

THE QUEST FOR WHOLENESS
SCHILLER'S CONCEPT OF ALIENATION REVISITED

CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES

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THE QUEST FOR WHOLENESS
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by

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Abstract

This thesis examines Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, and revisits his concept of alienation, a key to understanding his controversial rhetoric. I argue that his terminology - in which words have many meanings - may be understood in light of his dualistic view of humanity and his historical view of human progress. In his view of dualism and dialectic progress, Schiller sees either a fragmented or united human condition, and changes the meaning of his words depending on which era or state he is discussing. He holds that the aesthetic (holistic) education of man is vital in overcoming alienation, and contends we should use what he calls the play drive, a mental state equidistant from sense and reason, in all aspects of life, just as artists do when realizing the combination of mind and matter. For Schiller, ultimate social reform must start from the foundation of such a synthesized psyche, since this is the only way to build the bridge between the ideal and real, to realize humanity's dreams of freedom.

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The nature of the language (precisely its tendency to the universal) must be fully submerged in the form given to it, the body must lose itself in the idea, the sign in the indicated, the reality in the appearance. Free and victorious must that to be presented stride forth from the presenting, and, despite all fetters of language, stand there in its entire truth, liveliness and personality before the imaginative power. With one word: The beauty of poetical presentation is “*free self-action of nature in the fetters of language.*”
(*Kallias* 526)

Introduction

Researchers have often considered Schiller's terminology in his aesthetical essays, such as the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, to be confusing and incomplete. Criticism concerning Schiller's terminology started early and continues to the present day. For example, Lesley Sharpe observes that in 1795, just after the *Letters* was published, "Johann Kaspar Friedrich Manso, a rationalist critic, and Friedrich August Mackensen, a Kantian, ... criticize Schiller's allegedly obscure language and resent his adaption of Kantian terminology to suit his argument. They were the first of a series of critics who dismissed Schiller's philosophizing as vitiated by poetic language and as making incorrect use of Kantian categories" (Sharpe 8). Sharp goes on to note that reviewers rarely address the arguments of the *Letters*. This kind of critique became widespread, she adds, and in 1819, "Friedrich Bouterwek, the anti-Romantic professor ... admires the brilliant intellectual content of the essays and the 'magic of their style' but claims that the truth is often lost amid the dazzling use of language" (Sharpe 9). Schiller's friends also added their voices: "... Herder called them [*Letters*] 'Kantian sins.' Klopstock, more severely, dismissed them as 'non sens' and found their 'pretensions dreadful.' The Danish prince, for whom the letters were originally meant, wrote to his sister: 'Schiller is really not a philosopher at all. He needs a translator'" (Regin 147).

In the late nineteenth century, E. Kühnemann held that "the names given by Schiller to his concepts are often ill-fitting and conceal, rather than clarify, the underlying thoughts" (Ives 8). In 1927, W. Böhm saw Schiller "as having insurmountable difficulties

in devising a comprehensive systematic approach to his subject matter ..." (Sharpe 46). In 1928, H. Lutz analyzed Schiller's use of the term *nature* and concluded that Schiller "constantly changed the names of his concepts and made no attempt to work them into a coherent system" (Ives 8). In 1957, H. S. Reiss claimed the *Letters* "are a masterpiece fraught with difficulties," and "Schiller failed to elaborate his political theory" (Reiss 35). Others conclude that "Schiller's essays are hardly systematic" (Kooy 14). Hermann Meyer (1953) claims that "Schiller did not wish to use the rational language and method adopted by Kant - a language which certainly tries to be as precise as possible and which is directed towards the intellect or 'common sense' of the reader," since Schiller "hoped not to construct a philosophical system" (Ives 8), but to appeal to people's imaginations in order to motivate them. Schiller seems to anticipate that his writings would be misunderstood; Regin comments that "... the readers of the *Horen* [the magazine which Schiller edited, and which published the *Letters* in three installments in 1795] were on the whole disappointed too, and complained about the obscurity of the letters. To this Schiller replied in a letter to the publisher Cotta that he was not surprised and suggested proceeding with their publication. 'Then we will see if the readers are forcing us, or we the readers'" (Regin 147).

On the other hand, although there are negative judgements, the *Letters* has had many admirers too: "... Schiller could boast of firm support from some of the most outstanding figures of the time. Goethe, as we have noted, was delighted with the letters and Kant wrote to Schiller on March 30, 1795 a polite letter in which he expressed his

admiration for the work, calling it ‘*vortrefflich*’” (Regin 147-148).

It may seem as though Schiller does not systematically define each word, and in fact he gives the same words various meanings, and at times changes those meanings in subsequent sentences or even in the same sentence, such as: “... people caught up in the process of civilization ... must fall away from nature by the abuse of reason before they can return to her by the use of reason” (L6 31). In Schiller’s writings, civilization, as opposed to nature, is sometimes used in the sense of nature itself. Similarly, realistic, as opposed to idealistic, is used in the sense of idealistic itself, and rational, as opposed to sensitive, is used in the sense of sensitive itself.

Many critics claim Schiller’s lack of clarity is the result of undeveloped thought, but this criticism comes from not recognizing Schiller’s unique terminology, which was already well-developed in the history of Schiller’s philosophical reflection. His views of alienation or fragmentation in the *Letters* were not sudden exhibitions of philosophical meditation, but the product of his lifework since his early twenties. In his medical dissertations *The Philosophy of Physiology* (1779) and *On the connection between the Animal and Spiritual Nature of Man* (1780), he explores the differences between body and mind, and searches for how the two are connected. These writings foreshadow his later aesthetical essays, in which he examines the dualism between reason and sense or mind and body, which he sees as deeply separating the human psyche and causing alienation both in the mind and the whole society.

The approach I take to Schiller’s rhetoric is not a common one, as Kontje

observes. He writes that for the critic “who is interested only in Schiller’s philosophical ideas, not the matter of their presentation, rhetoric is clearly something to be avoided” (Kontje 5). By contrast, Wilkinson and Willoughby, in their English translation of the *Letters*, correctly point out that Schiller’s unique writings are the result of his concept of duality and dialectic approach. However, though I admire Wilkinson and Willoughby’s analysis accompanying their translation of the *Letters*, I contend that they do not include enough attention to detail to show how each word changes meaning, and in what context such changes occur. It is true that Wilkinson examines the “interchangeability” of Schiller’s terminology to show “the dynamic interplay between the two fundamental *aspects* of human nature: sense and spirit, nature and freedom, finite and infinite, or however you like to call them” (*Reflections* 59); they also show the dialectic approach in the *Letters* (*Letters* Appendix III 348-350), which I will examine in Chapter 4, but they do not demonstrate clear connections between the dialectic method and the eleven definitions they cite for the important term *Nature*.

Wilkinson and Willoughby emphasize that Schiller’s aesthetics originated from both his psychological observations and his personal psychology - his conflict as a poet and philosopher, and they refer to Jung and Freud while discussing Schiller. This is likely due to Wilkinson and Willoughby’s view of aesthetics itself: “From the start, ... aesthetics was rooted in psychology” (*Letters* xxii). They continue “... Schiller’s subsequent treatment of this ‘birth’ [of his concept of the play drive] is not mystical at all. It is informed by the empirical psychology of his day ...” (*Letters* xcvi). Concerning Wilkinson

and Willoughby's approach to Schiller as a "psychologist," and their interpretation that Schiller's three kinds of drives come from psychological observations, Pugh observes:

Elsewhere they speak of "the general psychological orientation of his moral philosophy" (*Letters* Glossary 331) ... Wilkinson and Willoughby offer no support, moreover, for the alleged dependence of the "Spieltriebe" on the psychology of the eighteenth century, and there is no awareness of how the concept of form and matter, which underlie the "Formtrieb" and "Stofftrieb," emerge from Greek metaphysics. Metaphysics is in fact a blind spot in Wilkinson and Willoughby's interpretation.... (Pugh 291-292)

In this thesis, I intend to explain the connection between the many levels of Schiller's rhetoric and his definition of human development based on his concept of alienation or fragmentation, where we find the basis of the entire picture, and where we find the small but essential key to the puzzle of his terminology. Schiller's writings are not rough or incomplete. Far from it, he is exhaustive, definitive, and complete. Schiller clearly knows what he means in his sentences, since his aesthetical writing intends to show the work of art as a battle between matter (language) and mind (his thought). Ironically, his efforts gave his writings, a lifelong effort, a negative reputation. Remembering Schiller almost 20 years after his death, Goethe, Schiller's closest friend, told Eckermann that Schiller's philosophical speculation disturbed his poetry. "'It was sad', said Goethe, 'to see how so-highly gifted a man tormented himself with philosophical disquisitions which could in no way profit him'" (Eckermann 38).

The extensive use of dual definitions for his terms made his writing look contradictory; however, those words or concepts must be contradictory since this is the core of Schiller's concept of fragmentation. The concept of fragmentation may be clearly

seen in *Letter 6*, where he contrasts the Moderns and the Greeks. He writes, “How different with us moderns! With us too the image of the human species is projected in magnified form into separate individuals - but as fragments [*Bruchstücken*], not in different combinations, with the result that one has to go the rounds from one individual to another in order to be able to piece together a complete image of the species” (*L6 33*). However, Schiller’s concept of alienation is closely interwoven with his use of terms throughout the entire *Letters*, not only in *Letter 6*, and so thus I intend to revisit his concept of alienation.

It is well known that Schiller was very arbitrary in using terms from Kant, and Schaper sees “a whole series of misunderstanding of Kant” in Schiller (Schaper 99). However it may be more accurate to say that Schiller reads Kant through the lens of his own preoccupation with dualism, attempting to fit fragments into a pattern to construct a whole.

There are two key points to understanding Schiller. One is to recognize his historical distinctions: from a pre-historic era, called the state of nature; to ancient Greece, which is between the prehistoric era and modern civilization; the natural state, which includes the modern era, where we have to struggle to regain freedom; and finally, an ideal era after political reform called the *aesthetic state*. I maintain that those four stages are indications of his thought regarding fragmentation.

Another key to understanding Schiller is to notice that because of his view of fragmentation, his terms have dual or various meanings. I claim that Schiller’s discourses

are not incoherent and unsystematic, but come from his view of alienation - everything loses its nature when it is fragmented - and of holism - everything will be united after being healed of fragmentation. Schiller defines terms in his unique way depending on the context. His concept of alienation in the *Letters* is not merely part of the history of political theory which influenced later thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, but the key to understanding Schiller's use of language, and also the key to understanding the core of his aesthetics - holism. Converting value and meaning in each term is the main theme in Schiller's aesthetics. The paradoxes in his terms reflect his logic and holism. Schiller's terms relate and correspond to each other so closely that it is impossible to define one without taking account of its opposite. Words such as nature and civilization, or ideal and real, change their meanings when they are either fragmented from or integrated with their opposites. For example, nature will be defined as human sensuousness, and also as a united human psyche - a synthesis of sense and reason. For Schiller, nature and civilization, which oppose each other, will be united under the same definition when they overcome their one-sidedness. Therefore, nature, which is the opposite of civilization, is a synonym for civilization in a different paragraph. Schiller's hope that we will reach an ideal state in the future does not contradict his disappointment that we will not reach that ideal state in a fragmented era. It is impossible to realize social reform with our fragmented or one-sided nature, civilization, reason, and sense, but it is possible to realize social reform with a united or synthesized nature, civilization, reason, and sense.

Works of philosophy are comparable to works of art for Schiller, in that they both

are about freedom, nature, goodness, and beauty - that is to say, about humanity. Creating such works of art means engaging in the war to save this fragmented world, to reconcile the reason-sense conflict, and, for Schiller who was a playwright, novelist, poet, historian, and philosopher, language is the most important tool in creating works of art.

For Schiller, fragmentation, historical distinctions, and various uses of such terms need to be connected in order to be understood. Schiller's dialectical approach will be seen in each element of his conception of the eras of human development and his terminology. In general, the dialectical method of exposition employs the triadic relationship of a one-sided thesis, a one-sided anti-thesis which negates the thesis, and a synthesis which neither abolishes nor simply unites the two, but which includes and preserves the two as correlative principles. I claim that Schiller reconciles binary opposites and achieves wholeness in the third or higher stage of such a dialectical process.

The *Letters*, the expression of his ideas for political reform, is, in part, Schiller's response to the French Revolution. In 1792, just before he started *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, the French National Assembly awarded him an honorary French citizenship, and invited him to run for office in the National Assembly. He was well known for a series of plays considered to be sympathetic to the Revolution. However, Schiller would not participate in the Revolution itself, with which he was in disagreement. The Revolution had declared universal human rights to be above country and race. This was a universal truth not previously recognized in European politics - not by England's Glorious Revolution of 1688, which was mainly for the bourgeoisie and aristocracy, nor

even by the American Revolution of 1776, which still maintained black slavery. Peace is the premise for *the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens*; yet, although the French Revolution intended the realization of human rights, it led to the Terror, civil war, and international wars. France declared war on numerous countries, including Austria, Prussia, Britain, and Holland, to preserve her new government. Over the twenty-three years from 1792 to 1815, she experienced only a few years of peace, and was responsible for the deaths of an estimated two million people. In 1793, the year of the Terror, Schiller wrote that if the revolutionaries were performing acts of reason and true freedom then he would abandon literature and “devote all [his] activities to the most glorious of all works of art, to the monarchy of reason” (qtd. in Berghahn 107). Instead, because acts of reason and freedom were rare, he doubted that “political regeneration” had begun, and despaired of such a reformation occurring “for centuries” (ibid).

In this thesis, beside the *Letters*, I refer to Schiller’s other aesthetic essays, such as *On the Art of Tragedy* (1790), *Kallias* (1793), *On the Pathetic* (1793), *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry* (1795), *On Grace and Dignity* (1793), *From the Aesthetical Lectures* (1792-1793), and *Concerning the Sublime* (likely written 1794-96 and published 1801). Those writings, written at various times, are closely interwoven and without contradictions, as they were written under the concept of fragmentation and wholeness; therefore they are very beneficial to understanding the *Letters*. I claim that Schiller, while writing the *Letters*, is not suddenly attempting to develop the theme of aesthetics, to define terms in isolation, or to suddenly present a coherent view of humanity based on his

theory of alienation. I therefore disagree with Lutz, who claims that Schiller lacks consistency, and concludes that the *Letters* are “not a public utterance at all, but rather a private document testifying to their author’s philosophical progress” (*Letters* xliv Introduction).

First of all, in Chapter 1, I examine the historical importance of Schiller’s concept of alienation or fragmentation, a concept which influenced Hegel and Marx. I also explain his view of antagonism - the reason and sense conflict. In Chapter 2, I consider his concept of the stages of human development, in which each stage reflects either a fragmented or united condition in the human psyche and political state. In Chapter 3, I examine Schiller’s terminology and his use of such words as reason, nature, and civilization. In Chapter 4, I explain how Schiller’s dualism and dialectic attitude are closely interwoven. I also deal with his concept of ideality and reality which, while opposites, become synonyms under the concept of wholeness. Schiller’s concept of alienation underlies his lifework through his aesthetic writings, and is the key to understand his theory and rhetoric, which have hitherto been negatively judged. In Chapter 5, I discuss Schiller concept of play, and its role in social reform. Throughout this thesis, I argue that Schiller’s terminology is a systematic pattern of definitions based on his concept of alienation and his unbroken belief in the future - the belief that someday our fragmented condition will be healed when we unite in wholeness.

Chapter 1 The Definition of The Fragmented World

1.1 Holism

Schiller uses the term *aesthetic* in reference to life, politics, and morality, and not in the restricted sense of a theory of art. In the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, his readers are not expected to learn artistic skills, such as painting or playing instruments; he never directly connected fine arts and social and individual reform in the *Letters*. He writes that “most perfect of all the works to be achieved by the art of man” is “the construction of true political freedom” (L2 7), and to realize this, first of all, his readers are expected to grasp the concept of wholeness, integrating the dualisms of reason and feeling, of mind and matter, and of nature and civilization. Schiller uses *aesthetic* in the sense of sublating these opposed elements, as in artists who compound material and imagination. His *aesthetic* is a synonym of *holism*, in the sense of a theory “that in one way or another affirm[s] the equal or greater reality or the explanatory necessity of the whole of some system in relation to its parts” (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, *Holism*). His *aesthetic* means overcoming our dual character and gaining harmony.

Because of this view of wholeness, Schiller does not define words in the *Letters* in a conventional way. Instead, he defines his words in his own way. In this thesis, I discuss fragmentation and wholeness, basic concepts in Schiller’s holism and teleology. Taking account of fragmentation and wholeness leads us to a correct understanding and interpretation of his theory of social reform; it is the key to clarifying the definitions of his words, and the key to judging his theory’s consistency.

Schiller suggests grasping the world in wholeness to reconcile fragmentation. Fragmentation will be overcome by achieving both our physical possibilities and our moral possibilities. We have to recognize and achieve wholeness in order to act as a single integrated power.

One-sidedness in the exercise of [a man's] powers must, it is true, inevitably lead the individual into error; but the species as a whole to truth. Only by concentrating the whole energy of our mind into a single focal point, contracting our whole being into a single power, do we, as it were, lend wings to this individual power and lead it, by artificial means, far beyond the limits that nature seems to have assigned to it. (L6 41)

In Schiller, individuals have to develop themselves to work in harmony. The conflict of reason and sense makes it impossible to solve political and psychological problems. In order to reach the condition of wholeness we have to achieve a condition called the aesthetic state, both in the sense of the psyche and in the sense of political government.

For Schiller, the ultimate definition of humanity comes from grasping and acting on the concept of each individual's wholeness. He writes, "*Wholeness* of character must ... be present in any people capable, and worthy, of exchanging a state of compulsion for a state of freedom" (L4 23). Man's total character is the perfect concord of reason and sense. "What he is meant to be, however, is neither [an animal with or without reason]; he is meant to be a human being. Nature is not meant to rule him exclusively, nor reason to rule him conditionally. Both these systems of rule are meant to co-exist, in perfect independence of each other, and yet in perfect concord" (L24 181). In Schiller, all actions are aimed at overcoming fragmentation, because freedom results from man's wholeness.

1.2 Fragmentation

Schiller's concept of *fragments* can also be called *alienation*, a term used by Hegel and Marx, understood as our separation from ourselves or our true character as the integration of reason and sense, and our separation from a society which regards its citizens as foreigners. Both Marx and Hegel use the word alienation (*Entäusserung* or *Entfremdung*), while Schiller uses stranger (*Fremdling*) and fragment (*Bruchstück*). It is Hegel who first uses alienation (*Entäusserung* or *Entfremdung*), by which he means "the idea that something which is in fact part of ourselves seems to us foreign and hostile. In both the spiritual and material world (such as the world of work), this stage of alienation provides the motive force for dialectic change" (Magee 161).

According to Wallimann (4 -5), *Entäusserung* is usually translated as alienation and *Entfremdung* as estrangement. However much depends on the English translators, since the terms are impossible to translate into English in a precise way.

There can hardly be said to be any very common practice among English translators. Thus, M. Milligan (*Economics and Philosophical MSS of 1844*; cit.) translates *Entfremdung* as "estrangement" and *Entäusserung* as "alienation" (or "externalisation"); T. Bottomore (*Karl Marx: Early Writings*) claims that Marx does not distinguish between the two terms and translates both as "alienation" (or "estrangement"). D. McLellan (*Karl Marx: Early Texts*) and L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat (*Writings of the Young Marx*) translate *Entfremdung* as "alienation" and *Entäusserung* as "externalisation." (Chiodi 124 translator's note)

Although I use alienation and fragmentation synonymously in this thesis, I prefer using the word fragment when discussing Schiller's concept, because Schiller's word, fragment (*Bruchstück*), is at the core of his concept of holism. It suggests its own solution,

wholeness (*Ganze* or *Totalität*), as neither *Entfremdung* nor *Entäusserung* does. Schiller often describes the contrast between fragment and whole as in the following passage:

...everlastingly chained to a single little fragment [*Bruchstück*] of the whole [*Ganze*], man himself develops into nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his own nature, he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his specialized knowledge. But even that meager, fragmentary [*Fragmentarische*] participation, by which individual members of the state are still linked to the whole [*Ganze*], does not depend upon forms that they spontaneously prescribe for themselves (for how could one entrust to their freedom of action a mechanism so intricate and so fearful of light and enlightenment?); it is dictated to them with meticulous exactitude by means of a formulary that inhibits all freedom of thought. The dead letter takes the place of living understanding, and a good memory is a safer guide than imagination and feeling. (L6 35)

For all three philosophers, alienation is caused by specialization, which divides and separates human abilities, and which isolates people from their own nature and isolates individuals from society and the state, making them feel they are fragments which do not have connections with society, with others, or even with themselves. Thus humans feel they are outside of their society; they feel they are outside their own personalities.

Like Schiller, Hegel and Marx regard the ancient Greeks as living in a pre-alienated condition, in an ideal harmonious relationship between the individual and society, because for the Greeks reason and sense, subjectivity and objectivity, intellect and feeling, ego and the external world were not yet separated clearly. However, with the subsequent development of civilization, wholeness and harmony have been lost.

Although the three writers agree that human rationality is the origin of alienation, they disagree regarding the details. For Schiller, the origin of alienation is the

development of reason; for Hegel, it is self-consciousness which wants to achieve actuality; for Marx, it is the greed of capitalism in industrial society under the name of utility. Marx's focus is capitalism, which he maintains causes alienation – understood as the negative condition where workers are distanced from their products since they cannot possess them, are distanced from their work activity since it is for the sake of others, and are outsiders to others, since workers are in competition as slaves of capitalism.

The three men agree with regard to self-alienation. The origin of fragmentation is actually not society, nor civilization, nor money, but is our rationality, which wants to expand its ability into our lives. In Schiller as in Hegel and Marx, alienated people are not only laboring workers, but also politicians, authorities, reformers, revolutionaries, scientists, and philosophers who do not know that they too are alienated from themselves, thus having difficulty realizing what they intend. Their language and their intention, their will and their actions, often do not directly correspond. Schiller's concept of self-alienation - "we have given ourselves a master within" (*L6* 33), by which he describes the psychological abuse brought about by civilization - influenced Hegel's concept of the master and the slave. Marx writes of the oppressed worker class and the oppressing bourgeois class, and claims that even the oppressing class is alienated since the bourgeois are enslaved by capitalism's forces of production.

All three of them regard alienation as necessary for the material and psychological development of humanity, and they claim that we are slowly moving toward the time when we will abolish alienation at the end of history, in Hegel and Marx, and as the

aesthetic state in Schiller. The three philosophers claim that freedom and self-fulfilment will be realized at the last stage.

For all three philosophers, alienation ensures that the process of dialectic change, the development of a synthesis from the interaction of thesis and antithesis, continues through history. Schiller displays a sharp sense of the division of human development and psychology regarding fragmentation, and his theory of historical distinctions can be seen clearly in *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*. Chapter 2 of this paper will explore the details of Schiller's concept of the stages of development for the human psyche and the political condition. There is a three-fold transformation of the psychological and political condition: development, decline, and development with integration of the first two experiences in the last stage. I deal further with Schiller's dialectic concept in Chapter 4.

Although the three men have similar concepts of fragmentation or alienation, their solutions to alienation are clearly different. For Schiller, the solution is achieved by the development of integration between reason and sense - the aesthetic ability. For Hegel, it is achieved by uniting with others and being a part of the integrated state, through incorporating ourselves with family, civil society, and the state, which represents the individual's will as wholeness. Schiller and Marx regard the state as a necessary evil¹ - evil in the sense of restricting the individual's freedom. For Hegel, individualism, understood as the condition in which the state is in a subordinate condition to its citizens,

¹ For Schiller, this is a "natural state," such as the ancien régime. In Section 1.8, page 31, I discuss Schiller's position regarding the state.

leads to the individual alienating himself, since this relationship causes alienation by going against the wholeness and harmony of the state. Hegel holds that alienation and its overcoming are a process whereby people lose and then regain themselves. Thus alienation for Hegel is an essential phase or stimulant for the unfolding of the absolute mind (Geyer 26), a condition “when the *Geist* comes to know itself as the ultimate reality, and realizes that everything that it had hitherto regarded as alien to itself is in fact part of itself, not in conflict with itself” (Magee 161).

For Marx, the solution to alienation involves, first of all, a stage of “raw communism,” which does not solve greed, as private property becomes common property. The second stage, “ultimate communism,” will realize the overcoming of greed and private property, and labour will be replaced by “free, joyous, productive activity” (Lavine 283). To reform society, he suggests there is only one “practical movement” - revolution. “A revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the *ruling* class cannot be overthrown in any other way but also because the class *overthrowing* it can succeed only by revolution in getting rid of all the traditional muck and become capable of establishing society anew” (Marx 431).

1.3 The Division of Labor

Schiller attacks civilization and the current state, and here we clearly see the influence of Rousseau, who claimed that humans are isolated and separated from their true character, and have been suppressed by the state, authority, and laws. Schiller claims that civilization enables us to live and survive with others, but encourages only limited

abilities. The division of labor causes an imbalance between the employment of the intellect and the use of mechanical skills, and this imbalance causes lack of harmony in the human psyche.

When the community makes his office the measure of the man; when in one of its citizens it prizes nothing but memory, in another a mere tabularizing intelligence, in a third only mechanical skill; when, in the one case, indifferent to character, it insists exclusively on knowledge, yet is, in another, ready to condone any amount of obscurantist thinking as long as it is accompanied by a spirit of order and law-abiding behavior; when, moreover, it insists on special skills being developed with a degree of intensity that is only commensurate with its readiness to absolve the individual citizen from developing himself in extensivity - can we wonder that the remaining aptitudes of the psyche are neglected in order to give undivided attention to the one that will bring honor and profit? (L6 35-37)

Schiller uses a machine metaphor when he describes modern society as “an ingenious clockwork, in which, out of the piecing together of innumerable but lifeless parts, a mechanical kind of collective life ensued. State and church, laws and customs, [are] now torn asunder” (L6 35). An individual is reduced to having become “a single little fragment of the whole,” and cannot develop except as a fragment, and therefore “we see not only merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part of their potentialities, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain” (L6 33). Schiller allows that exceptional individuals may accomplish more than what is expected of them, but holds that “a mediocre man will consume in the office assigned him the whole meager sum of his powers” (L6 37). Such men do not have time for leisure.

1.4 Micro Levels of Fragmentation

Thus, in Schiller, there are two levels of fragmentation; the micro and macro

levels. The first is in the individual's psyche, and the second is a political and social condition. Schiller looks at two sides because he holds that the reason and sense conflict in the human psyche expands to the society and state, since parts (individuals) construct the whole.

With regard to the inner or micro condition, intellect and sense become strangers to each other because of the lack of connection and harmony between them. Once civilization had "inflicted this wound [the separation of intuitive understanding from sense and the speculative understanding from reason] upon modern man," sense and reason "withdrew in hostility to take up positions in their respective field, whose frontiers they now began to guard with jealous mistrust" (L6 33). Then overspecialization lead to the "suppressing [of] the rest of our potentialities" (ibid.).

For Schiller, the ancient Greeks did not have this problem arising from the reason and sense split; they enjoyed knowing objects from both sides since they did not yet know the clear division caused by the development of civilization, as I explain in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Schiller asks why "the individual Greek [was] qualified to be the representative of his age, and why can no single modern venture as much?" and answers "Because it was from all-unifying nature that the former, and from the all-dividing intellect that the latter, received their respective forms" (L6 33). In the modern era, we cannot unite reason and sense because we depend so much on reason, which tends to divide the world into two. Civilization makes this problem worse.

It was civilization itself that inflicted this wound upon modern man. Once the

increase of empirical knowledge, and more exact modes of thought, made sharper divisions between the sciences inevitable, and once the increasingly complex machinery of state necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks and occupations, then the inner unity of human nature was severed too, and a disastrous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance. (L6 33)

In civilization, there is a strong tendency to see things or objects as particles or fragments, so we cannot discover the meaning of the whole, and cannot notice fragments are actually parts of the whole, or that fragments are connected. Scientists and philosophers use the intellect to analyze phenomena in nature, and this is the only way to discover truth in the scientific method. Yet this approach impedes our ability to grasp nature as a whole, for “intellect must first destroy the object of inner sense if it would make it *its own*. Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by analyzing them, only lay bare the workings of spontaneous nature by subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques” (L1 5).

The intellect separates and analyzes objects, so objects are fragmented. This process reveals the details, but does not reveal the whole. Furthermore, Schiller holds that the analytical use of words will escalate the tendency to fragmentation in thought. He writes that “in order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, [the philosopher] must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any wonder that natural feeling cannot find itself again in such an image, or that in the account of the analytical thinker truth should appear as paradox?” (L1 5). For Schiller, language places a restriction on expressing what we really want to communicate.

Thus “man can be at odds with himself in two ways” (L4 21) because we isolate ourselves as slaves of sense or reason. One is either a savage, when “feeling predominates over principle,” or one is a barbarian, when “principle destroys feeling” (ibid.). “The savage despises civilization, and acknowledges nature as his sovereign mistress. The barbarian derides and dishonors nature, but, more contemptible than the savage, as often as not continues to be the slave of his slave” (ibid.). Unlike Rousseau, Schiller does not use the word savage with the connotation of individuals of innocent and noble status. Savages are like animals, without reason, so when he says “a return to the savage state,” it is intended to indicate a return to a violent, amoral, and non-rational status. A barbarian, on the other hand, who concentrates on the practical affairs of living life often has “a *narrow* heart, since his imagination, imprisoned within the unvarying confines of his own calling, is incapable of extending itself to appreciate other ways of seeing and knowing” (L6 39). Those people who believe they are in control of reason and are civilized are barbarians in Schiller’s view. They are in “complete lethargy,” representing “[the other extreme] of human depravity” (L5 25). He calls their reason *cold* reason, merely a “so-called reason,” which does not care about benevolent results. He writes, “Hence the abstract thinker very often has a *cold* heart, since he dissects his impressions, and impressions can move the soul only as long as they remain whole” (L6 39). Thus Schiller concludes that “In the first case [too much focus on the material] [man] will never be *himself*; in the second [too much intellect] he will never be *anything else*; and for that very reason, therefore, he will in both cases be *neither the one nor the other*, consequently

- a non-entity" (*L13 89*).

1.5 Macro Level of Fragmentation

The other level of fragmentation is an outer or macro condition; the individual and state become strangers to each other since the state treats individuals merely as things. The great variety and diversity of people is simplified by the state through classification and occupations, and the state treats its citizens merely in terms of rank or job. Schiller claims that gradually "the concrete life of the individual is destroyed in order that the abstract idea of the whole may drag out its sorry existence, and the state remains forever a stranger to its citizens since at no point does it ever make contact with their feeling" (*L6 37*). The individual is abused, and the self-interest of rulers and elites produces political alienation and hatred among the citizens.

In Schiller, humans must not be treated as mere "material." He writes "The statesman-artist must approach his material with a quite different kind of respect from that which the maker of beauty feigns toward his. The consideration he must accord to its uniqueness and individuality is not merely subjective, and aimed at creating an illusion for the senses, but objective and directed to its innermost being" (*L4 21*). Such statesman-artists are unlike artisans who do not have to care if they do violence to the material, for their concern "is not with the whole for the sake of the parts, but with the parts for the sake of the whole" (*L4 19*). They care about the appearance, not the essence, and do not respect the material. However, politicians must consider each individual's dignity and happiness. Schiller notes that for the political artist, "man is at once the material on which

he works and the goal toward which he strives. In this case the end turns back upon itself and becomes identical with the medium; and it is only inasmuch as the whole serves the parts that the parts are in any way bound to submit to the whole” (*L4* 19-21).

Originally, a state has to be “an organization formed by itself and for itself, it can only become a reality inasmuch as its parts have been turned up to the idea of the whole” (*L4* 21). A state exists for its own sake, which means it is for the sake of those individuals who compose the whole. Each member of a state has to agree with “the idea of the whole,” since “the state serves to represent that ideal and objective humanity that exists in the heart of each of its citizens” (*L4* 21).

Schiller goes on to describe the modern condition, where “enjoyment [is] divorced from labor, the means from the end, the effort from the reward” (*L6* 37). There is no harmony because of specialized knowledge and activity. Humans do not have joy in labor which forces them to work for the sake of the state, not for themselves. According to Schiller, this is the situation in most European countries of his era. Political and social conflicts such as the French Revolution, with all their terrible consequences, occur because of such psychological (or micro) and political (or macro) fragmentation.

However, he contends that they are inevitable. Schiller asks

With this twofold pressure upon it, from within and from without, could humanity well have taken any other course than the one it actually took? In this striving after inalienable possessions in the realm of ideas, the spirit of speculation could do no other than become a stranger to the world of sense, and lose sight of matter for the sake of form. The practical spirit, by contrast, enclosed within a monotonous sphere of material objects, and within this uniformity still further confined by formulas, was bound to find the idea of an unconditioned whole receding from

sight, and to become just as impoverished as its own poor sphere of activity.”
(L6 37-39)

In Schiller, the fragmented condition is caused by the needs of utility. He claims that “... at the present time material needs reign supreme and bend a degraded humanity beneath their tyrannical yoke. *Utility* is the great idol of our age, to which all powers are in thrall and to which all talent must pay homage” (L2 7). He questions rationality, which is regarded as a practical asset in both society and the individual. As he observes that rationality or practicality is hurting people in his own fragmented era, he shows that real practicality will come from the mind not being a slave of the material but “playing” with material - a synthesis of reason and sense - as Chapter 5 of this paper will detail.

1.6 Reason and Sense

Throughout history, humans have failed to realize their abstract ideas through politics. There is indeed a great irony in history; religions, ideologies, and theories of social reform which were intended to make humans equal and free have failed to realize their original humanitarian purpose, and mankind has ended up with power struggles and battles over self-interest which usually result in hurt being caused to others. We seem to know what we intend to achieve, but do not know how to achieve it.

For Schiller, the contradiction of humanity - the theories of love of humankind beside our violent, murderous nature - is caused by an imbalance of reason and passion. Schiller claims that unless the problem of the human psyche is resolved, we will not be able to realize social reform. He holds that this struggle between reason and sense, a

conflict which is part of human destiny, originates with two opposing elements - an unchanged *person* and a changing *condition*. In this, he acknowledges that his concepts of person and condition are influenced by Fichte (L4 17 fn), as are his concepts of the formal and sensuous drives (L13 85 fn).

Schiller notes Fichte's *Lectures on the Vocation of a Scholar* (L4 17 fn), as a reference concerning *person* and *condition*. According to Fichte, humans have a "pure I" - the archetype of the individual, which affects rational functioning, and a "not I" or "empirical I," which affects sensual functioning. Our purpose is to bring harmony to the contradiction between the "I" and the "empirical I" by reciprocal action. He writes, "The ultimate characteristic feature of all rational beings is, accordingly, absolute unity, constant self-identity, complete agreement with oneself. This absolute identity is the form of the pure I and is its only true form" (Fichte 148-149). The tool for the integration of sense and reason is culture or civilization (*Kultur*) in Fichte (150). Only through cultivating ourselves can we go back to our nature, the "pure I.." The advance of culture means that everyone should be educated to develop the skills to realize harmony between reason and sense, to realize one's integrated personality in "absolute unity, constant self-identity, complete agreement with oneself" (ibid. 149).

In Schiller, the *person* is beyond time and space, while the *condition* is within time and space. The *person* must be our "own ground" and it "manifests itself in the eternally persisting 'I'" (L11 75). Schiller writes, "Every individual human being, one may say, carries within him, potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human

being, and it is his life's task to be, through all his changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of this ideal" (L4 17). This "I" has an absolute and ideal concept of its being, "grounded upon itself, that is to say, *freedom*." The *person* cannot change itself because it "cannot have a beginning in time." The material surrounding the "I" is ever changing, while the "I" does not change. The *person* is "nothing but form and empty potential" (L11 77) apart from perceptions and sensations, although we can do nothing in this material world without a body. The person is "merely the predisposition to a possible expression of [man's] infinite nature" (L11 77).

On the other hand, the *condition*, the "determining attributes" of the self, "must *proceed from something*" within time and space (L11 73). The *condition*, "apart from any spontaneous activity of the mind," makes it possible to exist in the world of matter, yet cannot create a personality. Only man's sensuous nature or *condition* can "turn [his] potential into actual power; but it is only his personality that makes all his actual activity into something that is inalienably his own" (L11 77).

Human personality has a tendency or "disposition to the divine"- to unite the elements in an "absolute manifestation of potential (the actualization of all that is possible), and absolute unity of manifestation (the necessity of all that is made actual)" (L11 75-77).

This changing material within [man] is accompanied by his never-changing "I"- and to remain perpetually himself throughout all change, to convert all that he apprehends into experience, i.e., to organize it into a unity that has significance, and to transform all his modes of existence in time into a law for all times: this is the injunction laid upon him by his rational nature. (L11 75)

This suggests that the *person* deals with ideality and possibility, and strives to realize its character in reality. That is to say, the person is the absolute purpose in our spiritual life. On the other hand, the *condition* is based on practicality and reality, and our senses want to realize the *condition* in ideality; we want to realize the absolute purpose in our material lives, as if we have a permanent existence. A finite human body exists by changing, and the infinite personality exists by not changing. Realizing both elements, or “the constant unity that remains eternally itself amidst the floods of change” (L11 75), is our goal. But this is almost impossible to realize. Schiller calls it an “unending task” or “the way to the divine (if we can call a way that which never leads to the goal)” (L11 75).

1.7 The Sensuous and Formal Drives

Because of “the two fundamental laws of [man’s] sensuo-rational nature” (L11 77), which originate from the *person* and *condition*, Schiller holds that human-kind is subject to “two opposing forces” in the attempt to achieve the double task of “giving reality to the necessity *within*, and subjecting to the laws of necessity the reality *without*” (L12 79). He calls these forces the *sensuous* and *formal* drives.

The sensuous drive comes from our physical, sensuous nature, and acts in the world of matter, time, the senses, and the necessities of living. This drive deals with the *condition*, which is human-kind’s natural or physical condition, and with the concept of change. Schiller claims that physical existence is known only through sensation, which he defines as a state in which “time [is] occupied by content.”

The formal drive comes out of the *person*, or man's rational nature, which Schiller calls "the absolute existence of man" (L12 81). The *person*, "from [man's] rational nature," produces the formal drive which maintains as its eternal purpose the desire to be itself. The *person* wants to be "an absolute and individual unity" and "*since we are to all eternity we ourselves*," the formal drive acts to affirm that "the personality can never demand anything but that which is binding upon it to all eternity" (ibid.). When the formal drive is demanding something "for this moment," it is also demanding it forever. The formal drive "wants the real to be necessary and eternal, and the eternal and the necessary to be real. In other words, it insists on truth and on the right" (ibid.). While the sensuous drive provides *cases*, the formal drive gives *laws*. The formal drive intends to release humans from "the bondage of time" (ibid.) and lead them from the sensuous to the ideal world.

Thus, for Schiller, human nature is faced with two conflicting challenges (L11 77). He holds that the first challenge, arising from the sensuous drive, "insists upon absolute *reality*: [man] is to turn everything which is mere form into world, and make all his potentialities fully manifest." The other challenge, arising from the formal drive, "insists upon absolute *formality*: [man] is to destroy everything in himself which is mere world, and bring harmony into all his changes. In other words, he is to externalize all that is within him, and give form to all that is outside him" (L11 77). Both the formal and sensuous drives are directed "toward truth and toward perfection," and are "wholly earnest in [their] demands," since the sensuous drive deals with "the reality" of life, and

the formal drive deals with “the maintenance of dignity” (L15 105).

While the sensuous drive is necessary for humans to exist as matter, it also makes “complete fulfillment” of human potential “impossible” (L12 81). Schiller holds that “with indestructible chains it binds the ever-soaring spirit to the world of sense, and summons abstraction from its most unfettered excursions into the infinite back to the limitations of the present” (L12 81). He writes that the sensuous drive has changeability and extensity, and the formal drive has autonomy and intensity, but we often mix up their roles and areas of influence. That is to say, we mistakenly transfer the intensity of the formal drive, which is active, to the sensuous drive, which is passive, and use the receptive faculty of the sensuous drive, instead of the determining faculty of the formal drive. Also, we mistakenly transfer the extensity of the sensuous drive, which is passive, to the formal drive which is active, and use the determining faculty of the formal drive instead of the receptive faculty of the sensuous drive (L13 87-89).

Because in [man’s] experience the sense drive *precedes* the moral, he assigns to the law of necessity a beginning in time too, a *positive origin*, and through this most unfortunate of all errors makes the unchangeable and eternal in himself into an accidental product of the transient. He persuades himself into regarding the concepts of right and wrong as statutes introduced by some will, not as something valid in themselves for all eternity. (L24 179)

Unfortunately, the formal drive may well push us into the “most terrifying servitude” (L24 175). When humans want to rise to an unlimited condition, their hearts are still limited by matter and time, and the desire to realize unlimited ideal conditions is replaced by the desire to realize limited material conditions. Although the purpose of the

formal drive or reason is to lead humans to “truth and morality” by thinking and activity, this is transferred to an “unlimited longing and absolute instinctual need” by the passivity and feeling of the sensuous drive. Therefore, we obtain “*care and fear*” (L24 175) as the product of reason which is mistakenly working in the territory of the sensuous drive, and which “mistakes its object and applies its imperative directly to matter” (L24 175-177). Humans try to realize “systems of unqualified eudaemonism” (L24 177) from the formal drive in the world of matter. Reason’s tendency to a moral ideal becomes the tendency to an ideal of desire with “an animality striving toward the absolute” (ibid.). Reason is misled by sense, and “the life of sense knows no *purpose* other than its own advantage, and feels driven by *no cause* other than blind chance” (L24 179). Therefore, without “grasping the sublime necessity of reason,” man makes selfish advantage “the arbiter of his actions,” and “blind chance” the “sovereign ruler of the world” (ibid.). When humans use reason mistakenly, they look at the permanent ideal condition in the sense world as if matter is permanent.

Under the guise of rationality, humans, who misapply the formal drive to the material world, are actually controlled by desires, passions, or fears. Yet if reason builds its own state of moral necessity, if it rejects the natural state, in the sense of a political state which provides the material necessities but not political freedom, then reason “jeopardizes the physical man who actually exists for the sake of a moral man who is as yet problematic, risks the very existence of society for a merely hypothetical (even though morally necessary) ideal of society” (L3 13).

1.8 State of Reason

On the basis of this analysis, Schiller holds that there are three kinds of political conditions which reflect mental conditions. One is the natural state which is guided by the sensuous drive. This natural state - the details of which I examine in the next chapter - provides only physical needs. The natural state, as found in the German states or France's ancien régime, does not offer political freedom, and is not open to the possibility of reform. Schiller holds that "the [natural] state as at present constituted has been the cause of evil," the cause of the fragmented condition (*L7 45*). The second is the moral state, which is guided by the formal drive, and which carries the realization of political freedom - though Schiller holds that such a state will never be fully realized. The third state is the aesthetic state which is guided by true reason, in the sense of a synthesis of reason and sense, or person and condition. In this state, humans finally realize political and mental freedom. Schiller calls this third state a state of reason. The three states represent either a one-sided human ability (reason or sense) or united human ability; reason and sense are sublated without being annihilated, which Schiller calls reason in the sense of true reason. 'True' or 'ideal' in this case means the condition of wholeness which we will attain after overcoming fragmentation. (I deal with his definition of the true and ideal in Chapter 4). The three states may be described as follows:

Table 1.1 Three States

<u>Fragments</u>	<u>Fragments</u>	<u>Wholeness</u>
<u>Natural state</u>	<u>Moral state</u>	<u>Aesthetic state = State of Reason</u>
Current condition	Never fully realized	Will be realized in the future
Sensuous drive	Formal drive	Sensuous/Formal drive
Physical need	Mental need	Physical and Mental need
Lack of Freedom	First Freedom ²	Second Freedom (Physical/Mental)

Human nature is reflected in the state. A natural state, influenced by the sensuous drive (which Schiller sometimes calls natural character), has rule of force. Moral humans cannot stay in this natural state because they respect law, but physical humans can stay since they care about physical needs. A moral state, influenced by the formal drive (which Schiller sometimes calls moral character), is not created “*because [moral character] never becomes manifest*” (L3 15).

Since the moral state has not yet been realized, except in the imagination, and since humans need physical satisfaction, which the formal drive often ignores, the moral state merely represents a possibility, not a reality. For example, despite the good intentions behind the American and French revolutions, which Schiller acknowledges, the results are less than moral states. Reason tends to seek only an ideal and rational rule, and practicality is subordinate. If reason alone acts, and if it does not care about the conditions necessary for human life, it will bring us to mortal dangers as in the French Revolution. On the other hand, the ability to realize reform is not to be found “in the natural character

² For Schiller, the first freedom entails the concept of freedom; the second freedom involves the realization of freedom in the material world by the harmony of the formal and sensuous drives. I discuss Schiller’s concept of freedom in detail in Section 3.5.

of man [ruled by the senses and instinct] that, selfish and violent as it is, aims at the destruction of society rather than at its preservation" (L3 15). Schiller claims that "what we must chiefly bear in mind, then, is that physical society *in time* must never for a moment cease to exist while moral society *as idea* is in the process of being formed; that for the sake of man's moral dignity his actual existence must never be jeopardized" (L3 13). Therefore Schiller holds that the gradual but complete change of the human psyche is the way to achieve social reform. Schiller writes, "For the state as at present constituted has been the cause of evil, while the state as reason conceives it, far from being able to lay the foundations of this better humanity, would itself have to be founded upon it" (L7 45).

The third political state, the state of reason or the aesthetic state, realizes the ideal personality in individuals. An individual's subjective humanity - *condition* - has to be sublated with his objective ideal archetype - *person*. The state has to represent this ideal personality in individuals.

This archetype, which is to be discerned more or less clearly in every individual, is represented by the *state*, the objective and, as it were, canonical form in which all the diversity of individual subjects strive to unite. One can, however, imagine two different ways in which man existing in time can coincide with man as idea, and, in consequence, just as many ways in which the state can assert itself in individuals: either by the ideal man suppressing empirical man, and the state annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself *becoming* the state, and man in time being *ennobled to the stature* of man as idea. (L4 19)

Schiller chose the latter way, but in this regard, we have to conquer the material in order to heal the disintegration of the psyche and politics. "*Nature* always makes the first demand on the human being, a demand that may never be disavowed. For the human

being - before being anything else - is an entity who feels. *Reason* makes the second demand on the human being, since a human is an entity who feels rationally, a moral person, and it is this person's duty not to let nature prevail over him but rather to master it" (*Pathetic* 48). Reason needs to take certain steps to reach victory, and I deal with the details in the next chapter.

Chapter 2 Human Stages of Development

2.1 The Meaning of History

Schiller's plays may be seen as the place where he describes our fragmented condition and our earnest desire to regain our previous condition - wholeness. His plays feature frustrated characters such as Franz Moor (*The Robbers*), Mary Stuart, and Don Carlos, who cannot achieve what they really want - perhaps to go back home, or to their original status. They cannot realize their wish because of their psychological and social problems - they feel they are fragmented or isolated from themselves and society. We see the same concept in Schiller's philosophical writings. For Schiller, humans want to go back to nature (home), but are in civilization (a prison, foreign country...), and have to suffer this fragmented (isolated) condition in the vain hope of wholeness (being united with family and home) someday.

For Schiller, history means the consequences of education or culture expressed by the word *Bildung* in German. The meaning of history is to bring humans to the state of reason by means of freedom. Schiller's view of history is connected to his claim that humans eventually progress morally to regain wholeness in the psyche and the political state. The *person* - the ultimate "archetype of a human being" - "is to be discerned more or less clearly in every individual, is represented by the *state*, the objective and, as it were, canonical form in which all the diversity of individual subjects strive to unite" (L4 17-19). In *What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History?*, Schiller claims that fragmented events which seem unconnected with others are actually connected with

others, and thus we may be able to find progress, led by reason. Because of the lack of complete and reliable sources of historical information, history is not a science but “an aggregation of fragments” (*What Is* 268).

But now the philosophical understanding comes to its aid, and while it binds these fragments together with artificial connections, it elevates the aggregate to a system, to a reasonably connected whole. Its authority for this lies in the uniformity and invariant unity of the laws of nature and of the human soul, which unity is the reason, that the events of most distant antiquity return in the most recent times under the coincidence of similar circumstance from the outside, as also the reason, that, therefore, from events most recent, lying within the field of our observation, a conclusion can be drawn and some light shed, in hindsight, on events which faded away in prehistoric times. (*What Is* 268)

When considering Schiller’s terminology, it is necessary to note his view of human progress for individuals and society, since this view is based on the stages of the human condition with regard either to wholeness or fragmentation. In considering “the development of mankind as a whole, or of the whole development of a single individual” (*L25* 183 fn), Schiller claims that there are three stages or phases of the development of culture:

Are not those three stages which we can distinguish in all empirical knowledge likely to hold approximately for the general development of human culture?

1. The object stands before us as a whole, but confused and fluid.
2. We separate particular characteristics and distinguish; our knowledge is now *distinct*, but isolated and limited.
3. We unite what we have separated, and the whole stands before us again, no longer confused, however, but illuminated from all sides.

The Greeks found themselves in the first of these three phases. We find ourselves in the second. The third, therefore, we may still hope for, and when it comes we shall no longer yearn for the Greeks to return. (qtd. by Wilkinson in *Letters* 234)

According to Schiller, it is necessary that all humans pass through these stages, in any era

or place “to complete the full cycle of their destiny” (L24 171), and that “the human being in nature cannot progress other than by cultivating himself and thus passing over into a civilized state” (Naive 202). Each stage might be longer or shorter because of the circumstances or human will, but a stage cannot be left out or the order changed (L24 171). Schiller notes that man “must pass through several stages - these deviations are nevertheless all attendant upon his physical condition, since in all of them the life impulse [sensuous drive] plays the master over the form impulse [formal drive]” (L24 181). Humans have to pass through stages either as “animal[s] void of reason,” such as in the state of nature when humans are the same as animals, or as “animal[s] endowed with reason” (L24 181), such as in the natural state where humans are controlled by reason, which suppresses sense.

We can look at Schiller’s stages of human progress from two points of view: as a theory of historical development, and as a theory of the development of artistic creativity in individuals which will lead them to be moral. His stages are intended to explain human political and mental progress as follows:

I remind my readers once again that, necessary as it is to distinguish these two periods³ in theory, in practice they more or less merge one into the other. Nor must we imagine that there ever was a time when man found himself purely at the physical stage, or another when he had entirely freed himself from it. From the moment man sees an *object*, he is no longer in a merely physical state; and as long as he continues to see objects, he will not entirely have escaped from that physical

³ Here Schiller means, on the one hand, a state of nature (“physical stage”), in the sense of a prehistoric era when humans lived as animals without rationality, and, on the other hand, ancient Greece and a natural state, in the sense of civilized eras. These terms will be discussed below.

stage; for only inasmuch as he had physical sensations is he able to see at all. In a general way, those three moments which I mentioned at the beginning of the twenty-fourth letter may well be considered as three different epochs, if we are thinking either of the development of mankind as a whole, or of the whole development of a single individual; but they are also to be distinguished in each single act of perception, and are, in a word, the necessary conditions of all knowledge which comes to us through the senses. (L25 183 fn.)

Schiller admits that “This state of brute nature [state of nature] is not, I admit, to be found exactly as I have presented it here among any particular people or in any particular age. It is purely an idea; but an idea with which experience is, in certain particulars, in complete accord” (L24 173).

In attempting to lay out Schiller’s concept of human development, I have added an extra stage at the beginning, before number one in Schiller’s ordering above. Schiller does not include this prehistoric era in his list, since it is before human culture and civilization, but he does describe an animal-like condition, a time before humans obtained consciousness called “a state of nature” (L3). So, I regard the four stages as follows:

Stage 1: A State of Nature (The condition before civilization and political bodies).

Nature as humanity’s animal-like condition.

Reason as potential human ability which is not yet revealed.

Sense as actual ability – the impulse for self-preservation.

In this stage, a state of nature; humans do not have self consciousness yet. They do not know the pleasure of ornamentation. Thus they are not human-like; they do not appreciate beauty.

Stage 2: An Age of Transition (Ancient Greece).

Nature as true human nature.

Reason as a sense of intellectual ability, not clearly distinguished from sense.

(Humans start to use reason, but reason and sense are not yet clearly distinguished.)

Sense as a feeling or physical desire which is not clearly distinguished from reason.

Civilization in its beginnings, just before the development of political bodies which will treat humans as material.

In this stage, humans start to develop civilization and culture and experience the pleasure of ornamentation. They start creating works of art. Following the terminology of *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, this may be called the Naive era, since humans are in a natural condition, have well-combined psyches, and are able to reflect such a condition in their works of art.

Stage 3: Natural State (A political state which provides only physical necessities).

Nature as the real life of humanity - violent, or nature as character lost since ancient Greece.

Reason as intellectual ability, opposed to sense or feeling.

Sense - feeling opposed to intellect. Reason, in this stage, suppresses feeling, and the psyche is divided into two. Humans are often under the control of only one side.

Civilization as the origin of humanity's violent character and alienation.

Following the terminology of *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, this stage can be also called the era of *Sentiment*, in the sense of an era of struggle to go back to our nature - a united psyche. Artists have to struggle to combine their concepts and materials, as individuals have to struggle with their sense and reason conflict to realize their total humanity.

Stage 4: Aesthetic State (A political state based on an aesthetic mental state).

Nature as humanity's true nature which unites with freedom and beauty.

Reason as intellect which shows maximum ability, as in works of art.

Sense as feeling which shows maximum ability, as in works of art.

Civilization as a necessary tool to realize the aesthetic state for the human psyche and political body.

In this stage, finally, our struggle with reason and sense will cease, the mind and body problem will be solved, and we will be able to move to the reformation of the political state, just as artists will realize ideal beauty after they conquer the material.

I believe these four divisions help clarify Schiller's main definitions of nature, reason, sense, and civilization, since each stage involves a distinct use of the terms. They are key words for understanding not only Schiller's theory of human progress but also his concept of wholeness, since they show various meanings in each stage. Therefore I hold that Schiller's terminology results from his theory of alienation and not from any inconsistency. His holistic view is that the opposing relations will be sublated and bring us happiness. On the other hand, in his view of fragmentation, or when we look at divided

elements, they bring the disasters and misery of human history, causing political conflict, violent revolution, and the peril of death.

2.2 Reflections: Resistance in the Fragmented Era

In *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, published the same year as the *Letters* (1795), Schiller describes the history of literature regarding the progress of humanity. The ancient Greeks had naive character, a harmonious condition to express their nature. In Schiller's view, they could grasp objects as a whole, but since their reason and sense were not yet clearly divided, they did not analyze or reflect, but simply imitated the object in their works of art. He holds that because the naive poet imitates "simple nature and feeling, limiting himself solely to imitation of reality, he can have only a single relation to his object and, in *this* respect, he has no choice regarding the treatment" (*Naive* 204).

On the other hand, modern individuals have sentimental character in the sense of a strong desire to go back to their original harmonious psyche, before civilization developed the reason and sense conflict. Sentimental poets show the desire to go back to nature, to a united psyche. "This sort of poet *reflects* on the impression the objects make upon him and only on the basis of that reflection is the emotion founded..." (*Naive* 204).

Since sentimental poets *reflect* on the impressions of objects with their reason, and naive poets *imitate* objects with their reason and sense combined psyches, T. J. Reed uses the term *reflective* instead of *sentimental* when he writes "The awareness of lost naturalness and the impulse to restore it together make modern writing 'reflective', what Schiller calls 'sentimentalisch' - again, not a dismissive term, since it is concerned with

an anything but shallow or trite emotion” (Reed 75). Sentimental or reflective represents the human reaction and resistance to the modern, fragmented era; naive represents the tendency to be in harmony and wholeness. In the modern era, the poet’s ability is in realizing human wholeness by overcoming the fragmented psyche. Thus Schiller claims “The ancient poets touch us through nature, through sensuous truth, through living presence; the modern poets touch us through ideas” (*Naive* 201).

The modern era or natural state is a fragmented era, but this is also the preparatory era for the coming age - the age of the aesthetic state. In *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, Schiller does not deal with the specifics of the coming age of the aesthetic state; however, he “... does not consider sentimental poetry the end of art and human development. In a letter to Humboldt dated December 25, 1795, Schiller explains that if sentimental culture or humanity is ‘complete ... it is no longer sentimental, but ideal ... I present the sentimental as only *striving after* the ideal’” (qtd. by Hinderer and Dahlstrom in *Essays* xiv).

Naive and Sentimental Poetry has been relatively ignored compared to the *Letters*, since it has the style of a history of literature. Writing on Schiller’s philosophical works, Regin deals with *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* in only one paragraph. He comments: “As the title indicates, the work falls clearly outside the field of our investigation. It is of great importance for literary criticism and prosody, but has little bearing on the development of Schiller’s thought in a strictly historical or philosophical sense. Yet a few words may be said about his idea of the Idyll as the ideal form of poetry, the synthesis of elegy and

satire” (Regin 113). However, the true figure and purpose of *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* is not merely the history of literature, but concerns the development of humanity’s stages. Schiller’s history of literature could equally be the history of any human activity such as visual art, music, or politics, since this must be called the history of resistance to alienation.

Schiller’s concept of the artist’s character - naive and sentimental - has been criticized as an unrealistic view of the history of literature since its publication in 1795. Sharpe comments that, for example, in 1804,

Like August Wilhelm Schlegel he [Jean Paul Richter] objects to Schiller’s classification of specific writers as naive or sentimental ... and over-stresses the historical nature of the division. Like Herder, toward whose aesthetic ideas he felt a greater sympathy, he doubts the usefulness of any such sweeping distinction. Schiller’s identification of the question of the self-consciousness of the artist, an issue so important in Romantic criticism, is ignored by both Schlegel and Jean Paul. (Sharpe 11)

Admittedly it may be simplistic to say the ancient Greeks were naive and modern poets are sentimental, but Schiller acknowledges that the distinction of eras is merely a generalization of moral attitudes. He writes, “I note that the division attempted here, precisely because it is based simply upon the manner of feeling, should determine nothing at all in the division of poems themselves and the derivation of the poetic types” (*Naive* 212 fn). For Schiller, a modern poet is “one who is a modern in the moral sense of this term” (*Naive* 199), and he classifies eras by their prevailing moral attitude, such as one of reaction to and reflection on opposing the fragmentation of society. Schiller shows higher regard for the resistance of moderns than the attitude of the ancient Greeks:

This road taken by the modern poets is, moreover, the same road humans in general must travel, both as individuals and as a whole. Nature makes a human being one with himself, art separates and divides him; by means of the ideal he returns to the unity. Yet because the ideal is an infinite one that he never reaches, the cultured human being in *his* way can never become complete as the natural human being can be in his way. If we pay attention solely to the relation in which both stand to their respective ways of proceeding and to what is optimal for each, then the cultured individual would necessarily lag infinitely behind the natural individual in perfection. On the other hand, if one compares their two approaches with one another, then it becomes apparent that the goal for which the human being *strives* through culture is infinitely superior to the goal that he *attains* through nature. (Naive 202)

For Schiller, a genius is one who is truly aesthetic, and the aesthetic is found in “the intimate merging of the spirit with the material and in the unified relation of a work to the capacity to feel and have ideas” (Naive 222). There exist rare persons who are not alienated in their psyches even in modern “ages of artificial culture” (Naive 196); such geniuses will be able to produce works of art which, as a result of their moral attitude, combine material with form in harmonious concord. For example, Shakespeare and Goethe, geniuses who could combine reason and sense to write their respective works, were naive poets according to Schiller (Naive 197). “Every true genius must be naive or he is no genius.... It is a gift of genius alone, always to be at home even beyond the confines of what is familiar, and to *expand* nature without *going outside* it” (Naive 189).

If we look at *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* as the expanded version of Schiller’s concept of the stages of human development discussed in the *Letters*, his most important intention is going back to nature, to the time before we were fragmented. *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* is the history of fragmentation, and the declaration of the

future aesthetic state, and *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* is the history of poetic resistance to fragmentation since we lost the nature we had in ancient Greece.

Literature and all the fine arts are a reflection of the human desire to go back to a natural status - humanity's original, united psyche. Schiller's naive character corresponds to nature, and his sentimental character corresponds to civilization. He writes, "For ultimately we still have to concede that neither the naive nor the sentimental character, considered by itself, can completely exhaust the ideal of beautiful humanity, an ideal that can only emerge from the intimate union of both" (*Naive* 249). Achieving an excellent work of art is not only possible in literature, visual arts, or music, but also in the whole of humanity through history; each individual would be and must be an artist. The history of literature is a reflection of the history of the war to regain freedom, and I explain Schiller's concept of the stages of human development below.

2.3 Stage 1: A State of Nature - Before Civilization

This stage is called *a state of nature* (L3 11), a "state of brute nature" (L24 173), or the "physical state" (L25 183), which means an animal-like condition before civilization. In this condition, the human is "merely a passive recipient of the world of sense" (ibid.). Humans feel like animals, but do not think since they do not yet have consciousness or "sheer insight and free resolve" (L3 11). They do not look upon and think about the world using reason because they are still "completely one with that world" (L25 183). In this condition, humans experience "the savagery of life" (L24 171). They do not have any law, nor do they have freedom. They do not have any rules, but are slaves of

this animal-like condition. Humans hunt to eat, defend themselves to survive, and receive objects merely by natural impulse without self-consciousness. This stage is characterized only by fear and the desire to act.

In this stage, humans are not yet themselves in the sense of their original nature as a rational existence. They do not yet know their true selves - their "dignity" (L24 173), and they do not see dignity in others. Therefore, they are not truly human. In this stage, nature, the power which created humans, merely cares about humans as it cares about other animals: "Nature deals no better with man than with the rest of her works: she acts for him as long as he is as yet incapable of acting for himself as a free intelligence" (L3 11). Nature, in this stage, is hiding its true purpose or gift for its human children. Its true purpose is bringing humans from stage 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and eventually to stage 4. Humans do not yet know their moral necessity, such as freedom which will be derived from their innate ability to reason.

The *state of nature* in the sense of a pre-civilization or pre-political state is not exactly equivalent for Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Schiller. In Hobbes, state of nature also means state of war, because humans are free and equal enough to insist on what they need, and kill others to preserve themselves, under no constraints. Until reason suggests humans move to form a political state, they are in "continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 89). There is no morality and no justice in this condition. On the other hand, in Schiller's state of nature, merely a condition controlled by animal-like instinct, humans are not bloody and

brutal as in Hobbes. Humans are ignorant brutes, but this is not because of their natural character, but because of what Schiller sees as their lack of natural character - human dignity aided by reason. In Schiller's state of nature, humans do not have freedom and equality as in Hobbes. Schiller would regard Hobbes' freedom (men are free to kill each other and are free to choose an absolute monarchy in order to preserve their lives) and equality (equal ability to kill each other) as the lack of freedom and equality. Schiller's freedom and equality come from knowing our dignity. In Hobbes, reason brings humans into political states to choose the most practical way of self-preservation and the duty to care about the self preservation of others. However, in Schiller, physical necessity brings humans into political states against their will. Until they wake up in the political state, they do not even have clear consciousness.

In Locke's state of nature (*Second Treatise*, Ch.2), humans have morality, justice, and freedom - in the sense of action regarding personal property based on individual will. Humans have, for Locke, a natural capacity to act according to the laws of nature from reason, grounded on mutual interdependence, and need a minimum of governance by the state. They care about others to preserve each other. In this condition, the laws of nature are enacted by each person according to his will, based on reason. However, in Schiller's state of nature, there is no freedom, no morality, and no justice, since humans lack self-consciousness.

In Rousseau (*Origins of Inequality*), in the state of nature, humans lead solitary lives with the instinct to live. They had plenty of food because the population was very

small; they did not have private property and did not have to wage war with others. When humans got together and started living closely, socialization brought the problem of inequality. Humans abandoned the life of happiness, simplicity, and equality, for the seeking of wealth and private property. For Rousseau, human misery comes from unlimited desire. Unlike Hobbes and Locke, who claim civilization and political organization as the progress of the state of nature, Rousseau regards this development as regression.

There are similarities between Rousseau and Schiller in the notion that civilization made human misery, with lack of freedom, and inequality with overspecialization of jobs. However, unlike Rousseau, Schiller does not mention private property as the main problem. His concern is the problem of the human psyche - the split of reason and sense, and the misery it has brought to human life. In Schiller's view, humans - unlike Rousseau's noble savages - are miserable in the state of nature since basic survival is a daily struggle. As they do not have society, political freedom is beyond their conception. There is only a short moment when humans could enjoy harmony without the reason - sense conflict; this is the transition from the stage 1, *state of nature*, to stage 3, the *natural state* as a political state which provides only the physical necessities but not political freedom. This stage of transition is represented by ancient Greece.

2.4 Stage 2: An Age of Transition - Ancient Greece

When humans gain self-consciousness, they are already in the political state, and are provided with the physical necessities such as food, shelter, and clothes. Humans

moved to this stage, which Schiller calls a natural state, because the “force of [man’s] needs” (L3 11) - physical necessity - propelled them into the state, the political body, before they were able to choose what they wanted. Schiller writes that “out of the long slumber of the senses [man] awakes to consciousness and knows himself for a human being; he looks about him, into his situation before he was as yet capable of exercising his freedom to choose it; compulsion organized it according to purely natural laws before he could do so according the laws of reason” (L3 11). In this context, natural law mean innate human instinct without choice, will, or even consciousness.

This is the beginning of awareness of the lack of freedom. However, there is a small gap or space when humans did not yet have this problem. This stage is very short because it is in the transition from the state of nature to the natural state (as a political body). In this transitional space, humans were neither in the state of nature nor the natural state as a political body. Schiller sees this stage represented in ancient Greece - at least in the idealized, utopian Greece of his vision. He needed such a myth of the past as a basis for a possible future. According to this model, the Greeks gained consciousness, reason, and civilization, but civilization was not yet harmful since their reason was not yet far from their senses.

Schiller describes nature as an operating power in the world - which can be called “mother nature”- an educator or parent which cares about her children. In this stage, nature as a ruler of the world finally starts to save humans from their brutal and ignorant condition. Schiller says “in this state of sullen limitation [man] gropes his way through the

darkness of his life until a kindly nature shifts the burden of matter from his beclouded senses, and he learns through reflection to distinguish *himself* from things, so that objects reveal themselves at last in the reflected light of consciousness" (L24 173). This is the stage when "The object stands before us as a whole, but confused and fluid" (qtd. by Wilkinson in *Letters* 234). As the ancient Greeks do not have the problem of a reason and sense split, they can enjoy knowing objects from both sides. In this stage, humans are half children and half adult-like; they have reason, but do not need to use reason independently.

The entire edifice of [ancient Greek] social life was erected on feelings, not on some clumsy work of art. Their theology itself was the inspiration of a naive feeling, born of a joyful imagination and not of brooding reason as is the belief of the churches of modern nations. Hence, since the Greek had not lost the nature in humanity, he also could not be surprised by nature outside humanity, and for that reason could have no pressing need for objects in which he rediscovered nature. One with himself and content in the feeling of his humanity, the Greek had to stand quietly by this humanity as his ultimate and to concern himself with bringing everything else closer to it. *We*, on the other hand, neither one with ourselves nor happy in our experiences of humanity, have no more pressing interest than to take flight from it and to remove from sight so miscarried a form. (Naive 195)

Ironically, humans found themselves - their true nature, having reason and sense in harmony - just after they obtained reason, and just before they fell into the misery of civilization, as Schiller claims:

With the Greeks, humanity undoubtedly reached a maximum of excellence, which could neither be maintained at that level nor rise any higher. Not maintained, because the intellect was unavoidably compelled by the store of knowledge it already possessed to dissociate itself from feeling and intuition in an attempt to arrive at exact discursive understanding; not rise any higher, because only a specific degree of clarity is compatible with a specific fullness and warmth. This

degree the Greeks had attained; and had they wished to proceed to a higher stage of development, they could, like us, have had to surrender their wholeness of being and pursue truth along separate paths. (L6 39-41)

The logical mind with moral desires gave humans freedom to choose civilization.

However, instead of choosing the way to freedom, we lost happiness. Because of our dependence on artificial or man-made products, we cannot go back to nature, although our natural condition, which we possessed in ancient Greece, can be found in children, or in some limited people's simple, childlike actions.

The ancient Greeks had what we have lost - freedom and beauty which come from the unity of the psyche. Schiller says "we then see in nonrational nature only a more fortunate sister who remained at home arrogantly confident of our freedom. With painful urgency we long to be back where we began as soon as we experience the misery of culture and hear our mother's tender voice in the distant, foreign country of art" (*Naive* 192). He adds that humans, as "mere children of nature," remained "happy and complete," but became neither happy nor complete when free to use reason. Our feeling of nostalgia, when we look at nature, is a reflection of our own lost nature. According to Schiller, simple objects in nature such as flowers and animals "are what we were; they are what we should become once more. We were nature like them, and our [aesthetic] culture should lead us along the path of reason and freedom back to nature" (*Naive* 180-181). When he implies a "back to nature" stance, he is talking about our true natural character, which was found neither in a state of nature, as in stage 1, nor a natural state, as in stage 3, when a political body limits our freedom. True human nature is to be found only in the era of

transition - the second stage - between the state of nature and the natural state.

There are similarities between Rousseau and Schiller regarding the “back to nature” concept. When both use the word nature they are not talking about going back to an animal-like condition. They are talking about the second stage - the transition between a state of nature and civilization. In Rousseau, the second state of human history is the beginning of a civil state as yet uncontaminated by civilization, without inequality and with human dignity in the place of socialization. This is a natural community before the political body appears. People start using reason when they understand themselves as individuals. This is a perfect time for humans, as Rousseau explains:

... although men had become less forbearing, and although natural pity had already undergone some alteration, this period of the development of human faculties, maintaining a middle position between the indolence of our primitive state and the petulant activity of our egocentrism, must have been the happiest and most durable epoch.... The example of savages, almost all of whom have been found in this state, seems to confirm that the human race had been made to remain in it always; that this state is the veritable youth of the world. (*Inequality* 65)

This golden age-like stage, such as in ancient Greece, which is Schiller’s generalization of the category, can be seen in any era, race, or individual, as he writes:

Beneath a serendipitous sky, in the uncomplicated relationships of that original condition, and with limited knowledge, nature is easily satisfied and a human being does not become a savage until need produces fear in him. All people with a history have a paradise, a state of innocence, a golden age. Indeed, each individual human being has his paradise, his golden age that he recalls with more or less enthusiasm, depending upon how poetic his nature is. (*Naive* 228)

The reason humans could not stay in such an ideal stage is similar in both Rousseau and Schiller. In Rousseau, there is a special character which only humans have.

This is “the faculty of self-perfection,” an unlimited ability which is “the source of all man’s misfortunes” (*Inequality* 45), which pulls humans from nature into the political state. In Schiller, reason tends to progress, and cannot stop, but since it has to deal with sense it cannot avoid falling into a worse condition.

For many German writers, such as Winckelmann, Hölderlin, Schiller, Nietzsche, Hegel, and Marx, ancient Greece was the model of an ideal society and the ideal human condition. The common concept among those thinkers is that before modern civilization and alienation, before the separation from our true nature and enslavement in society, there was an ideal state. An individual Greek had a simplicity and wholeness of character which was not subject to the contradiction between reason and feeling, between the mental and physical. And the Greeks could develop their abilities as much as possible, as they did not experience a tension between principle and passion. Schiller is clearly under the spell of Winckelmann, who greatly influenced German writers regarding the harmony and beauty considered to exist in ancient Greece. According to Macleod, “It has become an academic commonplace to say of classical German aesthetics that it is underpinned by the notion of ‘the middle’” (Macleod 27). For Winckelmann, the middle or golden mean is represented by beauty in the fine arts of Greece. The physical and mental, and rational and sensuous unity brings harmony and beauty, for “Beauty is nothing other than the middle between two extremes. Just as the middle path is always the best, it is always the most beautiful. In order to find the middle, one must know the two extremes” (qtd. by Macleod 27). According to Macleod, “Such a middle way also suggests a temporal

location of 'in-betweenness': a nostalgic version of classical Greek perfection, a utopian call for an aesthetic state that could restore such wholeness" (27). Schiller uses Greece to show nature in the sense of humanity's original character which had beauty and freedom from the unity of two elements. The Greeks had an "all-unifying" concept of nature, uniting matter and form, but modern humans have "all-dividing intellect" (L6 33), which divides matter and form.

To the Greek, nature is never *mere* nature, for which reason he need never blush to know her; to him, reason is never *mere* reason, for which reason he need never shudder to tread under its rule. Nature and morality, matter and mind, Earth and Heaven, flow together with wondrous beauty in his poems. He introduced freedom, which is at home not merely in Olympus, also into the business of morality, and one will therefore want to indulge him, if he misplaces sensuousness, too, into Olympus. (Grace 341)

Schiller's four stages can be considered theoretical history; whether or not an event truly happened in the past is not his primary focus. He uses the term "era" when describing the process of creating works of art, itself a metaphor for the stages of progress of individuals and the political state. History and the individual will pass through the same stages as works of art. Much as a sculptor has to struggle to combine his conception with such materials as wood and stone, a human as a work of art, has to struggle to combine mind and body, or reason and sense, to regain a harmonious condition.

2.5 Stage 3: A Natural State - Provides Only Physical Necessities

Stage 3 is the era of the *natural state*, which Schiller defines as "any political body whose organization derives originally from forces and not from laws" (L3 13). He uses the term *nature* in a negative way in stage 3, and a *natural state*, or modern political state,

provides the bare minimum of physical necessities. *Nature* in the sense of human character is violent and irrational under such a *natural state*. This state does not recognize that each individual has the dignity to seek freedom. In this stage, the individual starts to question his lack of freedom under the natural (political) state; "But with this state of compulsion, born of what nature destined him to be, and designed to this end alone, he neither could nor can rest content as moral being. And woe to him if he could!" (L3 11). In this stage, the division of labour induces humans to use reason and sense independently and expand the gap between them. Humans try to go back to the harmonious condition which they had before, but since they are using their abilities separately, their political and mental conditions become alienated, meaning that each person is isolated from his true nature and purpose, and also isolated from others; each becomes merely part of a machine, to serve and labour without joy. Thus this stage could also be called the era of alienation. It immediately follows the stage represented by ancient Greece, a stage humans had to leave because reason, in its drive for development, has a tendency to separate from sense.

Schiller claims that civilization ruins mental and social harmony by fragmentation. Since reason as a natural innate characteristic is a factor in the development of the four stages, and therefore brought about civilization itself as an element of our advancement, we can regard civilization as a temporary "adversary."

If the manifold potentialities in man were ever to be developed, there was no other way but to pit them one against the other. This antagonism of faculties and functions is the great instrument of civilization - but it is only the instrument; for

as long as it persists, we are only on the way to becoming civilized. Only through individual powers in man becoming isolated, and arrogating to themselves exclusive authority, do they come into conflict with the truth of things, and force the common sense, which is otherwise content to linger with indolent complacency on outward appearance, to penetrate phenomena in depth. (L6 41)

Civilization is the only way to go back to our nature, in the sense of our original integrated psyche. This is the plan of nature as a rule or force of the world, which leads humans to reach the final stage, by using civilization both as a necessary evil and a necessary good. Schiller writes "I readily concede that, little as individuals might benefit from this fragmentation of their being, there was no other way in which the species as a whole could have progressed" (L6 39). Without darkness, without chains, without restrictions, we will not know how to seek light and freedom. According to Schiller, heroic efforts are required to go back to nature and the harmonious life. To return to paradise, we have to be like children who have not separated reason and sense. Schiller's solution is that only an individual's virtue can repair the gap between matter and form, insight and action, or the individual and society.

2.6 Stage 4: The Aesthetic State

The Greeks were born with harmony within themselves and with others, but in stage 4, which is the aesthetic condition of individuals in the aesthetic political state, simplicity is obtained through aesthetic semblance - equidistant from material and mind, and we can expand the aesthetic semblance in the fine arts into all conditions of human life. For Schiller, the task of the eternal and ultimate *person* is to achieve integration of the fragmented relation between our rationality and sensuality, of the individual and the

state. Our reason ultimately will be synthesized with sense as the true rational condition by the help of civilization. Therefore, the cause of fragmentation leads to the solution.

The formal drive, which is the impulse of reason, is enthusiastic to realize the moral state, or as Schiller writes, "The pure moral impulse is directed towards the absolute" (L9 59). But such a way will not bring victory for reason: "Far too impetuous to proceed by such unobtrusive means, the divine impulse for form often hurls itself directly upon present-day reality and upon the life of action, and undertakes to fashion anew the formless material presented by the moral world" (L9 59).

Schiller holds that sense (the receptive faculty) has to achieve maximum passivity, and reason (the determining faculty) has to achieve maximum activity, while each remains independent from the other (L13 87). Only the third drive can bridge the gap, and allow for the realization of the goals of sense and reason. This third drive - what Schiller calls "the play drive" - is the impulse to experience reason and sense, or the formal drive and sensuous drive at the same time. The third drive is the synthesis of the opposed elements, as I explain in Chapter 5.

The object of the play drive is beauty, which is experienced only by uniting the two drives; by using this third drive, Schiller argues, man will be able to realize himself as existence in the world by drawing the world "into himself in all its infinitude of phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his reason" (L13 87-89). In this condition, "We unite what we have separated, and the whole stands before us again, no longer confused, however, but illuminated from all sides" (qtd. by Wilkinson in *Letters* 234).

Schiller expresses his concept of fragmentation and integration in his theory of human development, as this chapter has shown. However, his definitions of words such as nature, reason, civilization, and freedom reveal much of his thinking regarding this concept as well, and the next chapter examines his usage of such terms.

Chapter 3 Terminology - Fragmentation and Wholeness

3.1 Fragmentation in Language

Schiller uses the words *lower*, and *higher* or *lofty*, in the *Letters* to indicate the dual nature of various words. In this chapter, I explain both what he calls *higher* or *narrow* - by which he means not commonly used - definitions, and his *lower* or *broad* - by which he means commonly used - definitions. Also, I observe that those dual meanings in Schiller's terms, in the *Letters*, are combined as the result of his aesthetic approach - which is guided by the goal of harmonizing the opposing elements.

For Schiller, a splendid work of art combines form and matter almost equally. A writer who puts his ideas into language is the same as a sculptor who puts his ideas into a material substance. It could be said that the *Letters* is itself Schiller's work of art, as he tried to show the combination of a poetic mind and a conceptual mind in his philosophical analyses:

The language places everything before the *understanding*, and the poet shall bring everything before the *imaginative power* (present); the poetical art wants *intuitions*, language gives only *concepts*. Language, therefore, deprives the object, whose presentation is entrusted to it, of its sensuousness and individuality and impresses on it a property of its own (universality), which is alien to it. It mixes - to make use of my terminology - into the nature of that to be presented, which is sensuous, the nature of the presenting, which is abstract, and therefore brings heteronomy into the presentation of the same. (Kallias 525)

There is a strong connection rhetoric in his philosophical writings between Schiller's and his theory of fragmentation and wholeness. For Schiller, language is a tool to express thought, but it can also hide truth. For example, intellect understands objects or

concepts by analyzing each element as a fragment. Thus Schiller holds that philosophical writing, because analytical, tends not to seek objects as part of a wholeness. Schiller disagrees with much technical terminology in philosophical writing, as he clearly states in the beginning of the *Letters*.

But it is precisely this technical form, whereby truth is made manifest to the intellect, which veils it again from our feeling. For alas! intellect must first destroy the object of inner sense if it would make it *its own*. Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by analyzing them, only lay bare the workings of spontaneous nature by subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques. In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any wonder that natural feeling cannot find itself again in such an image, or that in the account of the analytical thinker truth should appear as paradox? (L1 5)

Schiller holds that the technical form of philosophy often does not express truth, but deforms it. When readers receive what someone wrote, it is no more than the remains of a thought. Words have to be a direct reflection of real life for Schiller, but it is difficult to express our thought clearly in language.

The rules of grammar restrict the poet less; he offers it up to nature; his sentence construction becomes more irregular; so is, for example, sometimes the more frequent use, sometimes the omission of conjunctions natural and purposive. At times the language paints even the object itself. Often the objective of an object is animated by the subjective of the expression in the language...

(*Aesthetical Lectures* 478)

Thus objects of nature might be lost “through the abstract nature of language” (ibid.). In the following sentences, Schiller uses the term ‘poetic’ in the sense of ‘aesthetic’ - the overcoming of the disagreement between the intention and the language without losing either.

Shall, therefore, a poetical presentation be free, then the poet must “*overcome the tendency of language to the universal through the greatness of his art and triumph over the matter* (words and their laws of inflection and construction) *through the form* (namely the application of the same).” The nature of the language (precisely its tendency to the universal) must be fully submerged in the form given to it, the body must lose itself in the idea, the sign in the indicated, the reality in the appearance. Free and victorious must that to be presented stride forth from the presenting, and, despite all fetters of language, stand there in its entire truth, liveliness and personality before the imaginative power. With one word: The beauty of poetical presentation is “*free self-action of nature in the fetters of language.*”
(Kallias 526)

For Schiller, language is not only a medium of fine art but also a way to regain freedom. To achieve total humanity and wholeness, we need different kinds of language use. In the beginning of the *Letters*, Schiller remarks that the free mode, suggested for the *Letters* by his patron Duke of Augustenburg, is not a restriction for him but rather a necessity: “Little practiced in the use of scholastic modes, I am scarcely in danger of offending against good taste by their abuse. My ideas, derived from constant communicating with myself rather than from any rich experience of the world or from reading, will be unable to deny their origin: the last reproach they are likely to incur is that of sectarianism” (LI 3). The *Letters* is the declaration of Schiller’s unique philosophical expressions opposing “the use of scholastic modes.” In a letter to Goethe, he writes:

You and I, and other good people, know very well that man ... always acts as a whole, and that nature proceeds by way of synthesis. But it would never occur to us to deny on that account the need for analysis and distinctions in philosophy ... any more than we should attack the chemist for destroying nature’s syntheses. But this Herr Schlosser [Goethe’s brother-in-law, who had just published a second attack on Kant] and his like want to sniff and fumble their way through metaphysics. They insist on knowing everything by way of synthesis. This apparent richness, however, merely conceals the most wretched and platitudinous emptiness. The affectation of these gentlemen for keeping man in a permanent

state of totality, for spiritualizing the physical and humanizing the spiritual is, I fear, nothing but a miserable attempt to ensure the survival of their own wretched self in all its obscurantism. (qtd. by Wilkinson in *Letters* 223)

Wilkinson points out that recognizing the obscurity of language was common at that time in Germany. She claims that one of Schiller's aims is "to confess the faith he shared with many of his contemporaries, including Kant and Herder, that a thought can be transposed into different terms without becoming an altogether different thought - a faith which is essential to belief in popularization as he understood it" (*Gutenberg* 313). If we apply Schiller's aesthetic to understand his rhetoric, it will clear up his obscurity. Schiller follows his own advice in the *Letters*, since he claims that "In a truly successful work of art the contents should effect nothing, the form everything; for only through the form is the whole man affected, through the subject-matter, by contrast, only one or other of his functions" (*L22* 155). Applying this to language, it could be said that language (material) has to be conquered by form (an artist's intention).

On the other hand, if someone - even a reader of the *Letters* - tries to look at the work of art as content (material), he is looking at the object as only a part or fragment, and will not grasp the entire work. Schiller explains as follows:

But it is by no means always a proof of formlessness in the work of art itself if it makes its effect solely through contents; this may just as often be evidence of a lack of form in him who judges it. If he is either too tense or too relaxed, if he is used to apprehending either exclusively with the intellect or exclusively with the senses, he will, even in the case of the most successfully realised whole, attend only to the parts, and in the presence of the most beautiful form respond only to the matter. (*L22* 157)

The *Letters* was first of all written to Schiller's patron Duke Augustenburg, but in

the revised version Schiller replaces the name of the Duke, dedicating the work to public readers - the middle class *Bürgers* who were gaining economic power at that time in Germany (Kontje 123-134). Kontje points out that Schiller probably intends the *Letters* itself to be understood based on the aesthetical judgement which is explained in the *Letters*. He notes that because of Schiller's intention - that of reversing the value of the real and ideal for his readers - he is expecting readers, as aesthetically educated people, to understand the *Letters*:

If we trace the image of Schiller's reader as it emerges in the *Aesthetic Education*, however, we find a tendency to address the reader as if he were already a member of a select group of individuals in the aesthetic state.... In addition to these direct appeals to the reader, the basic stylistic changes in Schiller's theory as he moves from the depiction of reality to the philosophical deduction of an ideal involve a changing model of the reader's activity which again serves to distinguish him from the ordinary members of society. (Kontje 135-136)

Schiller regards his readers as his confidants who know how to judge the *Letters* as a work of art. According to Schiller, beauty will be limited by material in actual life, and also it will be received as a faded figure by our limited psyche - in either "a state of tension" because of the disagreement of reason and feeling, or "a state of relaxation" because of the exhaustion of reason and feeling (*L17* 117-119). However, he hopes his readers will not succumb to either state, and offers this encouragement:

Beauty will, therefore, in actuality never show herself except as a particular and limited species, never as pure genius; she will in tense natures lay aside something of her freedom and variety, in relaxed natures something of her vivifying power. But we, who have by now become more familiar with her true nature, should not let ourselves be confused by such discrepancies in her appearance. Far from following the ordinary run of critics, who define the concept of beauty from their individual experience of it, and make her responsible for the imperfections

displayed by man under her influence, we know that it is, on the contrary, man himself who transfers to her the imperfections of his own individuality, who by his subjective limitation perpetually stands in the way of her perfection, and reduces the absolute ideal to two limited types of manifestation. (L17 119)

For Schiller, one-sided definitions are ultimately false definitions. He sees humanity as violent when looking at human nature as a fragment of the reason-sense split; but when he regards human nature as a unity of reason and sense, a wholeness, he discovers an indispensable relation between human nature and reason, freedom, beauty and civilization. In this chapter, I deal with the contrasts between sense and reason, nature and civilization, and the first and second order of freedom, and I explore ways in which Schiller holds that it is possible to establish a harmonious interaction between those opposed terms.

3.2 Reason

Schiller uses reason, in a lower or false sense, when discussing one-sided human nature which lacks sense, or has conflict with it. He uses reason in a higher or true sense (sublated with sense) when discussing the entire human nature. Similarly, he uses sense in the lower or false sense, when discussing one-sided human nature which lacks reason, or has conflict with it. And he uses sense in the higher or true sense (sublated with reason) to designate the entire human nature.

When Schiller considers reason in this ideal meaning, it is clearly different from intellect, which is used in the narrow sense of reason which has a tendency to exclude sense. A one-sided reason will bring the danger even of death, as in the French

Revolution, where people misused their rationality. However, true reason will eventually bring us to an ideal political state after we pass through such hazards. Schiller uses either a lower or higher definition of reason and sense depending on which era or stage (as I explained in Chapter 2) he is talking about. If the era represents a fragmented state, reason and sense follow the lower or one-sided definition, and if the era represents a united state, they follow a higher or true definition. The following three categories apply to each of the human stages:

Category 1 - under the natural impulse

(applies to stage 1 - A State of Nature)

- *Reason* in the sense of the intellectual ability; it is not used yet since humans do not have even self-consciousness.
- *Sense* in the sense of sense and feeling from the *law of nature*, which is understood as an innate self-preserving impulse.

Category 2 - the conflict between two laws or two desires / alienation

(applies to stage 3 - the Natural State)

- *Reason* in the sense of the *law of reason*, which is understood as an innate moral tendency - the opposite of sense. *Reason as cold reason* without love of humankind. Reason in this usage attempts to realize a moral political state, but often falls into power conflict; Schiller writes, "For reason is satisfied as long as her law obtains unconditionally" (L4 93).

- *Sense* in the sense of feeling arising from the *law of nature*, which is understood as an

innate self-preserving impulse. *Sense* as the violent human tendency under the suppression of cold reason.

Category 3 - in the sense of ideal human personality / wholeness

(applies to stage 2 - ancient Greece and stage 4 - the aesthetic state)

- *Reason* which comes from the synthesis of sense and intellect. Reason's ultimate purpose is to bring us to a harmonious condition. *Reason* as the synonym of nature - the unity of sense and reason.
- *Sense* as human impulse or feeling, in a cooperative relationship with intellect. *Sense* as the synonym of nature - the synthesis of sense and reason.

In the modern era, category 2 in the above, one-sided sense is suppressed by one-sided reason; that is, analytical ability overrides humane temperament. We cannot progress without reason, but this reason ignores sense, and expands fragmentation in the psyche, so that sense leads to violent and bloody tendencies. Schiller writes, "Feeling is excluded as long as we are thinking, and thinking excluded as long as we are feeling" (L25 189).

Reason comes from *the law of the reason* or categorical imperative, which is an innate moral tendency - by which Schiller means an inclination from the formal drive. Reason wants to realize morality in the self and society. This desire is often misapplied to hurt others in order to make ourselves winners in temporal circumstances, to promote ideological dogma, to realize political power, or to win wars. For Schiller such activities are a misuse of reason in the area of matter:

That very drive which, applied to [man's] thinking and activity, was meant to lead him to truth and morality, brought now to bear upon his passivity and feeling, produces nothing but unlimited longing and absolute instinctual need. The first fruits which he reaps in the realm of spirit are, therefore, *care and fear*; both of them products of reason, not sense; but of a reason which mistakes its object and applies its imperative directly to matter. (L24 175-177)

Attempting to realize ideality in the material world, we will be never satisfied, or never realize happiness. That is to say, reformers or revolutionaries will gain social power, but they will not regain their mental freedom to release their fragmented psyches. Schiller states, "An unlimited perpetuation of being and well-being, merely for the sake of being and well-being, is an ideal which belongs to appetite alone, hence a demand that can only be made by an animality striving towards the absolute" (L24 177).

Using only the intellect is problematic, as is using only feeling. First of all, intellect focuses on the specifics, and does not want to see wholeness, so it will never find an ultimate solution. For example, Schiller claims that our tendency to impose preconceived notions upon nature is one of the major impediments to the progress of natural science (L13 89 fn 2). He asserts that "the intellect remains eternally confined within the realm of the conditioned, and goes on eternally asking questions without ever lighting upon any ultimate answer" (L24 177).

The second problem regarding the use of the intellect involves the formation of human character. Schiller criticizes attempts at influencing character which involve suppressing passion under the name of principles. He writes that "if we are to become compassionate, helpful, effective human beings, feeling and character must unite, even as

wide-open senses must combine with vigour of intellect if we are to acquire experience” (L13 89 fn 3). He asserts that these humane qualities are, in fact, diminished when we attempt to substitute the intellect for feeling, or principles for passions (ibid.).

For Kant, reason (*Vernunft*) regulates the quest for and the securing of knowledge. When Schiller uses *Vernunft* to indicate the cause of alienation or fragmentation, he is following Kant’s definition. However, Schiller also uses the word to mean *true reason*, a higher form of reason which is the synthesis of reason and feeling, and which is necessary for the attainment of morality. For Schiller, only *true reason* regards things as whole. He writes, the “Form of [true] reason [*Vernunft*] is the kind and manner, as it expresses its power of combination” (*Kallias* 485). As in category 3, true reason which leads us to act rationally, that is morally, comes from the sublation of feeling and intellect. Schiller holds that “Nature (sense and intuition) always unites, intellect [*Verstand*] always divides; but Reason [*Vernunft*] unites once more” (L18 127 fn). In the integrated definition, reason and sense will solve the conflict as an ultimate rational condition called the aesthetic state, which I deal with in Chapter 5.

There are clear differences between Schiller’s concept of reason (*Vernunft*) and that of Hobbes. Hobbes distinguishes reason (the equivalent of *Verstand*) in the sense of the faculty for mathematics and logical thinking (*Leviathan* Ch. 5 and 27), from reason (the equivalent of *Vernunft*) in a higher sense, one which supports a “Law of Nature” or rule for survival (Ch.14). This second form of reason is a tool to satisfy the human drive for self-preservation; it leads men to live in peace as far as is possible, and when war is

unavoidable, to use all means to gain victory (*Leviathan* 92). The goal of reason (*Vernunft*) is to avoid violent death, and in this regard reason promotes morality.

In Schiller, the desire to preserve oneself comes from a natural impulse or sense, but not reason (*Vernunft*). Unlike Hobbes' reason (*Vernunft*), Schiller's reason (*as in Kant*) often ignores self-preservation because of its purpose - realizing morality in the sense of freedom. In Locke, reason (the equivalent of *Vernunft*) guides action, or provides a way to reach truth and knowledge, and is necessary in order to be moral. Unlike Locke, Schiller does not trust only reason's (*Vernunft* as in Kant) judgement.

In Rousseau, life should be guided not by reason but feeling. Schiller was an avid reader of Rousseau, and quoted *Héloïse* on the title page of *Letters*: "Si c'est la raison, qui fait l'homme, c'est le sentiment, qui le conduit" (*Héloïse* 239). Through this novel Rousseau describes how strong are our feelings, and how difficult it is to have harmony with reason. Like Rousseau, Schiller distrusts reason, as in category 2, since it brought civilization and inequality, and he emphasizes valuing sense and feeling. Both of them claim that cold reason, in the sense of intellect [*Verstand*] which disregards human concerns, often makes mistakes of judgement. Rousseau did not hold a teleological view regarding reason, unlike Schiller, who believed that the ultimate purpose of reason will solve the problem it caused.

3.3 Nature

The concept of nature is one of the essential keys to understanding Schiller's rhetoric. Nature has various definitions in his writings, and if we grasp the details of this

multiplicity they in turn make clear the definitions of other terms. Nature which opposes civilization will be a synonym of civilization later. Thus, beauty, freedom, morality, and love are attributes of nature. As those terms are interwoven very closely, it is impossible to define them separately.

Schiller employs different meanings of *nature* in almost every other sentence throughout the *Letters*. Wilkinson and Willoughby analyze eleven kinds of uses under three categories (*Letters* 322-326). They write, concerning nature, that “nowhere is the confusion of Schiller’s terminology more apparent - or more irritating! The senses available to him, both secular and sacred, were many” (ibid.). Nevertheless, Wilkinson writes of Schiller’s unique terminology:

... if Schiller’s terms are inexact, then it is not random inexactitude, if inconsistent, not haphazard inconsistency; that if his thought is guilty of illogicalities, it is not therefore without meaning; that if the form of the whole is confused, it is a most intricately designed confusion; and that the overriding intention has a clearly defined - and also definable- character, which is apparent in the detail of the language no less than in the dynamics of the total structure. (*Reflections* 57-58)

However, although Wilkinson and Willoughby hold Schiller’s rhetoric to be comprehensible, since it is a reflection of Schiller’s “dynamics of the total structure,” they do not explain why he employs so many meanings of the term ‘nature.’ I assert that those various uses of *nature* may be clarified by recognizing their relation to Schiller’s stages of human development, which show either fragmentation or wholeness.

The following distinctions are based closely on Wilkinson and Willoughby (*Letters* 322-326). But what I add is an account of which stage, in my judgment, will

apply to each use of *nature* (I add labels such as N1, N2... to make the explanation clearer) to prove that Schiller's terminology is based on his concept of fragmentation.

N1 *Nature* in the first category is in "its widest sense" (L20 139) "the source of all things" (323), which gave us our lives and all of existence. This category, it seems to me, corresponds to all four of the stages, and is a "mother nature" which affects humans in a neutral way.

In the second category nature is "that which stands over against us, and to which we are related in various ways" (323). This category is divided into five kinds of use because of different relations with humans:

N2 *Nature* "as power or force" (323) for us. I assert that this usage applies to stage 1 (the state of nature) when humans are animal-like, and to stage 3 (natural state) when humans are under restriction by governments which merely give them physical necessities but not a political necessity - freedom.

N3 *Nature* which is perceived by humans as "completely one" (L25 183) with themselves since they do not have rational thought and self-awareness in their pre-historic condition. I contend that this usage applies to stage 1 (state of nature) when humans are animal-like, when they do not yet have self-consciousness.

N4 *Nature* as material, such as stone, which is used as a sculptor's material (L4 19). Schiller uses this example to contrast with human nature in the sense of human dignity which cannot be treated as material by political states. I hold that this indicates stage 3 (natural state), which does not treat humans as spiritual but as material.

N5 Nature - “a kindly nature” which brings humans into a rational state (L24 173) - which leads humans to be moral and aesthetic in the sense of uniting feeling and reason - mother nature’s gift. I hold that this usage applies to stage 2 (Greece), and stage 4 (aesthetic state). Nature gave the Greeks happiness in the past, and in the current condition is still watching and leading us to reach an aesthetic state under the guidance of reason.

N6 Nature as “sense and intuition” – the opposite of intellectual ability (L18 127 fn). This usage, I hold, applies to stage 1, the animal-like condition, and stage 3, the problematic condition because of the antagonism between sense and reason.

Nature in the third category means “*Natur* in the sense of man’s own, ‘human’, nature” (324), and under this category there are five uses according to Wilkinson:

N7 Human Nature - that which humans are given to preserve themselves as a natural impulse. I hold that this usage applies to stages 1 and 3.

N8 Human Nature which is made from two elements - sense and reason. I contend that this usage applies to stages 3, when both have conflict, and stage 4 when they integrate.

N9 Human Nature which leads us to “involuntary” action (325) based on feeling and sense, without rational considerations. I hold that this usage applies to stage 1, (animal-like condition), and stage 3 (physical desires bring us into political bodies against our will).

N10 Human Nature which leads us to act voluntarily based on rational

considerations and self-awareness, but which is often misused because too much rationality causes lack of growth of feeling. I contend that this applies to stage 3, where we make mistakes in using the intellect.

N11 *Human Nature* as a harmonious condition under the reciprocal action of feeling and reason. I assert that this usage applies to stage 2 - the Greeks, and to stage 4 - the aesthetic state which is not yet realized.

Nature in the second category (different relations with humans and nature) and the third category (human nature) will be applied to various stages, with either a fragmented or integrated society and psyche. Schiller explains why a human has to step through several stages: "But what makes him man is precisely this: that he does not stop at what nature herself made of him, but has the power of retracing by means of reason the steps she took on his behalf, of transforming the work of blind compulsion into a work of free choice, and of elevating physical necessity into moral necessity" (L3 11). Nature as the origin of all existence plans to bring humans to its ultimate purpose - realizing a state of reason where we can realize laws of reason (moral tendencies), accompanied by sense. I claim that each category in Wilkinson and Willoughby's analysis corresponds to humans in either a fragmented condition or a united condition, so the following may clarify the issue:

Category 1, Nature, a general term, as in "mother nature." (stage 1-4) N1

Category 2, Nature in the sense of its relation to humans

- Fragmented condition

2.1 Nature which makes humans slaves of physical necessity.

(stage 1, a state of nature) N2, N3, N6

2.2 Nature which makes humans violent because of the antagonism of reason and sense. (stage 3, natural state) N2, N4, N6

•Integrated condition

2.3 Nature which makes humans moral with a united psyche. Reason and sense are not yet divided. (stage 2, Greece) N5

2.4 Nature which makes humans harmonious and moral with a united psyche - sense and reason in reciprocal action. (stage 4, aesthetic state) N5

Category 3, Nature in the sense of human nature

•Fragmented condition

3.1 Human nature which is based on natural impulse and sense.

(stage 1, a state of nature) N7, N9

3.2 Human nature which is violent since humans are slaves of impulse and sense, not using reason correctly. (stage 3, natural state) N7, N8, N9, N10

•Integrated condition

3.3 Human nature with unity between reason and sense. (stage 2, Greece) N11

3.4 Human nature with unity between reason and sense with the help of the play drive. (stage 4, aesthetic state) N8, N11

From N1 to N11, each definition applies to each stage; also, each definition applies to either a fragmented or integrated condition. Thus, I claim we can divide each definition

into four categories, based on each stage. From stages 1 to 4 we see different aspects of nature, as follows:

Stage 1: A State of Nature - under the natural impulse

- N7 *Human nature* in the sense of a natural impulse to preserve ourselves, without reason.
- N2, N3, N6 *Nature* in the sense of its relation with humans, is defined as an unavoidable force which controls humans as the slaves of instinct. Nature in this sense is “completely one ” (L25 183) with humans since they do not have rational thought and self-awareness.

Stage 3: Natural State - under the conflict between two laws or two desires / fragmentation

- N7 *Human nature* is defined as “sense and intuition” – the opposite of intellect ability (L18 127 fn), and also as the natural impulse to preserve ourselves.
- N10 *Human nature* is also defined as consciously acting based on rational considerations and self-recognition, but which is often misused because too much rationality causes lack of growth of feeling.
- N8, N9 *Human nature* is also defined as violent character which brings unintentional action based on feeling and sense, without integrated rational considerations, that is, rationality incorporated with sense.
- N6 *Nature* in the sense of its relation with humans, defined as the loss of an integrated psyche, lost since civilization appeared. Therefore the condition of this era is “unnatural” (Naive 182), which means lack of freedom, beauty, rationality, and morality.

Stage 2: Ancient Greece - the ideal human personality / wholeness.

- N11 *Human nature* in this stage means having integration of reason and sense; there is no distinction between them.
- N5, N11 *Nature* in the sense of its relation with humans, defined as a harmonious condition in society when societies and states were just beginning, and fragmentation had not yet started. Humans lived moral and harmonious lives.

Stage 4: the Aesthetic State - the ideal human personality / wholeness.

- N11 *Human nature* is defined as the harmonious unity of reason and sense. It is defined as true rationality cooperating with feeling.
- N5, N11 *Nature* in the sense of its relation with humans, defined as a reformed political condition where humans finally can realize the ideal state without the conflict between the individual and state, without fragmentation. In this stage nature unites with civilization, sense unites with reason, and individuals unite with states.

Some critics see a problem with Schiller's treatment of nature's contradictory character - which can be brutish but also helpful for humans. For example, Kooy points out a problem which "has to do with Schiller's shifting attitude towards nature, that is, brute physical nature, and the determinism inherent in it. This problem crops up most clearly in his incompatible descriptions of beauty, as the appreciation of the forms of nature and art, and sublimity, as the overcoming of determinism in nature by a free act of will" (Kooy 15-16). In Schiller, nature indeed has dual or several characters which can be harmful or beneficial for humans. This is because brute nature is only one aspect of

nature. As in the above examination, I hold that Schiller clearly would know which meaning he intends, based on either a fragmented condition /era or united condition /era. He claims that there are two kinds of human nature, as there are two kinds of definitions of civilization. One is *actual nature* as a fragment (the sensuous side of human nature) which “exists everywhere,” and the other is *genuine nature* as wholeness (human nature as *living form* - the synthesis of body and mind, which I will discuss in the next chapter) which is “all the more rare, since it requires an inner necessity to exist” (*Naive* 236). Schiller claims: “Nature, we know, although an infinite magnitude as a whole, reveals itself in each individual effect to be dependent and deficient. Only in the totality of its appearances does it express a grand, self-sufficient character” (*Naive* 250-251). In Schiller, going back to nature in the sense of our original mental state is our moral and rational desire.

Since this interest in nature is founded upon an idea, it is able to reveal itself only to minds receptive to ideas, that is to say, moral minds.... Still, nature will always have something of this effect even on the most callous individual. For the *potential* for morality, common to all people, is all that is needed to produce this effect and we all, without distinction, are driven to the contemplation of *this idea*, despite the tremendous distance between our *deeds* and nature’s simplicity and truth.
(*Naive* 181-182)

In Schiller, being natural and simple means being beautiful and free. “Why is the naive beautiful? Because the nature therein asserts its right over affectation and disguise” (*Kallias* 515). For Schiller, nature, in the sense of humanity’s original character as seen in ancient Greece, is a synonym of *freedom*. Humans gain freedom when they are free from fragmentation in their psyches and society. It is possible to use nature and freedom

interchangeably, as he explains:

... I must first determine the concept *nature* and secure it before any misinterpretation. The expression *nature* is dearer to me than *freedom*, because it indicates at once the field of the sensuous, whereupon the beautiful is confined, and implies beside the concept of *freedom* also at once its sphere in the sensuous world. In contrast to technique, *nature* is, what is through itself, *art* is, what is through a rule. *Nature in artfulness*, what gives itself the rule - what is through its own rule ... When I say: *the nature of the thing: the thing follows its nature, it is determined through its nature*: so contrast I therein nature to all that, which is different from the object, which is considered merely as accidental to the same and can be dismissed, without at the same time canceling its essence. It is, as it were, the person of the thing whereby it is distinguished from all other things, which are not of its kind.... Merely that is indicated through the expression *nature*, wherethrough it becomes the determined thing that it is. (Kallias 503-504)

It is clear that Schiller's concept of nature is unique since every use of the term is based on whether it is one-sided or synthesized. Nevertheless, we still can compare Schiller's concept of nature with that of other philosophers. First of all, Hobbes' view of the nature, as it relates to humans, is a materialistic and mechanistic one. Hobbes writes "Nature... is by the *art* of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal" (Hobbes 9). He describes life as motion, so he regards machines as having artificial life. For Hobbes, human nature has two aspects. One leads to violent and brutish behaviour; men kill each other for self preservation in the state of nature. The other aspect is rational and leads to cooperation following the laws of nature; men seek peace and enter the contracts in order to build a political state, with the aim of regulating freedom in order to avoid war. Being natural, for Hobbes, means using reason to preserve life.

In Locke, nature, in the sense of its relation with humans, is "a state of perfect

freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man” (Locke 269). In this state, humans are equal, and have a rational and moral life without government. They have an innate rationality and morality called the law of nature which leads them to respect life, health, and freedom for oneself and others (Locke 271).

In Rousseau, nature means a natural state before civilization, and this state is not a state of war as in Hobbes, and does not have property as in Locke. In Rousseau’s natural state there is neither property nor inequality. Humans do not have reason here, only a natural impulse which enables them to obtain food. They are not miserable compared with modern man, who has unlimited desire. There are three kinds of human nature in Rousseau: one is a completely natural animal-like condition, where humans do not have reason, only feeling and impulse. Another is civilized humanity, where humans lead miserable lives because of the loss of freedom and equality. The third is an ideal human nature with reason but without the harm done by civilization, as in Schiller’s Greece.

In Schiller’s view, the natural condition of humans before civilization is not violent as in Hobbes, and not as harmonious as Locke contends, since humans do not have reason. Schiller’s view of nature, as it relates to humans, is similar to Rousseau’s, though Schiller’s human nature in the state of nature is not as harmonious as Rousseau’s, since humans are slaves of impulse. But civilized human nature is miserable since it brings the reason and sense conflict and classification, and inequality as in Rousseau.

3.4 Civilization

Civilization or culture (both words are translated from '*Kultur*') has two meanings in Schiller. One is *real* or *lower civilization* which "inflicted this wound [all-dividing intellect] upon modern man" (L6 33), and caused the fragmentation of the individual and society. In Schiller, in the lower or false sense (fragmented condition), civilization means only one-sided human rationality, which opposes human nature in the sense of an original reason-sense united psyche. Culture and civilization caused human misery by expanding the sense and reason split. Schiller claims "It was civilization itself that inflicted this wound [fragmentation] upon modern man" (L6 33).

The other definition is *ideal* or *higher civilization* in the sense of a holistic condition which unites the psyche; reason and sense are sublated, and this is a necessary tool for us to regain our freedom. "Culture [Kultur] is supposed to put humans in a state of freedom and to assist in realizing the concept of a human person as a whole" (*Concerning the Sublime* 71). In the higher or true sense (united condition), civilization means true human rationality incorporated with human nature. Higher civilization removes the violent tendency with the control of sensuous desire; thus humans will be moral and free. "A human being who is morally cultivated, and only this sort of human being, is completely free.... Nothing that nature does to him is violence, since it has already become *his own action* before it gets to him, and the dynamism of nature never reaches him, since he deliberately cuts himself off from everything that nature can reach" (*Concerning the Sublime* 72).

If we look at the object from a fragmented or a short-sighted view, civilization or culture will be regarded as harmful. However, if we look at the object from an integrated or a “long-sighted” view based on Schiller’s stages of human development, current civilization, which is harmful, will be regarded as beneficial.

As detailed in Chapter 1, according to Schiller, there are three kinds of people: savages, barbarians, and civilized persons. He writes, “The man of culture [*gebildet*] makes a friend of nature, and honors her freedom while curbing only her caprice” (L4 21). The true civilized man is a moderate person who has a balanced respect for both sides, our natural impulse for self-preservation and rationality, and is able to realize political reform. Such a person does not have masters over his psyche to misdirect his life. If nature and reason’s demands are fulfilled, this makes “permissible for *Propriety* to make the *third* demand on the human being and to require of him regard for society in the expression of feelings and reflections and to show himself to be a *civilized* being” (*Pathetic* 48).

The definitions of civilization I present below are in accord with Schiller’s concept of human development. As a result, the way in which civilization changes its meaning from lower (fragmented or one-sided) to higher (united or synthesized) becomes clear:

Category 1 - under the natural impulse

(applies to stage 1 - A State of Nature)

- *Civilization* is not revealed yet since humans are under the power of nature, a ‘mother nature’ or force, as mere animals.

Category 2 - under the conflict between two laws or two desires / fragmentation

(applies to stage 3 - The Natural State)

- *Civilization* - the source of human misery which brought humans fragmentation by the division of labor and the expansion of the disharmony between reason and sense, state and individual, with lack of freedom both in the psyche and in politics.

Category 3 - the ideal human personality / wholeness

(applies to stage 2 - Ancient Greece, and stage 4 - the Aesthetic State)

- *Civilization* - the necessary tool which brings humans integration between reason and sense, state and individuals. An aesthetic state is only possible in a civilization where we can use both reason and sense in a condition of wholeness.

If we review the four stages, civilization plays a positive role as an educator, leading humans to the aesthetic state where people live with a harmonious relationship of the mind and body. The hostility between sense and reason, or nature and civilization is, as a result, necessary for humanity's progress. The aesthetic state will be realized only in civilization or culture - what Schiller calls the "aesthetic culture" (L10 69). Leisure will be found in the highly developed civilization which can provide food, technology, and an organized social system, but not in a wilderness, or a prehistoric condition where we have to struggle to live.

For Hobbes and Locke, civilization means a rational and moral condition. This is because civilization and the state can bring peace and freedom to preserve humanity. However, for both Rousseau and Schiller, civilization and the state are the cause of

misery; they brought individual and political conflict and lack of freedom - isolation from nature.

3.5 Freedom

Schiller defines two kinds of freedom (*L19* 137fn). One is *freedom of the first order*, which is displayed by “acting rationally” (ibid.). This freedom is a priori and rational, as in Kant - every rational human has the thought of freedom. “Only of him who is conscious of himself can we demand reason, that is, absolute consistency and universality of consciousness; prior to that he is not a human being at all, and no act of humanity can be expected of him” (*L19* 135). Before the first freedom, humans are the same as the animals without reason; they lead a merely sensuous existence. When a human obtains reason, he wants to realize morality in accordance with his pure original self, the *person*. We are free to think about this absolute and universal concept of freedom, and Schiller calls having such a concept the first freedom.

However, humans have a “mixed nature” (*L19* 137 fn), involving the sensuous and formal drives, and though we have the first freedom as a concept, this mixed nature interferes with rational action when we attempt to bring a speculative freedom into reality. Thus, for Schiller, the flexible and practical way to realize the concept of freedom is as *freedom of the second order*, that is to say, freedom in real life. This freedom is displayed by “acting rationally within the limits of matter, and materially under the laws of reason” (ibid.). The second freedom is born from the first freedom: “We might explain the latter quite simply as a natural possibility of the former” (ibid.).

In Schiller's view, the revolutionaries of 1789 could not avoid seeking freedom since they had the first freedom - as the concept of universal human rights. He holds that they tried to change a natural condition to a moral condition, both in their psyches and in society. He writes, "For the work of blind forces possesses not authority before which freedom need bow, and everything must accommodate itself to the highest end that reason now decrees in [man] as person. This is the origin and justification of any attempt on the part of a people grown to maturity to transform its natural state into a moral one" (L3 13). However, the revolutionaries' intention to realize the first freedom as a pure idea brought devastating results. They would have needed the second freedom to achieve their aims in real life.

The struggle to gain freedom may be categorized in the following stages:

Category 1 - under the natural impulse

(applies to stage 1 - A State of Nature)

- Both *first* and *second freedom* do not exist since humans do not have speculative minds - they have a merely animal-like existence.
- The political *State* does not exist yet.

Category 2 - under the conflict between two laws or two desires / fragmentation

(applies to stage 3 - the Natural State)

- Individuals are fragmented in their psyches and political condition. *First freedom* exists in every person's speculation, but *second freedom* is not yet gained. Attempts at societal reform - humans want to actualize their idea of freedom in real life - are difficult and

largely unsuccessful since reason has a tendency to ignore sensuous nature and material needs.

- The political *State* - the natural state which makes individuals fragments does not provide moral freedom. Individuals and the state are strangers to each other.
- Because humans have to live as physical beings, they are forced to stay in a natural state which can provide food, clothing, and shelter. States which may be regarded as the source of fragmentation were also a necessity. Schiller asks, "Can the state be blamed for having disregarded the dignity of human beings as long as it was still a question of ensuring their very existence? Or for having hastened to divide and unite by the [mechanical] forces of gravity and cohesion, while there could as yet be no thought of any [organic] formative principle from within?" (L5 25-27).

Category 3 - human ideal personality / wholeness

(applies to stage 2 - Greece, and stage 4 - aesthetic state)

- *Second freedom* is finally obtained since there is no antagonism between reason and sense, nature and civilization, individual and state.
- The *State* - the aesthetic state which treats the individual as a part of the whole; in this case the whole (state) serves the part (individual).

Schiller's concept of freedom is clearly different from that of Hobbes, who claims that freedom means having the basic right to do whatever is necessary to preserve oneself. For Hobbes, in the state of nature, a state where individuals have the power to gain necessities to preserve themselves, everyone is equal and free in this sense. Humans are

free since they can do anything - based on what they want to gain. However, this state will lead humans to kill each other, and they will likely die in their youth.

For Locke, freedom or liberty means having the choice to act, or to decline to act, unburdened by necessity, and is, along with life and property, a possession. Locke's state of nature is a state of liberty, where individuals coexist, respecting each other's rights.

For Rousseau, freedom includes "natural freedom" or the independence of the individual, as in natural humans. But in a civilized and social condition, we need "moral freedom," where each individual takes the interests of others into account when deciding on a course of action. He holds that the "general will," the unanimous agreement among citizens, is to be carried out by governments. Any individual who disagrees with the general will must force himself, or be forced, to do what is right, to be free.

Unlike Rousseau, Schiller does not deny the need for property. He also does not see freedom in humans in a state of nature, but his concept of freedom could be close to Locke's. It is not clear if he would agree with Rousseau's "general will," though it may be acceptable if it is created after the reformation of the psyche. Comparing reason, nature, civilization, and freedom among Schiller, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau reveals that the greatest difference between Schiller and the others is that, for Schiller, freedom (second) means a harmonious relation between sense and reason. For the others, this may not be the case.

To realize freedom in real life - as in the aesthetic state - humans first of all must gain freedom in their psyches to reform their fragmented condition, and then can move to

gain freedom in their state.

Exclusive domination by either of his two basic drives is for [man] a state of constraint and violence, and freedom lies only in the co-operation of both his natures. The man one-sidedly dominated by feeling, or the sensuously tensed man, will be released and set free by means of form; the man one-sidedly dominated by law, or the spiritually tensed man, will be released and set free by means of matter. (L17 119)

In Schiller, freedom in real life is ultimately a synonym for beauty, humanity, and rationality. Human lives are controlled by matter; we have to devote energy and time to have the necessities to keep our bodies alive. When humans are controlled by gravity and mass, they lack freedom and naturalness. Likewise, a dog on a chain, a bird in a cage, a worker labouring without joy, and a human in prison are all similarly controlled by mass. There is no opportunity to be free, beautiful, and natural under such conditions.

But that freedom is itself an effect of *nature* (the word taken in the widest sense) and not the work of man, that it can, therefore, also be furthered or thwarted by natural means, follows no less inevitably from what has just been said. It arises only when man is a *complete* being, when both his fundamental drives are fully developed; it will, therefore, be lacking as long as he is incomplete, as long as one of the two drives is excluded, and it should be capable of being restored by anything which gives him back his completeness. (L20 139)

Only when we regain our original human nature - the integrated psyche - will we have the second freedom of being ourselves. The second freedom is a synthesis of restriction, such as gravity, and the concept of freedom (first freedom), as I discuss in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 - Schiller's World of Dualism


4.1 Dual and Dialectic Attitude

In this chapter I intend to analyze Schiller's systematic view of humanity, which parallels his view of alienation. He has a remarkably developed ability to observe fragmentation in every feature of experience, and he also sees dialectic movement attending the transformation to wholeness. This movement reconciles or sublates binary opposites and achieves wholeness through the third or higher stage of the dialectical process, which preserves the two elements as correlative principles without simply uniting them. For example, the development of humanity may be seen in three stages or levels: ancient Greece, the Natural state, and the Aesthetic state. Likewise, there are three kinds of drives: a formal drive, a sensuous drive, and a play drive, the latter in each case being a synthesis of the first two.


Wilkinson and Willoughby show three types of hierarchical relationships in the *Letters*, and I reproduce part of their schematic representation here:

Table 4.1 Wilkinson and Willoughby's Three Kinds of Synthesis


Type I. In this, familiar, type the term at the apex is different from either of those at the base or contains them both:




Type II. Here a single concept is polarized by qualifying adjectives. A feature of this type is that the term at the apex can turn into its opposite.



Type III. In this type, which we have termed binary synthesis, the term at the apex is the same as one of those at the base, but is printed in capitals to indicate that it is a higher concept, embracing both the limited concept of the same name and its opposite. The mark of this type of synthesis is that either of the terms at the base can move to the top.



... With the following diagram we have tried to illustrate what Schiller appears to have had in mind with his concept of the progressive refinement, or ennoblement (*Veredlung*), of the psyche.



But it is important to realize that a horizontal extension is also necessary: the aesthetic and the moral (intellect) can so interact that now the Aesthetic, now the Moral, goes to the apex of the triangle.



(Letters Appendix III p349-350)

Although Wilkinson and Willoughby observe the tendency of dualism and dialectic style in Schiller, they claim that Schiller's descriptions are not precisely dualistic or dialectic:

If we ourselves made do with a scale of triangles rising sideways, it was partly to reflect the fact that Schiller frequently operates with the synthesis of two antitheses (though not always); partly to correct the false assumption that all his syntheses are of the familiar, symmetrical, kind involving three terms - far more often they are asymmetrical and binary, one of the antitheses reappearing, raised to a higher level, as the synthesis; finally in order to insist that this is not then broken down into two new antitheses, but itself enters as one of the antitheses into the process immediately above. We are inclined to think that neither the dualism nor the dialectic is essential to Schiller's model. But what we learnt through the attempt to depict it in this way is the characteristics that are: asymmetry as well as symmetry, subordination as well as co-ordination, hierarchical transformations, continuously open-ended - and a sloping base to indicate that man's physical nature has priority in time. (Whole Man 203)

Wilkinson and Willoughby point out (*Letters* lxviii) W. Böhm's basic mistakes (1927): Böhm regarded Schiller's terminology in terms of homonyms, such as the sensuous drive/material drive (actually they are synonyms). Here, Wilkinson and Willoughby see Schiller's motives, and write: "It is, of course, perfectly true that these terms do on occasion change sides. But not without rhyme or reason. The reason varies" (ibid.). Yet, they do not make clear "the reason" behind Schiller's rhetoric. I hold that "the reason" for Schiller's multiple terminology is his concept of either a fragmented or united condition, that it to say, the reason does not vary.

Wilkinson and Willoughby understand that Schiller distinguishes his words as higher or lower, and changes their meanings. However, their explanation of why there are so many kinds of symmetry is unclear. Their diagrams are somewhat confusing, and I do not think their visual aids help readers to grasp what Schiller means. In addition, it seems as though Wilkinson and Willoughby are not aware that Schiller's historical distinctions could be clearly connected to his terminology. I have prepared a table based on my

contention that Wilkinson and Willoughby probably looked only at isolated elements, not the whole system:

Table 4.2. Regarding Historical Distinctions

Thesis (Wholeness)	Anti-thesis (Fragmentation)	Synthesis (Wholeness)
Ancient Greece	Natural state	Aesthetic state
Naive	Sentimental → Satire-Elegy- Idyll	Aesthetic

Table 4.3 Regarding Synthesis

A	B	C
Thesis	Anti-thesis	Synthesis
Fragments	Fragments	Wholeness (Ideality/Actuality=True=Aesthetic)
1, Condition	Person	True Humanity (Condition/Person)
2, Time	Absolute	True Existence (Time/Absolute)
3, Sense	Reason	True Reason/Sense
4, Sensuous Drive	Formal Drive	Play Drive (Formal/Sensuous)
5, Natural State	Moral State	Aesthetic State (The State of Reason)
6, Restriction	First Freedom	True Freedom (Second Freedom)
7, Feeling	Intellect	True Rationality (Intellect/Feeling)
8, Real	Ideal	True Ideal/Real
9, Fact	Truth	True Truth/Fact
10, Poetry	History	True Poetry/History
11, Poetry	Philosophy	True Poetry/Philosophy
12, Matter	Form	Living Form (Form/Matter)
13, Nature	Civilization	True Nature/Civilization
14, Nature	Art	True Nature/Art:
15, Work	Play	True Play/Work
16, Actual Beauty	Ideal Beauty	True Beauty (Ideal/Actual)

As I summarize in Table 4.3 below, throughout the *Letters*, there are binary elements, as in columns A and B, which are, in Schiller's view, completely opposed because in isolation they represent the alienation of human beings. Schiller emphasizes the importance of a third element, synthesized or sublated from the first two, which I list in column C.

It would, therefore, be a question of abstracting from man's physical character its arbitrariness, and from his moral character its freedom; of making the first conformable to laws, and the second dependent upon sense-impressions; of removing the former somewhat further from matter, and bringing the latter somewhat closer to it; and all this with the aim of bringing into being a third character ... (L3 15)

The theme of the *Letters* is how to create new elements, that is to say, the third character, from the binary elements, as "Only the predominance of such a character [the synthesis of elements] among a people makes it safe to undertake the transformation of a state in accordance with moral principles" (L4 17), and Schiller repeatedly demonstrates this synthesis for each set of elements in columns A and B.

For instance, he refers to the subsuming process in many places in the *Letters*, such as when discussing beauty:

Beauty, it was said, unites two conditions which are *diametrically* opposed and can never become one. It is from this opposition that we have to start ... In the second place, it was said, beauty unites these two opposed conditions and thus destroys the opposition. Since, however, both conditions remain everlastingly opposed to each other, there is no other way of uniting them except by destroying [aufgehoben] them. (L18 123-25)

Elements such as beauty, freedom, reason, and play, as the third characters (column C in table 4.3) represent the synthesized condition, that is to say, the *reciprocal action* of the binary elements. Schiller notes: "...beauty results from the reciprocal action of two opposed drives and from the uniting of two opposed principles" (L16 111). He explains that such reciprocal action "gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each in itself achieves its highest manifestation precisely by reason of the other being active" (L14 95).


Schiller frequently uses forms of the word *aufheben* in two meanings in the *Letters*, as Wilkinson and Willoughby point out (305). One is generally to preserve or save and the other is to annul or abolish. For example, in L1 it is translated *dissolved*, in L13 it is *destroyed*, in L14 it is *reconciling*, in L18 it is *destroying*, in L20 it is *annulled*, and in L23 it is translated *destruction*. As Wilkinson and Willoughby point out, even when Schiller is not using the word *aufheben*, he repeatedly demonstrates the concept of the synthesis of the binary elements as a completely new third element. They write that the dialectical concept “had already made its appearance, though without the actual occurrence of the word *aufheben*, in XV. 9: ‘they made both [opposites] indiscernible, for they knew how to fuse them in the most intimate union’”(Glossary 304-305). Wilkinson and Willoughby also note “In this double sense [preserve and destroy] *aufheben* was to become a keyterm of Hegel’s dialectical method.... It seems likely, in view of his expressed admiration for Schiller’s treatise, that it was from XVIII.4 [quoted above] that he took it” (Glossary 305).

In the above distinctions, the wholeness side represents the synthesis (represented here by the C column) of the fragments which it has subsumed. Schiller writes that “All improvement in the political sphere is to proceed from the ennobling of character...” (L9 55). So C means the realization of true truth, or true ideality/ true actuality which means the aesthetic. Moving from the Fragments column (thesis, anti-thesis) to the Wholeness column (synthesis), words change their meanings based on historical progress (which could be regarded as individual progress) as the above table shows. The side of wholeness

is represented by the aesthetic state, and this may be regarded as the reason Schiller often indicates that certain terms are synonyms for each other, such as beauty (line 16, C) = nature (line 13, C), freedom (line 6, C), play (line 15, C), or truth (line 9, C), and so on. He regards beauty as the center of those other terms, since beauty in the sense of an aesthetic/holistic condition represents *true* nature, *true* freedom, and *true* play as a result of wholeness. The same synonymous relationship holds for the other terms, such as humanity (line 1, C) = reason (line 3, C), and so on.

Schiller often uses terms interchangeably, such as the combination of nature (line 13, A) and reason (line 3, B), besides nature (line 13, A) and civilization (line 13, B), or the combination of feeling (line 7, A) and moral state (line 5, B), besides feeling (line 7, A) and intellect (line 7, B). Wilkinson and Willoughby regard such terminology as one of the reasons that Schiller's dual and dialectic approach is not well organized. However, I observe that Schiller never deviates from his rule - using opposite comparisons from A and B, because A originates from sense or *condition*, and B originates from reason or *person*, and thus he shows correspondences in his dialectic terminology. And C results from the correspondence of any item from column A and any item from column B. For example, (true) civilization is the synthesis of nature and reason, or (true) ideal state is the synthesis of restriction and freedom (first), or (true) nature is the synthesis of poetry and actuality. Such flexible alternate usage of words is strictly systematic, and Schiller never used A with A, B with B, or (A with B) with A. The system may be simplified as follows:

Table 4.4. Dialectic Terminology



It appears that when Wilkinson and Willoughby say “neither the dualism nor the dialectic is essential to Schiller’s model” (*Whole Man* 203), they do not see that there is a clear connection between Schiller’s dualism and the dialectic approach. For example, regarding their diagram III-a (Table 4.1), I hold that, their Natur in the bottom left corresponds to nature, side A - line 13 in my Table 4.3; their Freiheit in the bottom right corresponds to first freedom, side B - line 6 in my table; and their top FREIHEIT corresponds to true freedom (second freedom), C - line 6 in my table. In my view, Wilkinson and Willoughby’s three types of diagrams (Table 4.1) may be replaced by my diagram (Table 4.4), based on the condition - one-sided or synthesized: either only A or B or C (Table 4.4). There are clear parallels and correspondences for the words, lines, and rows. Throughout Schiller’s dialectics, I clearly see binary opposites A and B effectively synthesized as a third element, C. Therefore, I claim that Wilkinson and Willoughby’s view that dualism and dialectic are not essential in Schiller’s model should be revised.

Schiller’s dual and dialectic approach may also be seen in his treatment of the

three types of sentimental poetry - satire, elegy, and idyll. Those distinctions follow his analysis of moral attitude - how we develop a fragmented psyche - that is to say, one-sided reason and sense, or one-sided ideal and actual, and how this reflects our desire to go back to nature. I discern, in Schiller, that the stages of human development and the types of poetry correspond based on his dual (fragmented) and dialectic (from fragments to wholeness) approach (see Table 4.2), and I outline this correspondence as follows:

1. Naive (in the era of human wholeness)

This represents the ancient Greeks. Their poetry “move[s] us through nature, individuality, and a vivid *sensuality*...” (*Naive* 220). The impression made by naive poetry is “always joyful, always pure, always peaceful” (*Naive* 205 fn).

2. Sentimental (in the era of alienation or fragmentation)

This represents the modern era. Poetry shows conflict between reason and sense and utilizes “ideas and a lofty spirituality” (*Naive* 220); however “we always end up wavering between two diverse conditions” attempting to reconcile “the image of the imagination with an idea of reason... (*Naive* 205 fn). The sentimental poet must contend with “two conflicting images and feelings, with the actual world as a limit and with his idea as something infinite” (*Naive* 204).

In sentimental poetry, there are always conflicts or tension between the ideal and experience, and the attitude of poets to the polarities is categorized into three types of reactions:

a. Satire: *Contradiction or Energetic motion* (Sense as Fragment: Thesis)

The mind is occupied by the conflict between ideal and actual conditions, and this condition represents the conflict between the actual world and the ideal world. In such a context, some poets become satirists, resisting oppression. "The poet is satirical if he takes as his subject matter the distance from nature and the contradiction between the actual and the ideal..." (*Naive* 205).

b. Elegy: *Divided between Ideal and Actual / Alternation* (Reason as Fragment: Anti-thesis)

The mind is divided by either ideal or actual conditions interchangeably. This condition describes the conflict between the actual world and the ideal world, and expresses the resistance by reason. "If a poet sets nature off against art and the ideal off against the actual world, such that the presentation of the ideal dominates and the satisfaction taken in it becomes the prevailing feeling, I call him elegiac" (*Naive* 211).

c. Idyll: *Agreement or Energetic rest* (Sense/Reason as Wholeness: Synthesis)

The mind is occupied by the harmony between ideal and actual conditions. This condition describes the victory after the conquering of fragmentation. It is a blueprint for the future. "The concept of this idyll is the concept of a battle completely resolved in the individual as well as in the society, the concept of a free union of inclinations with the law, the concept of a nature purified to the point of supreme moral dignity" (*Naive* 232).

In Schiller's three stages of human progress, or three stages of poetry in the sentimental era, he demonstrates a dialectic progression which will clearly be seen in his

terminology. The construction of Schiller's thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, is motivated by his goal of achieving wholeness, which involves realizing universal human rights, that is to say, ideality, through action in reality.

There are parallels between Schiller's ideal/real definitions and his other definitions, such as play/work, matter/form, restriction/free freedom, and in the definitions of nature/civilization and reason/sense. Because of his concept of holism, one side has to correlate with the other side to be complete. The fragmented condition which is described as an opposed relationship, such as nature and art, or reason and sense, has to be sublated as wholeness, as we observe in his dialectic methodology. It is essential to define the terms from this point of view, either fragmented or united, because terms will change based on the context, as I explain in the following sections.

4.2 Two Kinds of Ideality

The words which refer to Schiller's aesthetic solution, such as ideality, truth, play, beauty, art, and semblance, will be defined from two aspects - the aspect of the false, in the sense of terms commonly used in daily life, and the true, in the sense of a real-ideal synthesized condition, as he states in the following:

Fortunately, however, in the rational nature of a human being there is not only a moral predisposition that can be developed by the intellect, but also an *aesthetic* tendency toward this moral development within his sensuously rational nature, that is to say, his human nature, a tendency that can be awakened by certain sensuous themes and cultivated by purifying his feelings in line with this idealistic impetus of the mind. I turn now to the treatment of this predisposition that is, to be sure, conceptually and essentially idealistic... (*Concerning the Sublime* 72).

In Schiller, the two aspects of *ideality* are a *lower* ideality and a *true* or *higher*

ideality. Ideality in the lower meaning arises from the formal drive and its speculative, rational approach to realize freedom. It is unrelated to Kant's concept of the noumenal. For example, we can observe lower ideality in the French revolutionaries' desire for freedom, even if they lacked practicality. On the other hand, higher ideality, for Schiller, comes from the dialectical synthesis of the formal and sensuous drives.

Similarly, for Schiller, reality has a lower and higher meaning. His lower reality comes from the sensuous drive and it has a pragmatic attitude to life. It is unrelated to Kant's concept of phenomena. Schiller's higher reality is the dialectical synthesis of the formal and sensuous drives. Thus, higher reality is a synonym of the higher ideality. When using the word ideality, Schiller is not interested in what is transcendental at all, but is interested in the realization of human rights. In his view, the true idealistic, a synonym of the aesthetic, does not mean the opposite of realistic but has to be practiced in real life.

Because of the way he defines both ideality and reality (each has a higher and a lower form), there is strong doubt among scholars concerning Schiller's attitude to the real and ideal in the *Letters*. Kooy comments that "One perennial problem is that in setting out the programme for 'aesthetic education' Schiller cannot decide whether he is offering a real solution that might actually be achieved in practice or instead an ideal solution that ought to be striven for but can never fully be realized. His idea of aesthetic culture seems sometimes to be constitutive of experience, sometimes merely regulative of it" (Kooy 15). I hold that Kooy's view is incorrect, though it may easily seem correct if we do not note that Schiller's terms have double meanings - they are always dealing with

dual aspects. In Schiller, beauty in the ideal has to be occupied by matter and form, while beauty in real life is often partial to either matter or form. Schiller strongly claims that we are able to realize what is true and ideal in this life as aesthetic semblance, the condition of matter and form synthesized. For Schiller, true ideality does not exist in the clouds or beyond the sky, but can exist in each individual person. Truth and ideality are reachable by combining the dual world - that is to say, by synthesizing a pragmatic attitude with an idealistic approach to life.

In Schiller, opposed terms are neutralized and turn into ideal or true elements, such as 'ideal civilization' or 'ideal nature' which I have discussed. Those *ideal* terms are related to each other, and often used as synonyms for each other. For example, *true* ideality is often used as the synonym of *true* reality. Or, *true* civilization is often used as a synonym of *true* nature, that is, nature and civilization sublated. When "these systems of rule ... coexist" (L24 181), all of the opposed terms will be combined under the name of wholeness. Therefore, for Schiller, perfection means wholeness. "Everything perfect ... is contained under the concept of technique, because it consists in the agreement of the manifold to the one" (Kallias 511).

4.3 Two Kinds of Truth

Thus, in Schiller, even *truth* has genuinely true or higher and partial or lower meanings. One is *pure* or *true* truth as wholeness, which is represented as *semblance* - a matter-form combined condition - which I explain in a following section. *True* truth comes from the synthesis of sense and reason, or matter and form. In Schiller's view, it

must represent a harmonious condition for an individual, state, or culture. In Schiller, reality does not mean true, and seeking after the real does not lead to truth: "Supreme stupidity and supreme intelligence have a certain affinity with each other in that both of them seek only the real and are completely insensitive to mere semblance" (*L26* 193). Truth in its higher meaning represents synthesis from both the idealistic and the realistic. Schiller writes, "a high degree of human truth is compatible with both and ... their deviations from one another make for a change in the individual, but not in the whole, and in terms of the form, but not in the content" (*Naive* 250 fn).

The other truth, for Schiller, is *impure* or *lower* truth as a fragment; this kind of truth comes from either lower ideality or lower reality, or form or matter, or is partial to one side. Truth in the lower category is limited even if it could be observable as existing in the phenomenal world. That is to say, truth in the partial category can be scientific truth, which scientists concentrate on, analyzing objects as merely fragments, and losing sight of the genuine truth which is to be found in wholeness. Only the synthesis (C) of the thesis (A) and anti-thesis (B) brings us a completed condition. This is the crucial element in leading humans to ideality in Schiller, as he states in a letter to Goethe: "Two things have to be part of the poet and the artist: that he lifts himself above reality and that he remains within the sensuous realm. Where these two are joined, there is aesthetic art" (qtd. by Hinderer and Dahlstrom *Essays* xvi).

Schiller applies his view of two kinds of truth to truth in works of art, such as in tragedy. In tragedy, there are representations of historic events to show "things that had

happened and how they happened” (*On the Art of Tragedy* 18). He calls this *historic truth*.

On the other hand, there is a more crucial truth called *poetic truth*, which stimulates our concept of freedom.

Since, however, [tragedy] is in a position to achieve *its* purpose, namely, the emotion, only on the condition of utterly conforming to the laws of nature, it is subject to the rigorous law of natural truth without its historical freedom being violated in any way. In contrast to ‘historical truth’ this natural truth is called the ‘poetic truth.’ Thus it is understandable how poetic truth often suffers when historical truth is strictly observed and, vice versa, how much more poetic truth stands to gain when historical truth is rudely violated. (*On the Art of Tragedy* 18)

In Schiller, the aesthetic judgement of works of art has to be based on the characteristics of the objects in the works of art, and how well they show humanity the way to regain freedom. For him, poetry is *the* tool to lead us to freedom, *the* tool to stimulate our desire to go back to nature.

...all aesthetic effect is based on the *poetic*, not the historic truth, none of our satisfaction with ideal characters is lost by recalling that they are poetic fictions. The poetic truth consists, not in the fact that something actually happened, but rather in the fact that it could happen, thus, in the internal possibility of the matter. The aesthetic force must, accordingly, already lie in the possibility depicted.
(*Pathetic* 66)

For Schiller, “Tragedy ... has a poetic purpose, that is to say, it presents an action in order to *move* us and, by moving us, to *delight* us. If then it treats some given material for this purpose, it becomes free in the imitation precisely for this reason” (*On the Art of Tragedy* 18). Referring to vices and acts of revenge performed on the stage, but not based on historical events, Schiller observes “The aesthetic judgement contains in these cases more truth than one usually believes” (*Pathetic* 68). He says this because such staged events can

stimulate our desire to regain freedom.

Schiller's historic truth is the equivalent of lower truth, and poetic truth is the equivalent of higher truth. Here, he uses poetic to indicate true truth or true ideality, that is to say, the aesthetic. In his concept of the development of human stages, Schiller is mainly focusing on poetic truth, not on historical truth. For him, it is not important if the Greeks were truly harmonious or not, but it is important to use their name to describe the character which is signified in their works of art - works in which form and matter are synthesized.

4.4 Realist and Idealist

At the end of *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, Schiller deals with two kinds of character in ordinary human existence, apart from poetry; he divides basic human character in the modern era into the realist and the idealist. A formula may help clarify Schiller's concept: The naive character minus the poetic element equals a realist, and a sentimental character minus the poetic element equals an idealist (*Naive* 250). As in Schiller's definitions of the real and ideal, nature and civilization, and sense and reason, the realist and the idealist also have two kinds of definitions for each. In the first, the positions are opposed; "between the two the same relation must obtain as is found obtaining between the effects of nature and the actions of reason" (ibid.). The realist's motivation comes from "the necessity of nature" and the idealist's motivation comes from "the necessity of reason." The realist has "the uniform testimony of the senses" and "a resignation and submission to natural necessity." Schiller holds that "The sphere of [the

realist's] knowing and acting extends to everything that exists conditionally. But he also never brings it beyond conditioned sorts of knowledge..." (*Naive* 251). On the other hand, the idealist has "a restless spirit of speculation that presses on toward what is unconditional in all knowledge and, in the practical sphere, what is left is a moral rigor that insists on something unconditioned in actions of the will" (*Naive* 250). The idealist "is satisfied only by the philosophical insight that leads all conditioned knowing back to some unconditioned knowledge, and that attaches all experience to something necessary in the human mind. The very things to which the realist subjects his thinking, the idealist must subject to himself, to the power of his thought" (*Naive* 252).

For the realist, providing the necessities of life is the most important task; for the idealist, gaining freedom is the most important task. "While the realist in his political tendencies aims at *prosperity*, even if it should be at the expense of the moral self-sufficiency of the people, the idealist will make *freedom* the aim, even if it is a threat to prosperity. For the realist independence *of the condition* is the supreme goal, independence *from that condition* for the idealist" (*Naive* 255). Therefore, although the idealist has knowledge about what is the right action to take, he often lacks the ability of realization. Therefore, the idealist, "with his philosophical knowledge ... can be master of the whole and in the process have gained nothing as far as particulars and the execution are concerned. Indeed, because in each case he presses for the *ultimate* reasons why everything is able to come about, he can easily forget the *most proximate* reasons why everything actually comes to be" (*Naive* 253).

For Schiller, idealists and realists stand in opposition: "Thus it happens that while the speculative intellect ridicules common sense for its *narrowness*, common sense lampoons the speculative intellect for its *barrenness*" (*Naive* 253).

The realist proves himself to be a friend of the human, without having a very high conception of human beings and humanity; the idealist thinks of humanity in so grand a manner that he comes dangerously close to despising human beings.... The realist ... would never have acquainted the human spirit with its independent greatness and freedom.... But for his part, the idealist would just as little have cultivated the sensuous power and developed the human being as a natural entity, which is an equally essential part of his vocation and the condition of all moral ennoblement. (Naive 255-256)

However, Schiller does not exclude either of the opposing characters, because "only by means of the perfectly equal *inclusion* of both can justice be done to the rational concept of humanity" (*Naive* 250 fn). Therefore, in a synthesis, the realist and the idealist become interrelated as a new characters. A true realist, like a true idealist, is someone who contains both sides - the real and ideal, sense and reason, nature and civilization. From Schiller's point of view, a realist in the lower meaning is not a true realist, since he lacks the tendency to realize freedom, and an idealist in the lower meaning is not a true idealist, since he lacks the ability to realize freedom, and neglects the necessities of life. Schiller applies his schema of idealist and realist to mistakes found in revolutions - real-life attempts at social reform - as discussed below.

4.5 Two Kinds of Revolution

In considering revolution, Schiller sees two possible ways of expressing the will, of realizing freedom. One is "*realistically*, when the human being opposes brute force

with brute force, when as a part of nature he masters nature,” and another is “*idealistically*, when he takes a step beyond nature and thereby negates the concept of brute force in regard to himself” (*Concerning the Sublime* 71). The realistic way is achieved through *physical culture*, but ultimately this would lead to a situation in which “human freedom would quickly be at an end” (71) because man cannot direct and control the forces of nature forever. On the other hand, the idealistic way is able to achieve *moral culture*.

To clarify which level of idealist or realist, or ideal or real Schiller is referring to, the following table may be useful:

Table 4.5 Schiller’s Categorization of Revolutions

Fragments Lack of realization <u>Mind</u>	Fragments Lack of aspiration <u>Body</u>	Wholeness Fulfillment of the both <u>Aesthetic</u>
Ideal	Real	(True) Ideal / Real
Idealist	Realist	(True) Idealist / Realist
Idealistic way	<u>Realistic way</u>	<u>(True) Idealistic / Realistic way</u>

In his definitions of the way of revolution, Schiller uses the idealistic way in the sense of a true idealistic way, which is the compound of the one-sided idealistic way which lacks the realization of freedom, and the one-sided realistic way which lacks the aspiration of freedom. As the underlined words indicate, his realistic way here is one of fragmentation, and his (true) idealistic way here is the way of wholeness.

Schiller uses realistic (the *lower* or *one-sided* realistic) in the sense of physical power, involving force or fighting; humans in this fragmented condition are under natural

impulses to defend or preserve themselves. On the other hand, he uses idealistic (the *higher* or *true* idealistic) in the sense of physical and mental power combined, as wholeness. Idealistic in this context is far different from idealistic in the lower sense, which often lacks the ability to realize freedom in real life. Idealistic in the true sense contains the ability to control both physical and mental power. It is not natural force, or instinct, or the passion to be violent. It is also not mere abstract thought which will end up as a dream. Schiller writes, "Chained as he is to the material world, man subordinates semblance to ends of his own long before he allows it autonomous existence in the ideal realm of art. For this latter to happen a complete revolution in his whole way of feeling is required, without which he would not even find himself *on the way* to the ideal" (L27 205). For Schiller, the French Revolution would be an example of physical culture, the conquering of force by force, and he had been skeptical about the future of the Revolution since its beginning. Only idealistic culture, in the sense of an aesthetic culture, can solve mankind's dilemma - lack of freedom.

As in Table 4.5, it is very important to know that Schiller's concept of *alienation* (fragments and wholeness) regulates each of his words, definitions, and themes. And once we apply this concept, we will recognize that his concepts are not confused at all. To understand Schiller's language, it is essential that we should always go back to the simple schema of fragments-fragments-wholeness. We have to know in which position or level - either the lower definition as fragment or the higher definition as wholeness - of ideal or real, idealistic or realistic, he is discussing. For example, if we apply the definition of

idealist, in which he meant lower, into the definition of ideal in which he meant higher, great confusion can result.

4.6 Two Kinds of Aesthetic Semblance

Schiller uses semblance (*Schein*) to express the character of beauty, since it is a kind of illusion which does not truly exist as an empirical phenomenon. Semblance in the sense of the pure appearance of beauty leads humans to play with beauty guided by neither of the other two drives, and thus humans enjoy matter as form. When we experience beauty in a work of art, or in nature, the beauty in the object is a kind of visual illusion. Concerning “*the reality in the appearance*”(Kallias 521), Schiller writes, “Reality is called here the *real*, which is always only the *material* in respect to a work of art and must be set against the *formal* or the *idea*, which the artist executes in this material. The form is to an art work merely appearance, i.e., the marble *seems* to be a man, but it remains, in reality, marble” (Kallias 521-522). In Schiller, semblance is what we experience in the beautiful object, and does not indicate reality; he writes, “The reality of things is the work of things themselves ; the semblance of things is the work of man ; and a nature which delights in semblance is no longer taking pleasure in what it receives, but in what it does” (L26 193).

A definition of humanity which clearly divides humans from animals considers whether or not we enjoy semblance; “And what are the outward and visible signs of the savage’s entry upon humanity? If we inquire of history, however far back, we find that they are the same in all races which have emerged from the slavery of the animal

condition: delight in *semblance*, and a propensity to *ornamentation* and *play*" (L26 191-193). We see what does not exist in reality because of illusion or aesthetic semblance, and feel the object is beautiful. To an animal a painting can be merely a dull paper, music can be noise, a sculpture could be a rock. But for humans they are beautiful, and inspire us to stop and enjoy the moment. This is the appreciation of artistic or technical illusion which only humans have. The beautiful is like a rainbow, something which actually does not exist as an object and which will not be seen by some animals, but which human eyes can see and human minds appreciate. The object of art is in our eyes and produced by us, as Schiller writes that the object viewed "is something different from the *sensation* we receive; for the mind leaps out across light to objects" (L26 195).

[pictorial and plastic art] detaches all the contingent limitations from its object and also leaves the mind of the observer free because it imitates only the *appearance* [*Schein*] and not the *actuality*. Yet, since all the magic of the sublime and the beautiful lies only in the appearance and not in the content, art possesses all the advantages of nature without sharing its chain. (*Concerning the Sublime* 85)

In experience, ideal beauty - which exists only as a concept - will be impossible in reality but possible in appearance.

In Schiller, there are two kinds of *semblance*; one is *true* or *pure* semblance as wholeness which overcomes matter, and the other is *false* or *impure* semblance as fragments which cannot overcome matter. Schiller calls false semblance a *dishonest*, *dependent* semblance, such as "lying colours" which "mask the face of truth and are bold enough to masquerade as reality," and he calls true semblance an *honest*, *autonomous* semblance, a "beneficent semblance with which we will fill out our emptiness and cover

up our wretchedness [an] ideal semblance which ennobles the reality of common day” (L26 201). Schiller further claims that some “shallow critics” complain that “the solid virtues have disappeared from the face of world, and that being is neglected for the sake of seeming” (L26 201), and he notes that those critics attack not only dishonest semblance, but autonomous and ideal semblance as well. Those critics claim that we add too much decoration in manners and fine art, and this goes against morality. However, for Schiller, we should not treat the material with undue respect, since the material is going to be, or has to be, the expression of form. Referring to the opinions of such critics, Schiller writes “With the judgement of this kind they show a respect for *substance as such* which is unworthy of man, who is meant to value matter only to the extent that it is capable of taking on form and extending the realm of ideas” (L26 201).

Schiller calls true semblance *aesthetic semblance* and he calls false semblance *logical⁴ semblance*. He writes,

It goes without saying that the only kind of semblance I am here concerned with is aesthetic semblance (which we distinguish from actuality and truth) and not logical semblance (which we confuse with these): semblance, therefore, which we love just because it is semblance, and not because we take it to be something better. Only the first is play, whereas the latter is mere deception. (L26 193)

In logical semblance we believe what we experience concerning the material world is truth; we cannot conciliate matter and form, and we confuse fact with truth, since “only when its concept can be referred back to the facts of experience is intelligence to be pacified” (L26 193).

⁴ Schiller defines *logical* as “the condition of rational determination” (L20 141).

Everyone has the capacity of aesthetic semblance to enjoy beauty in objects, but few people are able to gain morality in action and mind from this ability. Schiller's suggestion for the *revolution of feeling* (L27 205) is establishing aesthetic semblance in each individual, and then we will move to a political state, and in this sense aesthetic semblance becomes universal. This is the "lofty conception of aesthetic semblance" (ibid.). First of all, we have to have true culture, so that we would not misuse aesthetic semblance, which "will not become universal as long as man is still uncultivated enough to be in a position to misuse it; and should it become universal, this could only be brought about by the kind of culture which would automatically make any misuse of it impossible" (ibid.).

Because humans are limited to the material world, lower semblance, which is not yet able to overcome matter, has been merely a tool for their various purposes. For example, the semblance of serial killers, in the sense of experiencing beauty, could be the servant of their purpose - killing and collecting dead bodies. The semblance of some artists, in the sense of experiencing beauty, could be the servant of ideological propaganda, or the servant of fame, money, or merely limited to enjoying the material, and so their psyches would merely stay in the field of the material and not yet of form. Such semblance is limited to the material field; for killers, it is bodies; for artists, it is merely for the necessities of living or the material. Our hearts must be caught by beauty, but must not be caught by other interests. Schiller writes, "Wherever, then, we find traces of a disinterested and unconditional appreciation of pure semblance, we may infer that a

revolution of this order has taken place in [man's] nature, and that he has started to become truly human" (L27 205).

4.7 Two Kinds of Art

Schiller uses the concept of art (*Kunst, Künstler*) in the sense of civilization and technique, besides the use of fine art in the *Letters*. Art, in the first sense, has two meanings - either higher or lower. He refers to *lower art* in the sense of *lower* civilization or technique which has built the modern state, or natural state. For example, for Schiller, language is "the torment of [the philosopher's] own techniques [*Marter der Kunst*]" (L1 5) since it disturbs our thoughts and we cannot send our message to others precisely. Here *Kunst* is used to indicate a tool which deforms truth.

On the other hand, higher or ideal art means *higher* civilization or technique. Schiller holds that we will find true or *higher aesthetic semblance*, a term which may be applied not only to fine art but to life and politics, in this higher civilization. He claims such semblance has an "autonomous existence in the ideal realm of art" (L27 205). Higher art produces a holistic cure to develop the human psyche as wholeness; that is to say, higher civilization will rebuild a humanity which has been enslaved by the development of the current civilization. "Taste [*Geschmack*] does not only promote our felicity, but rather also *civilizes* [*zivilisiert*] and *cultivates* [*kultiviert*] us" (*Aesthetical Lectures* 460). Schiller comments that "It must ... be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers involves the sacrifice of wholeness. Or rather, however much the law of nature tends in that direction, it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher art the totality of our

nature which the arts themselves have destroyed” (L6 43).

The opposite of technique is nature, but technique is also the tool for going back to nature. Schiller writes, “In contrast to technique [*Technik*], *nature* is, what is through itself, *art* [*Kunst*] is, what is through a rule. *Nature in artfulness* [*Kunstmäßigkeit*], what gives itself the rule - what is through its own rule” (Kallias 503). Art (civilization or technique) and nature (our instinct, sense and feeling) are necessary tools to reconcile each other. Technique is skill to make objects beautiful, as in works of arts, but also skill to make humans beautiful to realize freedom. Schiller writes,

What, therefore, is nature in artfulness? Autonomy in the technique? It is the pure harmonization of the inner essence with the form, *a rule, which is at the same time followed and given by the thing itself*. (From this ground, in the world of sense, only the beautiful is a symbol of the completed in itself or of the perfected, because it does not need to be related as the purposive something outside itself, but rather at the same time commands and obeys itself and carries out its own law).
(Kallias 508-509)

For Schiller, higher freedom (second freedom) will be established by applying a higher rule - an inner rule which comes from our eternal ego *person*, and an outer rule from the *condition*; thus freedom and rule in this context are not opposed. Nature in artfulness means the reconciliation of opposed relations between fragments, as in the following:

Table 4.6 Nature in Artfulness

A	B	C
Fragments	Fragments	Wholeness
Nature	Technique	<u>Nature in Artfulness</u> (True Art)
Freedom	Rule	
Thought	Language	
Nature	Division of Labour	
Marble	Sculptor's Concept	

Between A and B there is a deep antagonism, and when we sublate them we can regain true freedom, nature, beauty, and humanity. Artfulness is used to indicate holistic healing for every fragmented element. Schiller claims "The artfulness only serves to make *freedom* visible..." (*Aesthetical Lectures* 475), and "Freedom in the appearance is indeed the ground of beauty, but technique is the necessary condition of our *representation* of freedom" (*Kallias* 503). For Schiller, freedom in its true meaning (second freedom) is freedom which is able to be realized, not merely in someone's dream, and to realize it we need the help of civilization.

Thus, in Schiller, *aesthetic* education has two meanings. One is *lower* aesthetic education which depends on an individual's taste, and makes it possible for us to be free from both the sensuous and formal drives *temporarily*, in a limited place - fine art. True or *higher* aesthetic education actually starts from this point - being free from both drives, realizing our nature. Schiller's concept of the naive can be called the era of nature because this indicates original humanity as wholeness, and his concept of the sentimental can be called the era of technique because this indicates the way to return to nature. Only through civilization and technique, or the artistic way, can we realize being beautiful. For Schiller, beauty is the technique to go back to our natural character in the sense of the united psyche, and he claims: "Beauty is nature in artfulness" (*Kallias* 503). He writes, "*Technique* [*Technik*] is the combination of the manifold according to purposes and necessary to beauty..." (*Aesthetical Lectures* 475). Aesthetic education (in fine art) is merely a playful moment, but (higher) aesthetic education will realize this playful moment

in our lives. For Schiller, the highest purpose of the highest aesthetic education must be and will be realized in politics. Being artists does not help us to be moral at all, but being artists *in our lives* helps us to be moral.

4.8 Two Kinds of Works of Art

Fine art itself is also divided into two meanings. One is *lower* or *real* fine art, which is barely able to show an attempt to conquer matter by form. For example, beauty “ennobles ... the beautiful tools and clothing of common architecture,” but “they are, through the shimmer, which beauty casts upon them only in passing, merely related to the works of beautiful art” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 465).

The second meaning of fine art is *higher* or *ideal* fine art, which can be realized with the harmonious cooperation of form and material in this empirical world. The object is able to show the result of conquering matter by the power of form. Schiller’s definitions of ideality and the ideal work of art correspond to each other as in the following schema:

Table 4.7 Schiller’s Ideality and the Ideal Work of Art

A	B	C (Actual World)
Ideality	Reality	True Ideality/Actuality
Ideal work of art	Real work of art	True Ideal/Actual work of art
Form	Matter	Ideal work of art (Sculpture ...)
Reason	Sense	Ideal work of art (Humanity)

Since everything must be represented as material, it is impossible to reach the highest ideal beauty because in this sense of ideal beauty the object should not be disturbed by material, which means objects should not carry material at all.

Since in actuality no purely aesthetic effect is ever to be met with (for man can

never escape his dependence upon conditioning forces), the excellence of a work of art can never consist in anything more than a high approximation to that ideal of aesthetic purity; and whatever the degree of freedom to which it may have been sublimated, we shall still leave it in a particular mode and with some definite bias. (L22 153)

In this context, ideal does not mean perfect or the highest which can be found only in abstract thought, but not in this material world. Practically speaking, a work of art cannot avoid leaning to either one side or the other, but it still can realize perfection in experience, in the sense of approaching the highest beauty in real life, by sublimating matter and form. This unending development is the characteristic of works of fine art. If we reduce the tendency of leaning to only one side, either matter or form, "then the nobler that art and the more excellent that product will be" (L22 153).

Schiller holds that "Art *in general* has the aim of truth or perfection, of the relationship of the manifold to unity, and realizes it with the understanding" (*Aesthetical Lectures* 465). Here, he is talking about the fine arts, but this general aim of the fine arts often is used to imply different levels of art for ordinary life. That is to say, art, in works of art, is the technique to create beauty, and this technique must be applied to humans themselves. That is, we ourselves must be the most important work of art for us to realize our lost nature. "Since nature provides for the purpose of man, but *places* its fulfillment into *his will*, the present relationship of his condition to his destiny can, therefore, not be the work of nature, but must be his own work. Thus, the expression of this relationship in his form belongs not to nature, but directly to himself; that is, it is a personal expression" (*Grace* 356).

4.9 Tragedy and Comedy

Schiller regards the work of art as a metaphor of humanity, representing the state of the psyche and the social struggle to gain freedom. For him, "Art must delight the spirit and oblige freedom" (*Pathetic* 49), and artists must describe "every expression of humanity and moral resistance" (*Pathetic* 55). Poetry in the aesthetic sense "can develop [the human being] into a hero" who struggles and resists his *condition*, and gives him the "strength to be everything he ought to be" (*Pathetic* 67).

Schiller holds this view regarding tragedy: "...tragedy is imitation of an action, which *shows us human beings in a state of suffering....* Only the suffering of entities both sensuous and moral, such as we are, can arouse our sympathy" (*On the Art of Tragedy* 18-19). Tragedy indicates human destiny - the development of the historical stages - by representing our struggle to gain freedom from the conflict of mind and matter, or reason and sense. "In general, the concept of suffering and of a suffering in which we are supposed to participate already determines that only *human beings* in the full sense of the word can be the object of the suffering" (*On the Art of Tragedy* 19). Tragedy can represent the struggle of fragmented humans, and their will to return to their original natural character, as whole beings.

When we watch a play, we prefer to watch a story in which the hero's freedom is threatened rather than the outcome after the hero has regained his freedom. "If a portrayal of pathos lacks an expression of nature suffering, it has no aesthetic force and our hearts are left cold" (*Pathetic* 59). According to Schiller, this is because our aesthetic judgement

is based on the moral urge to achieve freedom.

When we make aesthetic judgements, we focus far more on power than on its orientation and far more on freedom than on lawfulness. This becomes obvious enough from the very fact that we would rather watch power and freedom expressed at the cost of lawfulness than watch lawfulness expressed at the cost of power and freedom. That is to say, as soon as scenarios arise where the moral law is coupled with impulses whose force threatens to carry away the will, the character rises in aesthetic quality if he is able to withstand those impulses.

(*Pathetic* 68)

Evil individuals who are “free from all *morality*” or “pure intellects” who are “free from the coercion of *sensuousness*” are unfit for tragedy (*On the Art of Tragedy* 19). Therefore, tragedy has more important elements than comedy, since the former aims to show our resistance and our attempts to regain freedom. Schiller holds that “Many times there has been a dispute over which of the two, the tragedy or the comedy, deserves to be ranked ahead of the other. If what is being asked by this question is simply which of the two treats the more important object, then there is no doubt that the tragedy has the advantage” (*Naive* 207-208).

Schiller quotes Winckelmann’s description of the Greek sculpture *Laocoon* as an example of a great work of art which shows the struggle between our will to be free and its obstacle - in this case, Laocoon’s desperate resistance and the monster which is killing Laocoon and his sons. Concerning Winckelmann’s description of this “battle between pain and resistance” (*Pathetic* 54), Schiller exclaims: “How genuinely and how sensitively the intellect’s battle with the suffering of the sensuous nature is developed in this depiction and how accurately the phenomena are presented in which animality and

humanity, nature's coercion and reason's freedom, reveal themselves!" (*Pathetic* 54-55). Schiller finds perfection in *Laocoon* because it arouses the viewer's sympathy while remaining beautiful. He writes, "If the works of art have *moral* aims, they stand in relationship with the aesthetical works ... thus their beauty works only yet more ardently. If beauty, through compliance with the purpose of sympathy, has suffered nothing at all, then have such art works the greatest perfection (as for example the group of Laocoon)" (*Aesthetical Lectures* 465-466).

On the other hand, Schiller claims that "the beautiful does not have need of the expression of suffering" (*Aesthetic Lectures* 476). Unlike tragedy, comedy is the means by which poets can show their aesthetic ability - the ability to represent the resolution of the mind and matter conflict. He holds that it is comedy which "demands the more important subject" (*Naive* 208). In this context it is more difficult to prove the quality of comedy than tragedy. Schiller writes, "In tragedy so much happens already by virtue of the subject matter, while in comedy nothing happens because of the subject matter; everything happens because of the poet....The object carries the tragic poet along; the comic poet, on the other hand, must prop up and sustain his object in the loftiness of the aesthetic, through his subjectivity" (*Naive* 208). That is to say, for Schiller, comedy represents the united condition as wholeness, and tragedy represents the fragmented condition with lack of freedom. He writes that comedy's aim is "to produce and nourish this freedom of mind," while "the aim of tragedy is to help restore freedom of mind by aesthetic means when it has been violently overcome by a passion" (*Naive* 208).

For Schiller, life itself has tragic aspects because we have been divided and comedic aspects because we can regain freedom. Tragedy is the battle between mind and body, or between form and matter, while comedy is the peace following the battle; the victory is represented by form in the sense of living form.

4.10 Two Kinds of Form

For Schiller, form is an ideal concept directed towards the absolute, truth, and the permanent and unchangeable; it originates from the “I” which is the “absolute existence of man” (L12 81). This most human-like element is, ironically, the origin of fragmentation. According to Pugh, form is “a concept of central importance in Schiller’s mature aesthetics,” and Schiller could well have been influenced by Aristotle and Plotinus, who inherited Plato’s concept of form and focused on “the never ending struggle of form against matter” (Pugh 88).

In Schiller, form (*Form* or *Gestalt*) has a dual meaning. One is a true or higher form, as wholeness or living form which is defined as the objects or actions which keep *equilibrium* with sense and reason or matter and form. Form in this sense is truly an ideal concept in Schiller, one which we are able to realize in the material world. The second form is a false or lower form, as a fragment which is based on only the formal side, but not the material side.

According to Schiller, even excellent works of art, which almost combine matter and form, are still not able to reach ideal beauty in the sense of a beauty beyond phenomena, which cannot be seen in this world. However, we are able to reach ideal

beauty in practice as *living form* (*lebende Gestalt*) by creating ourselves as works of art - form and matter synthesized perfectly as *appearance*.

The object of the sense-drive, expressed in a general concept, we call *life* [*Leben*], in the widest sense of this term: a concept designating all material being and all that is immediately present to the senses. The object of the form-drive, expressed in a general concept, we call *form* [*Gestalt*], both in the figurative and in the literal sense of this word: a concept which includes all the formal qualities of things and all the relations of these to our thinking faculties. The object of the play-drive, represented in a general schema, may therefore be called *living form* [*Lebende Gestalt*]: a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call beauty. (L15 101)

Schiller writes, "Reason ... declares: The beautiful is to be neither mere life, nor mere form, but living form, i.e., beauty; for it imposes upon man the double law of absolute formality and absolute reality" (L15 107). Thus, for Schiller, living form or true semblance must be called *truly ideal* and *truly beautiful*. He holds that a block of marble can become living form through the transforming work of an architect or sculptor, but for a living human to be a living form, "his form would have to be life, and his life form" (L15 101). He writes that only when a person's "form lives in our feeling and his life takes on form in our understanding, does he become living form; and this will always be the case whenever we adjudge him beautiful" (ibid.).

Wessell sees Schiller's concept of living form as the unity of rationalism and empiricism.

Rationalism, for instance, conceives of unity as ontologically objective, i.e. unity inheres in things-in-themselves. Such unity is grounded in an analytical oneness. To be is to be one.... This structure appears as order. The maximization of order is perfection. Perfection is, in other words, the "form" of oneness in a manifold.

Empiricism, on the other hand, views unity as subjective, i.e. there is no unity inherent in things-in-themselves. Things are present to human consciousness as atomistic contents, as sense perceptions. Unity is introduced into the manifold by the mind (=subjectivity). The mind synthetically combines or holds the many together. This unity resides in the “determination” of the mind to view sense perceptions together. Such a synthesizing act, insofar as it transcends mere spatial and temporal conjoining, is habit (= inclination). The synthetic activity itself is a function of a deeper principle of unity, namely that of life. In other words, the determination of the mind to connect things is structured by the dual principle of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, that is of life. (Wessell 124)

As the way to unite the manifold, Schiller suggests we become living form, which means the combination of the subjective experience of beauty and universal validity - form.

According to Wessell, Schiller uses form or Gestalt as “a code name” for “aestheticians who tried to explain beauty in terms of ‘Vollkommenheit.’” Wessell writes that Vollkommenheit is “simply the *oneness* of being (= that which constitutes being) insofar as this *unum* ‘forms’ the many into connexial whole [sic],” and the *Gestalt* “constitutes the perfection of aesthetic awareness and hence the reality of beauty” (Wessell 58).

Schiller’s intention is to build a bridge between the world of phenomena which we experience through our senses and a theoretical or ideal world which we cannot experience as phenomena. It may seem impossible to build such a bridge, but Schiller holds that it can be done. The proof is “the infinite being realized in the finite” in experiencing beauty “...since in the enjoyment of beauty, or *aesthetic unity*, an actual union and interchange between matter and form, passivity and activity, momentarily takes place, the *compatibility* of our two natures, the practicality of the infinite being realized in the finite ... is thereby actually proven” (L25 189). According to Hinderer and Dahlstrom,

Schiller's ideal beauty is "not a mere form (a spatial and/or temporal *Gestalt* of *Spiel*), as it was for Kant, but rather 'the living form'" (*Essays* xx).

Whereas Kant construed beauty as a pleasure derived merely from the free play of mental faculties, Schiller's conception of beauty as the living form satisfies the ideal "play-drive" in human beings that optimally integrates two radically opposing drives; a sensuous or material drive for change (becoming) and a formal drive for permanence (being), which results in a conception of beauty as a dynamic, exuberant unity of opposites. (*Essays* xx)

To be living form, we have to resolve the conflict between matter and form, and to illustrate this concept, Schiller uses the metaphor of war, as I explain in the following section.

4.11 The Metaphor of War

Not only in the *Letters*, but in various other writings, Schiller uses war as an allegory of our resistance to dualism. For example, Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, is fully armed, and this has symbolic meaning for Schiller (*L8* 51). Athena's battle dress symbolizes the battle between reason and sense, or the formal and sensuous drives, with the goal of "true enlightenment" (*ibid.*). If we want to gain harmony in mind and society, that is to say, freedom, we have to battle "against error" (*ibid.*) to reach a synthesis of opposite elements, and this is very hard fighting indeed. Therefore, according to Schiller, many people refuse to think about the problem or to act; they do not use reason to be wise, but rely on politicians or higher authorities such as the church or state.

In the poem *TO A YOUNG FRIEND As He Dedicates Himself to Philosophy*, Schiller reveals some key points in his aesthetics.

Feelest thou power enough, to fight the most difficult battles,
 When thy reason and heart, senses and thoughts disunite?
 Courage enough, to wrestle with doubt, the immortal Hydra.
 And to manly attack, th' enemy inside thyself?
 With an eye that is healthy, a heart of innocence holy,
 To unmask the deceit, tempting thee as if the truth?
 Flee, if thou art not secure with the leadership in thine own bosom,
 Flee, the enticing abyss, ere be consumed in the maw!
 Several went for the light and only in deep night have fallen;
 There in the twilight's glow childhood wanders secure.

(*Poet of Freedom vol II 32*)

This poem describes an aesthetic battle, where aesthetic means showing the victory of the war between matter and form, or restriction and freedom, civilization and nature, or reason and sense. For Schiller, beauty is a rare victory by form over matter.

The nature of the medium or of the matter must therefore appear completely defeated [*besiegen*] by the nature of the imitated. Now it is, however, merely the *form* of the imitated, which can be conferred upon the imitating; therefore, it is the form, which must have conquered the matter in the artistic presentation. With a work of art, therefore, the *matter* (the nature of the imitating) must be lost [*verlieren*] in the *form* (of the imitated).... The *body* in the idea.... The *reality* in the *appearance*.

(*Kallias 521*)

Here, Schiller employs an allegory of war between matter and form. "Free, therefore, were the presentation, if the nature of the medium appears fully destroyed [*vertilgen*] through the nature of the imitated, if the imitated asserts its pure personality also in its representative, if the representing seems to have been completely interchanged through complete rejection or rather renunciation of its nature with the represented - briefly - if nothing is through the matter, rather all is through the form" (*Kallias 522*).

If an artist's idea is expressed well by the material in the work of art, form (idea) overcomes the material to realize itself in the phenomenal world. "Removed alike

from uniformity and from confusion, there abides the triumph of form” (L4 23). Schiller writes:

In a truly successful work of art the contents should effect nothing, the form everything; for only through the form is the whole man affected, through the subject-matter, by contrast, only one or other of his functions. Subject-matter, then, however sublime and all-embracing it may be, always has a limiting effect upon the spirit, and it is only from form that true aesthetic freedom can be looked for. Herein, then, resides the real secret of the master in any art: *that he can make his form consume [vertilgen] his material*; and the more pretentious, the more seductive this material is in itself, the more it seeks to impose itself upon us, the more high-handedly it thrusts itself forward with effects of its *own*, or the more the beholder is inclined to get directly involved with it, then the more triumphant the art which forces it back and asserts its own kind of dominion over him.
(L22 155-157)

Schiller here describes the war between form and matter and the victory of each individual person – “the aesthetic mode of the psyche” (L22 151), that is to say, the third character of the human condition synthesized as the play drive, which I discuss later.

In the passage quoted above, Wilkinson and Willoughby choose the English word *consume* as the translation of German *vertilgen*, although this word generally means abolish, annihilate, or destroy. They claim that here Schiller is indicating an organic metaphor, a concept which spread among 18th century philosophers to compare individuals or society to a living organism which grows, like a plant or animal, and cannot be separated into parts, as can a machine. They claim *consume* is a suitable translation since Schiller is talking about “artistic metamorphosis” (*Letters* Glossary 319) or “organic transformation” (*Letters* commentary 267), in which he does not mean completely destroying matter, but is implying taking matter into form to be a living organism.

Indeed, Schiller uses this metaphor in the *Letters*. Ancient Greece had “organic form” (L6 35): a living organism in which individuals are treated as parts united with the whole, but civilization and the state formed humans into a collection of parts, as fragments merely collected by gravity. However, Wilkinson and Willoughby appear to ignore Schiller’s allegorical treatment of war in the paragraph quoted above from *Letter 22*. In *Letter 23* he explains⁵ what he means by the analogy of art in *Letter 22* and refers to the “war against matter” (L23 169) involving the play drive. Moreover, we see the theme of war not only in the *Letters* but throughout his writings. As a representative sample, the following will help to demonstrate that *consume* is unlikely to be a suitable translation in *Letter 22*, as Schiller is not dealing with organic concepts, but with the war between matter and form:

Shall ... a poetical presentation be free, then the poet must ‘*overcome the tendency of language to the universal through the greatness of his art and triumph over [besiegen] the matter* (words and their laws of inflection and construction) *through the form* (namely the application of the same).’ The nature of the language (precisely its tendency to the universal) must be fully submerged [*untergehen*] in the form given to it, the body must lose [*verlieren*] itself in the idea, the sign in the indicated, the reality in the appearance. (Kallias 526)

It would not be wrong to say that after form conquers matter it is consumed. However, Schiller’s *vertilgen* indicates his idea of beauty - the condition in which matter *appears* to be *completely* eliminated and consumed inside form. For Schiller, matter is not abolished or annihilated, but is sublated into the wholeness of the new element, *as if* it was

⁵ In the beginning of L23, Schiller states that in L22 he is using the analogy of “the practice of art and the judgment of its works” (L23 161) to illustrate his inquiry into how humans gain freedom in mind and politics.

abolished. The observer is only aware of pure form. This appearance is called aesthetic semblance, the victory of beauty in the material world. Concerning this matter, I therefore agree with Pugh's observation that we should choose "annihilate" instead of "consume" (Pugh 292).

Pugh also points out Wilkinson and Willoughby's inconsistent attitude; they use *destroy* as a translation of *vertilgen* in a different part of *Letter 11* (which also deals with the metaphor of war) without any note. There, regarding two "absolute fundamental laws of [man's] sensuo-rational nature," Schiller writes, "The first insists upon absolute *reality*: he is to turn everything which is mere form into world, and make all his potentialities fully manifest. The second insists upon absolute *formality*: he is to destroy [*vertilgen*] everything in himself which is mere world, and bring harmony into all his changes" (*L11* 77). Note that here *vertilgen* is used in the same context as in the passage from *Letter 22*: "*he can make his form consume [vertilgen] his material...*" (*L22* 155-157). Pugh therefore claims that "Wilkinson and Willoughby's organic view of artistic creation, a cherished conviction among many British scholars, is clearly their own idea and not Schiller's" (Pugh 293).


Wilkinson and Willoughby admit that, strictly speaking, Schiller rarely uses the metaphor of a living organism, but nevertheless they claim that he frequently "accommodates" this metaphor in his asymmetrical syntheses:

The metaphors of organic growth are few, and not calculated either by their nature or by position to carry the weight of a concept which is notoriously recalcitrant to theoretical treatment. It is accommodated instead by a system of asymmetrical

syntheses which, though assimilated into the verbal texture and never made explicit as a schema, is none the less ‘there’ and abstractable by means of linguistic analysis. (Letters cxxviii)

As I note in the beginning of this chapter, Wilkinson and Willoughby hold that Schiller’s rhetoric is “often ... asymmetrical and binary, one of the antitheses reappearing, raised to a higher level, as the synthesis; finally in order to insist that this is not then broken down into two new antitheses, but itself enters as one of the antitheses into the process immediately above” (*Whole Man* 203). They use the following triangles to indicate this kind of three term relationship:

Table 4.8 Wilkinson and Willoughby’s Three Term Relationship (*Letters* Appendix III p350)



They claim that those asymmetrical syntheses can be the expression of the living organism metaphor: “the analogy [such as “*he can make his form consume [vertilgen] his material*” (*L22* 157)] is clearly with the assimilative processes of living organisms, and implies the concept of a hierarchy of forms in which the lower are constantly being assimilated into the higher” (*Letters* Glossary 319). However, if they use *consume* to describe the interaction between the higher (form) and lower (matter) elements, their illustration cannot use triangles as shown in Table 4.8; it has to indicate a one-way relationship between the top and bottom, such as in the following schema:

Table 4.9 Revision of Wilkinson and Willoughby's Living Organism Schema

LIVING ORGANISM		
Form	Reason	Ideality
↓	↓	↓
matter	sense	reality

Using this table, the phrase “*he can make his form consume [vertilgen] his material*” (L22 157) becomes understandable. Wilkinson and Willoughby write, “As in organic transformation, the raw material is broken down during the process and subordinated to a different principles of organization, serving a different end” (*Letters* commentary 267).

Wilkinson and Willoughby connect this organic hierarchy with Schiller's asymmetrical, triangular synthesis, but if they do so their triangular schema represents conflict between higher concepts such as the true or ideal form (living form) and lower concepts such as matter. Indeed, when they say the lower is assimilated by the higher, a contradiction results. Following Wilkinson and Willoughby's schema of Table 4.8, I construct a similar diagram, Table 4.10, to illustrate that lower concepts (such as matter) are consumed by higher concepts (such as form) throughout Schiller's rhetoric in the *Letters*.

Table 4.10 The Schema of Table 4.8 Applied to the Matter and Form Relation

a		b		c	
<u>FORM</u>		<u>REASON</u>		<u>IDEALITY</u>	
↘ <i>vertilgen?</i>		↘ ?		↘ ?	
Form	→ <u>Matter</u>	Reason	→ <u>Sense</u>	Ideality	→ <u>Reality</u>
<i>vertilgen</i>		<i>vertilgen</i>		<i>vertilgen</i>	

In this table, if we follow the interpretation that Schiller's rhetoric is based on the

concept of a living organism in which higher elements consume lower elements, we have to put *vertilgen* between the top and bottom elements as the bold arrows indicate. In this context, we cannot illustrate Schiller's sense of the battle between the two drives or two characters, which he repeatedly explains throughout the *Letters*. In addition, for example in a, there is no clear role or function of (lower) Form if we put *vertilgen* between (higher) FORM and (lower) Matter. In fact, the act of consuming or annihilating lower Matter does not come from higher FORM (Living Form), but it comes from (lower) Form which is in the *process* (not the result) of conquering the opposite side, Matter. Higher FORM *includes* Matter, but it does not *consume* or *annihilate* Matter, because FORM as a synthesis does not trigger the motion of *vertilgen* since it is the *result* of *vertilgen*. FORM *does not exist until* *vertilgen* occurs between the lower elements. And likewise for b and c in Table 4.10, REASON and IDEALITY are the result of *vertilgen* after Reason or Ideality conquer Sense or Reality.

In the phrase, “*make his form consume [vertilgen] his material*” (L22 157), Schiller uses the verb *vertilgen* to explain the battle between opposed elements - such as between Form and Matter, Reason and Sense, or Ideality and Reality - in the lower levels. The two lower opposed elements are antagonistic; Form, Reason, or Ideality are often not as strong as their opposed elements - Matter, Sense, or Reality. “Beauty is only a property of *form* and cannot be presented immediately in the mass” (*Aesthetic Lectures* 465). Often, the lower right side elements conquer the lower left side elements. Beauty is the rare victory of *form* overcoming the danger of being defeated by matter:

... the forces of nature, as we know, wage perpetual war with what is particular, or organic, and artful technology is ultimately defeated by *cohesion* and *gravity*. For that reason, too, beauty of form, as a *mere product of nature*, has its particular golden age of maturity and decay, which indeed accelerates the play, but can never arrest it; and its customary end is, that *mass* gradually becomes master over *form*, and the vital impulse toward form in preserved matter digs its own grave.

(*Grace* 358)

Here Schiller's concept of the war between form and matter is expressed, as he contrasts serious war and playful victory, and as he contrasts reason and sense, ideality and reality, or nature and civilization. The metaphor of war is crucial to understanding Schiller's symmetrical syntheses; therefore *vertilgen* should be interpreted as the metaphor of war, not of a living organism.

Schiller's metaphor of war is related to his view that our progress in history is based on our efforts to battle with nature - physical necessity - to regain freedom by reason. He states that the world is "nothing but the conflict of natural forces among themselves and with human freedom. As far as history has evolved until now, it has far greater acts of nature (among which all human emotions must be numbered) to relate than of self-sufficient reason" (*Concerning the Sublime* 81). Therefore, there are two kinds of actions based on either being defeated by material or winning over it. According to Schiller, if an act is motivated by sense it can be called *common* or *vulgar*; and an architectural work, for example, is "*common* if it shows us nothing but physical purposes" (*Pathetic* 50). On the other hand, if an act is motivated by reason, it is *noble*; "We call it *noble* if, independent of all physical purposes, it at the same time portrays ideas" (ibid.).

If we are completely defeated and our freedom is taken without resistance, we are

the same as animals. Schiller writes that a person in pain is “simply a tormented animal and no longer a suffering human being, for a moral resistance to suffering is absolutely required of a human being and only by this means is the principle of freedom within him, intelligence, able to make itself known” (*Pathetic* 49). In Schiller, fighting to regain freedom, such as in *Laocoon*, shows “the nobler side of humanity” (*Pathetic* 50). This nobleness comes from our reason; indeed, “Nothing is noble unless it springs from reason” (*Pathetic* 49).

Regarding the French Revolution, Schiller observes human nobleness in the revolution which is the first attempt to regain freedom. He claims that man “...is demanding restitution of his inalienable rights. But he is not just demanding this; over there, and over here, he rising up to seize by force what, in his opinion, has been wrongfully denied him” (*L5* 25). Schiller sees the revolutionary elements in man’s “first crude attempts at embellishing his existence” (*L27* 205), despite the resulting chaos, as the beginning of human progress. “As soon as ever he starts preferring form to substance, and jeopardizing reality for the sake of semblance (which he must, however, recognize as such), a breach has been effected in the cycle of his animal behaviour, and he finds himself set upon a path to which there is no end” (*ibid.*). When we resist whatever oppresses us, and attempt to regain freedom, we express our humanity and reveal beauty.

4.12 Two Kinds of Ideal Beauty

In Schiller, there are two kinds of ideal beauty. The first is a “highest ideal beauty” which is not realized in the world, so we are not able to see it.

The highest ideal of beauty is ... to be sought in the most perfect possible union and *equilibrium* of reality and form. The equilibrium, however, remains no more than an idea, which can never be fully realized in actuality. For in actuality we shall always be left with a preponderance of the one element over the other, and the utmost that experience can achieve will consist of an oscillation between the two principles, in which now reality, now form, will predominate. Beauty as idea, therefore, can never be other than one and indivisible, since there can never be more than one point of equilibrium: whereas beauty in experience will be eternally twofold, because oscillation can disturb the equilibrium in twofold fashion, inclining it now to the one side, now to the other. (L16 111)

Schiller goes on to differentiate two kinds of ideal beauty - one is ideal beauty which will never be realized, and another one is ideal beauty which “*exists in fact*” (L16 113), and is able to be realized. Schiller is not dealing with ideal beauty in the former meaning, but dealing with actual beauty in the latter meaning, which we are able to see in this world. He writes “...we descend from this region of ideas on to the stage of reality, in order to encounter man in a definite and *determinate* state, that is to say, among limitations which are not inherent in the very notion of man but derive from outward circumstance and from the contingent use of his freedom” (L17 117). In everyday life, we encounter either impure beauty - in the sense of beauty which is not able to conquer matter by form - or pure beauty as living form. Schiller calls ideal beauty (living form) in this world “mere nature,” or “the beauty of frame (*architectonic beauty*)” (Grace 342). This beauty is defined as “the sensuous expression of a concept of reason” (Grace 347), which “unites two conditions which *are diametrically opposed* and can never become one” (L18 123). The following table will simplify Schiller’s concept of beauty. Here, we clearly see the same pattern of Schiller’s dual (fragmented or united) and dialectic

approach in his concept of human development:

Table 4.11 Ideal Beauty

Fragments A	Fragments B	Wholeness (Aesthetic) C
Only in Idea	Only in Material	Realization of Both
Ideal Beauty	Actual Beauty	True Ideal Beauty
Form	Matter	Living Form
Reason	Sense	True Reason/ Sense
Moral State	Natural State	Aesthetic State
Never Realized	Current State	Will Be Realized

The perfection of humanity comes from being in the condition of wholeness, “in the harmonious energy of [man’s] sensuous and spiritual powers” (L17 117-119), while imperfection comes from being fragmented, under the domination of either the body or mind, or sense or reason. Therefore, humans experience one of two conditions - either a “state of tension” because of lack of harmony, or a “state of relaxation” because of lack of energy. Schiller writes,

...we are already assured in advance by pure reason that we shall find actual, consequently limited, man either in a state of tension or in a state of relaxation, according as the one-sided activity of certain of his powers is disturbing the harmony of his being, or the unity of his nature is founded upon the uniform enfeeblement of his sensuous and spiritual powers. Both these contrasting types of limitation are, as I now propose to show, removed by beauty, which restores harmony to him who is over-tensed, and energy to him who is relaxed, and thus, in accordance with its nature, brings the limited condition back to an absolute condition, and makes of man a whole perfect in itself. (L17 117-119)

Thus, there are two characteristics of beauty in experience. One Schiller calls *energizing beauty*, and the other is *melting beauty*. In the modern era - one of “discipline and form,” under the domination of civilization - “we find nature as often suppressed as mastered, as

often outraged as transcended” (*L16* 113). There is a lack of nature in respect of our sensuous side (such as instinct and feeling) and this causes lack of energy, under the suppression of reason. Energizing beauty is beneficial for people who lack energy.

On the other hand, in a pre-civilized era - one of “vigour and exuberance” (*L16* 113) - there is a lack of civilization or sophistication, and people are tense because of lack of harmony as a result of too much sense and feeling. In this era, “we find true grandeur of conception coupled with the gigantic and the extravagant, sublimity of thought with the most frightening explosions of passion....”(ibid.). For people who are under stress, melting beauty is beneficial for relaxation, as Schiller holds that “the effect of melting beauty is to relax our [physical and moral] nature” (ibid.).

Beauty reflects the mental state of individuals. “In order to get some idea of how beauty can become a means of putting an end to that twofold tension [between material life and abstract form], we must endeavor to seek its origins in the human psyche” (*L17* 121). Energizing beauty means the tendency to unite our dualism with the formal drive to create our personality, while melting beauty means the tendency to unite our dualism with the sensuous drive to create our personality. Schiller claims there exists “a twofold need in man to which that twofold beauty corresponds” (*L16* 115). When the two kinds of beauty are sublated, ideal beauty will be realized. Schiller examines those forms of beauty “in order finally to dissolve both these contrary modes of beauty in the unity of ideal beauty, even as those two opposing types of human being are merged in the unity of ideal man” (*L16* 115).

The two kinds of beauty can also be found in works of art, which have to be judged on their aesthetic value to determine if they are presenting form through material well - that is to say, if they offer an objective representation. “The great artist, one could therefore say, shows us the object (its presentation has pure objectivity), the mediocre shows himself (his presentation has subjectivity), the bad, his matter (the presentation determined through the nature of the medium and through the limits of the artist)” (*Kallias* 523). When we see a work of art which lacks the artist’s concept in the material, it will need melting beauty. When the work of art has weakness on the material side, it needs energizing beauty. The following table simplifies the categories of beauty.

Table 4.12 Schiller’s Categories of Beauty

A: Fragments Too much Relaxation	C: Wholeness Harmony	B: Fragments Too much Tension
Formal Drive		Sensuous Drive
Melting Beauty		Energizing Beauty
Civilization		Nature
Reason	Ideal Beauty / Living Form	Sense
Intellect	(The Perfection of Humanity in Real Life)	Feeling
Form		Matter
Mind		Body
↓		↓
(Need Energizing Beauty)		(Need Melting Beauty)

For Schiller, ideal beauty in actual experience is the equivalent of ideal humanity. Since it is the only way to be healed from fragmentation, “Beauty would have to be shown to be a necessary condition of human being [sic]” (*L10* 71). He holds that “Without beautiful things there would be a constant battle between our natural calling and our rational calling” (*Concerning the Sublime* 84). Beauty, as the synonym of living form, is

the synthesis of the logical nature and sensuous nature, or form and matter. He writes,

For precisely therein beauty shows itself in its highest radiance, when it overcomes the logical nature of its object; and how can it overcome, where there is no resistance? How can it impart its form to the fully formless matter? I am at least convinced, that beauty is only the form of a form and that that, which one calls its matter, must by all means be a formed matter. Perfection is the form of a matter, beauty, on the other hand, is the form of this perfection; which stands thus to beauty as matter to form.
(*Kallias* 483-484)

Perfection comes from the way of expression of form and matter, and this perfection displays beauty. “By means of beauty sensuous man is led to form and thought; by means of beauty spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense. From this it seems to follow that there must be a state midway between matter and form, passivity and activity, and that it is into this *middle* state that beauty transports us” (*L18* 123). For Schiller, beauty lies in the middle of the opposed elements; it is between one-sided nature and civilization, or one-sided intellect and feeling - that is to say, beauty is the sublation of the binary elements; it is true nature and true civilization, true intellect and true feeling.

Beauty is the product of the accord between mind and senses; it speaks to all the capacities of the human being at once. For this reason it can be felt and appreciated only on the supposition of a complete and free use of all the human being's powers. One must bring to the work an open sensibility, an expansive heart, a fresh and vigorous mind; one must have one's entire nature together. This is in no way the case for those alienated [*geteilt*] within themselves by abstract thinking, stifled by petty formulas of business, or weary from strenuous concentration.
(*Naive* 245)

Following Kant (114), Schiller calls ideal or pure beauty *free* beauty, and false or impure beauty *adhering* beauty which is dominated by a particular purpose. He writes,

Free beauties are those, with which we presuppose no characteristic purpose. For example, with a rose we are conscious of no determined purpose of its form and constitution. The *adhering* beauty, however, stands under the constraint of a concept, which exclusively permits only certain kinds of beauty and presupposes a purpose in the object. An unmixed, pure judgement of beauty is passed only in regard to *free* beauty. (Aesthetical Lectures 468)

The highest beauty in experience is realized in our lives. People who do not “have [their] entire nature together” (*Naive* 245) are people who cannot realize the beauty in themselves; they cannot unite the mind and the senses.

4.13 Objectivity of Beauty

Schiller’s solution to the problem of fragmentation comes from conquering the gap between the theories of beauty’s objectivity and subjectivity; in the objective view, beauty comes from an external world which does not depend on our feeling, while in the subjective view, beauty comes from our feeling, as in “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Schiller claims that beauty is objective experience, not only subjective experience. He writes, “Those who have dismissed the *objective* concept of beauty, hold beauty to be entirely *subjective*. Those who have accepted it, attempt to explain the concept either objectively or subjectively” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 467). Beauty is the representation of dualism as the synthesis of binary elements. Schiller disagrees with the theory which sees beauty as merely sensuous experience; he comments on Burke’s view: “Burke, in his *Philosophical Enquiry* ... makes beauty into mere life” (*L15* 103 fn). “Burke says, beauty arouses inclination, without desire for possession; a true, but only subjective explanation.... he derives true beauty also merely from *physical* causes...”

(*Aesthetical Lectures* 469–470). Schiller also disagrees with other theories which regard beauty as merely form. “As far as I know, every adherent of dogmatic philosophy, who has ever confessed his belief on this subject, makes it into mere form” (*L15* 103 fn).

It is interesting to observe, that my theory is a fourth possible form, to explain the beautiful. Either one explains it objectively or subjectively; and indeed either sensuous-subjective (as Burke among others), or subjective-rational (as Kant), or rational-objective (as Baumgarten, Mendelssohn and the entire flock of perfection men), or finally sensuous-objective: a term, whereof thou wilt now of course not yet be able to think much, except if thou comparest the three other forms with one another. Each of these preceding theories has a part of experience in favor of itself and obviously contains a part of the truth; and the error seems merely to be, that one has taken this part of beauty, with which it agrees, for beauty itself.

(*Kallias* 483)

Schiller intends to defeat the paradox - that the objectivity of beauty constitutes rational experience, while beauty comes from sensuous experience. Some researchers claim that Schiller does not adequately defend the concept of the objectivity of beauty, but we first of all have to define what objectivity means for Schiller. Since his definition of reason in an ideal sense is a compound of reason and sense, being objective means experiencing the harmonious relation of reason and sense. “I call beauty a *duty* of phenomena, because the requirement corresponding to it in the subject is grounded in reason itself” (*Grace* 349). In this context, being rational means being sensuous enough to be rational. For Schiller, beauty is the tool to establish the state of reason. Accordingly, in the experience of beauty, reason judges the object subjectively:

In order to resolve this apparent contradiction [“nothing seems to remain to beauty, on account of which beauty could be the object of a reasoning pleasure”] we must recall, that there are two ways by which phenomena become objects for reason, and are capable of expressing ideas. It is not always necessary, that reason

draws these ideas *from* the phenomena, for reason can *place* ideas *into* them. In both cases the phenomena will be adequate to an idea of reason, but with a difference: in the first case, reason finds the idea objectively within, as if it only receives the idea from the object, because the conception must be posited, in order to explain the constitution, and often even the possibility of an object; whereas, in the second case, it *makes* that which is independent of its conception in the phenomenon, spontaneously into an expression thereof, and thus treats something *merely* sensuous, as if it were more than sensuous. Thus, *in the first case*, the connection of the idea with the objective is objectively necessary, whereas in the other, this connection is supremely subjectively necessary. I need not say, that by the former I understand perfection, by the latter beauty. (Grace 345-346)

For Schiller, then, beauty is sensuous experience; however, beauty expands its sensitivity beyond the experiential world: the sublime and the beautiful together make “... the *aesthetic education* a complete whole and expand the human heart’s sensitivity to the entire scope of our calling, extending even beyond the world of senses” (*Concerning the Sublime* 84). Beauty as sensuous experience has to overcome our intellect to be objective, to realize ideal beauty in experience. Beauty is “mere effect of the world of sense”; but since “reason makes transcendental use of this effect of the mere world of sense,” we may place beauty “*subjectively* into the intelligible world” (Grace 346).

Beauty is ... to be viewed as a citizen of two worlds, belonging to the one by *birth*, to the other by *adoption*; she *receives* her existence in sensuous nature, and *attains* to the right of citizenship in the world of reason. From this it is also explained how it happens, that taste, as a faculty of judgement of beauty, steps into the middle between mind and sense, and connects these two natures, each scornful of the other, in happy concord: as it teaches *matter* respect for reason, it also teaches that which is *rational* its sympathy for sensuousness; as it ennobles perception into ideas, it transforms the world of sense in a certain way into a realm of freedom. (Grace 346)

This does not mean that the sensuous side should be stronger than the intellect. For example, works of art which are made only by passion are not fine works in Schiller’s

aesthetical judgment. Both passion and intellect must be free from their own restrictions. “There does indeed exist a fine art of passion; but a fine passionate art is a contradiction in terms; for the unfailing effect of beauty is freedom from passion. No less self-contradictory is the notion of a fine art which teaches (didactic) or improves (moral); for nothing is more at variance with the concept of beauty than the notion of giving the psyche any definite bias” (*L22 157*).

In Schiller, only the objectivity of beauty can cancel the gap between matter and form. He writes that “...just because it is both these things [beauty’s character as form and life] at once, beauty provides us with triumphant proof that passivity by no means excludes activity, nor matter form, nor limitation infinity...” (*L25 187*). He goes on to say that man can achieve second freedom despite depending “upon physical things,” and “Beauty is proof of this and, I must add, she alone can furnish such proof” (*L25 187*). Since we can realize ideality in experience, that is to say, the bridge between the dualities of the world such as the ideal and the real, this can lead us to moral freedom in the sense of realizing our original humanity as wholeness, mentally and politically. Thus we can be moral, which means following our nature to be free. Schiller writes,

...beauty offers us ... an instance of man not needing to flee matter in order to manifest himself as spirit. But if he is already free while still in association with sense, as the fact of beauty teaches, and if freedom is something absolute and supra-sensual, as the very notion of freedom necessarily implies, then there can no longer be any question for how he is to succeed in raising himself from the limited to the absolute, or of how, in his thinking and willing, he is to offer resistance to the life of sense, since this has already happened in beauty. (*L25 189*)

The objectivity of beauty instantaneously establishes the way of being free and

moral since it the synthesis of matter and form. Throughout the *Letters*, each explanation of the relationship between opposed terms corresponds to the subjectivity and objectivity in beauty in the sense of the perfection of humanity. Thus, I contend that Schiller spends the entire *Letters* attempting to prove the objectivity of beauty. If we consider his view of the universe, either fragmented or not, it is clear that he is applying the basic schema C is the synthesis of A and B (wholeness is the synthesis of fragment and fragment) to beauty, as he does to other terms:

Table 4.13 Under the Three Kinds of Beauty

A	B	C
<u>Energetic Beauty</u>	<u>Melting Beauty</u>	<u>Ideal Beauty</u>
Subjectivity (sense)	Objectivity (reason)	(True) Objectivity
Actual	Ideal	(True) Actual/Ideal
Nature	Civilization	Ideal Nature/Civilization
Sense	Intellect	Ideal Reason
Matter	Form	Living Form
State of Nature	Natural State	Aesthetic State

Schiller's ground of the objectivity of beauty lies in his theory of humanity as represented in the table above. Therefore, we see the concept of the objectivity of beauty: True objectivity is the synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity; True Nature/Civilization is the synthesis of Nature and Civilization; True Reason/Sense is the synthesis of Sense and Reason; and Living Form (True humanity) is the synthesis of Matter and Form. As in the above table, there are two kinds of objectivity in Schiller. One is one-sided or lower objectivity as in one-sided ideal and one-sided civilization which are fragmented; another is true or higher objectivity, as in true ideal or true civilization. He holds that "Every beauty of art requires, as imitation of nature, *truth*, and stands therein under objective

judgement” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 460).

While analyzing beauty, we should note what Schiller warns about the hazards of analyzing the essence of beauty. We should recognize that “[beauty’s] whole magic resides in its mystery, and in dissolving the essential amalgam of its elements we find we have dissolved its very being” (*LI* 5). In civilization, language is a necessary tool. However, language expands fragmentation since it makes our analytical mind more fragmented, and moves our focus away from truth. The terms which represent humanity’s dual character, such as objectivity and subjectivity, nature and civilization, reason and sense, or ideal and real, are the result of our rational minds, but also the result of fragmentation; therefore, language escalates the fragmentation in thought. Schiller’s intention is a harmonious unification of language (art or technology) and nature (our original intentions or thoughts before language made them fragmented). Without wholeness, there is no universal validity for each element in the world. There is no exception to this universal view in Schiller, as he stresses the world of alienation throughout his terms, as in freedom and regulation.

4.14 Freedom and Regulation

We see a pattern in Schiller’s view of first freedom (the concept of freedom) and regulation similar to the one we find in his concept of fragmentation and wholeness - which I have described as the relationship between nature and civilization, or reason and sense. Those are opposed but will be united, as in the following schema:

Table 4.14 Freedom and Regulation

A (Fragment)	B (Fragment)	C (Wholeness) (True Humanity/ Living Form)
Real	Ideal	(True) Ideality
Regulation	Freedom (first)	(True) Freedom (second)
Nature	Art	(True) Nature
Matter	Form	(True) Beauty

Under the cooperating relation between the two sides - reason and sense, intellect and passion, and technique and nature - freedom (second) will be born by integrating freedom (first) and regulation. Schiller writes that the aim of man depends on his “concept of the *dignity of man*, which rests upon the self-activity on his reason, upon his freedom from sensuous impulses” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 460). Regulation in A means mass and gravity, or restrictions from other humans, such as brute force or an oppressive state. Schiller writes that “...no object in nature and yet far fewer in art are free of purpose and rules, *none is determined through itself*, so soon as we reflect upon it. Each is there through another, each is there for another’s sake, none has autonomy” (*Kallias* 493).

In the above table, freedom (first) in B means the a priori, rational, and universal thought of freedom every human wants to realize, but does not have the power to realize since this concept, from the formal drive, does not correlate with the sensuous drive. Freedom (second) in C means a freedom which is visible and practical; that is, it is able to be practiced in accordance with regulations.

When humans were the “slave[s] of nature” (L25 185) in the sense of being merely sensuous animals without rationality, they were powerless to create beauty in

themselves. That is to say, they did not have the ability to convert matter by form.

However, when man reaches the stage where he is able to represent the dangerous forces of nature as form, as “object[s] of his contemplation” (*L25* 185), he can be free of fear and assert his independence. Schiller writes, “To the extent that [man] imparts form to matter, and for precisely as long as he imparts it, he is immune to its effects; for spirit cannot be injured by anything except that which robs it of its freedom, and man gives evidence of his freedom precisely by giving form to that which is formless” (*L25* 185).

To illustrate his concept of freedom and beauty, Schiller uses the example of a horse pulling a wagon piled with heavy things (*Kallias* 505). The horse is not free to act; its activity is the result of external influences. Schiller holds that the nature of an animal is expressed through its movement or form, and the beauty of the animal is in inverse proportion to its mass and the effects of gravity. A free horse runs with a light, springy step, and this reflects his unhindered nature. He can move easily and quickly along the same path where a carriage horse struggles “with lead-weight feet.... the ponderousness of the movement makes the carriage horse momentarily in our representation into mass, and the *characteristic* nature of the horse is suppressed in the same by the *universal* bodily nature” (*Kallias* 505). Schiller sees beauty in the free horse because it has movement based on its nature, not controlled by mass. He also points out that birds symbolize freedom and “most excite sentiments of beauty” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 475) because we see beauty where mass is overcome by the forces of life. He writes, “... we observe beauty everywhere, *where the mass is fully dominated by the form* and (in the animal and plant

kingdom) by the living powers (in which I place the autonomy of the organic)” (*Kallias* 505).

For Schiller, freedom is the will to determine oneself (mind) through material (body). He writes that “... because a will, which can determine itself according to mere form, is called *free*, so is that form in the world of sense, which appears determined only through itself, a *presentation of freedom*; for presented is an idea, which is so combined with an intuition, that both share with one another *one* rule of cognition” (*Kallias* 492). When we judge aesthetically, we want to know if the object has “independence of purposes and rules to the highest advantage,” or, on the other hand, if the object “must rather be subjected to rules” (*Kallias* 493). This is not a contradiction for Schiller, because “the *observed* influence of a purpose and a rule is proclaimed as force and carries with it heteronomy for the object. The beautiful product is permitted and must even be regular, but it must *appear free of regulation*” (ibid.).

For Schiller, freedom (second) is not merely a concept, but is visible in this world. Therefore, he writes, when it comes to aesthetic judgments, “we are interested, not in morality of itself, but simply in freedom, and morality can please our imagination only insofar as it makes that freedom visible” (*Pathetic* 68). Although we are not completely free because of mass and gravity, we can be free in appearance, in the real experience of beauty, when we achieve victory in the war with matter. Schiller writes, “*Free* were the presentation, where the presented seemed *itself to take action* and to have fully exchanged the matter with that to be presented” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 477). Thus, the appearance of

beauty means the presentation of freedom. "Freedom in the appearance is therefore nothing other than self-determination with regard to a thing, in so far as it reveals itself in the intuition" (*Kallias* 492). Schiller holds that

...because this freedom is merely lent to the object by reason, *since nothing can be free except the supersensible, and freedom itself can never fall as such into the senses* - briefly - since it is here merely a matter, that an object *appear* free, not actually *is*: so is the analogy of an object with the form of practical reason not freedom in action, rather *merely freedom in the appearance, autonomy in the appearance*.
(*Kallias* 489)

The medium or matter, as in the marble of a statue or the actor's "natural character" (*Aesthetical Lectures* 477), must not be the thing which the viewer notices as a characteristic of beauty. Schiller applies the same thought to poetry, maintaining "The poet must seek to overcome the striving for universality, which lies in the nature of his language, antagonistic to individuality, therewith the presented appears in its true characteristic. Presented free self-action in nature through language is beauty in poetry" (ibid.). In Schiller, appearance is the most trustworthy way to realize freedom and beauty.

Regarding Schiller's comment "Beauty ... is nothing other than freedom in the appearance" (*Kallias* 490), Norton states that this is Schiller's "most memorable yet enigmatic line," and goes on to say that many questions remain unanswered.

If, as he seems to imply, beauty is indeed the sensuous manifestation of freedom, which otherwise has no corresponding physical expression, then one would first of all wish to know what the sensible attributes of beauty itself are. Schiller remained stubbornly silent on this vital topic, and at most he addressed it only negatively.... he never revealed what perceptible qualities *do* have something to do with beauty, and without some indication of what they are, the rest of his argument necessarily rests on extremely unsteady ground.
(Norton 230)

Indeed, Schiller is clearly not addressing the sensuous attributes of beautiful objects. The experience of beauty, as in a horse running freely in a meadow, occurs in the mind of the subject, the individual viewing the scene. It is a sensuous experience of the subject. In Schiller's view, inner autonomy has to control the body, and when we observe that this condition exists in the object, we feel this is beauty. Schiller clearly holds that beauty does not have any particular physical condition, such as a figure, line, or symmetry, except freedom. "Regularity can thus not have value as the universal grounding concept of beauty, but rather *freedom*, that is, the characteristic self-determined through the nature of a thing" (*Aesthetical Lectures* 474-75). Thus, for Schiller, freedom is the synonym of beauty, and "Freedom alone is the ground of the beautiful" (*Kallias* 510). Here, he is indicating freedom as an attribute of that which is unregulated; if it is necessary to exhibit a particular sensuous attribute to be free, as Norton claims, this is a lack of freedom and, therefore, beauty. Consequently, I do not hold that Schiller's comment "Beauty...is nothing other than freedom in appearance" (*Kallias* 490) is contradictory or confused as Norton alleges.

Individuals are in and part of the whole, but must not be sacrificed to the aims of the whole. The aim of the state must be subordinate to the aims of the individual. "Beauty or rather taste regards all things as *self-aim* and by no means tolerates, that one serves the other as means or bears the yoke" (*Kallias* 513). Schiller writes that every citizen in the aesthetical world is a free citizen, possessing equal rights with all others, and "*may not once be compelled for the sake of the whole*, but rather must absolutely *consent* to


everything” (*Kallias* 513). For Schiller, freedom is “the harmony of the whole” (*Kallias* 515) - each part following its own nature in the whole.

A landscape is beautifully composed, when all individual parts, of which it consists, so play into one another, that each sets its own limits, and the whole is therefore the result of the freedom of the individual. Everything in a landscape should be referred to the whole, and everything individual should seem nevertheless to stand only under its own rule ... Men, animals, clouds want to move, for the freedom of the living expresses itself only in action. The river will accept in its course no law from the bank, but rather follows its own; in short: each individual desires to have its will. Where, however, remains now the harmony of the whole, when each concerns itself only for itself? Just therefrom does it follow, that each out of inner freedom directly prescribes itself the limitation, which the other needs, in order to express *its* freedom. (*Kallias* 514-515)

Without restriction, there is no concept of freedom. Being alone in a wilderness is not freedom. Schiller claims that humans can realize themselves “as whole” only in society, not in a solitary life. He writes that man’s “exalted freedom is absolutely nothing, if he is even bound in a single, solitary instance. Culture is supposed to put humans in a state of freedom and to assist in realizing the concept of a human person as whole” (*Concerning the Sublime* 71). Schiller illustrates the relation between wholeness, individuals, and freedom by using the example of an English dance on the stage. “I know no more suitable image for the ideal of beautiful behavior, than a well performed English dance, composed from many complicated figures” (*Kallias* 518). He points out that the thing which audiences see is unlimited movement; the dancers are mingling very rapidly, but they never crash although they seem to be acting as freely as they want. There is liveliness and brilliant order, and when groups of people are dancing, in the next moment someone different is dancing in the same place. Schiller writes, “It is striking, how good

fashion (beauty of behavior) is developed from my concept of beauty. The first law of good fashion is: *Spare others' freedom*. The second: Show freedom yourself,” and the fulfillment of these laws “alone makes the complete man of the world” (*Kallias* 518). For Schiller, if we can realize freedom, which brings morality, pleasure, and love, this will be the equal of realizing beauty, as he writes: “Freedom in the presentation of the physical and moral purpose of man could supply a true ideal of beauty, if, of course, all regularity in the presentation vanishes” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 473).

In Schiller, freedom is a synonym of nature; it means being natural, and nature means something being itself, free from restriction although always subject to gravity and material. To graphically represent the relation between freedom and nature, Schiller drew a straight line with sudden change in direction and a wavy line which changes direction in smooth oscillations.



Now is the entire difference between this second and the former merely this, that the former changes its direction abruptly, however, the latter unnoticeably; the difference of their effects upon the aesthetical feeling must therefore be grounded in this single observable difference of their properties. What, however, is a suddenly altered direction other, than one violently altered? Nature loves no jump. If we see it make one, then it shows, that violence has occurred to it. On the

contrary, only that movement appears voluntary, to which one can assign no determined point, in which it changed its direction. And this is the case with a wavy line, which is distinguished from the above - portrayed merely through its *freedom*.
(*Kallias* 517)

For Schiller, beauty, rule, nature, and freedom coexist as necessary elements for each other. He writes, “As far as the ideal of beauty is concerned, all *necessary* movements *must be* beautiful, because, as *necessary*, they belong to its nature...” (*Grace* 340). He states that “mathematical regularity” is not beautiful, and the “There are confused representations of perfection, which yet awaken directly no feeling of beauty; also, every judgement of beauty is not combined with the judgement of perfection” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 469). Even a perfectly drawn triangle, according to this view, could be less beautiful than an imperfectly drawn triangle which expresses its own freedom following its nature.

4.15 Nature and Duty / Principle and Practice

As in the relation of freedom and regulation, there is a corresponding relation between nature in the sense of our desire in the sensuous drive to preserve ourselves, and our duty in the formal drive to realize happiness for society. In the following table, the formal drive is represented as moral principle, freedom, and the ideal, while the other side, the side of the sensuous drive, is represented as nature, practice, regulation, and the actual.

Table 4.15 Under the Three Drives

A (Fragment) Formal drive	B (Fragment) Sensuous drive	C (Wholeness = Ideal Beauty) Play drive
1 Duty/Moral	Nature	(True) Moral
2 Principle	Practice	(True) Beautiful Action
3 Freedom (first)	Regulation	(True) Freedom (second)
4 Ideal	Actual	(True) Ideal
5 Action	Feeling	(True) Free Action
6 Form	Matter	Living Form
7 Reason	Feeling	(True) Reason
8 Moral State	Natural State	Aesthetic State

As in the above table, for example, duty/moral and nature in line 1 will be expressed as not only true moral, but also as elements of other lines of wholeness, such as true free action, true beauty, and true reason. Here, as in the definition of beauty, ‘moral’ means the result of a combination of body and mind or the sensuous and rational. When beauty, the equivalent of nature and freedom, is realized because of the integration of the opposite sides, the act becomes a moral act. The circulated or interchangeable relations, such as C (Free Action - line 5) is the synthesis of A (Principle - line 2) and B (Actual - line 4) in the above table, show that being truly moral means being beautiful, natural, free, ideal, and rational. If the action lacks beauty, it also lacks the other characteristics. But if someone assists another selflessly, he “has forgotten himself ... fully” and “fulfilled [his duty] with an easiness, as if merely the instinct had acted from him” (*Kallias* 498).

Schiller writes, “Therefore were a moral action then first a beautiful action, if it appears as an effect of nature arising from itself,” and a free action is beautiful “when the autonomy of the disposition and autonomy in the appearance coincide. From this ground is the

maximum of the character perfection of a man moral beauty, for it arises only then, *when duty has become nature to him*” (*Kallias* 498). Reason wants to influence our senses, to force us to act morally - to realize freedom for ourselves and others. Schiller holds that “... [reason] declares, if [any] action is that which it *wants* and *should be*. Every moral action is of this kind. It is a product of the pure, i.e., of the will determined through mere form and therefore autonomously ...” (*Kallias* 488).

In Table 4.15, elements under column A want to be free from elements under column B, and the converse is also true. For example, duty/moral (column A, line 1) has to be free from practice (column B, line 2). Being completely free is not possible, but the elements can be free in appearance. Schiller writes,

...we consider “every being in the aesthetical judgement as a self-aim” and it disgusts us (makes us indignant), to whom freedom is the highest, that something should be sacrificed to the other and serve as means. For that reason a moral action can never be beautiful, if we look on the operation, whereby it is frightened away from sensuousness. Our sensuous nature must therefore appear free in the moral, although it is really not, and it must have the appearance, as if nature merely carried out the instructions of our instincts, in which they bow down, directly opposed to the instincts, beneath the dominion of the pure will.
(*Kallias* 499)

Schiller gives an example of a moral act in *Kallias*, in a parable concerning the reactions of five individuals who encounter a man who had been beaten, robbed, and left to die. Four of the five passers-by react with a strong sense of either duty or self interest. The fifth, a Good Samaritan figure, acts “from the purest moral purpose,” forgets himself, and “fulfilled [his duty] with an easiness,” without self-interest (*Kallias* 498).

If the object manifests beauty with morality - if it shows the object’s nature and

freedom, then it is called ideal beauty in day-to-day experience. Schiller writes, “Although beauty only adheres to the appearance, so is *moral beauty* nonetheless a concept, to which something in experience corresponds” (*Kallias* 495 - 496). Schiller’s moral beauty is the combination of reason, which means a principle to realize freedom, and sense, which means acting to satisfy our physical desire. For him, moral beauty represents freedom in appearance - overcoming restriction, and showing freedom through matter - which he calls beauty. For Schiller, the moral is a synonym of the natural, free, and rational; it is the united condition of the opposite relations. The moral does not mean merely rational or intellectual, but both the rational and sensuous combined. Schiller holds that moral beauty will be seen in freedom in appearance - the overcoming of matter by form or of nature by reason. He writes, “I can advance to thee no better empirical proof for the truth of my theory of beauty, than if I show thee, that even the different use of this word [applying the concept of beauty to moral beauty] only takes place in such cases, where freedom is shown in the appearance” (*Kallias* 496).

4.16 Love as Beauty

Schiller tries to answer the question which has been asked since ancient Greece - what is love? He answers that love is beauty; that is to say, recovering our nature, overcoming alienation, and reaching wholeness. Schiller’s efforts in the *Letters* can be seen as an attempt at defining the interdependent relations of nature, freedom, moral, and love under the concept of beauty; if we know what beauty is, then we know what moral, freedom, nature, and love are. Beauty comes from realizing our ultimate personality -

which is represented as form through our actions. If we realize ourselves as works of fine art, then we can be called beautiful and we express morality and love; thus love is a synonym of beauty in Schiller.

Schiller also classifies love as false and true. *False* love is based on love of either the material or form, and ignores the other side. *True* love is based on love of both, and the realization of freedom in mind and body for ourselves and others. Thus, love is aware of the beauty in each object. For example, someone who has an obsessive, controlling personality, and tries to restrict his lover's freedom does not have true love. Restricted freedom in a cage does not make a bird beautiful. Both a horse carrying a heavy burden and a person in prison lack freedom and beauty. Under such circumstances those animals and humans are not loved, and not able to love themselves; they are alienated from themselves and others. Slaves of the physical world, they are subject to gravity without the wings to regain freedom in mind and body.

For Schiller, the ultimate goal of the aesthetic state is love for ourselves and others. Freedom in appearance (beauty) unites the inclination of reason and sense - and this condition is called love:

Freedom in the appearance awakens not merely pleasure about the object, but rather also *inclination* to the same; this inclination of reason, to unite with the sensuous, is called *love*. We contemplate the beautiful properly not with *respect*, but rather with *love*; excepting *human* beauty, which however, includes expression of *morality* as object of respect in itself. - Should we at the same time love that which is worthy of respect, so must it be by us achieved or for us achievable. Love is an enjoyment, respect, however, is not; here is tension, there relaxation. - The pleasure of beauty arises, therefore, from the observed analogy with reason and is united with love.
(*Aesthetical Lectures* 480)

If we are able to appreciate the moral element in each object, then we are able to love the object because we respect its natural status. If we see a lack of moral status in the object, we feel we should help it to realize the moral element. Therefore morality, represented as nature and freedom - the unity of reason and sense, is called beauty, and produces love. Schiller comments, "The beautiful ennobles sensuousness, and makes reason sensuous. It teaches, to place a value upon form. With the beautiful one learns to love things without self-interest, merely on account of their form" (*Aesthetical Lectures* 481).

Love is the compound of reason and sense; for example, the bond between the sexes, Schiller writes, is based not merely on passion but on a "compulsion ... of a lovelier kind" and a "communion of hearts" (L27 213).

Released from its dark bondage, the eye, less troubled now by passion, can apprehend the form of the beloved; soul looks deep into soul, and out of a selfish exchange of lust there grows a generous interchange of affection. Desire widens, and is exalted into love, once humanity has dawned in its object; and a base advantage over sense is now disdained for the sake of a nobler victory over will. The need to please subjects the all-conquering male to the gentle tribunal of taste; lust he can steal, but love must come as a gift. For this loftier prize he can only contend by virtue of form, never by virtue of matter. (L27 213)

For Schiller, good means realizing love, and there is no goodness without beauty, freedom, and nature. For him, the desire that objects be beautiful and good "can exist together with the greatest freedom of mind" though "we can only wish for the beautiful and the good to be present" (*Concerning the Sublime* 73).

The possibility of the realization of the aesthetic state comes from a refinement of our morality and love - by overcoming our dual characters. Schiller goes on to describe

how we will reach such a state with love, which is the realization of our humanity, through a playful mind - a synthesis of matter and form, or body and mind, or sense and reason - which is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 5 Play as the Perfection of Humanity

5.1 True Play

For Schiller, the task of reason is realizing beauty, and reason demands “a bond of union between the form-drive and the material drive; that is to say, let there be a play-drive, since only the union of reality with form, contingency with necessity, passivity with freedom, makes the concept of human nature complete” (*L15* 101-103). Neither the formal and sensuous drives, nor reason and sense, but only the play drive can reveal the beauty in humanity, or “the consummation of [man’s] humanity” (*L15* 103).

There are three kinds of play in Schiller. One is *ideal* play, which can be seen only in a divine world; like the concept of ideal beauty which cannot be seen in real life, this ideal play will not be experienced in our earthy world. He claims that Greek mythology is symbolically indicative of the concept of ideal play, as the figure of gods and goddess, who do not have any restriction of matter, are able to do what we are supposed to do - play freely.

... [the Greeks] banished from the brow of the blessed gods all the earnestness and effort which furrow the cheeks of mortals, no less than the empty pleasures which preserve the smoothness of a vacuous face; freed those ever-contented beings from the bonds inseparable from every purpose, every duty, every care, and made *idleness* and *indifferency* the enviable portion of divinity - merely a more human name for the freest, most sublime state of being. Both the material constraint of natural laws and the spiritual constraint of moral laws were resolved in their higher concept of necessity, which embraced both worlds at once: and it was only out of the perfect union of those two necessities that for them true freedom could proceed. (*L15* 109)

The second kind of play is *actual* play, such as in games and children’s activities.

In the *Letters*, Schiller notes that he is not talking about this kind of lower play: “True, we must not think here of the various forms of play which are in vogue in actual life, and are usually directed to very material objects” (L15 107).

While there is no beauty in the ordinary sense of play, we can find beauty in the third kind of play - *truly ideal* play which operates between matter and form, or reason and sense, in real life. “The beauty we find in actual existence is precisely what the play drive we find in actual existence deserves; but with the ideal of beauty that is set up by reason, an ideal of the play drive, too, is enjoined upon man, which he must keep before his eyes in all his forms of play” (L15 107). This third play includes fine art, but Schiller’s assertion that “man *only* plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he *is only fully a human being when he plays*” (L15 107), applies not only to the fine arts, but to the “art of living” (L15 109) as well, which is a more difficult task than the former. Here, the human psyche can be a lighthearted medium between the material drive and formal drive, which place demands on each other to preserve life from the *condition* and to preserve dignity from the ultimate ego *person*. “In a word: by entering into association with ideas all reality loses its earnestness because it then becomes of *small account*; and by coinciding with feeling necessity divests itself of its earnestness because it then becomes of *light weight*” (L15 105). This lighter feeling is called play. Under such a condition, life has *dignity*, duty allows for physical tendencies, and “our psyche accepts the reality of things, *or* material truth, with greater freedom and serenity once this latter encounters formal truth, or the law of necessity, and no longer feels constrained by

abstraction once this can be accompanied by the immediacy of intuition” (L15 105).

Schiller’s theory of play might be regarded as impractical for real life if we focus on the psychological aspects of play. However, I claim - and illustrate in Table 5.1 which follows - that his concept of play is part of his dynamic view of wholeness and of the dialectic progress of humanity. When Schiller says only play makes humans complete, he is not referring merely to a playful mind in real life, but to playful mind and action, a synthesis of matter and form, body and mind. Until we act, we do not start playing, and we are not yet able to show beauty in ourselves. The play drive in the ideal, and beauty in the ideal, will make humans complete and realize social reform.

Interpreting Schiller’s play merely from the psychological viewpoint ignores his earnest motive for writing the *Letters* and his theme - how to put principle into practice in real life. Schiller is not limiting the experience of joy to appreciating beautiful objects in works of art, although he uses fine art as an analogy to describe constructing humanity. He is also not talking about leading a solitary life of mediation, leaning to the side of form:

Man, as we know, is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively mind. Beauty, as the consummation of his humanity, can therefore be neither exclusively life nor exclusively form. Not mere life, as acute observers, adhering too closely to the testimony of experience, have maintained, and to which the taste of our age would fain degrade it; not mere form, as it has been adjudged by philosophers whose speculations led them too far away from experience, or by artists who, philosophizing on beauty, let themselves be too exclusively guided by the needs of their craft. It is the object common to both drives, that is to say, the object of the play drive. (L15 103)

As the following table shows, as in the case where true ideal beauty will be realized by the

sublation of ideal beauty and actual beauty, true play will be realized by the sublation of ideal play and actual play. If we focus on Schiller's concept of play as mere mental activity, it might well lead us to define his play as the ideal play in column A of Table 5.1, which does not have the possibility of realizing anything in actual life. Ideal play in column A means the activity of the formal drive without the material, which is impossible to realize in real life.

Table 5.1 Three Kinds of Play

Fragmented Humanity		Whole Humanity
A: Lack of realization	B: Lack of aspiration	C: Fulfillment of both
Ideal Play	Actual Play	(True) Ideal Play
Principle	Practice	Beautiful Action
Ideal	Real	(True) Ideal
Ideal Beauty	Actual Beauty	(True) Ideal Beauty
Formal drive	Sensuous drive	Play drive
Mind	Body	Living Form

Interpreting Schiller's play as actual play in column B of the table is also a mistake. Actual play means play which involves only the material, as seen in the enjoyment of games. Schiller anticipates an objection which would come from such a misinterpretation; he asks whether or not beauty is "degraded by being made to consist of mere play" and diminished by being associated with play (*L15* 105). He asks, "Does it not belie the rational concept as well as the dignity of beauty - which is after all, here being considered as an instrument of culture - if we limit it to *mere play*?" (ibid.). However, Schiller is not dealing with such "mere play."

We find Schiller's definition of play in C in Table 5.1 - true or ideal play which

must be realized in real life. “It [beauty] is the object common to both drives, that is to say, the object of the play drive. This term is fully justified by linguistic usage, which is wont to designate as ‘play’ everything that is neither subjectively nor objectively contingent, and yet imposes no kind of constraint either from within or from without” (L15 103-105). True play is the combination or synthesis of principle and practice, mind and action, or form and matter as living form. Play which operates either in the speculative or material world is not true play.

The second category of play, actual play, will not be the solution to lead humans to morality and goodness, as it is based on the material. True play comes from the world of reason. Thus, in an aesthetic state, man will be subject “to form even in his purely physical life,” and “it is only out of the aesthetic, not out of the physical, state that the moral can develop” (L23 165). The play drive has the power to liberate humans from the material world of appetites.

In Schiller, the war between matter and form is an allegory of playful activity - a peaceful mental condition achieved by the unity of opposed elements, intellect and feeling. “The law of [man’s] will he must apply even to his inclinations; he must, if you permit me the expression, *play* the war against matter into the very territory of matter itself, so that he may be spared having to fight this dread foe on the sacred soil of freedom” (L23 167-169). Through play, we easily overcome the binary elements, and in this moment realize our true nature. Schiller admits that his claim “man only plays when he is ... a human being, and he is *only fully a human being when he plays*” may appear

paradoxical, but it will “take on both weight and depth of meaning once we have got as far as applying it to the two-fold earnestness of duty and of destiny” (L15 107). Schiller claims that we should push the natural character (sensuous drive) further from matter, and make the moral character (formal drive) closer to matter (L3 15). He writes, “The most frivolous theme must be so treated that it leaves us ready to proceed directly from it to some matter of the utmost import; the most serious material must be so treated that we remain capable of exchanging it forthwith for the lightest play” (L22 157). Devoting ourselves either to form or matter has not produced desirable results for humanity. To regain true unity with ourselves, to heal our fragmented condition, to start political reform, we must play. Schiller holds that “Once man is inwardly at one with himself, he will be able to preserve his individuality ... and the state will be merely the interpreter of his own finest instinct, a clearer formation of his own sense of what is right” (L4 21).

When the third character, the play drive, predominates in a people, they are ready to reform their state with moral principles (L4 17). Only the play drive can start and continue the transformation, and create an aesthetic state, which is neither a natural nor moral state. Schiller claims that “the aesthetically tempered man will achieve universally valid judgements and universally valid actions, as soon as he has the will to do so” (L23 163). An aesthetic state is also called a state of aesthetic semblance because this state will be made in the same way artists create their works of art, by their “art of semblance” (L26 197) - playing with beauty to unite both drives. Beauty is integral to this process of change; Schiller writes, “With beauty man shall *only play*, and it is *with beauty only* that

he shall play” (*L15* 107). It is aesthetic people who finally establish an aesthetic political state. Schiller adds, “... we have to look around for ... people who combine in themselves all the realities of life with the fewest possible limitations, and are carried along by the stream of events without becoming its victims,” and he asserts that only such people “can preserve the beauty of human nature as a whole” (*Naive* 248).

5.2 Contemplation

Man in the first physical state is at one with the world, Schiller claims, and thus “there exists for him as yet no world” (*L25* 183). An escape from “the material world and a transition to the world of spirit” (*L25* 185) happens when a man starts observing the world with awareness of himself. In this stage, man “*contemplates*” the world; “his personality differentiate itself from it, and a world becomes manifest to him because he has ceased to be one with it” (*L25* 183). Reason in this context expands by moving into the area of feeling. “Through the aesthetic modulation of the psyche, then, the autonomy of reason is already opened up within the domain of sense itself, the dominion of sensation already broken within its own frontiers...” (*L23* 163). At this point the spiritual man, Schiller states, can begin to develop from the physical man “according to the laws of freedom” (*ibid.*). Schiller calls this awareness of self and the world contemplation.

Contemplation (or reflection) is the first liberal relation which man establishes with the universe around him. If desire seizes directly upon its object, contemplation removes its object to a distance, and makes it into a true and inalienable possession by putting it beyond the reach of passion. The necessity of nature, which in the stage of mere sensation ruled him with undivided authority, begins at the stage of reflection to relax its hold upon him. In his senses there results a momentary peace; time itself, the eternally moving, stands still; and, as

the divergent rays of consciousness converge, there is reflected against a background of transience an image of the infinite, namely *form*. (L25 183)

Schiller holds that contemplation brings a great change in man's inner world which may be compared to "a revolution in the outer [world]" (L25 185).

We have three ways of relating to "nature (as appearance)" (*Kallias* 485), according to Schiller. They are "*Passively*: if we merely *perceive* its effects; *actively*, if we determine its effects; both *simultaneously* if we *represent* it" (ibid.) Humans, in a prehistoric condition before they started using their rational ability, received objects passively; then they started observing actively with rationality, and finally both passively and actively simultaneously in contemplation. Schiller writes, "With *contemplation* of appearance we conduct ourselves *passively*, in that we receive its impressions: *actively*, in that we subordinate these impressions to our *forms of reason*" (ibid.). By contemplation he means "we are invited by the things themselves to their *representation*" (ibid.). The important element of contemplation is enjoying both sides, form and matter, and this experience Schiller calls beauty.

Beauty, then, is indeed an *object* for us, because reflection is the condition of our having any sensation of it; but it is at the same time *a state of the perceiving subject*, because feeling is a condition of our having any perception of it. Thus beauty is indeed form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time life, because we feel it. In a word: it is at once a stage of our being and an activity we perform. (L25 187)

He admits that beauty is "the work of free contemplation" which leads us to "the world of ideas," without "leaving behind the world of sense, as is the case when we proceed to knowledge of truth" (L25 185-187). Schiller holds that to get to the true ideal of human

ennoblement, man “must take leave of the actual world, for he can fashion it, like any ideal, only from inner and moral sources” (*Naive* 247). Man does not find it in his environment or busy life, “but only in his heart, and he finds his heart solely in the stillness of solitary reflection” (*Naive* 248). This holds the promise of change, for knowing such a state means acting to change the world.

However, when Schiller advocates “solitary reflection,” he does not mean living a solitary life. Both overly-isolated and overly-social people will be in danger of not realizing “the aesthetic mode of the psyche” (*L26* 191).

Not where man hides himself, a troglodyte, in a cave, eternally an isolated unit, never finding humanity *outside himself*; nor yet there where, a nomad, he roams in vast hordes over the face of the earth, eternally but one of a number, never finding humanity *within himself* - but only there, where, in his own hut, he discourses silently with himself and, from the moment he steps out of it, with all the rest of his kind, only there will the tender blossom of beauty unfold. (*L26* 191)

Truth in Schiller comes from a dynamic synthesis of the passive and active conditions. A sensuous person lacks activeness in his intellect, while an intellectual person lacks the passiveness to feel. To be both, “he will have to become aesthetic” (*L23* 163).

For Schiller, beauty transforms matter into form, and thus we feel joy in beauty which expands our material limitation. This pleasure is disinterested pleasure without purpose. When we see an object and experience its beauty, we do not distinguish the object from its appearance of beauty. This experience itself is called semblance⁶, which

⁶ As a state reflects the character of its individual citizens, Schiller also calls the ideal political state a state of aesthetic semblance, created in the same way artists create works of art, by the “art of semblance” (*L26* 197). Aesthetic semblance is the experience of beauty by the play drive in every human activity.

can please us by the object's beauty without purpose - that is to say, it is a disinterested pleasure. According to Schiller, we are not able to establish an ideal political state yet since "we have not yet attained to the level of pure semblance at all, that we have not sufficiently distinguished existence from appearance, and thereby made the frontiers of each secure for ever" (L26 201-203). By play, false semblance will be converted by true semblance. False semblance does not change our morality. True semblance means a kind of illusion which changes our morality by the conversion of the psyche.

Schiller writes, "We shall deserve ... reproach as long as we cannot enjoy the beauty of living nature without coveting it, or admire the beauty of imitative art without inquiring after its purpose...." (L26 203). Play, as an activity in the experience of beauty, is meaningful because it is free from purpose. Regarding this disinterested pleasure, Schiller claims it does not contribute to man's character or knowledge:

In the aesthetic state, then, man is *nought*, if we are thinking of any particular result rather than of the totality of his powers, and considering that absence in him of any specific determination. Hence we must allow that those people are entirely right who declare beauty, and the mood it induces in us, to be completely indifferent and unfruitful as regards either *knowledge* or *character*. They are entirely right; for beauty produces no particular result whatsoever, neither for the understanding nor for the will. It accomplishes no particular purpose, neither intellectual nor moral; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform no individual duty and is, in short, as unfitted to provide a firm basis for character as to enlighten the understanding. (L21 145-147)

This "meaninglessness" indicates meaning for humanity - transcending the ordinary definitions of real and ideal. "But how can we speak of *mere* play, when we know that it is precisely play and play alone, which of all man's states and conditions is the one which

makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once? ... the agreeable, the good, the perfect, with these man is merely earnest; but with beauty he plays" (*L15* 105-107). Leaving the material or formal states, either of which forces us to live seriously, for the aesthetic world, a middle ground between the material and formal states, allows us to realize ideality in real life.

5.3 Shaftesbury

Schiller's ideas of play, in the sense of disinterested pleasure with harmony, probably was influenced by at least three forerunners - Shaftesbury, Moritz, and Kant. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), who first introduced the concept of disinterested pleasure in the experience of beauty, was commonly known in Germany at that time. Ives writes, "Shaftesbury's own writings were translated into German in 1745 by the theologian and popular philosopher Spalding, and those of his disciples Hutcheson and Ferguson by Lessing (1756) and Grave (1772) respectively. Grave's translation of Ferguson's *Principles of Moral Philosophy* is one of the few works known for certain to have been read by Schiller in his youth" (Ives 16-17). After moving to Weimar in 1787, Schiller was directly influenced by his friend C. M. Wieland, an eager supporter of Shaftesbury's views, as Norton comments, "In 1788 ... [Schiller] mentioned in a letter from the end of November to Caroline von Beulwitz that he planned to read Shaftesbury during the following summer ..." (Norton 228).

Shaftesbury, in his *Characteristics*, discusses disinterestedness and ethics. As Odin notes, "Shaftesbury's principle of disinterestedness originally emerged as a polemic

against egoism in ethics and instrumentalism in religions “(Odin 29). Odin holds that Shaftesbury contrasted the attitude of disinterest with the attitude “of ‘enlightened self-interest’ defended by Thomas Hobbes” (ibid.). According to Shaftesbury, when we look at beautiful objects, our pleasure comes from a disinterested mind - in the sense of contemplation without self-interest or self-love, as follows:

If you are already ... such a proficient [sic] in this new love [of beauty] that you are sure never to admire the representative beauty except for the sake of the original ... you may then be confident.... Imagine then ... if being taken with the beauty of the ocean, which you see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head to seek how to command it and, like some mighty admiral, ride master of the sea. Would not the fancy be a little absurd? ... Let who will call it theirs ... you will own the enjoyment of this kind to be very different from that which should naturally follow from the contemplation of the ocean’s beauty. (Shaftesbury 318-319)

Thus, if we act as “disinterestedly or generously as [we] please” (56), we are not concerned with possessing the object or gaining self-interest at all in the enjoyment of beauty. “What is new in the passage is that Shaftesbury opposes disinterestedness to the desire to possess or use the object” (Stolnitz 134).

According to Shaftesbury, as in Schiller’s concept of sensuous and formal drives, there are two kinds of impulses - one is the impulse to self-preservation and the other is an impulse to participate in society. The general good for society is the “good of the whole” (Shaftesbury 21), and this social impulse does not contradict the impulse to do private good. Since all things are connected and interdependent, loving oneself, being “rightly selfish” (56) or having ideal “self-love” (56), is the same as loving mankind.

According to Shaftesbury, contemplation of beauty leads us to be moral - it creates

a harmonious relation between those two impulses. Ives claims that Shaftesbury attempts to show that the impulses overlap, and that his intent is to demonstrate “that one’s true self-good lies in the preservation and development of an ordered society..... Grudzinski⁷ considers that here the source of all later eighteenth century attempts to formulate schemes for the aesthetic education of Man may be seen, and he also believes that Shaftesbury was the first to use the word ‘harmony’ with reference to the inner life of the personality” (Ives 16).

According to Ives, “Shaftesbury’s ideas can undoubtedly be traced back to Greek sources” (Ives 13), especially Pythagoras, who viewed the universe as a whole with harmonious relations between each part, and Plato, who saw a harmonious personality in the unity of reason, desire, and passion (Ives 14-15). In turn, Shaftesbury seems to have influenced Schiller concerning his concept of wholeness in relation to morality. In *Characteristics*, Shaftesbury has one of his characters, Theocles, address the omniscient “guardian deity”: “Thy influence is universal, and in all things thou art inmost. From thee depend their secret springs of action. Thou movest them with an irresistible unwearied force, by sacred and inviolable laws, framed for the good of each particular being, as best may suit with perfection, life and vigour of the whole” (Shaftesbury 307). Shaftesbury claims that there is a universal order - a wholeness. He writes “All things [including humans] in this world are united” (ibid. 274), and when each part exists following its

⁷ Polish literary critic and scholar Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski (1919-2000).

nature in a cooperative relation, there is harmony. For example, each animal and object has “mutual dependency,” and has its functions and purposes in cooperation with others. “Thus, in contemplating all on earth, we must of necessity view all in one, as holding to one common stock” as “the works of nature” (ibid. 275). However, we often cannot see those relations as a whole, for “a mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully and, since each particular has relation to all in general, it can know no perfect or true relation of anything in a world not perfectly and fully known” (ibid. 275). If we can integrate our private desire to get the necessities and the public desire to improve society, then individuals will gain harmony in themselves as virtuous persons, and be able to realize virtue in society.

5.4 Moritz

Shaftesbury does not make clear the connection between aesthetics and his concept of disinterested pleasure. However, Schiller’s friend Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-1793), a pioneer of German aesthetics, transformed Shaftesbury’s ethical notion of disinterestedness into an aesthetical notion, which deeply influenced Schiller and probably influenced Kant. Schiller carefully read Moritz, and frequently mentions this writer, as in *Aesthetical Lectures* (470). Moritz, in *Toward a Unification of All the Fine Arts and Letters under the Concept of Self-Sufficiency* (1785) - published five years before Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* - comments, “In contemplating a beautiful object ... I roll the purpose back into the object itself: I regard it as something that finds *completion* not in me but *in itself* and thus constitutes a whole in itself and gives me pleasure for *its own*

sake.... Thus the beautiful object yields a higher and more disinterested pleasure than the merely useful object” (qtd. by Woodmansee 12). Woodmansee writes that Moritz

...gave the first unequivocal and systematic expression to what I have called our modern conception of the arts. Works of art, he argued in this [*Toward a Unification...*] and in his subsequent writings, are ‘self-sufficient totalities’ produced simply to be contemplated ‘for their own sake’ - that is, ‘disinterestedly,’ - purely for the enjoyment of their internal attributes and relationships, independently of any external relationships or effects they might have. (Woodmansee 11)

Moritz contrasts the utilitarian and the beautiful by referring to common, everyday objects in his home:

I only look at the clock and the knife with pleasure insofar as I can employ them, and do not employ them for the sake of looking at them. In the case of the beautiful, the opposite holds. The beautiful does not have its purpose outside itself, and does not exist for the perfection of itself, but rather for its own intrinsic perfection. One does not look at it because one wants to employ it, but only employs it because one wants to look at it. (Moritz 247)

As in Shaftesbury, Moritz uses disinterestedness as an antonym of selfishness. “Like the moral philosophers in Germany during this period, Moritz uses the terms “unselfish” (*uneigennützig*) and “disinterested” (*uninteressiert*) interchangeably to denote the absence of any selfish ulterior motives or interests, denoted by the English term “disinterested” (Olin 32).

Moritz claims that contemplation without ulterior motives or interests leads us to realize total humanity as wholeness. He claims,

We do not need the beautiful object in order to be entertained as much as the beautiful object needs us to be recognized. We can easily exist without contemplating beautiful works of art, but they cannot exist as such without our contemplation. The more, we can do without them, therefore the more we

contemplate them for their own sake so as to impart to them through our very contemplation, as it were, their true, complete existence.

(qtd. by Woodmansee 32)

Woodmansee comments, “The artist’s sole end or purpose in Moritz’s model of art consists in the creation of a perfectly ‘coherent harmonious whole’ [*übereinstimmendes harmonisches Ganze*]” (18). In Moritz, as in Schiller, we see the concept of wholeness as the total realization of humanity. Indeed, Schiller mentions Moritz when discussing the concept of wholeness: “The beautiful is recognized in the useful as superfluous. The useful receives its worth through its contribution to perfection of a whole. A whole is, what is completed in itself. Only the whole, which strikes the senses or can be embraced with imaginative power, is beautiful. - Up to here one can regard Moritz as right” (*Aesthetical Lectures* 470).

5.5 Kant

After Shaftesbury and Moritz, Kant systematized the concept of beauty and disinterestedness under the name of play. He defines beauty as the experience of pleasure which comes from disinterestedness. In *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment*, he writes, “*Taste* is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction *without any interest*” (Kant 96), and goes on to describe the object of satisfaction as beautiful. The beautiful, he holds, is “that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a *universal* satisfaction” (ibid.). Disinterestedness means we are interested in the object, but we do not have self-interest, concerning desire or utility, toward the object. Kant holds that only “the taste for the beautiful is a

disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, extorts approval” (ibid. 95), and the object of such a satisfaction is called *beautiful* (96). According to Kant, when understanding and imagination play without restricting each other so that “the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and understanding), [is] enlivened through mutual agreement” (104), we have the “feeling of free play” (102). He claims “In the judging of a free beauty (according to mere form) the judgement of taste is pure. No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve the given object and thus which the latter should represent is presupposed, by which the imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the shape, would merely be restricted” (114).

Kant’s intention is to establish the universal validity of claims to beauty. “Life is not merely an empirical awareness [in Kant’s philosophy], even of the pleasure of moral acts, rather it is a universal forming power that seeks self-awareness. It is this deeper notion of life that Kant integrates into his aesthetic theory as its transcendental grounding” (Wessell 132). Beauty is a subjective experience, yet, many individuals have common judgements regarding taste. Kant comments, “This state of a *free play* of the faculties of cognition with a representation through which an object is given must be able to be universally communicated, because cognition, as a determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject it may be) should agree, is the only kind of representation that is valid for everyone” (Kant 102-103). Wessell notes that “aesthetic theory cannot generate any universality or necessity, as Kant clearly saw.... Kant also

located the aesthetic in subjectivity. However, Kant showed that subjectivity itself evinces a rational structure. This structure generates universality in judgments of taste” (Wessell 136). Thus, “The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds” (Kant 106) and a universal condition to determine what is beautiful.

The play drive for Kant is a key to explain the subjectivity of beauty with its universal validity. Wessell observes that for Kant, as for Schiller, unity in multiplicity is rational and objective:

Any universe for Kant must be a function of necessary, a priori and universal principles. And feeling in its empirical content is always contingent and particular. Only form can constitute a manifold as a universe. The form (or objectivity constant) of an aesthetic universe cannot lie in Gefühl as the content (manifold) of aesthetic awareness, rather only in the reflective act whereby the percipient subject determines itself to its affective contents. (Wessell 131-132)

Wessell also points out that Kant and Schiller have similar attitudes toward wholeness as a synthetic unity of parts: “Schiller’s concept of human nature has much in common with Kant’s. For Kant (and for Schiller) experience involves a manifold held together in a synthetic unity. In all experience there is a plurality of determinations that are woven together to form a synthetic whole” (Wessell 138).

To the concept of the play drive which he inherited from Kant, Schiller added his own teleological view of wholeness: the fragmented condition which will be healed in the dialectical process of becoming whole in the progress of the individual and of history.

5.6 Conclusion - Is Play Realistic?

Throughout the *Letters*, we see connections between each concept and word, and

when we look at them all as one, it is evident that Schiller's intention is to construct systematic wholeness as a universally valid principle by a dialectical transformation in every aspect of life. In the order of the universe, everything has its own nature and purpose. For Schiller, the quest for wholeness is indeed the quest for humanity.

Because of his intention to construct a systematic wholeness, Schiller attempts, like Kant, to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. For Schiller, objectivity and subjectivity, ideal and real, truth and fact, reason and sense, form and matter, mind and body must be a oneness, a unity, as they are "two sides of the same coin." In Schiller, aesthetic means the manifestation of perfection - in the sense of a unity of the manifold. Thus, there are two kinds of worlds in Schiller; one is fragmented or one-sided and the other is united or synthesized, as follows:

Table 5.2 Two Kinds of Reality

<u>Fragmented reality (Clear border)</u>	<u>Aesthetic reality (Dissolving the border)</u>
Ideal - Real	Ideal/Real
Mind - Body	Mind/Body
Reason - Sense	Reason/Sense

Because he deals with two kinds of reality, Schiller uses each term in one or the other of the two contexts. This complexity has understandably confused many of his readers.

In Schiller, individual reform is necessary prior to social reform, as he claims: "...we must continue to regard every attempt at political reform as untimely, and every hope based upon it as chimerical, as long as the split within man is not healed, and his nature so restored to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer of the state, and

guarantee the reality of this political creation of reason” (L7 45).

Here, we should note what Schiller means by social reform. Social reform for Schiller is not a rebuilding of a natural state where the sensuous drive governs, and controls its citizens by power, nor an attempt to build a moral state where the formal drive governs, and controls its citizens by laws regulating morality. Social reform for Schiller means building the aesthetic state, which frees man “from the shackles of circumstances,” and releases him from “all that might be called constraint, alike in the physical and moral sphere” (L27 215). In this ideal state, all individuals are respected as free citizens; “In the aesthetical world, which is entirely different than the most perfect Platonic republic, even the coat, which I carry on my body, demands respect from me for its freedom, and desires from me, like an ashamed servant, that I let no one notice, that it *serves* me” (*Kallias* 513).

At the end of the *Letters*, he addresses the question of whether the aesthetic state exists at all and, if so, where it might be found:

As a need, [a state of aesthetic semblance] exists in every finely attuned soul; as a realized fact, we are likely to find it, like the pure church and the pure republic, only in some few chosen circles, where conduct is governed, not by some soulless imitation of the manner and morals of others, but by the aesthetic nature we have made our own; where men make their way, with undismayed simplicity and tranquil innocence, through even the most involved and complex situations, free alike of the compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert their own, as of the necessity to shed their dignity in order to manifest grace. (L27 219)

When Schiller states that the need for the aesthetic state “exists in every finely attuned soul,” he means we need individual reform first of all, as he stresses throughout the

Letters. On this basis, the possibility of a political aesthetic state exists. The citizens of such a state do not act to deprive each other of freedom; indeed, “none may appear to the other except as form, or confront him except as an object of free play” (L27 215). Here we clearly see Schiller’s revolution is *ideal* revolution (reform to achieve morality in individuals and society), but not *realistic* revolution (reform only society with brute force), as I discuss in Section 4.5, Two Kinds of Revolution.

However, Schiller is not saying that we have to wait to reform society, and suffer under oppressive power, with the vague hope of realizing the majority of people’s mental reform to attain an ideal personality. On the contrary, in his view, *we must engage with the outer world*. We must resist any lack of freedom, equality, and fraternity, that is to say, lack of morality in each era. Schiller has high regard for the human dignity displayed in the battle to regain freedom. Hence, for Schiller, play with joy is a most strategic way to gain victory, instead of a bloody struggle with fearful seriousness; he writes that man “must ... play the war against matter into the very territory of matter itself, so that he may be spared having to fight this dread foe on the sacred soil of freedom” (L23 167-169).

Only the play drive can simultaneously realize intention and action, or reason and sense, as in children who cannot stop playing with toys as they are attracted to the objects. Once we start to use the play drive as our guide, the battle between matter and form will be changed instantaneously into play. Schiller claims that beauty influences us “not by *providing an aid to thought* ... but merely by furnishing the thinking faculty with the freedom to express itself according to its own laws...” (L19 131). Thus, we go back to

nature by using the play drive in ordinary life to be beautiful and free, to awaken from the nightmare of alienation into the real world.

In Schiller's view, an individual who cannot control his emotions cannot control the outer world. Anger, for example, is not an effective motivation for reform; angry reformers will give up or lose sight of their true goals. More strategic ways to reform the outer world arise from reforming the inner world. By putting the world outside ourselves (*L25 183*), and contemplating our actions, we will begin to heal ourselves first, and then the world. When play sublates the opposing elements, social reform begins side by side with individual reform. The aesthetic state is a practical mode of society, as Schiller contends "...beauty alone can confer upon [man] a social character," and "The aesthetic state alone can make [society] real, because it consummates the will of the whole through the nature of the individual" (*L27 215*).

In Schiller, language reflects the alienated human condition and thought; ideality is opposed to reality, nature is opposed to civilization, and freedom is opposed to duty as language tends to present one-sided definitions as fragments. He offers a transformation of mankind's sense of values. Thus, an "easy" way to reform society which is "practical" and "realistic" might be difficult, impractical, and overly idealistic in Schiller's view. If we follow those terms and sense of values based on the common, fragmented definitions, since our actions accompany our language, according to Schiller, it will slow the development of human progress, and postpone reaching the end of the natural state and establishing the aesthetic state.

The *Letters* is, I hold, Schiller's "aesthetic mode of communication" with his readers. He claims:

Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the individual. All other forms of communication divide society, because they relate exclusively either to the private receptivity or to the private proficiency of its individual members, hence to that which distinguishes man from man; only the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is common to all. (L27 215)

When we dissolve the border in the definitions of terms, that is to say, synthesizing the opposing elements as in Schiller's definitions of ideality, reason, nature, beauty, and play, we finally start being free from the inconsistency of our dualism - our alienation. Critics who claim that Schiller lacks the ability to define his terms should recognize that he defines his terms in a deliberate, aesthetic manner - through a dialectical process involving form and matter.

Regarding the practicality of applying Schiller's concept of the aesthetic state through using the play drive, the reaction of many readers of the *Letters* is that this is not practical or realistic since Schiller does not show any clear method of how to perform play in real life. However, we should note that *one cannot be forced to play*. One cannot be forced to do that which does not come from one's inner life. There is no rule, method, or short cut to play since freedom is essential for play. As I discuss in Chapter 4.15 – Nature and Duty, the Good Samaritan figure, without a mental conflict between practice and principle, between freedom and regulation, was *playing* between the duality within himself when he helped the injured man. A beautiful soul or playful mind which makes

action and mind instantaneously one will be found only in such a harmonious individual.

Is Schiller's play realistic? From a one-sided or fragmented definition (A or B) of play, it is *unrealistic*, since realistic means focussing on material needs. However, from a united or *true* definition (C), play is *realistic*, and encompasses mental in addition to physical needs. From Schiller's point of view, the answer to the question reflects one's degree of alienation - as either a fragmented or a united personality. Until we start to play, we cannot convert the true meaning of real and ideal or false and truth. The *Letters* may be regarded as a mirror for each individual to search for wholeness by overcoming alienation. By reading the *Letters*, and deciding whether or not play is realistic, we are already starting our aesthetic education - the quest for wholeness.

To realize beauty in humanity, Schiller asks what realistic and true means, and shows that the poet's duty is to “*overcome the tendency of language to the universal through the greatness of his art and triumph over the matter* (words and their laws of inflection and construction) *through the form* (namely the application of the same)” (*Kallias* 526). Schiller's approach is to gain victory through language, and through this thesis, I claim that he won the battle to formulate the role and presence of ideal beauty in appearance.

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