THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY IN THE LAST THIRD OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
ABSTRACT OF THESIS

It is the thesis of this dissertation that the socio-political phenomenon, termed anti-Semitism, is not much older than the term itself and is not a mere continuation of the traditional Christian hostility toward the Jews. The latter constitutes only a necessary, but not sufficient cause. Profound changes effecting society as a whole, due to the coincidence of Germany's national unification under Prussian leadership with the onset of her rapid industrialization, gave rise to modern anti-Semitism.

The traditional hostility toward the Jews was primarily of a religious nature. In the seclusion of their European ghettos they turned into a pariah caste. By early assuming economic functions disdained by good Christians they were regarded in time as the driving element of the new economic system and were blamed for its disruptive effect on the old religious and social order.

The changing nature of the Jewish question was revealed during the constitutional debates of the North German Confederation (1866-1870) when the emancipation of the Jews became entangled in the conflict between those who wanted to retain the pre-industrial social order and those who proposed a new liberal order, with all its economic, political, legal, moral, and national implications.
The new phenomenon of anti-Semitism emerging in the 1870's derived its initial support from those social groups who were adversely affected by the coincidence of rapid industrialization, depression, *Kulturkampf* and liberal Federal legislation. Political anti-Semitism represented part of an organized social-conservative backlash, and was re-enforced by the rising integral nationalism. Jews were now seen and portrayed in new roles which were explicitly dissociated from their religious background. They were alleged to be the prime movers behind and thus responsible for the negative effects of all these simultaneous radical changes.
The Emergence of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany in the Last Third of the Nineteenth Century by
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Memorial University of Newfoundland, March, 1970.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AGSA  Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung
AMR  American Historical Review
BH  Business History
B.K.V  Bundesstaatlich Konstitutionelle Vereinigung
Fn.  Footnote
HJ  Historisches Jahrbuch
HZ  Historisches Zeitschrift
IRSH  International Review of Social History
JJS  Jewish Journal of Sociology
JMH  Journal of Modern History
JSS  Jewish Social Studies
N.Y.  New York
R.of P.  Review of Politics
U.P.  University Press
VSWG  Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
Chapter 1.
The Problem

Since anti-Semitism has attracted much attention, a paper on the subject requires some preliminary remarks. First of all, the word "anti-Semitism" is of modern origin. We shall not go into its etymology here. Most authorities allege that the term was first used only in 1879 by the German publicist, Wilhelm Marr. The word itself literally refers to hatred of Semites, but is most commonly understood and accepted as hatred of Jews. Actually, Marr introduced the concept of "Semitism" (Semitismus) in 1873, by which he meant a united movement or system of Semites whose "great mission" was "world domination". For Marr, "Semitism" was the rule by Semites which he equated with "Jewish Caesarism". Use of the word Semite and "Semitism" was preferable to Jew and Judaism to get across the idea that Jewry had to be combated not for religious reasons. The work in which this concept was first introduced was significantly entitled, The Victory of Jewry Over Germanity Considered From the Non-Confessional Standpoint (1873). Those who were opposed to that "Victory", and could no longer tolerate living under the domi-
ation of Semites and their system, became anti-Semites. This was clearly to be a secular struggle. All religious considerations had to be removed as they only confused the issues involved. The logical extension of this struggle would come with the creation of an organized political movement. "Political anti-Semitism", then, refers to the politically organized anti-Semitism which emerged in Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century. This phenomenon comes into existence at the same time as the new word, "anti-Semitism".

By no means are all writers in agreement concerning the significance of the new word. Some have viewed such a change as of little account, tending to project anti-Semitism back over the centuries and see hatred of the Jews as a kind of eternal hostility. Most students of Jewish history and anti-Semitism, however, feel that in the last third of the nineteenth century the traditional conflict which often marked relations between Jews and Gentiles was transformed into something new.

1 F. Lovsky, *Antisémitisme et Mystère d’Israël* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1955), p. 402, claims that political, economic, or social explanations of anti-Semitism have little value. Peoples are always against the Jews, and though the reasons vary, there is a basic continuity. Anti-Semitism, in his view, should be seen as less a prejudice and more as a "temptation". Like the sexual temptations correspond to a carnal reality and to a disequilibrium of man's instincts, so anti-Semitism inscribes itself as a spiritual reality where a disequilibrium of the conscience of peoples in the presence of Israel reveals itself. Anti-Semitism is the phantom inscribed in the obstinate heart of man concerning the mystery of Israel.

Of the two most recent accounts of political anti-Semitism in Germany after 1871, which accept this "transformation", neither really examines extensively the actual period of transformation.\(^1\) This paper seeks to fill something of a gap. It sets out to examine the period of transformation when an old antipathy became an organized political movement.

Of course, over the centuries there have been many different manifestations of hatred aimed at the Jews. There were the notorious Pogroms in Russia at the turn of the present century. The Dreyfus Affair in France was an example of a very different thing. There have been the infamous ritual-murder trials which have spread from as early as the thirteenth century up to the present day and in which the Jews have been accused of murdering some Christian according to demonic rites.\(^2\) Even recently (June, 1969) there was an outbreak of a kind of witch-hunt mania in Orleans, France, the object of which was the few Jewish merchants in Orleans.\(^3\) As with the investigation of any political phenomenon, however, the relevance of particular attitudes are only admissible when they have, in some form, been expressed and hence are verifiable.


\(^2\)See, for example, the recent works by Bernard Malanud, *The Fixer* (N.Y.: Dell, 1965) and Harry Golden, *A Little Girl is Dead* (N.Y.: Avon, 1965). The first is an account of Russian ritual-murder trials at the turn of this century, the second an account of the notorious Leo Frank lynching in Georgia. See also Norman Cohn, *Warrent For Genocide, The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967), pp.21-41.

The approaches which have been taken in an effort to understand anti-Semitism have varied greatly; so, too, have the results of these approaches. For the historian, the problem is compounded by a number of circumstances. Anti-Semitism is still very much alive and not part of the settled past. It lives as an issue about which everyone has feelings, more or less informed. How can an historian attempt a "sympathetic understanding" of such a phenomenon, when he knows it reached its ultimate conclusion in Auschwitz? One must steer a course between the Scylla of the apologist and the Charybdis of the polemicist. 1

The continuities involved in this subject make fixing precise chronological limits difficult, and, to some extent, arbitrary. By far the bulk of the paper, however, falls within the late 1860's and the 1870's. It was in the late 1860's that full legal emancipation of the Jews was carried out. Within a decade of the final removal of legal restrictions on the Jews, there grew up, first, a more widespread sentiment opposed to the Jews on various accounts and, then, political parties which sought to capitalize on that sentiment. The paper does not attempt to find any final answer to the causes of anti-Semitism. It merely attempts to show how it came to have some political potential.

The paper will begin by giving a brief account of the heritage of the past relations between the Jews and Gentiles in Germany. Here we shall not give the whole history of these

relations, only some of the salient features. Next there is a discussion of the struggle for the emancipation of the Jews. By emancipation here is meant the effort to remove legal and social discriminations placed on the person of the Jews. Particular attention has been placed on the discussions which led up to the final legal emancipation of the Jews in Germany (1866-1869). It was with those discussions that the nature and scope of the Jewish question made itself apparent. Next, is discussed the world in which the then fully emancipated Jews found themselves, and how, in short order, there grew up a sentiment in particular quarters which was hostile to the Jews on various accounts. By way of epilogue to this story, the paper ends with a brief account of the rise of political parties which sought to capitalize on the anti-Jewish sentiment.
Chapter 2

Heritage of the Past

Political anti-Semitism, emerging in the last third of the nineteenth century has numerous important links with the past. To fulfill the task set in the introduction, that of examining the period of transformation when an old antipathy develops into an organized political movement, some attempt must be made to review what may be termed the heritage of that past. This will provide a basis for evaluating the new elements which attach themselves to the ancient prejudices. One may judge, indeed, just how far and to what extent there were new elements at all. Also, a brief look at the past may help in answering the question, "why the Jews?"

We do not by any means propose to answer this question by giving a history of the Jewish people and the attitude of non-Jews toward them, from the destruction of the Jewish state (circa 70 A.D.) to the mid-nineteenth century. As the noted sociologist Karl Mannheim has rightly pointed out, it is always possible to find precursors for any idea. The value of tracing origins lies in helping to account for the total phenomenon. One cannot restrict oneself to studying either one side or the other; one must examine the relations between the Jews and the Germans. Here we shall concentrate on these relations and their salient and enduring effects.

The presence of Jews in Germany (Cologne) has been documented as early as 321 A.D. The Jews came to Europe as immigrants to the new world. To help visualize the nature of the relationship between Jew and Gentile at this point, one may suggest a comparison with the modern immigration of religious communities such as the Mennonites of Western Canada. The Jews came as aliens, and what must surprise us was how long afterward they continued to be considered alien.

What gave this alien character significance, re-enforced it, as well as causing it to be highly explosive from time to time, was that it was based on mutual and irreconcilable religious differences. With a background of such religious differences behind it, the Crusades in the eleventh and twelfth century, for example, were often marked by assaults on the Jewish communities throughout Europe. Apart from the very real physical violence carried out against the Jews, the Crusades had important and enduring effects. The Jews were made aware of their utter defenselessness. Hence, on the one

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1 H.G. Adler, Die Juden in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1950), p.21
4 Erich Kahler, The Jews Among the Nations (N.Y.: F.Ungar, 1967), pp.31–47, charges that "the vehement hostility of the Christian church was the basis of all subsequent anti-Semitism".
And, they turned to the ruler for protection, (at a price of course), while on the other, this same insecurity led them to turn to trades whose assets were more portable and less vulnerable to plunder, that is, they moved into trade in money. This process was expedited when, particularly in German lands, Christian guilds explicitly barred Jews from membership, and similar barriers existed for land-holding. By the thirteenth century "Jew" and money-lender had become synonymous. Here the Jews were anathematized by the Church whose laws forbade the collection of interest or usury. The Jews, not believing themselves to be subject to canon law, felt free to enter the business, and did so in part because few Christians would openly compete with them. This did little to endear them to the Church. The decline in the legal status of the Jews reached something of a culmination in the formation of compulsory ghettos in Europe by the fifteenth century.

The ghetto, which has been traced back to medieval times, was originally only a particular area of a city where Jews lived of their own accord. The physical persecutions of the Jews

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1 For a full examination of the legal position of the Jews in Germany during the Middle Ages see Otto Stobbe, Die Juden in Deutschland während des Mittelalters (Braunschweig: n.p., 1866), especially pp.19-46.

2 See John T. Noonan Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge: Harvard U.P.; 1957), pp.1-37, who traces the evolution of the prohibition on usury in Europe to 750 A.D., but especially to 1050, in the teachings of the Church. Incidentally, they were originally aimed at usury rather than the Jews.

carried out during the Crusades in an attempt to force baptism upon them, had led some Jews to commit suicide rather than comply.\(^1\) Religion was obviously taken quite seriously. Even compulsory ghettos must have seemed to the Jews a better fate than to be left wholly at the mercy of outsiders. Even so, these sanctuaries did not go unmolested when Christian clergy felt the occasion to carry out some crusade of their own.\(^2\) By the fifteenth century the Jews of Europe found themselves in ghettos and often forced to wear yellow badges, to signify their alien, "untouchable" character.\(^3\) Instead of a gradual reconciliation between Christians and Jews, there was a growing alienation.

No doubt, a full reconciliation, given the divergent claims on both sides, would have been difficult. On the Christian side there was the belief that the Jews had rejected the Messiah, while the Jews regarded themselves as the "chosen people".\(^4\) The pressure of persecution and the desire to resist it, resulted in the Jews’ turning inward. Their already pronounced exclusiveness and distinctiveness became more and more accentuated, and Christians seemed content to keep the Jews isolated and apart.

\(^1\) Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance*, pp.82-92.
\(^3\) The badge was apparently the idea of Pope Innocent III (1198-1216), and formed part of the legislation of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. It was enforced sporadically for centuries.
The latter took on the characteristics of a radical "caste" as described by Max Weber. This entailed, apart from stringent segregation, the further existence of an ethnic barrier. To Weber, the Jews represented "the most impressive historical example of a pariah nation (Pariahvolk)". This meant that the inequality of the Jews was effectively institutionalized. No longer did Christian and Jew in Europe meet on an equal footing, but strict segregation became the rule and all contact, save the most unavoidable sort, ceased. The growing distinctiveness of Jews from those among whom they dwelt was reflected in a widespread loss of fluency in languages other than their own. In Germany of the late eighteenth century we shall meet Moses Mendelssohn, who was regarded as something of a revolutionary by many fellow Jews because he suggested that Jews learn German.

The Jews living in German lands suffered there under sporadic persecutions, and from time to time even expulsions. Still, in German lands, the degree of local autonomy was itself providential, for this made it unlikely that a consistent and universal anti-Jewish policy could be carried out. In the more centralized England, the Jews were driven out in 1290 and the "traces left were inconsiderable". In 1394 they were driven from France, in 1492 from Spain, in the last of the great expulsions. These expulsions and persecutions uprooted

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the Jews further and emphasized their alien character. By comparison, in Germany "there was never any universal and concerted attempt to rid the entire country simultaneously of the unbelievers by legal process."¹

One would have thought with the coming of the Reformation and the return to the Bible, that new hope would be offered to the Jews. Certainly, Luther was willing to forgive the Jews all past transgressions, including forgiveness of deicide, (a charge frequently levelled at them), if only they would become Christians. After this, the Jews would then be accepted in the community as well. As he said, "we must welcome them in friendship, let them live and work with us, and they will be of one heart with us".² In view of the lengths to which the Jews had carried their religious attitudes, this could hardly have presented itself as an attractive offer. Needless to say, when Luther came to this conclusion he took a far from friendly attitude toward the Jews. The episode did highlight the significant fact, however, that measures taken against the Jews were virtually entirely based on religion, and that Baptism was a passport to acceptance. To put the matter simply, the Jews could have emancipation in return for assimilation.

Thus, the promise of the Reformation, such as it had been, passed from sight. Germany, indeed, alsonever achieved the territorial unity which the Reformation initially seemed to

¹Roth, "European Age in Jewish History to 1648," p.233.
offer, but fell within a century into greater disintegration than ever before through the ordeal of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This war not only dashed the possibility for unity, but brought religious issues radically to the fore. In their struggle for power (or survival) the churches, whether Lutheran, Calvinist, or Catholic, developed rigid canons of orthodoxy. In such an atmosphere it was hardly likely that the Jews would be treated well. Yet, to a very limited extent, the sheer devastation and physical exhaustion caused by the war, and the nature of the settlement which ended it, carried certain advantages for the Jews in Germany.¹

This peace settlement of 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia, saw German lands divided as never before. This made carrying out any universal persecution even more unlikely than hitherto. In addition, the petty courts now set up in imitation of Versailles required large sums to support their tastes, and found certain Jews useful as managers. These Jews, the court Jews, (Hofjuden), as they came to be called, came to form a kind of aristocracy among the Jews.² Moreover, they remained an important element in government life until the modern era when, "through the evolution of the modern method of floating loans the public crédit was...'democratized', and, in consequence,
the court Jew became superfluous.\(^1\) Of the numerous economic myths concerning the Jews to which later anti-Semites called attention, those based on the image of the court Jews were perhaps as important as the Shylock-usurer ones. For example, on the basis of the role which a select group of Jews played in numerous courts of various lands, there grew up the myth that they created the international monetary network. The later international financier was seen to be linked with this as well, and the epitome of the whole business was seen in the very name, Rothschild.\(^2\) No doubt Jewish economic activity was assisted by their international ties. But two other factors were of some importance as well. The position of the Jews within society had conditioned them for specific kinds of economic activity which could be useful to Christians. Also, no more satisfactory business partner could be imagined than one who lacked political rights.\(^3\) But the rise of the court Jews cannot be taken as an indication of the rise in status of the Jews as a whole.

The Century following the Peace of 1648 has been interpreted by the great Jewish historian, Heinrich Graetz, as one


of almost uninterrupted decline of the Jews: The former teachers of Europe, through the sad course of centuries, had become childish, or worse, dotards. Every public or historical act of the Jews bears this character of imbecility, if not contemptibility. There was not a single cheering event, hardly a person commanding respect who could worthily represent Judaism, and bring it into estimation.

This came from the pen of one ordinarily highly sympathetic to the Jews. The point, which must be made here, is the extent the division had grown between the Jews and those among whom they lived. There was an inequality which was so persistent and, indeed, obvious that it became conventional and institutionalized. No one, not even the friends of the Jews, disputed it. It was this fundamental inequality in general which was to form an important link with future forms of hatred of the Jews. At the beginning of the eighteenth century few would have doubted the inevitability of the relationship of Jew and Gentile. In the course of that "enlightened" century the very deplorable condition of the Jews came to engage the attention of philanthropists in all walks of life. The impulse to bring the Jews once more into the world of the living came initially from the Jews themselves.

Graetz goes so far as to say that the "rejuvenescence or renaissance of the Jewish race,...may be unhesitatingly ascribed to Moses Mendelssohn" (1728-1786). This, he felt, was especially noteworthy, inasmuch as Mendelssohn "almost doubted the capacity for rejuvenescence in his brethren". Mendelssohn was born into the world of the ghetto and through tireless effort succeeded in raising himself intellectually until he was a peer to the learned

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Heinrich Graetz, History of the Jews (Phil.: Jew. Soc. of America, 1895), V, p.199

Ibid., p.292
men of the age. He established what was to be a life-long friendship with the great German writer, G.E. Lessing (1729-1781). It was through such friendships that the cause of ameliorating the conditions of the Jews in Germany was furthered. Lessing, for example, in his play "Nathan the Wise" made a powerful plea for religious toleration. In Nathan, the leading character, we see a rich Jew in Jerusalem, who was keenly aware of the status conferred upon him by virtue of being Jewish, even in Jerusalem. Lessing invested Nathan with the attributes of human sympathy, as though consciously attempting to undermine the "Shylock" image. Nor was Lessing the only friend of Mendelssohn who consciously sought to see the lot of the Jews advanced.

Another friend was Christian Wilhelm Dohm (1751-1820), later a high government official in Prussia. Mendelssohn in 1781 had invited Dohm to submit a disputation on behalf of the Jews of Alsace to the Royal Council at Versailles. The Alsatian Jews had originally appealed to the highly reputed Mendelssohn for help in their oppression. The immediate cause of Dohm's writing his pamphlet was less important than the matters he soon turned to, for he decided to write upon the condition of Jews in Western and Central Europe in general.

What was particularly interesting about Dohm's approach was that it began by admitting the unwholesomeness of the Jews and their physical and moral degeneracy. Dohm sought to push

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1 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan der Weise (1779) in Gesammelte Werke, 11, (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1954), cf. his earlier, shorter play as well, Die Juden.
an "environmental thesis" which stated, in effect, that any people as oppressed as the Jews had been could not help, but be degenerate. The solution involved granting them equal rights with non-Jews and dispersing the Jews in all walks of life. The latter proposal was based on his belief that "the undesirable qualities of the Jews were largely due to their exclusive absorption in commerce..." And again, in 1783 he wrote

I believe that the problem of the moral and civic improvement of the Jews would completely disappear within fifty years if it were possible to turn the majority of Jews into farmers and artisans. The objections raised against Dohm's basic requests ranged from charges against the Jews for past religious atrocities (deicide) to present social-economic behaviour. Interestingly, the fear was expressed that any country which took the lead in pressing emancipation of the Jews, would soon be flooded by Jews from all over the world. Dohm answered this by saying emancipation would be followed with special immigration laws. This fear, as we will see later, was a recurrent one.

At this point Dohm was presenting a challenge both to powerful prejudices and social realities. The comment by Graetz may help us visualize what was at stake. "Must not this demand to treat Jews as equals have appeared to respectable Christians as a monstrous thing; as if the nobility had been asked to place themselves at the same table with their slaves?" In Berlin, for example, this was not completely true, for there

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2 Ibid., pp.224-228, for a concise summary of objections.
existed at the end of the eighteenth century there, a class of "monied-Jews". These included large Jewish bankers who had won influence at court. In addition, there were the famous Jewish salons where high society gathered for social and intellectual discussion.¹ In both these cases, it is true, the idea of the "equality" of the Jews was not necessarily involved. The sentiments which Dohm expressed did not fall only on unsympathetic ears, but made their way into the highest offices.

Kaiser Joseph II of Austria, in his famous Toleration Patents of the early 1780's, sought to put an end to discrimination based on religion. His has been called a "sincere if rather fierce philanthropy".² He seemed to accept Dohm's conviction that an important step in rehabilitating the Jews was to get them to engage (once again) in agriculture. He summed up his over-all aims in regard to the Jews as follows:

My chief aim is education, enlightenment and better training for this nation. The opening up of new sources of income, the repeal of the hateful constraints, the abolition of the insulting badges on clothes—all this, as well as rational education and the extinction of their language, will serve to weaken their own prejudices, and either will lead them to Christianity or improve their moral character and make them useful citizens.³

During his lifetime Joseph attempted to carry such aims into practise, but on his death many of the reforms fell into disuse.


Resistance to his reforms, it should be remembered, was noticable on both sides, the Gentile and the Jewish. The few advances toward the integration of the Jews into German society were so limited in their effect and stirred up such opposition, that there was little room for optimism for the future. The idea of equality was still just that, an idea which had no reality in a society which consisted of a plurality of estates with different legal status. Equality for the Jews would have meant equality with one of these estates.\(^1\)

With the coming of the French Revolution the reason for being of both this "estate society" and the position of the Jews within it, were challenged.

In France itself Count Mirabeau is said to have been the chief advocate of Jewish emancipation, though he was inspired in this by his visits to Germany. He wrote in 1787:

> If you wish the Jews to become better men and useful citizens, then banish every humiliating distinction, open to them every avenue of gaining a livelihood; instead of forbidding them agriculture, handicrafts, and the mechanical arts, encourage them to devote themselves to these occupations.\(^2\)

The links between this attitude and those expressed earlier by Dohm are quite clear. (They also are basic to the liberal conception of the Jewish question in the nineteenth century.) Emancipation was enacted in France by the National Assembly on 27 September, 1781. It was not just a part of the "Rights of Man" legislation, according to which one's liberty was

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\(^1\) Dr. C. F. Heman, *Die historische und religiöse Weltstellung der Juden und die modern Judenfrage* (Leipzig: Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1885), pp. 29-30.

not to be jeopardized because of religious belief, but a special law granting to the Jews the privileges of citizenship.¹ The cause of freeing the Jews from restrictions now became associated with the idea of Revolution, and anti-Semites after 1870 would look back and say that the Jews were the only ones to benefit by the Revolution.² Still, certain important restrictions on full freedom of movement and occupation were re-instituted for a period of ten years by Napoleon's decree of 17 March, 1808, "in the hope", according to the Emperor, "that by the end of that period, and by the enforcement of various regulations, no difference whatever would exist between the Jews and other citizens."³ For Napoleon emancipation of the Jews clearly was equivalent to their assimilation. This point should be kept in mind to avoid the over-simple idea that the French favoured emancipation completely, while the Germans opposed it. Such was not the case.

The "ideas of 1789" were not without precursors in Germany. Defeat and limited occupation by French armies meant coming to grips with these ideas as never before. In Germany, the new Confederation of the Rhine set up under the aegis of Napoleon, carried forward, such as it was, the emancipation of the Jews. In this there was little uniformity. Saxony, for example, continued to insist on collecting the poll tax (Leibzoll) on Jews up to 1813. Frankfurt a.M. only agreed to rescind its laws on

¹Graetz, History of the Jews, V, pp.447-448.
²See the bitter comments of the leading French anti-Semite of the Third Republic, Édouard Drumont, La France Juive (Paris: C.Marpon & Flammarion, 1886), I, p.vi.
the Jews (which went back to the Judenordnung of 1616) upon much pleading and the payment by the Jewish community of 440,000 Gulden. In other areas of Germany there was even greater resistance to granting emancipation, (in Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen, for example, only under occupation by the French), In terms of the future of the Jewish question in Germany, events in Prussia were of greater significance.

Prussia's ignominious defeat at the hands of Napoleon at Jena and Auerstäd in 1806 was the cause of a complete re-appraisal of the basis of her existence. At the very least, defeat imposed an "enforced acceleration" of a re-appraisal which was already under way. This was the era of reform in Prussia, the era which resounds with such names as Stein, Hardenburg, Humbolt, to name but a few. Both Stein and Hardenburg were faced in their turn with perilous economic conditions. Baron von Stein (1757-1831) wished to get rid of everything which had hitherto stood in the way of individual initiative. He believed in removing the older forms of economic and social life in so far as they stood in the way of the rejuvenation of the state. His most original and enduring reforms concerned the administration of cities and his Städteordnung of 1808. The full content of these ordinances

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1 Adler, Juden in Deutschland, pp.48-49.
3 Heinrich von Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, trans. E. and C.Paul, (London: Jarrold, 1915), 1, p.327. Treitschke, in spite of his reputation, is still the most interesting to read on the early nineteenth century of Germany, and though he has a bias, it is not a blind one.
cannot concern us here. However, they did leave the door open for the acquisition of civic rights by the Jews, though Stein admitted he was no friend of the Jews. According to these ordinances, rights within the city could be acquired even by "unreliables, soldiers, minors, and Jews" provided they could satisfy the economic or property qualification. (In passing we might note with whom the Jews were grouped.)

Prince Hardenburg (1750-1822) went even further than Stein in this matter. He was similarly faced with monumental economic tasks and in an effort to effect economic growth declared on 2 November, 1811, "freedom to work at trades", (Gewerbefreiheit). He had wanted to introduce "democratic principles into monarchical government", to bring the government into "harmony with the Zeitgeist". Perhaps the chief problem with both the Stein and Hardenburg reforms was that they really were in advance of the Zeitgeist, at any rate in Prussia. Loud, indeed, were the lamentations when on 11 March, 1812, Jews who adopted permanent family names and accepted the duty of military service became burghers and were granted civil rights, though they were forbidden entrance into state


2 Gewerbefreiheit or freedom to work at trades must be seen in contra distinction to the highly regulated guild system. Attempts to carry this into effect were resisted by artisans throughout the nineteenth century.

3 Ernst Klein, Von der Reform zur Restauration: Finanzpolitik und Reformgesetzgebung des preussischen Staatskanzlers Karl August von Hardenburg (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), passim.
In spite of this enactment, and in spite of the social prominence of the Jewish salon and Jewish intellectuals, social discrimination persisted, even in high Berlin circles. The tenuous nature of the legal emancipation of the Jews in most German lands was made apparent even before the last shots of the Napoleonic epoch had sounded.

In the wake of Napoleon there followed a great reaction which in German lands worked to the disadvantage of the Jews. Even the strenuous efforts made by Hardenburg and the great school reformer, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), to guarantee and universalize such rights that the Jews had won during the revolutionary period, in effect came to naught. They had attempted, in particular, to have Article 16 of the new constitution of the German Confederation of 1815 guarantee that there would be "no discrimination in the enjoyment of civil and political rights" because of religious belief, whether Christian or Jewish. This failed not only because there was no apparatus or sufficiently strong central authority to enforce it, but because even the principle of religious freedom, especially in the case of the Jews, was not accepted. Even the wording

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1 Treitschke, History of Germany, 1, pp.440-442, commented that the "feudal-minded" were especially outraged, but he saw, that "it was in these necessary social innovations that there was to be found the greatness of Hardenburg's reforms".

2 See, for example, the "christlich-deutsche Tischgesellschaft" founded by Achim von Arnim and his friend Brentano in 1811. Its orientation was opposition to Hardenburg and welcomed as members "officers, landowners, teachers and literateurs", and let join "no Jews, no French, and no Philistines". Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1964), 11, pp.237-238.

of Article 16, when looked at closely, revealed that the mere substitution of the word "by" for "in" (which had been insisted upon before the Article was accepted) destroyed even the spirit of the constitution. By this simple change, the article read that it guaranteed "the rights already granted the believers in the Jewish faith by the individual confederated state", instead of in the individual states. This now meant that even in theory the Confederation did not take upon itself the protection of the rights of Jewish citizens whose legal emancipation had been pushed through under duress by the French occupation, but only those which had voluntarily granted emancipation. Really only Prussia came under this latter category, so that almost at a single stroke the gains made by the Jews were annulled.¹ The mood of governments in the matter of removing legal discriminations against those of the Jewish faith was, if anything, exceeded by public opinion.

This opinion was imparted formed by a resentment that the Jews were being granted citizenship, or placed on an equal footing after centuries of institutionalized inequality. But there were new factors at work in shaping public opinion, apart from the age-old antipathies. Of particular significance here was the rise of nationalism. According to Zionism as it later developed, anti-Semitism was inevitable so long as the Jews had to live within other nation-states; the only possible solution to the Jewish question was the creation of a Jewish nation-

¹See, for example, Adler, Juden in Deutschland, pp.48-55.
state as well. To fully accept that "the nation-state was the birthplace of anti-Semitism" is to implicitly accept the Zionist interpretation of anti-Semitism, and to regard the Jewish question less as a social or political one, and more a national question. In passing, such a view depends on the assumption that hatred of the Jews has been a universal phenomenon, universal in the sense that the whole population rather than particular groups, did the hating. While this paper will attempt to show that in Germany at any rate, the Jewish question was much more than a nationality question, one must not neglect to consider the importance of nationalism in this context.

It is to the period of the French Revolution in particular that most writers trace the origins of nationalism in Germany. It was particularly after 1815 when a frustrated sense of nationalism might be witnessed, that attacks upon the Jews from a nationalist basis began, and has been usually referred to as the "new Teutonism". One of those who attempted to channel its forces against the Jews was the Berlin Professor of History, Friedrich Rühs. His demands ranged from suggesting


3 See, for example, Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States; The French and German Experience (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), especially p.119 ff. Cf. the excellent synthesis of W.M. Simon, Germany, A Brief History (N.Y.: Random House, 1966), pp.73-113, who warns against the over-simple idea of regarding nationalism in Germany as a negative response to French occupation alone.

curtailment of the political rights of the Jews, to re-
introduction of the medieval badge. Another advocate of
similar mind was the Heidelberg philosopher, J.F.Fries,
who would have had the Jews expelled from the country al-
together.

Apart from such purely literary diatribes, there was the
interesting case of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852) who was
instrumental in founding both the Turnerschaft (or gymnastic
associations) and Burschenschaft (Students' association). 2
These organizations had as their purpose, the spreading of
German nationalism. Jahn was more than a little eccentric and
at one point said that "Poles, the French, priests, Junkers,
and Jews" were Germany's misfortune. 3 Heinrich von Treitschke
(1834-1896), the nationalist historian, called Jahn a "crank"
and his followers "thoughtless", and emphasized that "the
Teutonist movement was restricted to the very young". 4 A
notable feature of the Turnerschaft and Burschenschaft, which
absorbed much of this "teutonism", was their opposition to the
Jews. In this they were not wholly at variance with the opinion
of most Germans of the time. Treitschke said of the period, that
almost all reasonable persons started from the principle
that mere residence in the country did not per se suffice
to justify a claim to full rights of citizenship; they
were willing to admit the Jews to equality in the domain

1 A brief summary is given in Graetz, History of the Jews,
V, pp.510-535.
2 See Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (London: Macmillan,
1965), pp.89-98.
3 Jahn quoted in Adler, Juden in Deutschland, p.56.
4 Treitschke, History of Germany, 111, pp.7-12.
of civil law, but not—or at any rate not yet—to complete equality in all other respects. Little sympathy was to be found, for example, when the Jews of Frankfurt, who had paid dearly for their emancipation, (440,000 Gulden), had that emancipation effectively revoked. Nor did the difficulties in which the Jews now found themselves end with the isolated case of Frankfurt.

After the murder of the "reactionary" journalist, August von Kotzebue in March, 1819, there were instigated the Carlsbad Decrees in July, the intent of which was to keep control of liberal and national ideas. Students looked to those responsible for the repression and fought back where they could. They saw Metternich's hand at work, and since he was safely out of reach, they attacked at first the Rothschilds whom they were convinced upheld the throne, and eventually attacked Jews in general. The great "Judenstürmen" of 1819 saw plundering, mistreatment in many cities throughout Germany, and even murder in Würzburg where the trouble began in the first place. Cries of "Hep! Hep!" resounded in the streets, a cry which became all too familiar later. In such circumstances there was little wonder that the question of the emancipation of the Jews, made little progress.

The period of the Restoration after 1815 provided evidence of the persistence of the basic inequalities, albeit

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1 Treitschke, History of Germany, III, p.47.
2 The initials of Hierosolyma est perdita, traditionally though not factually the anti-Jewish slogan of the Crusades.
3 For a recent study of the whole period see Eleonore Sterling, Judenhass; Die Anfänge des politische Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815-1850) (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1969), pp.171-174, has a useful chronical of overt acts directed against the Jews in the period.
now under somewhat of a nationalist pressure as well. This is not to say that all anti-Jewish sentiment in this period was motivated by some form of nationalism, or that there was even a consensus shared by opponents of the Jews. The new legitimist governments in the period of restoration, hardly bastions of nationalism, did not look favourably upon the Jews. The Provincial Diets of Prussia in the 1820's were unanimous in desiring to see even the feeble edict of 1812 dropped. The anger of the Diets, it has been said, was due to the activities of Jewish usurers and estate agents. The Prussian King did not wholly ignore all these complaints and he did formally forbid the entrance of Jews into academic and scholastic posts in Prussia in December, 1822.¹ In spite of the setbacks, however, the Jews in German lands made noteworthy advances in the period 1800-1848; this was part of what the great historian of the Jews, Simon Dubnow, called their "self-emancipation".²

Though politically and socially circumscribed, the advances made were quite real. In terms of population, there had been an increase to nearly 300,000 by 1850 from roughly 100,000 in 1800, much of which was a result of Jewish immigration from the east. In addition to immigration from non-German areas in the east, there was a great deal of "inner" migration, that is, migration between German states, as well. In Prussia in 1837, for example, there were 145,364 Jews of

¹Treitschke, History of Germany, IV, pp.151-155.
whom 101,152 lived in the east, in Bromberg, Posen and Oppeln and only 44,212 in greater Prussia. By 1847, of 208,000 Prussian Jews only 82,500 lived in the eastern areas, indicating a substantial movement, to the western, more advanced and prosperous areas.¹ The beginnings of industrialization offered new opportunities for the Jews, especially because the many restraints of the Jewish guild organs also broke down. There was now a chance for Jews to diversify outside of just "trade" (Handel) to industry and manufacture. Ownership of real estate and farming were still not real possibilities, and by mid-century in Germany were still so rare as to be virtually non-existent.² Though many remained small traders and dealers, it was in this period that a transition to larger enterprises began, to the stock exchange, to banking, as well as to training for the free professions.

Culturally the great writers Ludwig Börne, and Heinrich Heine emerged. Both were converts to Christianity and the latter often expressed his fate at being reviled by both Christians and Jews; the Christians because he had once been Jewish, and the Jews because he failed to remain so, and for failing to "draw the sword for their emancipation".³ In fact both Börne and Heine sought consciously to further the Jewish

¹Arthur Ruppin, Die Soziologie der Juden (Berlin: Jüdischen Verlag, 1930), 1, pp.158-159.
²Ibid., pp.318-319.
³Heinrich Heine, Briefe (Mainz: F.Kupferberg, 1949/50), 1, part ii, pp.146-148, Heinrich Heine to Moses Moser, 8 November, 1836. One feels he expressed his feelings toward Germany from abroad in his poem Adam der erste, which ends: Ich will mein volles Freiheitsrecht! Find ich die gringste Beschränkns, / Verwandelt sich mir das Paradies/ In Hölle und Gefängnis.
cause. Heine, outside Germany as well as outside of Judaism once remarked that only from Carthage could Rome be attacked.

Another famous convert, Karl Marx, went beyond demands for justice or liberty for the Jews; he "substituted for the plight of the Jew the plight of the proletariat".\(^1\) Those who hated the Jews often pointed to Marx and his fellow socialist of Jewish decent, Ferdinand Lassalle, as examples of the Jewish propensity to radicalism and their "decomposing" or "fermenting" effect. In a famous tract \textit{Zur Judenfrage} (1843) Marx set out his ideas on the Jewish question. Here he said that it was sheer egoism for the Jews to expect political emancipation since no one in Germany was politically emancipated.\(^2\) The substance of his message was that religious emancipation was dependent on political emancipation, and since the latter was impossible in bourgeois society, anything, but a complete break with that society, would be futile in so far as solving the Jewish question. To those who said the Jews had no right to expect full emancipation if they retained their religion, Marx said they could not expect it before a new age dawned.

Another publication prior to 1848 deserves attention as an example of how the left viewed the Jewish question at this point, both as a background to the events of 1848 and because many anti-Semites after 1870 looked back to it. \textit{Les Juifs, Rois}

\(^1\)Edmund Wilson, \textit{To the Finland Station} (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), p.307.

\(^2\)Karl Marx, \textit{Zur Judenfrage} (1843) Karl Marx--Friedrich Engels Werke (Berlin: Dietz-Verlag, 1969), I, p.347. This analysis of the Jewish question became fundamental to Marxian-socialism in the latter part of the century.
Le Epoque (1845) was the title of Alphonse Toussenel's (1803-1885) work. He considered himself a disciple of Charles Fourier, and sought a new revolution against what he felt to be a very real, though new, brand of feudalism: "L'Europe est enfeodee à la domination d'Israel...Jerusalem a imposte le tribut à tous les empires". He defined Jews thus: "I call those people by that name of scorn, Jew, all traffickers in money, all unproductive parasites, living from the substance and from the work of others. Jew, usurer, hawkers are synonymous to me." For him work (travail) was "the natural destiny of man" which capital oppressed. He ended with the imperative, "Mort au parasitisme! Guere aux Juifs!" Such purely literary attacks were swept aside by the events heralding the great revolution of 1848. This we shall examine in the next chapter.

In the period following 1848 the modern ideas of race and racialism were first introduced. The French aristocrat Comte Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), wrote his famous traise on the inherent, and as he said, the permanence, of the inequality of the human races. Though his own racialism was based on class rather than nationalist sentiment, his ideas added weight to the arguments of those who had said for so long, that race differences were indelible.

1 Cf. Marx, Zur Judenfrage, p.373, 377. "The emancipation of the Jews ultimately means the emancipation of humanity from Judaism...the social emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of society from Judaism", and again, "money is the passionate God of Israel."


3 For the semantics and a basic examination, see Louis L. Snyder, The Idea of Racialism ("Amvil Books"; N.Y.: Van Nostrand, 1962), especially pp.7-38.
differences were indelible.¹ Even at the time of Joseph II in the eighteenth century, many had been skeptical of ever "rehabilitating" the Jews. If one accepted the ideas of people such as Gobineau, he had "scientific" confirmation that this was so. As yet this idea did not win a wide currency, and even after 1870, not all those hostile to the Jews accepted them.

In the literature of the post 1848 period a good deal of anti-Jewish sentiment could be witnessed. The relation of this sentiment to the later political movement with a specific program based (in part) on a hatred of the Jews may not be direct, but a connection is not difficult to imagine, even if we regard it simply as popularizing that sentiment.² Neither of the two leading historical works on political anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany (1871-1918) mention the anti-Jewish sentiment expressed in German literature, though even the most obscure political or philosophical types are mentioned.³ The popular "image" of the Jews was not only a function of history, (both books also fail to relate the Jews in history to their problem as well), but of the interpretations given of the Jews by contemporaries, including novelists and playwrights. While in this period Gobineau's ideas would be esoteric, what popular artists

²No work that we know of has attempted to study German literature and its attitude toward the Jews, at any rate in a scholarly fashion.
³See Massing, Rehearsal For Destruction, passim, who neglects this side of the story completely, and Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, passim, who at least touches the matter through only with regard to Richard Wagner.
had to say was no doubt more widely known.

The composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883), for example, who was very much opposed to the Jews, has been called the only man after Karl Marx, who loomed as large as Bismarck in the age of Bismarck. Wagner sought to make his own averse ideas on the Jews popular, but with a limited success. His notorious article "Das Judentum in der Musik" (1850) emphasized the inability of the Jews to really comprehend German music because of their being alien. What he was doing was turning a personal feud with a Jewish music critic which went back some ten years, into a condemnation of all Jews. There was the suggestion in Wagner, that a nation was such an exclusive body that no outsiders could really hope to penetrate it in depth. With regard to the Jews, he was accepting the work of history and, at the same time, alleging that by that very reason the Jews would always be unacceptable as Germans. He personally refused to support the anti-Semitic political movement which began in the early 1880's, but he lent a certain respectability and form of rationale to hatred of the Jews.

\[1\] Köhn, Mind of Germany, p.189.

\[2\] Richard Wagner, My Life (N.Y.: Dodd Mead, 1931), p.565, commented on the stir, nay the genuine consternation, created by this article defies comparison with any other similar publication. The unparalleled animosity with which, even up to the present day, I have been pursued by the entire press of Europe can only be understood...when it is...remembered that almost all the newspapers of Europe are in the hands of Jews.


\[4\] Ibid., p.333, Richard Wagner to Angelo Neumann, 23 February, 1881, "Der gegenwärtigen antisemitischen Bewegung stehe ich vollständig fern."
The famous novelist, Gustav Freytag (1816-1895), echoed sentiments which found the Jews unacceptable as well, though for slightly different reasons than Wagner. Freytag wrote perhaps his most famous work, *Soll und Haben* (1855) in the period of the "social novel" in German literary history. Freytag himself has been described as a "conservative liberal" and sat briefly as a liberal (1867) in the Reichstag. As a politician he was most opposed to the nobility "yet as a novelist who wanted to gain a wider circle, he depicted merely the weaknesses of the aristocracy, but the vices of the Jews".

In *Soll und Haben* the Jewish merchant was seen without any code of honour, and in contrast to the Christian merchant, no honest representative of productive capital, but a dishonest representative of rapacious capital. In all comparisons between Jew and Christian, the former invariably came off worse.

In another novelist's most famous work, Wilhelm Raabe's (1831-1910) *Der Hungerpastor* (1864), a contrast was presented between Christian and Jewish intellectuals. The latter shared the same characteristics basically as the Jewish merchants. They were cunning, rapacious and greedy, though now for knowledge. The Jew desired knowledge (unlike the Christian) not

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for itself, but as a means to another end, namely domination. Of the two leading characters, one Jewish and one Christian, the former ultimately hungered for worldly goods, achieved that aim and was corrupted, while the latter (who was, moreover, a theologian) hungered only for spiritual goods. Some writers have emphasized that the peculiar social ethic of the Jews resulted from their religion playing a more important role in their economic life; it was more immediate to them, and their religious leaders stressed success in the world more than did the Christian leaders. Wagner, Freytag, and Raabe are interesting examples of the reception accorded the Jews as they emerged from centuries of institutionalized inequality. They not only showed their own awareness of this basic inequality, but gave arguments for its continuing and made such arguments popular. They provide concrete evidence that prior to the 1866 constitutional debates there was still a great deal of popular antipathy to the Jews.

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1Bramsted, Aristocracy and the Middle Classes in Germany, pp.121-149, Wilhelm Raabe, Der Hungerpastor, Werke (Freiburg: im Breisgau: H.Klemm, 1955), pp.37-40.

2See, for example, Werner Sombart, Der Bourgeois (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1913), pp.299-302.

3An early "Zionist" in this period, the famous socialist Moses Hess, thought one had to face the fact that the Jews formed a distinct nation and hence needed a state as well. With the successful unification of Italy, and the "last nationality question" of the Jews had now to be faced. See his Rom und Jerusalem, die letzte Nationalitätsfrage (1869) in Ausgewählte Schriften (Cologne: Joseph Melzer, 1962), pp.221-320.
Chapter III

The Struggle For Emancipation (1847-1870)

The events of 1848 mark a turning point in German history and the Jewish question in Germany. It was in the course of the revolution that a concerted attempt to enact the legal emancipation of the Jews in Germany could be witnessed.

In an important prelude, the 1847 meeting of the United Prussian Landtag, the Jewish question had been raised. The debates which took place then with regard to Jewish question, can be characterized as more than a little obscure with regard to the actual legal issues involved. Indeed, the debates concerning the legal and constitutional position of the Jews continued to be confused and confusing down to the foundation of the Empire in 1870. This happened partly because in law the Jews were defined by their religious practice, and if one opposed removal of legal restrictions on them, he had to appear as one who sought to limit religious toleration. The matter was further confused when those who sought retention of existing law had to justify themselves with reference to the theory of the Christian state, while those who sought change did so in the name of the rights of man. There was consequently little facing up to the real political questions involved. The young Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), in advocating retention of restrictions against the Jews to the Landtag, relied only in
part on the theory of the Christian state.

He expressed one of the real political issues involved when he claimed, that while he was no enemy of the Jews and would agree to their being granted all rights, his one exception was that "In a Christian state" Jews ought not to be permitted to hold official office. Aside from this, he also warned that Prussia ought not to improve the conditions of the Jews too much, for it would then become too great an "attraction for the millions of Russian Jews"—they would see Prussia as "an Eldorado".\(^1\) Bismarck was not without predecessors in his fears, as we have seen already. In fact, he expressed here a traditional fear of those living in eastern Germany, that of inundation by Ostjuden and, or, Poles. The Landtag itself accomplished little with regard to the Jews. Its fate became interrupted by the revolution spreading from France.

The fortunes of the Jews in Germany and the revolution of 1848 had both negative and positive aspects. On the one hand some Jews were bodily attacked, while on the other, sincere attempts were made to carry through their full emancipation; in some areas, particularly the cities, some Jews were in the vanguard of the revolution, while in certain rural areas they sometimes became its victims. The Jews in Germany by 1848 were far less a homogeneous group than at the beginning of the century. Consequently, the treatment they received tended to vary accordingly. Even within Prussian cities, for example,

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there were great differentiations; Jews living in Berlin were at the top of the scale, socially, economically, and culturally, while those to the east, in Posen, were not nearly so well off.¹

News of the revolution of February in France spread to Germany where it precipitated sporadic incidents of open violence. The attacks on the Jews in 1848 primarily took place in rural areas in south west Germany in the form of spontaneous and unorganized peasant _jacqueries._² The motives in attacking the Jews were not simply attributable to latent anti-Semitism. Jews rather found themselves under fire because of the economic functions they were then performing in these areas. The violence that broke out in Baden, for example, was aimed primarily at the nobility, many of whose agents were Jews. In addition, peasants had had to borrow heavily from Jewish money-lenders in the period 1845-1847, which had been disastrous years for agriculture.³ The immediate aim of the uprisings was the destruction of records of peasant dues, duties, and debts, suggesting comparisons with 1789 in France. Other areas experienced outbursts against the Jews,


in Mühlheim, for example, houses of the Jews were burnt and plundered and some three hundred Jews were driven to exile in Basel, Switzerland.\(^1\) Persecution of the Jews also marked events in Electoral Hesse.

In Hesse Jews had won absolute legal equality in 1833, and in that respect Hesse was considerably ahead of other German lands. This equality had been granted by the Prince-ruler. The unrestricted opportunities thereby presented to the Jews, however, were not favourably received by the population as a whole. The result was that Hesse became an area animated with oppositions to the Jews. This resentment was fused with economic complaints, and in 1848 the lands of Hesse witnessed persecution of the large landowners and with them, the Jews.\(^2\) The slogan of down with "Junkers und Juden" was utilized in Hesse in the 1880's to elect the first Reichstag deputy (Otto Boeckel) who ran on an overtly anti-Semitic program. In Frankfurt many adversaries of emancipating the Jews were master artisans, and a petition drawn up on 3 March, 1848, signed by many citizens began: "the most important question in the eyes of the citizens of Frankfurt concerns the equality accorded to the Jews".\(^3\) Thus, even the city which was to host the great debates of the Paulskirche was itself not undisturbed by a


\(^3\) Quoted in Droz, *Revolutions Allemandes*, p.163. It should be kept in mind that the Jews took a leading role in the revolution at some points, see Adolf Kober, "Jews in the Revolution on 1848 in Germany," *JSS* vol. X, #2 (1948), pp.135-164.
"very strong" sentiment against the Jews. On the negative side, then, the Jews had suffered in the initial days of 1848. This must be kept in mind because so often 1812 and 1848 are looked upon as the dates when Jews in Germany were emancipated with virtual unanimity and no dissenting voices.

Legal restrictions on the Jews were removed and reasserted, then partially removed again, on so many occasions that there was a great difficulty in saying with certainty just what the legal position of the Jews was at any particular time. This was further complicated by variations from state to state, and even from city to city. Considerations of the legal status of the Jews now took place once again, at the Frankfurt National Assembly which began meeting 18 May, 1848. Five Jews (one baptized) actually attended the Assembly, including the already famous advocate of Jewish emancipation, Gabriel Riesser (1806-1863). He was elected as second Vice President by a large majority, suggesting an absence of prejudice against the Jews there. The preceding "Vorparlament" (20 March to 3 April, 1848) had expressed interest in introducing the principle of religious freedom, though non-Christian religions do not appear to have been specifically mentioned. The Assembly now had to face such delicate questions because it wished to introduce into the new constitution it was to draw up a section on "Basic rights"

1 Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, 1, p.374.
of individual rights was a relevant experience to the men of 1848.

Debate on the Jewish question occurred within the context of abolishing religious requirements for civil rights. The little opposition expressed consisted of arguments based on the harmful economic behaviour of the Jews as usurers. Riesser, who took upon himself a response on behalf of the Jews, denied such arguments. He admitted that a wide gulf separated Germans from Jews, but said that an eventual end to that separation would come only with the end of restrictions on the Jews. He felt that removal, for instance, of the condition which insisted that all children from mixed marriages be brought up as Christians would lead to greater inter-marriage. He realized, with other supporters of the Jewish cause at the time, that granting of legal rights was only the beginning of a process which must go ahead for many years before all Germans would treat their Jewish co-citizens on terms of equality.²

¹Cf. Erich Marcks, "1848," Männer und Zeiten, Aufsätze und Reden zur neueren Geschichte (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1911), pp.199-243, especially p.222. For an opposing view see Simon, Germany, pp.151-173, "the failure lay in the circumstances of the time, and not in any dilatoriness of an assembly".

One should keep in mind that this Assembly, which was about to grant full legal emancipation to the Jews in all German lands, was dedicated to achieving German unity. Here much nationalism was in evidence, but it was still a nationalism tempered by liberalism. No one there seems to have expressed the idea that the Jews should be excluded from full rights of citizenship on nationalist grounds. In the brief debate on the Jewish question, Catholics were particularly disposed to Jewish emancipation, suggesting a contrast with France, and apparently contradicting the usual charge of Catholic hatred of the Jews. Article 5 of the new constitution was explicit in declaring full religious freedom to "every German", guaranteeing no restrictions because of religious practice. One of the subsections (#149) went so far as to adjust the form of the oath to "so wahr mir Gott helfe" (so help me God), to make it inoffensive to non-Christian, specifically to Jewish, Citizens.

Unfortunately, the favourable resolve of the Assembly on the Jewish question, like the work of the Assembly as a whole, was annulled with the success of the counter-revolution in 1849 and the reaction which followed. The constitution was designed as a German Imperial one, and with the reversion to the pre-1848 system of particularism, the constitution became a dead letter. The old German Confederation started up once again, and its

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Federal Diet formally declared the Grundrechte null and void. Legally, therefore, the situation for the Jews returned to its pre-1848 status. The experiences of 1848, however, must be viewed as a period which provided new and powerful advocates of Jewish emancipation. In many important respects the counter-revolution, its success notwithstanding, did not simply mean reversion to the pre-1848 days.1

The "imposed" constitution of 31 January, 1850 in Prussia showed that in some respects the spirit of liberalism was not to be avoided. It made many important concessions (if not the essential ones) to the spirit of liberalism, such as equality before the law, and because it granted sufficient control over the budget to the houses of representation, made possible the constitutional crisis of the 1860's. The articles of the Prussian constitution on religious matters, hence the Jewish question, were fairly vague. By stating that the institutions of the state were to be based on the Christian religion, (Article 14), it meant that Jews could not become teachers, judges, or any sort of official.2

Quite apart from the official prejudice built into the constitution with regard to non-Christians, there were the well-known administrative means of avoiding treating the Jews with equality. It was an accepted fact, for example, that even after 1870 the officer corps and reserve officer corps were

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2 Dürig & Rudolf, Texte z.d. Verfassungsgeschichte, Articles 12-18 Verfassungs-Urkunde für den preussischen Staat, 1 January, 1850, pp.92-93.
not open to Jews, or to "social misfits or young men with unorthodox political views", (an interesting grouping).\(^1\)

The revolutionary character and the advance thinking of the Frankfurt Assembly could be seen with regard to its treatment of the Jewish question.

The period following 1848 was not the period to look for removal of legal restrictions on the Jews. In order to discuss such a matter, constitutional considerations would have been involved. No one in high office could consider revising the constitution in this period. Questions of internal sovereignty were simply not open to debate. Hence, no uniform laws could be brought in or restrictions removed until the prevailing situations changed sufficiently to necessitate new constitutional discussions. Before this would happen some years had to pass, to 1866 and the founding of the North German Confederation, to 1870/71 and the founding of the Second Reich.

The year 1866 in German history has been likened to the peripety in a great drama, with the years that followed providing the solutions.\(^2\) The formation in that year, of the North German Confederation was precisely the event needed to provoke new constitutional discussion. It is essential to take a closer look at that discussion, particularly those which concerned the

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Jewish question. First of all, this matter has been completely neglected heretofore. There exist, in spite of this, a whole series of statements which need revision. A more detailed examination should help one to understand the scope of the Jewish question at the beginning of the new Reich in 1870. The constitution worked out by the North German Confederation eventually became the basis of the German Federal Constitution of 1871. As an introduction to the constitutional discussions after 1866 we must first view briefly the political parties involved and the new assembly, the Reichstag, in which the discussions took place.

Political parties had existed in rough and rather unorganized form before 1866, and even in 1866 they still had not emerged in the form they would have after 1870. But this is a point we shall later discuss to a greater extent. Bismarck had instructed that the new assembly was to be elected on direct and equal manhood suffrage. From the outset there was a multi-party system and no single party won a majority. The National Liberal party led with 79 members, the left-liberals or Progressives had 19, and there were some 40 various other liberals who would support liberal proposals out of the 297 seat Reichstag. On the right, the Conservatives won 59 seats and the more moderate Free Conservatives, 40.

Anyone who reads through the debates over a period of time will be impressed by several things: the high calibre of the discussion, the desire to at least discuss uncomfortable issues,

the very real power of the Reichstag to get things done, even though Bismarck could retain his position as Chancellor (in theory) by keeping the confidence of the king. Max Weber's bitter comments on the fruitlessness of discussion in the Reichstag and the attraction of a poor quality of deputy were unsupported in many points. One only has to remember the lengths to which Bismarck later went to retain the support of the Reichstag. The constitution which was presented for deliberation in 1867 had been broadly outlined by Bismarck and was "the embodiment of his political aims and desires."²

From the outset there was a clear consciousness of the importance of the task being undertaken and especial attention centered on the "German question", that is, the ultimate form of the Confederation. There were clearly few rigid party lines, and differences were often radical between members of the same party.³ The fourteenth sitting (18 March, 1867) witnessed the initial broaching of the religious question as part of settling the Grundrechte. The initial proposal referring primarily to non-discrimination against Catholics in confederate states was

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² Erich Eyck, Bismarck; Leben und Werke (Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch, 1943), 11, p.327.
³ North German Confederation, Konstituierender Reichstag Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Norddeutschen Bund im Jahr 1867 (Berlin: 1867), I, pp.112-116. See, for example, Johannes Miquel and Otto Michaelis, both prominent liberals. Henceforth cited as Konst.Reich.Steno. Berichte, with appropriate dates. Throughout the paper, basic biographical and party affiliation has been gleaned from the very valuable Max Schwarz, MdR Biographisches Handbuch der Reichstag (Hannover: Verlag für Literature und Zeitgeschshen, 1965), passim.
proposed by the Free Conservatives. The National Liberals emphasized the importance of complete freedom of movement and introduced a petition from Mecklenburg "to extend civil rights to the Jews". The petition maintained that in Mecklenburg the Jews could not acquire real estate, win civil rights, or even settle in Rostock and Wismar (they could only remain in the latter cities for twenty-four hours). They asked for complete equality and the common rights of a native. The very first petition ever to be presented to the Reichstag was one from the executive committees of the 412 synagogues in North Germany, which expressed a desire to remove all legal restrictions against the Jews and to grant to "every German" full freedom of religion and conscience.¹

The Progressive deputy from Rostock, Moritz Wiggers (1816-1894), though elected from Berlin, then entered the debate and became perhaps the single greatest fighter for the rights of the Jews in Mecklenburg and North Germany as a whole. He pointed out that religious discrimination was rife in Mecklenburg, and even the Catholic and Reformed Church, as compared with the Evangelical-Lutheran Church, to which he belonged, was at a disadvantage in the competition for such things as government positions. He indicated, in other words, that public affairs were generally backward there, and within that context one must see the legal restrictions upon the Jews there. The persistence of actual restrictions could be witnessed in certain areas in Prussia just prior to 1866, as well as Meck-

¹Text of the petitions may be found in Konst.Reich.Steno. Berichte, 11, pp.27-37, and the debate in 1, p.257.
lenburg, and anti-Jewish sentiment in rural areas particularly was cultivated by a few Conservatives at election time.¹ Wiggers proceeded to outline to the Reichstag the history of the Jews and their struggle for emancipation in Germany. He showed that in many areas Jews could not own land, and even to carry on a trade had innumerable incumbrances because of an over-elaborate permit system. He sought to answer those who would object to removal of legal restrictions on the Jews by pointing out the useful economic functions the Jews could perform once legally emancipated. The eminent jurist, Karl Braun (N.L. 1822-1893), pointed to the anomaly that a Jew coming from France could buy property in Mecklenburg, while a native Jew could not, not even if he were the richest in Prussia. Moreover, he maintained that there was a fundamental incompatibility between the constitution in Mecklenburg and the one proposed by the Confederation. Here the question of jurisdiction was raised, always a fundamental issue to a confederate system, and one in which the Jewish question became embroiled. As yet, it did not break out into the open, but the question was there. What were the spheres of jurisdiction between the central authority and the individual members? The immediate answer to

¹See Eugene N. Anderson, The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia 1858-1864 (N.Y.: Octagon Books, 1968), p.280, 375-8. At Bromberg in October, 1862 Conservatives claimed "the Progressives were worse than all Frenchmen, for they wish to abolish all religion and even grant all sorts of rights to Jews," and from Elbing the report was circulated "that if the Progressive party won the election (1862), Prussia would be partitioned within a year; the French would receive one part, the Russians another, and the Jews the third". On Bromberg see Klaus Rehfeld, Die preussische Verwaltung des Regierungsbezirks Bromberg 1848-1871 (Cologne: Bota, 1968), pp.17-31.
the challenge, denied that the federal Reichstag had any business in touching upon the internal affairs of Mecklenburg, or any other confederate state. One of the decisions we shall have to make was how far such an attitude could be called anti-Jewish, how far the desire to preserve states-rights was legitimate as opposed to a smoke-screen behind which could be retained all the old prejudices and practices.

As with all such questions, the answer was not completely one or the other, but from an extensive examination of the daily Reichstag debates over a period of years, we should say that states-rights, or to give this its more derisive title, particularism, was a legitimate position and cannot be regarded as implicit anti-Semitism. We can say that even though in many cases, as we shall see, those who favoured states-rights were implicitly condoning the continuation of very real restrictions upon the Jews. The nature of the issues were of such a fundamental character that they could not be dropped easily, in spite of, rather than because of, the involvement of the fate of the Jews. The initial attempt to introduce full freedom of religion, which would have emancipated the Jews en passant, failed to win sufficient support.

It was not without accident that members of the Reichstag from the notorious "particularist" state of Hanover attempted to side-step the "inconvenient" fact that advocates of states-rights had to appear even implicitly as defenders of restrictions on the Jews. On 20 March, 1867, Baron Ernst von Hammerstein (B.K.V.)

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from Hanover pointed out that actually Jews in Mecklenburg had never been citizens and would have to remain so unless the constitution expressly cleared up the matter. The National Liberal, Otto Michaelis (1826-1890) claimed that unless "certain categories of people" such as travelling artisans and especially the Jews, "who are not even citizens", have the numerous regulations repealed on their person, any idea of freedom of movement was "completely illusory". A representative from Saxony wanted to keep Saxony's name out of the whole business when he said that the native Jews had the same rights in Saxony as followers of other religions and the only restrictions there applied to "foreign Jews". This restriction consisted of forcing the latter when first coming to Saxony to settle first in Leipzig and Dresden. Once again the representative of the executive power interjected to reassure all that the individuals state's laws would not be tampered with. This was nothing less than a challenge to the liberal idea of "Rechtseinheit".

This was a challenge which the famous National Liberal and Jewish member Eduard Lasker (1829-1884) was prepared to take up immediately. The following day he emphasized the need to have at least a minimum "Grundrechte" which crossed the borders of all confederate states. This would ensure freedom of person and residence. Knowing full well the threat implicit in

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2 Literally "Legal Unity", for a full account see Rudolf von Gneist, Der Rechtsstaat und die Verwaltungsgerichte in Deutschland (1879) (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), pp.1-37, 65 ff.
such a proposal to proponents of states-rights, he expressly denied that he wished to encroach upon local rights. He would not even look for such potentially controversial and dangerous rights as freedom of assembly and press, but claimed an interest only in "personal rights." Other National Liberals tried to kill the demand that this "minimalist" position be expanded as the Free Conservatives advocated because they saw the minimal proposal of Lasker offered the only hope for a compromise. More skeptical members felt that both were deluding themselves since the Reichstag was there to decide really only whether the proposed constitution would stand with or without amendments. The Conservative leader, Hermann Wagener (1815-1899), thought talk of "Grundrechte" devoid "of any practical content" and therefore opposed the idea. Wagener later helped found the Christian Social Worker's (anti-Semitic) Party (1878). He had pessimistically observed earlier that the masses only worried about two things, "their heart (religion) and their stomach (that is, all that one today places under the name of the social question)." We shall see later that the Jewish question came to fit the prescription of an issue which embraced both "heart" and "stomach." At the moment, other prominent Liberals came forward to re-enforce Lasker's stand.

Another famous National Liberal jurist, C.M. von Schwerin

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3 Konst. Reich. Steno. Berichte, 1, p. 120, 9 Sitting, 9 March, 1867.
(1804-1872), wished to have the Grundrechte make the Reichstag into an arbitrator of disputes, "a protector of the security of the German people", particularly in the light of Prussia's dominance of the upper house (Bundestag).\(^1\) This point was further emphasized by the well-known Progressive, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808-1883). In debate representatives of the executive denied not only the practicality, but even the need of such formal guarantees. The latter emphasized that the law ought not to be the carrier of a national idea, but the protector of the individual states. Too much centralization would repel rather than attract the southern states, and the "federative element" of the proposed constitution was the only hope of unity for all Germany. The left generally, which had already expressed fears of "unity" cancelling out "liberty", were here challenged directly with a play on their desires for national unity. For the moment the proposed basic rights were defeated. What was unfortunate, so far as the Jews as a whole were concerned, were the extraordinarily explosive issues with which their fate became entangled.

Immediately, however, a new tack was proposed by the National Liberal and jurist from Mecklenburg, F.W. Prosch (1802-1876). Instead of attempting to present the Jewish question as part of a general principle he attempted to confront the Reichstag with the reality of the unique situation of the Jews, and sought to liberate the Jews without offending anyone's sense of particularism. Prosch expressly aimed at having a proposal

accepted, that full civil rights be extended to the practitioners of the Jewish faith and that it was false to maintain that "religious-moral" matters were an area of autonomy of the individual states. He alleged that the matter he proposed did not touch the "sovereign rights" of the churches, but was demanded by the "principle of humanity of the times" in redress of "the obvious great burdens which those of the Jewish faith must bear over the whole land". Their "great inequality" had to be ended in all respects if they were to be made equal to the followers of the Christian faith. To those who put their faith "in the power of toleration" he said that far too much stood in the way of its realization, such as in the case of the laws of Mecklenburg; a good will, or even the best will would not be enough to break stubborn resistance. His speech was not very well received. The negative response came from all sides of the house, and particularly from an unlikely source, the Jewish member, Eduard Lasker.

Lasker himself was always a very vocal member of the house and attracted a great deal of attention. His close relations with Bismarck and his advocacy of liberal economic policies won him great attention by those hostile to the Jews after 1870. In the debates at hand Lasker came forward as a self-styled representative of German Jewry. He expressed his thanks to Dr. Frosch for proposing his amendment and for showing concern for the human condition. But, he said, "I think I more correctly judge the disposition of the Jews when I say, that they desire

1Könst.Reich.Steno.Berichte, I, pp.312-313, 17 Sitting, 21 March, 1867,
no special legislation;...it does not suit our position and not our striving that the Jews be entitled to a special law". Lasker's response had been brief and to the point, and no one else spoke on the matter. Thus it failed to pass.¹ On first reading, then, the legal position of the Jews remained unchanged.

Not until mid-April, 1867 when the constitution as a whole was once more read through, did an opportunity really arise to take up these questions again. Once more it was brought up by a National Liberal from Mecklenburg, a lawyer and notary, Otto Wachenhusen (1819-1889). His proposal which stated that in no confederate state should rights be withheld on account of religious belief or practice was doomed to failure. A Free Conservative member for Düsseldorf, F.J.Kratz (1809-1875), noted that Wachenhusen rightly saw this as a chance to liberate the Jews, and that the Confederation ought to correct an immoral situation wherein "a ruling religion" dominated. He knew very well the chances such a proposal had of passing, and suggested that a determined stand by the Reichstag might induce such states as Mecklenburg of its own will to change its laws. The hope expressed here of side-stepping all objections and employing a moral suasion approach also came to naught.² At the closing sitting on 17 April, 1867 the king expressed his satisfaction that the constitution was a federative one and left each member state quite free. This, he felt, held out considerable hope for the eventual union with the "brothers" to the south. The constitution was approved and

² Ibid.
passed, leaving not a few loose ends to be worked out during the meetings of the now constituted North German Confederation which began meeting in the early part of September, 1867.

The initial sittings sought to resolve some of these loose ends. Those of relevance to the Jewish question alone will concern us here. Wiggers, for example, wanted to have full freedom of movement and dropping of the passport system for internal movement, but this was defeated by those who claimed that it ensured order in the state. The discussion of mid-October, 1867 on the subject of "interest" is worthy of attention. Lasker had proposed removing all restrictions on interest rates, and came up against the opposition of several prominent Conservatives. The first, Gustav von Saltzwedell (1808-1897) a Prussian landowner, complained about the effect such a proposal would have for "usurers" and "swindlers", and in the interest of agriculture he claimed could not be permitted to pass. Herman Wagener also strenuously opposed the proposal for he said he stood against "mobile credit and usury" because they ultimately led to great swindles. Moreover, the power of money which was behind the development of German industry must be stopped. According to Wagener this capital plus universal suffrage for the masses produced the "crisis of our times". He therefore advocated strong control over money matters and reinforcement rather than dissolution of the laws on usury. Otherwise, the "cultural conditions" would continue to decline under the pressure of "money-capital".1

The liberals present were quick to notice that Wagener had introduced the "unfortunate idea" of "the domination of capital over work, particularly the domination of mobile capital over landed capital", and how he had seen this mobile capital "in conflict with the old culture." For Schulze-Delitzsch, "to conduct a war against mobile capital", which played such a great role in the times, was "to fail to recognize the primary conditions of modern development". This development had already, in part, caused a liberation from feudalism, in the political as well as in the economic sphere, and its continued existence was necessary to break the hold of the knightly class. Lasker pointed out that, precisely for these last reasons, Wagener so strenuously fought mobile capital. Lasker's friend, Dr. Braun was upset that Wagener implied that "money-capital would become the absolute power". Braun, like all the liberals, felt that the higher "economic interests of the nation" were at stake and the interests of particular sectors of the economy had to serve that higher aim. With a dissertation on the necessities of capital he opposed Wagener's quote from the French socialist Proudhon that "only work (Arbeit) is productive".

To an extraordinary degree, the issues raised here and the historical identification of the Jews with usury, mobile capital, 

and liberal policies, together anticipated the arguments of political anti-Semites in the seventies and eighties. The associations, which Wagener in particular verbalized, were to grow. The social question, which grew out of the development of modern industrial society in urban areas and the crises which threatened agriculture from time to time in rural areas, was this early linked up with activities characteristic of the Jews, though, of course, not monopolized by them. Indications existed, even then, of the suitability of the Jewish question as an issue which might have very meaningful political implications and utility.

Wagener himself had already begun to show concern for the social groups who would later see a solution to their problems in following political parties overtly anti-Semitic, particularly the peasants and the artisans. He had always been concerned that "the right" not be looked upon as defending such things as absolutism and bureaucracy and appearing to have the notorious reactionary Nicholas I of Russia "as a patron saint". He clearly felt that, in opposing liberal economic policies, he was trying to bring peace out of the social war which raged through Europe and provide an alternative to the workers' turning to social democracy. He was prepared for the establishment of co-operatives and state intervention. The evident decline of the artisan class and small trade needed immediate attention, as did the lot of the unsung agricultural worker. The claims of the community (Gemeinschaft) had to come before particular parties in order to

1Hermann Wagener, Erlebtes, Meine Memoiren aus der Zeit von 1866 und von 1873 bis jetzt (Berlin: R. Pohl, 1884), pp. 25-7.
ensure "the harmony of interests and the solidarity between the various classes".\(^1\) The old guild institutions needed updating and the right to work guaranteed. In short, he was advocating a kind of corporative socialism.\(^2\) This basically social concern was one of the roots of all the anti-Semitic parties in the seventies and eighties. The latter found support among the very social groups which, as Wagener mentioned in the 1860's, were adversely affected by on-going economic developments.\(^3\)

In debate in the house some interesting objections to Wagener brought out the full implications of the latter's economic and social views. Once again Schulze-Delitzsch led in the fray. The latter claimed he was not afraid to admit the existence of a social question, but believed Wagener's solution amounted to nothing short of re-instituting feudalism or putting protection back into the production system by turning back the clock. As far as he was concerned, Wagener was effectively proposing re-introduction of the "estate" or Stand, a legal

\(^1\) For a full study of the important concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft see Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, trans. C.P. Loomis (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1963, org. ed., 1887), passim.


\(^3\) Wagener once defined industrialization 'as the economic and social sickness which transformed men into commodities, which enforced the division of labor and free competition only in order to monopolize wealth and impoverish the masses'. Speculation and plundering of the poor were laid at the door of the industrialists; their abuse of money power to achieve social and political eminence he deplored. The stock-exchange was condemned. Everyone was menaced by the Jews whose propagation of immorality and political ruin, intensified by their habit of living in cities. Quoted from his Staats- und Gesellschaft-Lexikon, 23 vols, (1859) in William O. Shanahan, German Protestants Face the Social Question (Notre Dame: Notre Dame U.P., 1954), pp. 363-365.
entity of the Middle Ages. Schulze saw an "estate" as "a closed legal community" (Rechtsgemeinschaft), not really a class of citizens, which distinguished itself actively through occupation or social situation from others and which could work "only in a closed society". The social question was "the modern sphinx" and it could not be solved by turning the clock back, but by applying the best that the modern world had to offer. Here two rival Weltanschauungen came face to face in a conflict which was to last for many years. The point which must be remembered was the date when the conflict achieved currency, for it not only showed up nicely part of the rationale underlying arguments for or against emancipation of the Jews, but part of the rationale underlying the political anti-Semitism which developed later. Noteworthy too, was how fairly abstract constitutional issues provided responses on both sides which may be regarded as mirroring the attitudes of the social, economic, political, and constitutional views of the Reichstag.

The interaction of these views with the Jewish question was revealed particularly well when issues such as freedom of movement and freedom of trade (Gewerbefreiheit) were discussed. As we shall see later, those groups, such as the artisans, who were hurt by the operation of Gewerbefreiheit proved amenable to the persuasions of anti-Semitic political parties. Those who attempted to have the principles accepted on 21 October, 1867 because they were "the alpha of all economic development in

\[1\] \textit{N.D.B.Reich.Steno.Berichte, 1, pp.405-410, 18 Sitting, 12 October, 1867.}
every state" were opposed by representatives of the Chancellor's office who said that this would shake the very principle of community life at the local level. Not mere residence or settling in a particular area was to determine citizenship, but the acquisition of landed property. The National Liberal, Dr. Braun, explained that, because in some states Jews could not acquire land, non-acceptance of freedom of movement implicitly condoned a situation in which Jews could not acquire citizenship rights. The government denied that any discrimination against the Jews was intended. Conservatives claimed further that such "freedoms" would ruin the Confederation both by making it international and removing the force of local law. For the moment, the latter's arguments were once again sustained, and religious belief continued on the books as ultimately determining citizenship. A few days later, however, the debate was resumed.

From the Jewish communities of Mecklenburg-Schwerin came petitions which had originally been sent to the commission set up to study the question of freedom of movement. Debate was led by the National Liberal, W. Endemann (1825-1899), a professor at Bonn. His main point was that "Mecklenburgers of the Jewish faith" were being in fact denied "civil equality". He outlined the content of the petitions and the history of the Jews. Apart from the discriminations we have already seen, he mentioned others such as the denial of the right to become notaries and advocates, and to be partakers in government. Of Mecklenburg-Strelitz he said that Jews could not become citizens in the towns.

Moreover, he declared, old customs prevailed whereby Jews had to pay a poll tax (Judenschutzgeldes), could not acquire real estate nor even hold mortgages, and were excluded from all agricultural pursuits. To Endemann, the "equality of all religious denominations" was "a necessary postulate of modern law". Alone, a law on freedom of movement would ensure an "unqualified right" of settlement and therefore citizenship.

He reported that presently the legal status of the Jews varied greatly in the confederated states. In Prussia they were "fairly free" while in Oldenburg, Hamburg, Lübeck, Weimar, Coburg, Braunschweig, they had virtually full legal emancipation. In Saxony there were the restrictions on "foreign" Jews, while in Hesse things were far from satisfactory. In places like Anhalt and Lippe the legal status of the Jews was "not clear". His desire was to both improve and universalize the legal position of the Jews, to grant them all the rights of full citizenship.¹ The proposal in the form of a law on freedom of movement was accepted and passed, though not without some skeptical remarks by Conservatives to the effect that "the mark of a pencil" would really change nothing. It was on this note that the sessions for 1867 came to a close. Still, the Jewish question was not fully settled.

Over the next few years there was a running battle to make sure that "the mark of a pencil" would in fact mean real change in the actual position of the Jews with respect to the now established law on freedom of movement. The power to change

social attitudes was, of course, not within the competence of the Reichstag. In the new year (1868) the first real mention made of the Jewish question came from Wiggers through a personal interpellation. An interpellation was an individual questioning of the executive by a member and required an answer. Wiggers now complained that the Jewish question was not resolved by the laws on freedom of movement, but that, since the law on freedom of movement had gone into effect on 1 January, 1868, governments in Mecklenburg, for example, had not only not complied, but had even passed laws of their own which directly contradicted the federal law. The effect of these new laws was that Jews were forbidden such positions as lawyers, school-teachers (in Christian schools), policemen, and many other such occupations. Those Jews who now acquired lands were obliged to pay disproportionate legal fees.

What he now proposed, was that the federal government guarantee the private, personal rights of the Jews as well as those of the public. If federal legislation was not to be "only a joke", the spirit as well as the letter of the law must be kept. The executive agreed that certain contradictions in law still existed, but for the moment to let the matter subside.¹

Further, in June, 1868 a petition was presented from the "Jewish co-citizens" of Berlin, which referred to certain anomalies in the legal position of the Jews in Berlin. There were objections, for example, about the form of the oath citizens

¹N. D. B. Reich. Steno. Berichte, 111, pp. 92-117, 8 Sitting, 16 April, 1868.
had to take, a problem we saw dealt with in 1848.\(^1\) A week later Wiggers brought up his old interpellation relative to Mecklenburg, though he referred to matters in Berlin, Anhalt and Saxony as well. Time had come, it was now said, to end the religious state and invalidate the so-called Christian theory of the state. While the government responded that the laws already passed ought to be sufficient, the Conservative spokesman, Count H. von Bassewitz (1814-1885) from Schwerin, maintained such matters were not within the jurisdiction of the federal government. He implied, at least according to Lasker, that the Jews really sought not only equality, but special treatment and privileges. Lasker denied this recurrent charge, saying that what he "and his co-religionists" desired was to get on in the world. There were some Conservatives who claimed to be alarmed at the very idea that all the restrictions on the civil rights of the Jews would be removed. A Conservative member for Elbing felt that removing restrictions on inter-marriage between Christians and Jews tampered with the law and church; much of what was involved merely concerned the personal feelings of the Jews. His primary objection was that a precedent would then be established by the central authority for interference in local affairs.

The issue of the legal position of the Jews was brought up in the new sitting in 1869, by Wiggers, with a proposal

on "the parity of denominations". He gave a lengthy speech once again on the full history of the emancipation question, and the subversion in many areas of the legislation passed. This, he said, "belied the civilized times in which we live". The government replied that it would look into the matter. Two months later Wiggers brought up the matter once again. Throughout, it should be remembered, the issue most often in contention was the competence or jurisdiction question. The idea of actually establishing full citizenship or equal political rights for all inhabitants of the Confederation doubtlessly had to involve such a conflict. Evidence of the difficulty of finding a modus vivendi between advocates of states rights and the central authority abounded in the Reichstag debates.

With regard to emancipation of the Jews matters finally came to a head between 12 and 20 May, 1869. In order to be able to assure full civil rights throughout the Confederation, clearly, some solution to the competence question had to be found. To make rights of citizenship fully portable from state to state federal activity was necessary. On the left, implementation of such rights was part of liberal economic policy while, on the right, there was resistance because the right desired a weak federal government. One side sought to limit mobility, while the other to facilitate it. Wagener,

for example, refused to accept that such freedoms as freedom of movement and Gewerbefreiheit represented the "progress of civilization". For him such matters were opposed to "all the fundamentals of our society and civilization". Opponents rightly judged that he emphasized the "swindles of capital and the exploitation of the worker", and the contrast between capital and work. The attempt to have the Jews emancipated from all legal restrictions was part of the strenuous battle waged against such conservative opposition and should not be viewed as merely a "concession to liberalism", which misses the whole significance of the struggle.

On 2 June, 1869 Wigger's interpellation came forward, this time with success. Von Bassewitz made one last effort to annul the passing of what must be regarded as full legal emancipation of the Jews. He declared that a special point need not be made of the matter, as it was already covered by previous legislation. If there were certain gaps, the individual states should be allowed to fill them on their own; otherwise, federal activity constituted "interference". The spokesman for the Centre-Catholic party, L.Windhorst (1812-1893), agreed with these points. Though he wished legal restrictions to end on all citizens he was not prepared to see further extension of the power of the central government. Wiggers said briefly that he did not believe the issue of legislative competence was involved. At long last his proposal was accepted by a

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2. Massing, Rehearsal For Destruction, p.3.
majority of the house and read:

All still remaining limitations of civil and civic rights based on differences of religious creed are hereby abolished. Particularly will the right to participate in municipal and state government and to hold public office not be dependent on religious creed. 1

Three days later it received third reading, without objection, and passed into federal law. The long struggle for emancipation had finally met with success.

The constitution which had evolved in the North German Confederation, including the articles which emancipated the Jews, passed virtually unchanged into the constitution of the new German Empire. Though no objections were raised, special efforts were taken at the time of transition in 1870 to ensure that the constitution would not be side-stepped with regard to the Jews, as it had been before. 2 In the south of Germany, Baden in 1862 had dropped its legal restrictions on the rights of the Jews, Württemburg in 1864, Bavaria, only when it joined the new Empire, in 1870-71.

Chapter IV

Emergence of Political Anti-Semitism
in the Liberal Era (1870's)

In order to understand why the Jewish question not only did not pass into oblivion as part of an "unenlightened" past as most liberals of the time expected, or hoped, but actually re-asserted itself, we must attempt to outline the factors at work in the new Reich. As we mentioned at the outset, there is a consensus today that in the last third of the nineteenth century the traditional Jewish-Gentile conflict was transformed into something new. Unfortunately, few attempt to see this transformation as part of the change affecting European, specifically German, society as a whole. Before we attempt a broad view of the great changes sweeping German society after 1870, and the effect on the Jewish question, we must bring the picture of the Jews in Germany up to date. There is a measure of truth in the suggestion of contemporaries, that the Jews were rebuked largely because of the way they made their living.¹

One can hardly leave the matter at that.

By 1871 there were 512,000 Jews in Germany (1.25% of the population), which increased to 615,000 (0.95%) by 1910. The

Shift from the eastern areas to the west continued as before.\(^1\) Overwhelmingly the Jews remained faithful to their religion—at least the number of conversions was remarkably small.\(^2\) The large city became their occupational centre.\(^3\) In terms of occupational distribution the trends we examined previously of earlier periods continued, with few going into agriculture or artisanship in western Germany. By a peculiar irony of history the activities to which the Jews had been restricted for centuries, for example, commerce and money-lending, made it quite probable that they would be the people most likely to take a leading part in the rise of the new economic system. As one author put it, however, when the "acids of capitalism" began to be felt, it was easy to associate the most ominous features of that system with the Jew and his culture.\(^4\)

Other activities of the Jews won attention by those hostile to the Jews. For instance, it was often pointed out that the Jews were over-representative in certain free professions such as the press and literary criticism.\(^5\) Jews were also said to be present at the university and other institutions of higher learning in disproportionate numbers.\(^6\) Socially, the Jews were rarely accepted; this was experienced even by those whose

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\(^1\) See Appendix 1, Jewish Inner-Migration.
\(^2\) Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden*, 1, p.297, puts the figure for the whole nineteenth century at 22,520.
\(^3\) See Appendix 2, Urbanization of the Jews.
\(^5\) See Appendix 3, Comparison of Jews and Non-Jews by Occupation.
\(^6\) See Appendix 4, Religious Composition of Higher Education. One should be warned that everyone who pointed to the "disproportions" of the Jews in certain activities were not always anti-Semitic.
business successes were so prominent as to permit them to rub shoulders with royalty.\footnote{Cf. Laman Cecil, Albert Ballin; Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888-1918 (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1967), pp.100-102. James Joll, "Walther Rathenau: Prophet without a Cause," Three Intellectuals in Politics (London: Pantheon, 1960), p.65 quotes Rathenau to the effect "that no amountof ability or merit" can rid a German Jew of the status of being born a second-class citizen.} After the centuries of institutionalized inequality, some social antipathy was perhaps inevitable, particularly when linked to the successes of the Jews. The relevance of this and other forms of anti-Jewish feeling to political anti-Semitism occurred when major issues combined with it.

We must now attempt to show how there developed a peculiar relationship between these major issues and anti-Jewish feelings.

The most impressive issue which came into greater prominence in the years after 1870 was the growth to maturity of industrialization.\footnote{See, for example, Wolfram Fischer, "Oekonomische und soziologische Aspekte der frühen Industrialisierung," Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichtliche Probleme der Frühen Industrialisierung, ed. Wolfram Fischer (Berlin: Springer, 1968), pp.1-20.} More specifically, the rate of industrial growth accelerated rapidly after 1870, and is easily illustrated by a glance at the usual indices of industrial growth, for example, steel and pig iron production.\footnote{Steel production (1900=100) grew from 4.1 in 1865, to 18.0 in 1890, 33.4 in 1900. Calculated from Walter G.Hoffman, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Springer, 1965), pp.352-354. See Appendix 5, Pig Iron Production.} In the period 1870-1914 real national income more than tripled and real national income per capita more than doubled.\footnote{See Appendix 6, Real National Income, Appendix 7, Real National Income Per Capita. Also note, Appendix 6, that (1900=100) production of Producer's Goods multiplied in this period six times, and Consumer's Goods, three times.} The rapid industrialization was reflected in an occupational shift from non-industrial
occupations like farming, fishing, and forestry, to occupations in commerce and industry. The usual accompaniments of industrialization, population growth and urbanization, were present to a radical degree. The social disruption involved in these population developments was exacerbated in addition by great "inner migrations" between cities and the countryside, and from cities in the east to cities in the west.

It is fair to characterize the industrial revolution in Germany as coming to maturity later than most Western countries and being incredibly rapid when it finally came. One historian described the German economy of the period as one which "presented some of those contrasts between advanced and backward sectors associated with rapid, unbalanced growth". The essence of these "contrasts" grew out of what we may call the "incomplete" nature of the industrial revolution in Germany of the pre-World War I era. This is not to say that there is some organic process through which all industrializing nations

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1 See the tables in Hoffmann, Wachstum der Wirtschaft, p.35
2 Of the population of some 41 million in 1871, 63.9% lived in centres of less than 2,000 souls; in 1910 60% of a 65-million population lived in cities larger than 2,000. In 1850 there were 3 cities over 100,000; in 1910 5 cities had 500,000-plus populations and 17 with 200,000-plus. Wilhelm Treue et al (eds.), Quellen zur Geschichte der Industriellen Revolution (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1961), pp.142-143.
3 In a sample year (1907) some 11,792,000 people lived in Large Cities (100,000-plus population) of whom less than half (42.4%) had been born within these cities. Wolfgang Köllman, "Industrialisierung, Binnenwanderung, und "Soziale Frage": Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der deutschen Industriegrossestadt im 19. Jahrhundert,"VSWG vol. XLVI (1959), pp.63-65.
must inevitably pass, only that the social change lagged behind the rapid economic change in Germany at this point.\textsuperscript{1} This should hardly surprise us, for technological change can be wrought much more quickly than social attitudes can be changed. This has been termed in various accounts the industrial revolution in a feudal society, and was put most succinctly by the famed industrialist, Walther Rathenau (1867-1922):

\begin{quote}
It will be difficult for future writers of German history to understand how, in our time, two class systems could penetrate each other; the first is a survival of the feudal system, the second the capitalist class system, a phenomenon produced by the mechanization itself. But it will strike him as even odder that the newly arisen capitalist order had first of all to contribute to the strengthening of the feudal order.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

In spite of the great changes, in other words, much testimony can be found to justify labelling Imperial Germany a "feudal-industrial state".\textsuperscript{3} As one author put it, "the correlates of industrialization" appeared in Germany only partially or in

\textsuperscript{1}Hans Dahrendorf, Democracy and Society in Germany (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), p.402, suggests that only in the wake of National Socialism "was the social revolution completed for Germany that was lost in the faultings of Imperial Germany and again held up by the contradiction of the Weimar Republic".


\textsuperscript{3}See, for example, W.H.Dawson, German Life in Town and Country (London: George Newnes, 1901), pp.21-37, from which Talcott Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," (1942) Essays in Sociological Theory (N.Y.: Free Press, 1954), pp.104-123, is apparently derived. Also Max Weber, who seemed quite aware of the feudal aspect of Imperial Germany. As a nationalist he felt Germany could not afford the "victory of feudalism" over industrialism if she was to become a great power. See "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik," (1895) Gesammelte Politische Schriften, pp.1-25. Another contemporary, Charles Tower, Germany of Today (London: W.& Norgate, 1913), p.208 was struck by Germany's "adopting of extreme modernism...after having retained the ancient ways longer than the rest of the world."
strange deflections. "Throughout, the industrial revolution carried within it a counterrevolution--and strangely, the counterrevolution did not arrest the progress of the revolution or prevent active resistance against it."\(^1\) An astute critic of Imperial Germany observed the continuity of the old values. Business success was not enough to ensure social acceptance, for "social divisions" were "very fine and precise, and jealously observed....A man may have at his command the gold of a Croesus, but if he have nothing more he will knock in vain for entrance into good society."\(^2\) Not only did big business as a whole enjoy an uneven reputation,\(^3\) but the very heart of the capitalist system, the stock-exchange, was subjected to continuous attack.

The existence of the feudal elements had political significance because they were not quiescent, but fought strenuously to re-enforce or at least to preserve, their positions within the structure of the economy and society. The precise groups we put under the heading of "feudal elements" will be made apparent as our account proceeds. At this point one should be admonished not to associate these "feudal elements" only with the East Prussian landowners, the Junkers.\(^4\) It was true, however, that the chief force backing and sustaining the "counterrevolution" against the industrial revolution in the newly united Germany

\(^1\) Dahrendorf, Democracy and Society in Germany, p.61.  
\(^2\) Dawson, German Life in Town and Country, p.21.  
\(^3\) Cf. Ernst Nolte, "Big Business and German Politics: A Comment," AHR vol. LXXV (1969), 71-78, and in the same issue,(#1) the studies of "Big Business in German Politics", pp.37-70.  
\(^4\) Cf. the comments on the relationship of anti-Semitism and the Prussian Junker's social ideals, Kitchen, Officer Corps, p.37.
was this unshaken social and political position of the Prussian ruling class. The nature of the goals of the social "counter-revolution", which has been suggested as paralleling the industrial revolution, is at least suggested, if we recall that many writers have termed it "the social conservative response to industrialism".\(^1\) It was conservative in that it sought to conserve many of the social and economic values of the pre-industrial era. It is important to keep in mind, at this point, that political anti-Semitism came to be one of the manifestations of this social-conservative counterrevolution.

Some conservatives had certainly attempted to halt many of the changes implicit in liberalism, particularly liberal economic policies, prior to 1870. We have already seen how forcefully people such as Wagener fought liberalism in the Reichstag. In the late 1860's a new group who called themselves the "Social Conservatives" came under Wagener's leadership. Certain anti-Jewish arguments were used by this group from time to time. The mouth-piece of the group was the *Berliner Revue*. One of Wagener's disciples, Rudolf Hermann Meyer (1839-1899), as editor of this paper from October, 1870 onward, led a particularly spirited attack on "Manchesterism", or liberal laissez-faire economics. Meyer's "socialism" has been described as advocating "a satisfied rather than an emancipated working class".\(^2\) He urged the Conservative party to come to grips with some of the changes in the

\(^1\) Hermann Lebovics, "A Socialism for the German Middle Classes: The Social Conservative Response to Industrialism, 1900-1933" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of History, Yale University, 1964), passim, which surprisingly does not allude to earlier social conservatism.

\(^2\) Shanahan, *German Protestants Face the Social Question*, p. 377.
facts of life imposed by economic changes, if only "to kill the socialist labor movement with kindness". At the moment, however, the concept of a social conservatism with vague religious and anti-Jewish undertones foundered, and the *Revue* itself had ceased publication by 1873. The moment was not propitious to conservative influence, for in the new Germany, liberalism was in its heyday.

There is virtual unanimity among historians that particularly the 1860's and early 1870's was the period when liberalism appeared victorious, not only in Germany, but to some extent in most European lands. There was long history of liberal concern over the impact of economic change, though many liberals maintained that the adverse conditions which existed in certain areas could only be ameliorated, ultimately, by complete resignation to the laws of *laissez-faire*. In the early 1870's there grew up a more wide-spread concern with the social question. At the universities, for example, the focal point of public interest shifted from the old nationalistic


historians, like Duncker, Droysen, Mommsen, Dahllmann, Sybel and Treitschke, to the up-coming economists--to Schmoller, Lujo Brentano, Herkner, Schulze-Gaevernitz and Adolf Wagner. 1

Much of the energy previously devoted to national-unity questions now apparently turned to internal matters, with the aim of making the new nation-state habitable. 2 In October, 1872 the Verein für Sozialpolitik was founded with the intention of fighting for solutions to the social question, frequently in opposition to laissez-faire and the "tyranny" of "Manchesterism". 3 One of the leading lights of the Verein, Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), expressed his concern from the outset with the "classes that were left behind in the competitive struggle", those people unaffected by the new prosperity. 4

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2 See, for example, Gustav Friedrich von Schönb erg, Arbeitsämter, eine Aufgabe des Deutschen Reiches (1871) in Ernst Schraepler (ed.), Quellen zur Geschichte der soziale Frage in Deutschland (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957), 11, p.53, where: "The so-called social question is for us, since a solution to the national one has been found, perhaps the most important of the future....We have today already founded the Rechtsstaat. Now it is necessary to make the Kulturstaat into a reality."


4 Gustav Schmoller, Die soziale Frage und der preussische Staat (1874) in Schraepler (ed.), Quellen der sozialen Frage, 11, p.62. Schmoller was always noted for his moderation and was no anti-Semite. In an interview later (1894) he gave his views. Then, he saw that the Jewish question would grow with continued immigration of Jews. His hope that emancipation of the Jews would lead to Jews and Christians coming closer together was disappointed. The real trouble came when the Jewish question became mixed up with "social-economic passions". Hermann Bahr, Der Antisemitismus; Ein internationales Interview (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1894), pp.35-37.
The Verein, it should be interjected, was by no means anti-Semitic. Lasker, for example, who was famous both as a Jew and a liberal, had been invited to attend its founding meeting.\(^1\) The Verein did represent an influential group of scholars who early questioned the consequences of liberal economic policies. The new and growing popularity of such attitudes was bound to have a profound political impact. This impact was heightened by three other factors at this point, which tended to direct public attention toward the Jews as the ultimate movers behind liberal economic policies and hence as persons responsible for the "social question". The three factors included the stock-market crash of 1873 and the resulting "depression", the struggle which took place between the government and German Catholics (the Kulturkampf), and, finally, the rise of a virulent integral nationalism.

The economic causes of this stock-market crash and particularly the so-called "great depression" which followed it, are still actively debated. Perhaps the best critique thus far, concludes that in fact "the nineteenth century was marked by a protracted and sharp deflation from 1817 to 1896 with only one short interruption of some six or seven years", (the years immediately prior to 1873). In other words, the brief period prior to 1873 represented a momentary inflation upon which, in the years following, contemporaries tended to look as a time of unrivaled prosperity while they viewed their own time as one of

"depression". In essence, therefore, the whole "depression" affair, at least in economic terms, was "an optical illusion".\(^1\) Certainly, at least relative to the years prior to 1873, there was a persistent decline of prosperity in the short run after 1873. Usually reliable economic indices, such as real wages, and building investment, both declined after 1873.\(^2\) Therefore, while this period (or "depression") may be viewed as part of a larger deflationary cycle which covered the nineteenth century, it had a very real, immediate, and perceptible impact.\(^3\)

The actual stock-market crash which signalled the beginning of the "great depression", (or, if you will, the end of the brief inflation), originally hit Vienna in April, 1873 and by September spread to Berlin. The German vocabulary, rich in epithets for the period following the foundation of the Empire in 1871, has termed it the period of "promotion-fever" (Gründungsfieber) and "promotion-mania" (Gründungsmanie).\(^4\)

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\(^1\) For an excellent summary of the conflicting theories as well, see Landes, "Technological Change and Industrial Development", p. 458 ff. For a persistent opponent see Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), pp. 1-21.

\(^2\) See Appendix 8 Real Wages in Germany and Appendix 9 On Building Investment.

\(^3\) In a letter to Droysen 23 November, 1873, Treitschke commented of his recent trip to Berlin. He was appalled at "diese unnatürlichen wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse Berlins sind wirklich ein nationales Unglück, sie prägen dem Leben der Hauptstadt immer mehr den Newyorker Character auf". Johann Gustav Droysen, Briefwechsel, ed. Rudolf Hübner (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1967), II, pp. 909-911.

At the time more level-headed analysts sought to explain the "crash" as a consequence of the recent war with France, indemnity payments, the over-speculation and over-expanded credit (buying on the margin), and the resulting development of uneconomic ventures which collapsed under pressure. Playing the stock-market became popular, with rather disastrous effects. Because of the new, more unrestricted regulations on founding joint-stock companies, a whole rash of new companies came into existence, a trend which tailed off remarkably after 1873. Not everyone was prepared to make such cool analyses, and to speak of the necessity of liquidating the "uneconomic" ventures in favour of more "rational" ones.

The Jews were identified in the public mind from the very beginning with the "crash" and an anti-Semitic reaction resulted:

In the small towns the Jews found themselves boycotted in society, and often also in business. Officers and officials openly displayed anti-Semitic papers, the students mocked and thrashed their Jewish comrades, proceedings which often led to duels; in gymnastic and veteran's societies the cry echoed: "Out with the Jews!" Restaurants and hotels tried to attract the anti-Semitic public by proclaiming themselves as judenrein. Many watering-places and health resorts made the stay of Jewish visitors impossible.

The savage war raged everywhere in North Germany, threatened the honour and social position of the Jews, and even, especially in the small towns, their material existence. The personal mockery and maltreatment of individual Jews by people, were the order of the day, and likewise the exclusion of Jews from public and private appointments.

The anti-Semitic criticism tended to emphasize less the economic causes behind the "crash" than the moral causes. The

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2 See Appendix 10, New Joint-Stock Companies Founded.
swindles which were also a feature of the crash, were singled out for special attention. It would appear that "swindle" came to be the watch-word of the era, behind others such as the "social question" and soon after, the "Jewish question". Not everyone who objected to the "morally reprehensible means of making profits" or complained that large fortunes were "more likely to be made by dishonest than by honest means" were hostile toward the Jews. Indeed, the first major public statement on the seamy side of stock-exchange and business promotion activity came from Eduard Lasker in the early months of 1873 in the Prussian Lower House. He repeated what came to be known as his "revelations" in the Reichstag on 4 April, 1873. He sought to direct the country's attention to the lax laws on the "promotion and administration of joint-stock companies". He gave specific examples and offered reasonable solutions through revising the law. The leading Free Conservative Wilhelm von Kardorff (1828-1907), in response to Lasker's Reichstag speech, said that the masses always craved an object of resentment—sometimes it was the Junkers, sometimes the officer corps, and presently it was the stock-exchange promoter. He said that the workers resented the stock-exchange, but because they had already turned to the socialist parties, they were immune from appeal by other political parties. But, he went on, a "third very real class" (among whom he included people like the "small artisan and small civil servant") was not committed. Thereupon,

1 Schmoller, Die soziale Frage und der preussische Staat, p.63.
he accused Lasker of attempting to win over this class, and of using his "revelations" for that political purpose. It was true that his "revelations" had been particularly damaging to several leading Conservatives, notably Hermann Wagener, who became implicated in some of the shady dealings. This was in fact a considerable blow to the Conservative cause.

From von Kardorff's charges, incidently, one gets an insight into the extremely fluid political situation which still existed in Germany, for political organization was still at a fairly primitive level and parties were as yet not completely committed to the interests of particular social groups. There was a certain irony in his charges, that the National Liberal party sought the support of the "petit bourgeoisie" (or, in German, Mittelstand). As we shall see


3See Thomas Nipperdey, Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961), passim.

4Mittelstand refers to more than just an income group equivalent to "lower middle classes". It contains concepts of status and caste. Stand or estate was a group defined by social status and occupation, of approximately equal property and income, and possessing rights not enjoyed by others. The groups embraced by Mittelstand would include artisans, small business people, and shopkeepers, property owners in town and country, independent professional people, small rentiers and pensioned people. Cf. Massing, Rehearsal For Destruction, p.209; Paul Kosok, Modern Germany, A Study of Conflicting Loyalties (N.Y.: Russell & Russell, 1969, org.ed, 1933), p.31; Werner Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: George Bondi, 1903), p.537 ff. on the "Spielerei" of the whole concept; Guenther Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany (Totowe: Bedminster Press, 1966), p.260 fn.23, suggests that under the strains of industrialization the Mittelstand tended toward an "assertive over-identification with the dominant system. Anti-Semitism was one of the results."
later, much of the following of political parties which came
to accept anti-Semitism as part of their program, was drawn
from this social group, and were dedicated to thoroughgoing
anti-liberalism. A more astute observer in the 1860's and
eyearly 1870's could easily have predicted such an outcome. This
becomes evident from an examination of the social and economic
content of the anti-Jewish literature which poured from the
presses in reaction to the "great crash".

This new literature sought to involve the Jews, not only
in the stock-market crash, but also in the most explosive
issue of the day, namely the social question. The work which
first directed attention at the activities of the Jews and
linked them to the vital issues of the modern age was that of
the publicist, Wilhelm Marr (1819-1904), which we saw in the
first chapter. Marr desired to put the Jewish question on a
wholly new basis and had no patience with the more traditional
charges leveled against the Jews such as deicide. He stood
firmly against all religious persecution of the Jews; this only
confused the issues involved. For him the Jewish question
was a "social-political one, nothing more". Besides a rather
questionable analysis of this question, he presented a whole
series of images with which he linked the Jews. Some examples
are: the Jewish "alien domination" (Fremdherrschaft) over
Germany, Jewish "powers of manipulation" (Manipulationsgeist),
"Jewish free trade", "Jewish Press", Jewish "world leadership",
(Weltherrschaft), "Judaizing tendencies" which he saw every-

\[\text{Marr, Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanentum, passim.}\]
where (Verjudungstendenzen), "abstract individualism and social nihilism" of the Jews, the "golden international"—the list might be extended for some time. He saw western Europe in Jewish hands, and Germany in particular as the "social Eldorado of Jewry". The Judaizing (Verjudung) of German society he saw as having its beginnings with the theory of individual social liberty. In the name of liberty the Jews were emancipated, and were permitted to begin their assault on German society. His message was that the Jews, no longer a weak, suppressed race, exercised virtual hegemony in Germany. Unless the German people fought back, "Finis Germaniae" and "Vae Victis".

Marr considered that the recent successes of the Jews in business had been prepared by strengths they had derived from their struggle for existence throughout history. A professor at Prague, August Rohling, the previous year (1872) also expressed alarm at the power of the Jews. He said that although the Jews represented but 3/10 of 1% of the world's population, they were "the most powerful in all nations, the kings of capital, the princes of trade, the leaders of the press". Rohling blamed the teachings of the Talmud for the continuance of Jewish particularism and exclusiveness which were the great obstacles in the path of their assimilation.¹

The claim of the disproportionate power of the Jews was now being emphasized. This was considerably different from the days of the enlightenment and Joseph II when they won attention

on philanthropic grounds. The claim of the disproportionate power of the Jews was emphasized within Germany, and the same thing appeared during the Dreyfus Affair in France at the end of the century.1

This popularized picture of the power of the Jews lent itself well to those who sought to explain current economic problems in terms of the activities of the Jews. The stock-exchange, widely regarded as the heart of the capitalist system, now came to be regarded, as one writer put it, as "the permanent fulcrum" of "Jewish power" and even the "Jewish spirit".2 To people of this hue it was incontestable that the Jews dominated the economic life of Germany and that political liberalism was an accomplice to this. The most vehement and influential critic of the new economic system who adopted anti-Semitic views was the publicist, Otto Glagau (1834-1892). His articles which appeared in the Gartenlaube, a middle class magazine, from 1874 to 1876 and achieved great popularity were later reprinted as books. These works achieved much influence and are worth a closer examination than they usually have received.

1 See the remarks of a Dreyfusard, who said "the really popular remedy" to anti-Semitism would be "les représentations proportionelles", that is, "every twenty jobs should be filled by 15 Catholics, 3 Protestants, and 2 Jews". Michel Colline (Paul Stapfer), L'Affaire Dreyfus, Billets de la Province (Paris: Tresse & Stock, 1893), pp.27-32, written for Le Siècle 22 June, 1893. Cf. J.L. Talmon, "Mission and Testimony: The Universal Significance of Modern Anti-Semitism," The Unique and the Universal, Some Historical Reflections (London: Secker & Warburg, 1965), p.132. Graetz, History of the Jews, V, p.704, saw the new anti-Semitism as a resulting from the competition for positions in which the Jews were doing well.

2 See, for example, Constantin Frantz, Der Nationalliberalismus und die Judenherrschaft (Munich: Huttler, 1874), pp.26-29. On Frantz see Max Hâne, Die Staatsideen des Konstantin Frantz (Berlin: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1929), p.156 ff.
Glagau clearly felt himself to be a man with a great mission, a man who was not to be deterred, either by those who sought to deny there was any economic crisis at all or those who scorned him for his pronouncements on the Jews. He said that he did not in fact identify the Jews as the only promoters and swindlers, but it was no fault of his that 90% of the swindlers were Jews and at most 10% were Christians, Glagau appears to have been a man who tended to see economics in terms of the activities of men rather than in more abstract terms or laws. He rated Lasker's "revelations" a tactic to divert attention away from the real enemies of the Reich (Reichsfeinde). Being above parties himself, as he claimed, he could afford to seek after only the truth. His was a campaign, even a crusade, against jobbers and promoters, the stock-exchange, and corruption in society, the press, and parliament particularly, where certain legislators aided and abetted swindlers. He was to be the man who stood out against the "pseudo-freedoms" which liberalism carried through in legislation.¹

Glagau was in agreement with Lasker in condemning the infamous Dr. Strousberg and the "Strousberg system". This latter individual was perhaps the most notorious of the promoter-swindlers, who happened to be Jewish as well. Glagau once said that Strousberg's motto had been, "a golden key opens every door", and "a donkey laden with gold may climb any wall".²

¹Otto Glagau, Der Börsen- und Grundungs-Schwindel in Berlin (Leipzig: Paul Frohberg, 1876), pp.V-XXXV. He estimated that the Gartenlaube had 400,000 subscribers and 2,000,000 readers.
²Ibid., p.8.
Well would Glagau agree with other influential personages that the stock-exchange represented "riches without work" (Arbeit). The wide-spread tendency of the population to "play" the stock-exchange, the initial abnormal rise in prices and profits, and their eventual fall after 1873, were all part of one great swindle. He emphasized that Berlin was virtually under the thumb of the Jews since they ran the stock-exchange, speculated in housing, controlled the press, and in great numbers daily appeared in Berlin as immigrants. He looked back but a few short years "to 1866, when all the Jews had in Berlin was a synagogue". He was convinced that the new economic legislation had been of benefit chiefly to the Jews, while the nation as a whole actually paid for it. Parliament represented primarily the interests of great industry and large-scale trade, capital and the stock-exchange; people like the peasants and artisans were being left out. What was needed was "a complete break with the present economic system and regime of stock-exchange liberals, emancipation from the domination of the Jews, and a basic revision of economic legislation, the energetic prosecution of fraud and swindling and the expulsion of promoters and their friends from the official market". To Glagau, "Manchestererism" was really unsuited to Germany, because he saw Germany as "an agricultural state" which would "always

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Paul de Lagarde, "Diagnose" (1874), Deutsche Schriften (Göttingen: Dieterichsche Verlag, 1892), p.94.


\textsuperscript{3}Otto Glagau, Der Börsen- und Gründungs-Schwindel in Deutschland (Leipzig: Paul Frohberg, 1877), pp.XXXVII-XXXVIII.
remain so". "Still, our 'Economists', who look to France and England, desire to make Germany throughout into an industrial and trading state. It bothers them not, that the small business man will soon be wholly enveloped by large-scale industry, that the peasant class declines..."\(^1\)

In his ideas of the role of the state in solving the social question, he substantially agreed with Schmoller's speech of 1874, "Die soziale Frage und der preussische Staat". He said he would willingly support the Verein für Sozialpolitik so long as it fought "against the domination of capital". He recognized the necessity for political parties to represent specific social-economic interests. Thus far, he charged, only the liberals have succeeded in doing this, in so far as they represented capital. Now the threatened "artisan and the Mittelstand" needed to organize politically as well. His socially conservative brand of anti-Semitism was accorded no little response in Germany. In addition to the works by people such as Glagau and Marr there was a whole host of others of a similar nature.

While there might be disagreement on numerous issues there was a broad consensus regarding the place of the Jews in the new economy. Demands for reform came from a certain Judge C. Wilmanns, for example, whose analysis was concluded with a word on the urgency of creating a party to carry out social reform. Wilmanns saw that unlimited competition would eventually

\(^1\)Glagau, "Die Hebung der Industry", Börsen- und Gründungs-Schwindel in Deutschland, p.21. Cf. the same sentiments in the work of Lagarde; "Der deutsche Politik,"(1874), Deutsche Schriften, p.28.
result in the destruction of the middle classes and leave only a few large capitalists and a huge proletariat. In his view, these middle classes, particularly landowners, artisans, and the like, had to be protected. One needed to organize in order to apply pressure to have legislation enacted. He saw the Jews as forming a great "golden international". He fully agreed with Marr, Glagau, and Rohling and even stated that in his view a Jew remained a Jew regardless of whether he changed his religion or not.1

Rudolf Meyer (1839-1899), we met before as editor of the Berliner Revue and associate of Hermann Wagener. His work was particularly interesting, for in it he accused the government and Bismarck with complicity in the swindles of 1873. Like many other anti-Semitic statements in this period, Meyer singled out the activity of the prominent Jews in Germany, particularly men such as Bismarck's banker, Gerson von Bleichröder,2 and Hansemann, founder of the great credit bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft. He too stood for the protection of the "little man", but said he knew full well how difficult it would be "to control the pernicious influence of Jewry on our industry".3 He looked back to 1866, as had Glagau, and to 1870 with their

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1 C. Wilmanns, Die "golden" International und die Notwendigkeit einer sozialen Reformpartei (Berlin: M. Amt. Niendorf, 1876), pp.1-2, 58-63. He was for throwing off the influence of the "Three internationals" of ultramontanism (black), Social Democracy (red), and "international money-power" (golden).


glorious military victories as marking "not the beginning of a new epoch of culture, but the end of Christian civilization". His work ends with the imperative, to "eliminate the present system and its carriers".\(^1\) Bismarck, who regarded attacks upon his policies as attacks upon himself, responded with a suit against Meyer which succeeded in driving the latter from Germany.\(^2\) Two of the most prominent "social conservatives", Wagener because of his involvement in rather shady dealings and Meyer through his libel suit, were therefore no longer in any position to lead any sort of movement. Still, the political alliance between the Mittelstand and those with a social-conservative view, (who were also opposed to the Jews), would not simply fade away. On the contrary, the possibility of such an alliance was to grow because factors, other than the social-economic which we have seen thus far, seemed to re-enforce this basic tendency.

A second factor, besides the reaction to the "great crash" and economic system, heightened the effects of the industrial revolution in Germany and helped add fuel to the fire of the new political anti-Semitism. This second factor was the struggle between the Catholic Church and the state, the so-called *Kulturkampf*.

Most historians agree that Bismarck was the moving force behind the assault on the Church, but liberalism which fought everywhere for separation of church and state provided its

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\(^1\) Meyer, *Politische Gründer*, p.201.

\(^2\) Otto Fürst von Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (1898) (Stuttgart: Cottäsche, 1921), 11, p.155. Bismarck had wanted to sue others who had made similar attacks before.
The Kulturkampf should be seen as primarily an attempt by Bismarck to control the newly created Catholic Centre party. This party had won 58 seats in the first elections in 1871, and as it was usually allied with the smaller Polish party, from the outset the two constituted the second largest political group after the National Liberals.

To the request for support by the Pope, Bismarck had initially responded in the affirmative. At least privately Bismarck thought he should receive in return something of real value. He asked for the support of the Pope in orienting the Catholic party in Germany to the support of Bismarck. When this failed he changed his tactic to the offensive. 2

It is difficult today to imagine how intensely this "struggle" was waged, and how seriously many liberals, who supported Bismarck, took the whole matter. Through this struggle Bismarck succeeded in alienating German Catholics, who therefore turned as a body to support the Centre party, and many Conservatives of the Protestant faiths as well. In some ways, in fact, matters got out of hand, for Bismarck had definitely not

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2 This change has been traced by George G. Windell, The Catholics and German Unity 1866-1871 (Minneapolis: Minnesota U.P., 1954), p. 199, to 12 April, 1868 when Bismarck expressed the hope for the Pope to exercise a "moderating influence" and threatened that "it would pain Prussia to have to find that Rome favors what is happening, or that it is not strong enough to put a stop to it; to find in Rome not an ally against the revolution, but a more or less conscious enemy". 
desired to increase the number of his enemies, but to cow into submission the few he had had.¹ Years later, he claimed his policy had been determined by the desire to establish the unity won on the battlefield.² Numerous writers, then and since, have claimed the religious battle was part of the war against clericalism of which 1866 and 1870 were the opening shots.³

Reaction to the Kulturkampf was extremely heated on both sides. Bismarck's supporters, mainly the National Liberal party, became highly animated. Otherwise calm and reliable individuals, men respected for their sobriety and fairness of judgement, found themselves vehemently disposed against the Catholic Church. For example, the Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Vice-President of the Reichstag (1871-1874), ambassador to France for many years and finally Chancellor of Germany (1894-1900), are full of references to ultramontanism or Jesuitism. Hohenlohe was also a practising Catholic and his brother was a Cardinal opposed to the new infallibility dogma.⁴ At one point Hohenlohe even suspected

² Bismarck, Gedanken u. Erinnerungen, II, pp.145-164. He emphasized the Polish side of the struggle here as well.
³ See, for example, H. Robolasky, Bismarck, Zwölflahr deutscher Politik 1871-1883 (2nd ed.; Leipzig: Rengersche Buchhandlung, 1884), pp.348-386.
⁴ See Hans Philippi, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und dem Heiligen Stuhl 1872-1909," HJ 82 Jahrgang (1963), pp.219-262. The dogma of Papal infallibility was proclaimed 18 July, 1870, and met immediate opposition in both Austria and Prussia.
that at one time Bismarck had been under the influence of the Jesuits.¹ The new slogan for such people became, "down with Jesuitism!" To Catholics, and even to many Protestants, it appeared that the clandestine anti-religious or secularist movement had finally showed itself in the form of a full-scale anti-clerical assault. It was a dramatic confirmation to them that religion was in danger. Everywhere, secularism was sweeping to victory, and the place of religion usurped by a kind of substitute religion, (nationalism), or rejected out of hand by those joining the new socialist movement.

It became a widely accepted belief that the Jews were responsible for the Kulturkampf. Precisely where this idea was introduced and by whom is still debated. One cannot see it in relation to the actual activities of the Jews in the houses of representatives. There is no substance to the charge, for example, that Jewish members of the Reichstag had publicly supported Bismarck's religious policies and therefore drew the scorn of Catholics who had so recently seen the legal restrictions removed from the Jews.² If these Jewish members, such as


²Massing, Rehearsal For Destruction, pp.17-18 claims that Lasker "had taken a vigorous part in the parliamentary struggle for the anti-Catholic legislation". Not only was this not the case, but the motives of the prominent Jews in the Reichstag (Lasker, Bamberger, Friedenthal) were questioned by opponents of the Jews. Lothar Bucher wrote to Moritz Busch (11 July, 1872), both well-known associates of Bismarck, that probably the reason these Jews "had spoken and voted against the Jesuit laws, was because they felt a dim presentment that, in an outburst of general indignation against themselves and their race, a demand may be made for exceptional measures against them and their tactics". Moritz Busch, Tagebuchblätter (Leipzig: Grunow, 1899), 11, p.366. Cf. Wilhelm Cahn (ed.), Aus Eduard Lasker's Nachlass, Fünfzehn Jahre parlamentarischer Geschichte (1866-1880) (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1902), p.70 ff.
Lasker, had supported such policies in view of the principles, which they had so recently espoused to win Jewish emancipation, a certain amount of Catholic scorn might have been expected. Each time a piece of anti-Catholic legislation came before the Reichstag, however, the two leading National Liberal Jews, Lasker and Bamberger, voted against the legislation. Though they did not speak out in defense of the Christian churches, neither did they speak for policies widely accepted by the party to which they belonged.¹

There is some evidence to suggest that as early as mid 1872 some people believed that all the Catholics wanted was what the Jews already had.² This is, of course, a subtle form of resentment. Marr had regarded the Kulturkampf in 1873 as part of the Jewish quest for world domination, though he emphasized that church-state conflicts should cease in order to face the real enemy, the Jews.³ The well-known Catholic publicist, Constantin Frantz (1817-1891), tended to regard the struggle as part of the Jews' attempt to bring the "Rechtsstaat" (in place of the Christian state) to Germany, and he saw Bismarck with his friends, "unwittingly" playing into their hands. These Jews, (Frantz referred to them as "parasites in a Christian world"), were working hand in hand with the National Liberals, and together were assailing the very foundations of the Christian

² Ibid., p.1077, see the speech of W. von Hörmann zu Hörbach, a Catholic from Bavaria.
Numerous other examples may be found which maintained that the Jews alone would benefit from a state where relations were governed only by law and citizenship did not depend on religion as well. Other examples can be found which regarded the conflict as yet another divisive element which further fragmented the German sense of community (Gemeinschaft).

The public press was actively involved on all sides. The Catholic newspaper, Germania, sponsored, beginning in the summer of 1875, a series of articles which attempted to reveal the Jewish policy behind the conflict. It reprinted Bismarck's "Jewish-speech" which he had delivered at the United Landtag of 1847. This must have been a little embarrassing for the Chancellor because not only had he disagreed at that time with Jews in public life, but he even used as partial rationalization for that contention the Christian theory of the state. Many of the Germania articles were reprinted in numerous other papers, and spread throughout the country. The well-known Conservative mouth-piece, the Kreuzzeitung had a considerable anti-Jewish tradition from its beginnings under the editorship of Hermann Wagener. One historian believed that in fact Germania had been duped by the Kreuzzeitung into espousing

1 Frantz, Nationalliberalismus und Judenherrschaft, p.23,63.
2 Cf.Constantin Frantz, Der Untergang der alten Parteien die Parteien der Zufunft (Berlin: Graf Behr, 1878), pp.133-
3 Kurt Wawrzinek, Die Entstehung der deutschen Antisemiten
   teien, 1873-1890 (Berlin: Emil Edering, 1927), pp.11-15.
anti-Semitism. Catholic anti-Semitism, however, never achieved any widespread support, (as in France), perhaps because the Catholics were a minority religious group in Germany. Soon after their appearance in Germania, the anti-Semitic articles were retracted. Even though it lasted for but a brief period, further ideas averse to the Jews were spread. At this point, we must turn to the role of nationalism and its impact on the growth of a sentiment hostile to the Jews.

Nationalism is perhaps best understood as a state of mind, a national consciousness, but one "in a state of excitement, intense concern, exacerbation or indignation. The shriller it sounds, the more likely does it conceal some final, deep-seated insecurity. If it becomes a permanent attitude, it is a sign of perilously unhealthy conditions". In terms of its social function, it has been viewed as an ideology of social integration, and representative of a sense of national solidarity.

In the period following the foundation of the Empire the idea that the fate of the nation was somehow involved in the successful resolution of the social question, (and to a less extent, the Jewish question), was surprisingly widespread. This brings into focus a point we have touched in passing, namely the effect of nationalism and the newly won unification upon the rise of a

3 Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus, Soziologie und politische Pädagogik (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1964), 11, pp.52-54.
sentiment of anti-Semitism after 1870 to the point where it became politically meaningful and exploitable. Some people, for example, simply attribute the rise of a new anti-Semitism to the "strengthened consciousness of Germanity caused by the victories of 1870/71 and from the foundation of the Empire."\(^1\)

In relation to this others have seen anti-Semitism as primarily "hatred of the foreigner".\(^2\)

Without exception all the people we have met in this chapter pointed to the lack of assimilation of the Jews, and, therefore, to the unfulfilled expectations of Jewish emancipation. The most widespread feeling appears to have been that the Jews had "misused" their emancipation and had broken an implicit "contract" which stated: we'll emancipate you if you agree to assimilate, that is to assume the normal "proportional representa-

\(^1\) Karl Friedrich Borée, Semiten und Antisemiten, Begegnungen und Erfahrungen (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1960), p.7. Cf. Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik (4th ed.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1918), 1, pp.296-297, claimed that during the middle ages Jews were tolerated because "they controlled the trade of the world". In time, however, they ceased to be indispensable...and it then became apparent what a dangerous disentrating force lurked in this people who were able to assume the mask of any other nationality. When a nation has become conscious of itself, fair-minded Jews must themselves admit this, there is no longer room for the cosmopolitanism of Jewry....It can no longer be doubted, that Jewry can continue to play a role, if they become full Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans, (as the case may be),...consent to merge their old memories into the nation to which they belong politically. This is a completely just and reasonable demand which we of the Occident must make of them; no people can concede a double nationality to the Jews.

tion" in all walks of life. Incidentally, few of these people we have met thus far could be called "racist", with the possible exception of Marr and Wilmanns, as this developed later. Most would subscribe to Lagarde's dictum that "Germanity lies not in the blood, but in the soul (Gemüt)". Much of the talk about "alien domination" really boiled down to resentment at the successes of the Jews since they had been emancipated, resentment not simply of Jewish wealth, but the power and influence that went with it. It can be argued, of course, that psychologically a decision had already been made, or at least a predisposition existed, that one be inclined against the Jews even before one looked in detail at their activities.\textsuperscript{1} The essential point, or so it would appear, was that all the individual activities of the Jews were alleged to have a collective meaning, as if it were believed that through some form of explicit or implicit conspiracy, these people had decided to carry out activities detrimental to the nation. The Jews were a distinct nation which had visibly conquered Germany. This conquest was being expedited by liberal economic policies which both emancipated the Jews, (or gave them freedom to do what they wanted), and set about weakening and destroying the "real" Germany. More vulnerable groups within the old society were already going under.\textsuperscript{2} These latter groups embraced the so-called \textit{Mittelstand}.

\textsuperscript{1}Stanislav Andreski, "An Economic Interpretation of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe," \textit{JJS} vol.2 (1963), pp.201-213 points out that in all cases the psychological factor is important but cannot by itself account for the variations.

\textsuperscript{2}The importance of individual vulnerability in the psychology of the anti-Semite, why such a vulnerable individual directs his aggression at an out-group rather than an in-group, the correlation
It was significant that both the workers, who rallied to the highly organized and powerful Social Democratic party, and the entrepreneurial class, which found powerful spokesmen as well, did not as a rule support political parties which advocated anti-Semitism.\(^1\)

At least in the minds of theoreticians, an over-bearing sense of being German often led to expression of anti-Semitism. Constantin Frantz, whom we may select as an example, expressed quite succinctly what many others also maintained: "One speaks of German or French Jews, but never of Jewish Germans or French"; they live in France or Germany "only by accident".\(^2\) A famous French novelist and nationalist put it slightly differently when he said that the Jews had no "patrie"; they had no ties to the lands wherein they lived, but went "only where they find their greatest profit".\(^3\)

There were several significant ideas expressed here. First, because the Jews could not support or maintain a state they were thought to be somehow inferior.\(^4\) There was also the idea that the Jews were a nation which deliberately chose to remain a

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\(^2\) Frantz, Nationalliberalismus und Judenherrschaft, p.10.


\(^4\) Cf. Varnhagen von Ense, Europäische Zeitenwende Tagebücher 1835-1860 (Munich: Alert Langen-Georg Müller, 1960), p.246, entry for 24 May, 1848, who felt that the best nations were "mixed" (Mischvölker), and the Jews, who were seen as the "purest", were the worst off because they could not even support a state.
nation and therefore refused to make a commitment to the nation-state wherein they lived. (In present day Canada the typical response to any immigrant who happens to voice either any approval for his land of origin or disapproval at Canada, is to tell him in no uncertain terms to go back to the place from which he came.) Finally, there was expressed the idea that the Jews were cosmopolitans or "nomads" who were by nature "robbers" and "plunderers".¹ In an interview towards the end of the century, a leading Social Democrat, August Bebel (1840-1913), remarked on the importance of the economic position of the Jews in accounting for anti-Semitism, and also the "national impulse". This latter "impulse" was more pronounced in Germany, he claimed, because there, as opposed to Spain or Italy, for example, the Jews were more "visible" and, consequently, more alien.² Nationalist arguments, in other words, were found to re-enforce basic social and economic feelings, and they were therefore another point of appeal for political anti-Semitism.

No discussion of the inter-action between anti-Semitism and nationalism can fail to discuss Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), the man most frequently suggested as having person-

¹This idea was taken up later by Adolf Wahrmund, Das Gesetz des Nomadentums und die heutige Judenherrschaft (1887) (Munich: Deutscher Volks-Verlag, 1919), p.41
²Bahr, Antisemitismus: Ein internationales Interview, p.23. Cf. the response by Friedrich Spielhagen in the same interview. Spielhagen added that "one must not approach the problem of anti-Semitism from the psychological side. One must rather come from the economic side. It is an economic question and demands an economic solution." As long as one does not help the economically weak against the economically strong, then no amount of education and culture, will put an end to anti-Semitism. p.8
ified a nationalism which contained elements of anti-Semitism in this period. Treitschke has been surrounded by so many myths that when one really confronts the man's work, he is surprised not to find an ogre. Of course, it has recently been argued that the very "moderation" of Treitschke's attacks upon the Jews was instrumental in spreading the popularity of anti-Semitism. He succeeded where more virulent types would have failed.¹ His brand of nationally motivated anti-Semitism was similar to most others in its view that the Jewish question involved the unity and strength of Germany. In so far as he interested himself in the social question, (he tended to remain aloof on most such matters), he exhibited a similar concern.² Socialists and their sympathizers, for example, disgusted him because they unnecessarily raised insatiable expectations and therefore brought about conflict.³ The strong, viable, state, he believed, ought not to be torn by conflicts which broke down the national consensus. His personal formula appears to have been based on the fairly standard liberal idea of "careers open to the talented". If the Jewish question had not been solved by the removal of legal restrictions on the Jews, as he, a liberal, had hoped and expected, the fault lay

² Treitschke, Politik, 11, p.480, for critical remarks on the Jews and their disproportionate role in the stock-exchange.
³ See his reply to Schmoller's "Die soziale Frage und der Preussische Staat" (1874), Heinrich von Treitschke, "Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner" (1874) in Schraepler (ed.), Quellen der sozialen Frage, 11, pp.66-73.
with the Jews because they did not assimilate. One should note here, that he attacked the Jews not because they could never be German, (he was not a racist), but because they "did not want to be unreservedly German". He doubted whether the Jewish immigrants from the east would ever be assimilated. He noted with great concern the large numbers of Jews in Germany, saying that more Jews lived in Berlin than in all of France put together. 2

The end of the 1870's and early 1880's saw a quite pronounced increase in the published output of anti-Semitism and also the beginning of organized political parties with anti-Semitism in their program. (This last point we shall take up in the next chapter.) It was at this critical moment that Treitschke launched a great public campaign on the Jewish question in the press. His allegations elicited numerous responses and counter-charges. In fact, there ensued a verbal war, involving many prestigious academics and public figures. This "war" has been termed the "anti-Semitic conflict" Antisemitismusstreit. 4

It was here that Treitschke coined the slogan "the Jews are our misfortune". It did not matter that it was for him only a statement of a mental exasperation, which he followed with clarifications, the substance of which was that no one wanted to repeal

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1 Treitschke, "Unsere Aussichten" (1879), Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe, IV, p. 481.
2 Treitschke, "Herr Graetz und sein Judentum" (1879) Aufsätze, Reden, Briefe, IV, p. 483 ff. Cf. the later "Die jüdische Einwanderung in Preussen" (1883), pp. 642-646.
4 All the main documents are collected in Walter Boehlich (ed.), Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1965), passim.
Jewish emancipation.

Some of the responses he provoked are noteworthy not only as answers, but as evidence of the wide variety of causes allegedly behind anti-Semitism. Ludwig Bamberger, for example, a leading liberal of Jewish faith saw anti-Semitism as a parallel to North American "nativism" of the period, which was aimed at immigrants coming into the new world. Theodor Mommsen, the historian and nationalist, objected to Treitschke's using his lecture hall to such demagogic ends. His opposition to Treitschke should also serve to remind us, once again, that not all nationalists were anti-Semitic. Treitschke responded to this by gleaning Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte* (vol.111,550) for what he felt were anti-Semitic expressions there. He selected what was to become a famous quote: "Jewry", Mommsen had said in his history of Rome, "was an active ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition". Though Mommsen repeatedly claimed that this quote was taken wholly out of context, it nevertheless was anxiously taken up by many anti-Semites because it summarized their fears so well. By a peculiar irony the expression earned Mommsen a place in anti-

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1 Ludwig Bamberger, "Deutschthum und Judenthum" (1880), in Boehlich (ed.), *Antisemitismusstreit*, pp.149-180, especially p. 158. For the American story Cf. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (N.Y.: Alfred A.Knopf, 1956), passim. The comparison of American Populism and pre-World War I political anti-Semitism in Germany should not be dismissed because of the little amount of anti-Semitism in populism--the similarities are more substantial than that.

2 See Appendix II, *Declaration of the Notables*.

3 Theodore Mommsen, "Brief an den Redakteur der Nationalzeitung" (1890) and "Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum" (1880) in Boehlich (ed.), *Antisemitismusstreit*, pp.208-225.
Semitic lore next to Richard Wagner and Treitschke.\(^1\) Mommsen's statement and Treitschke's, (who could also claim to having his expression distorted), were often linked together. Nor, then, were Treitschke's aims any more satisfactorily achieved.

The effect of the public debate in fact worked in the opposite direction to Treitschke's desires. The very popularisation of anti-Semitism, which resulted in part from his publications, by its very nature would make it more difficult to achieve the full assimilation of the Jews in Germany. Recent scholarship has also held him partially responsible for supplying the impetus behind the eventual restrictions on Polish and Jewish immigration into Prussia in 1885/86.\(^2\)

His immediate impact upon his own students was great, though he specifically enjoined them not to organize and become involved in the conflicts of the day.\(^3\) German students did organize, however, at the beginning of 1881, first in Berlin, and soon after in Halle, Leipzig and Breslau, the Verein deutscher Studenten, which eventually spread to most German universities. This Verein actually embraced a collection of separately organized local student associations. Its source of inspiration went beyond Treitschke.\(^4\) Its leading ideas included


\(^3\)Heinrich von Treitschke, "Antwort auf eine studentische Huldigung" (21 November, 1880) *Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe*, IV, pp.537-538. "I urge you strongly to desist from public demonstrations of any kind."

\(^4\)It included people like Adolf Wagner, Adolf Stoecker and Friedrich Naumann. See Theodor Heuss, *Friedrich Naumann, der Mann das Werk, die Zeit* (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich, 1947), pp.21-29.
loyalty to the monarchy, the fatherland, and Christianity. Anti-Semitism assumed a prominent role in the activities of the Verein since the occasion for its foundation was the Antisemitenpetition in 1880 protesting against the prominent role of Jews in the political and cultural life of the nation.¹

One of its more famous members, the publicist, Helmut von Gerlach (1866-1935), described it as a social club where one could go to discuss the issues of the day and meet the famous anti-Semites such as Glagau and Treitschke. He claimed the Verein "was anti-Semitic because Jewry was considered un-German, (race theory), unpatriotic, (the Jews stood almost without exception in the camp of the opposition), and asocial, (they were believed to be the pillars of Manchesterism)."²

Treitschke seems to have vacillated between wanting to be something of an idol to these students and, at the same time, something of a conservative influence. Although he would support neither the infamous Antisemitenpetition of 1880, which demanded that the government repeal Jewish emancipation, nor any measures which violated the principle of legal equality, he was uncertain enough in his rejection to inadvertently appear as one of its

¹ Professor Dr. Jordan, "Die Geschichte des Verbandes," Praktisches Handbuch der Vereine Deutschen Studenten (Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1958), pp. 10-21. The petition was presented to Bismarck 13 April, 1881. It contained 225,000 signatures distributed thus: 1/5 came from Silesia, 30,000 from Brandenburg Province (12,000 from Berlin), Westphalia had 27,000, Rhein Province 20,000, Württemburg, Hohenzollern and Baden combined had 7,000, Bavaria 9,000. See Wawrzinek, Antisemitenparteien, p. 38.

sponsors. As with so many other anti-Semites, the attacks upon Treitschke only served to inflate his reputation for his followers.

If one wanted to find the really complete anti-Semite of the decade of the 1870's, one would have to choose Otto Glagau. In a work written toward the end of the 1870's he reviewed the significant events of the decade and brought the diverse strands of anti-Semitism together. He reiterated the charge that Lasker opposed only promoters of particular political views and that the National Liberals had systematically sought to shift the blame to the Conservatives for the economic chaos. The Kulturkampf was part of an effort to divert attention, but the "real instigators and heralders were the promoters and the Jews". These same people now attempted to discredit him by charging that he was possessed by a blind "hatred of promoters". Though Glagau concentrated on the Jews, he threw his net wide enough to include all liberals whose economic policies were having a detrimental effect upon certain vulnerable social groups, the artisans, the peasants, indeed, all the "little people". The so-called liberal freedoms, which, he said, were inspired by the Jews,


3 Glagau, "Gründerhate", Neue Culturkampf, p.149, 98.
freedom of movement and freedom to work at trades (Gewerbe-
freiheit), for example, were, in practice, undermining the
welfare of those vulnerable groups which modern technology
and industrialization had apparently condemned to the junk
heap. In this way the economic policy of the Reich bore the
stamp of a bankers-policy; it was overly rational, materialis-
tic, and not concerned with the human elements involved. ¹
Glagau was prepared to call for a "new Kulturkampf" against
the "pseudo liberal freedoms"; this would begin by having all
the legislation since 1867 repealed. He wanted to shore up
"the three main pursuits of the population which were being
systematically ignored", namely, agriculture, artisanship,
and small business (Gewerbe but not Handel). Because of the
false ideas of "tolerance" and "humanity" "the Jews now
dominate Germany, its business life, they create the new laws,
form public opinion etc.; we have just emancipated him and
now he rules us.... The social question is clearly the Jewish
question."² The survival of the new Reich was seen by him to
be contingent on successfully meeting these challenges.

In conclusion, it is not difficult to visualize that the
ideas embraced by anti-Semitism had undergone quite a sweeping
change. By the simple process of addition one can see that it
was linked to some of the most explosive issues of the new era.
Because of this, anti-Semitism came to have a considerable
political potential.

Chapter V

Epilogue: The First Anti-Semitic Political Parties

In the last chapter we attempted to outline the development of an anti-Semitic sentiment. The matter we shall now view involves the creation of political parties which sought to capitalize on that sentiment. We shall see that this political anti-Semitism eventually formed part of the ideological ammunition with which certain social groups, particularly the Mittelstand, fought the rapidly expanding industrialization which affected their position within society. The creation of political anti-Semitism, that is to say, politically organized anti-Semitism, occurred within the context of the politicization of society as a whole in Germany.

In terms of political organization, the degree of intensity of electoral battles, and political involvement, Germany of the early 1870's was relatively innocent. Competition between various parties tended, therefore, to be carried on in a rather gentlemanly fashion. In the course of the decade considerably new trends began to set in. These new trends were attributable to many factors, but existed primarily because many people felt their fate to be involved in what went on in the federal and state legislatures. There was a quite discernable trend under

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1 See, for example, the excellent study, Nipperdy, Organization deutscher Parteien, pp.9-41.
the impact of industrialization and economic change to organize in an effort to mitigate the worst effects of this change. Definite interest groups came into existence, either to fulfil direct economic and social interests or to have legislation enacted or changed. While such interest groups had existed before, it was only after 1870 that they entered, in a serious way, into the political sphere. For example, two of the more sensational political events of the 1870's included the growth of Catholic political participation with the Kulturkampf, and the growing power of the newly united Social Democratic party. Though this period has usually been referred to as the "liberal era" it is perhaps better seen as the period of "conservative revival and the decline of liberalism". For example, after the successes in the federal elections of the early 1870's the two main liberal parties representation in the Reichstag declined, while the fortunes of the Conservative party improved.

3 Ludwig Bergstrasser, Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland (Munich: Günter Olzog, 1960), pp.140-146.
4 Schwarz, MDR, pp.820-821. In the 397 seat Reichstag support for the two main liberal parties (N.L. and Progressives) went respectively from 120 and 40 (1871), to 152 and 49 (1874), to 127 and 35 (1877), to 98 and 26 (1878). In the same period the two main conservative parties (Konservative and Deutsche Reich Partei) went
the growth of a sentiment opposed to liberalism, re-enforced as it was by real social and economic problems, the change should hardly surprise us.

It should be remembered that the new Empire was very much Bismarck's child, and he had never wanted to be dependent upon liberal support. In retrospect he viewed his break with the Conservatives as most unfortunate, but dictated by their demand that he break with the constitution, as he had during the Prussian constitutional conflict on a previous occasion. He particularly resented the way in which the National Liberals had attempted to take advantage of his difficulties with the Centre party during the Kulturkampf. Still, he had little choice but depend on liberal support when the Conservative party was in such disarray. Few indeed were the Conservative politicians such as Count Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879), who realized that the Conservative party "had to become a party of Conservative progress, and abandon the policy of the drag..." As the decade wore on, however, both the Conservatives and Bismarck began to move together once again.

To explain fully why this was so is more involved than might appear on the surface. The answer to this question entails taking into account the reasons behind the foundation of the Empire in the first place, whose interests it was to serve and respectively from 54 and 38 (1871), 21 and 33 (1874), 40 and 38 (1877), 59 and 56 (1878). In the Prussian Lower House the conservative renaissance was far more apparent, see Otto-Ernst Schüddelkopf, Die deutsche Innenpolitik im letzten Jahrhundert und der konservative Gedanke (Braunschweig: Albert Limbach, 1951), p.124.

\[1\] Roon to his eldest son, 25 February, 1868, quoted by Bismarck, Gedanken, II, pp.165-185, Roon was minister of war 1858-1873 and a leading Conservative.
sustain, and how the initial coalition of forces began to change.¹ (Even the personal disposition of Bismarck is not easily reconstructed.²) It is also true that liberalism itself was undergoing a crisis, caused in part by the growing diversity of interests of the bourgeoisie. Whereas earlier there had been a fairly homogeneous interest underlying liberalism, with the breakthrough of industrialization the interests of the upper bourgeoisie came to be differentiated from the middle, and lower middle classes.³ Of course, some would maintain that liberalism was fated to a tragic end the moment it accepted a compromise between "liberty" and "unity", by agreeing to work with Prussian power at all.⁴ These various factors must be kept in mind when one is attempting to account for the decline of liberalism and the revival of conservatism. One would have to conclude, however, that not only was the "liberal era" of short duration, but it was in many important

¹See the recent work by Wolfgang Zorn, "Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der deutschen Reichsgründungszeit 1850-1879)," Sozialgeschichte, ed. Wehler, pp. 254-270. Also Helmut Böhme, Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966), pp. 1-10, and the numerous fine articles in Helmut Böhme (ed.), Probleme der Reichsgründungszeit, 1848-1879 (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsche, 1968), passim.


³See the very suggestive Theodor Schieder, The State and Society in Our Times (London: Nelson, 1962), pp. 39-64 on "The Crisis of Bourgeois Liberalism".

respects highly tenuous.¹ Now we must turn to the actual political parties which accepted anti-Semitism as part of their program, and the response they enjoyed.

For many reasons the political movement created by the Court Chaplain, Adolf Stoecker (1835-1909), the Christian-Social Workers party, may be chosen as an example of a socially-conservative anti-Semitism. It began in the decade of the 1870’s, and by its very name it was obviously addressed to the social question; it was this party which introduced anti-Semitism as a political slogan and associated with the Conservative party within the Reichstag; finally, it is the party about which we have the most material. Its centre of activity was Berlin. Political anti-Semitism was first introduced in Berlin and spread from there to the outlying areas.

The chief mover and representative of the party, Stoecker, had a proletarian background, about which he never failed to remind his audiences. He was the son of a blacksmith and studied theology, but at great sacrifice to his parents. He rose from being a tutor in a private home in 1859 to a preacher to the military in Metz during the Franco-Prussian war. His patriotic speeches won such attention that by 1874 he was called upon to become third court preacher in Berlin.²

¹Signs that the end of the "liberal era" was at hand appeared first in April, 1876 with the departure of Rudolf Delbrück, culminated in a reversion to protective tariffs in 1879. See Ivo Nikolai Lambi, Free Trade and Protection in Germany, 1868-1879 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1963), pp.131-149. Bismarck's attempt to root out liberals from the administration met with less success, cf. Schwarz, "Political Attitudes", pp.11-13, 249 ff., and Rudolf Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck, 1867-1890 (Münster: Aschendorff'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1957), pp. 262-270.

Opinion on his general world-outlook is extraordinarily varied. Some see him as essentially backward looking. Friedrich Naumann (1860-1922), the well-known public figure and former student of Stoecker, thought him a child of the spirit of the restoration 1850's and the world of Friedrich Wilhelm IV.\(^1\) Others have, on the contrary, seen his view oriented not to the past, but to the future.\(^2\) The Marxist historian, Arthur Rosenberg, has called him "the most intelligent champion of the Conservative opposition to Bismarck" who declared "it to be the duty of Prussia and of the Protestant Church to come to the aid of the city-proletariat, crushed down as it was by Jews and capitalists, by seeing that their just demands were fulfilled."\(^3\) To the initiated he was regarded as "the greatest man of the times, after Bismarck", a man who wanted not only to help directly where he could, but one who had taken up the political struggle in order to have remedial legislation enacted.\(^4\) We must look at the reality behind such views.

Even before 1874, when he came to Berlin, there is some


\(^2\)Karl Buchheim, Geschichte der christlichen Parteien in Deutschland (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1953), p.239.


evidence to suggest that Stoecker had been concerned with the growth of irreligiosity and the social question. This concern was magnified many times when he arrived in Berlin. The emergence of the Social Democratic party the next year (1874), which was dedicated to atheism in his view, had a great impact on him as well. The growing concern with the social question brought forward numerous propositions for "solving" that question, apart from those offered by Social Democracy. Stoecker found many of the arguments of members of the Verein für Sozialpolitik congenial. Particularly interesting were the ideas of one of the members, Dr. Gustav Schönberg (1839-1908).\footnote{On Schönberg see Müssigang, Soziale Frage, pp.173-182.} It was this latter individual who saw the social question as more than a material, economic one, affecting only the working classes. Rather he saw it as affecting the whole population and involving, besides a material, moral and religious solutions as well. "False extreme outlooks", such as socialism and communism, did not have the answers; they were to be found through making relevant once again "the imperatives of moral teaching, religion, humanity, and culture".\footnote{Gustav Schönberg, Die sittliche-religiöse Bedeutung der sozialen Frage (Stuttgart: Levy & Müller, 1876), passim.}

These were also the conclusions reached by a preacher and friend to Stoecker, Rudolf Todt (1837-1887), in his Der radikale deutsche Sozialismus und die christliche Gesellschaft (1877). With Todt and a group of friends, Stoecker formed on 5 December, 1877 the Zentralverein für Sozialreform auf religiosen und
Stoecker explained that it took its clue from Adolf Wagner's "What is Socialism?", an article which insisted that real socialism must be based on religious, as well as social and political principles. Wagner (1835-1917), incidently, was perhaps the best known of this group as a leading academic and charter member of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. In his article Wagner said that "the socialist is not necessarily politically radical, an absolute enemy of religion and the Church, or a philosophical materialist". What they were after, said Stoecker, was "a conservative socialism" to provide a viable alternative to Social Democracy.

Why then, it must be asked, did he not simply throw in his lot with the established Conservative party? The old Conservative party had attempted to come to grips with the world following its dismal showing in the 1874 federal elections. A new "German Conservative" party was founded in 1876, and though its initial program sought to win some kind of national support, the party remained overwhelmingly centered on East Elbian agrarian interests. The large agrarian interests had

1Bahr, Antisemitismus-Interview, pp.76-78. Wagner admitted an antipathy to Jews but rejected being called a leading anti-Semite. "That I never was....I was a Christian-Socialist. But of the anti-Semitism which one presently sees, I have never represented. I hold that anti-Semitism, which mixes up the social question with the Jewish question, to be false. A solution of the Jewish would not fully solve the social question at all....The social question is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with the Jews."


3Felix Salomon, Die deutschen Parteiprogramme (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), 11, pp.7-9, and on the East-Elbian character see the statistics on the geographical location of the elected representatives in Hans Booms, Die Deutsch-Konservative Partei (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1954), pp.6-7.
their own problems, for in the course of the 1870's Germany began to experience a severe agricultural crisis which paralleled and re-enforced the "depression" in industry. The causes again were many. Germany passed from net-exporter to net-importer of agricultural produce from 1875 onward; there was increased competition of foreign produce; there was a fall in prices.¹ The result was that agrarians became converted to the idea of protective tariffs and exerted much effort to have the agricultural tariffs raised.² The means employed in winning public support included some anti-Semitic appeals. The well-known interest group associated with the Conservatives, the Farmers' League (Bund der Landwirte), which began later (1893), was marked by considerable anti-Semitism. This became an integral part of the agrarian movement as a whole, as part not only of their political and economic ideology, but of their practical political activities and agitation as well.³ In short, the newly founded (1876) German Conservative party had interests which diverged sharply from the social question as seen by Stoecker and company in Berlin.

²Lambi, Free Trade, pp.131-149.
³Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und prus-sischer Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (Hannover: Verlag f.Lit.u.Zeit., 1966), p.111. Cf. Bernard Lazare, Antisemitism Its History and Its Causes (N.Y.: International Library, 1903), p.206 commented: "The emancipation of the Jew is linked with the growth of the prevalence of industrial capital. So long as landed capital retained the political power, the Jew was deprived of any right; the Jew was liberated on the day when political power passed to industrial capital."
Stoecker realized the need of a party more oriented toward the modern social question, but of a conservative-Christian basis as well. The original Zentralverein für Sozialreform was deliberately created as a non-political body. Against the advice of Todt, who thought politics no place for a man of the cloth, Stoecker, with the help of such people as Adolf Wagner and Hermann Wagener, set out to form the Christian-Social Workers party in early 1878. His own reasons, as he explained in a letter to Crown Prince Friedrich, were mixed. He wanted to help revive the religious feelings of the people, and particularly to cut off the support of godless Social Democracy by offering a reasonable alternative. In order to reach the workers' hearts one necessarily had to deal with the social question.¹ Friends liked to compare his entering into the political fray to Luther's nailing his theses to the Church door.² Certainly, he always had about him the ethos of a man with a religious mission in the world.

The first meeting of his party on 3 January, 1878 was something of a disaster. Many workers attended, but, unfortunately, they consisted primarily of disciplined members of the Social Democratic party. Stoecker's address to the meeting on the deplorable nature of working-class movements which emphasized hatred of fatherland and Christianity, did not fall on sympathetic ears. The hated Social Democracy attained the

²Max Braun, Adolf Stoecker (Berlin: Verlag d.Vaterland., 1912), pp.96-97.
initial victory, The party, therefore, had to be formally constituted at a later, smaller meeting with some fifty people present. Over the next few weeks Stoecker turned his attention to the artisans. In fact, it was in the hall of the Artisan's Union (Handwerkerverein) that most of the party's initial meetings were held. His speech to them on 18 January, 1878 emphasized that the artisans "were free men, not slaves to any party". Though he did not want to restrict his following to this group, it seemed clear to him that these people needed political representation as well as the workers. His interest in them was confirmed the following week when these artisans enthusiastically received his proposed program. In it he opposed the picture of the socialist future. In his view solutions to the social question involved first, improving bad social conditions, then, providing greater economic security, and finally, organizing politically. His brand of socialism involved humanitarian state help, balanced with self-help, which together would provide greater equality between men, but not the equality of the propertyless. ¹

The initial program of the party made no mention of the Jews as such. It did, however, mention items which were considered to be particularly associated with the Jews and which were popularly denounced by anti-Semites. For example, the first point of the program declared that the party based itself on the Christian religion and the love of King and

¹Stoecker, C.-S. Raden, pp.1-19.
fatherland. There were, too, demands for tax on the stock-exchange and for restoration of the laws on usury. Social Democracy was opposed as "impractical, un-Christian, and unpatriotic". The first election in which the party engaged, the Reichstag elections of 1878 in Berlin, ended in failure for the party.

This initial failure did not deter Stoecker. After his lack of success at drawing off the support of Social Democracy (or the Progressive party, also very strong in Berlin), he renewed his efforts to win the "uncommitted" social groups, the artisans and the "little people" or Mittelstand. In a speech of 29 March, 1879 on "the distress of artisanship and relief", he explained how the present economic system was ruining the artisan and how the present doctor, liberalism, prescribed only a "hunger-cure". It was liberalism which was causing the economic and moral ruin of the country. He qualified his disdain of liberalism by saying that he did not reject the "old liberalism" which preached freedom of conscience, equality before the law, and the free development of the personality. Rather, he opposed "modern, false liberalism". Precisely what comprised "false liberalism" was left rather vaguely defined. His ideas on this matter he developed a full year later in a speech "on the artisan question". By that time he

1Salmon, Parteiprogramme, I1, Programme der christlich-sozialen Arbeiterpartei (1878), pp.47-49.
2They received but 1,421 votes, compared to 56,000 (Social Democratic party) and 86,000 (Progressive party).
3Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, pp.31-32. On the idea of "false liberalism" see the earlier program of the Centre party (1876) in Salomon, Parteiprogramme, I1, p.22
was also making openly anti-Semitic statements and appeals as well. There, "false liberalism" was seen to be primarily economic liberalism, and the principle of Gewerbefreiheit he called "a misfortune for individual man and for the nation". Once again the appeal was made for the need to organize. He gave the artisans just what they wanted to hear, namely, that Gewerbefreiheit should be dropped. In order to face the modern world, though, guilds would clearly have to be up-dated. This up-dating would have to be supplemented by legal enactments making them compulsory once again.\(^1\) In this context, the relevance of the Jewish question was seen to be in their untoward influence. This influence Stoecker seems to have visualized as equivalent to the influence exercised upon the flock of Moses when he went up on the mountain to receive the commandments from God. Stoecker seems to have seen the Jews tempting the German people away from their true path by introducing the spirit of "mammonism, ego-ism, atomism, and the rule of the golden calf".\(^2\)

The development of his anti-Semitism proceeded by almost imperceptible steps. As a speaker Stoecker has been highly regarded. He seems to have been able to feel out the attitude of his audiences and to play upon matters which enjoyed some response. One of his followers emphasized that Stoecker had

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\(^1\) Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, pp.233-241. For an introduction to the problem of the artisans in general see Wolfram Fischer, Quellen zur Geschichte des deutschen Handwerks (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957), passim.

ignited the artisan and small merchant classes with his eloquence and "initially with his off-handed critical remarks on Jewry". The first formal speech centered on the Jews was delivered on 19 September, 1879, after his first failure at the polls. Its intention was to bring about a social reconciliation between Christians and Jews. This could come about, Stoecker felt, if the Jews "were a little more modest", "a little more tolerant", "a little more equal". In its way it was a moderate speech, but one that contained most of the usual anti-Semitic statements, from the statement that the Jews were "a state within a state" to charges that the Jews should engage in more productive work (Arbeit).

It ended on a rather ominous note, by saying that certain "demands" had to be met:

Either we succeed in this and Germany will rise again, or the cancer from which we suffer will spread further. In that event our whole future is threatened and the German spirit will become Judaized. The German economy will become impoverished.

Stoecker, like Treitschke, did not oppose the Jews for racial reasons, and considered racial theories un-Christian. Moreover, he always dissociated himself from traditional hatred of the Jews. What he claimed to fight against was "modern Jewry", which was a different thing altogether. He was a little uncertain regarding just who "modern Jewry" was, but he realized there were good and honest Jews. Nor did he

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1Gerlach, Von Rechts nach Links, p.105
2See the critical comments of Bamberger, Erinnerungen, p.381.
3Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, pp.359-369, cf. Lagarde, Programm für die konservative Partei Preussens, October, 1884, Deutsche Schriften, pp.360-366, desired that the Conservative party fight both the Jews and "Judaization" of Germany.
oppose the wealth of the Jews as such, but what he called
their "predominance" (Uebermacht). ¹ He even refused, again
like Treitschke, to advocate restrictions being placed on
the rights of citizenship of the Jews. Still, he did regard
emancipation as having erred in its expectation that assim-
ilation would follow. It had also erred in so far as it
expected to draw the Jews away from such occupations as
usury. In view of these "disappointments" what was needed
now, was a means of limiting their influence upon the life
of the nation which stood, in his view, on the brink of an
unspeakable ruin, a "material, moral and religious ruin". ²

The solutions put forward by Stoecker are interesting
in so far as they reflect the sort of anti-Semitism accepted
by his followers. The Jewish question became involved in the
social question at many points, as we have seen, and their
solutions similarly overlapped. One could make it more
difficult for the Jews to exploit Germany by tightening up
economic legislation; the same legislation would help those
social groups being adversely affected by the economic and

¹Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, p.259 April, 1881, Christliche-
konservative Ziele für die Gegenwart.
²Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, pp.391-415 February, 1880, Das
unzweifelhaft Berichtete, Edle und Notwendige der gegenwärtigen
antijüdischen Bewegung und Prinzipien, Thatsachen und Ziele in
Judenfrage. This speech was delivered to the Prussian Lower
House of which he was a member from 1879. See the extremely
revealing debates reprinted as Die Judenfrage im preussischen
Abgeordnetenhaus, Wörtlichen Abdruck der stenographischen
Berichte vom 20-22 November, 1880 (Breslau: Franz Goerlich,
1880). Especially noticeable is the residue of Catholic and
Conservative resentment of the Progressives whom they accused
of at once pushing for complete removal of restrictions on the
Jews and the Kulturkampf. See the replies of Virchow, pp.41-
55, Richter, pp.92-110, and Stoecker, pp.110-133.
social developments. In this way Jewish "great-capital" and trade, Jewish usurers and itinerant vendors could be restricted (not qua Jews but qua occupations). Peddling was to be forbidden, the stock-exchange taxed. On the other side, guilds should be given assistance, co-operatives established. The Jews were to be fought "without hatred, without insults, without slander", but their predominance had to end. His was a moral appraisal of the situation, as distinguished from a scientific one, and required basically a moral solution. This was what he meant when he said that for him the Jewish question was a "social-ethical" one. He could not agree with Marx or Lassalle who, he said, sought to get the workers to hate industry or capitalism as their enemy. "Our movement corrects this; we show the nation that the root of their desperate conditions lies in the power of money, the spirit of Mammonism of the stock-exchange". He constantly maintained that the Jews were not content to live as other people, but were determined to dominate. This was easily verified by reference to such things as their disproportionate numbers in educational institutions. The ultimate solution for Stoecker to the Jewish question, was to offer the imperative "buy from no Jew!", since he felt that, deprived in this way, the Jews would go into more "productive" work (Arbeit).

1Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, p.421, 3 February, 1882 Das Judentum im öffentlichen Leben eine Gefahr für das Deutsche Reich.

How was all this received? Officially, in the highest circles, there was a mixed reaction. Bismarck’s association with Jews was well known, and in fact he was much persecuted because of them. He explained to his private secretary, who was a man with certain anti-Semitic tendencies, in November, 1881, that he had not at first favoured all the agitation directed at the Jews, but had reason for some second thoughts since Stoecker’s election to the Reichstag in 1881.¹ Then, for a fleeting moment, he thought that Stoecker’s movement might help take Berlin out of the hands of his political enemies, the Progressives and the Social Democrats. Nevertheless, he commented, these “elections have shown that the German Philistine still lives and allows himself to be frightened and led astray by fine speeches and lies”.² Later under William II, on whom Stoecker exercised a considerable influence, he had reason to dislike Stoecker very much indeed. This was primarily because Stoecker was bent on driving a wedge between William II and Bismarck (post 1888) with the view to clearing the way for himself.³ The public response was hardly more gratifying.

¹Stoecker was elected in October, 1881 but not in Berlin but Arnsberg. He kept the seat to 1893, lost it briefly and regained it in 1898 until his death in 1909.
²Busch, Tagebuchblätter, 111, p.55, entry for 16 November, 1881. Busch seems to have been anxious to show that Bismarck had adverse ideas on the Jews, which the Chancellor heartily disclaimed. See Bismarck to Busch, 3 August, 1883, Hans Rothfels (ed.), Bismarck-Briefe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955), pp.405-406.
his activities, frankly rejected the appeals of a Christian Socialism with its monarchic and patriarchal overtones, "pulpit socialism", as it has been called.\(^1\) One of his biographers has constructed a correlation table between the size of his audiences and the nature of the subject under discussion. On the basis of this he concluded that such success as was achieved was "due not to the orthodox Court Chaplain, but to the anti-Semitic agitator", and that "the kernel of the movement was hardly religious, but rather political-social".\(^2\) His party was so consistently ignored by the working class, that at the beginning of 1881 the "Workers" in the title of the party was dropped. The only people he seemed to be able to arouse were the Mittelstand. These people rejected both Social Democracy and sweeping industrialization because, ultimately, both would turn them into proletarians. While the group comprised by the Mittelstand was far from homogeneous, they did share a basic desire to conserve the social and economic values of the pre-industrial era which conferred upon them a certain status.\(^3\) Even the so-called new Mittelstand of white collar workers whose prosperity, whether they liked it or not, was tied to the prosperity of industry, rejected the clerical union


\(^2\) Frank, Hofprediger Stoecker, p.126.

\(^3\) Cf. Lebovics, "Socialism For the Middle Classes," p.36 ff. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man. Social Bases of Politics ("Anchor Books"; N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp.142-145. It is often pointed out that members of the Mittelstand, would likely not be found at a single table in a restaurant. "Supra, p.79."
which the Social Democratic party sought to foster and formed their own instead.¹

There was a large number of small anti-Semitic political parties after Stoecker. Looking back in 1890 he liked to pride himself on being the first to strike out against the activities of the Jews and stated that "for two full years the Christian Social party stood alone", (1878-1880). Then, finally, in 1880 more and more people began to become actively engaged, and there grew up a strong sentiment which wanted to get Berlin out of Jewish hands. In 1880 Stoecker had been encouraged to see the academic youth manifest a new spirit.² At that time he was gratified at the beginnings of other groups such as that under the schoolteacher, Br. Ernst Henrici (the Sozialer Reichsverein), and the Deutscher Volksverein begun by Bernard Förster (Nietzsche's brother-in-law) and Max Liebermann von Sonnenberg. This latter organization attracted some 6,000 people to its first meeting. It was then, Stoecker explained later, that the popular idea of the "Berlin movement" came into existence.³


²See his later speech C.-S. Reden, p.102, 4 March, 1881 Das Aufwachen der deutschen Jugend. "The national movement which is presently directed against the pre-dominance of Jewry in our national life, has moved the whole nation into motion, and with the whole nation also our youth, particularly the academic youth."

³Stoecker, C.-S. Reden, pp.LLV-LV
These latter individuals, while their presence was felt for a very short time, were more virulent and unscrupulous than Stoecker ever was. Helmut von Gerlach, who at one time was an anti-Semite, but who gradually moved further and further left, said he was driven away from political anti-Semitism because of the calibre of the leaders. He was especially shocked at Sonnenberg, who at Gerlach's request to find a more scientific basis for anti-Semitism, answered tersely: "Dear friend, first we will seek political power, then will we search for a scientific basis for anti-Semitism".¹

Henrici's organization, like that of Wilhelm Marr's Antisemiten-Liga (founded in 1879), attempted to use anti-Semitism as the primary principle of political activity, and to blame the Jews for all the national problems. All these minor groups enjoyed a short existence and almost immediately evaporated.²

It was with the groups which followed Stoecker that racial anti-Semitism became more popular and accentuated by anti-Semitic political parties, though the full potential of racial ideas was only realized after the first world war. Racists tended to be far more radical in their denunciations of the Jews and also to emphasize their role in what was usually perceived as a steady decline of German social life in the widest sense of the term. Certainly, the idea of decline had

¹Gerlach, Von Rechts nach Links, p.111.
²For a brief summary of these groups see Wawrzinek, Antisemitenparteien, pp.30-46.
an important place in the mind of many anti-Semites.¹

Though distinct in many ways, the newer racial anti-Semitism did have many links with the socially conservative non-racial variety. Eugen Dühring (1833-1921), the well-known philosophical opponent of Engels² and a lecturer in economics and philosophy at Berlin University, provided one of these links.

A leading historian of socialism in Germany summarized Dühring in an undoubtedly partisan manner as a "vulgar materialist, positivist, eclectic, an ideologue of petty-bourgeois socialism and enemy of Marxism".³ For Dühring the Jewish question was primarily a racial, then a moral, and finally a cultural one. Thus it no longer mattered what particular religion a Jew practised, since his race was indelible. He repeated all the standard charges, that the Jews were corrupters, that their role in the press, the stock-exchange, radical parties resulted in the rather disastrous social situation. His version of the idea of true versus false liberalism said that since emancipation the Jews exercised a monopoly of power, and, therefore, the "true" fighter for

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¹See Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (London: n.p., 1899), 1, p.XCVI: "There exists perhaps no savage, at least no half-civilized people, which does not to my mind possess more beauty in its surroundings and more harmony in existence as a whole than the great mass of so-called civilized Europeans." See the study of Otto Hintze, "Rasse und Nationalität und ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte," (1903) Soziologie und Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), pp.46-65.


³Franz Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Berlin: Dietz-Verlag, 1960), 11, p.734.
freedom should fight the Jews. Others phrased the same message differently by saying that to be "liberal is to hate all of no value, and cherish worth".

Dühring considered the Jews as inherently business types; therefore, everything they touched bore the same stamp. Even the Jewish religion was of the same cut. Tolerance toward the Jews, therefore, had to be weighted against the damage they caused. The Jews simply had to be reminded that they were only guests of the national community. Up to that moment "the Jews had benefited with evil hypocrisy from the rights of man and equality. Freedom and equality has served them only as a mask, while they sought...not equality, but to be the elect." The solutions he proposed included deportations, (this was how, he said, Egypt had solved the problem), re-ghettoization, or even the creation of a Jewish state outside Europe. The solutions offered by communism and socialism were insufficient, in his view, because they only attacked the Jews in passing, in so far as they were capitalists. But "the Jew as capitalist is only one of the figures from which the social role of Jewry

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3 See particularly here Wahrmund, *Das Gesetz des Nomadentums*, passim, calls the Jews nomadic by nature, hence they are gatherers, robbers, plunderers, who need freedom (à la liberalism) to operate. See, p.157, "mitteleuropa must reshape itself on the basis of agriculture; particularly is it necessary for Germany to do this, as the Germans are a nation of peasants."
is established". 1 Jewish emancipation obviously had to go, and "the choosy exceptional nation will also be handled with choosy exceptional regulations....Judaization of the nation and all economic conditions is the fact; de-Judaization (Entjudung) the duty." 2 The Jewish question was for him certainly a social question "of the first order", but beyond that it was a question of survival. 3

There were between 1878 and 1900 at least six political parties which were overtly anti-Semitic. At the peak of their power they did not achieve very great influence. The great diversity and interaction of these various parties, which tended to change their names with every election, cannot receive extensive treatment here. Their representation in the 397 seat Reichstag stood at 16 in 1893; in 1898 this increased to 19, though divided between two parties; in 1907 there were at least 18, but now were divided among five different parties. 4 The actual elected strength of anti-Semitism was difficult to determine, since anti-Semites often ran under another party banner. Stoecker, for example, was always listed as a member of the Conservative party. 5

1 Dühring, Judenfrage, p.112.
2 Ibid., pp.118-119.
3 See also Hermann Ahlwardt, Der Verzweiflungskampf der arischen Völker mit dem Judentum (Berlin: F.Großhäuser, 1890), p.14 ff. Here he proceeds in a systematic fashion to outline why all social groups and occupations for one reason or another, needed to be protected from Jewry. p.176.
5 Schwarz, MdR, pp.806-807. Votes for anti-Semitic parties, in 1890, 47,536 (total vote 7,223,542; for 1893, 263,861 (of 7,673,273); 1898, 284,250 (of 7,752,693); 1903, 244,543 (of 9,495,587). Cf. Die Antisemiten im Reichstag (Berlin: Carl Kunde, 1903), passim.
The growing number of political parties dedicated to anti-Semitism was a reflection of a growing diversity. In spite of these diversities, however, most shared a broad consensus. There has been a tendency to exaggerate this agreement by suggesting that the idea of the Volk pervaded the entire movement. We would suggest that such consensus as they shared grew primarily out of the social bases of the movement as a whole, in so far as it was a movement. While a detailed examination of the social bases of political anti-Semitism would be necessary to prove this, we have sufficient indications that this was so.

The analysis made by the Social Democratic party went to the heart of the matter. At the Berlin Congress of the party held in 1893 a resolution was passed which declared that:

Anti-Semitism springs from the discontent of certain bourgeois strata, who find themselves adversely affected by the development of capitalism and are in part destined to decline through this development, but who, mistaking the actual cause of their situation, direct their struggle not against the capitalist economic system, but against a symptom appearing in it which becomes inconvenient to them in the competitive struggle against Jewish exploitation. Thus its origin compels anti-Semitism to make demands which are as much in contradiction with the laws of economic and political development of capitalism as they are hostile to progress....

The resolution optimistically concluded that once the "petty bourgeois and peasant strata" realize that it is capitalism

---


2 The full text is given in Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p.345, Appendix V. For a full examination of Social Democracy on anti-Semitism cf. Silberner, Sozialisten zur Judenfrage, pp.258-269, Massing, Rehearsal For Destruction, pp.151-208.
and not just Jewish capitalism which is the enemy, they will recognize that only "socialism can free them from their misery". This policy and interpretation of the social-economic basis of political anti-Semitism placed what it felt were economic inevitabilities before sociological considerations. In their Erfurt program of 1891 the Social Democrats indicated that they desired to win the allegiance of what they termed the "declining classes" to the cause of anti-capitalism, and therefore, to the support of socialism.¹

There could never be any agreement of this sort, for the Mittelstand in Germany feared Social Democracy as much as the continuing changes sweeping the country. It was precisely the "inevitability" of their economic decline that these people were attempting to combat. Resignation to the laws of economic development came easily only to those who, according to these "laws", would inherit the earth. The vulnerable Mittelstand had as much reason to resent Social Democracy as industrialization, because in both cases, the Mittelstand would be turned into proletarians and this would result in a loss of social status. One should be reminded here of the point we made in the last chapter, concerning the nature of the industrial revolution in Germany.²

If one wishes to verify further the social composition and orientation of political anti-Semitism after Stoecker, many examples may be chosen. There was, for example, formed

²"Supra, p.68 ff."
in Saxony in 1881 the Deutsche Reformpartei, which was almost a carbon copy of the Stoecker movement. Small businessmen, artisans, shopkeepers, and petty officials made up the followers. Compulsory guilds, easier credit for the Mittelstand, higher taxation on mobile capital were among its demands. Its Leipzig branch (formed in 1884) was led by Theodor Fritsch, who also founded and was president of the Saxon Mittelstandsvereinigung. Its branch in Kassel (1886) was led by Otto Boeckel (1859-1923). Boeckel was an example of a man who sought to capitalize on the economic distress of the peasants in the countryside, specifically in Hesse. Hesse not only was backward economically and had a fairly large percentage of Jews living in the countryside, but, as we saw already, it had a recent history of spontaneous anti-Jewish activity. It was Boeckel who succeeded in being elected in 1887 for Kassel, sat as the first anti-Semitic deputy not associated with the Conservative party, and kept his seat until 1903.

His opponent in two elections (1898 and 1903) in Hesse was Helmut von Gerlach. According to the latter, the peasants in Hesse were desperately poor. They were too poor to even use a savings bank and were driven to the "Jewish money man". If they wanted to buy a cow, they had to go through Jewish middlemen. When a peasant went too far in debt, it was a Jew

1 Wawrzinek, Antisemitenparteien, pp.46-49. The originator, Alexander Pinkert, also organized in Dresden in 1882 the "Ersten Internationalen antijüdischen Kongresses" to which all the leaders of the "Berlin movement" were invited.
2 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p.108.
who came to sell off his property. Into this area came Boeckel who desired to capitalize on the peasant anti-Semitism which had come out into the open earlier, in the days of 1848. He would travel from village to village with the cry "Peasants, free yourselves from Jewish middlemen!" In conjunction with this he founded peasant credit societies and "Jewish free" cattle markets.

He was through and through a democratic anti-Semite. The peasants adored him as their awakener and liberator. From miles away they came to his meetings. Peasants lads on horseback would escort him when he honoured by his presence a Jewish-free cattle market. Garlands were strung across the streets, the mothers held their little children up and told them 'Look at the man; he is our liberator!' For a few years he was truly the peasant king of Hesse. 1

The peasants of Hesse had usually voted, as they were instructed, for the large landowner in the area. Boeckel did such a thorough job of convincing the peasants that their interests were not the same as that of the large landowner and the Conservative party, that he could discredit his opponents (such as Gerlach) by merely insinuating that the latter was a Conservative (which he was not). Boeckel called the Conservative's Bund der Landwirte, the Bund der Bauernfänger or "League of peasant deceivers". 2

He worked out a program, the first point of which called for a reversal of Jewish emancipation and the placing of them under an aliens' law. It went on to make the standard anti-Semitic economic demands, to place a tax on the stock-exchange, to limit speculation, and to forbid door-to-door

---

1 Gerlach, Von Rechts nach Links, pp.170-171.
2 Quoted, by Frank, Hafprediger Stoecker, p.238
selling and bazaars. Jewish immigration was also to be forbidden, (a point which Stoecker's revised program of 1896 also accepted). Real assistance was to be given to the artisans, to farmers, even to the lower ranks of the officer corps and bureaucracy. It was especially clear to Boeckel that agriculture needed protection to survive. He pointed to England as an example where free trade had led to the decline of agriculture. Any persons who opposed such remedial action were "either Jews or their mercenaries". Boeckel seriously presented the "work of the Jews" as the cause of the plight of his followers. His logic could be simple indeed: 'the price of grain was falling, the price of bread, rising; who was responsible, but the bread usurer (Brotwucher), speculators, and great traders'. While Stoecker felt Boeckel to be far too radical, the two groups clearly shared many of the same views, even though one was centered primarily in the city and the other in the countryside.

Some writers have concluded that the whole anti-Semitic business in the last third of the nineteenth century was of

1 Salomon, Parteiprogramme, 11, Neues Programm der christlichsozialen Partei, (1896), p.112.
2 Ibid., Programm der Oberhessischen Antisemitischen Partei Erfurt (1890), pp.74-76.
4 He commented once that "the struggle between Jewry and Christianity is no struggle of religion, no struggle of race, but more, both together; the struggle between Jewry and Christianity is a struggle for survival." Dr. Capistrano [Otto Boeckel], Die europäische Judengefahr (Cassel: n.p., 1886), p.3.
little significance because nothing was actually enacted against the Jews.\(^1\) The anti-Semitic movement can be seen as part of a general conservative movement which sought, by all possible means, to preserve a world which was fast disappearing.\(^2\) Even the old Conservative party had set out to find as much support as possible to defend conservative interests against modern developments. By 1892 that party claimed that, among other things, it fought against "the disintegrating Jewish influence on the national life".\(^3\) The anti-Semitic parties were not discouraged by the government because the government was no less anxious to maintain the old society, particularly in view of the growing strength of Social Democracy.\(^4\) The latter party had won the largest popular vote in 1890, but because of "rotten-boroughs" ranked only a distant fifth in elected members to the Reichstag.\(^5\)

The paper cannot deal with the extensive reforms which the government passed for the protection of agricultural and such pre-industrial groups as the artisans. The threat of Social Democracy forced the government to find support from

\(^1\) Frank, Hofprediger Stoecker, p.240, claims the whole movement between 1876 and 1900 "did not noticeably change the nature of the Jewish question"!!


\(^3\) Note the ironic use of Mommsen here, See Salomon, Parteiprogramme, 11, Neues Programm der Deutschen Konservativen Partei (Tivoli), (1892), p.71.

\(^4\) Lorenz Curtius, Der politische Antisemitismus von 1907-1911 (Munich: Kommissions-Verlag des National-Vereins für das liberale Deutschland, 1911), p.11.

these social groups. In order to win that support concessions had to be made. The guilds which existed after 1869 did so merely as private organizations. Reforms passed in 1881 saw them once more transformed into "corporations of public law" (öffentlichrechtliche Körperschaften). The regulations grew steadily until at the end of the century membership in a guild was made compulsory for all independent artisans, if a majority of a certain trade in a particular community decided upon it. In addition, numerous regulations of a vocational nature were passed.¹ The government granted many such reforms the effects of which were to make the country pay for the persistence of economically inefficient groups. More than economic considerations were involved, obviously. The whole political order came to be directed to the maintenance of many elements of pre-industrial society. The apparent decline of political anti-Semitism after the turn of the century can partially be understood in terms of the growing sympathy of the government, who, by alleviating the conditions of those groups which had supported the various anti-Semitic parties, thereby removed the bases of the protest. In addition, it has been pointed out by one writer, that although specifically anti-Semitic parties declined after 1900, the number of parties and movements which adopted anti-Semitism as part of their general outlook actually increased.²

²Fulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p.126.
What the paper has attempted to do is to concentrate on what was felt to be the vital period when anti-Semitism was transformed from a religious-social antipathy, (which periodically broke out into open conflict), into an organized political movement. Political anti-Semitism in this period was clearly not only based on a hatred of Jews, but emerged in relation to changes affecting society as a whole.
# APPENDICES

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</table>
Appendix I: Inner Migration of Jews in Germany After 1871

Jews in Eastern Provinces of East and West Prussia, Pommerania, Silesia

1871--- 162,704 Jews  = 31.8% of all Jews in Germany
1890--- 140,756 Jews  = 24.8% of all Jews in Germany
1910--- 107,340 Jews  = 17.4% of all Jews in Germany

Jews in Berlin and Brandenburg Province

1871--- 47,489 Jews  = 9.3% of all Jews in Germany
1890--- 93,061 Jews  = 16.4% of all Jews in Germany
1910--- 151,356 Jews  = 27.9% of all Jews in Germany

Source: Ruppin, Soziologie der Juden, I, p.160. Note: all statistics on the Jews are based on religious information.
## Appendix 2: Urbanization of Jews in Germany After 1871

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>1871 Jews</th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>1910 Jews</th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>1925 Jews</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>36,015</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>144,007</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>172,672</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>10,009</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>26,228</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>29,385</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breslau</td>
<td>13,916</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>20,212</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>23,240</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>13,796</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19,472</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>19,794</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>4,523</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>12,393</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>16,093</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>2,097</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11,083</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>10,086</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9,434</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>12,954</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: pulzer, *Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, p. 346
Appendix 3: Comparison of Jews to Non-Jews by Occupation For a Selected Year (1920)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Letts</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>World Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>82.31</td>
<td>30.29</td>
<td>82.68</td>
<td>79.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial &amp; Artisans</td>
<td>32.49</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>22.23</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>48.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Profession</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscell.Prof.</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>30.45</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>10.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden*, 1, p.358
Appendix 4: Religious Distribution at Institutions of Higher Learning, Selected Institutions of the Universities of Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Technischen Hochschule of Karlsruhe, 1869-1893

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Evangelical</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1869/73</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874/78</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>1,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879/83</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884/88</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>3,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889/93</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>3,593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Friedrich Paulsen, Die deutschen Universitäten und das Universitätsstudium (1902) (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), p.196, who also commented that such a situation was unique to Germany, and was "due to the wealth, energy, and tenacity" of the Jewish people.
Appendix 5: Pig Iron Production in Germany and the United Kingdom, 1860-1910 (in tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>2,729,000</td>
<td>8,521,000</td>
<td>14,794,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,886,000</td>
<td>7,873,000</td>
<td>9,103,000</td>
<td>119,777,000</td>
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</table>


Appendix 6: Real National Income and Industrial Production, Selected Years (1913=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Real National Income</th>
<th>Industrial Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix 7: Real National Income Per Capita, Germany, Great Britain, United States, Selected Years (1900=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bry, Wages in Germany, p.23.
### Appendix 8: Real Wages in Germany and Great Britain, Weekly or Daily, 1871-1913 (1913=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>74.00</td>
<td>73.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>79.00</td>
<td>73.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>79.00</td>
<td>76.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>81.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>84.00</td>
<td>88.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>81.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>73.00</td>
<td>81.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>77.00</td>
<td>83.00</td>
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<td>1879</td>
<td>74.00</td>
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<td>1880</td>
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<td>1881</td>
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<td>1887</td>
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<td>1889</td>
<td>88.00</td>
<td>98.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>87.00</td>
<td>102.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>102.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>86.00</td>
<td>101.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>87.00</td>
<td>101.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>88.00</td>
<td>106.00</td>
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<td>1895</td>
<td>89.00</td>
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<td>99.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>96.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Bry, *Wages in Germany*, pp.466-467.
### Appendix 9: Real Investment in Building in Germany
(Millions of marks—constant 1913 prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Non-Agricultural</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>.210</td>
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<td>.310</td>
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## Appendix 10: Founding of Joint-Stock Companies in Germany After 1871

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<th>Average Value (mill. Marks)</th>
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Source: Sombart, Deutsche Volkswirtschaft im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, p.566.
Appendix II: The Declaration of the Notables

Fierce battles have unified our fatherland into an Empire of mighty aspirations. This unity has been achieved by the victory which the feeling of essential community has gained in the popular conscience of the Germans over the distinctiveness of descent and creed, which have cleft our nation like no other. To let individual citizens atone for such differences is neither just nor noble, and hits above all those who are honestly and seriously attempting to throw aside their peculiarities and to march loyally together with the nation and with those whom they know to be striving towards the same objectives. Such action merely hinders what remains the common aim: the ironing-out within the German nation of all differences still operating. Now, in an unexpected and deeply shameful way, racial hatred and the fanaticism of the Middle Ages are being resurrected in various places, notably in the major cities of the Empire, and directed against our Jewish fellow-citizens. How many of these have, through hard work and talent, brought profit and honour to the fatherland, in trade and industry, in science and the arts—that is forgotten; the precept of law and the behests of honour that all Germans are equal in rights and duties—these are ignored. The carrying-out of this equality is not merely the province of the tribunals, but of the conscience of every single citizen. The revival of an ancient folly is threatening like a contagious pestilence, to poison the relations which Christians and Jews
have proclaimed on the basis of tolerance in state and parish, in society and the family. If at present envy and malice are preached by the leaders of this movement only in the abstract, the crowd will not delay to draw the practical conclusions from such vague speech-making.

Men who should be proclaiming from the pulpits and the seats of learning that our culture has overcome the isolation of that race which once gave to the world the worship of the one God, are undermining the legacy of Lessing. Already we can hear the cry for discriminating legislation and the exclusion of Jews from this or that trade or profession, honour or position of confidence. How long will it be before the herd clamours for this too? There is yet time to step against confusion and to avert national disgrace; the artificially inflamed passions of the multitude can yet be broken by the resistance of determined men. Our call goes out to Christians of all parties to whom religion is the tidings of peace; our call is addressed to all Germans to whose hearts the ideal inheritance of their great princes, poets and thinkers lies close. Defend by public declarations and with calm expositions the fundamentals of our common life: respect for every belief, equal rights, equal favours in competition, equal recognition of capability and enterprise for Christians and Jews.

Source: Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, pp.337-338. The declaration was signed by seventy-five prominent men including Mommsen, Droysen, Gneist, Virchow, and appeared in the National-Zeitung, Berlin, 14 November, 1880. The declaration was not without a little nationalism itself.
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