Being and Time:
The Question Concerning Environmentalism

by

© Lawrence Donegan

A thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy
Memorial University of Newfoundland

December 2012

St. John’s
Newfoundland
This thesis endeavors to determine whether Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is consistent with environmentalism. Hubert Dreyfus’ characterization of *Being and Time* as the decisive step towards technology will provide evidence for the non-environmental character of *Being and Time*. Joseph Fell and W. S. K. Cameron will demonstrate an inability to reconcile *Being and Time* with environmentalism, and Paul Farwell will be unable to change my conception of the authentic status of producing. My exegesis of *Being and Time* will determine that the being-in-the-world of Dasein is understood through a technological horizon in which all entities are subordinate to a productive and pragmatic schema. What Dasein primarily encounters in the environment is not a robust understanding of nature as inherently valuable, but raw material. Thus, I will conclude that *Being and Time* is inconsistent with environmentalism.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the whole Memorial University philosophy department for providing an excellent environment in which to study. Particular thanks must go to Sean McGrath for encouraging my ideas about Heidegger. I would additionally like to thank my two readers: Antoinette Stafford and Peter Gratton. Thanks must also go to Jay and Shannon for the technical support. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and my brother and sisters.
# Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgements.................................................................................................. iii

Preface....................................................................................................................... 1

Introduction............................................................................................................... 2

Chapter One.............................................................................................................. 10

Chapter Two............................................................................................................ 22

Chapter Three......................................................................................................... 65

Chapter Four............................................................................................................ 83

Bibliography............................................................................................................. 93
Preface

Much academic work has been devoted to connecting the philosophy of Martin Heidegger to an ecological or environmental philosophy.¹ The majority of this work focuses on the later Heidegger in which there are clear instances of writings that resonate with ecological thinking. As an environmentalist, the question of the relation of Heidegger’s philosophy to environmentalism is a source of concern to my own intellectual passions. Particularly appealing about this issue in Heidegger’s philosophy is that a striking problematization of technology occurs in Heidegger’s philosophy. However, the genuineness of Heidegger’s environmental commitments is not a clear cut story, and deciding whether or not the early Heidegger in *Being and Time* is presenting an ecological or environmental philosophy may go a fair way toward discerning how true to environmentalism Heidegger really was. Given that the scholarly literature on the ecological philosophy of Heidegger primarily reflects the work of the later Heidegger without inquiring into whether Heidegger’s philosophy was ecological earlier in his life, I will ask how faithful Heidegger was to environmentalism in *Being and Time*.

Introduction

Is the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time* consistent with environmentalism? This is the guiding question of our thesis. I put forward the following hypothesis: *Being and Time* understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon that is inconsistent with environmentalism.

My investigation will proceed in four parts: Chapter One will evaluate Hubert Dreyfus’ interpretation of the technological significance of *Being and Time*, Chapter Two will be an immanent reading of *Being and Time*, Chapter Three will evaluate further scholarly literature, and Chapter Four will determine whether *Being and Time* is consistent with environmentalism.

A word is in order about the methodology of this dissertation. We are beginning with Hubert Dreyfus’ account of *Being and Time* because it succinctly states the essence of what I find problematic about *Being and Time*. Since there is a clear expression of my argument in Dreyfus’ critical account of *Being and Time*, I have put Dreyfus at the beginning of my thesis. In order to engage critically with the rest of the scholarly literature, which, in my view, does not sufficiently understand what is environmentally problematic about *Being and Time*, a prior engagement with the text of *Being and Time* is necessary. Thus, the assessment of Joseph Fell, Paul Farwell, and W. S. K. Cameron follows my substantive exegesis and interpretation of *Being and Time*. It is significant to note that with the exception of Cameron’s 2004 article there is no up-to-date relevant scholarship on the relation of *Being and Time* to environmentalism.
I will now define technology and environmentalism, but must first preface the formulation of environmentalism with a proviso. The object of this thesis is not to provide an exhaustive account of the theoretical foundations of environmentalism. I myself am an environmentalist and am engaging with *Being and Time* in terms of my prior understanding of the meaning of environmentalism. My understanding of environmentalism does not claim to exhaust the literature on environmentalism, but I do claim, in my terms, to have accurately reduced my environmentalism to its definitive features. In order to understand the environmental significance of *Being and Time* it is not necessary to ground one’s interpretation in current theories in environmental philosophy. The intuition that there may be something environmentally problematic about *Being and Time* can occur quite independently of a familiarity with theoretical debates in environmental philosophy. The basic schema for an environmental philosophy that I am about to provide is adequate to the task of giving a background on the basis of which I can critically engage with the environmental content of *Being and Time*.

How can we define technology? Technology is a set of practices oriented towards the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production and consumption. Specifically, it is the machinery, equipment, and products produced from industrial modes of production. Modern technology implies a total mobilization of nature for production such that nature becomes a mere raw material. To borrow from Heidegger, it “is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that
can be extracted and stored as such.” The unreasonable and non-environmental character of technology is that it demands of nature more than it can sustainably produce.

We can define environmentalism in terms of three fundamental conditions. It (a) believes nature to possess a biocentric value or meaning; (b) places a positive value on harmonizing human existence with nature; and (c) aims to conserve the natural integrity of the environment through reducing productive and consumptive activities. Such practices aim to maintain a sustainable relationship to the earth whereby all natural beings can flourish.

We can clearly see that modern technological practices are contrary to environmental practices. In a technological paradigm nature is not understood as having an intrinsic value, but is valued for its serviceability to instrumental uses. In a technological paradigm, one does not harmonize with nature, but, rather, manipulates it as though it were a raw material. Lastly, rather than conserving nature through reducing production, the modern technological paradigm involves a total mobilization of nature that unreasonably demands that nature supply more energy than it can sustainably produce. Environmentalism lets nature be; whereas, technology does not let nature be.

A further illustration of the nature of environmentalism is in order. The question may persist: what do we mean by environmentalism? Environmentalism is a practice whose primary object is to accord human existence with the conditions of environmentalism we have enumerated. On the one hand, environmental practices

---

involve acting in ways that conserve the natural environment. One, as it were, limits one's practices as a consumer and producer in keeping with the principles that prevent pollution and conserve nature. The issue is essentially that one reduces one's ecological footprint.

Another definitive condition of environmentalism is essentially bound up with this kind of praxis that conserves the environment. That is to say that the harmony of human beings with nature essentially depends on whether our practices conserve the natural integrity of the environment by a reduction of our ecological footprint. In the idea of harmonizing with the environment, there is a romantic notion of nature whereby what grows naturally in our external environment resonates with the organic process of growth inside ourselves. Environmentalism involves the notion of a balance of nature whereby all beings are in a state of ecological equilibrium that can be disturbed by pollution or non-environmental productive practices. Harmony with nature, moreover, involves a sense by which we understand nature to possess normative value. In harmonizing with nature outside ourselves, we are acting according to a meaning intrinsic to our own nature and to the wider environment.

Thus, the idea of harmony with nature leads into another one of our conditions of environmentalism: that there is a meaning in nature. An environmental worldview believes that nature is a meaningful order that exhibits an organization that possesses intrinsic value. With this idea, we are at the frontier of something that our intellectual culture generally has little patience for: the idea that there is a telos or logos in nature. A
common ecological intuition is that the environment that surrounds us is not an inert dead reality, but a kind of living activity. Natural processes are interrelated such that the life of human beings is dependent on the wider ecosystem. There is, as it were, a web of life. The sun, the rain, the forest, and all other elements of nature are part of a single common biocentric order of meaning. The ability of the human species to flourish depends in part on the ability to harmonize with and conserve the meaning of this nature beyond ourselves. Thus, the way that human beings should exist on the earth is fundamentally determined by the teleological meaning inherent in nature. In understanding nature we are grasping an order that exists independently of the mind and on which the purposes and very existence of human life is dependent. For environmentalists, the meaning of nature signifies a possible foundation for grounding human culture. The task of rationally understanding the vital nature of the environment, as something that embodies a distinct meaning and form, is a task beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one that, I would suggest, is essential to the foundations of environmentalism.

Central to the argument of this thesis is that a philosophy consistent with environmentalism must possess a robust theory of nature in which nature is understood to be a meaningful and valuable order of being-in-itself. So too must such a philosophy advocate harmony with nature and the conservation of nature. However, an understanding of nature as inherently meaningful is particularly essential to whether a philosophy is environmental. Environmental intuitions are inseparable from the view that nature has an intrinsic significance and should not merely be subject to technological production.
We will now summarize the technological narrative implicit in Heidegger's "history of Being." In the aftermath of Being and Time, Heidegger declares a fundamental decline to be implicit in post-Socratic philosophy. Plato is symptomatic of a metaphysical determination that has fatalistically determined the course of Western history and has consummated itself in modern technology. The decline in the thinking of Being leads directly into modern technology. We thus see that technology is, in a significant way, problematic for Heidegger.

"The Question Concerning Technology," while giving expression to the idea that there is a danger in technology, also sees a saving power in technology. To Heidegger, technology is a kind of revealing. It is a mode of aletheia whereby Being reveals itself. Enframing is the claim that challenges human beings to reveal the real in terms of the "standing reserve" of technology. Technology, as a way of revealing, is a kind of destining determinative of human history.

Heidegger holds that meditative thinking can resist the technological power latent in calculative thinking. As opposed to the technological nature of calculative thinking, Heidegger proposes that "releasement" can lead to a free relation to technology. However, meditative thinking, and the "releasement towards things" that accompanies it, does not change our continued consumption of technologies, and, thus, does not reduce

4 See: Ibid., p. 19.
5 See: Ibid., p. 24
our ecological footprint. Rather than advising us to limit the practices that can prevent the proliferation of technology, Heidegger tells us to be open to the mystery in technology. The danger that Heidegger fears is not so much that technology will reduce the earth to a raw material, but that technology will lead to a triumph of calculative thinking over meditative thinking.

Despite any ambiguities in Heidegger’s understanding of technology, we find a clear environmental tone in many of the later writings of Heidegger. In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger writes that “mortals dwell in that they save the earth.”

In “The Letter on Humanism” we hear that an environmental disclosure of nature is possible: “It could even be that nature, in the face it turns towards man’s technical mastery, is simply concealing its essence.” In “The Ister” there is an engagement with the nature philosophy of Friedrich Holderlin that enchants our understanding of the natural environment. In 1955, at a Memorial Address in Messkirch, Heidegger raises alarm in an environmental manner at the loss of rootedness in the earth: “The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.”

---

9 Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” p. 50.
There seems to be a fundamentally environmental impetus in the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Thus, I am inclined to see a division in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which does not admit of continuity on the question of environmentalism. While the later Heidegger was certainly at times environmental, the early Heidegger in *Being and Time* may not be environmental. It would seem that there was a point of insight in Heidegger's "turn" that led into a questioning of technology and the aspiration for an environmental ethos. However, this is not the subject of this thesis.
Chapter One

1.1

We have put forward the hypothesis that *Being and Time* understands Dasein's being-in-the-world within a technological horizon. Is there evidence in the scholarly literature to support this claim? Indeed, there is. Hubert Dreyfus states that *Being and Time* is the decisive step towards technology. Harold Alderman states that in *Being and Time* "technological work becomes identified with Being."10 Andrew Feenberg states that *Being and Time* is a "productionist text."11 Michael Zimmerman, in addition to telling us that *Being and Time* understands being-in-the-world in terms of instrumental tools, states that "Heidegger believed, moving beyond the nihilism and violence brought by modern technology was possible only on the condition that humanity first submit to the claim of modern technology."12 Theodore Kisiel states:

The field of objects which yields the original sense of being is that of the *produced* object accessible in the course of usage. Accordingly, it is not the field of things in their theoretical reification but rather the world encountered in going about our producing, making, and using which is the basis, the according-to-which and towards-which of the original experience of being...Being means *being produced.*13

---

The scholarly literature we will examine offers support for our hypothesis that 

*Being and Time* understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon.

Dreyfus essentially understands the distinctly technological character of what is environmentally problematic about *Being and Time,* but backs away from the conclusion that *Being and Time* is fully technological by virtue of narrowing his definition of technology. Through a critical engagement with Joseph Fell, Paul Farwell, and W.S.K. Cameron, my position emerges as the stronger evaluation of Heidegger’s thought. Fell cannot change our understanding that the ready-to-hand (handiness) is the primary kind of nature in *Being and Time.* Farwell, while indicating that production is not emblematic of authenticity, cannot change our understanding of the authentic status of production. Cameron succinctly shows that the instrumental and anthropocentric understanding of the environment is problematic, but is unable to show that this problem resolves itself. Thus, the scholarly literature leaves open the possibility of concluding that *Being and Time* is inconsistent with environmentalism.

1.2

We will begin our account of the scholarly literature on the environmental status of *Being and Time* with an engagement with the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus. In “Heidegger’s History of the Being of Equipment,” Dreyfus presents a decisive analysis of *

*Being and Time* with respect to environmentalism which resonates with our hypothesis that *Being and Time* understands being-in-the-world within a technological horizon. Environmentalism is not explicitly referred to in Dreyfus’ text. However, it is implicit
that *Being and Time* does not present an environmental philosophy insofar as it leads to the technological “assault” and “attack” on nature. Our analysis will show that Dreyfus correctly interprets *Being and Time* to be a decisive step towards technology.

Dreyfus raises the question of the environmental status of *Being and Time* through an engagement with the technological content of *Being and Time*: “To what extent is the account of the being of equipment in *Being and Time* a critique of the ontology of technology and to what extent is it a contribution to the development of a technological understanding of Being?” Dreyfus argues that *Being and Time* plays a “transitional role in the history of the being of equipment.” Though Dreyfus states “it is not clear whether *Being and Time* opposes technology or promotes it,” he admits that “far from resisting the modern tendency to transform everything into standing-reserve, the understanding of the being of the ready-to-hand in *Being and Time* leaves equipment available for the assault of technology.”

Dreyfus notes that the distinction of subject and object makes modern technology possible. *Being and Time* offers a phenomenological critique of the subject-object distinction through the analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, and, hence, “*Being and Time* would seem to stand in direct opposition to the technological understanding of

---

15 Ibid., p. 175
16 Ibid., p. 175
17 Ibid., p. 175.
Moreover, the primacy of readiness-to-hand (handiness) over presence-at-hand (objective presence) is an implicit criticism of calculative and logistic ontologies in that these “present-at-hand” modes of thinking are dependent “upon the nonformalizable everyday intelligibility of the primordial way human beings encounter entities within the world.” Thus, the understanding of equipmental practices will rescue beings from the objectifying representations of a Cartesian ontology that employs mathematical technology. Since Being and Time “explicitly denies the possibility of a ‘mathematical functionalization’ of the ready-to-hand,” Heidegger, in this view, resists technology by denying the possibility that the mathematical functions that structure modern technology could impose themselves on our everyday tool-using practices.

However, there are, Dreyfus suggests, “hints scattered throughout Heidegger’s later works that in opposing the subject/object ontology by an appeal to the primacy of equipment, Being and Time was itself a formulation of the penultimate stage of technology.” Heidegger’s opposition to...

...the Cartesian subject/object distinction in terms of an account of Dasein as a user of equipment becomes an ambiguous form of opposition, for it is no longer clear whether such an analysis offers a critique of technology in the form of a transcendental account of the pre-technological everyday understanding of equipment, or whether, under the guise of a

---

18 Ibid., p. 173.
19 Ibid., p. 174.
22 We will later show that the present-at-hand is not technological insofar as it is does not use, produce, or manipulate the environment.
23 Ibid., p. 174
transcendental account of everyday activity, such an analysis reflects a transition in the history of the way equipment is which prepares the way for technology.24

Thus, Heidegger’s critique of the functionalization of everyday ready-to-hand practices may possess positive environmental significance, but these very practices lead into technology.

Dreyfus states “the central theme of Division 1 of Being and Time, [is] that ready-to-hand equipment is ontologically more fundamental than present-at-hand objects.”25 My argument will show that this prioritization is contrary to an environmental philosophy insofar as nature is discovered by the use of equipment rather than through its pre-productive existence. The identification of nature with the proximally ready-to-hand indicates an understanding of the world that is not environmental as it reduces nature to an instrument.

Dreyfus cautions against the notion that the account of equipment in Being and Time is fully technological. The transitional role that Dreyfus understands Being and Time to serve implies “that the analysis of equipment in Being and Time is neither pre-technological nor fully technological.”26 However, Dreyfus recognizes that Heidegger’s notion of equipment is not resistant to the tendency to transform nature into a technological standing-reserve. Equipment is “at-hand” for the anti-environmental assault of technology by means of the ready-to-hand understanding of nature.

24 Ibid., p. 175.
26 Ibid., p. 175.
Dreyfus delineates three modes in the history of the being of equipment: craftsmanship, industrialization, and cybernetic control or technology, which, respectively, correspond to *techne*, pragmatism, and systems theory. Nature is understood in craftsmanship as *physis*, in industrialization as a raw material, and in cybernetic control as standing-reserve. Showing an environmental disposition, Dreyfus presents such a transition from craftsmanship to industrial production to technology as a decline.

Dreyfus thinks *Being and Time* espouses "a simple pragmatism," so, one would think, Dreyfus identifies *Being and Time* with industrial production, which, to our understanding, bears a technological character. However, Dreyfus argues that it is unclear what kind of production Heidegger has in mind in *Being and Time*:

*Being and Time* offers an understanding of the being of equipment which hovers ambiguously between that of craftsmanship and technology and so tempts readers to identify *Being and Time* with one or the other, while at the same time resisting either assimilation.

Dreyfus inquires into how we use equipment and remarks that disposability characterizes equipment. However, a hammer, though defined by its function or in-order-to, is not disposable like a product that is used and disposed of. In *Being and Time*, we can take "care of equipment – not the way the craftsman takes care of his personal tools, but the way the foreman takes care of industrial equipment."

---

27 Ibid., p. 177.
28 Ibid., p. 176.
29 Ibid., p. 177.
of circumspection, such as ‘inspecting’, checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the ‘operations’.

To Dreyfus, the use of equipment in *Being and Time* is not environmentally benign because of this industrial connotation and because of its disposable nature.

Dreyfus distinguishes between three kinds of use in Heidegger’s writings. The first kind of use is compatible with environmentalism and corresponds to craftsmanship. This use does not dispose of things, lets a thing be what it is, and is responsive to the demands that the thing makes on us as we use it. There is something “reliable” and “resistant” in this kind of use that relates the user with the used in such a way that things are not exploited. The second kind of use corresponds to industrial production and refers “to utility as fulfilling a function.” The third kind of use corresponds to technology and refers “to using-up as exploitation.” This last “degenerate form of use – exploiting – clearly corresponds to the technological attitude in which equipment is only insofar as it is at our disposal.”

To my mind, the notion in *Being and Time* that tree is timber and a mountain is quarry corresponds, in its totalizing mobilization, to utility or using-up more so than to the use that “lets be.” Thus, we see evidence that the kind of use of the environment in *Being and Time* is, within Dreyfus’ schema, technological.

Dreyfus raises the issue of the kind of nature that belongs to natural beings in *Being and Time*. The Greek conception of *physis*, which corresponds to craftsmanship, is

---

32 Ibid., p. 177.
33 Ibid., p. 176.
self-contained and environmental because it enables nature to be independent and free. However, according to Dreyfus, nature is a raw material in Being and Time, which, rather than being identified with physis, corresponds to industrial production. The nature of physis exhibits a subordinate role in Being and Time as nature “can be encountered only as it fits, or fails to fit, into the referential totality.”

Dreyfus has, by our definition of technology, conceded that Being and Time understands nature technologically because of the admission that nature is a raw material for industrial production. Dreyfus has a smaller domain of objects corresponding to technology insofar as, to his understanding, industrial production does not correspond to technology. However, it is hard to see how radios, automobiles, and other industrial products are not technological. Both industrial production and technology are “a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” It would seem that Dreyfus, in stating that nature in Being and Time is a raw material corresponding to industrialization, has conceded a technological status to Being and Time.

Does Being and Time, contrary to environmentalism, solely understand nature as a raw material? Is a river, in Being and Time, more than a mere energy source, or is it “that the use of the river as water-power is the primordial way the river is encountered?” On this question, Dreyfus says Being and Time demonstrates a profound

---

34 Ibid., p. 183.
ambiguity. In order to answer this question we will examine how Dasein encounters nature in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger identifies three ways of encountering nature – readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, and the nature that “stirs and strives.” Heidegger ignores the environmental kind of nature of *physis*, ignores the nature that “stirs and strives,” and does not mention “the hidden riches of nature.” Thus, “in the language of the later Heidegger, *Being and Time* has no place for the withdrawal and resistance of the Earth.”

Presence-at-hand is also secondary as it is shown to be a privative mode of readiness-to-hand. Thus, the only remaining avenue in which nature, in *Being and Time*, can be encountered is through readiness-to-hand. Thus, contrary to environmentalism, *Being and Time* pragmatically understands nature through utility.

Dreyfus provides a further analysis of the ambiguity in *Being and Time* over the question as to whether nature is itself something ready-to-hand. Nature, according to *Being and Time*, is not intrinsically ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but is ontologically founded on the worldliness of the world and Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Though Heidegger acknowledges nature to be worldly, the worldliness of the world, through which one understands nature, is a ready-to-hand network of relevant relations of significance (in-order-to, what-for, for-the-sake-of-which). There is, according to Dreyfus, a technological tendency “in the ontological priority granted to the structure of

---

37 Ibid., p. 177.
the totality of involvement as the structure of the world.”38 Since Heidegger conflates worldliness with readiness-to-hand, “all beings including those of nature are founded ontologically, i.e. get their intelligibility from the structure of the equipmental totality.”39 Nature is ready-to-hand insofar as worldliness is ready-to-hand.

Dreyfus analyzes the attempt of Heidegger to resist the conclusion that Being and Time understands nature through readiness-to-hand. The tool-analysis of the environment in its equipmentality is, as Heidegger says, preliminary and prepares the way for the transcendental account of the world. However, the present, in the temporal schema that is the transcendental condition of the possibility of the world, is the in-order-to: “The horizontal schema of the present is determined by the in-order-to.”40 Heidegger repeats the claim that “relations of significance...determine the structure of the world.”41 Thus, Dreyfus remarks that “even on the transcendental level, the world is equated with the totality of involvements, and all entities, including Nature, can only be encountered as they show up in the equipmental world.”42 Thus, nature is only disclosed through readiness-to-hand.

Dreyfus argues that Heidegger denies the locality of the region and thereby exhibits a technological philosophy. A region, such as a workshop or room, is the condition of the possibility of equipment. Thus, “a region must already be discovered if

---

38 Ibid., p. 181.
40 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 365.
41 Ibid., p. 211.
there is to be any possibility of referring and finding the places of a totality of useful things available to circumspection." However, Heidegger wants to found a region, and the spatiality of beings encountered therein, on the worldliness of the world, and, therefore, "it is as if in Being and Time Dasein is uprooted from the dwelling in nearness which is illustrated by later Heidegger." Being and Time takes equipment "to be dependent on one total network in which it is a node," and the thing is not something that organizes a local region, but rather it is "a slot in a global system." This technological idea that "equipment more and more comes to fit together in one single system is already a step from the relatively autonomous and autochthonous workshop of the craftsman towards the uprooted interconnectedness of industrial mass production." Dreyfus concludes:

By highlighting the interrelationships between all items of equipment and by defining equipment by its position in this referential totality, Being and Time denies localness, thus removing the last barrier to global totalization, and preparing the way for the "total mobilization of all beings" which, according to later Heidegger, makes up the essence of technology.

Being and Time, as a transition in the history of the being of equipment, is "the decisive step towards technology." Dreyfus qualifies the sense in which Being and Time is technological by saying that "in Being and Time there is no outright attack [on

---

43 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 103.
46 Ibid., p. 181.
47 Ibid., p. 182.
48 Ibid., p. 182.
49 Ibid., p. 182.
nature]."\(^{50}\) However, this appears as a minor qualification when, by contrast, Dreyfus states that "the account of worldhood in Being and Time, however, removes every vestige of resistance – that of \textit{physis} and earth, as well as that of will and subjectivity – to the technological tendency to treat all beings (even man) as resources."\(^{51}\) Moreover, Dreyfus notes that the lack of receptivity in Being and Time "to 'the nature that stirs and strives'...leaves open, indeed, encourages, the kind of attack and reordering of nature which encounters natural objects as standing reserve."\(^{52}\) This comes very close to an admission that Being and Time is fully technological. Dreyfus ends by stating that ordering the world technologically simply for the sake of ordering the world technologically "is the understanding of Being definitive of technological nihilism, an understanding prepared but not consummated by the account of equipment in Being and Time."\(^{53}\) The claim that Being and Time leads into technology offers support for our hypothesis that Being and Time understands the world within a technological horizon that is inconsistent with environmentalism. However, owing to his strict definition of technology, Dreyfus evades judging Being and Time to be fully technological.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 183.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 183-4.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 183.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 184.
Chapter Two

2.1

This chapter will investigate Being and Time with respect to the guiding question of our thesis. The bulk of this chapter will investigate “The Worldliness of the World,” which is Chapter Three of Division One of Being and Time, as here there is an explicit account of how Dasein exists in the environment. My interpretation will also include the other sections of Being and Time that are apposite to the question of our thesis and help to determine whether Being and Time is an environmental text.

This particular section of my thesis will provide an exposition of average everydayness as a theme of the analytic of Dasein. The analytic of Dasein in Being and Time analyzes average everydayness in order to reveal structures constitutive of the being of Dasein. Heidegger wants to understand the being of Dasein ontologically in its phenomenally nearest kind of being, and, as such, Heidegger seeks to make average everydayness “accessible in its positive characteristics.”\(^\text{54}\) Average everydayness characterizes Dasein initially and for the most part, and is the everyday undifferentiated and indifferent character of Dasein. The indifference of average everydayness is “a positive phenomenal characteristic.”\(^\text{55}\) Moreover, average everydayness may not be

\(^{54}\) Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 44.
\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 43.
“structurally different from the ontological determinations of an authentic being of Dasein.”

However, though the average everyday interpretation of Dasein is positive and potentially authentic, it is a preliminary interpretation of Dasein. The aim of the average everyday interpretation of Dasein is “to expose the horizon for the most primordial interpretation of being.” Due to its preliminary nature and because it may not be primordial, an average everyday mode of being-in-the-world may not provide the final basis upon which one can assess the environmental dimensions of Being and Time.

2.2

This section of my thesis will provide an analysis of objective presence (presence-at-hand). “Objectively present” translates “Vorhandenheit”, which can also be denoted by “presence-at-hand” and being “occurrent.” Objective presence is a mode of existence that expresses the “whatness” of a thing in a categorical way. Theoretical knowledge in the sciences fundamentally concerns itself with objective presence. To Heidegger, objective presence is inappropriate to the being of Dasein because it is categorical and essentially indifferent to the being of Dasein.

Heidegger investigates the notion of objective presence in the context of a consideration of how Dasein knows the world. Knowing belongs to being-in-the-world

---

56 Ibid., p. 44.
57 Ibid., p. 17.
58 This chapter will refer to presence-at-hand as objective presence in keeping with the terminology of the Stambaugh translation of Being and Time.
and is grounded in already-being-alongside-the-world. In already-being-alongside-the-world, Dasein does not primarily stare at something objectively present, but is engaged with and absorbed by its world. Thus, “being-in-the-world, as taking care of things, is taken in by the world which it takes care of.”\(^5^9\) For an objectively present knowing of things to arise through observation there must be a deficiency in the way Dasein concerns itself in its doings in the world. Such a deficiency arises when Dasein refrains from producing, manipulating, and using the environment and merely lingers with the world. This way of being enables Dasein to “encounter beings within the world solely in their mere outward appearance (eidos).”\(^6^0\) Looking in this manner is a way of setting one’s sight on objective presence. Objectively present looking at things “becomes a mode of independent dwelling together with beings in the world. In this dwelling ["Aufenthalt"] – as refraining from every manipulation and use – the perception of what is objectively present takes place.”\(^6^1\)

We note here an affinity between environmentalism and objective presence. Insofar as it refrains from the manipulation, production, and use of the environment, an objective presence corresponds with an environmental way of being. Technology is a specific way in which Dasein uses, produces, and manipulates its environment. Thus, \(prima facie\), an objectively present mode of dwelling cannot be technological. In perceiving beings independently of all production and manipulation, nature is understood in its pristine purity. However, whether objective presence is in essence

\(^{5^9}\) Ibid., p. 61.
\(^{6^0}\) Ibid., p. 61.
\(^{6^1}\) Ibid., p. 61-62.
environmental is something we will determine as we proceed through our investigation.

Objective presence has an environmental significance that an environmental philosophy would not understand to be a deficiency. However, rather than positively characterize a way of being that does not manipulate the environment, Heidegger assigns a fundamentally deficient status to a way of being that refrains from producing, using, and manipulating. Thus, we have a reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent with environmentalism.

2.3

I shall now clarify the meaning of authenticity, inauthenticity, and show that Being and Time may prescribe a way of being-in-the-world for Dasein that is inconsistent with environmentalism. Authenticity and inauthenticity are possible due to the “mineness” that belongs to Dasein. Heidegger speaks of the possibility that Dasein can choose itself and win itself. Insofar as Dasein can have lost itself and be in need of gaining itself, Dasein “is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself.” 62 Authenticity is a way of being in which Dasein is free to choose to be itself. Moreover, average everyday structures of Dasein’s being can be identical to Dasein’s authentic being.

Inauthenticity is identified with the way of being in which Dasein does not choose itself, but gets carried along by its lostness in the public realm of the “they.”

62 Ibid., p. 42.
Inauthenticity is not a “lower” degree of being, but signifies Dasein in several of its concrete and positive modes of being-in-the-world.

For the ends of this thesis what is important is that there is a prescriptive ontology of Dasein at work in Being and Time. A prescription is a guide, directive, or rule that is binding for Dasein. Though Heidegger offers a neutral phenomenological description of Dasein’s being, the authentic mode of Dasein’s being-in-the-world is a prescriptive guide that states how Dasein should comport itself in the world. If it turns out that a way of being-in-the-world that is fundamentally inconsistent with environmentalism is also understood to be authentic, then we will understand Being and Time to prescribe a way of being-in-the-world that is inconsistent with environmentalism. Moreover, insofar as average everyday structures of Dasein’s being can be authentic, there is reason to suspect that what Heidegger describes in Division One of Being and Time may have an additional prescriptive significance.

2.4

In “The Worldliness of the World,” Chapter Three of Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger aims to make being-in-the-world visible with regard to the structure of the world. Heidegger’s project in Being and Time seeks being in the ontological sense, and, therefore, his phenomenological ontology will aim to reveal the world ontologically. We will, at present, investigate how Heidegger approaches the phenomenon of the world and show that worldliness is the structure that Heidegger seeks to reveal.
Heidegger is not concerned with describing the ontical and pre-phenomenological look of beings that appear in the world. Rather, a phenomenological description of the world amounts to showing the being of objectively present beings and fixing this being in categorical concepts. The beings present in the world, according to the common standard of interpretation, are things of nature and things of value. Heidegger will move his analysis away from an understanding of things as having value. Things of value are founded on things of nature, are merely innerworldly, and cannot arrive at the phenomenon of the world.

Neither can explicating the being of nature arrive at the phenomenon of the world. The primary sense of nature that Heidegger has in mind in this chapter of Being and Time is the nature of the natural sciences and what is objectively present in the world. Nature, writes Heidegger, "is itself a being which is encountered within the world and is discoverable on various paths and stages."\(^63\) An ontology of nature, vis-à-vis the natural sciences, does not reach the phenomenon of the world because nature is a being encountered in the world that presupposes the world.

Heidegger wants us to encounter the worldliness of the world, which "is an ontological concept and designates the structure of a constitutive factor of being-in-the-world."\(^64\) Since being-in-the-world is an existential determination of Dasein and worldliness is constitutive of being-in-the-world, worldliness is also existential. World

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 63.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., p. 64.
signifies a determination of Dasein, and, thus, an ontological investigation into the world is also an ontological investigation within the analytic of Dasein.

Heidegger delineates four senses of the world. The first is an ontical-categorical sense: “1. World is used as an ontic concept and signifies the totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world.”65 The second sense of the world is an ontological-categorical sense: “2. World functions as an ontological term and signifies the being of those beings named in 1.”66 In this case, one can think of the world of mathematical objects. The third sense of “world” is an ontical-existentiell sense that can refer to the public world of Dasein: “3. Again, world can be understood in an ontic sense, but not as beings essentially unlike Dasein that can be encountered within the world; but, rather, as that ‘in which’ a factual Dasein ‘lives’ as Dasein.”67 The fourth sense of the world is an ontological-existential sense: “4. Finally, world designates the ontological and existential concept of worldliness.”68 Worldliness is a kind of being that belongs to Dasein and never refers to something objectively present in the world.

Ontology all too often passes over the phenomenon of worldliness. Instead of interpreting the world, the attempt is made “to interpret the world in terms of the being which is present within the world but has not, however, even been initially discovered, that is, in terms of nature.”69 An ontology that substitutes nature for the world and

65 Ibid., p. 64.
66 Ibid., p. 64.
67 Ibid., p. 65.
68 Ibid., p. 65.
69 Ibid., p. 65.
interprets nature as objectively present beings within the world passes over the phenomenon of worldliness. Such an ontology deprives the world of its worldliness by using nature as an ontological and categorical "limit case of the being of possible innerworldly beings."\(^{70}\) As such, nature, as a categorical content of structures, "can never render worldliness intelligible."\(^{71}\) Nature does not determine being-in-the-world, but, rather, nature is itself discoverable through being-in-the-world.

The sense of "nature" that conveys the sense of an environmentalist ethic is distinct from the scientific and objectively present sense of nature. Heidegger writes: "even the phenomenon 'nature,' for instance in the sense of the Romantic concept of nature, is ontologically comprehensible only in terms of the concept of world; that is, in terms of an analytic of Dasein."\(^{72}\) Thus, the nature of the environmentalist can only be clarified and understood through the concept of worldliness and the analytic of Dasein. Moreover, we see that Heidegger distinguishes this environmental conception of nature from objective presence, which refers to a theoretical and scientific kind of nature.

Being-in-the-world, and hence the world itself, "must be the subject of our analytic in the horizon of average everydayness as the nearest kind of being of Dasein."\(^{73}\) Thus, an analytic of the average everydayness of Dasein's being-in-the-world is the departure point in our investigation into the worldliness of the world. Something like the

\(^{70}\) Ibid., p. 65
\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 65.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 65. The Romantic conception of nature is environmental in that it has a strong appreciation of a nature that "stirs and strives," believes nature to possess an intrinsic value, and places a positive value on harmonizing human existence with nature.
\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 66.
world will show itself if we take that which is nearest to Dasein’s way of being as our interpretive clue in discovering worldliness. Heidegger thinks the surrounding world, id est, the environment, is the world that is closest for everyday Dasein, and, as such, will focus his analytic on how Dasein exists in the surrounding world. Heidegger writes:

Our investigation will follow the path from this existential character of average being-in-the-world to the idea of worldliness as such. We shall seek the worldliness of the surrounding world (environmentality [umweltlichkeit]) by way of an ontological interpretation of those beings initially encountered within the surroundings.\textsuperscript{74}

2.5

Heidegger wants to discover how Dasein encounters the world and the being of beings in our environment. We have found that our clue to encountering the world is to understand that which is nearest to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. This section of my thesis will show that a world of use and production is nearest to Dasein and that Dasein encounters being through its dealings with useful things that are constituted through handiness.

According to Heidegger, it is through the everyday dealings of Dasein with other innerworldly beings that Dasein understands the being of that which is in our environment. Dealings, rather than being grounded in a perceptual cognition, are grounded in “a handling, using, and taking care.”\textsuperscript{75} The phenomenological question currently at issue is the nature of “the being of those beings encountered when taking care

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 66.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 67.
of something."\textsuperscript{76} Entities encountered in production and use phenomenologically determine the ontological structure of being. In Dasein’s concernful taking care of things, being is “what is used, produced.”\textsuperscript{77} The way of being nearest to Dasein in its average everydayness is a concernful productive manipulation of things that sets beings to use.

Whether use has a negative environmental connotation is not initially clear. In \textit{What is Called Thinking} Heidegger describes the meaning of the original Greek word for “the useful”:

“To use” means, first, to let a thing be what it is and how it is. To let it be this way requires that the used thing be cared for in its essential nature— we do so by responding to the demands which the used thing makes manifest in the given instance.\textsuperscript{78}

“Using” does not mean the mere utilizing, using up, exploiting. Utilization is only the degenerate and debauched form of use. When we handle a thing, for example, our hand must fit itself to the thing. Use implies fitting response.\textsuperscript{79}

Thus, there is evidence that the kind of using Heidegger has in mind, which is constitutive of the way Dasein is primarily in the world, may be environmentally benign.

However, since that which is nearest to Dasein in its average everydayness is a mode of dealing in the world that uses and produces, \textit{Being and Time}, given my definition of technology, may prescribe a technological mode of being-in-the-world.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 67.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 67.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 187.
Insofar as being is what is used and produced, rather than giving an environmental sense to being, Heidegger pragmatically understands being-in-the-world in a potentially technological way. An environmental understanding of the world does not prioritize the productive manipulation of things in the manner of Being and Time. Heidegger, in orienting his ontology through production and use, has given us reason to consider Being and Time inconsistent with environmentalism.

To Heidegger, a using and handling is constitutive of Dasein. Everyday Dasein comports itself towards the world in terms of useful concerns and “always already is in this way.” For example, when one opens a door, one uses the latch. Dasein orients itself in space through the usefulness of certain avenues for living. This pre-reflective and pre-theoretical pragmatic know-how through which Dasein always already operates in its world is the way that everyday Dasein exists in the world.

Heidegger considers whether things are the beings that ought to serve as the preliminary theme of his investigation, but argues that one goes astray ontologically when one designates things to be “initially given.” That which Dasein encounters initially is not a mere thing. As we have seen, things of nature and of value are insufficient for the question at issue. Heidegger thinks that the Greek term pragmata is an appropriate word for things and defines it as “that with which one has to do in taking care in

---

80 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 67.
Given that Heidegger approves of the Greek term *pragmata* for things, we see a clear pragmatic element to Heidegger’s ontology.

Heidegger calls what we encounter in our concerns “Zeug” or “useful things.” “Zeug” has the connotation of tool, and can also be translated as equipment, gear, or stuff. I will refer to “Zeug” as equipment when it is more appropriate to the context. We primarily concern ourselves in our environment with useful things, which are understood within the framework of work. As examples of useful things, “we find utensils for writing, utensils for sewing, utensils for working, driving, measuring.” Heidegger seeks to disclose the kind of being of a useful thing by uncovering the utility that makes a useful thing what it is. Since Dasein will relate to the environment through using and manipulating nature insofar as equipment is what Dasein primarily encounters, useful things have a negative environmental significance.

The being of a useful thing belongs to a totality of useful things and can be understood only in terms of this total context. An individual useful thing never shows itself by itself, but rather its individuality emerges from a total organization of useful things. Thus, Heidegger writes that “a totality of useful things is always already discovered before the individual useful thing.” We first encounter a room “not as what

---

81 Ibid., p. 68.
82 Ibid., p. 68.
83 Ibid., p. 69.

33
is ‘between the four walls’ in a geometrical, spatial sense, but rather as something useful for living." Out of this structure of use in its wholeness, Dasein orients itself in space.

Useful things are essentially things that are “in-order-to.” This in-order-to contains a structure of reference of something to something, and is a kind of reference according to which Dasein is assigned to its world. The dealings of Dasein “with useful things are subordinate to the manifold of the references of the ‘in-order-to.’” Heidegger writes that “the different kinds of ‘in order to’ such as serviceability, helpfulness, usability, handiness, constitute a totality of useful things.” Thus, the in-order-to is a pragmatic kind of reference. In dealing usefully with our surrounding world, our concerns subordinate themselves to the in-order-to constitutive of useful things.

In Dasein’s dealing with useful things such entities genuinely become what they are. For instance, a hammer reveals itself as what it is in hammering. Even though in using a hammer Dasein does not thematically grasp the hammer nor understand the structure of it as a useful thing, hammering “has appropriated this utensil in the most adequate way possible.” Heidegger writes: “The less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more we take hold of it and use it, the more original [ursprunglicher] our relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a useful thing.” In using a hammer Dasein encounters it primordially as what it is, attains

---

84 Ibid., p. 68
85 Ibid., p. 69.
86 Ibid., p. 68.
87 Ibid., p. 69
88 Ibid., p. 69.
a more appropriate relation towards the stuff of the environment, and uncovers the specific “handiness” of the hammer.

Handiness (readiness-to-hand)\(^\text{89}\) is the ontological term that signifies the being of a useful thing, and handiness is that in which a useful thing reveals itself as itself. Handiness translates “Zuhandenheit” which carries the connotation of what is “at hand,” “ready-to-hand,” and “available.” It is when entities function in their use that useful things are handy and primordial. Handiness is the being-in-itself of useful things which allows them to be at our disposal. Dasein orients itself in the environment through the handiness that useful things show themselves to possess. Handiness, \textit{id est}, the way Dasein knows how to use useful things in accordance with the in-order-to constitutive of its useful dealings, has priority to the extent that “things,” insofar as we encounter them in our environment, are handy and pragmatic pieces of equipment.

We have shown that Dasein’s relation to the environment becomes more primordial through handily using useful things. However, for environmentalism, a primordial encounter with things does not arise, as with \textit{Being and Time}, through the pragmatic using of handy beings, but occurs through an encounter with the nature that exists, in its untouched and pristine character, prior to the manipulation and use of the environment. When a mountain, as such, is not used for quarry and a tree is not used for timber, one preserves the ecological value of such natural things. A tree or mountain is biologically and chronologically prior to timber or the quarry, and, as such, for

\(^{89}\) In this chapter we will refer to readiness-to-hand as handiness in keeping with the terminology in the Stambaugh translation of \textit{Being and Time}.  

35
environmentalism, nature is itself prior to the handiness of useful things. However, Heidegger, by arguing that what Dasein first encounters is handiness and that the original way Dasein is in the world is a way that uses things, reverses the environmental conception in which nature in its untouched purity is prior to the handiness of things. In associating primordiality with handiness, Heidegger has given us a reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent with environmentalism.

Circumspection is the sight through which Dasein deals with useful things in their handiness in accordance with the referentiality of the in-order-to. It is through circumspection, rather than through merely looking at the appearance of useful things or through theory, that one discovers handiness. The handy entity is not a theme for circumspection, but “withdraws, so to speak, in its character of handiness in order to be really handy.”

Everyday dealings initially occupy themselves not with the tools, but with the work that is to be produced. Thus, the primary concern of the dealings of Dasein is the work to be produced. The work carries with it the referential-whole in which one encounters useful things, and “is what is primarily taken care of and is thus also what is at hand.” The work produced has the same kind of being as other useful things and is fundamentally something handy. Heidegger gives shoes and a clock as examples of what work is to be produced. Due to the nuanced nature of Being and Time, it is, as Dreyfus has noted, unclear whether the kind of production Heidegger has in mind is that of a more

---

90 Ibid., p. 69.
91 Ibid., p. 69-70.
primitive form of production, such as craftsmanship, or a more industrial form of production, such as machine technology.

The work produced is the what-for. The what-for of a hammer, for instance, may be the house or shelter for which it is used. In its concernful dealings, Dasein encounters the work such that it "always already lets us encounter the what-for of its usability in the usability which essentially belongs to it."\(^{92}\) The work exists "on the basis of use and the referential context of beings discovered in that use."\(^{93}\) Moreover, "the work that has been ordered exists in its turn only on the basis of its use."\(^{94}\) Thus, usefulness is the essential characteristic that determines the way in which a produced work exists. Given that use is the criterion determining what Dasein produces, environmental principles of conservation do not determine how Dasein produces.

Productive work is useful for something, but it also uses a material for something. The work produced, therefore, contains a reference to the materials used. Hammers, tongs, and nails refer to "steel, iron, metal, stone, wood."\(^{95}\) Leather may serve as a material for production and it depends on hides, which depends on animals. In the case of animals, there are "beings accessible in the surrounding world which in themselves do not need to be produced and are always already at hand."\(^{96}\)

---

\(^{92}\) Ibid., p. 70.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 70.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., p. 70.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 70.
\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 70.
Dasein discovers nature through its productive involvement in a world of work in that nature gives itself as a product useful for useful things. Contrary to my notion of environmentalism, Heidegger writes that Dasein discovers nature “in the use of useful things, ‘nature’ in the light of products of nature.” For Being and Time to be consistent with environmentalism, nature must have a status independent of production. If the only way Dasein can encounter nature is through its handiness for production, then we will have reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent with environmentalism.

Nature, Heidegger notes, “must not be understood here as what is merely objectively present, nor as the power of nature.” Heidegger understands nature as a raw material for human production: “the forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind is ‘wind in the sails.’” Nature, therefore, is understood instrumentally within a technological framework wherein nature exists as a handy raw material that stands on reserve for production. This instrumental conception of nature is not consistent with environmentalism because natural entities are understood to exist as technological resources serviceable to production and because nature has no value independent of its handiness for productive uses.

97 Ibid., p. 70.
98 Ibid., p. 70.
99 Ibid., p. 70.
100 It is possible that this conception of nature could be applicable to craftsmanship. However, in craftsmanship the forest is a forest in addition to being timber and the mountain is a mountain in addition to being quarry because nature has not been totally mobilized for production. Heidegger, in this conception of nature, depicts a total mobilization of nature for productive activities whereby the forest is timber and the mountain is quarry, and, thus, the conceptualization of nature at work in this part of Being and Time is technological.
Heidegger points out that nature can be theoretically understood, apart from its handiness, in its objective presence, but in this way one does not arrive at an ecological significance of nature. We have shown that there is an environmental connotation to objective presence. However, we again see that the conception of nature in objective presence is not an environmental understanding of nature, but is a categorical mode of theorizing. A botanist or geographer, in falling within the theoretical standpoint of objective presence, does not reveal the romanticized conception of nature that stimulates ecological understandings. The nature that, in the ecological sense, comes over us, “stirs and strives,” and captivates us as landscape is not what is at issue in Being and Time as Heidegger understands nature through the lens of production.

In addition to referring to its usability for something and what it consists of, productive work refers to the user. Dasein encounters the public world through productive activity, and this activity not only occurs in the isolated workshop, but also is present in the public world. In craft conditions, “the work is cut to his figure; he ‘is’ there as the work emerges.”\(^\text{101}\) It is significant that Heidegger explicitly refers to craftsmanship, and, again, we see that it is not clear, in some ways, whether the kind of production in Being and Time refers to craftsmanship or technology.

Dasein discovers the surrounding world of nature as it goes about its productive activity. Through production, nature is given a certain direction and the effort of producing useful things alleviates for Dasein the burdens of nature. Contrary to

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 71.
environmentalism, the direction that nature possesses is not an intrinsic quality of nature, but arises from the circumspective awareness of the productivity through which nature is modelled. Heidegger writes: "In taking care, nature is discovered as having some definite direction on paths, streets, bridges, and buildings. A covered railroad platform takes bad weather into account, public lighting systems take darkness into account."\textsuperscript{102}

The absorption of Dasein in its nearest work-world serves a function of discovering. What Dasein discovers is innerworldly beings that are handy. Handiness does not colour beings that are initially objectively present, but, rather, handiness is initially encountered in beings and has priority over objective presence in how we deal with the world. The being "in-itself" of entities is ontologically and categorically determined as handiness. Thus, we again see that Heidegger privileges beings in their pragmatic – and potentially technological – use-functions. There is, contrary to environmentalism, no nature "in-itself" that we discover as entities pragmatically disclose themselves through handiness.

Given the prioritization of handiness, we can reiterate that Heidegger understands objective presence to be a deficient mode of being-in-the-world. Objective presence is a founded mode of being-in-in-the-world, does not have priority in the discovery of beings, and is not initially encountered in beings. It is not inconsequential to the ends of this thesis that Heidegger determines a mode of being-in-the-world that refrains from use and production to be a deficiency. In directing his analysis towards a pragmatic

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 71.
understanding of being-in-the-world in which Dasein handily orients itself among uses and production, Heidegger offers support for our hypothesis that Being and Time understands being-in-the-world within a technological horizon.

Heidegger asks whether handiness is founded on objective presence insofar as that which is handy can be "only on the basis of what is objectively present." 103 Given that the cognition associated with objective presence is a founded mode of being-in-the-world, that Heidegger has associated handiness with primordiality, that handiness is the kind of being nearer to Dasein, and that handiness constitutes the ontological-categorical being-in-itself of entities, Heidegger clearly intends to show that objective presence is founded on handiness. Just as, for Heidegger, theory presupposes praxis, so too does objective presence presuppose handiness. Heidegger writes:

But if, in our continuing ontological interpretation, handiness proves to be the kind of being of beings first discovered within the world, if its primordiality can ever be demonstrated over and against mere objective presence, does what we have explained up to now contribute in the least to an ontological understanding of the phenomenon of [the] world? 104

We have shown that Heidegger favours pragmatic ways of understanding how Dasein is in the world. Dasein circumspectively orients itself in the world through using handy equipment and is concernfully absorbed in a world of production. Nature is understood technologically out of a context of production and use insofar as it functions as a raw material. Rather than espousing an environmental philosophy, our analysis of

---

103 Ibid., p. 71.
104 Ibid., p. 72.
Being and Time has shown that Heidegger pragmatically characterizes the being-in-the-world of Dasein and understands nature technologically.

2.6

Heidegger’s characterization of the environment proceeds by asking how it is we can arrive at the phenomenon of the world through the being of what we encounter in our useful dealings with innerworldly beings. Heidegger inquires into the possibility that there is, within the field of Dasein’s productive work, a way innerworldly beings announce the worldly character of the surrounding world. It will be shown that certain modes of concern that disrupt Dasein’s order of referentiality and make handiness unhandy lead into the phenomenon of the world. With regard to environmentalism, this section of my thesis will show that, as in a technological horizon, Dasein cannot encounter nature “in-itself” and worldliness arises out of a productive context.

Heidegger asks us to consider “how ‘is there’ a world.”\textsuperscript{105} The world is determinative of innerworldly beings and conditions the existence of innerworldly beings. Being-in-the-world is constitutive of Dasein, and, thus, the being of Dasein is essentially bound up with the world. Thus, Heidegger asks:

Does not something like [the] world show itself to being-in-the-world taking care of the beings encountered within the world, that is, their innerworldliness? Does not this phenomenon come into view pre-phenomenologically; is it not always in view without requiring a thematically ontological interpretation? In the scope of its heedful absorption in useful things at hand, does not Dasein have a possibility of

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 72.
being in which, together with the innerworldly beings taken care of, their worldliness is illuminated in a certain way?¹⁰⁶

Heidegger is inquiring into a possibility through which the worldliness of the world illuminates itself amidst the handiness of Dasein’s productive involvements.

What are the modes of concern of everyday being-in-the-world, vis-à-vis handiness, in which the worldly character of beings shows itself? Heidegger examines three such modes of Dasein’s concernful dealings – namely, conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. Conspicuousness occurs when equipment is unusable, obtrusiveness occurs when equipment is missing, and obstinacy occurs when there is something that stands in the way of Dasein’s doings with equipment.

Conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy are all modes of Dasein’s concernful dealings that bring out the objective presence in that which possesses handiness. Entities that are normally unproblematically absorbed within Dasein’s circumspection become objectively present when there are disruptions in the referential order in which one uses them. Since objective presence arises in a breakdown of our ordinary dealings, we again see that handiness has priority over objective presence and that objective presence must presuppose handiness. In becoming conspicuously, obtrusively, or obstinately objectively present, the equipment that is handy in our concerns becomes repulsive equipment that one would like to shove away. However, “in

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 72.
this tendency to throw things away, what is at hand [handy] is still shown as being at
hand [handy] in its unyielding objective presence.”¹⁰⁷

Heidegger asks what “this reference to the modified way of encountering what is
at hand, a way in which its objective presence is revealed, mean[s] for the clarification of
the phenomenon of [the] world?”¹⁰⁸ Heidegger concedes that we have not yet come
substantially closer to the phenomenon of the world. Nonetheless, the disclosure of
objective presence in certain handy modes of concern puts us in a position to bring the
worldliness of the world into view. Conspicuous, obtrusive, and obstinate modes of
being-in-the-world cause that which is handy to lose its handiness in a peculiar way.
Handiness “does not just disappear, but bids farewell, so to speak, in the conspicuousness
of what is unusable.”¹⁰⁹ Handiness, as it were, still shows itself in its absence and in this
way “the worldly character of what is at hand [handy] also shows itself.”¹¹⁰ The worldly
character of handiness shows itself in the unusable nature of handiness.

When a useful thing has no application and does not turn handily to our concerns,
“the constitutive reference of the in-order-to to a what-for has been disrupted.”¹¹¹ In such,
“a disruption of reference – in being unusable for… – the reference becomes explicit.”¹¹²
Conspicuous, obtrusive, and obstinate modes of concern are disruptions in which a
reference becomes explicit such that the “what-for” becomes visible. Dasein catches

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 74.
¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 74.
¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 74.
¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 74.
¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 74.
¹¹² Ibid., p. 74.
sight of that towards which its productive work aims, and the whole workshop, which is that wherein Dasein concernfully dwells, shows itself. When the whole workshop becomes visible, "the context of useful things is lit up, not as a totality never seen before, but as a totality that has continually been seen beforehand in our circumspection. But with this totality, [the] world makes itself known."\textsuperscript{113}

Thus, the world announces itself through the circumspective awareness of the total context of useful things that lights up in a referential disturbance. Rather than being a kind of environmental insight into the world, one sees that the world discloses itself out of the horizon of Dasein's equipmental involvement within a production workshop. Since worldliness arises out of the "lighting up" of a totality of equipment, the disclosure of the world is fundamentally technological.

For that which is at hand to be encountered in its handiness and "being-in-itself," the referentiality in which Dasein is absorbed must remain unthematized for circumspection. Thus, "the condition for the possibility of what is at hand not emerging from its inconspicuousness is that the world \textit{not announce itself}:"\textsuperscript{114} If that which is handy is to remain inconspicuous and genuinely be handy, then the world must be in the unthematized background of Dasein's concerns. The non-announcement of the world of handy inconspicuous beings constitutes the phenomenal structure of the "being-in-itself" of beings in their handiness. Inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and non-obstinacy all

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 75.
refer to a positive phenomenal characteristic of the being of that which is handy. They "express the character of keeping to itself of what is at hand." 

Insofar as inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and non-obstinacy are conditions in which Dasein is unproblematically absorbed in the handiness of production and insofar as each is a positive phenomenal characteristic of the being-in-itself of things, we see that Heidegger prioritizes a handy way of being that produces. Moreover, the breakdown in the ability of Dasein to handily use equipment for productive purposes is a deficient mode of being-in-the-world, and we see that Dasein cannot encounter nature "in-itself" as the only way to relate to the environment is through handily using useful things.

We have shown that Heidegger arrives at the phenomenon of the world through the involvements of Dasein in a world of production. The particular modes of concern that make handiness unhandy and the circumspective awareness of the total workshop that arises from a referential disruption announce the phenomenon of the world. The route by which worldliness is illuminated in Being and Time is not through an environmental understanding, but arises out of the handiness of a context of production-equipment. Moreover, Dasein cannot encounter nature "in-itself" apart from its productive practices in a world of handiness.

2.7

We will now investigate the nature of signs so as to clarify the pragmatic nature of Being and Time. We will examine the bearing of signs on handiness and the world,

\[^{115}\text{Ibid., p. 75.}\]
and we will show that the being of a sign is rooted in use. Furthermore, we will disclose the nature of signs in the primitive world.

Heidegger gives an ontological analysis of references through signs. Signs are interpreted to be useful things, and their “specific character as useful things consists of indicating.” The specific example of a sign Heidegger uses is the adjustable arrow on a motor-car that indicates the direction the car will travel. The car arrow is understood pragmatically as a sign “handy within the world in the totality of the context of useful things belonging to vehicles and traffic regulations.” We discover the car arrow and other signs not as mere things that occur, but through circumspectly encountering handy equipment.

Heidegger pragmatically explains the ontological structure of signs: “As indicating, ‘referring’ is rather grounded in the structure of being of useful things, in serviceability-for.” Serviceability-for, as the structure of useful things, ontologically grounds the referring of a sign. Heidegger states that “the ‘referral’ of indicating is the ontic concretion of the what-for of serviceability, and determines a useful thing for that what-for.” In pragmatic fashion, serviceability-for is ontologically and categorically determinative of useful things.

Signs let Dasein encounter the handiness of the environment in a way that secures an orientation for Dasein’s dealings in the world. Signs “are useful things which

---

116 Ibid., p. 77.
117 Ibid., p. 78.
118 Ibid., p. 78.
119 Ibid., p. 78.
explicitly bring a totality of useful things to circumspection so that the worldly character of what is at hand makes itself known at the same time." Thus, signs make the world explicit within an environment that is pragmatically handy.

Signs do not have to come into being through the production of a useful thing such as a car arrow. In addition, “signs also originate when something already at hand is taken as a sign.” In such cases a more primordial meaning is evident, and signs discover something. When the south wind, for instance, “is ‘accepted’ by the farmer as a sign of rain, this ‘acceptance’ or the ‘value attached’ to this being is not a kind of bonus attached to something already objectively present, that is, the movement of the wind and a certain geographical direction.” The mere objective presence of the south wind does not establish the sign for rain. On the contrary, the south wind becomes recognized as a sign through its handiness as “the farmer’s circumspection first discovers the south wind in its being by taking the lay of the land into account.” Thus, we see that, rather than reading a sign through an ecological insight into nature “in-itself,” Dasein understands signs through handiness.

We have seen that signs occur in the pragmatic context of the handiness of useful things, but can there be signs without this emphasis on utility and handiness? Indeed, there can be. Heidegger explores the nature of signs, such as magic and fetishism, among primitive Dasein. Primitives do not establish their signs through theoretical speculations.

---

120 Ibid., p. 80.
121 Ibid., p. 80
122 ibid., p. 80.
123 Ibid., p. 81.
and their “use of signs remains completely within an ‘immediate’ being-in-the-world.”

For primitives, “the sign coincides with what it indicates...the sign itself always is what
is indicated.” The sign is not free from what it indicates as no detachment of the sign
from what it indicates is possible. This coincidence of the sign with what is indicated
does not “mean that the sign-thing has already undergone a certain ‘objectification,’ that
it has been experienced as a mere thing and been transposed together with what is
signified to the same region of being of objective presence.” Rather this coincidence of
sign and indication in the primitive world is based on the total lack of possible
objectification, and this impossibility of a sign becoming objectified “means that signs
are not at all discovered as useful things, that ultimately what is ‘at hand’ in the world
does not have the kind of being of useful things at all.” Hence, Heidegger writes,
“perhaps this ontological guideline (handiness and useful things), too, can provide
nothing for an interpretation of the primitive world, and certainly for an ontology of
thingliness.” Thus, the way of life in the primitive world does not discover signs as
useful things and may not be rooted in handiness.

The inquiry of Heidegger into the usage of signs among primitive peoples reveals
a kind of being-in-the-world that is consistent with environmentalism. The primitive
world is fundamentally environmental in that it is not oriented towards production and
does not reduce nature to the handiness of its uses. As against the pragmatic and
technological determination of average everyday Dasein, the primitive world is not understandable through useful things and may not be oriented by handiness. In “letting be” the untouched nature of natural beings rather than excessively using nature, the primitive world is evidence that there is an original way to be in the world that harmonizes with nature.

One would think it obvious that a primitive way of being can be associated with primordiality as both would appear to be original ways of being. However, the conception of primordiality that Heidegger adopts contradicts Heidegger’s own position that “primitive Dasein often speaks out of a more primordial [ursprünglichen] absorption in ‘phenomena.’” Heidegger cannot consistently claim that primitives are primordial because, on the one hand, handiness is the kind of being that is primordial, and, on the other hand, primitives may not orient their being through handiness. It would seem then that in identifying primordiality with handiness Heidegger contravenes the possibility of identifying the primitive understanding of being-in-the-world with primordiality.

The conceptualization of signs that Heidegger develops is consistent with his pragmatic privileging of beings in their useful handiness. Signs are useful things that possess handiness in their being and serviceability-for is the ontological structure of signs. Although it is not through some ecological insight that average everyday Dasein understands signs, in the primitive world there exists an environmental way of being in which signs are not understood as useful things.

129 Ibid., p. 51.
2.8

We will now aim to disclose the nature of relevance, what is meant by the “letting be” of beings, the nature of significance, and how Heidegger describes the worldliness of the world. In regards to environmentalism, we will show that Heidegger understands the suitability of beings through use, understands relevance within a context of uses, establishes a way in which Dasein “lets be,” and conceives of the structure of significance constitutive of worldliness within a framework of handiness.

Handiness, as the being of the beings encountered at hand in the world, is “ontologically related to the world and to worldliness.” The world is essentially “there” in things that are handy, and is discovered unthematically prior to the discovery of things we encounter. In certain ways that we deal with our surrounding world, the world can appear since it is that through which handiness is handy. The world lets handiness be encountered, and what we encounter is, as it were, released and given free rein in its being for our circumspection. Heidegger asks what this freeing means and in what way it is ontologically distinctive for the world.

Handiness and useful things are constituted through reference. Specific kinds of reference include serviceability for, impairment, and usability. References can become concrete through “the what-for of serviceability and wherefore of usability.” The qualities of things at hand are bound up with their suitability or unsuitability for certain uses in the same way that objective presence is bound up with handiness. Moreover, “as

\[130\] Ibid., p. 83.
\[131\] Ibid., p. 83.
the constitution of useful things, serviceability (reference) is also not the suitability of beings, but the condition of the possibility of being for their being able to be determined by suitability. Thus, serviceability is the condition with regard to being that enables an entity to be suitable for something. Insofar as serviceability can be likened to usability, uses are determinative of the suitability of something for something, and we, thus, again see that pragmatic considerations determine what is appropriate.

Reference is a condition of the possibility of something being handy and useful. Since reference is a structure of the being of handy things, things “have in themselves the character of being referred.” One discovers beings as being referred to something, and in their being referred to something beings possess “relevance” for something.

What is relevance? Relevance can be likened to an involvement. Relevance lets something be “together with” something and is the character of being that belongs to handiness. Relevance is the being of beings in the world and through it innerworldly beings are always already freed. Relevance is an “ontological determination of the being of these beings.” Something is relevant to its use insofar as it is serviceable or usable for its use. Thus, relevance concerns the pragmatic usefulness of something for certain ends such as “the what-for of serviceability, the wherefore of applicability.” Hammering, for instance, can be relevant in terms of the what-for insofar as it is serviceable to fastening an area to protect against bad weather. This relevance is one that

---

132 Ibid., p. 83.
133 Ibid., p. 84.
134 Ibid., p. 84.
135 Ibid., p. 84.

52
Heidegger insists is for a possibility of Dasein’s being, and, thus, relevance, in addition to being grounded in use, is grounded on an existential structure.

An individual handy thing is always relevant in terms of a totality of relevance and the totality of relevance is prior to the relevance of an individual thing. Thus, the “relevance things at hand have is prefigured in terms of the total relevance.” The total relevance which “constitutes the things at hand in a workshop in their handiness is ‘earlier’ than any single useful thing, as is the farmstead with all its utensils and neighboring lands.”

Relevance, in being outlined in advance through a totality of relevance, refers back to an original what-for that has no further relevance. Thus, the total relevance “ultimately leads back to a what-for which no longer has relevance, which itself is not a being of the kind of being of things at hand within a world, but is a being whose being is defined as being-in-the-world, to whose constitution of being worldliness itself belongs.” The what-for ultimately leads back to a “for-the-sake-of-which.” Heidegger writes that “the for-the-sake-of-which always concerns the being of Dasein which is essentially concerned about this being itself in its being.” Relevance and the what-for are founded on the being of Dasein in its worldly and existential “for-the-sake-of-which.”

Heidegger ontologically interprets the phenomenon of “letting be.” He writes that “to let something be relevant means to let things at hand be in such and such a way in

---

136 Ibid., p. 84.
137 Ibid., p. 84.
138 Ibid., p. 84.
139 Ibid., p. 84.
factual taking care of things, to let them be as they are and in order that they be such.”\textsuperscript{140} The ontic meaning of this “letting be” is to be interpreted ontologically. Ontologically understood, “letting something be relevant is the previous freeing of beings for their innerworldly handiness.”\textsuperscript{141} To “let be” is not to produce or bring beings into being, but to discover that which already is within the handiness of a context of use. To “let be” ontologically in terms of relevance “concerns the freeing of every thing at hand as a thing at hand, whether it is relevant in the ontic sense or whether it is such a being which is precisely not relevant ontically.”\textsuperscript{142} A being that is not relevant ontically is one that we do not “let be,” but rather work upon, improve, or smash. “Letting be” is an a priori perfect tense in which Dasein discovers that which is already in being and lets ontical beings be relevant in terms of its handy dealings in the world.

Our analysis has inclined towards a criticism of the pragmatic and technological dimensions of Being and Time out of a concern for environmental integrity. However, the notion of “letting be” may be a redemptive idea from the standpoint of environmentalism. In what sense, then, is the “let be” of Heideggerian fundamental ontology a principle consistent with environmentalism?

“Letting be” is not consistent with the radical forms of environmentalism that, as with the primitive world, insist on the abandonment of most forms of handiness and use from an environmental way of life. There is no better way to “let be” than to refrain, as

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 85.
in objective presence, from the use and manipulation of the environment. That Heidegger understands “letting be” in terms of handiness suggests that Heidegger does not realize that an orientation towards the world in terms of useful things will lead to the excessive exploitation of nature. Insofar as “letting be” refers to a relevant context of use and handiness, Heidegger, in “letting be,” remains within a pragmatic framework in which Dasein manipulates nature. If Heidegger had rather applied his principle of “letting be” to a nature that “stirs and strives,” then Heidegger would potentially be consistent with all forms of environmentalism.

“Letting be” does not produce, but allows Dasein to discover what already is. In such a notion, there is an environmental principle of reduction and of conservation that renders Heidegger, in a sense, consistent with environmentalism. Rather than exercising a greater technological dominance over nature, in “letting be” Dasein “reduces” production and thereby “reduces” environmental exploitation. Furthermore, in letting beings be what they are, “letting be” “conserves” the beings of Dasein’s environment in a way parallel to the demand of environmentalists to conserve nature. In that it reduces production and conserves beings, “letting be” is consistent with environmentalism.

“Letting be,” on the one hand, embodies environmental principles of reduction and conservation, but, on the other hand, it applies to the handiness of Dasein’s concerns in which Dasein uses the environment. On the whole, however, we can say that the environmental credentials of “letting be” outweigh its non-environmental credentials. “Letting be” is a principle that ambiguously offers support for environmentalism.
Environmentalism can be made consistent with forms of being-in-the-world that minimize the extent to which Dasein produces. Although what Dasein “lets be” are handy useful things, the way in which Dasein uses the environment and the way in which it is handy has been qualified by the principle of “letting be” such that Dasein conserves beings and, through refraining from production, reduces the extent to which one exploits nature. Hence, though not a robust environmental principle, “letting be” minimizes the extent of Dasein’s use of the environment in a way consistent with environmentalism.

To Heidegger, a relevant being that Dasein “lets be” is discovered concernfully as a being that is always already handy in Dasein’s surroundings, and is not merely objectively present. Dasein does not first encounter things as mere things, but initially encounters the handiness of the “thing.” Thus, “when a being shows itself in general to heedfulness, that is, when a being is discovered in its being, it is always already a thing at hand [handy] in the surrounding world and precisely not ‘initially’ merely present ‘world-stuff.’”143

Dasein, writes Heidegger, “has been referred to an in-order-to in terms of an explicitly or inexplicitly grasped potentiality-for-being for the sake of which it is, which can be authentic or inauthentic.”144 This in-order-to prefigures a what-for as something that can be relevant in and with something. On the basis of its potentiality for being, a what-for arises “as the possible letting something be relevant which structurally allows

---

143 Ibid., p. 85.
144 Ibid., p. 86.
for relevance to something else." Dasein is always "already referred in terms of a for-the-sake-of-which to the with-what of relevance." Dasein refers itself from a for-the-sake-of-which to relevance in such a way that Dasein always already "lets beings be encountered as things at hand [handy]." Heidegger writes, "that within which Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of self-reference is that for which it lets beings be encountered beforehand." The world is that within which Dasein understands itself, and, is, thus, that for which it lets beings be encountered. Moreover, "as that for which one lets beings be encountered in the kind of being of relevance, the wherein of self-referential understanding is the phenomenon of [the] world." The world is the "within" for the sake of which Dasein lets beings be encountered, and the structure wherein Dasein is referred is constitutive of the worldliness of the world.

Dasein understands itself in terms of a primordial familiarity that is existential and is essential to Dasein’s understanding of being. The meaning of this familiarity with the world in its worldliness can only be clarified on the basis of a primordial ontological interpretation of Dasein’s being, Dasein’s possibilities, and being in general. It is possible that Heidegger may have intended to develop, as opposed to the preliminary average everyday ontology of the world, a primordial ontology of the world that is

\[145\] Ibid., p. 86.
\[146\] Ibid., p. 86.
\[147\] Ibid., p. 86.
\[148\] Ibid., p. 86.
\[149\] Ibid., p. 86.
consistent with environmentalism. However, because Heidegger associates primordiality with the handiness that uses useful things for production, and because, as we shall show, Heidegger associates primordiality with handy relations of significance in a context of relevance, there are substantive reasons to believe a primordial ontology of the world will not coincide with an environmental philosophy.

In its familiar relevance, Dasein moves within its frame of reference according to the disclosure that its understanding holds before itself. In its familiarity with relations, Dasein “signifies” to itself, and, moreover, “primordially gives itself to understand its being and potentiality-of-being with regard to its being-in-the-world.” 150 The activity of Dasein occurs on the basis of relations of significations: “The for-the-sake-of-which signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-in of letting something be relevant, and the latter a what-with of relevance.” 151 Significance is the relational totality of these significations that forms a primordial totality and a priori signifies Dasein’s understanding of being-in-the-world. The structure of the world is constituted by significance, and the significance disclosed in these relations is an existential characteristic of Dasein. The context of relations, which is constitutive, as significance, of references, can be formally understood as a system of relations in the sense of relationships in which concernful circumspection dwells.

Heidegger writes that “in its familiarity with significance Dasein is the ontic condition of the possibility of the discovery of beings with the kind of being of relevance

150 Ibid., p. 87.
151 Ibid., p. 87.
(handiness) which are encountered in a world and that thus can make themselves known in their in-itself."\textsuperscript{152} Dasein is the condition of the possibility of discovering relevant and handy beings. As a being of significance, Dasein "always means that a context of things at hand [handy] is already essentially discovered with its being." \textsuperscript{153} Thus, we see that the significance constitutive of worldliness necessarily understands Dasein in a world of handiness. Insofar as Dasein is, it has always already been referred to a handy world in terms of significance. Moreover, "as the existential constitution of Dasein, of its being-in-the-world, this disclosed significance is the ontic condition of the possibility for discovering a totality of relevance." \textsuperscript{154}

Heidegger has delineated three kinds of being that must be kept distinct. First, Heidegger has shown the being of beings encountered in their handiness, and, second, he has shown the being of beings encountered in their objective presence. Lastly, Heidegger has shown "the being of the ontic condition of the possibility of discovering innerworldly beings in general, the worldliness of the world." \textsuperscript{155} The worldliness of the world is an existential determination of Dasein qua being-in-the-world that makes it possible in the first place for beings to be discovered.

Thus, we see that Heidegger differentiates handiness as a way of being from worldliness. Dasein and the worldliness of the world are both conditions of the possibility of something being handy that, owing to their existential and ontological

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 87.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 87.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 87.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 88.
nature, are not founded on uses and handiness. However, as we have already seen in Dreyfus’ analysis, there is reason to believe that Heidegger conflates handiness with the worldliness of the world.

Although Heidegger thinks the worldliness of the world must be understood in distinction from handiness, the structure of the world is constituted by a significance that always already reveals the world to be handy. The worldliness of the world is itself found to be a structure of handiness. The in-order-to and what-for, as significations that constitute the structure of worldliness, are pragmatic references that pertain to use and production. Thus, the significance constitutive of the world reveals worldliness to be a world of handiness, and Heidegger conflates a handy mode of being-in-the-world with the worldliness of the world. To encounter something within the worldliness of the world, it must fit within the equipmental schema of a referential totality understood through handiness.

We have shown that the ontological character of beings in their handiness is relevance, that in “letting be” one frees beings in their relevant handiness, that the world is that for which Dasein lets entities be encountered in their relevance, and that the worldliness of the world consists of significance. With regards to environmentalism, our analysis of Being and Time has shown that use is predominant within Heidegger’s ontology insofar as serviceability determines the suitability of things and we have seen that Dasein, in its relevance and significance, always already discovers “things” as handy.

156 See page 18-19 of Chapter One.
We have seen that Dasein and the worldliness of the world are founded on an existential way of being that is itself identical with a handy mode of being, and we have seen that in “letting be” Dasein relates to its environment in a way that is ambiguously environmental.

2.9

This section of my thesis will inquire into the status of nature in Being and Time. Heidegger writes:

"Nature," which “surrounds” us, is indeed an innerworldly being, but it shows neither the kind of being of handiness, nor of objective presence as "natural things." In whatever way one interprets this being of “nature,” all modes of being of innerworldly beings are ontologically founded in the worldliness of the world, and thus in the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. 157

Nature is not a being that is handy or objectively present, and must be understood through the worldliness of the world and the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. We have shown that Dasein encounters nature through handiness, but, given the above quote, it would seem that Dasein does not encounter nature solely through the handiness of productive engagements.

Heidegger, on the one hand, acknowledges nature not to be handy. Yet, on the other hand, Heidegger reveals the worldliness of the world, through which nature is understood, to be constituted by the handiness of relevant relationships of significance. Given that worldliness itself always reveals the world to be handy and is composed of

157 Ibid., p. 211.
pragmatic significations—such as the in-order-to and what-for—the understanding of
nature that arises from the worldliness of the world remains within the parameters of
handiness. A worldly understanding of nature will not be distinct from a handy
understanding of nature.

2.10

This section of our thesis will show how Heidegger intends us to understand the
average everyday description of being-in-the-world in which Dasein uses, produces,
and manipulates its environment. We will turn to a passage of Being and Time that
indicates the way in which we are to understand the pragmatic average everyday mode
of being-in-the-world. Heidegger intends the average everyday mode of being-in-the-
world that uses and produces to be positive. However, in addition to being positive,
does Heidegger understand the pragmatic mode of being-in-the-world to be authentic?

That Dasein deals with the world through use and production may be descriptive of
Dasein, but not something that Heidegger prescribes for Dasein’s authentic being. The
question, which will demonstrate Heidegger’s environmental integrity, simply becomes
whether the average everyday description of being-in-the-world has an authentic
significance.

Heidegger writes:

As examples of the phenomena of being together with...we chose the
using, handling, and producing of things at hand and their deficient and
undifferentiated modes, that is, the being together with things that belong
to everyday need. The authentic existence of Dasein also maintains itself
in such taking care, even when it remains “indifferent” for it.158

158 Ibid., p. 352.
The authentic existence of Dasein maintains itself in the concernful taking care that uses, handles, and produces handy things. Heidegger has certainly worded his understanding of use and production in a more favourable light given that using and producing are done in the service of need. However, this quote makes it clear that there is no modification of the handy inauthentic using and producing of equipment whereby one authentically relates to the environment in an environmental way. Though one may be indifferent to the using and producing of things, there is no avenue out of a pragmatic horizon for Dasein in Being and Time insofar as a way of being that uses and produces remains authentic.

There is a certain falleness that characterizes the description of the being-in-the-world of Dasein. Thus, through a change of emphasis one can argue that the point is not so much that using and producing is authentic. Rather, authentic Dasein remains fallen and, hence, unable to change a condition of use and production. However, the point remains that Heidegger does not prescribe an environmental way of relating to the environment for the authentic being of Dasein. The authentic existence of Dasein does not relate to nature in a way distinct from an average everyday way of being-in-the-world. Whether this reflects the fallen status of Dasein does not change the fact that Heidegger has conjoined a non-environmental way of being-in-the-world with the authentic being of Dasein. The pragmatic using of nature for productive ends is coextensive with an authentic mode of being-in-the-world, and, thus, we have further reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent with environmentalism.
Our elucidation of *Being and Time* has significantly clarified whether the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time* is consistent with environmentalism. The notion of "letting be" is the only aspect of *Being and Time* that we have found to be in any way consistent with environmentalism. The bulk of our evidence indicates that *Being and Time* does not present an environmental philosophy as it pragmatically understands being-in-the-world through an orientation among uses and production. Furthermore, there is support for our hypothesis that *Being and Time* situates being-in-the-world within a technological horizon that is inconsistent with environmentalism. A final synthesis of the consistency of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time* with environmentalism will await our fourth chapter.
Chapter Three

3.1

This chapter of my thesis will evaluate more of the scholarly literature pertaining to the question of whether *Being and Time* is consistent with environmentalism. We will look at three philosophers — Joseph Fell, Paul Farwell, and W. S. K. Cameron — and determine in what sense these scholars support my hypothesis that *Being and Time* understands the world within a technological horizon that is inconsistent with environmentalism.

We will first turn to the work of Joseph P. Fell. Fell defends Heidegger’s environmental integrity. Nature, Fell suggests, is not merely understood through readiness-to-hand in a derivative and deficient way. To Fell, anxiety discloses a present-at-hand (objectively present) primordial nature that has priority over a ready-to-hand (handy) nature. Our analysis will show that, contrary to environmentalism, the only disclosure of nature in *Being and Time* is through the ready-to-hand as anxiety does not disclose a present-at-hand nature.

Fell shows that it was a matter of concern to Heidegger that *Being and Time* was given a pragmatic and technological interpretation. To Heidegger, *Being and Time* attempted...

...a first characterization of the phenomenon of the world through an interpretation of how we move about first and for the most part in our world everyday. In so doing, I started with what is ready-to-hand for us everyday, what we use and manage...The point was to press on, by and
through this first characterization of the phenomenal world, to an
exhibition of the phenomenon of world as a problem. But it was never my
intention to assert or establish through this interpretation that the essence
of man consists in his wielding a spoon and fork and riding on the
streetcar. 159

Heidegger, thus, warns us “against misinterpreting the equipment analysis of Division I
of Being and Time as claiming that the human being is essentially a practical user of
practical instruments.” 160 However, admittedly, Heidegger also states that “we have to
clarify for ourselves what it signifies that man has a relation to the works that he
produces. It is for this reason that a certain book called Sein und Zeit discusses dealings
with equipment.” 161 Thus, there may be an intrinsic reason underlying the pragmatic
orientation of Being and Time.

Moreover, Heidegger, in the above quote about “wielding a spoon and fork,” does
not admit the extent to which a pragmatic mode of being-in-the-world has been
“essentialized.” The analysis of Being and Time reveals the pragmatic use of equipment
to play a crucial role in the average everyday and authentic mode of being of Dasein. To
reiterate: Using and producing is the kind of being nearest to Dasein; being is what is

159 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, in Martin Heidegger:
Heidegger,” in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, edited by Hubert Dreyfus & Harrison Hall,

Heidegger,” in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, edited by Hubert Dreyfus & Harrison Hall,

161 Martin Heidegger, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of
Force, translated by W. Brogan and P. Warne, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1995), p. 117. (In Andrew Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The
Catastrophe and Redemption of History, p. xiv).
used and produced; 'pragmata' is the appropriate word for things; Dasein relates primordially to the environment through the handiness of uses; Dasein understands nature through its instrumental handiness; signs are understood pragmatically; and the significance constitutive of the structure of the world always already discovers the world to be handy. Since Dasein is, even in its authentic being, constituted by handy involvements with equipment, we find it hard not to conclude that Dasein “essentially” operates in the world in a pragmatic way.

Fell tells us that the pragmatic analysis of Being and Time was only a first characterization based on “how we ‘first and for the most part’ (zunächst and zumeist) comport ourselves in everydayness.”162 Fell stresses that the pragmatic mode of being-in-the-world described in Division One is an average everyday interpretation that is preliminary, and remarks that “the interpreter of Being and Time must be careful not to conflate what is ‘first and for the most part’ with what is ‘fundamental’ or ‘primordial’ (ursprünglich).”163 However, this interpretation is problematic because, in addition to being the positive mode of being through which Heidegger hopes to access the meaning of being, the average everyday way Dasein uses equipment is primordial and not distinct from an authentic mode of being. Thus, there is something “fundamental” about what is “first and for the most part.”

Fell refers us to a passage in Heidegger’s “The Essence of Reasons” that attempts to vindicate the approach of Being and Time to the environment:

---

163 Ibid., p. 66.
If we somehow equate the ontical system of useful things (of tools) with the world and explain being in the world as traffic with useful things, we then abandon any understanding of transcendence as being in the world in the sense of a “basic constitutive feature of Dasein.”

On the other hand, a study of the ontological structure of “environmental” being (in so far as it is discovered as tool) has one singular advantage for a preliminary characterization of the world: it leads over to an analysis of this phenomenon and prepares the way for the transcendental problem of the world. As is indicated clearly enough in the outline and arrangement of sections 14-24 of Being and Time, this is the sole intention of the analysis of environment, which itself, considered in terms of the guiding aim of the book remains subordinate.

There are reasons why the concept “nature” seems to be missing in the Analytic of Dasein – not only “nature” in a primordial sense (cf. Sein und Zeit, p. 65 et infra). The decisive reason is that we encounter nature neither within the compass of the environment [Umwelt] nor in general primarily as something to which we relate ourselves. Nature is primordially manifest in Dasein because Dasein exists as situated and disposed [als behindlich-gestimmtes] in the midst of beings. But only in so far as situatedness (thrownness) belongs to the essence of Dasein and is expressed in the unity of the full concept of care can we attain the basis for the problem of nature.¹⁶⁴

Thus, the pragmatic approach to the environment in Being and Time was a merely preliminary determination that leads into the transcendental problem of the world.

Nature, moreover, is absent from Being and Time because Dasein does not encounter nature in the environment. Only through the concept of care does one attain the ground for the problem of nature. Heidegger states that the pragmatic characterization of the environment is “subordinate” to the guiding aim of Being and Time, but, as we have noted, the preliminary pragmatic characterization of the world has a primordial and authentic implication. Heidegger’s qualification does not change the extent to which a pragmatic mode of being-in-the-world is definitive of Dasein.

Fell states what we find problematic about *Being and Time*: “The ‘preliminary’ characterization of world in *Being and Time* has not done justice to the relation of world and nature. (The oft-noted infrequency of the term ‘earth’ in *Being and Time* seems one sign of the incompleteness of that book’s treatment of the being of nature.)”\(^{165}\) Moreover, the prioritization of the ready-to-hand implies nature has a derivative and deficient status:

If one starts philosophically with Dasein’s everyday preoccupation with practical equipment, one reaches nature as such only secondarily, by a derivation or shift of focus that brings presentness-at-hand to the fore... So it can appear to the interpreter of *Being and Time* that nature is a derivative phenomenon and a deficient phenomenon, dependent for its being on the prior showing of an apparently primordial readiness-to-hand.\(^{166}\)

Fell denies the “derivative” and “deficient” status of nature in *Being and Time*. To Fell, readiness-to-hand is not primordial and the average everyday use of the environment is not authentic. Fell states: “Heidegger never says that readiness-to-hand is ‘primordial;’ it is the kind of being that is experienced ‘first and for the most part’ in ‘average everydayness,’ which is a ‘fallen’ and ‘inauthentic’ experience.”\(^{167}\) However, I have shown that readiness-to-hand is primordial and that an authentic mode of being maintains itself in the world in a way that handily produces in terms of the average everyday way Dasein is “first and for the most part.”

Fell argues that the familiar everyday comportment of Dasein among pragmatic instruments is a limited aspect of being-in-the-world. An understanding of nature can

\(^{166}\) Ibid., p. 67.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., p. 67.
move beyond the “limits of praxis” through a disclosure of the strange. Nature is primordially in Dasein because of the “situated and disposed” character of Dasein. Thus, an analysis of the disposition of Dasein will lead into “Heidegger’s account of the disclosure of primordial nature and so his account of the limits of praxis.” In order to show that Heidegger has a robust theory of nature, Fell shows that the strangeness of a present-at-hand mood of anxiety is a disclosure of primordial nature. To Fell, “the presentness-at-hand of primordial nature is disclosed in an anxious failure of understanding.” However, this is quite the leap. An anxious way of being-in-the-world does not relate Dasein to presence-at-hand or to primordial nature. Indeed, when we consider that Heidegger associates primordiality with readiness-to-hand and states that Dasein cannot encounter the nature that “stirs and strives” through presence-at-hand, we find no basis for a present-at-hand primordial nature.

Nonetheless, Fell remarks that Heidegger in Being and Time “leaves no doubt” that anxiety and the strange “describe sheer presentness-at-hand.” We read that:

The nothingness of the world in the face of which anxiety is anxious does not mean that an absence of innerworldly things objectively present [present-at-hand] is experienced in anxiety. They must be encountered in just such a way that they are of no relevance whatsoever, but can show themselves in a barren mercilessness.

---

168 Ibid., p. 68.
169 Ibid., p. 76.
170 Ibid., p. 70
171 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 343.
Granted that anxiety can disclose present-at-hand beings in “a barren mercilessness,” is there further evidence for the position that anxiety refers to presence-at-hand? Heidegger states...

...that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite to be taken care of; the threat does not come from something at hand [ready-to-hand] and objectively present [present-at-hand], but rather from the fact that everything at hand [ready-to-hand] and objectively present [present-at-hand] absolutely has nothing more to “say” to us.\(^{172}\)

Thus, anxiety does not issue from something present-at-hand, but rather originates in the face of “nothing.” Heidegger states that “nothing which is at hand [ready-to-hand] and present [present-at-hand] within the world functions as that which anxiety is anxious about.”\(^{173}\) The object of anxiety appears rather as the being-in-the-world of Dasein. The world and “nothingness” is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Thus, rather than there being a substantial connection between anxiety and the present-at-hand, anxiety is not anxious about the present-at-hand.

Though Fell admits that *Being and Time* prioritizes readiness-to-hand over presence-at-hand from the standpoint of average everydayness, Fell believes that the present-at-hand has priority over the ready-to-hand from the standpoint of anxiety. Anxiety makes possible the disclosure of readiness-to-hand because “the original experience of the strange is the ground-possibility of any practical comportment, of any becoming-familiar with equipment.”\(^{174}\) Moreover, the “disclosure of beings *as present-at-hand* in anxiety is the original ground-possibility of both the presentness-at-hand of the

\(^{172}\) Ibid., p. 343.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., p. 186.

theoretical object of science and the readiness-to-hand of the equipment of everyday praxis."\(^{175}\)

On the basis of the association of anxiety with the present-at-hand, Fell declares that beings are “originally” or “primordially” present-at-hand. The present-at-hand is “brought out of hiding by overt anxiety as an ‘original’ or ‘primordial’ disclosure of beings,”\(^{176}\) and, in the “routine disclosure of the ready-to-hand the anxious disclosure of present-at-hand nature is already being covered over.”\(^{177}\)

However, this line of argument, in which the strangeness of the present-at-hand is prior to the familiarity of the ready-to-hand, ignores that anxiety does not possess the kind of being of presence-at-hand. It ignores that the primordial relations constitutive of Dasein are understood through Dasein’s familiarity with the world and that Heidegger founds the present-at-hand on the ready-to-hand. We have shown that what is nearest to Dasein and is “first and for the most part” is a pragmatic engagement with useful things in a context of use and production. This ready-to-hand mode of being is itself prior to the present-at-hand that Fell associates with anxiety. Dasein is primordially in the world in a way that handily uses useful things, and cases of presence-at-hand arise only when there is a deficiency in the handy way Dasein is taken in by the world. \textit{Being and Time} does not support Fell’s idea of a present-at-hand anxiety.

Fell thinks that “in the order of authentic recognition or retrieval, the presentness-at-hand disclosed in anxiety is seen to have a certain priority over a still merely possible

\(^{175}\) Ibid., p. 70.  
\(^{176}\) Ibid., p. 71.  
\(^{177}\) Ibid., p. 71.
readiness-to-hand. Moreover, for Dasein “an authentic remembering of its anxious temporal basis would require recognition of and resignation to the severe limits of praxis.” Praxis may be limited, but the modification of inauthenticity in an authentic mode of being does not modify the pragmatic nature of being-in-the-world. Contrary to Fell, an authentic mode of being-in-the-world maintains itself in the midst of ready-to-hand uses and production. In the order of authentic retrieval, presence-at-hand does not have priority over readiness-to-hand since it is a deficient mode of being-in-the-world.

Fell’s notion that there is a priority given to the anxious disclosure of a present-at-hand nature is not supported by Being and Time. Fell cannot overturn the view that Dasein exists in a pragmatic world that originally discloses equipment. Ultimately, nature, in Being and Time has a “deficient” and “derivative” status from an environmental perspective insofar as it is understood instrumentally through a set of pragmatic ready-to-hand engagements that subordinate it in production. Fell’s account of a present-at-hand primordial nature that anxiety discloses does not distance us from our hypothesis that Being and Time understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon.

3.2

In “Can Heidegger’s Craftsman Be Authentic?” Paul Farwell examines whether the productive craftsman of Being and Time authentically resides in the world. Contrary to my argument that the producer exists authentically, Farwell argues that the productive

---

178 Ibid., p. 72.
179 Ibid., p. 77.
work of craftsmanship is primarily inauthentic. Although Farwell is right to indicate that craftsmanship corresponds to inauthentic temporality, we will show that Farwell cannot overturn our understanding that producing possesses an authentic status in *Being and Time*.

Farwell shows that “The Temporality of Circumspective Taking Care” in Division Two of *Being and Time* clarifies that “inauthentic temporality is by definition the temporality that characterizes the craftsman’s workshop activities.” Inauthentic temporality and the temporality in which the craftsman takes care of his tools both pertain to an awaiting, making present, and forgetting. Thus, the very act of using tools, insofar as it falls within the inauthentic temporal schema of “awaiting/retaining/making present,” renders the craftsman inauthentic.

In Farwell’s formulation, Dasein in its authentic being is indifferent to any pragmatic concerns as authenticity arises from a fundamental disengagement from worldly concerns. The authentic confrontation of Dasein with its temporal limits is hidden by Dasein’s absorption in the inauthentic present of a world of productive work. As such, the tools themselves “lure Dasein into inauthenticity,” and “the world of an authentic Dasein would look more like a world of broken hammers.”

---

183 Ibid., p. 89.
Farwell’s position is appropriately nuanced. Though he maintains craftsmanship is primarily inauthentic, “the craftsman need not leave his workshop to achieve authenticity.”\textsuperscript{184} Authenticity is a modified way in which Dasein seizes upon average everydayness. Thus, Dasein can authentically exist in the average everyday way it uses the environment. However, whether Farwell can square the above comment about the authentic craftsman with his conclusion that the authentic world is “a world of broken hammers” seems suspect.

Farwell has a peculiar understanding of Heidegger’s claim that “the authentic existence of Dasein also maintains in such taking care [the using, handling, and producing of things], even if it remains ‘indifferent’ for it.”\textsuperscript{185} For Farwell, this claim means “an authentic Dasein is a being-in-the-world, even if it is indifferently so.”\textsuperscript{186} Surely, however, the point is that the using and producing of the craftsman is authentic. Heidegger’s explicit statement would seem to undermine Farwell’s position that the productive engagements of Dasein are inauthentic. It may not, as Farwell suggests, be incidental that productive concerns may be a matter of indifference, but this does not change that in using and producing a craftsman maintains himself authentically.

Farwell tells us that a broken hammer makes us aware of the world, but does not tell us that a hammer that inconspicuously functions is understood positively. To Farwell, the authentic moment is when the hammer breaks and “Dasein breaks from its

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{185} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p. 352.
\textsuperscript{186} Paul Farwell, “Can Heidegger’s Craftsman Be Authentic,” p. 86.
engagement.” ¹⁸⁷ However, the present-at-hand moment in which Dasein can no longer engage with its world is a deficiency that does not have priority over ready-to-hand productive engagements. The way Dasein primordially relates to phenomena is through handily using equipment, and this primordial connotation to producing implies that there is something authentic about production. Though authenticity, as something existential, is not essentially formed out of handy productive practices, a producer can certainly be authentic in his workshop. Dasein’s productive engagements are still fundamentally positive, primordial, and authentic.

Farwell has justly pointed out a way in which, vis-a-vis temporality, Dasein’s using and producing with equipment is inauthentic and rightly shows that pragmatic concerns are not the ultimate object of authenticity. For Farwell, the craftsman must break from his workshop in order to be authentic. However, Heidegger still understands using and producing to possess a positive phenomenal significance, and Farwell does not adequately concede that using and producing are coextensive with authenticity. Ultimately, our position that Heidegger prescribes a pragmatic mode of being to be authentic is supported by Being and Time as authenticity, as we have shown, maintains itself in the productive activities of the craftsman. Thus, the authentic moment is not, to our mind, a break from Dasein’s engagements, but a modification from within the very average everyday engagements of Dasein in a productive world.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 88.
3.3

We will now assess W. S. K. Cameron’s “Heidegger’s Concept of the Environment in Being and Time.” Cameron astutely shows that Being and Time may be inconsistent with environmentalism because it understands the environment instrumentally and is anthropocentric. Cameron, however, is unsuccessful in attempting to allay this worry and does not show that Being and Time is consistent with environmentalism.

Cameron recognizes that, from an environmental standpoint, Being and Time raises “alarm.” Being and Time is anthropocentric in two major ways: Dasein is categorically distinct from other biological beings as the only being of value and Dasein constitutes its environment in terms of instrumental relations. The instrumental conception of the environment is evident because “Dasein becomes aware of its environment as a region of ready-to-hand equipment characterized by its serviceability, conduciveness, usability, and manipulability.”\(^\text{188}\) Thus, it would seem that Being and Time does not affirm the intrinsic value of the environment.

Cameron’s argument is that neither Heidegger’s “anthropocentric commitments nor Dasein’s original and never abandoned orientation to use are problematic per se.”\(^\text{189}\) To Cameron, “Heidegger leaves open the possibility that Dasein could develop a non-

\(^{189}\) Ibid., p. 35.
instrumental relation to the natural world.”\textsuperscript{190} Cameron believes he can dispel the suspicion that \textit{Being and Time} is inconsistent with environmentalism and show that \textit{Being and Time} can ground a non-instrumental understanding of the environment.

Cameron admits the content of \textit{Being and Time} is not helpful in supporting the claim that there is a non-instrumental understanding of the environment: “We’d be on firmer ground if Heidegger had offered examples of things that could not adequately be regarded from an instrumental perspective; since he does not, we can only surmise an argument from silence.”\textsuperscript{191} If “an argument from silence” is all that we have, then it is quite apparent that the only understanding of nature in \textit{Being and Time} is instrumental. However, Cameron insists Heidegger maintains that a non-instrumental way of being is possible: “If Heidegger never denies that we could regard a thing in a non-instrumental way, that bare possibility stands against Heidegger’s exclusively instrumental examples.”\textsuperscript{192} Cameron here, as in other places, uses an excessive sense of possibility to argue for the compatibility of \textit{Being and Time} with environmentalism.

To Cameron, the environment in \textit{Being and Time} does not only consist of tools. The environment as a whole is not instrumental as the referential totality “is not a tool, but rather the condition of the possibility of encountering and using tools.”\textsuperscript{193} However, Cameron admits “this reassurance is wan.”\textsuperscript{194} Even if the referential totality that

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p. 35.  
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., p. 38.  
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 38.  
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., p. 38.  
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., p. 38.
conditions the tool-using practices of Dasein is not itself an instrument, it is
fundamentally not environmental insofar as it delineates the domain of objects in the
world to be equipment subject to instrumental uses. The environment as a whole, insofar
as worldliness discloses the world to be ready-to-hand, is still the instrumental workshop
for the use of equipment.

Cameron thinks an instrumental attitude can be problematic, but argues that an
instrumental orientation towards nature is “unavoidable and presumptively good.”195 Our
pursuit of food, shelter, and other needs is inseparable from an orientation that makes use
of tools. Use is not disrespectful, Cameron argues, as even environmentalists “use” a
mountain when they hike across it and “use” other people in their social relations.
Human life requires instrumental relations with other people and things, and, thus, use is
fundamental to our identity.

It is rather contrary to environmentalism, however, to justify use of the
environment in this way. Surely, there is a qualitative difference between the hiker who
uses the mountain by hiking and the mining company that seeks to use it as a raw
material, and, surely, it is appropriate to treat people as ends in themselves rather than to
instrumentally use people. Cameron, moreover, is evading his earlier critique of the
instrumental conception of the environment in Being and Time and is now arguing
environmentalism should accept an instrumental conception of the environment.

195 Ibid., p. 38.
Since we treat humans instrumentally, we are not, Cameron reasons, in a position to deplore the instrumental conception of the natural world. Thus, "even if the biocentricist rightly demands our acknowledgement of the value of the natural world, she cannot complain that we regard that world instrumentally."\(^{196}\) Again, we take issue with the claim that an instrumental social relation can justify an instrumental relation to nature. Both practices are problematic and the way in which we ought to treat persons, id est, as ends in themselves, is indicative of the non-instrumental way we ought to treat nature.

Biocentricism aims to engender respect for all living creatures and for ecosystems, but Cameron states: "I have not found any passage in Being and Time that unambiguously asserts the intrinsic value of the non-human environment."\(^{197}\) Though, surely, this signifies to us that Being and Time may be inconsistent with environmentalism, Cameron believes "Heidegger provides resources for understanding how the environment’s inherent value could come to be recognized."\(^{198}\) However, what we are looking for as environmentalists, and what neither Being and Time nor Cameron provide, is a conception of the intrinsic value of nature.

Though Heidegger categorically distinguishes Dasein from non-Dasein beings, "he draws no further conclusions about Dasein’s moral priority to what is not Dasein."\(^{199}\) Heidegger, according to Cameron, does not negate the possibility that other creatures have intrinsic value. Thus, "Heidegger may thus suggest that we can and perhaps will

\(^{196}\) Ibid., p. 39.
\(^{197}\) Ibid., p. 40.
\(^{198}\) Ibid., p. 40.
\(^{199}\) Ibid., p. 40.
eventually regard aspects of the natural world as intrinsically valuable." Moreover, "Heidegger may not demonstrate the necessity of such [biocentric] changes, but at least his theory is open to their possibility." These claims about the merely possible ignore the explicit content of Being and Time. Being and Time does not biocentrically understand the environment as Cameron has not overturned his original insight into the anthropocentric and instrumental nature of Being and Time.

Heidegger’s prioritization of Dasein is not problematic, according to Cameron, insofar as Dasein is the being that ought to be respectful to nature and is the being that is morally accountable. Cameron argues that biocentricism is consistent with Heidegger’s prioritization of Dasein because it inevitably will be human beings who declare the meaning and value of nature. The very claim to demand respect for nature can only address humans insofar as we are the only species that can be held accountable. Cameron states that, with this in mind, “Heidegger’s defence of Dasein’s epistemic and pragmatic priority appear less problematic.”

Heidegger, according to Cameron, does not commit “to a traditional distinction between an instrumentally valuable world and intrinsically valuable Dasein.” However, Heidegger does commit to exactly this position. The natural world is a referential totality of relevant ready-to-hand equipment as nature is fundamentally understood to be an instrument. Contrary to Cameron, the environment is defined solely

---

200 Ibid., p. 41.
201 Ibid., p. 41.
202 Ibid., p. 42.
203 Ibid., p. 42.
through Dasein’s instrumental concern, and Heidegger does not suggest how a non-instrumental relation to the environment could develop. Even though Heidegger never explicitly denies that Dasein could exist in a way that "stirs and strives," the only kind of disclosure of nature in *Being and Time* is instrumental. As Heidegger does not provide a conception of the natural world that is intrinsically valuable, we can, contrary to Cameron, conclude that *Being and Time* is environmentally problematic.

Cameron concludes by stating that in *Being and Time* "the environment is not defined solely through Dasein’s instrumental concern."\(^{204}\) Moreover, Heidegger does not rule out the possibility of non-instrumental relations to nature and *Being and Time* even "suggests how they can develop."\(^{205}\) However, we have seen that this argument is erroneous. *Being and Time* does not establish how Dasein can biocentrically relate to its environment as the environment is understood instrumentally and anthropocentrically through ready-to-hand productive uses. Cameron states the problem of *Being and Time* with respect to environmentalism, but does not convince us that Heidegger resolves this problem. If there were a non-instrumental biocentric relation to nature in *Being and Time*, Cameron certainly does not bring it to light.

\(^{204}\) Ibid., p. 42.  
\(^{205}\) Ibid., p. 42.
Chapter Four

4.1

The aim of this thesis is to determine whether the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time* is consistent with environmentalism. We are now at the stage of our investigation where we can review the evidence at hand and offer a final conclusion with regards to our question. First, we will reflect on the environmental significance of use and production being constitutive of being-in-the-world. Second, we will determine how my definition of environmentalism and technology applies to *Being and Time*. Third, we will examine the resemblance between the nature of being-in-the-world and a technological horizon, and, lastly, we will deliver a verdict as to whether *Being and Time* is consistent with environmentalism.

Heidegger discloses the way of being nearest to Dasein to be one of use and production, but this very way of being can lead into an environmental crisis. Insofar as Dasein utilizes nature and is primarily a being that produces, Dasein reduces nature to a mere raw material and exploits the natural resources of the environment. One uses oil for gas, trees for timber, and the mountain for quarry, but the extent to which one uses and produces is a measure of one’s ecological footprint. Understanding nature solely to be something serviceable to uses undermines the capacity for natural beings to possess a meaning that demands the respect of human beings. In *Being and Time*, the ecological moment in which the environment is no longer “at hand” for handy uses is a mere deficiency, and nature, as such, is understood through its productive handiness.
Is the kind of use that Heidegger has in mind in Being and Time environmentally benign? Insofar as Heidegger describes a handy mode of being that uses its environment in a context in which Dasein “lets be,” it would seem that the kind of use Heidegger has in mind may be environmentally benign. However, an environmental standpoint simply cannot forget that Heidegger understands nature as a raw material such that the use of the environment exploitatively uses-up nature. Insofar as “the forest is timber,” the productive use of the environment that characterizes being-in-the-world does not merely “let be,” but, rather, manipulates the environment in a harmful way.

Heidegger refrains from understanding nature in its unhandy “stirring and striving,” and understands the environment through a seemingly technological paradigm that views the objects of nature as useful entities whose meaning is their productive handiness. However, one does not think of all the things one concerns oneself with as useful in the pragmatic manner of equipment nor can the nature of things at hand be understood solely through use. An icon such as a crucifix, a natural entity such as a tree, or a piece of art cannot be understood through an equipmental schema. Similarly, the everyday objects one uses possess values not reducible to use. One does not merely use the bed one sleeps on or the house one lives in. An environmental way of being embodies this sense by which the things with which one lives are not understood through their usability.

206 In keeping with the ecological philosophy of the later Heidegger in writings such as “Building Dwelling Thinking,” one could say that, rather than merely using such things, one dwells with one’s bed and house.
It is environmentally problematic that Being and Time is not able to account for entities that are not useful things. A natural being, such as a rock or tree, which is fundamentally outside the arena of human productive work, is a being that is also outside the domain of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. Environmentalism sees value in trees, mountains, and other species in a way that places the handiness of such natural objects secondary to the ecological meaning of such beings. Insofar as Heidegger understands nature through use and production and argues that handiness is the fundamental way something is an object of concern, the ability to recognize an ecological meaning in natural beings is not evident in Being and Time.

Is Heidegger not right to say that the average everyday way nearest to Dasein is one of use? Is not use fundamental to human action? We can agree that the average everyday way that Dasein is in the world is one that is guided to a significant extent by uses and production, but Heidegger, with his emphasis on useful things, handiness, production, *et cetera*, overstates the extent to which this is primary. If, as in primitive society, Dasein is capable of a way of being that is not constituted by handiness and useful things, then it is possible that what is nearest to Dasein is not use and production. Heidegger describes the existence of Dasein within a framework that seems to reinforce the sense that there is nothing problematic about technologically using the environment as a raw material or production being primary. Instead of opening space for the possibility of a way of being that does not merely use the environment as a raw material, being itself is understood as the object of production and the partiality of Being and Time
bears the marks of a technological and pragmatic philosophy that overstates the extent to which use and production found being-in-the-world.

4.2

We shall currently look at our definition of environmentalism and technology in light of our aim to assess the consistency of Being and Time with environmentalism. In terms of our definition of environmentalism, Being and Time does not give nature a robust biocentric meaning, does not develop a way in which Dasein harmonizes its existence with nature, and does not aim to conserve the natural integrity of the environment. In terms of our definition of technology, Being and Time orients itself towards the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production, interprets being-in-the-world within a framework in which there is a totalizing mobilization of resources for production, and establishes a technological framework in which Dasein will produce beyond what is sustainable. Being and Time is, on the whole, technological.

We have to first concern ourselves with what we deemed to be an ambiguous form of support for environmentalism. “Letting be,” in a weak sense, conserves nature and reduces technological production. However, “letting be” occurs in a context in which entities possess a functional handiness for relevant uses. In “letting be,” Dasein is not relating to nature “in-itself,” but to handy useful things. Letting a hammer be relevant for hammering or a pen be relevant for writing is not substantial enough to change the dominant pragmatic and technological orientation of Being and Time. As it concerns the relevance through which Dasein handily uses equipment and cannot change
the instrumental conception of nature as a raw material, “letting be” is not sufficient to render *Being and Time* consistent with environmentalism; nor can “letting be” alter the technological implications of *Being and Time* that repeat themselves again and again.

Why is *Being and Time* inconsistent with our definition of environmentalism? Heidegger passes over understanding nature as something that “stirs and strives” and understands it in light of its uses. This productive relation of Dasein to the environment inevitably brings about the exploitation of nature in which natural beings are objectified into handy products. In *Being and Time*, nature merely functions as a raw material for instrumental use and there is no sense in which nature is understood to possess a meaning that calls for Dasein to respect nature. *Being and Time* does not recognize the intrinsic value of nature. *Being and Time* does not prescribe harmony with nature as there is no ecological account of Dasein’s interconnections with nature. Given the dreaded instrumental definition of nature as a raw material that is totally handy for production, *Being and Time* understands nature as a resource and does not prescribe the conservation of nature.

In what way does the disclosure of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* conform to our definition of technology? We have said that technology is a practice oriented towards the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production and consumption. Heidegger takes this technological orientation as the basis of his understanding of being-in-the-world. As in a technological horizon, use and production are nearest to Dasein, being is what is used and produced, and handy useful things are
what Dasein primordially uses in its environment. Nature, moreover, is discovered as a product and is an instrumental raw material. Heidegger prioritizes a handy mode of being and understands authenticity to be consistent with the handy using and producing of the environment. If technology is a set of practices oriented towards the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production and consumption, then Being and Time is, on the whole, technological.

More than merely involving use of the environment, modern technology is the machinery, equipment, and products produced from industrial modes of production and it implies a total mobilization of nature for production such that nature becomes a mere raw material. There is an ambiguity as to whether the kind of production in Being and Time is industrial and, hence, technological. We have argued that there is, in Being and Time, a technological framework implicit in the total mobilization of nature as a raw material. Beyond this, however, it is not clear that the understanding of the environment cannot apply to craftsmanship. The kinds of examples of things produced include hammers, pens, needles, clocks, leather, nails, tongs, bridges, and buildings. These kinds of products are all potentially works of craftsmanship, and, though Heidegger does technologically understand nature as a handy raw material subject to a total productive mobilization, it is not clear that Being and Time is definitively technological insofar as the kind of production may not be industrial.

The final aspect of our definition of technology to consider is that technology unreasonably challenges nature to supply energy beyond what it can sustainably produce.
We see that *Being and Time* is guilty of this insofar as nature is understood through its handiness as a raw material. Understanding use and production to be nearest to Dasein and understanding things as pragmatic equipment are formulas for unsustainability. To a significant extent, Dasein will challenge nature beyond environmental limits if it maintains itself within the way of being *Being and Time* prescribes.

We have seen that *Being and Time* is not consistent with our definition of environmentalism. *Being and Time*, on the whole, is technological insofar as the schema through which Dasein pragmatically goes about using the environment is fundamentally productive, totally mobilizes nature as a raw material, and will lead to environmental exploitation beyond what is sustainable. The ambiguity as to whether the production specific to *Being and Time* is industrial is a possible exception to this technological nature. However, Dreyfus has shown that *Being and Time* characterizes Dasein’s being-in-the-world in an industrial way in that Dasein cares for equipment in the sense of inspecting industrial operations, and, as we are about to show, *Being and Time* fundamentally understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon.

4.3

We have to ask ourselves: what is the way of being that belongs to a technological horizon? Presumably, in a technological paradigm a way of being would possess a deficient status insofar as it refrains from the production, use, and manipulation of the environment. The way of being nearest to Dasein would be one that uses and produces, and being itself would be the object of use and production. It would not so much be that
Dasein encounters things, but, rather, Dasein would encounter pragmatic equipment. In a technological horizon, the primordial way Dasein deals with the world would be through the handiness in which Dasein pragmatically uses useful things. This pragmatic handiness would, in a technological horizon, indicate to us the very being of what we encounter in our environment. Nature, in a technological horizon, would be discovered instrumentally through production, would be a raw material, and natural beings would be equivalent to productive entities such that, for instance, tree is timber. An understanding of the world would arise through a disclosure of the handiness of the production workshop in which Dasein uses useful things. Something such as a sign would be pragmatically understood as a handy useful thing. The appropriateness of something for something would be determined pragmatically through use or serviceability. The relevance that constitutes the being of beings would concern pragmatic references such as serviceability and confirm that handiness is the kind of being that genuinely belongs to things. The structure of the worldliness of the world would be identified with a significance that always already reveals "things" to be handy. Lastly, a technological horizon would consider an authentic mode of being-in-the-world to maintain itself in the average everyday using, producing, and manipulating of the environment.

What is it that we have established in the above analysis? It is clear that the kind of being-in-the-world that a technological horizon "would" engender is the kind of being-in-the-world that Heidegger prescribes for Dasein in *Being and Time*. Therefore, the hypothesis we have put forward at the beginning of our thesis is fundamentally correct. *Being and Time* understands being-in-the-world to operate within a technological
horizon. *Being and Time* sets in place the technological horizon that subjects nature to environmental exploitation.

4.4

I have just put forward a decisive criticism of *Being and Time*. We have shown that *Being and Time* understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon. *Being and Time* repeatedly adopts a pragmatic and technological understanding of being-in-the-world. Furthermore, the scholarly literature has not shown *Being and Time* to be consistent with environmentalism and Dreyfus very nearly declares *Being and Time* to be fully technological. We have found *Being and Time* to be contrary to our definition of environmentalism and consistent with our definition of technology. All these factors indicate that *Being and Time* is not consistent with environmentalism.

Due to all the factors we have enumerated, we can finally, as it were, deliver a verdict: *Being and Time* is inconsistent with environmentalism. More than merely not offering any substantial environmental insight, *Being and Time* has a negative environmental significance and is anti-environmental insofar as it describes Dasein within a technological horizon. As Dreyfus has shown, *Being and Time* prepares the way for technological nihilism. The most basic prerequisite for a philosophy to be consistent with environmentalism is an account of nature as a meaningful and valuable order. Not only does *Being and Time* not have this, but the conception of nature *Being and Time* does have technologically understands being-in-the-world through the handiness of pragmatic dealings that render nature a raw material. This productive and technological
conception of nature arrests the possibility of understanding the intrinsic value of nature. As an environmentalist, I think it is evident that *Being and Time* is not consistent with environmentalism because it fundamentally orients Dasein to the environment through a technological horizon in which Dasein uses nature and produces without any sense that nature has intrinsic value. If my thesis has gone substantially in the direction of showing, in the face of environmental concerns that are of grave importance for our modern culture, that in *Being and Time* Heidegger is not a reliable figure in presenting an environmental philosophy, then I believe my thesis has been a progressive contribution to knowledge in the humanities.
Bibliography


