (2008.03.31 - 2008.11.14)
- Ran for leadership of the Liberal Party (2006)

While sitting as an opposition MP, Findlay served as Assistant Critic to Finance (a "Pipeline"-related area) and had no involvement with either traditional "Women's Interests" or the Status of Women.

### **5.5. Diane Albouzy**

Diane Albouzy has an extensive portfolio including committee membership in both "Pipeline" - related areas as well as traditional "Women's Interest" related areas. Although a longstanding cabinet minister, Albouzy has remained either a Minister or Secretary of State. This follows the trend since the beginning of Stephen Harper's Prime Ministerial career, in which a growing proportion of female cabinet ministers are Ministers of State, rather than ministers with a portfolio.

Table 5-5

Diane Albonczy

- Elected to the 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th and 41st Sittings.
- Reform Party (1993.10.25 - 2000.03.26), Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (2000.03.27 - 2003.12.22) and Conservative Party (2003.12.23 - present)
- Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas and Consular Affairs) (2011.01.04 - present), Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance (2006.02.07 - 2007.08.13),
- Critic of Health (2001.01.05 - 2001.12.17), Assistant Critic of Justice (1995 - 1996.10.24)
- Member of Foreign Affairs and Defence (2011.01.04 - present), Vice Chair of Environment and Energy Security (2008.10.30 - 2010.01.18), Standing Committee of Justice and Legal Affairs (1994.01.17 - 1996.02.02, 1994.01.17 - 1996.02.02), Status of Persons with Disabilities (1997.09.22 - 1999.09.18, 1999.10.12 - 2000.10.22), Health (2001.01.29 - 2002.09.16) and Finance (2006.04.03 - 2007.09.14)
- No involvement in the Status of Women Committee
- Ran for leadership of the Canadian Alliance (2002)

Although she ran for the party leadership, has had a relatively lengthy career as an MP, ample experience in cabinet and in "Pipeline"-related committees, she has yet to be appointed to a "Pipeline"-related cabinet portfolio by Prime Minister Harper—indeed, she has yet to be appointed to a portfolio. Her lack of a portfolio is surprising, given the length and nature of her career.

## 5.6. Francine Lalonde

Francine Lalonde ran for the leadership of the Bloc Québécois in 1997 soon after the inception of the party. As many of the other female politicians featured here, she has had no involvement in the Status of Women committee. She also has not been involved in any other traditional "Women's Interest"-related committees.

Table 5-6

Francine Lalonde

- Elected to the 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th Sittings.
- Bloc Quebecois Party
- Critic of Foreign Affairs (1999.06.30 - 2006.09.11, 2007.01.23 - 2008.06.25, 2009.05.22 - 2011.01.20)
- Sat on Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (1999.10.12 - 2000.10.22, 2001.01.29 - 2002.09.16, 2002.09.30 - 2003.11.12, 2004.02.02 - 2004.05.23, 2004.10.04 - 2005.11.29, 2006.04.03 - 2007.09.14, 2007.10.16 - 2008.09.07, 2009.01.26 - 2009.12.30, 2010.03.03 - 2011.03.26)
- No involvement in the Status of Women Committee
- Ran for leadership of the Bloc (1997)

Lalonde does, however, have extensive involvement with Foreign Affairs and International Trade, serving as the party critic from 1999 to 2011. She has also been a longstanding Member of Parliament, elected from the 35<sup>th</sup> to 40<sup>th</sup> Sittings. As a member of the Bloc Quebecois, not a governing party, she did not have the opportunity to sit in cabinet. However, she was the Critic of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which could be considered a high prestige position within non-governing parties.

### 5.7. Alexa McDonough

Together with Audrey McLaughlin, Alexa McDonough is one of the most well-known women in the NDP. McLaughlin, the first female federal party leader, was replaced by McDonough.

McDonough "champion[ed] a non-traditional leadership style" (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 86) and is described by Trimble and Arscott (2003) to be "Canada's most experienced female party leader" (88). She doubled the party's seats in 1997, and was able to secure official party status (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 87). As an MP, she held prominent critic positions: opposing the



Prime Minister, and as critic to Foreign Affairs. She was also critic of the International Human Rights portfolio, but as most all of the women featured in this section, was not involved with the Status of Women Committee. She resigned as leader of the NDP in 2003 (Bashevkin, 2009: 5).

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Table 5-7

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Alexa McDonough

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- Elected to the 36th, 37th, 38th and 39th Sittings
  - New Democratic Party
  - Critic of Foreign Affairs (2003.02.04 - 2007.09.26),  
International Human Rights (2004.04.16 - 2004.07.21)  
and Prime Minister (1997.06.02 - 2003.02.03)
  - Sat on Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
International Development (2002.09.30 - 2003.11.12,  
2004.02.02 - 2004.05.23, 2006.04.03 - 2007.09.14)
  - No involvement in the Status of Women Committee
  - Ran for leadership of the NDP twice (1995 and 2001)
  - Leader of the NDP from 1995-2003.
- 

#### 5.8. Notable Women: Canadian Female MPs 1997-2011

Together, these seven examples of prominent Canadian politicians paint a picture of a "Successful" woman in Parliament. Only one of these women was involved with committee work related to the Status of Women – whereas 33.8% of female MPs were involved in this committee. Conversely, only one was appointed to a "Pipeline"-related cabinet portfolio (A. Anne McLellan). Although all of these women ran for their respective party's leadership (with the exception of McLellan), only Alexa McDonough succeeded in securing the leadership of her party, the NDP.

What does a "Successful" female MP look like? The female MPs discussed were more likely to be involved with "Pipeline" committees than the average female MP and much less likely to be involved in the committee work related to the Status of Women. Four of the seven were involved in committee work related to traditional "Women's Interests", and in two of these cases held a

cabinet portfolio related to traditional "women's interests." A successful woman in Canadian politics still often does not receive a "Pipeline"-related cabinet portfolio or become leader of a party. Generally, the highest level of success that a woman can expect in Parliament is running for leadership of the party or remaining in office for a long term. While examining the political careers of these seven women in detail provides some indication of what it takes to be a "Successful" female politician, the following section provides a broader look at the activities of male and female MPs from 1997 to 2011.

## CHAPTER 6:

### DOES REPRESENTING WOMEN PENALIZE MPS?

#### 6.1 Background

This section presents the results of the relationship between substantively representing women through committee and cabinet involvement on "Success". The definition of "Success" for this thesis has three components: "Pipeline" cabinet positions (prestigious posts), leadership, and longevity in Parliament. The first part describes the rates at which MPs were involved in "Women's Interests" and the Status of Women Committee, which is the independent variable. The second part of this section examines each component of "Success" separately, and then as a group, and the affect that the independent variable has on this dependent variable.

#### *Legislative Activity Related to "Women's Interests"*

The first step to understanding the impact that substantively representing women has on the careers of politicians is to analyze the rates at which politicians, both male and female, participate in activities related to "Women's Interests". Membership on committees related to women's interests (including Status of Persons with Disabilities, Human Rights, Health and Environment committees) can be understood to be a means to substantively represent women. Thus, the degree to which women and men tend to be appointed to these committees also illustrates a gender difference between who represents women substantively.

Table 6-1  
Adoption of "Women's Interests" by Sex

	Men	Women	Total
None	228 46.2%	45 33.6%	273 43.5%
One or More	266 53.8%	89 66.4%	355 56.5%
Total	494 100.0%	134 100.0%	628 100.0%

Ch2 6.779/ Significance 0.006 / Gamma 0.258

While overall more men are involved in committees related to women's interests (N of 266 versus 89), as seen here, when we examine participation rates by sex, women are significantly more likely than men to be involved in women's interests: 66.4% of women compared to 53.8% of men are involved. The proportion of women who sit on "Women's Interests" committees is nearly twice the proportion of those who do not, or over two thirds of female politicians in this period. Furthermore, the significance level of this relationship is 0.006, indicating that the relationship between sex and adoption of women's issues is statistically significant. The fact that more women are involved in women's interests, also considered less prestigious positions, illustrates that women are more concentrated than men in less-prestigious positions.

The appointment of MPs to a "Women's Interest"-related cabinet post is a higher level of prestige than committee membership, as it signifies that the MP was appointed to cabinet. This appointment automatically infers a higher level of power and influence than that of the committee membership. "Women's Interest" cabinet portfolios are still less prestigious, however, than "Pipeline"-related cabinet posts. Table 6-2 presents the appointment to cabinet portfolios related to women's interest, by sex.

Table 6-2

## "Women's Interests" Cabinet Posts by Sex

	Men	Women	Total
None	484 98.0%	127 94.8%	611 97.3%
One or More	10 2.0%	7 5.2%	17 2.7%
Total	494 100.0%	134 100.0%	628 100.0%

Ch2 121.177/ Significance 0.000/Gamma -0.087

The trend remains: when broken down by sex, the proportion of women appointed to a "Women's Interest" cabinet post is twice as high as the proportion of men appointed to a similar portfolio – even though only 7 women were selected, compared to 10 men. Although these numbers seem fairly similar, women constitute a much lower proportion of the total number of seats in the House of Commons. Thus, while 5.2% of women held these positions, 2% of men also hold a women's interest cabinet post. This is a relationship significant at the 0.000 level, indicating it is statistically significant. Furthermore, the proportion of women appointed to these positions is smaller than the proportion who sat on committees related to women's interests. Thus women in Parliament are likely to represent women's interests in committees and in cabinet, but they do so, for the most part, in committee work.

### *Legislative Activity Related to the Status of Women*

The Status of Women Committee was created in 1971 as a response to the recommendation contained in the report of the *Royal Commission on the Status of Women* in 1970. Since 1986, the position of "Minister responsible for the Status of Women" has been held consistently by a female cabinet member. This one post is reserved for a female (increasingly, this responsibility is allocated to a Minister of State, which indicates it is not a portfolio on its own). As shown in Table 6-3, much of the legislative activity related to the Status of Women, even at the committee level, is performed by women.

Table 6-3			
Involvement in Status of Women, By Sex			
	Men	Women	Total
No Involvement in the Status of Women	475 84.2%	89 15.8%	564 100%
Involvement in Status of Women	19 29.7%	45 70.3%	64 100%
Total	494 100%	134 100%	628 100%
Ch2 101.835/ Significance 0.000/Gamma .853			

Women were significantly more likely than men to be involved in the Status of Women. 70.3% of women (45) compared to 29.7% of men (19) were either on the Status of Women Committee or held the position of Minister of the Status of Women. Furthermore, whereas nearly one third of all women MPs had some involvement in the Status of Women (45 of 134), only a small fraction of male MPs were involved (19 of 494). Thus, although men constitute nearly 30% of all of MPs (both male and female) involved with legislative activity related to this issue, when we focus solely on men themselves, the proportion of MPs involved drops substantially: only 3.9%

of male MPs (19/494) were involved in this committee. The vast majority of men have no involvement whatsoever with legislative activity related to the Status of Women. This constitutes another activity, of low prestige, of which about 30% of women are involved.

## 6.2. Who Receives the "Pipeline" Posts?

The first indicator of success is the receipt of a "Pipeline" position. These high prestige positions, or "top jobs", are divvied by the executive amongst a select few cabinet members. Being appointed to such a position denotes a high level of status amongst the governing party, as well as a significant level of responsibility. Clearly, this type of position can only be given to a member of the governing party. Thus, the analysis here is limited to those within the Liberal and Conservative Parties.

Before examining the rate of promotion to "Pipeline" cabinet posts, it is imperative to present the rates of appointment to cabinet, in general. Table 6-4 does just that, presenting the relationship amongst the two governing parties, The Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, and appointment to cabinet. The rate at which a political party promotes its members may be indicative of the types of opportunities available to MPs in each party.

Table 6-4			
Cabinet Posts within Governing Parties			
	Liberals	Conservatives	Total
None	126 51.2%	107 74.8%	233 59.9%
One or More	120 48.8%	36 25.2%	156 40.1%
Total	246 100.0%	143 100.0%	389 100.0%
Ch2 20.978/Significance 0.000 /Gamma -.478			

It appears by Table 6-4 that the Liberal Party are more likely to appoint more of their members to cabinet positions than the Conservatives. However, this very significant relationship might, in actuality, be a result of the long-standing reign of the Liberal Party in the 1990s under Jean Chretien. Many of the members were incumbents in this period of study and were promoted previous to 1997. The new Conservative Party, on the other hand, is a fairly young party, and has not held office for as many years as the Liberal Party did in the Chretien/Martin era. It will be interesting to compare the data in Table 6-4 with similar data collected in a few years, after Harper's majority government has had a few years of stability.

Even considering the differences in length of government, it is notable that there is quite a difference between the Liberal Party (promoting 120 different MPs to cabinet), and the Conservatives, promoting only 36. Thus, whereas the Liberal Party appointed nearly half of all its MPs in this period to a cabinet position at some point, only a quarter of Conservative MPs have had such an opportunity. This suggests that Liberal MPs may have had more access to the paths to power. Alternatively, it may also indicate a switch to a more concentrated pool of more powerful politicians, rather than a dispersed version of power. In general, about 40.1% of MPs that are members of governing parties were appointed to cabinet from 1997-2011.

Now that the average rate of cabinet appointment for governing parties has been established, we can return to the primary goal of this section, answering the basic question: what is the rate at which the average cabinet minister is promoted to these prestigious positions? Table 6-5 presents this relationship. Of the 175 ministers who held cabinet posts in this period, 19 (or 10.9%) were "Pipeline" posts.



Table 6-5

"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and Cabinet Posts, Amongst MPs

	Cabinet Post	No Cabinet Post	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	156 89.1%	453 100%	609 100%
"Pipeline" Cabinet Post	19 10.9%	0 0%	19 100%
Total	175 100%	453 100%	628 100%

Ch2 50.717/Significance 0.00/Lambda 1

Even though "Pipeline" posts only constitute a minority of cabinet positions, they constitute an even smaller minority of MPs. Only 19 of 628 MPs in this period held a "Pipeline" cabinet post. The "Pipeline" post, therefore, represents the most elite of the executive. What does this elite look like? For one, they are almost entirely male. Table 6-6 displays the relationship between sex and "pipeline posts".

Table 6-6  
 "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and Cabinet Posts, Amongst MPs, by Sex

Men			
	Cabinet Post	No Cabinet Post	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	117 86.7%	359 100.0%	476 96.4%
"Pipeline" Cabinet Post	18 13.3%	0 0.0%	18 3.6%
Total	135 100.0%	359 100.0%	494 100.0%
Women			
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	39 97.5%	94 100.0%	133 99.3%
"Pipeline" Cabinet Post	1 2.5%	0 0.0%	1 0.7%
Total	40 100.0%	94 100.0%	134 100.0%
Ch2 49.677/2.368/Significance 0.00/0.299/Lambda 1			

Of the 19 politicians appointed to "Pipeline" cabinet posts 18 were men; 3.6% of all male MPs were appointed to this position, whereas less than 1% of all female MPs were appointed to these positions (0.7%). This relationship is so strong in fact, that the relationship between involvement in cabinet posts and "Pipeline" cabinet posts disappears for women when the control of sex is added. Furthermore, of the 19 men appointed to these posts, three (Jean Chretien, Paul Martin and Joe Clark) also became Prime Minister. Only four Prime Ministers sat during this period, and the fourth, Stephen Harper, had a fairly short career before becoming Prime Minister. His party was not in power while he was an MP. Thus, he never had the opportunity to hold such a position before becoming Prime Minister. Of the cabinet ministers in this period, men were much more likely than women to be appointed to "Pipeline" posts than women.

*"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and "Women's Interests"*

The next step in this analysis is to move beyond what these MPs looked like (descriptive representation) to analyse how their activities in Parliament (substantive representation) impacts their chances of being involved in prestigious "Pipeline" posts. Of the utmost significance to this study is whether a MP who substantively represents women through committee involvement is likely to achieve success, through factors such as receiving "Pipeline" posts. Involvement with "Women's Interests" alone does not appear to impact whether or not a MP will be appointed to a "Pipeline" cabinet post. The rates of promotion to these posts are fairly similar amongst those involved or uninvolved with "Women's Interests". Of those that hold "Pipeline" posts, 8 (42.1%) had no "Women's Interest", whereas 11 (57.9%) did hold a "Women's Interest". Neither the Chi Square nor Gamma produced a significant measure of association to indicate a strong relationship exists between the two factors.

However, there is another level of involvement of "Women's Interests": on the executive level. To understand whether there is any overlap between holding cabinet portfolios related to women's issues and "Pipeline" posts (receipt of a high-prestige position), the two were also cross tabulated and the results can be seen in Table 6-7. This table shows the relationship between "Women's Interests" cabinet posts and the likelihood of receiving a top position (a "Pipeline" cabinet post).

Table 6-7

"Women's Interests" Cabinet Posts and "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts

	No "Women's Interest" Cabinet Post	"Women's Interest" Cabinet Post	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	594 97.2%	14 82.4%	608 96.8%
"Pipeline" Post	17 2.8%	3 17.6%	20 3.2%
Total	611 100.0%	17 100.0%	628 100.0%
Ch2 11.853/ Significance 0.014 / Gamma 0.764			

Of the cabinet ministers who had ever held "Women's Interest" cabinet posts, only three had also held "Pipeline" posts at one time or another. There appears to be minimal crossover between the two types of positions. However, of the 628 Members of Parliament during this time period, 594 (94.58%) had held no women's interest or pipeline cabinet post whatsoever. Thus, the number of MPs actually holding either of these positions is a small exclusive pool of executive members. The fact that 82.4% of those that held "Women's Interest" cabinet posts did not hold also "Pipeline" cabinet posts illustrates that although cabinet posts are generally dispersed amongst a small group of individuals, those that represent "Pipeline" posts and those that represent "Women's Interests" generally do not consist of the same individuals. Therefore, those who are involved in "Women's Interests" in cabinet, those that can be understood to be substantively representing women, are not likely to be given a prestigious cabinet position. This supports my hypothesis that those who represent women are less likely to be "Successful" as measured by receiving highly-coveted pipeline positions.

To understand whether or not this relationship is consistent for both men and women, I added the control of "sex" to further investigate this relationship. The results can be seen in Table 6-8.

Table 6-8  
"Women's Interests" Cabinet Posts and "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts, By Sex

Men			
	No "Women's Interest" Cabinet Post	"Women's Interest" Cabinet Post	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	467 96.5%	8 80%	475 96.2%
"Pipeline" Cabinet Post	17 3.5%	2 20%	19 3.8%
Total	484 100%	10 100%	494 100%
Women			
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	127 100%	6 85.7%	133 99.3%
"Pipeline" Cabinet Post	0 0%	1 14.3%	1 0.7%
Total	127 100%	7 100%	134 100%
Chi2 7.202/18.279/ Significance 0.052 / Gamma 0.746/1			

When sex was added as a control, the relationship became less significant. This is likely to have occurred due to the fact that amongst all of the women included in this study only one held a "Pipeline" cabinet post and she also held a "Women's Interest" cabinet post (Anne McLellan, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, 1997.06.11 - 2002.01.14; Minister of Health, 2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11). Thus, 100% of the women who held a prestigious cabinet position also held a traditional "Women's Interest" cabinet post. Conversely, the majority of men who held a pipeline cabinet post did not hold a women's interest post. Most MPs, including both men and women, who held "Women's Interests" cabinet posts were unlikely to also hold a "Pipeline" cabinet post. This indicates that those involved in "Women's Interests", even those involved

within the higher levels of power, the ministry – are unlikely to also be involved in “Pipeline” cabinet posts. Thus, “Women’s Interests” cabinet posts do not seem to lead to gaining more prestigious positions. Although it is difficult to draw a conclusion about the nature of women in “Pipeline” posts (as there is only one), it is intriguing that McLellan would also have held a “Women’s Interest” cabinet position, suggesting that she is expected to still represent women.

### ***“Pipeline” Cabinet Posts and the Status of Women***

Tremblay indicates that there are two levels of substantive representation of women’s interests: traditional women’s interests and women’s rights. The previous section dealt with interests considered to be traditional women’s interests. The next stage of the analysis investigates the impact of legislative activity surrounding the Status of Women (“women’s rights” committee) on cabinet portfolios. The Status of Women Committee is a particularly interesting aspect to study as it is dominated by women. On the committee level it is predominately women, whereas on the cabinet level it is entirely composed of men. Therefore, unlike the “Women’s Interests”, which has involvement of both men and women, the Status of Women represents an area almost entirely female-dominated.

I hypothesized that legislative activity related to the Status of Women and “Women’s Interests” would be unlikely to overlap with holding “Pipeline” portfolio. In other words, those involved with representing women will be less likely to be promoted to prestigious cabinet positions. I further hypothesized that this would be intensified for women, whom I expected to constitute the majority of the committee memberships for “Women’s Interests”. Table 6-9 begins to illustrate the relationship between legislative activity related to the Status of Women and “success.”

Table 6-9

Involvement in Status of Women and "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts

	No "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts	One or More "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts	Total
No Involvement in the Status of Women	548 90%	16 84.2%	564 89.8%
Involvement in Status of Women	61 10%	3 15.8%	64 10.2%
Total	609 100%	19 100%	628 100%

Chi2 .671/ Significance 0.304/Gamma .255

Only three Members of Parliament were involved with both the Status of Women Committee in this period as well as a "Pipeline" cabinet post. Although also not statistically significant, this table illustrates that of those who have received "Pipeline" cabinet posts. The vast majority were not involved in the Status of Women, and of those involved in the Status of Women, bulk of those were not assigned to "Pipeline" cabinet posts.

This relationship does not become significant for men or women when sex is added as a control. This implies that neither men nor women who become involved in this committee are likely to be promoted to the prestigious positions of Foreign Affairs, Justice or Finance, as illustrated in Table 6-10.

Table 6-10  
Involvement in Status of Women and "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts, By Sex  
Men

	No "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts	One or More "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts	Total
No Involvement in the Status of Women	460 96.8%	15 3.2%	475 100%
Involvement in Status of Women	16 84.2%	3 15.8%	19 100%
Total	476 100%	18 100%	494 100%

Women			
No Involvement in the Status of Women	88 98.9%	1 1.1%	89 100%
Involvement in Status of Women	61 100%	0 0%	61 100%
Total	133 100%	1 100%	134 100%

Ch2 8.303/.509/Significance 0.27/.664/ Gamma .704/-1

Only one woman was appointed to a "Pipeline" cabinet post (A. Anne McClellan) and she was not involved in the Status of Women committee. Of those promoted to a "Pipeline" cabinet post while also having been involved in the Status of Women committee, all three were men. Again, while these results are not statistically significant, they are substantively interesting: men who are involved in the legislative activity related to the Status of Women may not avoid penalty, but may in fact be rewarded.

When this relationship is extended to the cabinet level, it becomes evident that those who hold Status of Women cabinet posts do not also hold "Pipeline" cabinet posts. These positions are exclusive of each other.



Table 6-11  
Status of Women Cabinet Posts and Appointment to  
"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts

	No "Pipeline"	One or More	Total
No Status of Women Cabinet Post	601 98.7%	19 100%	620 98.7%
Status of Women Cabinet Post	8 1.3%	0 0%	8 1.3%
Total	609 100.0%	19 100.0%	628 100.0%
Ch2 0.253 / Significance 0.781/ Gamma -1			

As Table 6-11 illustrates, 100% of those who represent the Status of Women on the executive level, did not hold a "Pipeline" cabinet post. This indicates that those who hold the position of Minister Responsible for Status of Women are not likely to be subsequently placed in a high prestige position. As the Status of Women cabinet post is exclusively female, and the "Pipeline" posts are nearly all held by male Parliamentarians, what might this signify about these positions?

#### 6.2.1 "Pipeline" and "Women's Interests" Posts: Sex-Typed Positions?

For the purposes of this study, "Pipeline" and "Women's Interests" cabinet posts are both essential to understanding the effect of substantive representation of women on the "Success" of each Member of Parliament. If women mainly hold portfolios related to "Women's Interests", and men hold "Pipeline" cabinet posts, it indicates that these positions still operate within sex-appropriate stereotypes. In the period of 1997 – 2011, men still held the "Pipeline" cabinet posts (with one exception), and women held more of the "Women's Interests" posts, as well as *all* of

the Status of Women posts. This section will present a reverse chronological representation of these posts from the 40<sup>th</sup> sitting to the 36<sup>th</sup> sitting.

For the 40<sup>th</sup> sitting, all three pipeline positions were held by men (see Table 6-12). Conversely, the Status of Women position was held by women (Helena Guergis and Rona Ambrose). Even though Health was also held by a woman, both Ministers of Environment were men. One might argue, however, that given the increased prominence of the Environment portfolio in the 2008 election (Jones, 2008; Boutet, 2008), the status of this portfolio was higher than normal.

Table 6-12

Ministers of "Pipeline" and "Women's Interest" Cabinet Posts, 40<sup>th</sup> Sitting

"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts			"Women's Interests" and The Status of Women		
	Name	Date		Name	Date
Finance	James Micheal (Jim) Flaherty	2006.02.06 –	Status of Women	Helena Guergis (Minister of State)	2008.10.30 – 2010.04.09
Justice	Robert Douglas Nicholson	2007.01.04 –		Rona Ambrose	2010.04.09 – 2008.10.30
Foreign Affairs	Lawrence Cannon	2008.10.30 – 2011.05.17	Health	Leona Aglukkaq	–
			Environment	Jim Prentice	2008.10.30 – 2010.11.04
				Peter Kent	2011.01.04 –

In the Harper government that began in 2008, women dominated the posts of Status of Women and Health, whereas men held all "Pipeline" posts, as well as the post of Minister of Environment. This trend continues from his earlier (2006) government.

The 39<sup>th</sup> Sitting of Parliament resembled the 40<sup>th</sup> in that all pipeline cabinet posts were held by men. The "Women's Interests" portfolios, however, were also dominated by men: Tony Clement represented Health and John Baird was one of the two Ministers of Environment. The Ministers of Status of Women were both women (see Table 6-13).

Table 6-13

Ministers of "Pipeline" and "Women's Interest" Cabinet Posts, 39<sup>th</sup> Sitting

Pipeline Cabinet Posts			"Women's Interests" and The Status of Women		
	Name	Date		Name	Date
Finance	James Michael (Jim) Flaherty	2006.02.06	Status of Women	Beverley J. Oda	2006.02.06
		-			2007.08.13
Justice	Vic Toews	2006.02.06		Josée Verner	2007.08.14
		-			-
		2007.01.03			2008.10.29
		2007.01.04	Health	Tony Clement	2006.02.06
	Robert Douglas Nicholson	-			-
					2008.10.29
Foreign Affairs	Peter Gordon MacKay	2006.02.06	Environment	Rona Ambrose	2006.02.06
		-			-
		2007.08.13			2007.01.03
		2007.08.14			2007.01.04
	Maxime Bernier	-		John Baird	-
		2008.05.26			2008.10.29

Paul Martin's government (the 38<sup>th</sup> Sitting) was even more male-dominated. All four ministers of "Pipeline" cabinet posts were male (see Table 6-14). Women also do not represent Health or Environment. Instead, women represent only the Status of Women and held fewer of these positions than they did in other sittings.

Table 6-14

Ministers of "Pipeline" and "Women's Interest" Cabinet Posts, 38<sup>th</sup> Sitting

"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts			Women's Interests" and The Status of Women		
	Name	Date		Name	Date
Finance	Ralph	2003.12.12	Status of Women	Jean	2003.12.12
	Edward	-		Augustine	-
	Goodale	2006.02.05		Liza Frulla	2004.07.19
Justice	Irwin Cotler	2003.12.12	Health	Pierre	2004.07.20 -
		-		Stewart	2006.02.05
		2006.02.05		Pettigrew	2003.12.12
Foreign Affairs	Bill Graham	2003.12.12	Environment	Ujjal	2003.12.12
		-		Dosanjh	-
		2004.07.19		David	2004.07.20 -
	Pierre Stewart	2004.07.19		Anderson	2006.02.05
		-		Stéphane	2003.12.12
		2006.02.05		Dion	-
	Pettigrew				2006.02.05

Jean Chretien was Prime Minister for both the 36<sup>th</sup> and 37<sup>th</sup> Sitzings of Parliament. His government is the only one discussed here to promote a woman to a "Pipeline" position.

The 37<sup>th</sup> Sitting of Parliament is still mainly dominated by men; however, it includes the only female to sit on a "Pipeline" cabinet post. A. Anne Mclellan was the Minister of Justice from 1997 to 2002 and also represented the portfolio of Health, later, from 2002 to 2003. Three women represented the Status of Women (see Table 6-15).

Table 6-15

Ministers of "Pipeline" and "Women's Interest" Cabinet Posts, 37<sup>th</sup> Sitting

"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts			"Women's Interests" and The Status of Women		
	Name	Date		Name	Date
Finance	John Paul Manley	2002.06.02 - 2003.12.11	Status of Women	Jean Augustine (Secretary of State)	2002.05.26 - 2003.12.11
		1993.11.04 - 2002.06.01		Claudette Bradshaw	2002.01.15 - 2002.05.25
Justice	Martin Cauchon	2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11	Health	Hedy Fry	1996.01.25 - 2002.01.14
		1997.06.11 - 2002.01.14		A. Anne Mclellan	2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11
Foreign Affairs	Bill Graham	2002.01.16 - 2003.12.11	Environment	Allan Rock	1997.06.11 - 2002.01.14
		2000.10.17 - 2002.01.14		David Anderson	1999.08.03 - 2003.12.11

The 36<sup>th</sup> Sitting was similar to the 37<sup>th</sup> sitting. Anne Mclellan held the position of Justice and Attorney General. However, a woman held the position of Environment – Christine Susan Stewart (see Table 6-16).

Table 6-16					
Ministers of "Pipeline" and "Women's Interest" Cabinet Posts, 36 <sup>th</sup> Sitting					
"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts			"Women's Interests" and The Status of Women		
	Name	Date		Name	Date
Finance	Paul Edgar	1993.11.04	Status of Women	Hedy Fry	1996.01.25
	Philippe Martin	-			-
		2002.06.01			2002.01.14
Justice	A. Anne Mclellan	1997.06.11	Health	Allan Rock	1997.06.11
		-			-
		2002.01.14			2002.01.14
Foreign Affairs	Lloyd Axworthy	1996.01.25	Environment	Christine Susan	1997.06.11
		-		Stewart	-
		2000.10.16			1999.08.02

Women are not prominent in either "Pipeline" posts or "Women's Interests" posts in any of the sittings. In all sittings of Parliament, women were underrepresented in both "Pipeline" posts and "Women's Interest" posts, but do consistently head the portfolio of Status of Women. The fact that men head all of these positions, particularly the "Pipeline" posts, illustrates that women are still systematically excluded from many positions within cabinet. As the prestige of the portfolio increases, fewer women sit within those posts, fitting with Bashevkin's (1985) rule that the higher the position, the fewer women you tend to see holding the post.


#### *Women in Cabinet: The Proportion That Have Ministries*

One other aspect of cabinet posts should be included: the tendency of women's cabinet positions to be "Ministers of State" rather than Ministers with portfolios. The following Table 6-17, and the following Figure 6-1, illustrate the rates at which women's cabinet posts actually represent a portfolio, rather than simply a Minister of State.

Table 6-17

Number of Women in Cabinet, 36th - 40th Parliament with Portfolios

	Ministers with Portfolios		Total Number of Female Ministers
	#	%	
36th Sittings	7	77.8%	9
37th Sitting	7	58.3%	12
38th Sitting	7	58.3%	12
39th Sitting	5	62.5%	8
40th Sitting	7	58.3%	12

**Figure 6-1****Percentage of Female Cabinet Ministers with Portfolios per Sitting**

This table totals the number of women who sat in cabinet for each sitting. Therefore, it illustrates not the number of women at any specific time, but instead, the number of women in total that sat in cabinet per sitting (between one election and the next). The number of women with portfolios has not increased, but instead the number of women that sat in the Parliament for the 40<sup>th</sup> Sitting with portfolios is significantly lower than the 36<sup>th</sup> and 39<sup>th</sup> Parliaments. Although women are sitting in cabinet, they are frequently not allocated any ministerial responsibilities. This indicates that they are being placed in cabinet in proportional numbers, but the placement is more

ceremonial than practical. The numbers of women in cabinet is misleading; the proportion of the seats that they hold is not equal to the proportion of power that they are given. Furthermore, Bashevkin (2009) gives an alternate explanation for the jump in the 39<sup>th</sup> Sittings:

Harper appointed only six female ministers to his 26-member cabinet, three of whom were demoted by the time he shuffled the political executive in the summer of 2007. At this point, the prime minister named five women to his 26-seat cabinet (19 percent). In response to criticism from Equal Voice and other groups, these numbers increased to 11 women in an enlarged 38 member cabinet following the 2008 election (130).

Bashevkin states that originally Harper's appointment of women was much lower. However, after public pressure – specifically from Equal Voice – he adjusted the number of women in Parliament. Despite this, the data still indicates that a large proportion of women hold no portfolio. Furthermore, the number of women in cabinet, and without portfolios, has stalled since 1997.

#### *Posts Held By Women*

This raises a number of additional questions. Particularly, how many women were allocated to cabinet posts with ministries and, when appointed, what posts were these women given? In total, 24 different women were appointed to positions with ministries within cabinet from 1997 - 2011. Table 6-18 presents a list of positions that these women held, how many women were responsible for these positions and the names of the women appointed to each post.



Table 6 – 18

## Cabinet Posts Held By Women from 1997-2011

Post	#	Who Held the Post
International Cooperation	6	Bev Oda, Josee Verner, M. Aileen Carroll, Maria Minna, Susan Whelan, Diane Marleau
Labour	5	Lisa Riatt, Rona Ambrose, Bev Oda, Claudette Bradshaw, Claudette Bradshaw
Canadian Heritage	5	Josee Verner, Bev Oda, Liza Frulla, Helene C. Scherrer, Sheila Copps
Citizenship and Immigration	4	Diane Finley, Judy Sgro, Elinor Caplan, Diane Marleau
Human Resources and Social Development	4	Diane Finley, Liza Frulla, Belinda Stronach, Jane Stewart
Intergovernmental Affairs	3	Josee Verner, Rona Ambrose, Lucienne Robillard
La Francophonie and Official Languages	2	Josee Verner, Diane Marleau
Western Economic Diversification	2	Rona Ambrose, Carol Skelton
Health	2	Leona Aglukkaq, A. Anne Mclellan
National Revenue	2	Carol Skelton, Elinor Caplan
Environment	2	Rona Ambrose, Christine Susan Stewart
Fisheries and Oceans	1	Gail Shea
Natural Resources	1	Lisa Riatt
Public Works and Government Services	1	Rona Ambrose
Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency	1	Leona Aglukkaq
Veteran's Affairs	1	Albina Guarnieri
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness	1	A. Anne Mclellan
Responsible for Democratic Renewal	1	Belinda Stronach
Justice and Attorney General	1	A. Anne Mclellan
Responsible for Crown Corporations	1	Lucienne Robillard
Responsible for Infrastructure	1	Lucienne Robillard
Indian Affairs and Northern Development	1	Jane Stewart

Women were most likely to hold the position of Minister of International Cooperation. Six women held this position from 1997-2011. This was closely followed by Minister of Labour and Minister of Canadian Heritage; five women were responsible for each of these posts in this time period. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development were two other common posts amongst female cabinet ministers, four different

women held these positions as well. A number of other positions had two female Ministers, including the two "Women's Interest" cabinet posts of Health and Environment. However, La Francophonie and Official Languages, Western Economic Diversification, and National Revenue all held the same number of female Ministers (two), while a number of other positions had one female cabinet minister. Therefore, the "Women's Interests" cabinet posts were not the most common post to be held by a woman. Six positions were more likely to be held by women, three positions were just as likely to be held by women and eleven other positions were half as likely to be held by women. This presents an additional question. Are "Traditional Women's Interests" truly representative of the posts that are allocated to women? Or are the positions identified here (such as International Cooperation, Labour and Canadian Heritage), along with the Status of Women, what could be more accurately described as women's portfolios? Furthermore, are these positions even lower prestige than that of the "Traditional Women's Interests"?

### **6.3 Leadership and Substantive Representation of Women**

The second variable of "Success" for this study was leadership. Reaching a level of leadership denotes gaining popularity and support within a political party. However, there are a number of levels of leadership that a politician can reach and thus, for the purposes of this study, leadership was measured on a scale. If a MP ran for a political party leadership they were coded as 1. If they succeeded in gaining that leadership, they were coded as 2. If that party were a governing party while they were leader, and they therefore reached the level of Prime Minister, they were coded as 3. All other MPs (93.8%) were coded as 0 for having no leadership experience. This dispersion of leadership by sex is displayed in Table 6- 19.

Table 6-19  
Leadership, By Sex

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
Men	462 93.5%	21 4.3%	7 1.4%	4 0.8%	494 100%
Women	127 94.8%	6 4.5%	1 0.7%	0 0%	134 100%
Total	589 93.8%	27 4.3%	8 1.3%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%
Ch2 1.488/ Significance .547/ Gamma -.119					

Although this relationship does not appear to be statistically significant, it illustrates that men constitute the majority of those who ran (77.8%) and won (87.5%) leadership contests, as well as 100% of all Prime Ministers in this period. In fact, women are noticeably absent from the two highest levels of leadership. No woman who sat in Parliament from 1997 – 2011 became Prime Minister (although there were four) and only one woman secured the leadership of a political party (Alexa McDonough, NDP, 1995-2003). The number of men who ran for leadership almost doubles the number of women and seven times more men than women led political parties in this period. However, the rates of running for leadership are proportionally very similar: 4.2% of men ran for the leadership of their party, while 4.2% of women also entered the race. This relationship persists when political party is added as a control (those who ran for leadership are dispersed amongst the political parties). What changes occur (after the level of running for leadership), that keep women from winning these posts and eventually, becoming Prime Minister? Does substantively representing women impact a MP's chance of rising higher on the leadership ladder?

### *Women's Interests and Leadership*

Earlier in this chapter, it was established that although men and women are involved in "Women's Interests" at similar levels, the proportion of women involved in these committees was greater than the proportion of men. If women are more likely to substantively represent women, how does this impact their bid for leadership? The following Table presents the relationship between "Women's Interests" and Leadership.

Table 6-20

Adoption of "Women's Interests" and Leadership

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Women's Interests"	262 96%	9 3.3%	1 0.4%	1 0.4%	273 100%
One or More	327 92.1%	18 5.1%	7 2%	3 0.8%	355 100%
Total	589 93.8%	27 4.3%	8 1.3%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%

Ch2 5.052/Significance .036/ Gamma 0.342

This table, in fact, indicates that those who reach higher levels of leaderships were more likely than not to have been involved with a "Women's Interest". The levels of leadership were consistently at least twice as high amongst those with involvement in "Women's Interests". For example, of those that became Prime Minister, three had some involvement. The significance of this relationship is 0.036.

However, when sex is added as a control, the impact of involvement in "Women's Interests" seems to tell a different story. Although the relationship remains significant amongst men, the relationship is no longer statistically significant amongst women. This may be because women are largely absent from the upper levels of leadership.

Table 6-21

## Adoption of "Women's Interests" and Leadership, By Sex

## Men

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Women's Interests"	219 96.1%	7 3.1%	1 0.40%	1 0.40%	228 100%
One or More	243 92.4%	14 5.3%	6 2.3%	3 1.1%	266 100%
Total	462 93.5%	21 4.30%	7 1.4%	4 0.80%	494 100.00%

Ch2 5.260/Significance .027/ Gamma 0.394

## Women

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Women's Interests"	43 95.6%	2 4.4%	0 0%	0 0%	45 100%
One or More	84 94.4%	4 4.5%	1 1.1%	0 0%	89 100%
Total	127 94.8%	6 4.5%	1 0.7%	0 0%	134 100.00%

Ch2 0.510/Significance .754 / Gamma 0.127

It is worth noting, however, that involvement in "Women's Interests" appears not to impede the ability of men to secure high levels of leadership.

The substantive representation of women is not limited to one variable in this study. The second, higher tier representation, is through cabinet posts in "Women's Interests". Not only can these

interests be pursued at the committee level, but at the executive level as well. Fewer MPs have the opportunity to participate in cabinet and thus, the appointment to these positions is more elite and reveals a precise decision made by the Prime Minister. The effect that this appointment has on the level of leadership that a MP portrays a distinct relationship – separate from that of involvement with “Women’s Interests” alone – which encompasses a much larger group of MPs. How does it impact a politicians’ career when they are appointed to a “Women’s Interest” cabinet post? The last section established that they are less likely to hold a “Pipeline” post when appointed to a “Women’s Interest” cabinet post. Does the same effect persist with leadership? Table 6-22 answers this question.

Table 6-22

## “Women’s Interests” Cabinet Post and Leadership

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No “Women’s Interests”	577 98.0%	24 88.9%	6 75%	4 100%	611 97.3%
One or More	12 2%	3 11.1%	2 25%	0 0%	17 2.7%
Total	589 100%	27 100%	8 100%	4 100%	628 100.0%

Chi2 23.451/Significance 0.000 / Gamma 0.736

As this table illustrates, those appointed to a “Women’s Interest” cabinet post are less likely to reach higher levels of leadership within their parties. Of those who were Prime Minister, none held a “Women’s Interest” cabinet post. Similarly, of those who led a political party, 75% did not hold such a post. Of those who ran for leadership, 88.9% did not. Proportionally, those involved with the “Women’s Interest” post were more likely than those who were not involved to achieve higher levels of leadership. However, as they are involved in the executive, they are therefore part of the elite. As only 175 of 628 members held a cabinet post in this period, this

explains why those in the executive would be more likely than the average MP to be involved in leadership.

Regardless, those in higher levels of leadership are less likely to be involved in "Women's Interests". The following Table investigates whether this relationship remains significant for both sexes, or if this effect is limited to men or women. It finds that in fact, the relationship only persists at a significant level for men – indicating that men who achieve higher levels of leadership are less likely to be involved in "Women's Interests" cabinet posts. However, as women only account for a fraction of those achieving any level of leadership (7 of 39, or 18%). Thus, the lack of significance may reflect the fact that women simply are not represented in higher levels of leadership to a degree that could produce a significant measure of association.

Table 6-23

## "Women's Interests" Cabinet Post and Leadership, By Sex

Men					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Women's Interests"	456 98.7%	19 90.5%	5 71.4%	4 100%	484 100%
One or More	6 1.3%	2 9.5%	2 28.6%	0 0%	10 100%
Total	462 93.5%	21 4.30%	7 1.4%	4 0.80%	494 100.00%

Ch2 32.138/Significance .000/ Gamma .811

Women					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Women's Interests"	121 95.3%	5 83.3%	1 100%	0 0%	127 100%
One or More	6 4.7%	1 16.7%	0 0%	0 0%	7 100%
Total	127 94.8%	6 4.5%	1 0.7%	0 0%	134 100.00%

Ch2 1.706/Significance 0.426 / Gamma .532

As with "Pipeline" cabinet posts, neither men nor women involved in "Women's Interests" cabinet posts are likely to achieve high levels of success in leadership. A further trend persists as well; women are simply not present in the higher levels of success in this aspect, either. Of the 12 members to achieve higher levels of leadership, only one (8.3%) was a woman. The next stage is to examine whether this continues for those who substantively represent women through involvement with the Status of Women committee.



### *Status of Women and Leadership*

Testing Status of Women with leadership did not produce a statistically significant relationship, regardless of the fact that a very small proportion of those involved in the Status of Women made it into the higher levels of leadership. Table 6-24 shows this in depth.

Table 6-24					
Involvement in the Status of Women and Leadership					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No Status of Women	528 89.6%	26 96.3%	7 87.5%	3 75%	564 100%
Involvement in the Status of Women	61 10.4%	1 3.7%	1 12.5%	1 25%	64 10.2%
Total	589 93.8%	27 4.3%	8 1.3%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%
Ch2 2.264/Significance 0.519 / Gamma -.147					

The majority of those who were involved in leadership were not involved in the Status of Women. However the proportion of those in leadership had comparable levels of involvement in the Status of Women. In fact, the higher the level of leadership, the higher the proportion of those in leadership to be involved in the Status of Women. This seems to indicate that involvement in the Status of Women does not negatively impact the likelihood of achieving leadership.

However, when separated by sex, the data unveils an interesting phenomenon (as seen in Table 6-25).

Table 6-25					
Involvement in the Status of Women and Leadership, By Sex					
Men					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No Status of Women	445 96.3%	21 100%	6 85.7%	3 75%	475 100%
Involvement in the Status of Women	17 3.7%	0 0%	2 14.3%	1 25%	19 100%
Total	462 93.5%	21 4.30%	7 1.4%	4 0.80%	494 100.00%
Ch2 7.777/Significance .051/ Gamma .293					
Women					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No Status of Women	83 65.4%	5 83.3%	1 100%	0 0%	89 100%
Involvement in the Status of Women	44 34.6%	1 16.7%	0 0%	0 0%	45 100%
Total	127 94.8%	6 4.5%	1 0.7%	0 0%	134 100.00%
Ch2 1.340/Significance 0.512 / Gamma -.523					

Of those involved in the Status of Women, who also succeeded in their leadership bid (3), all were men. This adds to the evidence that men benefit when involved substantively representing women, while women themselves are penalized. Of those that became Prime Minister, only one (Paul Martin) was involved in the Status of Women. One other reached the level of party leader,

and one more ran in a leadership contest. Neither of these relationships is significant, but this might be the result of low numbers of MPs in the higher levels of leadership.

When only those who held Status of Women cabinet posts are included in the test, the relationship appears to be intensified. No MP who became the Minister Responsible for the Status of Women reached any level of leadership.

Table 6-26

## Status of Women Cabinet Posts and Leadership

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No Status of Women	581 93.7%	27 4.4%	8 1.3%	4 0.6%	620 100%
Involvement in the Status of Women	8 100%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	8 100%
Total	589 93.8%	27 4.3%	8 1.3%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%

Ch2 .537/Significance 0.911 / Gamma -1

Regardless of the fact that these are cabinet posts, they are less likely to be involved in leadership than the average MP. This table indicates that no woman involved in Status of Women cabinet posts also ran for leadership, lead a political party or become Prime Minister. Placing women in this ministry, appears to direct them away from the path to leadership entirely.

*"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and Leadership*

Examining "Pipeline" posts provides an interesting juxtaposition with the "Women's Interests" cabinet posts, as "Pipeline" posts are dominated by men, whereas the Status of Women is dominated by women.

Table 6-27

"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and Leadership

	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	574 97.5%	27 100%	7 87.5%	1 25%	609 100%
One or More	15 2.5%	0 0%	1 12.5%	3 75%	19 100%
Total	589 93.8%	27 4.3%	8 1.3%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%

Ch2 74.376/Significance 0.00 / Gamma .644

Of those that were Prime Minister, 75% were involved in "Pipeline" cabinet posts. To compare, no Prime Minister held a Status of Women cabinet position or a "Women's Interest" cabinet post. Thus, those involved in the male-dominated "Pipeline" posts included 3 of the 4 Prime Ministers to sit in Parliament from 1997-2011. None of these were a Status of Women cabinet minister or a "Women's Interests" cabinet minister.

When this is separated by sex, the gender gap becomes more evident. Only one woman was involved in "Pipeline" posts and she was in the category of "no leadership". This explains why this relationship has a high Chi Square for men but not women. On the other hand, the low numbers of women across the board helps to explain the -1 Gamma associated with this relationship for women.

Table 6-28

## "Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and Leadership, By Sex

Men					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	448 97%	21 100%	6 85.7%	1 25%	475 100%
One or More	14 3%	0 0%	1 14.3%	3 75%	19 100%
Total	462 93.5%	21 4.30%	7 1.4%	4 0.80%	494 100.00%
Ch2 61.357/Significance .000/ Gamma .656					
Women					
	No Leadership	Ran in Leadership Contest	Lead Political Party	Became Prime Minister	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	126 99.2%	6 100%	1 100%	0 0%	133 100%
One or More	1 0.8%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%
Total	127 94.8%	6 4.5%	1 0.7%	0 0%	134 100.00%
Ch2 0.056/Significance 0.973 / Gamma -1.00					

Women are not present in "Pipeline" posts in high enough numbers to understand the relationship between "Pipeline" posts and leadership. One other aspect that should be discussed is the fact that the majority of those involved in leadership did not hold a "Pipeline" post. This makes sense as this is testing cabinet posts. As only governing parties can hold cabinet posts, while leadership represents every party, there is some lack of congruency between leadership and cabinet posts.

#### 6.4 Longevity and Substantive Representation of Women

The third factor, longevity, examines whether women are as likely as men to become leaders of their parties and ultimately, Prime Minister. This met with varied results. Career length, or longevity, was more equally dispersed amongst the two sexes than leadership or "Pipeline" posts. However, longevity in Parliament is not sufficient on its own to confer "Success". Instead, a politician can remain in office while never achieving high levels of "Success" as measured in this study. The existence of "backbenchers" has been a fundamental and longstanding feature in Parliamentary governments. Kornberg (1976) describes a backbencher as a politician who "remain[s] virtually unknown and without influence after years in office" (10). Backbenchers are not influential (as defined by Kornberg), nor do they receive "top jobs". Therefore, regardless of whether or not a backbencher is able to hold electoral support and enjoy a relatively long political career, they are not necessarily deemed "Successful" as defined in this study; longevity is only considered a factor of "Success" when paired with the other factors. Career length, by sex, is displayed in Table 6-29.

Table 6-29

Career Length, By Sex

	Short	Medium Length	Longer Than Average	Total
Men	159 32.2%	179 36.2%	156 31.6%	494 100%
Women	55 41.0%	41 30.6%	38 28.4%	134 100%
Total	214 34.1%	220 35.0%	194 30.9%	628 100.0%

Ch2 3.738/Significance 0.154/ Gamma -.124

According to Table 6-29, the differences between the sexes in career length are not significant. Women and men have similar career lengths in Parliament, although women are more concentrated in short careers (41.1%) and less concentrated in long careers (28.4%), than men, who are more dispersed amongst all the career lengths. This is a less distinct relationship than between "Pipeline" posts and leadership, which display much more evident sex differences.

### *Women's Interests and Longevity*

What is the impact of legislative activity related to "Women's Interests" on the success of MPs? Table 6-30 demonstrates the relationship between legislative activity related to "Women's Interests" and career length. MPs who adopt "Women's Interests" are more likely to have long careers. This may indicate one of two things: a) that those who adopt women's issues consequently have longer careers; and b) MPs with long careers may be more likely to adopt women's issues because they have had more opportunities to do so.

Table 6-30

Legislative Activity Related to "Women's Interests"  
and Career Length of MPs

	None	One or More	Total
Short Career	124 45.4%	90 25.4%	214 34.1%
Average Career	89 32.6%	131 36.9%	220 35.0%
Long Career	60 22.0%	134 37.7%	194 30.9%
Total	273 100.0%	355 100.0%	628 100.0%

Chi2 31.477 / Significance 0.000/ Gamma 0.356

Although those with a long career are more likely to focus on women's interests, there is not much difference between those with average length careers (36.9%) and long careers (37.7%) and their likelihood of focusing on "Women's Interests". However, there is a significant difference between average careers and long careers when MPs do not perform legislative activities related to "Women's Interests". Those with no women's interest are more likely to have short to average length careers, whereas those with a "Women's Interest" are concentrated in average to long career lengths. Those with short careers are not likely to have performed legislative activities related to "Women's Interests" – whereas those with average or long careers are more likely than not to have been involved in these interests. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.00 level.

Table 6-31 examines this relationship further, by including an assessment of the role of MP sex. By breaking this relationship down by sex, we can determine whether men and women who focus on "Women's Interests" are equally likely to have long careers.



Table 6-31

Adoption of "Women's Interests" and Career Length of  
MPs, by Sex

Men			
	None	One or More	Total
Short Career	94 41.2%	65 24.4%	159 32.2%
Average Career	78 34.2%	101 38.0%	179 36.2%
Long Career	56 24.6%	100 37.6%	156 31.6%
Total	228 100.0%	266 100.0%	494 100.0%
Women			
Short Career	30 66.7%	25 28.1%	55 41.0%
Average Career	11 24.4%	30 33.7%	41 30.6%
Long Career	4 8.9%	34 38.2%	38 28.4%
Total	45 100.0%	89 100.0%	134 100.0%
Ch2 17.837/ 20.731/ Significance 0.000/ Gamma 0.3/0.645			

This relationship remains significant even when the control of sex is added, which suggests that it is a result of the original relationship and is not specific to either men or women. Both sexes are more likely to be involved in women's interests as they have longer careers. However, men are more likely to be involved in women's interests when they have average length careers than long careers – whereas, women continue to increase their participation as their career lengths increases. This might indicate that male politicians were less likely to focus on these issues decades ago but that women are still expected to represent "Women's Interests" currently. Alternatively, it might suggest that men with longer careers are less likely to be expected to

focus on these interests and instead are being placed in other, more prestigious positions, both in cabinet and committee work – which is not true for women.

Furthermore, women are less likely to have careers as lengthy as those of men – most women have short careers (41%), then average (30.6%) and then long (28.4%). Men, on the other hand, are most likely to have average length careers (36.2%), then short (32.2%) and then long (31.6%). The relationship between sex and career length is not statistically significant, however. Thus, women are not significantly less likely than men to have long careers.

Table 6-32  
"Pipeline" Cabinet Posts and Career Length

	Short	Medium Length	Longer Than Average	Total
No "Pipeline" Cabinet Post	210 34.5%	216 35.5%	183 30.0%	609 100%
One or More	4 21.1%	4 21.1%	11 57.9%	19 100%
Total	214 34.1%	220 35.0%	194 30.9%	628 100.0%

Chi2 6.693/Significance 0.035/ Gamma .407

Career length is not significantly impacted by cabinet posts in "Women's Interests" or the Status of Women. Involvement in the Status of Women reflects the same thing as career length by sex as women dominate the Status of Women. However, when sex is added as a control the relationship lessens. The majority (57.9%) of those involved in "Pipeline" posts, however, have "longer than average careers. Table 6-32 displays this.

### 6.5. "Success": What does it All Mean?

The definition of "Success" in this study included all three factors previously discussed, longevity, leadership, and "Pipeline" posts, and combines them into one variable.

Table 6-33

"Success", By Sex

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
Men	149 30.2%	318 64.4%	23 4.7%	4 0.8%	494 100%
Women	33 24.6%	96 71.6%	5 3.7%	0 0%	134 100%
Total	182 29%	414 65.9%	28 4.5%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%

Ch2 3.246/Significance 0.355/ Gamma 0.086

Women are proportionally more likely than men to achieve some level of "Success". However, they are less likely than men to achieve moderate success, and no woman achieved high success. Men also greatly outnumber women in every category. This effect echoes the relationships previously discussed in this paper; women are less likely to be involved in "Pipeline" and leadership, but amongst longevity there is minimal difference between the sexes. Therefore, much of the female presence in "low success" and "moderate success" can be accounted for through women's longevity. However, the fact that few women achieved "moderate success" and none achieved "high success" points to the lack of women in leadership and "Pipeline" posts, the two other facets of "Success".

### *Women's Interests and "Success"*

When "Success" is cross tabulated with "Women's Interests", it is obvious that although the majority of those involved in "Women's Interests" are concentrated in "low success", this is not significantly different from those who do not hold "Women's Interests". However, as this category includes the majority of MPs, both men and women, "Women's Interests" do not represent a female-dominated variable.

Table 6-34

"Success" and Involvement in "Women's Interests"

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No Involvement in "Women's Interests"	60 22%	205 75.1%	8 2.9%	0 0%	273 100%
One or More	122 34.4%	209 58.9%	20 5.6%	4 1.1%	355 100%
Total	182 29%	414 65.9%	28 4.5%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%

Ch2 19.935/Significance .000/ Gamma -.187

This relationship is statistically significant with a Chi Square of 19.935. However, the Gamma is -.187, illustrating that the relationship is not strong.

However, when only "Women's Interests" cabinet posts are included, a different picture emerges. Those who sat as a Minister for a "Women's Interest", were much less likely to achieve higher levels of "Success".

Table 6-35

"Success" and "Women's Interests" Cabinet Post

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No "Women's Interests" Cabinet Post	175 28.6%	409 66.9%	23 3.8%	4 0.7%	611 100%
One or More	7 41.2%	5 29.4%	5 29.4%	0 0%	17 100%
Total	182 29%	414 65.9%	28 4.5%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%
Chi2 28.943/Significance .000/ Gamma 0.084					

Table 6-35 illustrates that MPs who held a "Women's Interest" cabinet post significantly less frequently had high levels of "Success". The category with the highest frequency of MPs with "one or more" posts (7 or 41.2%) had no "Success" whatsoever.

Even though those with "Women's Interest" cabinet posts are all within the executive they are *less likely than the average MP* to achieve a high level of success. They are also more likely than the average MP to be within the category of "no success" whatsoever. They are, however, more likely to achieve "moderate success".

This relationship remains significant for men when sex is added as a control. Table 6-37 shows the level of success amongst men and women who held "Women's Interest" cabinet posts.

Table 6-36

"Success" and "Women's Interests" Cabinet Post, By Sex

Men

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No "Women's Interests" Cabinet Post	145 97.3%	316 99.4%	19 82.6%	4 100%	484 98%
One or More	4 2.7%	2 0.6%	4 17.4%	0 0%	10 2%
Total	149 100%	318 100%	23 100%	4 100%	494 100%

Ch2 30.917/Significance 0.000/Gamma .202

Women

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No "Women's Interests" Cabinet Post	30 96.20%	93 98.80%	4 80%	0 0%	127 94.6%
One or More	3 9.1%	3 3.1%	1 20%	0 0%	7 5.2%
Total	33 100%	96 100%	5 100%	0 0%	134 100%

Ch2 4.056/Significance .132/ Gamma -.174

Although men held a larger number of these posts, women are proportionally more likely to hold one. A larger percentage of men that held one of these positions (40%) reached a level of success

above "low", whereas only 14.3% of women that held such a post reached comparable "Success".

*The Status of Women and "Success"*

Those involved in the Status of Women largely did not achieve moderate or high levels of "Success". As with involvement in "Women's Interests", those involved with Status of Women are concentrated in the "low success" category, as seen in Table 6-37.

Table 6-37					
"Success" and Involvement in the Status of Women					
	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No Involvement in the Status of Women	166 91.2%	368 88.9%	27 96.4%	3 75%	620 100%
Involvement in the Status of Women	16 8.8%	46 11.1%	1 3.6%	1 25%	8 100%
Total	182 29%	414 65.9%	28 4.5%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%
Ch2 3.072 /Significance 0.381/ Gamma 0.059					

However, when this is broken down by sex, the gender-specific effect becomes clearer.

Table 6-38

"Success" and Involvement in the Status of Women, By Sex

Men

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No Involvement in the Status of Women	142 95.3%	308 96.9%	22 95.7%	3 75%	475 96.2%
Involvement in the Status of Women	7 4.7%	10 3.1%	1 4.3%	1 25%	19 3.8%
Total	149 100%	318 100%	23 100%	4 100%	494 100%

Ch2 5.571/Significance 0.134/Gamma -0.049

Women

	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No Involvement in the Status of Women	24 72.7%	60 62.5%	5 100%	0 0%	89 66.4%
Involvement in the Status of Women	9 27.3%	36 37.5%	0 0%	0 0%	45 33.6%
Total	33 100%	96 100%	5 100%	0 0%	134 100%

Ch2 3.778/Significance 0.151 / Gamma 0.061

Of those that are involved with the Status of Women that achieve moderate or high success, all are men. Even though women constitute the majority of those involved in the Status of Women, those that are involved in the Status of Women *and* success, are all men.



Table 6-39 illustrates the relationship between "Success" and Status of Women cabinet posts.

Table 6-39					
"Success" and Status of Women Cabinet Post					
	No Success Factor	Low Success	Moderate Success	High Success	Total
No Status of Women Cabinet Post	180 98.9%	408 98.6%	28 100%	4 100%	620 100%
Status of Women Cabinet Post	2 1.1%	6 1.4%	0 0%	0 0%	8 100%
Total	182 29%	414 65.9%	28 4.5%	4 0.6%	628 100.0%
Ch23.027 /Significance .381 / Gamma .059					

It is not necessary to break it down by sex, as only women hold these posts. Those who held Status of Women cabinet posts, were less likely than the average MP to reach high levels of success. In fact, no Minister Responsible for the Status of Women rose above "low success". However, this "low success" can be attributed to longevity. Status of Women ministers did not achieve "Success" in the other aspects, leadership and "Pipeline". To be appointed to the responsibility of the Status of Women is to afford that MP fewer opportunities in leadership and "Pipeline" than that of the average MP. As this is a female-only position, the fact that it results in such a low level of success is indicative of the power balance of gender currently in Parliament. The rates of "Success" amongst positions that are less female-specific (such as "Involvement in Women's Interests" and the Status of Women as a whole) are higher than that of the position that is female-only. When women substantively represent women on the cabinet level, they have less of a chance to achieve prestige in Parliament than if they had not been appointed to cabinet at all.

To substantively represent women in cabinet, as a women, is a career direction that largely does not lead to "Success" as conceptualized in this thesis.

## CHAPTER 7:

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The period of 1997 to 2011 presents an interesting case study for women's representation.

Although much had been achieved in previous decades, with increases in the number of women in Parliament and in the executive, scholars agree that this momentum has greatly disappeared since its peak in the early to mid nineties (Bashevkin, 2009; Trimble and Arscott, 2003).

Particularly, women were slow to enter higher levels of prestige and power, such as the executive and party leadership. Although various explanations have been presented to explain the stagnation in women's progress, previous chapters of this study have explored the role of legislative activity of MPs in this relationship. In other words, how early committee membership in particular, affects whether or not politicians will be appointed to prestigious positions.

Specifically, it examines whether they will become party leaders (and, in the case of governing parties, prime minister). Since both committee involvement and cabinet posts are allocated by party leaders, this illustrates a resource-hoarding effect, in which women are directed away from the paths to power to lower prestige positions.

Increasing the number of women in Parliament can have a number of benefits. Chapter Two discussed the need for descriptive representation in Parliament, finding that more women in Parliament could result in more support for women's issues (and thus, descriptive representation of women leads to better substantive representation of women). However, more women in Parliament (and in higher levels of government) could have some less obvious consequences, as well. In particular, more female role models in government, and in high status positions, increases the number of women and girls that envision themselves as politicians, thereby

encouraging a cycle of participation by women. Additionally, an increase in the female presence in government has the potential to support change in Parliament to create a more woman-friendly political environment (as women have been found to operate differently on committees and within organizations). Alternatively, if women continue to be underrepresented in government the opposite will persist – women's issues will continue to be ignored, fewer women will be persuaded to run for office and the Canadian government will remain a male-dominated sphere.

Earlier in this thesis, it was established that women throughout the world are placed in cabinet portfolios related to "Women's Interests". This is not necessarily true for the Parliament of Canada for the 36<sup>th</sup> to 40<sup>th</sup> Sittings of Parliament. Not only were the higher prestige "Pipeline" posts dominated by men, but the "Women's Interests" portfolios of Environment and Health were also occupied by a majority of men. Women did consistently hold the position of the Status of Women, however this position has largely been held by Ministers of State (Ministers with no portfolio) or by Ministers with other portfolios, thus a doing double-duty. Which cabinet positions were held by women? Of the women that did sit in cabinet, many were Ministers of State, some were Ministers of Status of Women, few were responsible for "Women's Interests" cabinet posts and one was responsible for a "Pipeline" cabinet post.

This thesis hypothesized that since more women would be involved with "Women's Interests", they would therefore be less likely than men to be "Successful" and be appointed to highly prestigious positions. Women were in fact more likely than not to sit on "Women's Interests" committees, and much more likely to be involved in legislative activity related to the Status of Women than their male counterparts. This involvement was not correlated with "Success" in Parliament. Involvement in either of these issue areas did not frequently overlap with "Pipeline" issue areas. Therefore, it seems that representing women on "Women's Interest" committees and

in cabinet may penalize members. However, involvement in the Status of Women Committee seemed to have a different effect on men than on women. Incidentally, the one female who was involved in a "Pipeline" cabinet post, was not involved in Status of Women – yet, three male politicians involved in the Status of Women were also appointed to "Pipeline" cabinet posts. This illustrates that the effect was not equal for both sexes.

What does this indicate for the representation of women in Canadian politics? The substantive representation of women, particularly on the Status of Women committee, does not correspond with pipeline posts for women. However, this relationship was not found to be significant in this time period, as there was only one female MP who held a pipeline portfolio. Women are simply not present in more prestigious posts at present. This is not to say that women should not hold posts as the Minister of Status of Women, but that this should not be incompatible with reaching higher levels of "Success". In other words, in order for there to be increased gender equality in the higher levels of power in Parliament, there must also be a shift in how "Women's Interests" committees are prioritized. If women-dominated committees are considered to be low prestige, it is more difficult for women to break into the higher levels of governmental power, and consequently hold posts such as party leader or Prime Minister.

The second hypothesis, that "Success" will differ by party, found varying results. The Liberal Party was more likely than the Conservative Party to appoint female members to cabinet. However, of the women included in the notable women section, most had been involved in legislative activity related to "Pipeline" issues, and only one was involved in the Status of Women Committee, despite her party. However, the NDP has had a history of more female leaders than the other federal parties (two, Audrey McLaughlin and Alexa McDonough) indicating that the pathways to leadership may indeed be easier to navigate for women in the

NDP than in the other parties. Unfortunately, so few women have been able to achieve power that it is difficult to find links between trends in leadership amongst the small number of women that have been able to climb those ranks.

What explains the current level of gender (in)equality in Parliament? It seems that society believes that the political system is not broken, and therefore, there is no need to fix it – or that in fact, Canada has reached gender parity in Parliament. However, this thesis demonstrates that there is something broken within government; although women have entered Parliament in higher numbers, they still are not near the numbers of men and are almost entirely absent from the top jobs. If gender equality continues to be ignored, or disregarded, women will remain underrepresented within Parliament.

In order to get a broader understanding regarding what has gone astray studies such as this are not only necessary, but essential. However, not only must the committee activities and cabinet posts of Members of Parliament be included in assessments of legislative activities, but their overall activities should also be taken into consideration. Committee membership is one way in which a MP could be said to be substantively representing women. This project could be expanded to include a larger period of time, as well as a broader understanding of what is meant by "substantive representation". Although involvement in "Women's Interests" and "women's rights" committees are not correlated with top jobs in Parliament, we still do not fully understand with the role of factors such as bill proposals and campaign platforms. How does this type of substantive representation of women impact the ultimate "Success" of an MP? Does it compound the effects?

Not only is it imperative to understand what influences the "Success" of female MPs, but it is also important to determine how to make the road more accessible. Presently, women are not present in the top jobs in Canada's Parliament. It appears that these positions may, in actuality, be becoming less obtainable for female politicians (as illustrated by the decrease in the number of portfolios held by women in cabinet). In order to reverse this effect, it is necessary to know what has changed, and what must continue to change, in order for women to achieve equal levels of opportunities as men. As Canada seems to have reached a type of post-feminism, a new type of obstacle, is it a broader public education regarding equality that will affect women's careers? Is it a change in governing party? Could new institutional changes (such as quotas, or a national childcare policy) allow women to overcome electoral barriers, thereby representing a larger proportion of the Members of Parliament? Should the means by which members are appointed to committees and cabinet be reviewed and reformed, opting for a consensus-based decision rather than an executive-dominated decision?

If measures are not taken to increase women in Parliament, and women remain underrepresented, the political environment will remain male-dominated, and less than encouraging for women considering a political career. If women cannot break through the glass ceiling that is the executive, it is possible that not only will the current environment in government continue, but in fact, become exponentially worse.

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