A RISK INTERPRETATION
OF SELF-DISCLOSURE

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JAMES McCLOSKEY
A RISK INTERPRETATION OF SELF-DISCLOSURE

by

James McCloskey, B.A.

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St. John's Newfoundland
ABSTRACT

Several reward/cost factors influencing self-disclosure were examined within the alleged context of developing an audio-visual training program in the evaluation of facial cues. Tested individually, 40 male and 40 female subjects were led to believe that their facial expressions either did or did not reveal when they were lying. The consistency of this information with their expectations and whether personal or impersonal disclosure would be favourably evaluated were also manipulated. Based on exchange theory considerations of risk and trust, these variables were expected to interact such that they would alter the perceived rewards and costs associated with disclosing information about oneself. A number of personality variables influencing disclosure were controlled for in the experiment.

Subjects chose 20 topics, from a list of 35 topics varying in intimacy value, which they wished to discuss while being videotaped. Their self-rated anxiety was also assessed. The results of the analyses of covariance on these two variables did not offer general support for the risk interpretation of self-disclosure although specific results offered partial support for the model. Two significant interactions suggested the operation of other variables related to the control people feel they have over their facial expressions.
and the causes to which they attribute their behavior. It was suggested that these variables may have affected how the experimental variables were interpreted by the subjects and thus, did not provide a very powerful test of the risk model of self-disclosure. It was suggested that these variables be examined in terms of how they alter the reward/cost outcomes in the present experimental context.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS AND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation Checks</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX F</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Response frequency by disclosure cue condition on the relation of personal</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disclosure and maturity (recall).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Summary of Analysis of Covariance on</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intimacy of disclosure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Group means for intimacy of chosen disclosure adjusted for covariates and</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>locus of control effects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Summary of Analysis of Covariance on</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the anxiety measure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure 1 | Regression lines depicting the transparency by consistency by locus of control interaction for intimacy of disclosure | 35 |
| Figure 2 | Regression lines depicting the transparency by disclosure cue by locus of control interaction for intimacy of disclosure | 38 |
INTRODUCTION

A common feature of social psychological experimentation and a necessary one in clinical settings is that people are asked to reveal information about themselves which at times may be of a personal or intimate nature. Jourard (1964, 1968) has used the term "self-disclosure" to refer to this verbal information that people reveal to each other through their interactions. Goodstein and Reinecker (1974) have defined disclosure more specifically in terms of an intentional sharing of information about oneself with another person. While disclosure has been defined in terms of verbal interaction, it has also been recognized that it may encompass non-linguistic forms of communication (Cozby, 1973). Research to date however, has focused on verbal disclosure, following from Jourard's definition. Self-disclosure has been viewed as a key factor in the development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships and research has attempted to determine those factors, both situational and personal, which influence disclosure and to determine how disclosure influences human interaction (Jourard, 1964, 1968, 1971; Cozby, 1973; Goodstein & Reinecker, 1974).

Recently, self-disclosure has been interpreted in terms of exchange theory formulations of risk and trust (Ellison & Firestone, 1974; Grant, Hannah & McCloskey, 1975).
According to the exchange interpretation, peoples' actions toward other individuals are in part determined by their assessment of the reward/cost factors which are present in the situation. Lundstedt (1966), following this exchange theory premise, defined interpersonal risk in terms of an individual's willingness to relinquish his or her power and influence over another person. According to this theory, trust and risk are complementary concepts based on one's consideration of current reward/cost factors and one's past experience in similar situations. Thus, human interaction is explicable in terms of the perceived outcomes or consequences of one's actions in a situation.

For example, relatively intimate disclosure may be seen as a reward to the recipients of the disclosure indicating to them that they are liked and trusted by the discloser (Worthy, Gary & Kahn, 1969). Disclosers, in turn, may perceive that their disclosure is potentially rewarding since it may lead to a favourable evaluation or liking from the recipient. In terms of Lundstedt's approach, the discloser is giving up some degree of control in anticipation of a favourable outcome. Although this example was given in terms of rewards it must be kept in mind that within this exchange formulation it is the relative weight of rewards to costs which influences how the person acts. In this case, the reward of being
favourably evaluated and liked by the recipient may outweigh the possible loss of control to the recipient.

Lundstedt also saw personality factors as important intervening variables influencing interpersonal risk. Although Lundstedt did not specify what any of these factors were, Lillibridge and Lundstedt (1967) found that other measures of trust and risk taking (dispositional measures) correlated highly with their own measure of interpersonal risk. Their scale also correlated highly with a measure of confidence in interpersonal contexts (self-esteem) such that those who were low in willingness to relinquish power and influence over others were also less confident in themselves. One would expect that locus of control (Rotter, 1966), a variable assessing the extent to which people have a general belief that they control their own outcomes, would relate to interpersonal risk since risk is defined in terms of giving up control. Those with a belief in internal control would be expected to be higher in interpersonal risk since they feel they have more control over the outcomes of a situation. This variable will be considered in more detail in a later section.

From the example, given previously, of disclosure in terms of risk, it can be seen that one of the many ways in which individuals can give up some of their control and influence over another person is to reveal information
about themselves to that person; that is, to disclose some personal aspect of themselves. In terms of the rewards or costs in such a situation, disclosers have to consider the possibility that the information they reveal may be used against them or as the basis for a negative evaluation (Ellison & Firestone, 1974; Grant, Hannah & McCloskey, 1975).

A number of findings from the disclosure research fit the risk interpretation. Rivenbark (in Jourard, 1968) found that adolescents reported being less willing to disclose personal information about themselves to strangers or a television or radio audience. They were more willing to disclose to friends or family members. The interpersonal risk theory would predict such a finding since there would be greater costs involved in disclosing to a stranger. Such costs may possibly stem from the fact that the closer has no expectations regarding how personal disclosure will be received by a stranger whereas when disclosing to friends, past experience probably provides expectations concerning how disclosure of personal information will be accepted. This same rationale fits research indicating that people disclose more information to people they like (Jourard, 1971).

Worthy et al. (1969) examined disclosure in relation to exchange theory, as a behavioral indicator of trust.
They argued that disclosure can serve as a reward factor indicating to the recipient that he or she is liked and trusted by the discloser. Consistent with this interpretation, they found that the intimacy of exchanged disclosure in a small group followed a norm of reciprocity such that more intimate disclosure was given to those from whom the person had received intimate disclosure. Also, more intimate disclosure was made to those who were initially liked and final liking was greater for those who gave more intimate disclosure. Other investigations have also confirmed this reciprocity effect of disclosure and have construed disclosure in exchange terms as a behavioral indicator of trust (Schlenker, Helm & Tedeschi, 1973; Ellison & Firestone, 1974; Rubin, 1975). Ellison and Firestone (1974) provided the most general definition of trust as "... placing of a person's outcomes under the complete or partial control of another with the expectation that the other will respond so as to maximize goal attainment or minimize negative outcomes." (p. 655). This definition is a more specific statement of Lundstedt's concept of interpersonal risk.

The evidence suggests the usefulness of interpreting self-disclosure in terms of risk and trust. However, consideration of specific factors contributing to inhibit disclosure, by increasing the risks or costs involved in
disclosure situations, have been neglected. The present investigation then, attempted to examine the influence of several cost factors which may influence disclosure in experimental contexts.

As already noted, the risk interpretation of disclosure accounts for the fact that people are less willing to disclose information about themselves to a stranger than to friends or family. A more important and interesting finding in this respect is that people will disclose personal information to a stranger when they expect that they will never have to interact with the person again (Rickers-Ovsiankina & Kusmin, 1958; Rubin, 1975). The interesting feature about these findings is that the potential costs associated with disclosure to a stranger can be attenuated by the expectation that one need not interact with the person again.

A second, equally important factor which may influence disclosure to a stranger has been suggested by Harré and Secord (1973). They have suggested that in both laboratory and natural settings, people may discuss more personal topics with a stranger they never expect to see again because they are capable of falsifying the information they reveal about themselves without fear of being found out. These authors suggest that an individual's
capability of falsifying disclosure is an important
determinant of how the person responds in many experi-
mental contexts. In terms of risk, the perception that
one can falsify disclosure without detection should
reduce the perceived risks involved in disclosing personal
information. By default, it may also serve to enhance
the rewards relative to costs since the person is free
to falsify disclosure in order to be favourably evaluated
by another. In a more general sense, the fact that a
person may be able to falsify his or her disclosure in
an experimental context without fear of discovery con-
tributes an additional variable to current considerations
of artifacts in experimental research. The present
investigation attempted to determine the role of a person's
assessment of whether he or she can falsify responses
without detection as a determinant of self-disclosure in
a specific experimental context.

If, as suggested earlier, there are risks associated
with disclosing personal information about oneself, then
when situational determinants do not attenuate the risks,
one would expect some degree of anxiety to be associated
with disclosing personal information. Cozby (1973) and
Argyle and Kendon (1967) have both argued that with
increasing levels of intimacy of disclosure, costs become
more salient than rewards and that the most obvious cost
is in terms of an increase in anxiety over revealing information one would prefer to keep private. In support of this argument, Grant et al. (1975) have shown that individuals who anticipated answering personal questions were more anxious and less willing to proceed with a disclosure session than those who anticipated answering neutral questions. Subjects who were more anxious were also less willing to continue with the disclosure session.

It was the purpose of the present investigation to examine the influence that peoples' assessment of whether they can falsify disclosure without detection has on their anxiety and choice of disclosure. Specifically, in terms of the risk model, it was hypothesized that when people are aware that they cannot falsify their responses without discovery, they will be more anxious and choose less intimate disclosure when given a chance to do so.

Only one study has attempted to manipulate peoples' assessment of whether they can falsify disclosure without detection. Grant et al. (1975) manipulated perceived transparency by leading subjects to believe that their facial expressions would or would not reveal when they were lying. Presumably, the restriction of this alternative increases the costs associated with disclosing personal information. Thus, subjects who are told that their facial expressions reveal when they are lying (i.e., they are transparent) should be more anxious and
less willing to continue with a disclosure session in which they anticipate having to answer personal questions. The findings however, did not reveal any effect for this manipulation.

Although this might suggest a failure of the risk interpretation of self-disclosure, such a conclusion must be tempered by several restrictions on this result. Failure of the transparency manipulation may have been attributable to the fact that subjects may have been uncertain about how their responses would be evaluated. Rosenberg (1965, 1969) has shown that evaluation apprehension may be an important determinant of how subjects respond in experimental contexts in which they feel they are being evaluated. Evaluation apprehension refers to the person's concern about being positively evaluated. According to Rosenberg, in an evaluative context an individual will be concerned about being favourably evaluated and will respond in order to maximize the possibility of being positively evaluated. The major dependent variable in the Grant et al. study was the subjects' indication of their willingness to continue with the experiment. Thus, the subjects could have inferred from the demand characteristic of the situation (developing an audio-visual program for clinical students) that their continued participation would be
favourably evaluated. That is, there were greater costs involved in withdrawing from the experiment than with the risk of having one's falsifications detected.

A second important consideration stems from the fact that the transparency manipulation attempted to influence the subjects' belief in whether their facial expressions reveal information about themselves. Attention then, should be given to whether the communication is congruent or discrepant with the individual's perception of his or her transparency. Grant et al. (1975) included a check for the consistency of the transparency communication but the majority of subjects reported that the communication was "somewhat consistent" with their own evaluation of their transparency.

The general literature on the disconfirmation of expectancy suggests that discrepancy may yield some degree of uncertainty about one's position. Jones and Gerard (1967) have suggested that following disconfirmation a person may be motivated to seek out more information in order to establish his or her position with certainty. Brickman (1972) has confirmed that discrepancy can lead to information seeking. He has also found that subjects who received discrepant information were more tense and uncertain about their position, suggesting to him that discrepancy arouses two competing tendencies: conflict
(dissonance) and curiosity. He cited his own and other evidence indicating that while the information value of the discrepant feedback and the subject's curiosity may lead to information seeking, subjects are also cautious and conservative in altering their beliefs. That is, the dissonance and possibly suspicion aroused by the discrepancy move the person to reject the information.

This analysis suggests two competing hypotheses in the present context. First, if transparency is presumed to increase the costs associated with disclosing personal information, then the addition of discrepant information may increase costs further by making subjects uncertain about whether they can reliably falsify their responses. Since this conflict or uncertainty is likely to be responded to in terms of rejecting the discrepant information, it would be predicted that there would be decreasing costs in the following order: disconfirming transparency, confirming transparency, disconfirming non-transparency and confirming non-transparency. The rationale behind this prediction is that if persons initially perceive the risk of disclosing false personal information as high (i.e., they are transparent), disconfirming this expectation will contribute to the costs in terms of uncertainty more so than either confirming transparency or disconfirming non-transparency.
Risks are lowest when non-transparency is confirmed. The fact that individuals tend to be conservative and maintain their prior belief (Brickman, 1972) explains why disconfirming transparency rather than disconfirming non-transparency yields greater costs.

The second alternative assumes that uncertainty motivates the individual to seek more information. This suggests that for disconfirmation the person should be more willing to disclose information in order to test the validity of the communication.

A pilot study attempting to examine discrepancy in relation to transparency, offers tentative support for the first interpretation but the results are questionable due to a number of methodological inadequacies.

The present investigation was basically a replication of the Grant et al. (1975) study but included discrepancy of the transparency information from the subjects' expectations as a variable. The demand characteristic of the situation was controlled in two ways. First, the major dependent variable was the person's choice of intimacy rated disclosure topics rather than his or her willingness to continue with the experiment. Second, a disclosure cue indicating how the subject could respond and be favourably evaluated was also included. Rosenberg (1965, 1969) has shown that such evaluative cues can be important
determinants of how a person responds in an experiment. In conjunction with the transparency and discrepancy variables, the disclosure cue indicating that intimate disclosure would be favourably evaluated would serve to increase the costs associated with the other two variables. Thus, it was expected that these three variables would interact such that when subjects are told that relatively neutral disclosure choices are favourably evaluated there would be no effect for either transparency or discrepancy. Subjects would respond according to the cue since the cue would add a reward component to a low risk behavior.

When the disclosure cue indicates that subjects will be favourably evaluated for personal disclosure, an interaction between transparency and discrepancy was anticipated. Subjects who receive information disconfirming their transparency should be more anxious and choose less intimate disclosure than those who receive confirmation of their transparency. These latter subjects should be more anxious and choose less intimate disclosure than those who have their non-transparency disconfirmed who in turn should be more anxious and choose less intimate disclosure than those who have their non-transparency confirmed.

The predicted interaction was expected when other variables, notably personality factors, were controlled. Lundstedt (1966) suggested that personality factors
influence interpersonal risk and research on self-disclosure suggests that a number of personality variables influence disclosure. Burhenne and Mirels (1970) have suggested that social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) should relate to disclosure since people high in the approval seeking motive should act to protect their vulnerable self-esteem. Consistent with this interpretation, they found that social desirability, as measured by the social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), was negatively related to written disclosure. Grant et al. (1975) failed to find a relation between social desirability and willingness to continue in their experiment possibly due to the demand characteristic of the measure of willingness to continue.

Watson and Friend (1969) have constructed scales to assess two specific forms of anxiety. The first, social anxiety and distress (SAD) is a reliable indicator of social avoidance (anxiety). They have shown that people high in SAD avoid social interactions, talk less, prefer to work alone, were more worried and less confident about their social relationships. This variable appears to relate to how people approach social situations and could conceivably be a determinant of disclosure.

Their second measure assesses fear of negative evaluation (FNE), a concept very similar to Rosenberg's evaluation apprehension. Watson and Friend (1969) have
found that subjects who are high in FNE tend to be more nervous in evaluative situations and work harder to avoid disapproval and to gain approval. One might expect that FNE would interact with the three variables in the present experiment such that the predicted effect would be stronger for those high in FNE.

Ellison and Firestone (1974) and Ryckman, Sherman and Burgess (1973) have contrasted individuals who have a generalized expectancy for internal control (internals) with those who have an expectancy for external control (externals) in terms of disclosure. In both cases, internals were more willing to disclose information about themselves than externals, based on their responses to a disclosure questionnaire. Ellison and Firestone (1974) also found that internals were more willing to disclose highly intimate information about themselves to an interviewer they did not know. The locus of control measure (Rotter, 1966) assesses peoples' expectancy that the outcome of their behavior is contingent on external events beyond their control (external control) or on their own directed actions (internal control). In the present investigation it was expected that the internal subjects would be less influenced by the experimental manipulations of transparency, consistency and disclosure cue.

A 40-item measure of self-disclosure (Jourard, 1971),
shown to predict actual disclosure (Jourard & Resnick, 1970), was used to assess the initial disclosure level of the subjects. Although disclosure scales are not generally very predictive of actual disclosure, Cozby (1973) has noted that this scale may be more valid since it assesses an individual's willingness to disclose information to a stranger as well as the individual's past history of disclosure. Other scales only assess the latter component of disclosure. This measure was included in the present study as a control for individual differences in the subjects' disclosure levels.

In summary, the present investigation attempted to examine the influence of several situational and personal variables on anxiety and choice of disclosure in an experimental context. Specifically, it was predicted that when personality differences are controlled and the individuals perceive that intimate disclosure would yield a favourable evaluation for themselves, feedback concerning whether they can falsify their responses without detection should interact with the discrepancy of this feedback from their initial expectation to influence their anxiety and choice of disclosure.
METHOD

Overview

Subjects were tested individually in two separate sessions. In the first session their responses to a number of questions were videotaped for the alleged purpose of evaluating their transparency. In the second session they anticipated a second taping which they were told would be used for training clinical students to detect facial cues. They were given feedback leading them to believe that they were either transparent or non-transparent.

Measures were obtained of the subjects' own expectation about their transparency, social desirability, social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, locus of control and disclosure level during the first session.

In the second session measures of the subjects' self-rated anxiety and their choice of intimacy rated disclosure topics constituted the dependent variables.

Design

The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial with two levels of transparency (transparent - non-transparent), two levels of consistency of the feedback (consistent - inconsistent) and two levels of disclosure cue (personal disclosure favoured - impersonal disclosure favoured). A total of 115 subjects were assigned randomly to the experimental
conditions with the restriction that subjects were assigned to transparency conditions such that there were 10 subjects per experimental condition. The only other restriction was that there were equal numbers of males and females assigned to each group.

One hundred and fifteen subjects were run in order to meet the requirements of the design and the operational definition of consistency which excluded all subjects who responded in the middle of the scale assessing their expected transparency rating. Only the data for 80 subjects were used in the analysis.

Subjects

Fifty-six male and 59 female Memorial University undergraduates served as paid volunteer participants. Each subject was paid $3.00 for participating in the experiment.

Procedure

Upon entering for the first session, subjects were seated facing a television camera and monitor. The experimenter explained that the study was part of an ongoing project to develop an audio-visual program to train clinical psychology students to evaluate non-verbal cues. At this point the concept of transparency was introduced as follows:

For both sessions of this experiment we will be making a videotape of your facial expressions as you
give answers to a number of questions. These tapes will be viewed by a group of clinical psychologists who will try and determine from your facial expressions whether or not you were telling the truth on each question. This will give us a measure of your transparency, the degree to which your facial expressions or non-verbal cues give you away. As an example of transparency, you may know of someone who blushes every time they try to hide something from you; yet by blushing they are letting you know that they are not telling you something.

Following this introduction, subjects were asked to indicate on an 11-point scale their own felt transparency; that is, their estimate of how transparent they thought they were (see Appendix C). Subjects were then given a list of 24 topics to be used for the taping session. These topics were selected to be relatively neutral with respect to intimacy of disclosure (see Appendix B). Ten of the topics were starred and subjects were told that for each of the starred items they would be asked to lie but for all the other questions they should respond truthfully. The 10 lie items had been selected at random and were the same for each subject. After the subjects had a chance to
examine the topics the experimenter reminded them to lie for each of the starred items. The experimenter then started the videorecorder, asked the subject to look at the camera when answering a question and then began asking the questions. Following the taping, the experimenter played back a small portion of the tape (the last 3 or 4 questions) to let the subject know that a tape had actually been made. He then asked the subjects if they had remembered to lie for the appropriate questions. If a subject reported that he or she had forgotten to lie for one or more items, the experimenter made a note of the item(s) and told the subject that the clinicians' rating of their transparency would only be based on the remaining items.

Subjects were then asked to indicate on an 11-point scale the rating they thought they would receive from the clinicians (see Appendix D). They were then asked to complete a number of questionnaires. These measures were the personality measures of social desirability, social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, locus of control and self-disclosure level and were administered in that order.

When subjects had completed the questionnaires, an appointment was made for the second taping session and the experimenter informed the subject that his or her rating
of transparency would be available at that time. The experimenter explained that the clinicians who were rating the tape did not know in advance that the subject had been asked to lie for any of the questions.

Upon entering for the second session (the next day) subjects were again seated facing the camera and monitor. The transparency and consistency manipulations were then presented as follows. The consistency of the feedback was determined by comparing a subject's expected rating of transparency (see Appendix D) with the standard communicated rating of transparency. A difference of two points or less was defined as consistent and a difference of four points or greater was defined as inconsistent. The feedback that subjects received was as follows:

For the transparent disconfirmed condition:
Contrary to your own rating of your transparency, the clinicians' ratings indicated that you were very transparent. They were able to detect from your facial expressions 8 of the 10 times you were asked to lie.

For the transparent confirmed condition:
Consistent with your own rating of your transparency, the clinicians' ratings indicated that you were very transparent. They were able to detect from your facial expressions 8 of the 10 times you were asked to lie.
For the non-transparent confirmed condition:

Consistent with your own rating of your transparency, the clinicians' ratings indicated that you were not at all transparent. They were only able to detect, from your facial expressions, 2 of the 10 times you were asked to lie.

For the non-transparent disconfirmed condition:

Contrary to your own rating of your transparency, the clinicians' ratings indicated that you were not at all transparent. They were only able to detect, from your facial expressions, 2 of the 10 times you were asked to lie.

To make the consistency or inconsistency of the feedback explicit, subjects were also reminded of the transparency rating they predicted they would receive.

Following this manipulation subjects were told that since they were one of the most/least transparent people tested so far, the tape they were about to make would be used in conjunction with a tape from a non-transparent/transparent person to train clinical psychology students to detect and evaluate facial cues. Subjects were then asked to sign a release form for the use of the tape. Subjects were then told that they would be asked to choose 20 topics from a list of 35 discussion topics for use in the taping. They were also told that they were expected to answer all
20 questions truthfully. The disclosure cue manipulation was then administered in the guise of providing the subject with some background information on the discussion topics:

Personal disclosure favoured condition:

Previous research has indicated that regardless of what people actually talk about, those who talk about personal or intimate topics are more mature than those who talk about non-personal topics.

Impersonal disclosure favoured condition:

Previous research has indicated that regardless of what people actually talk about, those who discuss personal or intimate topics are lacking in maturity.

Before subjects were given the list of topics to choose from they were asked to complete a 32-item mood checklist which contained the dependent measure of anxiety (see Appendix E). The checklist was introduced as a means of assessing how people felt about being videotaped.

Upon completion of the checklist subjects were given the list of 35 intimacy rated disclosure topics (see Appendix A). They were asked to look them over and circle the numbers for the 20 topics they wished to use for the taping session.

Following this, subjects were given a debriefing questionnaire on which they were asked to recall the
transparency rating they received from the clinicians. (see Appendix F). They were also asked to indicate on 11-point scales how consistent they thought the rating was with their expectation, how confident they were in the clinical ratings and how personal and intimate they thought the topics were. A number of other items checked for their recall of the disclosure cue manipulation, subject suspicions about the purpose of the experiment and the plausibility of the context.

The experimenter then explained that the experiment was over and that a second tape would not be made. He explained the nature of the experiment in detail with particular attention to explaining the manipulations of transparency and disclosure cue. Any questions were answered and the subjects were probed for possible suspicions. Subjects were then given their payment slips, thanked for their participation and requested not to discuss the experiment with other students until the end of the school term.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Manipulation Checks

Before presenting the main results the tests of the manipulation checks will be presented.

Transparency manipulation. When asked to indicate the transparency rating they had received from the clinicians all subjects were able to correctly recall the rating they had received.

Consistency manipulation. As a check on the manipulation of the given rating with the subjects' expected rating, subjects were asked to indicate the extent to which the rating they received was consistent with the rating they predicted they would receive. Subjects responded by checking the appropriate point on an 11-point scale ranging from "not at all consistent" (0) through "somewhat consistent" (5) to "very consistent" (10). Those in consistent information conditions perceived the rating they received as more consistent with their predictions ($\bar{X} = 7.38$) than those in inconsistent information conditions ($\bar{X} = 1.18$), $F(1, 72) = 178.38, p < .001$; confirming the effectiveness of this manipulation. No other variables had any bearing on responses to this item.

Disclosure cue manipulation. To check this manipulation subjects were asked whether on the basis of previous research the choice of personal topics indicated maturity.
Subjects could respond either "yes" or "no" to the question and as shown in Table 1 those in the personal disclosure conditions responded yes more often than no, whereas the reverse effect held in the impersonal disclosure conditions, \( \chi^2 (1) = 11.71, p < .05 \). This pattern of results confirms that the disclosure cue manipulation was perceived correctly.

Dependent Variables

Intimacy of chosen disclosure. Subjects chose 20 disclosure topics from a list of 35. Each topic had been previously assigned an intimacy weight. These weights consisted of the mean intimacy rating for each topic based on ratings by an independent sample of 78 first year undergraduates from the same subject population as the experimental sample (see Appendix A). The sum of the intimacy weights for the 20 topics chosen by a subject constituted the index of disclosure.

The present experiment was designed to examine whether choice of disclosure was influenced by the manipulations of the subjects' rated transparency, the consistency of this rating with their own perceived transparency and the information that either personal or impersonal disclosure would be evaluated favourably. Specifically, it was expected that there would be decreasing choice of intimate disclosure for the following pattern of conditions when
Table 1  Response frequency by disclosure cue condition on the relation of personal disclosure and maturity (recall)

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<tr>
<th>Disclosure Cue</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Disclosure Favour</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonal Disclosure Favour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
personal disclosure was favourably evaluated but not when impersonal disclosure was favourably evaluated: confirmed non-transparency, disconfirmed non-transparency, confirmed transparency and disconfirmed transparency. In terms of the experimental conditions this pattern corresponds to the non-transparent/confirmed, transparent/disconfirmed, transparent/confirmed and non-transparent/disconfirmed conditions respectively. This represents a three way interaction between transparency, consistency and disclosure cue.

This pattern of results was expected when personality factors were controlled. Specifically, social desirability, social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, locus of control and self-disclosure level were assessed. To control for the effects of these personality variables an analysis of covariance was employed with the personality variables included as the covariates. Since these covariates were also of interest as potential factors influencing disclosure it was deemed important to assess the assumption of the homogeneity of regression for the covariates. Although departures from the homogeneity assumption do not detract severely from the robustness of the analysis of covariance (Winer, 1971), interactions between the covariates and treatments were of some interest. These interactions were of interest not only because they invalidate the analysis
but also because it was previously suggested that variables such as fear of negative evaluation and locus of control may interact with the experimental variables.

Fisher's $z_{F}$ (Ferguson, 1971, p. 170) was used for the initial test of the covariate effects at different treatment levels and served as the criterion for further testing via multiple regression (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973, p. 270). The multiple regression computer routine from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 6 (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner & Bent, 1975) was used for these analyses and the subsequent analyses of covariance. Only the locus of control variable did not meet the homogeneity assumption, $F(7, 64) = 2.51, p < .05$, and was included as an additional independent variable in order to assess its interactions with the other independent variables.

Since the covariates were potential determinants of disclosure a regression approach to the analysis of covariance was employed with the covariates entered concurrently with treatments. The analysis for the intimacy of chosen disclosure variable is summarized in Table 2. The expected three way interaction between transparency, consistency and disclosure cue was not obtained even with a priori contrasts designed to test for the effects. The contrast between the non-transparent/disconfirmed/personal disclosure condition and the other three personal disclosure
Table 2  Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Intimacy of Disclosure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Proportion of Variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covariates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Anxiety</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.810</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of Negative Evaluation</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Disclosure</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.315</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Main Effects</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency (T)</td>
<td>.005</td>
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<td>.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency (C)</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure Cue (D)</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.008*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locus of Control (L)</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x C</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.618</td>
</tr>
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<td>T x D</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x L</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C x D</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C x L</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1.502</td>
</tr>
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<td>D x L</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x C x D</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x C x L</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.218*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x D x L</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.282**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C x D x L</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x C x D x L</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residual</strong></td>
<td>.642</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*  $p < .05$

**  $p < .01$
conditions approached significance, $F(1, 60) = 3.5$, $p = .06$. The adjusted group means, presented in Table 3, show that as predicted the non-transparent/disconfirmed/personal disclosure group chose less intimate disclosure than the other groups in the personal disclosure condition. This effect provides partial support for the risk interpretation. That is, perceived transparency and inconsistent information under conditions where personal disclosure is favoured increase the costs associated with personal disclosure and result in the choice of less intimate disclosure.

One possible explanation for the failure to obtain stronger support for the risk interpretation could be that the rewards and costs involved or considered when choosing disclosure are those which have a strong impact. That is, the other predicted effects may not have been obtained simply because the manipulations in these conditions may not have been as important or salient as other reward/cost considerations. The large error component and the fact that the overall intimacy of chosen disclosure was low ($\bar{X} = 61.22$) may also have contributed to the fact that only partial support was obtained. The large error component suggests that other factors may be important, some of which are suggested by the other significant effects of the analysis of covariance.
Table 3  Group means for intimacy of chosen disclosure adjusted for covariates and locus of control effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Disclosure</th>
<th></th>
<th>Impersonal Disclosure</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favoured</td>
<td>Favoursed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Favoursed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>64.24</td>
<td>59.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disconfirmed</td>
<td>64.02</td>
<td>59.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-transparent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>62.67</td>
<td>61.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disconfirmed</td>
<td>59.33</td>
<td>58.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The overall low intimacy of chosen disclosure, given that scores could range from 51.38 to 91.83, is consistent with previous research indicating that people are less willing to disclose personal information about themselves to strangers or a television or radio audience (Rivenbark, in Jourard, 1968). As indicated earlier, this is consistent with the risk interpretation of disclosure in that there may be costs associated with disclosing information since disclosers may be uncertain about how their disclosure will be received. This suggests that there could be differences in the salience or relevance of the various cost factors which may have masked the effects of the independent variables.

Other significant effects from the analysis of covariance may help to clarify the situation. The disclosure cue effect, $F(1, 60) = 5.008, p < .05$, indicates that those in personal disclosure conditions chose more intimate disclosure ($\bar{X} = 62.61$) than those in the impersonal conditions ($\bar{X} = 59.86$). This finding is consistent with the risk interpretation if one considers that the subjects were volunteers and likely to be cooperative either to learn something from the experiment or to be favourably evaluated for their performance. Both of these considerations are potential reward outcomes in this situation.

An alternative explanation for the disclosure cue
effect is suggested by work on compliance to threats (Heilman & Garner, 1975) which has found that there is greater compliance with a threat when a choice is available. In the present experiment the disclosure cue is an evaluative one which gives the subjects information on how they can respond and be favourably evaluated. Subjects may have perceived the information as a form of threat limiting their choice of disclosure topics.

The regression lines depicting the significant transparency by consistency by locus of control interaction, $F(1, 60) = 4.218, p < .05$, are shown in Figure 1. In order to examine this interaction further, the Johnson-Neyman technique (Johnson & Neyman, 1936; Johnson & Fay, 1950; Walker & Lev, 1953) was used to determine the values of the predictor variable, i.e., locus of control, at which differences occurred between groups on the criterion variable of intimacy of chosen disclosure. Comparisons, using this method, are made between two groups at a time, very similar to other comparison techniques. A modification of the method, suggested by Potthoff (1964), was included and yields a more conservative test of the interaction but increases the generalizability across values of locus of control by specifying the boundaries of a simultaneous region of significance. Application of the method to this interaction failed to determine any
Figure 1 Regression lines depicting the transparency by consistency by locus of control interaction for intimacy of disclosure (Higher scores on locus of control indicate external orientation).
region of significance, possibly due to the large error component from the analysis of covariance used in the calculation of the region of significance. Examination of the figure, however, does seem to indicate that the transparent/confirmed group differed from the other three groups. Internals in this group apparently chose more intimate disclosure than internals in the other three groups. Internals in the transparent/confirmed group also chose more intimate disclosure than externals in the same group.

Although the other three groups did not show this pattern this latter trend is interesting in that it supports previous findings that internals choose greater disclosure than externals (Ryckman et al., 1973; Ellison & Firestone, 1974). It had been expected that in the present experiment internals might not be as influenced by the manipulations of transparency, consistency and disclosure cue as the externals since the internals may believe that they have more control over the outcomes in the situation. In the present case, it may have been that the internals in the transparent/confirmed group chose greater disclosure because the transparency information although consistent with their expectation was not congruent with their generalized belief in control. Another alternative is that there could have been conflicting reward/cost outcomes. The choice of
greater disclosure could have been an attempt to assess their control or to clarify the nature of the implied outcomes. In the other three groups there is no incrongruity between the feedback and the subjects' generalized belief in control.

The transparency by disclosure cue by locus of control interaction, $F(1, 60) = 9.282, p < .01$, was also analyzed using the Johnson-Neyman technique. The regression lines for this interaction are given in Figure 2. Only the comparison between the transparent/personal disclosure group and the non-transparent/personal disclosure group yielded a region of significance. The values of locus of control at which differences occurred between these two groups were greater than or equal to 22.69 and less than or equal to 8.77. The former region was derived by extrapolation and, being beyond the range of the data, is of no concern here. Forty percent of the subjects in these two groups were within the region below the value of 8.77 on locus of control. Examination of the figure shows that internal subjects chose more intimate disclosure in the transparent/personal disclosure condition than in the non-transparent/personal disclosure condition.

This interaction clearly shows that internals reacted differently to the transparency communication. Internals receiving feedback that they were transparent chose more intimate disclosure than internals told they were non-transparent. This may imply that the feedback had
Figure 2  Regression lines depicting the transparency by disclosure cue by locus of control interaction for intimacy of disclosure. (higher scores on locus of control indicate external orientation)
implications for their belief that they control their own behavior. The information that they were transparent could have been incongruent with their generalized belief in internal control. This suggests that feedback concerning one's perceived ability to control one's facial expressions may be an important and overlooked variable. Internal subjects have been defined as those who have a generalized expectancy that they have control of the reinforcing contingencies which determine their behavior. Since information that one is transparent may be incongruent with the internal's belief in control it could conceivably result in an attempt to determine the extent of the control they have over such reinforcing contingencies as facial cues and disclosure and thus, the choice of more intimate disclosure.

Although not significantly different from the other groups the regression line for the transparent/impersonal disclosure group shows that internals in this condition tended to choose less disclosure than internals in the transparent/personal group. This suggests that an alternative explanation could be that the transparency information led the internals to respond more on the basis of the situational cues as guides for their behavior when the transparency information contradicts their belief in control. It may have been more advantageous for the internal
to conform to the disclosure cue in this case because the transparency and consistency manipulations did not provide clear expectancies about the outcome of personal disclosure. They may not have provided clear expectations because there were other factors present which had not been taken into account.

Research on non-verbal communication and expressive behavior (Eckman & Friesen, 1969, 1974; Snyder, 1974) has implied that there may be differences in the extent to which people can control their facial expressions. However, there has been no attempt to examine the extent to which people feel they have control over their facial expressions or how accurate they feel they are in controlling their expressions. The significant transparency by disclosure cue by locus of control interaction suggests that this specific belief in control may be an important determinant of whether the person will risk disclosing some personal information.

An additional and related consideration may be how the subjects interpret the feedback concerning the transparency of their facial expressions. Internal subjects may attribute the feedback either to their own ability or to lack of effort regardless of whether the information is consistent or inconsistent with their expectations. Thus, apart from the consistency of the information with
their expectations, consideration of the assessment subjects make of whether they can falsify their disclosure without detection through their facial expressions and their causal attribution of the feedback they receive concerning this ability to control their facial expressions may be necessary to determine the appropriateness of the risk interpretation. The present study does not allow us to come to any conclusion about the mediating effects of these variables but one might expect that they would influence whether the transparency manipulation influences the costs involved in disclosing information about oneself. Both factors may have confounded the transparency manipulation in the present experiment and thus contributed to the large error component.

*Anxiety measure.* The measure of anxiety consisted of the sum of the scores of five moods taken from the 32-item mood checklist (see Appendix E) which subjects completed just prior to selecting their discussion topics. The moods used were apprehensive, fearful, insecure, nervous and upset. This was the same measure of anxiety as that used by Grant et al. (1975).

The same procedure was followed in the analysis of this variable as for the disclosure variable. Based on the premise that the experimental manipulations would have a differential impact on the assessment of the
rewards and costs in the situation it had been predicted that there would be increasing anxiety in the personal disclosure favoured conditions in the following order of conditions: confirmed non-transparency, disconfirmed non-transparency, confirmed transparency and disconfirmed transparency. These correspond to the non-transparent/consistent, transparent/inconsistent, transparent/consistent and non-transparent/inconsistent groups respectively. Again this represents a three way interaction between transparency, consistency and disclosure cue.

None of the covariates in the analysis of the anxiety measure violated the homogeneity of regression assumption. The analysis of covariance, summarized in Table 4, yielded no significant effects. A priori contrasts were also not significant. This result was clearly contrary to the risk interpretation which anticipated the differential anxiety effect described above.

The present study also failed to replicate the finding by Grant et al. (1975) that those who were anxious were also less willing to continue with the disclosure session. In the present case the dependent variable was somewhat different since subjects were given a choice of disclosure topics. This may help to explain why there was no anxiety effect and also why there was no relationship between
Table 4  Summary of Analysis of Covariance on the Anxiety Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Proportion of Variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covariates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Desirability</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Anxiety</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Negative Evaluation</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Disclosure</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Control</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Effects</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency (T)</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency (C)</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosure Cue (D)</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x C</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x D</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C x D</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T x C x D</td>
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<td>.734</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Residual</strong></td>
<td>.841</td>
<td>67</td>
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</table>
anxiety and disclosure. The fact that the subjects were aware that they could choose the topics they wanted to discuss could have attenuated the anxiety effect because it decreased the perceived risk. Since there was no arousal of anxiety to any great extent there was no reason for the subject to respond other than to cooperate with the experimental demands. This may also help to explain the strong disclosure cue effect since it can be seen as a demand characteristic of the situation.

Patterson (1976) has argued that arousal is the critical determinant of changes in interpersonal intimacy. According to this model, arousal is labelled as either positive (liking, etc.) or negative (anxiety, etc.) affect and each leads to a different kind of reaction to the arousing stimuli. This labelling of arousal is based on the appraisal of the factors which contribute to the arousal. In the present experiment there was no differential arousal of anxiety as a result of the manipulations which were designed to alter the reward/cost outcomes in the situation. It may be that the choice of topics attenuated the arousal of anxiety or that the variables discussed earlier in relation to the disclosure variable, that is, the subjects' belief in their control of their facial expressions and the cause they give to explain contradictory feedback, may have contributed to subjects' assessment of other factors as more salient.
Personality variables. The personality variables were included in the present experiment as covariates but several of them were also expected to have certain effects.

The social desirability variable (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) had previously failed to predict subjects' willingness to continue with an experiment (Grant et al., 1975). It had also been found to correlate negatively with written disclosure (Burhenne & Mirels, 1970). The present experiment failed to find any relationship between social desirability and intimacy of chosen disclosure, $F(1, 60) = .029, \text{n.s.}$, consistent with the findings of Grant et al. (1975) but using a different measure of disclosure.

The social anxiety measure of Watson and Friend (1969) relates to how people approach social situations; those high in social anxiety tending to avoid social situations. It had been anticipated that this variable could conceivably be a determinant of disclosure. However, it too failed to predict disclosure when other variables were controlled, $F(1, 60) = 1.81, \text{n.s.}$. It also failed to relate to the measure of anxiety from the mood checklist, $F(1, 67) = 2.262, \text{n.s.}$.

The fear of negative evaluation measure (Watson & Friend, 1969) was expected to interact with the independent variables such that subjects high in fear of negative
evaluation would be affected by the manipulations to a greater extent. This variable did not predict either the disclosure or anxiety dependent variables. It was not found to interact with the independent variables when tests of the homogeneity of regression were conducted.

Jourard's self-disclosure scale (Jourard, 1971) was the only real covariate. It was included only to give some control over the variability in the subjects' general level of disclosure. It is interesting to note though that it also did not predict disclosure, $F(1, 60) = .315$, n.s.. Jourard and Resnick (1970) had designated subjects as either high or low revealers based on responses to this questionnaire. They found that consistent with this definition high and low revealers gave high and low disclosure respectively when disclosing to a person similar in disclosure level. Lows increased their disclosure when paired with a high revealer but high revealers did not change their disclosure when paired with a low revealer. Their initial finding was taken as predictive validity for the measure of disclosure but their other results and the present findings suggest that situational determinants may be more important in determining disclosure.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the exchange model of risk, it had been predicted that the manipulations of transparency, consistency and disclosure cue would interact to alter the assessment subjects made of the reward/cost outcomes in a situation and thus influence their choice of disclosure. Specifically, it had been hypothesized that when personal disclosure was favoured there would be increasing anxiety and decreasing choice of intimate disclosure in the following order of conditions: confirmed non-transparency, disconfirmed non-transparency, confirmed transparency and disconfirmed transparency. Although in general the results did not support the risk model, specific results confirmed that subjects in the disconfirmed transparency condition when personal disclosure was favoured chose less intimate disclosure than subjects in the other three personal disclosure conditions. The significant disclosure cue effect, indicating that subjects complied with the implied demand characteristic of the cue, was also interpreted as consistent with the risk model. The reward of a favourable evaluation from the experimenter may have been a more potent factor determining disclosure than the cost factors of transparency and consistency.

The significant interactions, transparency by consistency by locus of control and transparency by disclosure cue by locus of control, suggested further that there may have been
other factors present which influenced subjects' assessment of the reward and cost factors. Specifically, it was suggested that both the assessment of one's ability to control facial expressions and the cause to which one attributes contradictory feedback concerning this ability may have influenced how subjects interpreted the manipulations in the present experiment and thus yielded a less powerful test of the risk model.

Contrary to risk model, no significant differences were found for the anxiety measure.

Patterson (1976) has argued that changes in interpersonal intimacy are mediated by the labelling of arousal states, based on the assessment of situational cues, as either positive or negative. The assessment of the rewards and costs associated with disclosure may also enter into the labelling process and the risk model also predicts that this assessment influences choice of disclosure. Taken together, the risk and arousal models may help account for the present results.

In the present experiment, arousal labelled as anxiety may not have been as great as anticipated since subjects were free to choose their disclosure. This may have lowered the risks since there were alternatives to personal disclosure available to the subject.

Since both models predict that the arousal of anxiety is probably dependent upon how the subjects interpret the manipulation of the independent variables, it may be that
there were confounding effects of the subjects' perceived ability to control their facial expressions and the causes to which they attributed the feedback they received concerning this ability (e.g., ability, lack of effort, etc.). The interaction of transparency, disclosure cue and locus of control suggests that these factors may have influenced how subjects assessed the relevance of the various reward and cost factors present in the experimental context. It could be that these various factors placed more emphasis on the personal evaluative nature of the disclosure cue than on the transparency or consistency variables.

In conclusion, the risk interpretation of self-disclosure may still be appropriate for explaining changes in intimacy of disclosure if certain factors are taken into account. These are factors contributing to the assessment subjects make of the relative salience or importance of the various reward and cost considerations present in a situation. The present experiment offered only tentative support for the risk interpretation. The results suggested though that the perceived ability to control one's facial expressions and the cause to which one attributes feedback concerning this ability may be important factors which influence the relative importance of the various reward and cost factors in this particular experimental context.
It was also suggested that these various reward and cost factors may contribute to the arousal of affect and to the labelling of this arousal as either positive or negative affect. This labelling of arousal is in turn a mediating factor in the determination of one's reaction in a situation. That is, in the present experiment this could have been a factor in determining the intimacy of chosen disclosure.

The present analysis suggests that further research should attempt to determine the role of those factors contributing to how subjects determine the relative importance of the various reward and cost considerations in a situation. In terms of the context of the present experiment, it is suggested that further research could first assess whether there are reliable differences in the extent to which people can control their facial expressions and whether they feel they can control their facial expressions. The role of these variables and the attributions people make for the feedback they receive concerning their ability could then be assessed in a disclosure context. Particular attention could be given to how these factors affect subjects' assessment of other reward and cost factors which influence disclosure.
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Schlenker, B., Helm, B., & Tedeschi, J. The effect of personality and situational variables on behavioral


APPENDIX A - Intimacy Rated Disclosure Topics

1. What are your views on the way a husband and wife should live their marriage? 3.78
2. What are your usual ways of dealing with depression, anxiety and anger? 3.51
3. What are the actions you have most regretted doing in your life and why? 4.91
4. What are your personal religious views and the nature of your religious participation, if any? 3.08
5. What are the ways in which you feel you are most maladjusted and immature? 4.21
6. How do you react to others' criticism and praise of you? 3.42
7. What are your personal views on politics and the way the government is handling inflation? 1.73
8. What are the habits and reactions of yours which bother you at present? 4.14
9. What are the sources of strain and dissatisfaction in your marriage (or your relation with the opposite sex)? 5.05
10. What are your favourite forms of erotic play and sexual lovemaking? 5.94
11. What are your hobbies; how do you best like to spend your spare time? 1.81
12. What were the occasions in your life in which you were the happiest? 3.51
13. What are the aspects of your daily work which satisfy and bother you? 2.69
14. What characteristics of yourself give you cause for pride and satisfaction? 4.35
15. Who are the people in your life whom you most resent? Why? 4.85
16. What are the things that others praise and criticize in you? 3.42
17. What are the unhappiest moments of your life? Why? 4.65
18. What are your preferences and dislikes in music? 1.37
19. What are your personal goals for the next ten years or so? 2.78
20. What are the circumstances under which you become depressed? 4.26
21. What are your most common sexual fantasies and reveries? 5.90
22. How do you feel about engaging in sexual relations prior to or outside of marriage? 4.05
23. How many brothers and sisters do you have? 1.37
24. What movies have you seen recently? 1.47
25. With whom have you discussed your sexual experiences? 5.51
26. What are your favourite subjects in school? 1.24
27. What types of foods do you enjoy most? 1.36
28. What foods do you feel are best for your health? 1.42
29. What are the persons like with whom you have had some type of sexual experience? 5.81
30. How important do you feel education is to a person? 1.85

31. How do you feel about having members of opposite sex touch you? 4.87

32. How do you feel about having members of the same sex touch you? 3.84

33. What do you regard as the mistakes and failures your parents made in raising you? 4.22

34. Describe your personal financial position income, debts, savings, sources of income. 4.30

35. Do you care about what others think of you? 3.68

Note: The potential range of the Mean Intimacy Ratings was from 1 to 7.
APPENDIX B - Disclosure Topics Used in the Taping Session

1. Do you often long for excitement?

** 2. How should parents deal with their disobedient children?

3. Do you find it hard to take no for an answer?

** 4. Do you stop and think things over before doing anything?

5. What kind of party or social gathering do you enjoy most?

6. Would you say you are fairly self-confident?

** 7. Do you daydream a lot?

** 8. Do you generally do and say things quickly without stopping to think?

9. Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish?

** 10. Generally, do you prefer reading to meeting people?

11. Do other people think of you as being very lively?

12. What do you think of people who try to get ahead of you in a line of people?

13. Of all the people you know are there some you definitely do not like?

14. Do you find it hard to really enjoy yourself at a lively party?

** 15. Do you like the kind of work you have to pay close attention to?

16. What are your favourite sports?

17. Where would you like to go on a trip?

** 18. What type of reading material do you like most?
19. Do you like doing things in which you have to act quickly?

20. Do you hate being in a crowd who play jokes on one another?

21. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?

22. Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about?

23. What kinds of group activities do you enjoy most?

24. After you have done something important do you often come away feeling that you could have done better?

Note: Items with stars beside them are those subjects were asked to lie on.
Now that you know what transparency refers to, please indicate how transparent you think you are. That is, indicate the extent to which you think your facial expressions give you away.

very transparent

not at all transparent
The clinicians will be rating your transparency on the basis of the tape we have just made. They will try to determine from your facial expressions, which questions you have lied on. Please indicate below the rating you think they will give you, based on the number of questions they could detect correctly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not at all transparent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>very transparent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each of the following words describes feelings or moods. Respond to each adjective on the list according to how you feel right now. Circle any number from 1 to 7 whichever best reflects how you feel right now.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guide</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

moderately

extremely

For example, if the word is hungry and you are very hungry at the moment, you might circle 7 as follows:

hungry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

or if you were only slightly hungry you might circle 2 as follows:

hungry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please respond to all the words. This should take only a few minutes. Please begin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>adjective</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</th>
<th>adjective</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>apprehensive</td>
<td></td>
<td>hesitant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annoyed</td>
<td></td>
<td>pessimistic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>bold</td>
<td></td>
<td>insecure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>tingly</td>
<td></td>
<td>pent-up</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>sad</td>
<td></td>
<td>cooperative</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>contemplative</td>
<td></td>
<td>jittery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fearful</td>
<td></td>
<td>hostile</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>pleased</td>
<td></td>
<td>confident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defiant</td>
<td></td>
<td>helpless</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>elated</td>
<td></td>
<td>angry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>downhearted</td>
<td></td>
<td>overjoyed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>kindly</td>
<td></td>
<td>relaxed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engaged in thought</td>
<td></td>
<td>nervous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frustrated</td>
<td></td>
<td>nonchalant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enthusiastic</td>
<td></td>
<td>regretful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guilty</td>
<td></td>
<td>upset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F - Debriefing Questionnaire

1. What was your transparency rating as given by the clinicians? ______

2. How consistent was this rating with your own assessment of your transparency?
   - not at all consistent
   - somewhat consistent
   - very consistent

3. How confident are you that the clinicians' ratings accurately portray how transparent you are?
   - very confident
   - somewhat confident
   - not at all confident

4. How transparent do you think you really are?
   - not at all transparent
   - somewhat transparent
   - very transparent

5. How would you describe the questions you were asked to choose from?
   - highly personal and intimate
   - somewhat personal and intimate
   - not at all personal and intimate

6. In relation to the 15 remaining topics, how would you rate the 20 you chose?
   - much less personal and intimate than the others
   - somewhat personal and intimate than the others
   - much more personal and intimate than the others
7. In your opinion, does the choice of personal topics indicate maturity?
   YES  NO

8. On the basis of previous research, does the choice of personal topics indicate maturity?
   YES  NO

9. Did you feel anxious at any point during the experiment? If so, please indicate at which point(s) you felt anxious, whether you still feel anxious, what it was that made you anxious and how you tried to deal with it.

10. At any point during the experiment did you become suspicious of the experimenter's intentions or about what the experiment was actually concerned with? If yes, please indicate when you became suspicious and what it was that made you suspicious.

11. What do you suspect the experiment is actually about?

12. Try and estimate what the experimenter hopes to find out.

13. Did you feel forced to choose certain discussion topics?