


THE NEW FORT:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION OF AN 18TH-CENTURY FORT IN
PLACENTIA, NEWFOUNDLAND

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CONSTRUCTION OF AN 18TH-CENTURY FORT IN PLACENTIA,
NEWFOUNDLAND**

by

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ABSTRACT

From the very beginning of its history, Placentia, Newfoundland was shaped by the struggle between France and England. However, as is often forgotten in traditional histories, the actions of colonial agents are not dictated solely by their own will, but also by a host of other factors. By examining the archaeological and documentary record of the British New Fort it will become clear that there are design features and construction techniques present in its architecture which are the result of actions taken by the British to address a variety of external influences, specifically environmental and military, which were unique to Placentia. These adaptations to a particular colonial environment by a colonial agent will serve a microcosm through which the wider history of colonial and imperial conflicts can be examined. This paper will focus on outlining how these influences can be identified and examined as well as illustrating how they can be drawn together to create a much more nuanced understanding of how and why colonial agents, such as the British, attempted to reach their own goal of dominance while coping with the numerous external factors unique to particular locations.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Placentia is located on the sparsely populated, southwest coast of Newfoundland's Avalon Peninsula, about 100 km southwest of St. John's. Today it is a small, rural town struggling to refocus its economy following the moratorium on the cod fishery in 1992 and the final closure of the American base at Argentia in 1994. Placentia is barely known beyond its immediate region. There is little remaining of a physical nature to indicate to the uninformed visitor that this rural community was once a critical naval and economic base in a global struggle between competing world powers. This competition for imperial dominance not only influenced this settlement throughout its history but was responsible for its creation in the first place. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the competing empires of England and France committed significant resources in manpower and finances in their attempts to control Placentia and its harbour. Each sought to monopolize Placentia's important economic and strategic assets. This valuable position in the history of the colonial rivalries between England and France, both in terms of Newfoundland and the broader North American context is, sadly, often forgotten by locals and, perhaps more disconcertingly, by the wider academic community. This is an oversight that needs to be corrected. Such is one of the goals of the following analysis.

There have been several attempts, since the 1960s, to raise awareness of and to reposition the important role of Placentia in the wider colonial history of the region. The most significant of these is an ongoing archaeological excavation and public interpretation program at the Jersey side of the town. As well, there have been extensive excavations undertaken by Parks Canada at a military site known as Castle Hill in the past

and Amanda Crompton wrote about another military site in Placentia for her doctoral research, *The Vieux Fort: The Archaeological Investigation of a French Colony in Newfoundland*, covering the earliest French military occupation of the area. It is, however, the ongoing excavation program, presently dedicated to working toward preserving and presenting the valuable cultural resource of Placentia to the community and the growing number of tourists, which offers the best tool through which to educate the public. That said, there is a distinct need for further academic analysis of the archaeological remains which have already been recovered. It is the second goal of this analysis to address that need.

The third goal of the following analysis goes beyond simply emphasizing the importance of a specific site or working through the back log of excavated material culture. Traditional histories of Placentia, of colonial settlements similar to it and of imperialism and colonialism writ large, generally have concentrated on the stories of how various European individuals and factions conquered the sea, subjected the land and vanquished their enemies. Following the narrative accounts, these histories simply outlined the implications of the imperial actions on the wider progression of history. Today, such histories of colonialism and imperialism present historians with a number of difficulties due to their close connections with such issues as racism, slavery and exploitation (Conklin and Fletcher 1999: 1). The final and most sweeping goal of this analysis, therefore, is to illustrate how such a method of approaching the topics of colonialism and imperialism through the introduction of archaeological evidence into

traditional historical discourse may provide the means of overcoming some of the issues currently faced by such discussions.

1.1 HISTORY, ARCHEOLOGY AND COLONIALISM

Ever since the end of the age of European Colonialism and Imperialism, historians have struggled to come to grips with ways to discuss the history of these divisive topics. Questions such as, whose history it is to tell, how does one recover 'lost voices' and how can one estimate the overall impact of European Imperialism and Colonialism, have created and shaped new theoretical and methodological approaches (Conklin and Fletcher 1999: 1-2). Many of these new approaches, however, have created new challenges as they often contradict each other in their final analysis resulting in what appears to be more in the way of consternation than consensus within the field (Conklin and Fletcher 1999: 2-4). These difficulties will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter, but suffice to say for now that traditional historical methods and approaches have yet to come to terms with how to properly handle these sensitive issues. In light of these sometimes seemingly insurmountable points of contention, perhaps an entirely new approach to the subject is required. It is the third and final goal of this paper to develop just such an approach using the resources available to the historian and the archaeologist.

Specifically, this study will outline how the introduction of archaeological data into historical narratives can provide new perspectives on some of the issues which have plagued more traditional approaches and, thereby, help in overcoming them. This will be

done by utilizing the colonial past of Placentia as a historical locus through which to demonstrate how this can be achieved and by using the ongoing excavation project in Placentia as a ready source of archaeological data. Placentia is an excellent location to illustrate this proposed method of discussing imperialism and colonialism, as its history is dominated by the competition between England and France to monopolize its vital economic resource, the cod fishery. This struggle was just part of a much broader competition for global dominance. As a result, the story of Placentia's place in the imperial struggle provides a perfect microcosm through which the wider history of such colonial and imperial conflicts can be examined.

While this goal may sound extremely wide ranging and sweeping, its execution will be considerably narrower in terms of the topics being discussed and the historical period being covered. This study will focus on how a new approach to the subject can be applied to a specific site and time period. Consequently, the following analysis should be thought of as a case study or a proof of concept, to be utilized by others to assist in their attempts to approach this daunting subject. That said, it is important to understand the methodology and theoretical background of this new approach as well as some of the broad principles that are necessary for its application.

The principal concept behind this approach is that the actions of colonial agents, such as the English and French, must be localized within the geographical and historical context in which these actions were undertaken. Only then is it possible to deduce from the archaeological record and the available documentary evidence what were the motivations and influences behind certain actions and decisions taken by these agents. Put

simply, this analysis will treat the actions of agents involved in imperial and colonial activities as being the result of their desire to achieve their own goals in light of external factors which stood as obstacles to these goals, rather than solely as the result of their own motivations and will. Doing so removes the traditional historical error inherent in discussing the actions of such individuals within a conceptual vacuum, leaving the actions of agents of empire and colonialism without the necessary context to fully understand their motivations and goals. This means that rather than focusing on the narrative of the competition between France and England for domination over this region and its resources and on how this conflict thus shaped the development of Placentia, this thesis will be concerned with how the efforts of other imperial agents as well as the land, natural elements and resources of Placentia influenced the actions of those who sought to control it.

1.2 WHY PLACENTIA?

While it is all well and good to make suggestions about how the introduction of archaeological evidence into historical discourse may be able to overcome the difficulties faced by historians when approaching the topics of colonialism and imperialism, it is another thing all together to justify why Placentia should be used as a case study to demonstrate this hypothesis. Of course, the pedantic response to such a query is that Placentia is as good as any other site of European Colonialism, so why not? There are,

however, more compelling reasons why Placentia is particularly well suited to its role as the guinea pig for this nascent analysis.

The first reason is that Placentia was settled and occupied throughout most of its history for two very specific, inter-connected reasons: firstly, for the economic exploitation of the Newfoundland cod fish stocks and secondly, to serve as a military outpost from which the men and vessels required for conducting the fishery could operate, find safe refuge and be provided armed protection. These well documented motivations for the existence of the colony mean that one of the requirements for this historical/archaeological approach is satisfied, that there exists a clearly defined and supported motivation on the part those involved in colonial activities.

The second reason that Placentia is a good choice for analysis is that since the 1960s, extensive excavations have been undertaken at a number of sites covering both the French and English periods of control. The findings ranging from structural to material items provide invaluable research material regarding the actions of the two colonial powers in the interplay for imperial and economic control. Placentia, therefore, provides both documentary and archaeological supporting data.

The third reason for selecting Placentia lies in the parameters of this study itself. Placentia offers several possible archaeological sites for consideration. The set confines of this work and the principles behind its theoretical approach make it untenable to reach for a sweeping interpretation of how the actions and decisions of all those who once lived and worked at this site were influenced by external forces. Therefore, it is necessary

firstly to concentrate on a single site, within the larger confines of Placentia, which was actively occupied during the years when the colony was a focal point of the colonial conflict between France and Britain in North America. Secondly, it is necessary to focus on a particular time frame during which there was a clearly defined range of motivations for occupation at the selected site. Doing so will make it easier to explore the nuances of how external influences affected the actions and lives of individuals living at the chosen site and to examine the different ways in which the residents adapted to these influences. Fortunately, Placentia offers a site which satisfies these requirements perfectly: the English New Fort.

Built during the mid-eighteenth century to re-establish British military dominance in the region with the hope of securing the local fishing grounds and processing sites, the actions and decisions of its designers and builders were subject to a number of external influences. In particular, the architecture and construction techniques which these agents of colonialism utilized in creating and occupying this site are of interest as they offer one of the simpler items in the archaeological record for interpreting the effect of external influences on the residents and the wider imperial situation. This is due to the fact that eighteenth-century fortifications generally followed well documented principles and standard techniques which have distinct purposes and uses. Therefore, by looking at which of these principles and techniques were employed and how they were employed, and then cross referencing this information with the documentary record of what the intended purpose of them was, one should be able to draw some conclusions about what the intended goals of the New Fort's designers and builders really were. These findings,

will prove the validity of the theoretical approach utilised in this work as a means of historical investigation and, as will be discussed in greater detail later, in doing so will outline how it is possible to examine the motivations behind the actions of imperial agents in such a way as to avoid the moralization and counterfactual debates which often accompany such discussion in more traditional historical methods of doing so.

The New Fort is a relatively well documented structure and it has been extensively excavated over the last several years yielding a great deal of archaeological evidence for this discussion. Based on an examination of this evidence it is clear that there are design features and construction techniques present in its architecture which are indicators of decisions the English made in their attempts to successfully reach their goal of securing the fishery. The evidence also reveals that there were several specific external influences which shaped the ways in which the English made their decisions on how to achieve their primary goal. The most obvious influences are the threat of aggression on the part of others like the French and the harshness of the local environment of Placentia. The presence of these easily identifiable external factors makes the execution of this discussion much easier to conduct and, therefore, will provide the focal point for the rest of this analysis.

When viewed together, the foregoing reasons demonstrate why New Fort at Placentia offers an excellent microcosm through which the usefulness and value of introducing archaeological evidence into traditional historical discourse on colonialism and imperialism can be illustrated and the method of doing so can be demonstrated. Beyond its conceptual usefulness, however, New Fort also presents itself as a site in need

of scholarly attention. Consequently, this study constitutes the first in-depth analysis of New Fort. While the amount of published material on the military and colonial history of Placentia itself is not insignificant, the site itself remains in relative obscurity despite its importance to the development of Newfoundland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As well, the majority of the published works dealing with the history of Placentia and more specifically New Fort, such as Jean-Pierre Proulx's *Placentia: 1713-1811*, are several decades old. In light of the considerable amount of new archaeological evidence which has been uncovered during multiple seasons of excavation over the past decade, a new analysis is necessary.

1.3 ANALYSIS OUTLINE

The following examination is divided into chapters according to topic. Clearly, Chapter One, this chapter, serves as a general introduction to the rest of this work and, therefore, does not require further discussion. Chapter Two will concentrate on providing an explanation of the nuts and bolts of the theoretical underpinnings of the approach being proposed in this work. This theory-focused chapter will provide a brief historiography of the study of colonialism and imperialism and then outline some of the recent developments in the field. Next, the chapter will examine some of the principal concepts which are implicit in such a method of approaching these topics as well as how they will be used in the rest of this analysis. As well, there will be a discussion of how archaeological approaches, such as this one, can provide a valuable new perspective on

the study of imperialism/colonialism. Clearly, The discussion is wide ranging, but because one of the goals of this analysis is to outline why archaeology should be introduced into the imperialism/colonialism debate, it is important to explain why a new approach is required and what, in particular, this approach has to offer which may help to overcome some of the interpretative challenges currently faced by those attempting to address these topics.

Following the theoretical background provided in Chapter Two, Chapter Three will address the historical background of Placentia. Clearly, the scope of this chapter is quite large, but there are a few areas which will be highlighted. The first is a summary of Placentia's colonial past, covering the history of the community as well as the particular area of New Fort up until the current day. The bulk of this part focuses on the period during which Placentia was at the centre of the struggle for dominance between England and France. The second is a summary of the history of the current archaeological project being conducted on the site of New Fort as well as some of the other related areas which have been excavated. Finally, after the requisite historical and theoretical background is covered, the work moves on to showing how this method can be put into practice.

The body of this work comprises two chapters, each of which is broken down into subsections. The two chapters are dedicated to a discussion of the design of New Fort and its construction. Each of the subsections is dedicated to interpreting, based on the documentary and archaeological record, how two crucial external influences, namely the threat of hostile enemy attack and the harshness of the local environment, affected the actions and decisions of the agents involved in these activities. The objectives of these

two chapters are threefold; first, to outline the primary concerns each influence presented to the English at Placentia; second, to analyze historical sources and the available archaeological data regarding the design and construction of the New Fort to find possible manifestations of how the English adapted to these difficulties; and third, to draw comparisons with contemporary British fortifications and historical works on the design and construction of fortifications as a means of outlining how standard techniques of design and construction were adapted to the particular needs of those at Placentia. By addressing these questions it is possible to examine the motivations of the agents responsible for creating the New Fort as well as providing an example of how a similar analysis could be conducted at other colonial sites. These two chapters will then be followed by a final, concluding chapter.

1.4 THE END OF THE BEGINNING

In summary, two things stand out. Firstly, the current study of imperialism, as it is carried on by historians, often casts those persons being studied, both colonizer and colonized, as acting wholly independently of the environment in which they existed. Secondly, within the history of colonialism in North America, the important role played by the town of Placentia, Newfoundland, is often forgotten. The story of the microcosm provides a small, but valuable addition to the larger story of colonizer and colonized. This research study addresses three needs. First, it constitutes an original work on a subject which is worthy of study. Second it seeks to provide a new conceptual approach for

studying colonialism and imperialism through the introduction of archaeological evidence and analysis into this discussion as a way to overcome some of the sometimes contradictory and generally heated debate that currently exists in the field. Third, on a more practical level, it will hopefully draw greater academic and public interest to the area of Placentia itself; an important region in the history of Newfoundland and Labrador that, today, often receives scant recognition. Overall, this study of the New Fort in Placentia seeks to meet three goals; to bring to light the forgotten importance of Placentia in the history of colonialism in North America, to conduct and encourage others to conduct in-depth archaeological analysis of the evidence being provided by the ongoing excavations in Placentia, and to outline the value of introducing archaeological evidence into the colonialism/imperialism debate.

Chapter 2: Of Agency and Imperialism

Matthew Johnson has commented that, “historical archaeology...refuses to fit into the neat theoretical boxes that have very often been defined by prehistory archaeologists” (Johnson 1999: 192). The fact remains, nonetheless, that to achieve academic legitimacy, it is necessary to have some kind of recognized methodology and theoretical approach when conducting archaeological research. However, far beyond this ‘cut and paste’ approach to achieving legitimacy, theoretical approaches offer advantages to the historical archaeologist. This is especially true if they are used as a means of focusing research and analyses and not simply woven into an early chapter of a work primarily to ensure academic respectability and not reappearing as part of the final analysis. A theoretical approach, therefore, will form the framework for this thesis, as it should in any quality academic work.

While it can be difficult to utilize a pre-existing theoretical approach which can cover any eventuality that may arise during the course of one’s research, it is possible to develop a general approach that is as adaptable as possible. To do so, however, requires a clear understanding of what are the primary goals of one’s research. Only then, can one adopt a relevant theoretical approach. What follows is a statement of the primary goal of this thesis and its connection to the larger topic of imperialism/colonialism, a summary of the various theories which were considered and an explanation why the theories of agency and intersectionality have been adopted.

This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the concepts upon which this entire thesis is based. It comprises three sections: an outline of the ongoing historical debates over European Colonialism/Imperialism, including past approaches and some of the present day interpretative trends; an explanation of the role that archaeology has played in this debate; and, finally, a discussion of the established archaeological approaches with an emphasis on the concepts of agency and intersectionality, how they have been utilized by archaeologists in the past and how and why they are employed in this thesis.

2.1 HISTORY AND COLONIALISM/IMPERIALISM

The primary objective of this thesis can be simply stated. It is to use the case of New Fort, Placentia, as an example of how, through the prisms of History and Archaeology, the actions of individuals involved in European imperial/colonial activities can be interpreted as being largely the result of their desire to achieve their own goals and of the differing external factors which influenced the ways in which these players attempted to attain these goals. This approach differs in some ways from the more traditional, predominantly historical approaches to discussing the age of colonialism/imperialism into which the story of New Fort falls. To understand the difference, one needs to know something of the more common approaches that have been employed in the past and how they continue to influence the writing about colonialism/imperialism today.

The earliest histories of European Empires were usually devoted to illustrating the glories of imperial conquest and the richness of the various European nations. A prime example of this kind of imperial glorification is William Collier's *History of the British Empire* published in 1859 (Collier 1859). Historical works, like Collier's, were not critical examinations of the role of empire and the impact of imperialism, but rather reinforcements of what the authors perceived to be the progressive, positive nature of European imperial ambitions and the rise of Europe to world dominance in the modern era. More recently, and especially since the end of European imperialism in the twentieth century, historians have shifted their focus from the glorification of imperialism to a more sober and critical analysis of the long term impact of colonialism and imperialism on human society. Nevertheless, the more traditional trumpeting of the benefits of Empire, even in light of its acknowledge short comings and negative effects, still exists and the debate between those who defend colonialism and those who criticize it distinguishes the historical literature of the present day.

The proponents of colonialism and imperialism, such as Niall Ferguson in his *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons of Global Power*, released in 2003, usually argue that the long term benefits of colonialism to the development of modern global society outweigh the modestly acknowledged ill effects of colonialism on many peoples (Ferguson 2004). Their logic is that, despite the evils of slavery and cultural oppression, the spread of European style laws, economies and values were generally a good thing, in the long term, for those who were colonized and so impacted.

In contrast, the critics of colonialism and imperialism, such as Adam Hochschild, author of the famous (or perhaps infamous) *King Leopold's Ghost*, published in 1998, espouse almost exactly the opposite position. Their arguments generally focus on outlining the impact of colonialism from the perspective of those individuals who were colonized and then discuss the long term, negative effects that these influences imposed on these groups, their cultural habits, beliefs, languages and relationships (Hochschild 1998). As well, these detractors of colonialism often undertake a quest, "to recover the voices and lives of those....who rarely appeared in the official records" in the hopes of reinstating the voices of these individuals into the colonialism/imperialism debate (Cannadine 2005).

Recently, this quest for lost voices has begun to be applied to the colonizers as well as the colonized. Linda Colley in her 2004 book, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850*, focused on the stories of individuals involved in colonial activities who were captured by "Others" (Colley 2004). This refocusing of the quest for lost voices has had the benefit of creating a much more balanced discussion about the personal experience of those involved in all aspects of colonialism. In embracing a discussion of colonialism in terms of the contemporary dialect between colonizer and colonized, aggressor and defender, self and other, this approach facilitates an analysis of how the contrasting parties influenced and changed one another, something that the traditional historical approach did not enable, or even consider.

Yet, even the personal experience approach to interpreting the role and place of colonialism and imperialism in world history often appears to ignore that the interactions

between colonizers and colonized were set in the real world. This approach has been primarily concerned with the influences different colonial agents had on each other and has largely discounted the environment in which these agents operated. Furthermore, beyond the overly used concepts of the "White man's burden" and the quest for economic gain, the motivations behind the actions of colonial agents are often not discussed at all. Has any historian attempted to do otherwise? The answer is yes.

In her 1995 publication, *Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, Anne McClintock adopted what has been called an intersectional approach to studying several aspects of the history of colonialism. Intersectionality does not have its roots in the colonial debate, but rather in feminist sociological theory. It has, perhaps, been best summarized by Leslie McCall as, "the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relationships and subject formations" (McCall 2005:1771). It was precisely this ability to examine the relationships among multiple factors which enabled McClintock to discuss how the interactions of many different factors affected the shaping of colonial identities, values and practices (McClintock 1995). It is this principle of considering the points of intersection of different factors as being formative in shaping the actions of agents of colonialism/imperialism which forms the theoretical framework of this thesis.

Why this choice of theoretical approach? The purpose of this work is to provide an example of how the actions of individuals involved in colonial activities can be interpreted as the result of their desires to achieve their own goals in light of the presence of external factors which influenced the ways in which these individuals attempted to

attain their goals. In other words, this examination is concerned with identifying the points at which the goals of imperial agents and the influences of external factors intersected and how the interactions at these points of intersection affected the decisions and actions of these agents. While McCall and McClintock's use of intersectionality is valuable, it lacks a set of ground rules for establishing how various factors actually interact at points of intersection. Therefore, intersectionality can be thought of as a way to conceptualize the broadest aspect of the approach which is being utilized in this thesis, namely the existence of multiple factors, all of which contribute to a final outcome. This may not be an earth shattering assertion, but it is important to keep it in mind when trying to discuss how individuals interacted with each other and their environments.

Later, a more in-depth discussion follows describing how this thesis will conceptualize these points of intersection and which archaeological theories were formative in shaping the approach being utilized. First, however, it is necessary to outline some of the contributions archaeologists have made already to the study of colonialism and imperialism. The following section, therefore, provides a basic historiography of the topic and outlines why these approaches have, so far, proven to be inadequate to the task of truly grappling with the wider issues of colonialism/imperialism.

2.2 ARCHAEOLOGY AND COLONIALISM/IMPERIALISM

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of colonialism which archaeologists are presented with when approaching the topic is the fact that their field of study is

intrinsically linked with the colonial past. As Claire Lyons and John Papadopoulos pointed out in *Archaeology of Colonialism*, the origins of Archaeology and Anthropology are deeply rooted in colonial mentalities (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002: 2). Evidence of this linkage can be seen in the active interest of European powers in retrieving artefacts from the past of the regions that they once dominated. It is the process of recovering which contributed to the creation and early development of both disciplines (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002). Furthermore, Archaeology and Anthropology actually served a key part in how historians structured their examinations of colonialism and imperialism. This was because the studies conducted by anthropologists and archaeologists of past civilizations and ‘primitive’ cultures often legitimized the colonizer’s position of dominance by drawing similarities with the so-called great civilizations of the past and continuously reiterating the European “self” versus the uncivilized, backward, non-European “other” (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002: 5-7). This role in the academic pursuit of justifying the institutionalized racism against colonized people – which many would today deem to be one of the mostly morally reprehensible aspects of colonialism - does not prevent historians from addressing the issues of colonialism and imperialism. Nor does it stop the archaeologist.

Some of the earliest attempts to create a comprehensive archaeological approach to colonialism and imperialism are found in Stephen Dyson’s collection of essays *Comparative Studies in the Archaeology of Colonialism* released in 1985 (Dyson 1985). For Dyson, the purpose of this work was to encourage the development of a wider array of archaeological scholarship focusing on colonialism. He believed that, “the time seems

ripe to...develop a discipline of comparative colonial archaeology” (Dyson 1985: 2). Dyson maintained that this new field of comparative colonial archaeology should be based on the examination of material culture ranging through many different historical and geographical contexts. Also, he indicated that it should focus on discussing the process by which material goods were disseminated throughout the world and how the meanings associated with such items changed over time due to the interactions of different colonial communities (Dyson 1985: 2-4).

Despite Dyson’s own stated goals, his articles in *Comparative Studies in the Archaeology of Colonialism* do not present a unified analysis of the greater significance of colonialism. Instead, they are largely stand alone essays concentrating on sites which just happened to be associated with colonialism. Consequently, Dyson’s suggestions, made in 1985, for a comprehensive archaeological approach to the study of colonialism and imperialism did not, initially, take hold within the archaeological community. It was not until sometime later that archaeologists began to grapple more deeply with the impact of colonialism or became involved in considering the divisive issues which historians had already begun to acknowledge. Even a decade later, archaeologists continued to struggle with the idea of delving into the deeper, more worrisome issues of colonization. This fact is evident in Timothy Champion’s 1989 collection of articles, *Centre and Periphery: Comparative Studies in Archaeology*. The essays contained in this compilation, as with past archaeological studies, dealt with colonialism in a peripheral sense, more as a setting for the subjects that the writers were studying than as the principal, core topic of interest (Champion 1989).

Slowly the focus did begin to shift. By 2002, there was evidence of some advancement in the ability of archaeologists to address more directly the issues of colonialism. A collection of essays, *The Archaeology of Colonialism*, edited by Claire Lyons and John Papadopoulos provides one example. In the introduction, the editors indicated that they believed that archaeologists should follow the lead of the historians and become more concerned with the aspect of recovering lost voices and studying the impact of colonialism on indigenous communities rather than focusing on simply examining the broader contexts of imperialism or colonialism (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002). In fact, they even went so far as to state that they supported the views of Nicholas Thompson, an anthropologist who had written that colonialism could only be effectively assessed at a localized level by exploring its influences and effects within a limited area, timeframe and population group (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002:11). Furthermore, some of the articles in *The Archaeology of Colonialism* supported this shift in focus. By and large, the authors concentrated on examining the impact of colonialism on particular groups of individuals. The shift in focus to the impact of colonial activities on particular groups of colonized individuals is evident in articles such as Peter Van Dommelen's "Ambiguous Matters: Colonialism and Local Identities in Punic Sardinia" and Tom Cummins' "Forms of Andean Colonial Towns, Free Will and Marriage" (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002).

Despite these examples of archaeologists finally beginning to grapple with the deeper impact of colonialism, the majority of the articles in *The Archaeology of Colonialism* did not address the most divisive issues of European Colonialism. Instead, they used examples of colonialism from classical history. What makes this strange is the

fact that the cover image of the collection portrays a typical nineteenth-century photo of a colonial setting, with the apparently civilized white man with his rifle, cravat and pith helmet posing with two apparently non-European 'savages' (Lyons and Papadopoulos 2002). Perhaps the editors had no say in the cover image or, perhaps, they knew the topic that they really wanted to confront was that of European Colonialism, but the material submitted to the collection did so only indirectly. It does appear that the intention and the reality were not quite in sync. This may indicate how little research had been done from the new perspective but it also seems to indicate a degree of nervousness within the archaeological community about becoming embroiled in the ongoing, controversial debates on colonialism being waged within the discipline of History.

These concerns continued in Gil Stein's 2004 collection, *The Archaeology of Colonial Encounters: Comparative Perspectives* (Stein 2004). While the articles in the collection illustrate the ability of archaeologists to address the same kinds of questions about the oppression, racism and discrimination associated with the historical debate about colonialism and imperialism, the time periods with which most of the authors dealt, as in previous essay collections, were not those related to the contentious issues of European Colonialism. It is true that the research presented in this collection is very interesting and that the time periods, mostly pre-contact South American and classical European, are just as worthy of study. What seems strange, however, is that an anthology addressing colonial encounters was predominantly based on research connected to the ancient past rather than the well documented and contentious near past, namely the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ironically, once again, the cover image of this text

relates to the more “modern” past. It features an image of a European colonial scene, the Chapel and Russian well at Fort Ross built in 1812 in California. The juxtaposition of this cover image and the contents within seem to imply a reticence on the part of the mainstream academic archaeological community to get involved in the sometimes rather unbecoming debates about colonialism and imperialism which have been waged by many historians. Nevertheless, by 2004, there were some fine examples of archaeologists who were bucking the traditional approaches of their discipline.

In his book *The Archaeology of the Colonized*, published in 2004, Michael Given was very direct about his approach, one in which he endeavoured to relate the experiences of those individuals most directly affected by colonialism. In his opinion, all colonial powers were, “alien, external and they survived by extracting food and labour from their subjects” (Given 2004: 3). From this vantage point, Given went on to outline how to examine and reconstruct the experiences of colonized peoples using archaeological data, specifically material culture. He provided examples from several time periods of how this could be done. Michael Given clearly was willing to address head-on the uncomfortable issues of European Colonialism. This is not to say that Given based his work entirely in the field of European Colonialism. In fact, he did not, but his several examples of doing so represented a positive step toward archaeologists becoming fully engaged in the modern colonialism/imperialism debate.

While the moral backlash against the evil agents of European colonization had, by the early twenty-first century, led both historians and archaeologists to concentrate on looking toward the colonized to provide fodder for their research and discussions, the

pendulum ironically was about to shift. Some historians were already beginning to look back toward the colonizers and away from the colonized. An example of this developing trend was Linda Colley's 2002 book, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850*. In this historical account, Colley set out to offer what she argued was a more complete image of the nature of colonial interactions based on the experiences of Europeans captured by 'others' while engaged in a range of colonial activities (Colley 2002). It was on these stories of the colonizers rather than the colonized that Colley based her analysis. What is interesting is that while the agent focus might be different, Colley's work does not preclude the use of her agents-based theoretical approach to discuss the experience of a wide range of individuals regardless of their role in the colonial phenomenon.

2.3 ARCHAEOLOGY, COLONIALISM AND AGENCY

The primary archaeological theory which this thesis will utilize is that of agency. Thomas Barfield broadly defined agency theory as an approach which holds, in all of its many interpretations, that people do not merely react to changes in the external world but, "play a role in the formation of the social realities in which they participate" (Barfield 1997: 4). This seemingly simple concept has caused, and continues to cause, a great deal of scholarly discussion not only in the realm of Archaeology, but also in the wider community of the Social Sciences and Humanities.

Agency is not an entirely new concept. Many great thinkers of the past, ranging from Aristotle to Adam Smith, have addressed it. It has, however, only risen to prominence relatively recently in the Social Sciences and Humanities. Over the last thirty years, agency has been at the heart of much of the research done in these fields and it continues to generate disparate and varied methods of approaching its study (Dornan 2002: 303-4). The particular approach utilized in this thesis draws heavily from many of these methods and the rationale behind their use is best understood through a quick history of the recent developments in the field of agency theory itself as well as how it has been applied to Archaeology.

The emergence of the modern agency theory began during the latter half of the twentieth century and can be attributed in large part to two thinkers, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens (Dornan 2002: 305). It was the writings of these men which shaped our understanding of the relationship between ‘agents’, that is individuals capable of altering larger structures, and ‘structures’, that is the larger setting and state of the relationships between individuals (Dornan 2002: 305). It is from their occasionally conflicting theories about the nature of agency that some of the most important concepts for this thesis were gleaned.

Pierre Bourdieu outlined his views on the subject in his 1977 publication *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. In this he stressed the importance of humanity’s ability to offer resistance or acceptance to larger social patterns, specifically those which lead to inequality (Bourdieu 1977). In effect, Bourdieu was working from a Marxist view of society and, much like Marx, did little to recognize the ability of individuals to act

creatively (Dornan 2002: 306-307). Giddens and many others viewed Bourdieu's concept of agency as far too limited and insisted that the actions of individuals were not dictated just by unconsciously assimilated social norms, but instead were open to innovation and personal motivation (Trigger 2007:496).

Expanding on Bourdieu's views, Giddens put forward his theory of Structuration in his 1979 work, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* and again in his 1984 *The Constitution of Society*. It is Giddens's view of agency in which this thesis' approach is rooted. Specifically, there are two primary points of interest in Giddens' theory which have been adopted. The first is that of "tacit knowledge," which is the cognitive abilities actors are able to apply through their own initiative, but which they themselves do not necessarily "formulate discursively" (Giddens 1979: 57). The second is that of "practical consciousness," which Giddens defined as the "non-discursive, but not unconscious, knowledge of social institutions" that all individuals possess (Giddens 1979:24). Through these two concepts Giddens was able to discuss the agency of individuals within structures, not just as the result of internalized social practices or "practical consciousness" as Bourdieu had, but instead, as being partially contributable to the goals, wants and emotions, or "tacit knowledge" of the individuals themselves. Giddens' himself summed the net result of these two concepts up best when he said, "human beings are neither to be treated as passive objects, nor as wholly free subjects" (Giddens 1979: 150).

Many archaeologists have attempted to utilize these concepts of agency in their studies of the past, some adopting Bourdieu's limited views of personal initiative and

others a more Giddensian approach. These two schools of thought have spawned their own ever evolving set of sub-theories as archaeologists attempt to modify and alter pre-existing approaches to suit the needs of their own personal research subjects and fields. In fact, this analysis continues to do just that, and there are a number of examples of archaeological approaches utilizing agency theory which shape the methods being used here as will be discussed.

Some of the first archaeologists to utilize an agency-based approach were Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley. They attempted to use it as a means of discussing the development of beer bottle aesthetics and advertising as being representative of the meanings attributed to beer and its consumption in England and Sweden (Shanks and Tilley 1987). There is little question that their work represents, as Jennifer Dornan put it, the earliest “move within archaeology toward an inclusion of collective action in notions of agency” (Dornan 2002:310) For that reason, their contribution is worth mentioning (Dornan 2002: 310). Nonetheless, their approach was criticized by many for treating the individuals they were studying as being far too likely to simply act as they were directed. In 1989, Matthew Johnson went so far as to state in his *Conceptions of Agency in Archaeological Interpretation*, that Shanks’ and Tilley’s agents were no more than “cultural dopes,” and that their approach to agency left individuals dependent on social groupings in order to function (Johnson 1989). Since this thesis is firmly rooted in a Giddensian approach, the work of Shanks and Tilly appears to offer little guidance. Their efforts, however, represent one of the earliest archaeological works utilizing agency as a

means of theoretical discussion and must be recognized for blazing a trail for other such archaeological discourses.

The first major concept that influenced the development of a theoretical approach for this thesis is that of the Rational Actor. This concept was first presented by James Bell in his 1992 work *On Capturing Agency in Theories about Prehistory* (Bell 1992). According to Bell, it is, “the ideas and decisions of individuals [which] explain change”, but beyond knowing this, the variations in what motivates individuals to make the decisions they do are very difficult to uncover through the lens of Archaeology (Bell 1992: 39). This is due, Bell says, to the fragmentary nature of the archaeological record. Therefore, he suggests agency approaches should only be used by archaeologists when the motivations of the individuals being studied are widely shared and understood (Bell 1992). Expanding on this argument, Bell believed that his Rational Actor Theory, as well as agency in general, was only applicable to prehistoric societies in which individuals undertook activities that were largely the same and conducted under similar conditions (Bell 1992).

This concept of having to understand the motivations of the individuals in question has been adopted into the theoretical approach of this work, although Bell’s belief in its application to only prehistoric archaeology has been discarded. The relevance of this application is clear. The motivations behind the creation of the New Fort are well documented and understood; it was there to defend the settlement of Placentia which, in turn, was there to give the English access to the Newfoundland cod stocks. This clearly understood motivation satisfies Bell’s requirements for the application of his theory, at

least in general. Furthermore, by combining Bell's belief that, "the ideas and decisions of individuals explain change" (Bell 1992: 39) with Giddens' view that the actions of individuals are goals-based and neither totally free expressions of personal will nor completely constrained by social norms, this analysis is able to recognize that the designers and builders of the New Fort operated within the standards of military architecture of the day and were capable of deviating from these standards to suit their particular needs in Placentia.

The emerging approach to agency is still inadequate, however. What is missing is a way of conceptualizing what constrained the individuals who designed and built the New Fort from achieving their goals and why they took the actions they did in their efforts to reach them. Fortunately, Martin Byers has proposed a way of doing this. In his 1999, *Intentionality, Symbolic Pragmatics, and Material Culture: Revisiting Bindford's View of the Old Copper Complex*, Byers stressed the importance of what he called "Intentionality" (Byers 1999). This was a concept that Byers borrowed from the psychologist John Searle (Searle 1983). Byers defined the concept as, "the mental property of directedness or "aboutness" that our cognitive states and events have when we are attending to and acting in the world"(Byers 1999: 266.) Put more simply, it is an "approach dealing with action as rule-governed pragmatic behaviour" (Byers 1999: 266). Byers believed that intentionality, which in its simplest form seems to be an evolution of Giddens' view of agency, served as, "the human interface actively linking the world and cognitive human agency" (Byers 1999: 266). In light of this, he said, archaeologists could utilize, "material culture as the expressive pragmatic medium of this interface"

(Byers 1999: 266). To do so, however, Byers stated that it must be analysed from the view of four “States of Consciousness”: beliefs, wants, intentions and perceptions (Byers 1999: 267).

While these “states” were originally proposed by Searle, his rigid expression of them in formulas seems, on the surface, far too inflexible for general application (Searle 1983). Byers, however, offered an excellent summary of this concept and what it meant within any discussion of the agency of individuals. It is this summary which has influenced the choice of theoretical approach for this thesis:

...a human never simply thinks, feels, intends, hopes, fears, sees, hears, and so on. Rather, she/he thinks about X, while hoping for Z, and fearing that such and such may happen to prevent her/his intention of getting Y, which she/he intends to achieve by way of doing M, while all along monitoring both her/his perceptual experiences, i.e., seeing, hearing, and tasting, and her/his acting in/on the world and its states and events. In continually attending to and acting in the world, we sustain an ongoing, multiple, and modifying flow of Intentional states and events, a mental directedness or aboutness that links our cognition to the world through the physical agency of our bodies. (Byers 1999)

Interestingly, Byers concept of Intentionality and States of Consciousness can be combined with McClintock’s idea of Intersectionality. Doing so provides a means of illustrating the various points of intersection between an individual and his/her surroundings as well as a means of understanding how that individual managed these interactions. This combined concept has the additional bonus of utilizing an established

historical approach to colonialism. Perhaps, as a result, it can help to convince more traditional historians to accept the approach presented in this thesis and to accept the value of archaeological evidence to what many believe is *their* field. This interdisciplinary approach can benefit those researching and writing in both disciplines.

As noted earlier, the goal of this chapter is to outline how an agency based method of approaching colonialism/imperialism in the context of the story of Placentia's New Fort, was developed. The idea was, through the discipline of Archaeology, to identify and contextualize the actions of agents of empire within the historical and environmental conditions which had been defined as the entirety of the external influences the agents experienced. The external influences in this instance are the actions of other individuals than those responsible for constructing and designing the New Fort and the environment of Placentia. When applied to other sites any documented influences could be utilized instead. What is vital, however, is not just that these influences are incorporated into investigations of colonialism/imperialism, but that one recognizes that the individuals being studied were actively managing the impact of these influences in the ways they believed were best suited to their particular situation. So, to fill in the variables identified by Byers in the context of the designers and builders of the New Fort:

They thought about the threat of attack, while hoping to successfully defend Placentia, and fearing that the harshness of the climate and scarce resources of construction materials and manpower may happen to prevent

their intention of getting unlimited access to the cod fisher, which they intended to achieve by way of building a fort.

By combining this final theory with the theories of Giddens and Bell, the theoretical approach for this thesis has been developed. The question now is, exactly how will these combined theories be applied in this analysis and why? Clearly some basic parameters for the overall analysis have to be established.

The first parameter is that the actions of agents involved in imperial and colonial activities were the result of the agents' own abilities to decide what course of action was most likely to best meet their own goals given the existence of external factors which could help or hinder their efforts to do so. This is very much a Giddensian goal-based approach.

The second parameter is that the broad motivations behind the actions of these agents must be understood through means other than archaeological data, since the archaeological record is too incomplete to be a reliable source of doing so. This requirement, based on Bell's writings, is satisfied in the case of this analysis as the reasons behind the settling and defending of Placentia by the English are well documented in primary sources.

The third parameter, also coming from Bell's work, is the concept that the activities undertaken by the agents in question must be broadly similar. This rule is satisfied in this analysis by the fact that there was considerable regularity and similarity in

the methods of military architecture utilized during the eighteenth century. These methods are well documented and any deviations from them will be visible in the archaeological record.

The final parameter is that all of the discussion about the actions undertaken by these colonial/imperial agents must be localized within the geographical and historical context in which they took place. This is to satisfy Byers' concept of States of Consciousness because these states are directly linked to the time and place in which the agents being examined existed. This also fits with McClintock's concept of Intersectionality, which established that various factors actually interact at points of intersection and that it is these interactions which contribute to the shaping of a result.

In summary, the concept of agency as understood by Giddens, which conceives the actions of individuals as being neither completely free nor completely constrained, is goals- based. It provides the foundation for the entire analytical framework used in this thesis. From Bell comes the idea that the reason for change in structures lies in the ideas and decisions of individuals, but what the motivations behind these ideas and decisions were can only be known in circumstances when evidence other than archaeological data is available. Lastly, based on a reading of Byers and McClintock, this analysis holds that to utilize material culture as evidence through which to examine the links between the world and human agency, it is necessary always to be mindful of the States of Consciousness of the individuals being discussed as well as how their States of Consciousness intersected with the environment in which they lived.

The four core parameters must be kept in mind when attempting to apply this method to archaeological investigations of the actions of colonial agents. They will be ever-present in the following analysis of the design and construction of the New Fort in Placentia, Newfoundland.

2.4 CONCLUSION

In summary, three primary points must be remembered. The first is that, at present, traditional historical approaches to studying colonialism/imperialism are making little headway in finding methods of overcoming many of the contentious issues associated with the topic despite a great deal of scholarship in the last three decades. Second, some archaeologists have already made attempts to work their way into the study of colonialism/imperialism and to present their own interpretations of how best to approach the topic, but these approaches have had varying degrees of acceptance and success. Lastly, by modifying several different theories about the nature of agency which have already been utilized by archaeologists to suit their own studies of the actions of agents of empire, this analysis will provide a new, less contentious method of coming to understand why certain actions were taken by agents of empire and what the motivations behind them were. That said, it is possible to move on and actually illustrate how this method can be applied by discussing how the design and construction of the English New Fort were influenced by the threat of enemy attack and the environment of Placentia itself.

Chapter 3: Historical Overview

The history of Placentia is one of struggle and conflict. From the very beginning of its existence, the settlement was at the centre of a European struggle for global economic and military dominance. It is, therefore, only natural that its development was significantly influenced by these conflicts. The following historical overview will provide the broad historical context in which subsequent analysis of the New Fort fortifications at Placentia will take place. Consequently, rather than outlining specific details regarding the New Fort's design and construction and how these were impacted by external influences, this chapter will comprise a general historical narrative of Placentia's development, concentrating on its military character.

Before diving into the early history of Placentia, one should note that while a number of secondary sources were consulted including Nicholas Landry's 2008 *Plaisance, Terre-Neuve 1650 – 1713: Une colonie française en Amérique* and Frederick J. Thorpe's "Fish, Forts and Finance: The Politics of French Construction at Placentia 1699-1710", *CHA Historical Papers*, 1971, there are three which constitute the lion's share of the English language scholarly research on this topic: Jean-Pierre Proulx's 1979, *The Military History of Placentia: A Study of the French Fortifications*; D. W. Prowse's 1895, *A History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and Foreign Records* and Michael McCarthy's 1973, *A History of Plaisance and Placentia 1501-1970*. Since the principal focus of this thesis is the later, post 1713 English occupation of the site, these secondary sources should suffice to outline the earlier French presence at Placentia. Later,

when discussing the history of the English military occupation, there will be a heavy reliance on the primary documentary record, largely from the Colonial Office.

Unfortunately, these three sources pose some challenges. They sometimes disagree on details such as dates and interpretations. Even more frustrating is the fact that it is difficult to weigh the reliability of the individual contradictions because the information is often not documented, such as in the case of McCarthy who provides no in-text citations at all. As a result, when different facts and perspectives are presented by these sources, each will be noted for the sake of completeness and accuracy. That said, Proulx, as well as being the most recent study, is by far the best cited of these works and is, therefore, taken to be the most reliable of the three. Clearly, the early history of Placentia is still in need of some devoted academic attention but this is not the purpose of this thesis.

3.1 THE EARLY YEARS

The first record of European visitation to Placentia was in 1501 by the Portuguese brothers and explorers Gaspar and Miguel Cortreal (McCarthy 1973: 43). Impressed with its proximity to large fish stocks, its protective harbour and the large cobble stone beach (see Appendix 1) perfect for drying their fish, Placentia quickly became a favourite site for seasonal fishermen. The climate was milder than that on either Newfoundland's western coast or the eastern shore of the Avalon Peninsula and the local waters provided a ready supply of herring for bait fish (Lynch 1976: 4). In addition to its favourable climate

and location, the cobble beaches located on either side of Placentia's Harbour Gut provided an excellent area to split and dry fish (Lynch 1976: 4). With such natural advantages to offer seasonal fisherman, it is no surprise that Placentia readily became a popular centre of the industry.

Newfoundland fish quickly found its way into the marketplaces of Europe. For example, by 1507, a tax had been placed in Portugal on imported cod and records from 1509 show that fish from "Newland", namely Newfoundland, was selling in Rouen, France (Proulx 1979: 7-8). By the end of the sixteenth century, large fleets of seasonal fishing vessels were gathering in the harbour at Placentia to land and process their catches as evidenced by a report given by two English Captains, Whyte and Jones, in 1594. It stated that over sixty vessels crewed by French and Spanish Basques, Frenchmen and Portuguese sailors had gathered in Placentia harbour to set up their seasonal bases of operation of catching and processing cod fish (McCarthy 1973a: 42). All of these fishing vessels, at the time, were operating independent of any government, but with a fortune to be made from the Newfoundland fishery, that soon changed (Lynch 1976: 5).

The first country to take an interest in establishing a permanent settlement in Placentia was France. As early as 1603 Samuel de Champlain had suggested building a colony to monopolize the fishing industry, the profitability of which was by then well known in Europe (McCarthy 1973a: 43). Shortly thereafter, M. de Sainte-Catherine proposed a system for colonising North America which relied on using Placentia and Cape Breton as ports to which supplies and people could be shipped and then redistributed to inland settlements (Proulx 1979: 9-10). Aside from providing an

excellent harbour, which was also ice free, Placentia offered a good location for a military base from which the French could work to force the English out of the Newfoundland cod trade (Proulx 1979: 10-11). It was vital to secure the Newfoundland fishery from the English as France's local seas no longer could meet the demands of the predominantly Roman Catholic fish markets in France, let alone the rest of Europe. As well, the Newfoundland fishery represented the best available "nursery for seamen" for the French navy to call on in times of war (Thorpe 1971: 2). These very early arguments in favour of settlement appear to have fallen on deaf ears as there were to be no official attempts to establish a French colony in Placentia in the first half of the seventeenth century.

By the mid 1600s, the English presence in Newfoundland posed a serious challenge to the French fishing interests. Following the granting of a royal charter to the Newfoundland Company in 1610, the English fishing interests had started to focus attention on settling the eastern shore of the Avalon Peninsula in order to protect their access to the fish stocks in the area. Facing the prospect of the English taking control of Newfoundland, which by 1651 had an official English Governor and small settlements in places like Cupids, Conception Bay, Ferryland, St. John's and Renews, the French resolved to colonize Placentia and to establish their dominance in the region (Proulx 1979: 9). This need was highlighted by a number of English attacks on French fishing vessels in the area. As a result, in 1655 Le Sieur de Kereon began an abortive campaign at the French Court to establish a permanent settlement at Placentia to consolidate France's various territorial holdings on the island of Newfoundland. This effort failed due to reports of the harsh climate and poor soil conditions of the region as well as domestic

protests in St. Malo, political pressure and intrigue at the Court (Proux 1979: 12). However, with such favourable qualities for, “defence against the enemy...and [the] practical advantage as a trading and fishing port” it was only a matter of time until the site would be utilized as an outpost of empire (Prowse 1895: 181).

By 1660, Louis XIV was convinced that a permanent French settlement at Plaisance (Placentia) was a necessity. That year, he named Nicholas Gargot de la Rochette the first and, as it turned out, only, Comte de Plaisance. He also appointed him Governor of Newfoundland. A grizzled veteran of colonial combat in Acadia, the one legged Gargot, who had visited Placentia in 1651 onboard the French Privateer “Leopard”, was given the responsibility of establishing a settlement (McCarthy 1973: 44-45). This initial attempt, however, failed due to political squabbling at the French Court and pressure from many well to do merchants referring to themselves as, “corps de marchands, superbes et riches” and resulted in only a small group of settlers being transported to Newfoundland, the fate of whom is unknown (Proulx 1979: 13). In 1662, the King personally endorsed Gargot, removing political pressure from him, which in turn allowed the beleaguered Comte de Plaisance to send a second expedition to Placentia (Proux 1979: 13).

3.1 A TROUBLED COLONY

Amid political outcries from the English, a colonizing force left France for Newfoundland in 1662 (Proulx 1979: 13-14). This force consisting of two ships “Aigle d’Or” and “Fluste Royale”, 30 soldiers and about 50 settlers, was under the command of a Breton Nobleman, Le Sieur Thalour Du Perron who acted as Lieutenant-governor under the authority of Governor Gargot (McCarthy 1973a: 46-47). The goals of this expedition were nothing less than to establish a permanent French presence through which to possess the land, to control the fishing trade, to produce as much revenue as possible and, hopefully, to limit the influence of the English (Proulx 1979: 13-14).

When the expedition arrived in Placentia harbour, it discovered that two Englishmen, Isaac Dethick and a Mr. Mullins, had already established their own private “plantations.” They were quickly removed from their lands to make room for the French colonists (Prowse 1895: 178-179). In addition to these unofficial colonizers, the French found a small fort, built by either Basque and English fishermen around 1655 (Lynch 1976: 9) or by the French colonists sent two years earlier by Gargot in his first failed attempt at colonization. Du Perron quickly took possession of that structure as well (Proulx 1979: 13-14). Once Perron and his soldiers were sheltered in the most basic of fortifications and a fledgling community established on the southern side of the Placentia Gut, the French finally had their colony (Proulx 1979: 14). Survival, however, was dependent on a number of factors including sufficient supplies, soldiers and money supplied by France to keep the colony growing.

As in the past, nothing seemed to go quite as planned at Placentia. Before 1662 was out problems began to surface. The details of the events between the fall of 1662 and the arrival of reinforcements in the spring of 1663 are unclear. What documentary evidence is available provides, at best, a sketchy picture of what happened and at worst a complete fiction. M.J. McCarthy offers a colourful narrative of what befell the beleaguered residents that winter in his 1973 work *A History of Plaisance and Placentia 1501-1970*, but does not cite his sources (McCarthy 1973: 3-4). It is possible, however, that he based it on the accounts provided by the historian C. Millon in *Aventure du Rochelais Nicolas Gargot dit "Jambe de Bois"* published in 1928 which, according to Jean-Pierre Proulx, are themselves based on, "...fictionalized...data in his (Millon's) possession and presented...as Gargot's notes" (Proulx 1979: 14). In the interests of completeness, however, a summary of these supposed events follows.

From the start of his term as Lieutenant-Governor Du Perron's youth affected his judgement and rankled his subordinates. After arriving in Placentia, he apparently took little interest in the running of his nascent colony, preferring to hike into the woods to hunt for game with his younger brother and the expedition's chaplain (McCarthy 1973b: 3-4). The result of this lack of leadership was a growing sense of discontent among the rank and file soldiers who, in late fall of 1662 mutinied. Waiting until the governor had gone hunting, the soldiers then murdered their officers and took control of the fort. When the governor returned he and his brother were cut down without warning by a volley of musketry from the rebels. The chaplain, who was wounded by the surprise attack, fled to the woods. He eventually died of his wounds and exposure and when his body was

recovered by the rebels they mutilated it so they could blame his death on natives so as to ward off any anger on the part of the civilian settlers (McCarthy 1973: 4b).

The winter of 1662-63 saw the colony fall into a state of total anarchy as the rebels spent their time drinking wine, raping women and murdering any man who attempted to stop them (McCarthy 1973: 4b). The spring brought the possibility of retribution as reinforcements were due from France and being keenly aware of this fact, the soldiers attempted to flee to the English. Nevertheless, some of them were eventually captured and sent to Quebec for trial (McCarthy 1973: 4). Regardless of the veracity of this story, what is clear is that some kind of major rebellion occurred at Placentia during this time and the colony was effectively destroyed as a result (Proulx 1979: 14).

Because of the mutiny and the subsequent abandonment of any serious efforts at permanent settlement during the winter, the actual date of continual occupation of Placentia by the French is better set as 1663 when reinforcements from France arrived (Proulx 1979: 14). In the spring of 1663, Gargot, sent new soldiers and supplies under the command of a temporary Lieutenant-Governor, a line officer named Bellot dit Lafontaine, who governed “badly” between 1663 and 1666/7. At that point he was either recalled or also murdered by the colonists (McCarthy 1973: 46-47a). Proulx notes that Lafontaine was recalled on December 8, 1666 as a result of the, “negligence and the abuse of his power” (Proulx 1979: 14). This appears to be the more likely of the two possibilities. Sadly, it appeared that despite the king making special allowances for the colony and even offering to accept any English settlers who would swear allegiance to

France, the colony, now ostensibly in its fifth year, continued to flounder (Proulx 1979: 14).

With the colony in desperate shape, desperate action was required. Louis XIV now took a personal interest in making sure that Placentia would develop into an economic and military base secure and strong enough to challenge the English in the region. To that end, a new governor, La Palme, was sent to Placentia with instructions from the King to do just that (Proulx 1979: 14-15). Louis XIV made it clear to him that, in particular, colonists were to be encouraged to work the soil so that the colony might become self-sufficient and the fishermen were to be defended. To achieve these goals 150 soldiers, weapons and supplies were sent to Placentia (Proulx 1979: 15). Little else is known of La Palme's time in Placentia although he seems to have restored a degree of calm. It was his successor who truly turned the small colony into a success.

3.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESS

In 1670, the new governor, Sieur de la Poippe, arrived from France (McCarthy 1973: 47-48a). Poippe had a long and relatively successful term, taking pains not only to promote the economic growth of the colony, but also to build a functioning societal hierarchy to bring order and structure to the settlers' everyday lives (Proulx 1979: 19-20). Unfortunately, his fourteen year stay in Placentia coincided with war with Holland (1672-1678) with the result that much of the promised support from France never arrived (Proulx 1979: 20). Worse still, Prowse claims that the settlement was attacked at least five

times by English “buccaneers” who stripped the inhabitants of their possessions and ruined what buildings and agricultural cultivation existed (Prowse 1895: 182). In spite of these setbacks, the fishing trade continued to grow and by 1684 was prospering in the area (McCarthy 1973: 51-52a). Sadly for La Poippe, any part he played in the success of the fishing industry was overshadowed by accusations made by the colonists that he was illegally collecting “le tiers”, a tax on trade with New England merchants. Consequently, he was recalled to France that year (McCarthy 1973a: 51-52). With yet another ignominious end to a governor’s rule, it was time for another man to have his turn.

The next governor, Antoine Parat, proved to be even more unpopular with the locals than his predecessors. Immediately after his arrival in 1685, he took it upon himself to instigate a strongly anti-English policy aimed at ending the successful trade with New England. The local people of Placentia were not at all supportive of this position and even the French Government went so far as to reprimand him for his questionable treatment of a Boston merchant in 1687 (McCarthy 1973a: 52). This unpopularity continued to grow throughout his time as governor. According to McCarthy, it reached a climax in 1689 when it was revealed that Parat was openly living with the wife of one of the settlers and that he endorsed the local priest’s desire to take a mistress (McCarthy 1973a: 53).

When not busy beating up New England merchants or sleeping with settlers’ wives, Parat did attempt to make improvements in the economy and defences of the colony. His success can be judged by a 1690 report submitted by a group of London merchants in which they claimed that the French had beaten them out of the Newfoundland trade and that France now totally dominated the European fish trade (Canada 1962: 45). By this

time, the Newfoundland fishery was as important to France's economy as were Caribbean sugar, slaves, furs and the Mediterranean-Levant trade. It was, therefore, a valuable asset to be defended, something that Parat did well (Thorpe 1971: 1).

In terms of defence, Parat's success was more modest. He began in 1685 by constructing a small fortification, little more than a battery, called "le fort de Plaisance", on the northern side of the Gut (Lynch 1976: 12). Two years later, a small military force arrived under the command of the King's Lieutenant, Louis de Pastour de Costebelle, who was to act as Parat's second in command (McCarthy 1973a: 52). Aside from the soldiers and their personal equipment which arrived that year, an engineer and heavy ordinances also arrived with orders from the Court instructing Parat, with the assistance of the colonists, to improve "le fort de Plaisance" (Proulx 1979: 21-22).

The motivation behind this increase in military force was the War of the Grand Alliance (1689-1697) in Europe, known in North America as King William's War. Beginning in 1689, this war brought France and England into direct conflict on the continent and made official the hostilities which had already existed in the colonies for some time (Canada 1962:45). In light of its now relatively strong military presence and solidification as the centre of France's lucrative Atlantic fishing industry, it was becoming increasingly likely that if a major armed conflict took place, Placentia would be at its heart (Proulx 1979: 21). All that remained to be seen was whether the little colony could survive such a conflict.

The inhabitants of Placentia did not have to wait long for war to arrive on their doorstep. In 1690, the French were taken by surprise when English attackers, who ironically had been guided by a number of men whom Parat had uncharacteristically welcomed a few weeks earlier, came overland and stormed the small colony (Proulx 1979: 24-25). Parat's previous kindness was not exactly reciprocated by the English as they later tortured him to learn the location of any valuables the garrison and settlers might have hidden before the attack (McCarthy 1973: 62-63a). Aside from the wounds Parat received in the course of his torture, the human cost of the attack was quite minimal as only two soldiers were killed. Constabelle was wounded (Proulx 1979: 24).

The material losses, however, were terrible. After occupying Placentia for approximately six months the English left, carrying off anything of value including food, furniture, fishing equipment and personal belongings (Proulx 1979: 24-25). Before they left, they took the time to destroy the rudimentary defences and then sailed away in two vessels they had captured in the harbour, thus leaving the inhabitants to the mercy of the harsh climate and their own devices (McCarthy 1973: 62-63a). It was only through the assistance of the Basque fishing fleet which arrived in the spring that the colony survived (Gordon 1969: 4-5). Despite this much needed assistance, it was not long before trouble surfaced as animosity grew between the colonists and the Basque fishermen.

The Basque were angered by the presence of a military authority in a region once free of government meddling. As well, conflict emerged between the colonists and the Basque, who were annual visitors rather than permanent residents, over the ownership of beach plots. The disputes came to a head in August 1691 (Proulx 1979: 35). Although the

“mutiny” quickly died down, Governor Parat had had enough and returned to France, ostensibly to argue his case against the Basques, but much more likely to simply escape the madness which had overtaken the colony (McCarthy 1973: 64). As it turned out, Parat’s decision to return home foreshadowed his official recall as his replacement, Jacques-Francois de Monbeton De Brouillon had already been appointed and dispatched with the goal of taking office in June (Proulx 1979: 26-27). Brouillon’s departure, however, was delayed and with Parat gone, de Costebelle became the de-facto governor of Placentia for a year (Gordon 1969: 5).

Faced with continuing civil strife and bereft of any recognizable defences, it was only through Costebelle’s own hard work that Placentia managed to survive the year. After patching up relations with the Basque, the interim-governor re-established order among the inhabitants by executing a particularly obstinate individual named Doyen as a warning (Proulx 1979: 26). With civil order re-established, Costebelle then turned his attention to defending his little colony. He ordered new fortifications to be built around the town (McCarthy 1973: 64). This decision proved to be a wise one for less than a month after the palisade around town was completed; a party of Englishmen arrived with the intent of sacking Placentia once again. On seeing the rudimentary wall, they decided not to attack (Proulx 1979: 26). Finally, with the arrival of reinforcements from France (Proulx 1979: 26-27) and Acadia (McCarthy 1973: 64a), Constabelle was able to report in December of 1690 that the conditions, both social and military, had improved (Proulx 1979: 34-35).

In 1691, the new governor of Placentia, Le Sieur de Saint-Ovide de Brouillon, finally arrived in Placentia and quickly went about his ordered task, to establish Placentia as a military strong point (McCarthy 1979: 64-65a). Situated on the northern side of the harbour's entrance (see Appendix 1), Brouillon's Fort Louis became the single largest fort to be built by the French in Placentia (Proulx 1979:35-36). That said, the fort was still too small and too low to defend the approaches to the harbour (Lynch 1976: 12). Nevertheless, it was able to render the Gut nearly impassable to any ship (Proulx 1979: 35-36). In 1692, a visiting nobleman, Baron LaHontan, described Fort Louis as, "...nearly 300 paces in circumference and the fortification is both bad and irregular. It consists of four curtains of stone plied up between stakes...[and]...Only two bastions, built the same way as the stone curtains"(McCarthy 1979: 65). While not a magnificent piece of military architecture, it was at least superior to any previous defensive structure built in the colony.




Figure 1.1: Plan Du Fort De Plaisance Et Des Environs, Terre Neuve 1709

These new fortifications were soon tested for in 1692 Placentia was under attack yet again. This attack was not a surprise like the one in 1690. In fact, the residents had prior knowledge of the intended confrontation. In response to the threat that Placentia's new found military strength posed to their access to the fishery, the English had delivered a notice in the dark of night a few months prior stating "Avec le temps, je me veux m'establir icy" (Proulx 1979: 27). The attack came in the fall and was led by Commodore Williams who arrived with five ships. He made it clear his intention was to take the town (McCarthy 1973a: 64). Faced with an attacking force of between 700 and 800 English soldiers waiting to come ashore and with only 50 soldiers in the garrison, Brouillan was forced to turn to the community for help (Proulx 1979: 28-29).

LaHontan, the same man who provided the above description of Fort Louis, gathered together a "Fishermans' Brigade" and successfully fended off an English landing at La Fountaine which today is known as Freshwater (McCarthy 1973a: 65). This abortive landing, however, was only the beginning of the attack and after a day of negotiations between the two sides, Williams brought his fleet into cannon range of Fort Louis (Proulx 1979: 28-29). The following bombardment did significant damage to the town, but the fort remained relatively unscathed. Not wanting to risk his ships or men in a further attack, Williams withdrew by the end of September (Proulx 1979: 29).

Despite having successfully repelled Commodore William's attack, the incident had made it clear that Fort Louis was situated too low for its guns to reach The Road, the approach to the Gut, when its guns were at their proper elevation (McCarthy 1973a:66). While the English had been successfully prevented from entering the Gut by cables strung from Fort Louis to the southern side of the channel which were defended by the very effective southern facing guns of the fort, Brouillon realized that something had to be done to prevent ships from sailing into bombardment range of the fort (Proulx 1979:36). To this end he began construction of a four gun battery on the south shore of the Gut as well as a battery on Castle Hill (See Appendix 1) to the north, which he called the "Gaillardin". This was augmented by the addition of the Royal Redoubt in the same area in 1693 (Thorpe 1971: 4).

These structures, including Fort Louis, were meant solely to serve as temporary positions while masonry structures were built along a more traditional French continental style (Thorpe 1971: 3). However, they served the French well when in 1692 another large

English fleet arrived. This attack, consisting initially of 19 ships and expanded with the arrival of five more shortly after, was commanded by Admiral Francis Wheeler. Again, the English were forced to depart, this time without even attacking Fort Louis or making an attempt on the harbour (Proulx 1979: 29-39). While this can be partly attributed to poor weather and Wheeler's unwillingness to risk his ships in light of the losses the Royal Navy had experienced elsewhere that year, the fact that Brouillon was able to fire on his enemy from Castle Hill certainly contributed to the English Admiral's retreat (Proulx 1979: 29-30).

The English attacks between 1690 and 1693 led to a recognition by the French that they needed to secure Placentia as it was the only defended port from which their fishing fleets in Newfoundland could operate and place where naval vessels could safely stop for repairs during an Atlantic crossing (Thorpe 1971: 3-4). Between 1694 and 1695 Brouillon, assisted by Jacques L'Hermitte a former engineer corps member, put his efforts into doing just that (Canada 1962:45). Part of his efforts focused on rebuilding Fort Louis using stone and wood. The goal was not only to improve the defensibility of the fort, but also to cope with the constant erosive forces of the sea (Thorpe 1971: 4). Despite these efforts, a lack of supplies, the poor quality of his soldiers and the uncooperative nature of the inhabitants made the task of putting the colony's defences in order very difficult (Proulx 1979: 30-32).

3.4 ON THE OFFENSIVE

Following this period of relative calm, Brouillon finally was able to reverse the trend and take the fight to the English; after all, the War of the Grand Alliance was still underway. In 1696, two attacks were launched against St. John's, the main English centre in Newfoundland. The first, under the sole command of Brouillon, was successfully repelled by the English (McCarthy 1973a: 67-68). This attack, however, had been meant to be part of a much larger offensive which was to include forces from Canada under the command of Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville. This situation was largely Brouillon's own fault. The attack was jointly funded by d'Iberville, the King and Brouillon who was underwritten by the ship owners of St. Malo (Williams 1987). Brouillon, however, had second thoughts and in an attempt to cut d'Iberville out of the expected profits of the raid, he had gone ahead without the Canadians. Nevertheless, although his business partner was furious, the two agreed to re-launch the operation, this time together (Williams 1987).

This joint attack succeeded not only in the taking and burning St. John's, but also in a series of fruitful raids all along the coast of the Avalon Peninsula inflicting an estimated 200 casualties, taking 700 prisoners, wiping out 27 outposts and completely destroying the English Newfoundland fishery (Proulx 1979:32-33). Despite this impressive victory, the French were unable to hold St. John's as they lacked the necessary resources and men. Knowing that retribution would be soon in coming, they decided to return to Placentia to protect it in the event of an attack (Proulx 1979: 33). Fortunately, the War of the Grand Alliance ended in 1697 with the signing of the *Peace of Ryswick* and the threat of an

English attack on the colony quickly diminished. With the official end of hostilities, the pugnacious Brouillon retired due to failing health (McCarthy 1973a: 69). Despite keeping the title of governor, Brouillon's duties were taken over by Joseph de Monic, who effectively commanded the colony for several years (McCarthy 1973a: 69).

The new peace did not, however, mark an end to French ambitions to fortify Placentia. The raid on St. John's and the defeat of two English attacks had proven that the colony was a valuable military asset and the fish trade continued to pay dividends, making the prospect of losing Placentia unpalatable (Thorpe 1971: 4). As such, increased funds began to become available to the colony and a new drive to establish Placentia as a stronghold was initiated during this time of relative peace. This program concentrated mostly on improving the already existing structures, such as raising the ramparts of Fort Louis, building additional outer works for the Royal Redoubt and linking all of the positions with palisaded entrenchments to improve communication and mobility (Proulx 1979: 39-40).

By 1701, the defences of Placentia appeared to be in an acceptable state. Fort Royal Redoubt, or Fort Royal, was completed except for a few coverings. Fort Louis, although constructed almost solely of wood and earth, mounted 28 cannons and there were a number of outlying batteries all linked by trenches or palisades (Proulx 1979: 41-42). By 1702, however, conditions began to quickly deteriorate due to a lack of proper maintenance and the harshness of the climate. The relentless force of waves and weather had weakened Fort Louis so badly over time that it finally collapsed in a storm that year (Thorpe 1971:4). This disaster finally convinced King Louis to order the fort to be rebuilt

of stone and during the summer of 1703 efforts continued to accomplish this task while the old earth and palisades walls were allowed to continue to deteriorate (Proulx 1979 52-53). That same year, de Monic was relieved and a new governor, Daniel Auger de Subercase, arrived to take command of the colony (McCarthy 1973a: 69). No one could have known then that Placentia was entering its last days as a French possession.

3.5 THE COMING OF THE END

After taking his post, Subercase reported that the palisades around Fort Louis had rotted through. There was no time to waste in strengthening the defences as the War of Spanish Succession had once more brought England and France back into open conflict. Subercase set out immediately to tackle the challenge. Nevertheless, McCarthy insists that these efforts mounted to little owing to a lack of funds, available material and suitable labour (McCarthy 1979b: 4) As well, he accuses both de Monic and de Subercase of utilizing what stone, lime and masons were available for their own housing purposes rather than to repair the defensive works (McCarthy 1973b: 4).

A number of firsthand accounts, however, seem to contradict this assessment. Two provided by French deserters found by the English stand out. The first dates from September 1703. It comprises depositions of two men, Laville and Belrose, who stated that there were 38 guns in the lower fort and over 3000 soldiers and sailors in the town and on two men of war in the harbour (Hussey 1703). The second account comes from John Grimma and Guillaume Lassuse, who claimed that a new battery had been built at

the mouth of the bay (Anonymous 1703a). Clearly, these statements, coming from disenchanted French men, even today must be considered with some suspicion. The English evidently were suspicious for they sent a party of spies to verify these statements.

Returning from their excursion on November 19, 1703, the English spies reported that indeed the fortifications had been improved, including the addition of two new watch towers near the upper fort (Fort Royal) and the construction of masonry walls, measuring 16 feet in height and 8 feet in width, at the upper fort (Anonymous 1703b). A second party of spies was dispatched. Returning on March 23rd 1704, it too confirmed the statements of the deserters and the earlier party of spies (Anonymous 1704a). Regardless of how prepared, or unprepared, the French were for an attack in 1703, the defences proved at least sufficient to scare off two English warships in March of that year, although the presence of two French naval vessels probably also contributed to their withdrawal (Proulx 1979: 45).

Not one to resort to the defensive, Subercase retaliated by organizing an attack on St. John's, the principal English military base and port. In October 1703, he and his troops occupied the town for over a month, although they failed to seize the Fort (Proulx 1979:45-46). Upon returning to Placentia, Subercase decided to focus even more attention on improving its defences. The efforts lavished on Fort Louis in the summer of 1704 included extending it to the east and the south and rebuilding its southern facing wall completely in stone (Proulx 1979: 52-53).

Throughout this period spies and deserters from Placentia continued to relay information to the English and their accounts illustrate the results of this large rebuilding project. For example, the returned prisoner Edward Pickering stated on September 6, 1704 that there were, “continually masons working in order to build the lower fort with stone” (Anonymous 1704b). Nevertheless, the work must have progressed slowly as two French deserters who arrived at the end of September claimed that the walls of the fort were still only palisades on the landward side and that the seaward walls were simply sod works (Anonymous 1704c). Another deserter, arriving on November 25th stated that very shortly a wall of “lime and stone” was soon going to be built and that the lower fort now mounted 35 pieces of artillery (Anonymous 1704d). All of these accounts appear to confirm that work on rebuilding the walls of Fort Louis with stone progressed at a snail’s pace. Proulx states that this stone work was still underway in 1707 and by 1709 no real work was being undertaken to further improve Fort Louis or the defences of Placentia as a whole (Proulx 1979: 56-57).

Even if the French intentions of making Placentia a stronghold were hampered by a lack of masons and stone, the English were still very concerned by the threat the French colony posed to them. As early as 1704, there was talk in English circles of the importance of taking Placentia to prevent it from being used as a staging ground for attacks against the fishery and St. John’s, as it had been in 1696 (Merchants Trading to Newfoundland 1704). These calls for action were echoed throughout 1705 as many English officials believed that it was of the “greatest importance [that] the place be reduced for the good of England’s fishery” (Merrett 1705). Finally, in 1708, the English

decided to blockade the entrance to Placentia. Rather than speeding up reinforcement of the defences, this offensive move resulted in the French effectively terminating any work on the fort at Placentia (Proulx 1979: 47). They had other things on their mind.

In 1706, Subercase had retired and been replaced by Constabelle and it would be his sad task to eventually turn the colony over to the English (McCarthy 1973a: 70). The English naval blockade of Placentia not only limited the ability of Constabelle to build his fort, but also to feed his people who, along with nearly 500 returned prisoners of war, were beginning to starve as early as January of 1708 (Proulx 1979: 48). Despite these terrible conditions, Constabelle lead a surprise attack on St. John's on January 1st, 1708 (McCarthy 1973a: 70). Although successful, this offensive, like its predecessors, was not sustainable and after destroying the fortifications and pilfering anything of value, the French were forced to return to their garrison in Placentia (Proulx 1979: 48-49).

Short on supplies and reinforcements, Constabelle could do little but sit in Placentia and wait. From 1709 onwards, as war raged in Europe over the succession to the throne of Spain, and French –English hostilities continued in North America, Placentia was relegated to acting as a passive threat to the English. Even when reinforcements finally arrived in 1711, after the fall of Acadia at Port Royal, the French at Placentia chose not to undertake any further attacks against the English (Proulx 1979:50-51). Despite the ever increasing impact of the English blockade, the French did manage to repel English attacks in 1711 and 1712, but finally were forced to turn the colony over without a fight (Gordon 1969: 5).

War finally came to an end with the signing of the *Treaty of Utrecht* in 1713. France had lost the war in Europe and England was determined to gain some spoils in North America including the complete cession of Newfoundland and Acadia. This effectively ended the French presence in Newfoundland other than limited fishing rights in coastal waters from Cape Bonavista to Pointe Riche. In the case of Placentia, the French agreed to remove the civilian and military population by the end of 1714 (Proulx 1979: 51-52).

The French regime in Placentia was over. In July 1713, Governor Constabelle was instructed by the king to run up the English flag at all French forts and to defer to any English officer who came to Placentia (McCarthy 1973b:15). By September of 1714, the governor had finished preparations for the evacuation of the colony and on the 23rd wrote:

We are here the 23rd of Sept. The wind in to the N.N. east. Monsieur le Chevalier de Saujon is ready to leave the port. This will be at the latest between four and nine tomorrow morning. Everything of value is loaded for the voyage and the entire evacuation of the troops and inhabitants.
(McCarthy 1973b: 16)

After more than half a century of occupying Placentia, the French were gone.

“Plaisance” was no more; the English had come to stay.

3.6 MUDDLING THROUGH: THE EARLY ENGLISH YEARS

The French occupation of Placentia had been fraught with difficulties resulting from international armed conflicts, interpersonal conflict and greed and the nature of the local environment. The result of these realities was that, despite the extensive efforts made to turn Placentia into a military stronghold, the colony's forts were never really up to the task of repelling a major attack. This assessment is borne out by a report dated December 4, 1713 written by an English Captain, Cyprian Southack, shortly after the English took possession of the colony. In this report he stated that both Fort Louis and Fort Royal on Castle Hill were badly degraded and in poor repair at the time the English took possession of Placentia (Southack 1713). Despite the poor conditions of the old French forts, the English envisioned Placentia to be their new seat of military might in the region. With the lessons of the last war demonstrating that St. John's was vulnerable to attack even at the hands of relatively weak French forces, the English moved their headquarters from the thrice captured settlement to their newly acquired port at Placentia (Fry 2009). With this move a new chapter began in the military history of Placentia; one which would prove more peaceful than the last, but equally fraught with difficulties, failures and fortifications.

The first man appointed to command the new English colony of Placentia was John Moody, who arrived at his post on June the 5th, 1714 (Proulx 1971b: 120). Despite being entrusted with the command of Placentia, Moody was not the governor but rather a Lieutenant-Governor as Placentia had been placed under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Nova Scotia. This remained the case until 1729 (Prowse 1895: 285-287). Moody's

term as Lieutenant-Governor can be summarized as abusive and corrupt. His attention was dedicated primarily to the pursuit of enriching himself and his friends and leaving his responsibilities for the garrison and the people of the town seriously wanting, all leading to his recall in 1717 (Proulx 1971b: 120-121).

Despite this rather dismal assessment, Moody did attempt to protect his new colony as best he could in the face of England's apathy towards the construction of fortifications, having spent so much over the past decades on wars in Europe and North America (Proulx 1971b: 128). Forced to work with what limited resources were available to him, Moody resorted to pillaging the remains of Fort Royal on Castle Hill for stone in order to rebuild collapsed sections of Fort Louis, which continued to serve as the military and civil headquarters of Newfoundland (Proulx 1971b: 128). Such stop gap measures were the order of the day, even after Moody's requests for action finally convinced the Office of Ordnance to approve, in 1715, the construction of a new fort to replace the now truly decrepit Fort Louis (Proulx 1871b: 128). Despite plans to construct this new fort upon land on the southern side of the Gut, opposite Fort Louis, land which Moody had purchased in 1714 in anticipation of a new fortification, no construction took place during his term of office (Moody 1722).

The situation on the ground in Placentia was terrible at best. Worse than the absence of any proper fortifications was the fact that the garrison, swollen to over 300 men with the arrival of the withdrawn St. John's garrison, was bereft of proper shelter and supplies. In 1714, these conditions resulted in a revolt by almost half of the soldiers stationed at Placentia. Lieutenant- Governor Moody just managed to convince them to

return to duty, thereby preventing an escalation of the frustration (Campbell 1715). By 1715, the situation faced by the garrison was so poor that Moody wrote home to his government begging for supplies and money, going so far as to plead, “for God’s sake, don’t let me be made a meal of by the hungry soldiers” (Proulx 1971b: 131). Some relief followed that pitiful cry, when shortly thereafter many soldiers were transferred to other garrisons. Nevertheless, the problem of supplying Placentia continued to haunt the remainder of Moody’s governorship and for sometime thereafter. By 1717, criticism of Moody’s local real estate dealings and garrison discontent resulted in his recall. One would expect that with such an explosive body of men present, Moody must have felt at least some degree of relief when he was quietly replaced by Commodore Martin Purcell (Proulx 1971b: 121).

Very little is known about Purcell. His impact on Placentia was minimal due to his brief governorship. Before a year had elapsed, Samuel Gledhill was appointed as his replacement and, “by the aid of the Duke of Argyle, the Earl of Islay and the assistance of J.M, J.B., &c., he kissed His Majesty’s hand as Lieutenant Governor of Placentia with two companies of foot and Commander-in-Chief in Newfoundland” (Chippindall 1910: 114). This auspicious beginning to Gledhill’s governorship was marred somewhat by the fact that he and his family were almost killed in a shipwreck off Ferryland in September 1719 enroute to his new post (Chippindall 1910). This near disaster somewhat foreshadowed the rest of his time as Governor. Despite having been appointed to replace Moody in the hope of establishing a just administration at Placentia, Gledhill’s time as Governor proved to be just as corrupt.

Gledhill quickly became embroiled in a number of financial controversies. In his own memoirs he speaks of issues with a William Toshack, whose land and home were annexed in 1720 for the personal use of Gledhill and to make way for new fortifications (Chippindall 1910: 16-17). On top of this, Gledhill appears to have been grappling with his predecessor, Colonel Moody, over certain property and money the former governor had left behind when he had been recalled (Chippindall 1910: 17). Proulx states that the claims against Gledhill, which began to reach London in 1723 and led to his eventual recall in 1728, were totally justified (Proulx 1979b). Gledhill, not surprisingly, viewed them as a continuation of a long chain of politically and personally motivated attacks against him and his family (Chippindall 1910). Admittedly, such a claim is not totally believable when it comes from the accused man's memoirs especially when they were edited and published over a hundred years later by one of his direct descendants, but it is within the realm of possibility. His real estate dealings aside, what is relevant to this discussion is whether Gledhill made any significant contribution to the defences of Placentia during his nine years in command.

Without question the most significant development to the fortifications of Placentia during Gledhill's stint as Governor was the construction of Fort Frederick (see Appendix 1). Six years after the original proposal for its construction, work finally began in 1721 and the fort was occupied shortly thereafter, taking over as the English headquarters for Newfoundland (Penny 2009: 23). Fort Frederick, however, was a far cry from being a fortress. Instead, it was "a little picketed work with a stone semicircular battery, barracks and brick guardhouse" (Richardson 1962: 6). Nonetheless, with the

condition of Fort Louis worsening by the day, this small, enclosed battery was likely an improvement in the overall capabilities of the colony's defences.

Despite the apparent strengthening of Placentia's defences with the addition of Fort Frederick, its small size and simplicity was, in some ways, a portent of the relatively low level of effort the English were to commit in the future to defend the colony. The fort was quite small and really only able to garrison about 50 men during peace time (Penny 2009: 19). This represented a major decrease in the strength of the garrison, a decrease that Gledhill ascribed to the negative influence of his political enemies. He wrote in his memoirs that, "for the Finishing Stroke Removing All the Troops Excepting his own Company ...Impairing the Number of the Troops from 300 to 30" (Chippindall 1910: 155). Additionally, the governor stated that it was due to these same "adversaries" that the garrison of Placentia was reduced to a defenceless state by "perverting the Current Channel of the Governments Pay and Subsistence, Cloathing, Provisions" away from his command (Chippindall 1910: 155). Whether these allegations of politically motivated neglect of the garrison are true or not, it is clear that the soldiers were in a continuous state of need and suffered from constant supply difficulties, just as they had under Moody. Gledhill even reported that in, "the first Year of his Government (Gledhill's), the Garrison was reduc'd to very Great want of Provisions, Partly Occasion'd by the Loss of his Majestyes Storeship" (Chippindall 1910: 114).

Despite these difficulties in readying the defences of Placentia and the unscrupulous administrations of Moody and Gledhill, there were signs by the 1720s that the former French colony was once again beginning to play a major role in the society

and economy of the region. The completion of Fort Frederick appears to have signalled a renewed confidence within the civilian population. Shortly thereafter, a new wave of settlers from the British Isles established a number of businesses including a shipyard which helped to make Placentia a major hub for vessels traveling from North America to Europe or trading among the North Atlantic colonies (Proulx 1971b: 122). Gledhill clearly felt largely responsible for these improvements as he made clear in a letter in 1727, sent while in garrison at Fort Frederick to the King; “Since the Erecting FORT FREDERICK ... this Fishing Port, a few Years agoe at loest Ebb in Repute, Can’t now be justly stil’d Second to no one Fishing Port in all Your Majestyes Dominions” (Chippindall 1910: 123). In fact, Gledhill was so proud of his contributions to the colony he even went so far as to name one of his daughters Placentia Gledhill (Chippindall 1910: 121). With its regional, economic and logistical significance increasing one would expect to see the efforts to defend Placentia increase proportionally. This was not the case. The political and administrative arena for Newfoundland was to shift leaving Placentia on the periphery.

With Gledhill removed in 1729 amidst accusations of corruption and the memory of Moody’s similar misconduct still fresh in people’s minds, the English government decided that it was time to tighten governmental controls and responsibility in the small colony as well as in Newfoundland as a whole. The decision was made to create a new government for Newfoundland, one based out of St. John’s, under which Placentia would be placed (Proulx 1971b:122). The man appointed to head this new government as governor and commander-in-chief was Captain Henry Osborne of the Royal Navy.

Osborne quickly went about establishing justice and order in the colony and in a letter dated October 14, 1729 he recorded that he was taking great measures to punish petty crimes, appoint justices and ministers of the peace and even returning property in Placentia “unjustly dispossessed for several years” by Colonel Gledhill to its original owners (Prowse 1895: 287).

As for the military situation in Placentia, little transpired to improve the conditions for the men or the fortifications. Although focused on shoring up the justice system in Newfoundland, Osborne was not ignorant of the problems in Placentia. He recognized the need to improve the living conditions of the colony’s garrisons, including those of the men at Placentia (Proulx 1971b: 123). These men were largely of retirement age and under the command of a bedridden officer and themselves. They certainly were of little value in case of an attack (Proulx 1971b: 131). Before he was able to achieve much in this regard, however, Osborne was recalled in 1731 to be replaced by a quick succession of other governors who played little role in the development of Placentia or its defences. Attention had shifted to St. John’s.

Even before Osborne was recalled, there is evidence which speaks to the poor condition in Placentia. According to a report, duplicated by Osborne and originally drafted by the garrison’s storekeeper, Edward Hopley, dated the 25th of September 1730, the garrison comprised, “one Company of Foot consisting of Captain, Lieutenant, Ensign, Two Serjeants, two corporals, one drum Thirty four Private Men” (Osborn 1730). Of this company the Ensign was absent, the company’s commanding officer, Captain Hollingsworth was “confined to his Bed by age and infirmities” and only 10 privates were

listed (Osborn 1730). Furthermore, the surgeon, the Chaplain, the “Fort Major” and the Lieutenant-Governor “Gladhill” are marked as being absent from their posts (Osborn 1730). It is no surprise that the garrison was in such poor condition given the years of neglect. As Proulx notes this was the same company that originally arrived under the command of Samuel Gledhill in 1719 and which was by this time commanded by his son Joseph Gledhill (Proulx 1971b:131).

Fort Frederick appears to have been in an equally run-down state as the men who were stationed there. Osborne reported in 1730 that, “the Rowball (redoubt?) withoutside the Garrison is very much damaged by the sea”, that the palisade and the storehouse were “much decayed” due to the lack of a carpenter and the “Parapet of the Redoubt and Chimney very much Decayed for want of masons, or Brick layer” (Osborn 1730). To add insult to injury, he added that the entire fort was almost destroyed the following year when a fire ravaged the small community (Gledhill 1731b). In the same year as this near miss with an inferno, Joseph Gledhill implored the Duke of Newcastle to commit more resources to the defences of Placentia as it was, “y^e most considerable fishing port in American” (Gledhill 1731a). Despite this appeal, the sad state of both the garrison and fort generally continued throughout the 1730s.

There were some modest improvements. In 1732, another report on Placentia reveals that all the previously absent officers were now present and that 32 men and one Sergeant were present in the colony. As well, there was a detachment of the Royal Regiment of Artillery numbering 14 men which had been assigned but had not yet arrived at the time the report was drafted (Falkingham 1732). The document also included a

claim for money to pay the masons who had conducted work on the garrison which implies that some form of maintenance was being performed on Fort Frederick (Falkingham 1732).

Sadly, this momentary encouraging picture of the state of the defences of Placentia quickly evaporates after further examination of other sources. In 1735, a Commandeer Lee reviewed the garrison which had reported 32 serviceable men but, when mustered only 17 appeared, six of whom he said belonged in a retirement hospital, “ [I] could not find above seventeen [who] could appear, out of whom about six were quite unserviceable thro’ Age, and ‘tis a pity they are not provided for in Chelsea” (Board of Trade 1735). Lee also reported that even these few men were essentially unarmed as the small arms in the garrison’s stores were “so bad that very few of them are serviceable” (Board of Trade 1735). At least it seems that some maintenance had been done on Fort Frederick as the Commander found it be in good condition, but did emphasize that it was “so small a one” (Board of Trade 1735). It seems that Lee recognized that a larger fortification was needed to hold Placentia in case of an attack.

There is no evidence that the garrison improved at all over the next two years despite these disparaging reports. After another review of the garrison in 1737, Lee found that the soldiers were now “entirely unprovided with small arms” (Philips 1737). The return for Joseph Gledhill’s Company in that same year reported 36 men ready for service, 4 of whom were new recruits “not yet arriv’ d” (Gledhill 1737). What this reveals is that in the two years following Lee’s first inspection in 1735 nothing had changed. The garrison was still reporting 32 active men; the same 32 men of whom 15 did not

appear when the company was mustered and a further 6 of whom were too old to be of service. If this is indeed the case, the garrison of Placentia during those two years consisted of no more than 11 men fit for service none of whom was properly armed. Furthermore, this company, having arrived with Samuel Gledhill, had by this point been in Placentia for almost 20 years!

Lee's reports may have garnered some positive action. According to a report from later in 1738 on the condition of the garrison prepared by Captain Philip Vanbrugh, the new governor of Newfoundland, for the English government, the men were "in good order, and properly cloathed and armed (Vanbrugh 1738). The report on the fortifications was much less encouraging. Captain Vanbrugh stated that Fort Frederick had decayed quickly over the last few years and was now, "in a wretched and defenceless condition; the lodging for officers and men very indifferent, and, by no means fitted against the severe cold of the winder season" (Vanbrugh 1738). Clearly, little had changed in the garrison or the fort since the beginning of the decade and what had changed had deteriorated, not improved. This deterioration appears to be almost completely due to neglect on the part of the English government and such neglect, combined with the rising spectre of a new war with France, eventually led to cries by the populace for action.

Interestingly enough it was the security of the fishery, not fear of military aggression that prompted demands for improvements to Placentia's defences. These demands came not from the inhabitants of the colony, but from, "the Corporation of Dartmouth together with the Merchants and Principal Traders therefore in behalf of themselves and all other Fishing and Trading to Newfoundland" (The Corporation of

Dartmouth n.d.). The petition, which appears to date from 1739 or 1740 was addressed to “the Kings of Excellent Majesty in Council” and outlined that the merchants believed that, “the whole trade and fishery of that Country (Newfoundland) is in the utmost Danger there being only one small fort at Placentia with a few cannon” and that “being so defenceless it will become as easy Prey to any Enemy who shall attack it.” They cited the precedent of the French raids of the 1690s (The Corporation of Dartmouth n.d.). As a result, they asked that new defences be built, “for the security of so valuable a trade and nursery of seamen at such place or places as to your majesty shall see most proper” (The Corporation of Dartmouth n.d.).

This petition to improve not only the defences of Placentia, but Newfoundland as a whole, appeared to indicate the adoption of a new perspective and resulting initiative on the part of the British to better defend their colonial holdings in this area. In 1744, Europe became embroiled in another military conflict with the beginning of the War of Austrian Succession. It was not long before England and France were once again enemies in Europe and North America. In the years leading up to the conflict there was the renewed threat of an attack on Placentia, as well as other English colonial possessions. England became more interested in taking steps to secure its North American garrisons. These steps were not, however, entirely successful as far as Placentia was concerned but they did represent a shift in focus and a commitment to its defences, a shift which differed in character from the preceding two decades of blatant neglect.

3.7 THE ‘GLORY’ YEARS

This new vigour to defend Placentia did not begin to bear fruit instantly. Certainly, there is no evidence that the garrison was any stronger in 1740 than it had been two years previously. The returns for Gledhill’s Company still showed only 32 men in Placentia and the arrival of the four recruits listed in 1738 was still pending (Medly 1740). At least the previously mentioned artillery detachment had arrived on site by this point (Medly 1740). That said, three years after this return was written, there is evidence that the English were beginning to take genuine steps to improve the fortifications of the colony, including at Placentia.

The first documentary evidence of this new fortification program is provided by an Order in Council from May of 1741, just 3 years before the outbreak of war in Europe (Sharpe 1741). This records that an engineer had been dispatched to assess the scale of repairs necessary to make Fort Frederick serviceable again and that, on his recommendation, a number of artillerymen, who were previously to be transferred to St. John’s were, instead, to remain in Placentia (Sharpe 1741). Furthermore, instructions ordered that the Man-of-War was to remain stationed at Placentia until its repairs were completed in case the French made an attempt on the fort (Sharpe 1741). Of even greater import is a letter sent by Governor John Byng to the English government which provides evidence for the most significant development for the defence of Placentia during the 1740s. This document refers to the “Forts” at Placentia (Byng 1743). It is possible that this usage of the plural represents the first documentary evidence of the construction of a new fortification in the colony.

That new fortification is known only as the New Fort and despite being quite well documented in terms of its design, little is known about when its construction began. This lack of knowledge had occasionally led to misinterpretations of the Fort by historians. For example, Morris Lynch stated that it was just Fort Frederick renamed (Lynch 1976: 3). This is clearly not the case as the two structures were built on opposite sides of the harbour Gut. In terms of when the New Fort was begun, Elaine Mitchele states in her 1986 paper *Placentia: Built Heritage* that New Fort was built in 1743, although she did not cite the source of this date (Mitchele 1986: 23). Certainly construction of the New Fort must have been underway, because in November 1743 Thomas Smith, now the Governor of Newfoundland, reported that Captain Gledhill had, “by the assistance of the Inhabitants...begun some works, at The Old Fort at Placentia, the Better to Defend the Place, till the new Fort is perfected which his Majesty has ordered to be created there” (Smith 1743a). Clearly there was construction underway in Placentia prior to that report.

Regardless of when construction of the New Fort actually began, what is important is that Placentia was regarded as significant enough an outpost to warrant the construction of a considerable masonry fort. This New Fort, constructed on approximately the same area as the old Fort Louis on the northern side of the Placentia Gut (see Appendix 1, 4 and 5) and , was a much larger fortification than Fort Frederick. The construction of such a large stone structure represented a major commitment in terms of manpower and resources. Yet, despite the threat of war and the apparent desire to plan for and construct such a structure, once again Placentia encountered a problem with acquiring the necessary resources.

In spite of the Governor Smith's report in November 1743, sometime that fall construction had stalled due to a lack of financial support from the home government. On October 3rd, 1743, Smith instructed Gledhill to cease all construction of the New Fort as it was nowhere near completion. Instead, he was to shift his attention simply to putting Fort Frederick into a defensible state (Smith 1743a). That said, in a letter sent by Smith to Gledhill that same year it is clear that Smith expected this cessation of construction to be a temporary measure as he also instructed that the repairs to Fort Frederick should only be made sufficient to "stand...till the New Fort is finished" (Smith 1743b). Exactly how long these temporary repairs would need to last in order to remain serviceable until replaced by the New Fort was not specifically mentioned and may have proven to be a much longer time than Smith had ever anticipated.

In 1744, the year the war officially began, there was no evidence that the New Fort was any closer to completion. In a letter that year to the English government, Gledhill reported that the Fort Frederick was still in poor shape. He did not even mention the New Fort (Gledhill 1744). An Order in Council from that year outlines that the defences all around Newfoundland needed to be rushed into service and that those at Placentia needed to be "completed as soon as possible" (Sharpe 1744). With the New Fort still under construction and the rush to repair Fort Frederick revealed in these documents one would imagine that similar efforts were made to reinforce the garrison. That does not appear to have been the case.

In an undated letter, most likely from 1745 or 1746, Gledhill stated that, "the few men under my command who are but forty privates, have neither arms, clothing, bedding

nor provisions as yet. I am heartily sorry, this place is so much neglected” (Gledhill n.d.). In another letter from 1746, he echoed this again claiming that he had yet to receive any supplies or equipment for over three years. He even went so far as to say that, “It is hard in such a dismal climate as this where nothing grows to see the king’s troops naked” (Gledhill 1746). In light of the continued neglect of these men it is not entirely surprising that the necessary resources to build a major fortification like the New Fort were not forthcoming.

The continued weakness of the defences of Placentia caused consternation among the civilians who lived there. In August of 1744, they sent a petition to Gledhill outlining that they had little confidence that they or their possessions were sufficiently protected from roving French privateers and requested that further actions be taken to shore up the feeble defences of the colony (Traders and inhabitants of little and great Placentia and the boatkeepers in adjacent harbours 1744). This petition appears to have elicited little response as even by the end of the decade a report written by Governor Charles Watson recorded that the New Fort was “now erecting” and not yet complete (Watson 1749). Even after almost a decade of renewed attempts to improve the fortifications at Placentia, the English had little more to show for their efforts than a broken down old stop gap Fort, an under construction New Fort and a garrison made up of old, ill equipped men.

The reasons for this lack of political will to tackle the defence issues at Placentia partly lie in the military activities taking place in England’s other Atlantic colonies. In June 1745, an expedition from New England captured Louisbourg, thereby removing the closest French threat to the small colony. The Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic

waterways between Newfoundland and New England. Hostilities terminated in 1748 with the *Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle*. Ironically both sides returned their conquests during the war and Louisbourg was, to the consternation of New Englanders and Newfoundlanders, returned to France. Nonetheless, the French presence on Ile Royale no longer posed the threat it once had been. Consequently, the building efforts and reinforcement of the Placentia garrison which had been underway essentially ceased. The reality was that even when the threat of attack had been imminent, the efforts of the English to prepare Placentia had proven mostly ineffective. This continued to be the case into the 1750s.

There does appear to be some evidence that the English, at a minimum, attempted to keep what work they had done at Placentia serviceable and that the colony was better defended at the start of the 1750s than it had been at the start of the 1740s. This is borne out by a 1751 report on the state of the fortifications at Placentia drafted by an Engineer Officer, Leonard Smelt. Possibly one of the most important documents for studying this period in Placentia's military history, its opening statement does not paint a positive image of the colony's defensive abilities and it sets the tone for the rest of the report:

The Fortifications of Placentia (if they deserve that name) have every defect of design, situation & execution and notwithstanding their great expenses, are scarce capable of being made sufficient against a privateer (Smelt 1751).

Smelt then continued to say that the still incomplete New Fort was already starting to collapse, its completed walls already starting to bulge and its two unfinished sides only recently enclosed by palisades (Smelt 1751). Further in the report he notes that while Fort Frederick was in much better shape than the New Fort, it was still “yet capable of little defence” (Smelt 1751). Some construction had been undertaken. Smelt reports that a “lobby and laboratory” were constructed in the New Fort just that year, thus indicating that some efforts were being made to keep the defences in good order (Smelt 1751). Despite this, Engineer Smelt concludes that considering the continued difficulty in building proper fortifications at Placentia, the English would be better off to abandon these efforts altogether and, instead, rely on the Royal Navy to defend not only Placentia, but the whole of Newfoundland (Smelt 1751).

As strange as it may seem, Smelt’s report depicts a significant improvement in the overall capabilities of the defences of Placentia. Previous to this report there had been no evidence that the New Fort was being utilized at all. Smelt’s report implied that it was in use to some degree. Now enclosed fully by palisades and housing a “laboratory”, namely a powder storage and preparation area, New Fort, in the event of an attack, would have been capable of providing ammunition for any soldiers garrisoned there. Smelt also seems to indicate that Fort Frederick was in decent repair, indicating for the first time since the French built Fort Louis and its supporting battery, that the harbour Gut was once again protected by two forts.

Furthermore, the return of the company at Placentia in 1751 shows an increase from 40 men in 1746 to 56 infantry and 21 artillerymen (Hamilton 1751). While this still

represents a relatively small number of men garrisoned at Placentia, it does indicate that since 1744 there had been a significant increase in its relative strength. As well, it appears that this increase was not just a temporary measure as a return from September of 1754 reported the presence of 57 privates and 18 artillerymen (Hamilton 1754). Another return from 1755 reported the same number of men on strength, with the exception of one Gunner (Dorrill 1755).

This increased and apparently sustained improvement to the strength of the garrison at Placentia was well timed. The fickleness of European and colonial politics was not yet done with Placentia. Far away in the Ohio Valley the clash of British and French trading interests led once more to war, dragging all English and French colonial possessions into the conflict. On November 14, 1754, King George II announced to the British Parliament his determination to protect his possessions in America. Then in May 1756, Great Britain declared war on France and the next month France returned the favour. The Seven Years' War had begun. Since Louisbourg had once again arisen following the siege of 1744, the English were well aware that Placentia, along with the rest of Newfoundland, was a potential target of the enemy. It clearly needed better defences. While an improvement in the strength of the existing garrison at Placentia certainly would have been valuable in the event of such an attack, it did not represent the most significant development made to the defences of Placentia during this period. Instead, it was the construction of yet another fort, bringing the total of major defensive structures in the tiny colony to three. Unable to maintain two forts, the British apparently decided to add a third. Perhaps it would fare better than its predecessors.

The idea for a third fort lay in Leonard Smelt's report. True, he had suggested that the static defences at Placentia should be abandoned. In the event that idea was rejected and it was determined that the colony was to remain garrisoned, however, Smelt had provided a number of recommendations to improve the current fortifications. In these recommendations, he had mentioned modifications to the New Fort. More importantly, he had indicated that the old French Fort Royal on Castle Hill should be reoccupied and a new redoubt constructed outside of it in order to command the seaward approaches to the harbour and to prevent an attacking enemy from capturing the high ground and firing down into the New Fort and Fort Frederick (Smelt 1751). This suggestion appears to have received some traction because in 1757 exactly what Smelt had proposed was taken up by others.

In August of that year Richard Dawson, an Engineer, wrote to the Lords of Trade echoing Smelt's earlier recommendations. In his report, he outlined that it was imperative that Castle Hill be occupied as, "an Enemy should make themselves Master of [it], with a few guns they would oblige the Garrison to surrender, having no shelter from their Fire" (Edwards 1757). Also, in 1757, Richard Edwards, now Governor of Newfoundland, repeated this plea that resources be committed to rebuilding Fort Royal saying that, "some small fortification on the said Hill where the Castle formerly stood, which is now in ruins...would if repaired and a battery with prevent any ship from coming into the road...The expense of which would be trifling in Comparison to the Advantage" (Principal Officers of the Garrison at Placentia 1757). Edwards also recommended that a new barracks should be built in the still half finished New Fort, making new quarters for

the garrison “in case an Enemy, should suddenly Land in the night time” (Principal Officers of the Garrison at Placentia 1757). This proposed refocusing of the defences of the colony onto the northern side of the Gut represented a major change in the tactics employed at Placentia. As sound as the arguments were, it was not until a major catastrophe befell the English in Newfoundland that these recommendations were transformed into action.

In the interim, Louisbourg fell again in 1758 to the English. Anxious to take control of all New France, General Wolfe pushed on into the St. Lawrence the next year, taking control of Quebec City, followed the next year with the capitulation of Montreal. In the other theatres of the war in North America the French did little better. But, the larger European Seven Year’s War was not over. After the fall of Montreal, France made a fresh attempt to regain some of those territories she had lost to Great Britain. The first point of attack was not Louisbourg or Montreal or Quebec City. It was St. John’s.

In the spring of 1762 the unthinkable happened. The French captured the poorly defended St. John’s, making Placentia once again the capital of Newfoundland. With St. John’s in enemy hands, the English, under the direction of Governor Thomas Graves, were faced with the task of having to quickly prepare the decrepit defences of Placentia in case of further French attack. Graves left a record of his plans of how to accomplish this feat. The most important passages follow:

...Fort Frederick where the garrison is, stands on the south side of the entrance to the harbour on a Tongue of Sand, it has an irregular front towards the Sea where is some good 18 pounders mounted, but the back is only piqueted, and can make but little Defence against the Land...

...On the other side of the entrance is the foundation of a New Fort which was never finished, it had two very good ramparts next the sea which only want Platforms to be fit for Cannon. The other two sides for it is square has only Piqueting and might soon be made more defensible than Fort Frederick. There is a magazine and three pretty good Barracks in it, with room enough to erect as many as will quarter four companies, and as more barracks should be erected to contain the Troops within ye Fort it will cost no more to erect these in the New Fort than in Fort Frederick...

...I would propose to remove the Garrison to the other side and destroy the old Fort. The garrison would then be still mutually to aid and receive protection from a eminence which must at all events be maintain'd as it commands both Forts (Graves 1762).

This plan to abandon Fort Frederick and concentrate on preparing the New Fort and Fort Royal , now called Castle Graves in honour of the Governor, does not appear to have been carried out as planned and certainly did not result in the destruction of Fort Frederick (Proulx 1979b: 142). What it does seem to indicate is that all three forts at Placentia were still being utilized at this time. That said, the sudden attention paid to the defences of Placentia was short lived, as the English retook St. John's later that same year. The threat once again vanished, which may account for why the full extent of Graves' plan was not carried out (Proulx 1979b: 142). With the signing of the *Treaty of*

Paris in February of 1763, the Seven Year's War came to an end and the defences of Placentia began a long, slow descent into total neglect and eventual abandonment.

3.8 DECLINE AND FALL

Beginning as early as 1764 calls were made for Placentia to be abandoned by the military and although these voices remained on the periphery for the time being they eventually lead to the end of Placentia's military life (Penny 2009: 29). Initially it remained occupied but the garrison was clearly allowed to slip into a rapid decline. In September of 1764, Sir Hugh Palliser, the new Governor of Newfoundland, found the garrison at Placentia to be in total disarray and reported to the Lords of Trade that:

When I came to Placentia I found eleven Men at large, part of that Garrison had deserted a few days before, with their arms, accouterments & regimentals, supposed to be gone to St. Pierre. I found one man in Irons for treasonable expressions, & positively refusing to do duty; such Behaviour in old soldiers, who have served with reputation in War, is very extraordinary (Smelt 1751).

The reason for this misbehaviour seems to be general neglect and a lack for supplies. Palliser also stated that, "On landing I received the inclosed petition from the soldiers of the Garrison...for the want of food in the most inclement Post in His Majesties Domain" (Smelt 1751). This neglect seems strange as there was at least enough interest in

defending Placentia that the prewar increase in the strength of the garrison had been maintained, the returns for that year listing 52 men of the 45th regiment and 23 more from Captain Dovers' Company of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery (Smelt 1751).

Despite the continued presence of the enlarged garrison, the decline of the defences continued rapidly. By 1769, the Principal Officers of the Ordinance reported to the Master General of Ordinance that the, "Fortress of Placentia is of little or no use" (Smelt 1751). He went so far as to recommend that the post be abandoned asking, "whether you have any, and if any...objections to that fortress being dismantled and the stores removed to St. John's (Smelt 1751). This report may not be entirely trustworthy as it insinuates that no work had been conducted to maintain the defences of the colony since Smelt's 1751 report, which is clearly inaccurate. Indeed, through the 1750s and 1760s various efforts had been made to make the New Fort defensible and Fort Royal/Castle Graves had been rebuilt in 1762 (Smelt 1751).

By 1772, the condition of the forts as well as the state of the garrison were even worse than three years earlier. In his *Report of the State and Condition the Fortifications of Placentia, together with my opinion of the Utility thereof*, Governor Molyneux Shuldham provided a detailed outline of their condition:

Opposite Fort Frederick...a new Fort was begun some years ago, two sides of which were _____ finish, & one Barrack, before the impropriety of its Situation was pointed out to Government, when after a very great Expense

all further proceedings were suddenly countermanded; The Inhabitants of the town of Placentia have plundered at different times the Barrack floors, Doors & Windows, & the walls of the fort are now beginning to tumble down...

I do not think that this Garrison, or any other that may be erected [will be as effective as] a Moveable fortification. Therefore while Great Britain preserves her superiority at Sea I shall be sorry to see the Public Money squandered away ...where from the intenseness of the Frosts and Severity of the Climate the Repairs must be infinite (Shuldham 1772).

Worse yet, Shuldham also found the soldiers in the garrison to be totally ineffective as "Troops cannot act above Five Months in the Year, and the other seven totally useless and by Idleness, Drunkenness and Irregularity rendered unfit for further Service (Shuldham 1772).

What is interesting to note is that, despite the poor condition of the defences, Shuldham did comment that Placentia still represented a site of major strategic value to the English:

...Placentia, from the Convenience of the Road and the safety of the Harbour, has assumed the superiority of a Capital over the many small Harbours and Coves in the extensive Bay of the name and others situated further to the westward. Custom and Confidence in the Fortifications, have confirmed this pre-eminence, and now all the Fishery carried on at this side of the Island is supplied from this Magazine with stores and Provisions and while the Trade runs thro this Channel it appears reasonable that the Adventurers ought not to be disappointed in their

confidences nor by a total neglect of the Fortifications their Property be suffered to be Exposed and undefended.... (Shuldham 1772).

How the decrepit and poorly manned forts of Placentia encouraged confidence in the locals is beyond our knowledge today. Nevertheless, this summary of Placentia's importance to the local economy and the defence of the population does illustrate why, in spite of the many calls for its dismantling, the garrison was still in place. Regardless, what small efforts were being made to maintain some kind of military presence in the colony soon came to an end.

The year 1775 began badly for the garrison. On September 25th a strong gale blew in and did significant damage to Fort Frederick with:

Both Gates being Blown down, and shivered to pieces, with several scores of Palisadoes and Carried fairly out to Sea, and the Barracks half-full of water...Our Flag Stag was likewise blown down, and broken to pieces, with everything belonging to it. The Buildings have not suffered but in the shingling, but the Ordnance Stores, and the Victualling Storehouses lay now so open to the sea, that we are afraid the heavy seas in Winter, and the Floating Ice in the Spring, will undermined their Foundation and carry the whole away”
(Jervais Gossard and William Baker, Quoted in Penny 2009: 31)

There was some hope that this damage would lead to new improvements being made to the fortifications as once again war broke out, this time between the New England colonies and England. There were renewed cries for permanent fortifications to

be built. The Engineer Officer Robert Pringle stated just a month after the gale that damaged Fort Frederick that, “The defenceless state of every harbour in this Country except St. John’s exposes them without the smallest prospect of assistance, to every piratical attempt-however inconsiderable from the continent” and that due to the “impracticability of blocking up the whole coast of North America , so as to prevent an armed sloop of 10 guns from escaping thro’ the fogs that surround it,” defences had to be built in the major settlements throughout Newfoundland (Pringle 1776).

Pringles’ assessment of the tactics needed to keep the coastal communities of Newfoundland safe, clearly differed from those espoused by Smelt and numerous others who argued that the Royal Navy was the best solution for defending the colony. Although Pringles’ reasoning appears sound, and was proven correct based on the subsequent French raid in 1796 on Bay Bulls, it does not seem to have gained much traction with the English government. The defences of Placentia continued to decline (Proulx 1979b: 155) A half-hearted attempt was made to make Fort Frederick more defensible in 1776 (Canada 1962) but this work was very limited. Pringle reported that same year that Fort Frederick had no gunpowder, as “the magazine at Placentia cannot be kept dry” and noted once again that, “the Fortifications are not in a State of Defence” (Pringle 1776, Quoted in Penny 2009:31). By the end of the decade, not only were the forts essentially useless, but the garrison was also reduced to just 40 men (Proulx 1979b: 155). The writing was on the wall for Placentia as a military outpost.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the military presence at Placentia was truly entering its last days. In 1805, Captain George Ross drafted his *Report Upon the*

Defences of Placentia Newfoundland and made it clear just how minimal the military presence was:

Of the numerous traces of fortifications at this place – the old fort called Fort Frederick alone is at present occupied. The others are scarce to be discerned. The expense attending this Post seems to exceed its utility; and upon its present establishment it is far from being effective...A Corporal & four men of the Royal Artillery are stationed here – and there is occasionally a recruiting party of an officer and a few men from the Regiment at St.John's...This battery not more than thirty feet above the sea is surrounded by commanding heights & is therefore to be considered barely serviceable for the protection of the Town and harbour against shipping – which I presume is as much as is necessary to provide for the fishery should it in the event of an American War become a place of refuge (Gower 1805).

With such a pathetic garrison it is not surprising that Governor Gower recorded that, “I am clearly of [the] opinion that a fortification so ineffective ... be attended with no advantage whatsoever” (Gower 1805). Gower and those before him who had wanted the military to leave Placentia soon had their wishes granted. In April 1811, the British began the dismantling of the garrison and the following year the land was rented out for civilian use (Proulx 1979b: 156).

By 1811, Placentia had been the site of European military occupation for almost 150 years. Both the French and the English had struggled to build fortifications adequate to the task of defending the settlement and both had met with only moderate success at best. Soon the memory of Placentia's important place in the colonial military history of

Newfoundland was forgotten and the colony became just one of the many small fishing communities on the Avalon Peninsula. Only in recent years has the importance of Placentia's military history again become a topic of interest. This is surely a good thing.

3.9 THE DEFENCES TODAY

Today the defences of Placentia are little more than banks of earth, noticeable only to those with a knowledge of the colony's military past. Castle Hill has undergone extensive excavation and stabilization and is now a Parks Canada National Historic Site. Fort Frederick is essentially invisible marked only by a small plaque and soon may be threatened by the construction of a new bridge across the Placentia Gut. The site of Fort Louis and the New Fort is approximately 50 meters off Main Road in Placentia and is marked by signage. The area is owned, in majority, by the Town of Placentia though some areas of known occupation are under private ownership. What land the town does exercise ownership over was most recently utilized as a softball field. Today it is vacant land, left aside by the historically and culturally conscious Town Council.

Archaeological excavations have been undertaken at the site of Fort Louis and the New Fort since 2002, with the exception of 2005 and work was supervised by, in order of succession, Amanda Crompton, Steve Mills, David Fry and Matthew Simmonds. These excavations, funded jointly by Services Canada, the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador and the Town of Placentia, have uncovered a great deal of the New Fort, including its powder magazine, the Governor's Quarters and several parts of the bastions

and walls (Fry 2009). Much less of Fort Louis has been positively identified and further excavation is required before its outline and internal buildings can be identified. Today the project continues under the supervision of Mr. Simmonds and future field seasons as well as additional funding opportunities are planned.

Chapter 4: The New Fort as Designed

To the average observer all forts serve the same basic function: to act, for their builders, as defensive structures to ward off possible attack by an enemy. While this simple understanding of a fort's purpose is essentially correct, it is very much an oversimplification. Function, design and various external factors are intertwined. All must be considered when examining the physical elements of a fortification. By the eighteenth century, the design and construction of fortifications in Europe had taken on the characteristics of a science with complex rules and theories. That said, these principles were applied with a great deal of situational flexibility, especially by the English who generally lagged behind their European counterparts in this field.

The following discussion of the design of the New Fort is, in part, devoted to describing these standardized methods of fortification and to examining how they were implemented in this particular case. However, such an examination of the technical design features of the New Fort is not provided solely to establish factual details. It also provides a framework in which a discussion can take place about what the design features may reveal about factors influencing the decisions and actions of the English designers who were responsible for the fortifying of Placentia in the 1700s. This approach to interpreting the external factors that influenced the actions of the designers of the New Fort is possible because of the high degree of standardization that distinguished eighteenth-century European fortification design and construction and the fact that the English generally subscribed to these standards.

To achieve a clear and logical description and analysis of the New Fort's design, this chapter is divided into several subsections. First, there is an overview of the history of European fortifications in the 1700s, providing a basic understanding of the models upon which forts like the New Fort were based during the age of imperialism. Next, there is a detailed description of the New Fort in terms of how its design would have been understood by contemporary military engineers and commanders. This section examines a number of roughly contemporary texts on military architecture and tactics and then applies this information to historic maps and archaeological evidence from the New Fort. As well, a number of more recent academic texts on modern era European military architecture have been consulted. The objective is to produce a description of New Fort utilizing language and definitions common to the period of construction.

It is worth mentioning that the majority of these plans of the New Fort were actually created after construction had begun. However, they may still serve as representation of what the English had planned before construction had begun as the New Fort was never completed. As it was never completed, the plans must represent the intended 'as completed' form of the fort and, therefore, in the absence of any plans dating before the construction process began are our best available source for exactly what the English had had in mind when they began construction.

The next section is devoted to interpreting the New Fort design in terms of what the structural information reveals about the factors which influenced the decisions made by those agents responsible for creating it in the age of British imperialism. Within this section, there is a discussion of the distinct factors which influenced the design of the

New Fort. Broadly speaking these are twofold: military considerations and environmental realities. It should be noted that an ideal discussion of these factors would included some details regarding the Royal Engineers who were involved in the New Forts construction as it would have been their task to actually execute the design and construction of fortifications in the field. Sadly, no evidence regarding the identity of the individual or individuals responsible for the initial construction of the New Fort are available and as such a discussion of the influence of the Royal Engineers has been omitted from this examination.

In closing, there is a brief conclusion summarizing what the design and construction of New Fort reveals to modern day historians and archaeologists about the construction practices and military objectives of the 1700s, about the external factors that influenced the various agents who planned and carried out the plans for New Fort and the defence of Placentia and about the motivations of not only the designers and builders but also the governments and the military officials of the day in terms of the place of Placentia in the complex history of British Imperialism and Colonialism.

4.1 EUROPEAN FORTIFICATION AND SOURCES FOR ITS STUDY

The introduction of heavy ordinance onto the battlefields of Europe during the fifteenth century began a revolution in fortification and combat throughout Europe, one that sparked ongoing innovation and adaptation in methods of fortification over the next 200 years (Brice 1984: 101-102). By the seventeenth century, there was much talk about

the need to codify the standards for the use of heavy ordinance such as siege guns and cannons and the resulting methods of defending a fortified place against the increasingly heavy bombardments. Military engineers, mathematicians and philosophers put forward views on how fortifications could be better built to handle the advances in heavy artillery such as new combustible propellants and ignition mechanisms, as well as the rapidly ballooning size of professional infantry-based armies (Brice 1984: 115). By the eighteenth century, an age marked by Newtonian Science and Scientific Methodology, some standardization had occurred and a plethora of technical terms, definitions and theories for designing and constructing fortifications emerged. Martin Brice has gone so far as to say that, “from now on the story of military architecture becomes a babel of technical terms and bizarre geometry” (Brice 1984: 115).

One of the most important names associated with seventeenth-century European fortifications is that of the Marquis de Vauban. One of France’s foremost military engineers, Vauban was well known for involvement in numerous fortification construction projects under the rule of Louis XIV of France. His contribution to the field was not so much in the area of innovation, but rather in promoting the widespread standardization of practices, terminology and design (Brice 1984: 119-120). Combining his knowledge as an engineer and his practical military experience on the ground, having participated in many sieges, Vauban suggested and systematized ways fortresses could be constructed to better prolong resistance and ward off frontal attacks. To this end, he advocated things such as tower bastions and parallel trenches at approaches. In fact, many modern day writers regard Vauban’s ideas and teachings to have remained central to the

discipline of military architecture until the mid-nineteenth century when the introduction of more powerful rifled and breach loading guns caused a new wave of innovation in the field of military architecture (Hughes 1974; Hogg 1975; Brice 1984). Vauban's role as the touch stone for military engineers in the eighteenth century is also clear in numerous texts on the principles of military architecture written by contemporary authors like C.W. Pasley, H. Straith and J. Muller, who went out of their way to mention that their works were essentially new interpretations of Vauban's (Muller 1757; Pasley 1822; Straith 1833).

The principles of fortification design and construction put forward by Vauban, while capable of fending off the bombardments of massed artillery and of surviving prolonged sieges, showed little regard for expense (Brice 1984: 121-122). War was a costly undertaking for any country and many simply were not capable of funding the kinds of reinforced works Vauban proposed. His successors, in France, for example, were far more constrained in terms of the scale of their proposed defences because their budgets were critically under stress by the early 1800s (Brice 1984: 120-122). In light of the often limited amount of money, construction material and man power usually associated with the early stages of a colonial settlement and protection, the reality was that no matter how strong Vauban's ideas were in principle, the complex rules of European fortification that he and others proposed generally needed to be simplified when put into practice (Hughes 1974: 145).

While the French of this period appeared to be advancing in the areas of military engineering innovation and the implementation of new fortification systems, the British

generally lagged behind their continental contemporaries. This was largely due to the fact that Britain, because of her natural water walls that surrounded the island, had little need for the massive land locked style fortresses which dominated the European landscape (Hughes 1974: 145). In some ways this deficiency in the ways fortification construction evolved proved to be beneficial when it came to constructing forts in overseas colonial territories like Canada and Newfoundland. Having never truly undertaken grand scale projects utilizing all the principles of fortification put forward by those such as Vauban, the English did not feel bound by such conventions. Consequently, they were probably more flexible about adapting quickly to the realities of building fortifications on the colonial periphery where limited resources and man power necessitated resorting to simplified defensive systems (Hughes 1974: 145). It is this kind of adaptation to the particular needs and environmental conditions of specific colonial settings which are of interest in the design and construction of the New Fort at Placentia.

Before detailing the design of the New Fort, it is important to understand something about the sources which have been relied upon for information on the fortification terminology used at the time and the functions of the various features which will be identified. Although written after the designing and construction of the New Fort, one of the most valuable resources for discussing English fortifications of this period is the work of John Muller written in the second half of the eighteenth century. Muller was a Professor of Artillery and Fortification at the British Military Academy in Woolwich. His numerous writings ranged from such important topics as theories for measuring the amount of black powder in a cylinder to calculating the thickness of a masonry wall

required to hold back set amounts of earth. However, for the purposes of this discussion his most important works are *A treatise containing the practical part of fortification* published in 1755, *A treatise containing the elementary part of fortification, regular and irregular* reprinted 1799 and *The attack and defence of fortify'd places* released in 1757. While Muller was writing after Vauban, he made it clear that much of the original material for his writings was drawn from Vauban's theories and practices. It, therefore, seems reasonable to use both Mueller's and Vauban's works to derive examples of contemporary European fortification techniques.

In addition to Muller's works, two documentary sources from the first half of the nineteenth century have also been consulted. These are the 1822 publication, *A Course of Elementary Fortification*, by Lieutenant-Colonel C.W. Pasley of the Royal Engineers and the 1833 publication, *A treatise on Fortification: with observations on the increased effects of artillery* by Major Hector Straith, Professor of Fortification and Artillery at the Honourable East India Company's Military Seminary at Addiscombe. These works, although published respectively some 80 and 90 years after the New Fort was constructed, are still well suited as references for describing the design of the New Fort for two reasons. The first is that the terminology and techniques of fortification had changed very little during the decades between the design of the New Fort and the publication of Pasley's and Straith's books. In fact, both writers made explicit mention of their continued debt to the ideas of Vauban and Muller (Pasley 1822, Straith 1833).

The second and somewhat more pragmatic reason is that the writings of Pasley and Straith are better organized and more clearly written than those of their seventeenth

and eighteenth-century predecessor, Muller. With the many complicated technical terms and distinctions which define the numerous components of European fortifications during this time, the ability to quickly comprehend the differences between and the particular purposes of each is very important. These sources are simply better suited for allowing the modern reader to do so. That said, Straith's work did make reference to some of the changes which were starting to occur in fortification during his time, but these references are explicit to particular situations and, therefore, can be easily discounted for the purposes of this discussion. It should also be noted that there are a number of modern sources available for determining the exact meaning of the many military architectural terms from this period, terms which will be used in this study.

4.2 THE NEW FORT AS DESIGNED

In the very simplest terms the New Fort can be described as a having a rectangular outline and five interior buildings. However, this description falls short of providing any insight into why this fort was built, where it was built or why it was designed the way it was. To answer these questions and to address what the motivations behind the decisions made in terms of these questions require a much more detailed description of the New Fort.

The New Fort's exterior measurements were approximately 102 m by 80 m, producing a rectangular outline. This horizontal profile is properly referred to as "the trace", a term basically synonymous with the modern concept of a building's footprint

(Last 1998: 17). The actual physical walls corresponding to the trace, referred to as “the enceinte”, can consist of several different components, but in the case of the New Fort only two were present. These two components are called “bastions” and “curtains” (Geier 2011: 233). Bastions are projections of the enceinte and are a staple of sixteenth-, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century fortifications. The New Fort had four, one at each of its corners (Pasley 1822: 5). Connecting these bastions are long straight walls which are properly referred to as curtains, of which the New Fort also had four (Pasley 1822: 5). These two components, bastions and curtains, were present in most European fortifications of this period and formed the core around which all military architecture was constructed (Pasley 1822:5). These features, however, in and of themselves, reveal nothing about the vertical nature of the New Fort. To gain that perspective one must look to the ramparts.

4.3 THE CURTAIN RAMPARTS

The vertical profile of the enceinte is called “the ramparts”, a term which applies to both bastions and curtains (Pasley 1822: 3). All of the available information about the ramparts of the New Fort is specific to the fort’s long curtain walls. Therefore, for the remainder of this section the term ramparts will be used to refer exclusively to these defensive elements. The ramparts of the New Fort are best discussed as two matching pairs. The first pair was the much thicker pair and faced south and west. The second, thinner pair faced north and east. Eighteenth-century military engineers conceived

ramparts as being made up of several different components. A plan of these components is presented in profile format below (Muller 1799: 46). These profiles are essentially cross-sections of the ramparts showing the relative size of each component. Just such a plan exists of the New Fort's thicker ramparts.




Figure 4.1: Cross Section of a curtain wall showing important features

The most important sections of the rampart are the talus, the terreplein, the parapet and the scarp, each indicated on the above tracing (Pasley 1822: 15) The “talus” is the interior slope of the wall as it descends from the top of the rampart to ground level, usually at at least a 45 degree decline. It was usually made of earth (Last 1998: 16). Above this was the “terreplein”, the flat area on the top of the rampart where men and artillery rested in order to fire out of the fort at an enemy (Pasley 1822: 16). On the outward facing side of the rampart, the terreplein gave way to a raised section of the wall designed to provide cover from enemy fire for the men and equipment located on the rampart. This area was called the “parapet” (Last 1998: 14). Finally, the outward face of the rampart, from the bottom of the parapet down to the level of the exterior ground was

called the “scarp” (Pasley 1822:24). Scarps were often made of stone and in such cases the name for the stone wall of the scarp was a “revetment” (Pasley 1822:24). Each of these defined sections comprised numerous other related parts that were found in a variety of sizes determined by their relationship to one another.

The southern and western ramparts of the New Fort are better documented in the available plans of the New Fort than those to the north and east. These two ramparts appear to have been essentially the same in terms of their constructions and overall dimensions. Below (figure 4.2) is a copy of the only known profile of these ramparts as well as a modern tracing provided above the profile to help make it easier to distinguish the different interior components.




Figure 4.2 : Original and tracing of the New Fort's Rampart drawn from "Plan of the New Fort At Placentia Now Erecting At Placentia, Nfld." (See Appendix 2)

These ramparts were very substantial in size, being just less than 13.5 m thick at their base and almost 3.5 meters from their base to their highest point. The exterior faces of these ramparts were intended to have a masonry scarp revetment sloped at approximately 15 degrees and about 1.4 m at its thickest point. The interior slope of the wall or talus was also to be revetted, but with a much less severe slope of approximately 7 degrees, which mean that this area of the wall is not a talus proper. As such it should be thought of simply as a place holder for a talus or as a kind of proto-talus. Regardless of what terminology is used to describe this area, it was to have been much thinner than the scarp, measuring at just less than 1 m in thickness at its base.

Between the interior and exterior walls the usual practice was to pack in compressed layers of earth and occasionally small sticks. This filling was designed to act as backfill for the rampart. The available plans for the New Fort do not explicitly call for this kind of backfill, but based on the common British practices of the period, it seems likely that this was the intention of the designers. Also, one can make the same assumption based on the fact that the interior of the rampart shown in the profile is shaded differently than any of the other components, thus suggesting a change of some kind in the composition (Duffy 1996: 52).

The foundations of these revetments were also very substantial and appear to have been designed in three distinct courses. The scarp revetment's foundations are larger than those of the talus. This was probably due to the larger size of the structure. It was to have

been offset to the exterior of the revetment by about .12 m and was designed to descend 1.2 m below ground level. In addition, the exterior side of the foundation was very slightly sloped outward, while the interior side appears to have been left perpendicular to ground level. Similarly, the smaller talus revetment foundation was to be slightly sloped, but on both the interior and exterior sides. This talus appears to have been much shallower, as well, as it was only to project .35 m below the ground. The thickness was much less than that of the scarp revetment foundation, measuring just 1.2 m in width with an offset of .12 m on both the interior and exterior sides.

There is one further point of interest regarding the design of the ramparts. According to one set of plans, at least some areas were intended to have casemates, or vaulted bombproof chambers, in their interior as seen in the below image (Last 1998: 5). However, the intended location of these proposed casemates is not clear nor is there any indication of how many there were to be constructed.




Figure 4.3: Casemates shown in "*Plan of the New Fort At Placentia Now Erecting At Placentia, Nfld.*" (See Appendix 2)

Atop these quite massive ramparts there was to be a parapet and a terreplein. The terreplein was about 5.25 m wide and about 2.7 m above ground level at its outward facing edge, although it did slope toward the interior of the fort at about 5 degrees. Directly in front of the terreplein, on the exterior side of the rampart was the parapet. The New Fort's parapet was not very high, appearing to rise only about .7 m above the terreplein. The interior of the parapet, usually called the interior slope, was to be constructed of masonry and was designed to stand 90 degrees to the ground level and to be about 0.5 m thick (Pasley 1822: 19-20). From the exterior edge of the interior slope, the parapet descended at about 9 degrees to the top edge of the scarp revetment. The plans suggest that this was intended to be built of earth.

It is worth noting that it is in the design of the parapet that the southern and western ramparts notably differ (See Appendix 2). The western rampart's parapet was essentially a continual, unchanging slope of earth with no distinguishing features, over which a battery of 12 guns was to be sited. The southern rampart's parapet was very different. It had eight narrow openings, or "embrasures", through which cannons were to be sited and fired (Geier 2011: 233). It seems likely that the southern parapet was intended to be taller than the western one because at just 0.4 m in height there appears to be no purpose for there to have been embrasures cut into such a low feature. However, there are no available plans illustrating the proposed height of this embrasured parapet,

thus making it impossible to know for certain whether the southern parapet was designed with the intent of being taller than the unembrasured western parapet. Also, it is interesting to note that some plans of the New Fort do not show these embrasures on the southern parapet at all (See Appendix 3).

Unfortunately, the northern and eastern ramparts of the New Fort are not as well documented as the larger southern and eastern ramparts. No profiles of these ramparts are available. The trace plans of the fort (See Appendix 2 and 3), however, do provide some valuable information. As already mentioned, these two ramparts were designed to be much smaller than those to the south and west. In fact, judging from the available plans of the New Fort, they were to be just 3.4 m thick. Despite their comparatively diminutive size, it seems likely, based on a comparison of how they are represented on the plans with how the other ramparts were, that they both had a parapet, a terreplein and a kind of proto-talus, just as one would expect. Of course, these features were much smaller than those on the southern and eastern ramparts, the terreplein being just 1.7 m wide and the parapet and talus both being about .85 m in width. Also, while not expressly clear, it seems likely that these ramparts were envisioned as being roughly the same height as their much wider counterparts. Unfortunately, again there is no way of knowing this for certain. One feature of particular note, however, is the gate placed in the centre of the eastern rampart. This gate is represented differently on almost all of the plans so it is difficult to say much about the details of its design. However, the fact that it was placed in this location is worth noting for later discussion.

4.4 THE BASTIONS

Unfortunately, the designs for the bastions of the New Fort are not depicted on available plans in the same amount of detail as are the ramparts. In fact, there is no information pertaining to their height and nothing about the vertical features. Nevertheless, it is possible to ascertain some information about a number of important horizontal measurements from what plans are available (See Appendix 2 and 3). In particular, it appears that all of the bastions had a parapet of just under 0.2 m in width and a scarp revetment similar in thickness to the northern and eastern ramparts.

In addition to these limited details, there are several features that are unique to bastions which can help in developing a better picture of the bastion at the New Fort. In particular, three sets of measurements of the bastions can be ascertained from the available plans (See Appendix 2 and 3). These include the lengths of the walls, the angles of their salients and the size of their interiors. In general, the walls of a bastion are divided into flanks. These walls connect to the curtain walls of the fort. The faces connect to the flank walls. The curtain walls and flank walls then meet each other to make the point of the bastion (Pasley 1996: 8-9). All bastions have a left and right flank and a face. The angles at which these walls meet each other and meet the curtain walls are given specific terms. The angle where the left and right face meet is called the "salient angle" or the point of the bastion. The positions at which the faces meet the flanks are called the "shoulders" of the bastion. The points at which the flanks meet the curtain of the fort are

called the “angles of the flank” or the re-entry angle (Pasley 1822: 7-9). Finally, the interior measurements of a bastion are referred to as the “gourge”, which is the distance between the two flank angles, and the “capitol”, which is the distance from the centre of the gorge to the salient angle (Pasley 1996: 9).

All of these measurements are available for the New Fort’s bastions. Although there are small discrepancies in the measurements found on the various plans, they are so minor that they do not really impact one’s understanding of the overall design of the fort. All of the bastions had left and right flanks measuring about 5.7 m in length. All met the flank angle at about 90 degrees. The left and right faces of the bastions were about 11.75 m in length which resulted in the shoulders of the bastions measuring about 95 degrees and the salient angles about 80 degrees. The gorge of all the bastions was about 2.5 m long and the capitol was about 12.6 m long. While these measurements are very important, they unfortunately represent the extent of the factual details that can be derived from existing plans with respect to the design of the New Fort’s bastions.

4.5 INTERIOR STRUCTURES

Finding details about the interior structures is even more difficult than the exterior features. The interior buildings are the least well documented. This is interesting as it may shed some light on the relative importance in which the New Fort’s builders held the construction of the enceinte compared to the interior structures. Some things are known, however about the interior. It is clear from all of the available plans (See Appendix 2 and

3) that the New Fort was to have five buildings clustered into two groups, one to the North and other to the South, placed around a large open parade ground. In the north were to be the quarters for the keepers and gunners as well as the storehouse and the powder magazine. In the south were to be built the soldiers' barracks and the quarters for the Governor and officers. Beyond this basic foot print and layout of these structures, it is difficult to ascertain much more about their design. However, it is worth mentioning that all of the structures designed for human habitation were to have very large hearth features for heating and possibly cooking. Also, the storehouse along with the quarters for the Governor and officers and those for the storekeeper's and gunner's all appear to have been designed with two stories as indicated by the presence of staircases in their floor plans.

There were also some variations in the intended designs of the interior structures as there are some noteworthy differences between the various plans for the New Fort. For example, some plans show a small guard house located directly north of the soldiers' barracks while others have no indication of a guard house. In another example, there is one plan that shows completely different designs for the soldiers' barracks and the Governor's and Officers' quarters than appear in any of the other available documents.

One distinctive feature of most of the plans for the New Fort is that there is little indication of what materials the various structures were to be built. One has to rely somewhat on the general practices of the period. For instance, contemporary military architectural thought was that when possible powder magazines and barracks should be built of stone in the hopes of protecting the garrison from the dangers of incoming enemy

ordinance as well as to provide dry storage and ventilation of the powder they were to hold (Duffy 1996). However, the construction of such masonry buildings was often one of the factors which contributed to the huge expenses associated with fortification projects of this period, so it is possible that in the case of the New Fort they may have been destined to be built of wood or alternatively some could have been built of stone and others of wood (Duffy 1996: 29). The plans themselves are not at all helpful in addressing this aspect of construction.

4.6 ANALYSIS OF THE NEW FORT'S DESIGN

Now that the design of the New Fort has been described in a way in which contemporary military engineers would have understood it, it is possible to analyse its features to see what they can tell us about what military concerns were paramount in the minds of its designers. While doing this it is important to keep in mind that the creation of New Fort was inextricably intertwined with that of Placentia and its place in the imperial struggles between France and England in eighteenth-century North America. As such, for the purposes of this analysis, military concerns are defined as the threat of force from a group of individuals foreign to the local community and the efforts made to prevent the application of such force from causing harm. Specifically, this refers to the threat of an armed attack by an enemy, whom the English likely envisioned to be the French, while designing and constructing the fort.

In order to conduct this analysis, traditional military thought regarding the purposes of various military architectural features in the event of an attack is applied to the specifics of the designs for the New Fort. This analysis starts with a brief outline of the reasons why the fort was designed in the first place and why it was determined it should be built in the location that was selected. Next there is an assessment of the particular features in terms of military and imperial motivations, expectations and common practice.

In general, European forts of the 1700s were built in locations which allowed their occupiers to control routes of passage and trade and/or to serve as protection for local communities and their economic resources. These sites usually included mountain passes, river fords and harbours (Duffy 1996: 25-26). The motivations to control routes of passage and to protect imperial or domestic settlements are referred to as “strategic considerations”. These considerations include things like valuable economic resources, imperial land possession and the ability to defeat or, at least, manage competition or more importantly military threat. Strategy, therefore, was the ‘big picture’ of warfare and permanent forts, which required considerable time, effort and resources to construct and maintain, were generally only built after considerable premeditated strategic thought had deemed them necessary (Duffy 1996: 25).

In terms of the strategic reasons behind the fortification of Placentia, the available documentary evidence really does seem to speak for itself. In 1731, Governor Gledhill referred to Placentia as “y^e most considerable fishing port in American” (Gledhill 1731a). While this may have been somewhat of an exaggeration, there is no doubt that the

revenue from Placentia and from Newfoundland's fishing industry in general was a huge strategic asset for the English. Certainly, the English believed that the French, their historic enemy both in Europe and North America, would have liked to retrieve their former fishing colony. In fact, evidence shows that even the local inhabitants seemed to share this opinion, stating in a letter written to the governor in 1755, "we are truly sensible that the French are jealous of the possession we have of this place, will attempt to make themselves masters therefore" (Traders and inhabitants of little and greater Placentia and the boatkeepers in adjacent harbours 1744).

Aside from the economic strategic reasons for the fortification of Placentia, the port itself was considered to be a very valuable military asset. In the early 1700s, when the French still occupied the site, Beron de Lahonton reported on the value of the harbour not only to fishing fleets but also to naval vessels:

One could easily draw up 800 ships which the smallest cable could be sufficient to hold in any storm...there is sufficient water from the largest ships in this little strait as well as in the harbour...The fishery is very prolific...the cod dried there wonderfully well..Placentia is the route of the ships that come from France to Canada...so then, in case of need of supplies of masts or of repairs, they can be run into that harbour to remedy them (Lahonton in Gordon 1969)

While the strategic reasons for the English decision for the fortification of Placentia are clear, the reasons behind their particular choice of site and design for the New Fort are much less so. Just because military and/or government officials determined

that a particular site needed to be fortified, did not mean that each and every site was fortified on the same scale or in the same way; not every pass, inlet, harbour or ford warranted a massive fortress. Similarly, not every small fort was capable of protecting a community, depending upon the size of the settlement or its strategic significance. When the powers that be decided that a particular location was important enough to require a garrison, it was often the tactical or local operation level which dictated the shape those fortifications would take (Duffy 1996: 28-29). Questions of available resources, the projected size of the garrison, the climate and the lay of the land all had to be considered (Duffy 1996: 28-29). In particular, the nature of the local topography usually dictated the tactical situation of a given location due to its impact on the mobility of troops and the range of artillery, both of the enemy as well as the defender (Duffy 1996: 30-32). It is with these questions in mind that one has to examine the reasons why the English chose to build the New Fort where they did.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the location of Placentia's New Fort is that it was on Jerseyside on the northern side of the Gut, as can be seen in appendices 1, 4 and 5. This site was effectively a reversal in tactical thought on the part of the British when compared to their decision in 1717 to construct Fort Frederick on the south side of the Gut near the harbour mouth. It meant that the New Fort was, instead, to be built in the same area as the former French fort of Fort Louis. The decision to move to the Fort Louis site is also somewhat perplexing given as Steve Mills has observed, the Fort Louis site was not only lower than that of Fort Frederick but was also very prone to flooding. This is

a fact which continues to be evident in each successive field season of modern day excavation on the New Fort site (Mills Personal Correspondence 2010/2011).

Furthermore, a short distance north of the site of the New Fort is Castle Hill. This was where the French had built the Royal Redoubt but which was bereft of military occupation by the 1740s. The proximity of the hill represented a major tactical issue for the New Fort, a fact which was not lost on English officers much after the construction of the fort had begun. In fact, in 1751, Robert Smelt went so far as to say that the New Fort was within a “pistol shot” of Castle Hill (Smelt 1751). Worse yet, Smelt suggested that because of the presence of Castle Hill, the New Fort had, “been pushed so near the sea to avoid it, as to expose it’s Works to al the Violence of that Element” (Smelt 1751). That said, it is clear that this location must have been chosen for reasons that are less than obvious at first.

The key question which arises from the evidence that the selection of the Fort Louis site might not have been the most viable one is, why? Why did the New Fort’s designers situate the fort where they did? Also, why did they appear to overlook or underestimate the tactical and practical disadvantages? Why did they appear to have consciously ignored the contemporary European fortification principles which dictated that forts should not be built on soft sandy ground because they would, in time, start to sink? Why did they not avoid, as tradition dictated, building on sites surrounded by loose rock, such as those on Placentia’s beaches, which could lead to splintering, causing excessive injury to the structure and the garrison when hit by enemy artillery (Duffy 1996: 30)? Since the Jersey side beach on which the New Fort was built is made up of

cobblestone on top of sand, there must have been a very strong motivation to use this site in spite of its physical detractors. What seems to be the most likely reason is that the English were more concerned with making sure the New Fort would be capable of preventing enemy vessels from approaching the town and fort and stopping them from passing through the Gut into the harbour. To ascertain whether this was the overriding motivation for what appears to be a perplexing choice of site, one must look more closely at the design of the New Fort itself.

The most informative aspect to the New Fort's construction in terms of interpreting what military concerns its creators had in mind when they designed it is the enceinte. The curtain ramparts facing to the west and south were much thicker than those facing to the north and east. From this fact, one can reasonably deduce, based on the principle well established by the Marquis de Vauban, that fortresses should be built in such a way as to ward off the anticipated areas of maximum enemy pressure, the thickest walls on the west and south of New Fort were so designed to handle the brunt of an anticipated enemy bombardment. As well, the gate of the new Fort was located in the centre of the eastern rampart. Here again, based on the fortress design principles established by Vauban and Straith and others, it was common practice for gates to be situated in the middle of the curtain that was least likely to come under heavy enemy fire (Duffy 1996: 84). After all, a gate was in and of itself a weak point in terms of defending the physical perimeter of the fort.

There are other details of the New Fort's design which can be used as indicators in interpreting what the primary military concerns of the fort's designers were. Aside from

simply assuming that the thickest walls of the fort were placed in the areas that were thought to be the most likely to be attacked, the relationship between the fort's artillery and the thickness of its ramparts gives some indication of the kind of attack the English envisioned. According to Christopher Duffy, it was accepted by almost all military engineers of the period that the primary weapons of forts should be 16-24 pounders. This was because these armaments were sufficient to destroy the earthen works of enemy siege artillery or the hulls of enemy vessels (Duffy 1996: 99). For such guns to be mounted, however, it was necessary for a large enough space to be provided on the top of the ramparts for them to be serviced and the wall itself had to be strong enough to withstand the forces of the very heavy guns being fired and moved around. These concerns resulted in a generally accepted minimum width of a rampart bearing cannons to be 40 feet, or 12.2 m (Duffy 1996: 57). While the southern and western ramparts of the New Fort were easily above this minimum, those on the northern and eastern side were not. Consequently one can safely assume that these ramparts were never intended to mount heavy cannon and were never constructed in such a way as to do so. That said, this evidence simply supports what is already evident from the plans themselves, as none of them show gun batteries located on the smaller ramparts. However, other design features of the ramparts provide additional evidence for understanding the military considerations of the New Fort's designers.

As noted, the only significant differences between the southern and western ramparts were the presence of embrasures on the south and a simple parapet on the west. These differences seem to indicate that the designers of the New Fort envisioned the

batteries on these two walls to serve different tactical roles. It is also possible to ascertain what their roles may have been by examining why military engineers generally adopted these distinct features. Specifically, guns were usually set into embrasures when there was a risk that incoming enemy musketry could pick off the gunners serving the pieces of artillery (Straith 1833: 5). While the additional cover offered by the embrasures was useful for the gunners, it did severely limit the line of fire of the guns (Straith 1833: 5-6). By not using embrasures and simply firing over the parapet, which was referred to as “firing en-barbette”, the range firing arcs of the guns were greatly improved. The problem was that, in turn, the gunners were often left with very little cover. As a result, this arrangement was usually only used when the threat of having the gun crews picked off by small arms fire was thought to be minimal (Pasley 1822: 213).

This determination of the kinds and degree of arms fire anticipated may account for the design at the New Fort. These standard practices seem to make the difference in function between the south and western rampart very clear. The western rampart with its guns en-barbette looked out to sea and was likely envisioned as providing long range fire against enemy vessels approaching the town of Placentia. In such cases the threat of enemy small arms fire would have been minimal due to the long range of the artillery. Clearly in such a case, the benefits of having an increased firing arc for the guns of the New Fort would have been the primary concern. However, the southern rampart with its embrasures looking directly across the Placentia Gut could have done nothing to prevent ships from approaching the town. Furthermore, due to the limited arc of fire associated with guns in embrasures, it seems impossible that they could have been used to fire at the

Placentia beach to prevent enemy landings. If this had been the purpose of the southern rampart, it seems much more likely that the guns would have been set en-barbette as the range to the Placentia beach is quite far and the large arc of fire would have been far more effective in warding off enemy attack.

Based on this logic and on traditional practices, it seems most likely that the English outfitted this southern battery with embrasures in anticipation of an enemy vessel attempting to pass through the Gut into the harbour rather than direct enemy attack. Any vessel crossing into the harbour would have had to pass very close to the fort and its crew would likely have been able to fire on the artillerymen serving the guns on the southern rampart with muskets. With this in mind the New Fort's designers decided that it was necessary to provide the most cover they could for the gun crews and placed the gun in embrasures in hopes of doing just that. Also, if this battery was designed specifically to prevent ships traversing the Gut, the limited firing arcs of embrasures would have mattered little due to the passage's short width and length relative to the size of the New Fort and the range of the guns it would likely have mounted.

One remaining point to note is that the accepted thickness of a wall needed to stop a 24 pounder cannon ball was 15 feet, or about 4 meters (Duffy 1996: 59). While the parapets of the southern and western ramparts at about 3.7 m of thickness might have been able to stop such a round, there is no chance that the northern and eastern ramparts, at 3.4 meters at their thickest point, would have been able to do so at all. Again, this seems to indicate that these landward facing walls were simply not designed to stand up

to any determined enemy attack, while the seaward facing walls were designed specifically for that purpose.

Not only do the curtain ramparts appear to indicate that the New Fort was designed almost exclusively to deal with the attack of enemy vessels, but so too do the bastions. The primary purpose of bastions during this period was to provide mutual support and prevent to assure that enemy troops could not get close enough to enter any breaches they managed to inflict in the walls (Duffy 1996: 54). In addition to musketry fire, bastions were usually made large enough that they could site two cannons on both of their flanks to engage close range infantry (Duffy 1996: 65). These often led to very complicated systems of interlocking fire incorporating many bastions, but in the case of the New Fort, the bastions were only able to support their counterparts to the right and then left.

While the presence of a bastion on each corner of the New Fort indicates that its designers were concerned with making sure the English troops would be able to observe and fire down on anyone no matter how close they got to the walls of the fort, they do not detract from the conclusion that the New Fort was designed primarily to fend off a naval attack and could even be argued to be little more than a sea battery. The bastions were relatively small, providing very little room for soldiers who would have been firing down at an approaching enemy. Also the design of the bastions indicates that they were not designed to mount any guns, especially not designed to mount cannon. In fact, in 1751 after seeing the partially completed New Fort, the military engineer Smelt stated that, “the Bastions seem rather to have been intended for sentry boxes than for the defence of the

Fort" (Smelt 1751). This assessment of the New Fort's bastions as observation posts from which to view the lengths of curtain walls seems to lend further weight to the theory that they were not designed in anticipation of a land attack but rather as part of a complex intended to fend off naval aggression.

Aside from the function of holding off enemy naval vessels, there are some indications that the New Fort's designers had other military concerns in mind as well. Specifically, the interior structures of the New Fort represent a major improvement over those present in Fort Frederick, which contained only a small laboratory (small powder magazine), storehouse, officers quarters and a shared barracks for soldiers and gunners. With the addition of separate quarters for artillerymen, the provision for quarters for the Governor and the general enlargement of all the buildings, it seems clear that the New Fort's designers envisioned the New Fort would serve not only as a stronger defensive structure, but also as a better appointed administrative headquarters than its predecessor. The quarters for the officers, men and Governor in Fort Frederick had been inadequate resulting not only in discomfort for the men, but also the billeting of some of the garrison in Placentia itself. This situation had made the fort and the community vulnerable to a surprise attack. It would appear the designers of the New Fort wanted to remedy that fault. They did so by constructing better accommodations thereby removing the entire garrison from the most populated part of the town. Further protection was provided by ringing the entire garrison with a protective wall. This combined role of coastal defence battery and centralized administrative centre seems to represent the most likely military concerns the English had in mind when designing the New Fort.

At least based on the features included in the design of the New Fort this conclusion seems to be a viable one. Interestingly enough, however, the features that appear to be missing also support this conclusion that the primary focus of the fort was to defend against enemy vessels rather than enemy soldiers. There were several common aspects of European military architecture of the 1700s which were not included and their absence speaks volumes about the military concerns weighed by the English while designing the New Fort. The most significant feature which the designers omitted from their plans for the New Fort was a ditch. According to Muller, for any place to be defended effectively against a land attack it must have a ditch to hinder and thus slow down the advance of infantry (Muller 1757: 193). Though the absence of such a ditch in this case could be the result of the high water level at the site of the New Fort, it also support the case that the New Fort was never intended to be able to hold off a landward attack.

While the absence of a ditch is by far the most important feature of traditional European military architecture missing from the New Fort plans, it is by no means the only one. In fact, there are many features including banquettes, a glacis and ravelins. All were common fortification features of the day. The exact functions of each of these features are not important for the purposes of this analysis. Suffice to say that basically they were all meant to prevent enemy infantry from taking a fort (Muller 1799). That said, their absence does seem to indicate that the designers of the New Fort had no desire to include unnecessary or extravagant additions to the fort and only included in their design the standard military features they deemed necessary to the task they had in mind,

that of preventing enemy vessels from entering the harbour and bombarding the fort or community.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Considering the evidence that can be derived from the various plans for the New Fort, from the contemporary fortification standards of the 1740s, from the kinds of armament in common use, from the physical location of Placentia and from the imperial realities of French English relations in North America, a fairly clear picture emerges of what military strategic concerns motivated the agents, namely the political and military decision makers and designers responsible for the construction of the New Fort. Tasked with the strategic goal of securing Placentia for the use of the British navy and for valuable fishing fleets, they believed the greatest threat to these assets was an attack by enemy vessels. They were not concerned by the possibility of a land-based attack. Consequently, they designed a fort which was really little more than two enclosed batteries, one of which was tasked with firing at long range at ships approaching Placentia from sea along the Road and the other purposed with engaging enemy ships attempting to pass through the Gut into the harbour at close range (See Appendix 1).

In addition to this tactical role, the English also wanted the New Fort to serve as an administrative centre where the Governor and his soldiers could be assembled as a unit and protected from any conceivable threat to their person ranging from a surprise raid to civil unrest. The administrative role, in part, emerged as the military concerns facing the

English changed somewhat during the construction of the New Fort owing to changes in imperial and colonial objectives and circumstances in North America. These changes, not surprisingly, influenced the manner in which the fort was actually built and the design plans were realized. In addition to these changes in military priorities, there is evidence that the local environment of Placentia had a significant impact on the building of the New Fort in terms of materials, time and maintenance. It is these two factors, changing military priorities and environment which can best be interpreted by using the archaeological evidence in partnership with the documentary record. These are the focus of the following chapter.

Chapter 5: The New Fort as Built

Just as the design of the New Fort can be utilized as an interpretive tool, so too can its construction. In fact, in some ways, the relatively complex construction and repairs of the New Fort between the 1740s and early 1800s provide even better information for interpreting the external influences and resulting motivations that the English had to consider in terms of protecting their imperial interests in Placentia. While the examination of the design of the New Fort largely consisted of discussing the plans of the New Fort in the context of contemporary writings on standard military architectural techniques, the interpretation of the construction of the New Fort must consider several different avenues of investigation. The physical evidence of the construction left behind following the abandonment of the New Fort not only provides evidence regarding its purpose, but also reveals much about how the priorities of the builders changed over time and how the builders adapted to the local environment (for an indication of the scale of the physical evidence regarding New Fort's architecture see Appendix 7).

These changing priorities and the adaptations made during the various building phases of the New Fort are most visible in four features of its construction: the materials used in the construction; the evidence of deviations from the construction plans; the order in which various structures were built, or never built; and, the presence of construction projects undertaken outside of the body of the fort proper. By comparing the archaeological evidence with the documentary evidence pertaining to these four key aspects of the New Fort's construction, one can determine what external factors

influenced the English agents during the construction of the New Fort, how they adapted in order to achieve their own imperial goals, and why and how these goals changed overtime.

The analysis of the New Fort's construction is divided into two sections. The first addresses the military concerns and the second examines the environmental concerns. As established in the previous chapter, military concerns involve the threat of physical aggression by an external enemy and the efforts undertaken to prevent such force from harming the community or its structures. Environmental concerns, on the surface, imply considerations regarding factors such as climate, wind and water. At a deeper level, they also refer to such factors as the availability of construction resources and pre-existing features of the New Fort's location be they natural or man-made. Environmental concerns, for the purposes of this analysis, therefore, refer to any influences affecting the New Fort which were the direct result of the location chosen for the fort.

Some aspects of the New Fort's construction fall into both categories because sometimes environmental realities influenced military concerns and vice versa. For example, the wet and sandy nature of the soil on which the New Fort was built can be discussed under military concerns so that the tactical motivations behind its use can be examined. Similarly, the soil can be examined under environmental concerns so that its impact on the actual construction techniques utilized may be addressed. In spite of the separation of concerns into two sections, it must be remembered that they are not totally divorced from one another. This approach dovetails with Byers' theoretical understanding

of agency which states that individuals are always cognisant of many different concerns when making decisions (Byers 1999).

5.1 MILITARY CONCERNS

Perhaps the most important aspect of the New Fort's construction with regard to the military concerns of the English is the fact that it was never completed. It appears that after its construction began, sometime between 1741 and 1743, and its effective abandonment by the military in the 1770s, work was carried out in fits and starts. At no time did the English succeed in bringing the New Fort up to its full operational potential. Nevertheless, in addition to identifying the parts that were never completed, one can discuss in some detail the structures that were realized. Consequently, one can determine the kinds and levels of prioritization the English gave to the role of the fort at different times, which in turn, are related to the changing military concerns they faced over this time period.

Using archaeological and historical documentation, one can identify what areas of the New Fort were begun, what areas were finished and what features, although begun, were never completed. This is best done by examining the separate areas of the fort in two subsections: the curtain and bastion ramparts, and the interior structures.

5.2 THE CURTAIN AND BASTION RAMPARTS

Based on the available documentary sources and archaeological data, construction had begun on all of the planned curtains and bastions before the New Fort was abandoned. To what degree they were completed is, however, a matter for debate. The documentary evidence suggests that the smaller northern and eastern ramparts were never completed as designed and were, instead, simply completed as palisades so as to enclose the body of the Fort (Graves 1762a). This evidence is further supported by the archaeological evidence which shows that, while the foundations of these ramparts are present, the palisades were in fact constructed along their outer edge (Mills 2007: 5). Nevertheless, although it is clear that the foundations of these curtains were certainly completed, it is not currently possible to ascertain whether completion was achieved before or after the palisades were put in place. One interesting observation is that while the palisades along these ramparts were included on a set of engineer's plans drawn after the New Fort was begun, they were shown to be on the interior of the fort rather than on the exterior of the walls (Mills 2007: 5). Moreover, the foundations of the eastern rampart included what could only be the gate shown on several plans of the New Fort and which was discussed in the previous chapter (Simmonds 2009: 16). Beyond this, little is known regarding how close to completion these ramparts ever came.

The larger western and southern ramparts of the New Fort, judging from the available evidence, if not completed were at least built up much more than their smaller northern and eastern counterparts. The archaeological data and documentary record

regarding the western rampart is the most complete of any of the features of the enceinte. There are several references to this wall being completed (Smelt 1751; Graves 1762).

The Placentia Newfoundland Historical Sites and Monuments: Agenda 1962-4 states that no gun batteries were placed on the western or the southern rampart (Canada 1962: 8). It is possible, at least by 1751, that this was, however, no longer the case. By comparing the ordinance returns submitted by the garrison in Placentia before the most likely start date of the New Fort's construction around 1737 with the returns submitted around 1764, one can observe some correlation between construction and ordinance, if not the presence of a causative event (See Table 5.1). All of the available returns from this period for the iron ordinance listed in Placentia, which are drawn from the CO 194 series of documents, is tabulated in the below chart. Unfortunately, the record of returns for this period of 1737 to 1764, is somewhat fragmentary, especially during the critical period immediately after work on the New Fort is assumed to have begun. Nonetheless, the report of Engineer Smelt from 1751 and a plan of the New Fort from 1749 state that the western and southern ramparts were complete. This information can be correlated with the rise of the number of guns in Placentia shown in 1749 and which was maintained at a reduced but steady level until 1764.

Table 5.1: Ordinance by Year in Placentia, drawn from available CO 194 and 195 records series

	18 Pdrs	12 Pdrs	9 Pdrs	6 Pdrs
1737	8	-	4	-
1740	8	-	4	-
1743	8	-	4	-
1749	24	-	8	-
1751	15	-	4	-
1753	16	-	4	-
1754	16		4	-
1757	16	-	4	-
1758	16	-	4	-
1764	16	4	6	6

Admittedly, there are several flaws in using this evidence as proof of the New Fort having been armed at this time. Clearly, the 1749 report shows many more guns than any of the other returns until 1764, with the total being 32 as opposed to the 20 between 1753 and 1758. It is difficult to account for the sudden more than doubling of ordinance in 1749 from the three previous record dates. It could be the result of a man-of-war shipping its guns during maintenance in the harbour. It is possible that the guns were just being stored in Placentia before being shipped elsewhere. Regardless, what is noteworthy in terms of the arming of the New Fort is the increase from 1743 to the sustained levels from 1753-1758. This increase from 12 to 20 and the fact that this was sustained implies that the New Fort mounted some ordinance, especially when one considers the overall heavy armament of the Placentia fortifications.

According to the plans of Fort Frederick from 1749, this fort had two gun batteries, one of which mounted four guns and one of which mounted nine. There must

have been a recent addition as it is clear from the returns that as of 1743 the total strength of artillery in the garrison was eight 18-pounders and four 9-pounders (Byng 1743). There is a third battery, “the Earl of Hal[ifax?]'s battery”, included on the same plan of Fort Frederick but, it seems far too small in comparison to the other two for it to have mounted more than a single gun. Therefore, the greatest number of guns that could have been installed in Fort Frederick was fourteen, nine 18-pounders, four 9-pounders and a single lone gun which must have also been an 18-pounder as all of the 9-pounders reported in the returns are already accounted for. Discounting the erroneous 1749 returns and, instead, utilizing the 1751-1758 numbers, there still remain six guns for which there are no accounting of their use.

While it is possible that these guns were simply un-mounted, either being left in storage, in reserve or in maintenance, the fact that the 1737-1743 returns suggest that all available guns were mounted seems to make the case that these six unaccounted for guns were indeed mounted. Although there is no indisputable evidence of this, it still remains likely that these guns would have been mounted on one of the two completed ramparts of the New Fort. This supposition is further supported by the fact that no further increases in the number of ordinance at Placentia were reported in the available returns until 1764. The increase of 12 guns at this time was most likely the result of Governor Graves' reoccupation and the reconstruction of the old Royal Redoubt. This further implies that wherever the unaccounted for guns were, they stayed (Penny 2009: 28).

That said, there are two strong pieces of documentary evidence which do not support this position. The first is a report by Captain Cook in 1762 in which he reports

that, “the New Fort hath never been finished or had any Cannon mounted therein” (Penny 2009: 28). The second is provided by Governor Graves himself in 1762 when he wrote, “It [the New Fort] had two very good ramparts next the sea which only want platforms to be fitted for Cannon” (Graves 1762). Furthermore, no archaeological evidence has been found to indicate that any guns or platforms were ever mounted. These sources certainly seem to support the case for the unaccounted for guns simply not being mounted, but there still remains some uncertainty in this matter.

Unfortunately, despite the western rampart having been the site of intensive excavation in 2009 and 2010, there is little archaeological data to assist in clearing up this question of armament. Nevertheless, archaeological evidence does confirm that the ramparts were built. The amount of structure uncovered during these two seasons of excavation matches the documentary record in showing that this rampart, at least, was built up to a much greater degree those to the north and east. Also, although no excavation of the southern rampart has been undertaken due to it being located on private land and having had several modern domestic structures built upon it, a purely visual inspection of the area shows that it is built up in a manner which matches the dimensions provided for this rampart on the plans. With all of this taken into consideration, it seems that both of these ramparts may have been completed as the documentary source stated.

In terms of the bastions of the New Fort, little can be said. While the north-eastern bastion and a small section of the north-western bastion have been excavated, it is difficult to ascertain how built up these structure were when construction ceased. It is equally difficult to estimate at what point during construction they were created. This lack

of information is compounded by the absence in the documentary record of any explicit discussion of their condition. In fact, the only time these bastions were expressly mentioned was in 1751 by engineer, Leonard Smelt. This record, however, says nothing about what condition they were in at that time (Smelt 1751). Aside from this reference, the only other document is a map of the New Fort from 1749 which seems to show that all of the bastions other than the one in the north-east are complete. Archaeological data shows that this north-eastern bastion was at least started (Mills 2007: 5). It also shows that the foundations of this bastion were deeper in some places than others and that its interior was filled with sand and rubble (Mills 2007: 5). Beyond this, little else can be said about the bastion ramparts and curtain wall.

5.3 INTERIOR STRUCTURES

Of the New Fort's five interior buildings, the foundations of three have been fully uncovered, a fourth has been partially excavated and the fifth remains untouched. Unfortunately, the material culture recovered during the excavation of these four buildings, which were the powder magazine, storehouse, gunners' and storekeepers' quarters and the governor's and officers' quarters, provide little evidence of eighteenth-century English military occupation of these sites (Mills 2006; Mills 2007; Fry 2009; Simmonds 2009). The reason for this lack of artefacts has been attributed to the creation of a softball field in the area during the twentieth century (Mills 2006: 9). Another reason could be that these structures were never actually occupied during the English military

presence in Placentia. To determine the viability of this latter reason, one would have to fully excavate the interiors of these structures and conduct work on the soldiers' barracks, which at present remains untouched. Nevertheless, by comparing the archaeological remains of these structures with the available historical documentary descriptions of them, it should be possible to offer a modest interpretation of which were completed and/or occupied and which were not.

The earliest report about the state of the New Fort's construction comes from 1743. This report by Governor Smith states only that the recently started fort was nowhere near completion (Smith 1743a). It is not until 1748 that any real evidence of the state of the interior structures is available. In a map from that year, the soldiers' barracks is listed as "quite finish'd." The storekeepers' quarters and gunners' quarters, as well as the storehouse are listed as "not covered" (See Appendix 6). The officers' quarters are described as being raised to the second plinth and the magazine as having been, "taken down to the first plinth". Following this map, Engineer Smelt's 1751 report states that just that year a lobby and laboratory had been constructed within the New Fort. He makes mention of no other structures (Smelt 1751).

Six years after this report, Dawson's map of 1757, "A Plan of the Town and Harbour of Placentia, Section Shewing the Hill and Forts" seems to indicate that some of the planned interior structures of the New Fort were not yet completed. In fact, the two visible interior buildings are labelled only as "Intended Barracks" to be located on the eastern side of the fort and "Barracks", located on the western side of the fort adjacent the western rampart. Establishing what these structures were supposed to be like is difficult.

The same year that Dawson's map was created, Governor Edwards pleaded that a new barracks needed to be built in the New Fort as, "the old Barrack now in being was never designed to hold above 30 to 40 men" (Principal Officers of the Garrison at Placentia 1757). This statement seems to add credence to the idea that at least one of the barracks buildings was complete by this point. Perhaps the incomplete structure shown on Dawson's map was the result of Edwards' requests.

Not until 1763, after the English had moved their colonial capital from St. John's to Placentia, is there another detailed account of the state of the interior buildings. It appears that some construction had taken place for Governor Thomas Graves reported that the New Fort had "a magazine and three pretty good Barracks in it" (Graves 1762b). However, nine years later, Governor Shuldham reported that only one barrack was ever completed in the New Fort which casts Grave's report in some doubt, particularly as it is the only available documentary source stating that so many buildings were complete (Shuldham 1772b).

There is archaeological evidence that lends some plausibility to Graves' comment that the magazine had been complete. Extensive excavations were conducted in and around the powder magazine in 2008. These uncovered large (7m X 50-80 cm wide) wooden boards (Fry 2009: 17). Such boards were commonly used in the construction of powder magazine floors to aid in keeping the powder stored within dry. Although those found in the New Fort's magazine were not directly associated with any artefacts that could be used to directly date the boards to the period of the New Fort, they were overlaid by events which produced an artefact assemblage dating to a slightly later period. The

presence of these boards seems to support the case for this structure having been, at least, partially completed at some point, although to what degree and more precisely when, it is currently impossible to determine (Fry 2008: 17). That said, it is still possible to draw some interpretations about the military concerns the English had during the construction of the New Fort as well as how they changed throughout this period.

5.4 ANALYSIS

Despite the fact the order of construction, the completion dates and even the status of several components of the New Fort remain shrouded in confusion and mystery, two things regarding the military concerns faced by the English during this time are clear based on the evidence. The first is that certain components of the New Fort were given priority in the construction process. The second is that the tactical and strategic concerns which underpinned the design of the fort must have changed while it was under construction. The reasoning behind these two assessments of the New Fort as it was built is rooted in two primary groups of evidence. Firstly, certain parts of the New Fort were completed before others and secondly, the fort was never completed to fulfill the function for which it appears to have been designed.

Based on the design and location of the New Fort and taking for granted that the primary purpose behind the decision to construct the fort in the first place was to provide gun fire to prevent enemy vessels from approaching the town or passing through the Gut, it is easy to understand why the first components of the fort completed were the southern

and western ramparts. Clearly, if motivated by the threat of an enemy vessel coming into the harbour with the purpose of attacking the town and garrison, the primary military concern would have been to ensure the ability to ward off such an attack. Therefore, it seems only logical that the features of the fort most directly associated with this endeavour would be given priority during construction and, as a result, be completed first. This does not, however, explain why the other features of the fort were not completed after the ramparts were done or why the ramparts themselves may never have been armed with the cannon necessary for performing their intended function. To do so, it is necessary to contextualize the construction process within the strategic and tactical situation of the time. This will enable one to establish the changes in the military concerns which occurred at the time and to determine how these changes influenced the actions and decisions of those agents responsible for the New Fort's construction.

The earliest possible date for construction to have begun on the New Fort is sometime in 1742. With war with France looming on the horizon, only to break out in 1744, it seems that Governor Thomas Smith in October 1743 decided that there was not enough time to make the New Fort ready to defend Placentia. For that reason, he ordered Gledhill to cease construction (Smith 1743). This delay in construction, clearly motivated by fear of imminent enemy attack, appears ironically to have then continued due to a sudden end to this concern. With the fall of Louisbourg in 1745, the most direct threat facing Placentia was removed. This change from the sudden threat of French attack to a strategic situation in which an attack was unlikely, explains why the construction that did occur at the New Fort after 1745 appears to have been conducted at a very slow pace.

This lethargic attitude toward the need to finish the New Fort in light of the much diminished threat of enemy attack is further supported by the fact that the garrison at Placentia in these post-war years was undermanned and left in a state of ill supply (Gledhill n.d.). Of course, since renewed conflict between old imperial rivals was never far off, war again faced Placentia in the mid 1750s and the New Fort again received some additional attention.

That said, with the signing of the *Treaty of Aix la Chapelle* in 1748, the New Fort effectively had lost its tactical purpose. Because the New Fort could not be finished quickly enough, Fort Frederick had been chosen as the favoured one. It had been partially rebuilt and was now capable of defending the Gut. This change in the potential of Fort Frederick combined with Smelt's report in 1751 which stressed the weakness of the New Fort in the event that an enemy should land and capture Castle Hill, effectively deprived the New Fort of the function it was designed to serve, as well as the conditions under which it was intended to do so. This change in the primary military considerations facing the English is clearly visible in the treatment of the New Fort received from this point onwards.

When the Seven Years War broke out in 1756, once again pitting English and French colonial possessions against each other in North America, Placentia was protected by the small, inadequate Fort Frederick and the half finished, effectively redundant New Fort. Placentia need not have worried for long. The English capture of Fort Louisburg in 1758 and the subsequent English push up the St. Lawrence River into New France removed any urgency on the part of those responsible for defending Newfoundland to

focus on fortifying Placentia. Certainly, there is little evidence to show that the New Fort received much attention at this time. Complacency, however, had its own consequences. It was sharply rewarded when the French turned their attention to Newfoundland, taking St. John's in 1762. It was this event which brought about what appears to have been the final spurt of work on the New Fort, as well as on the defences of Placentia as a whole.

Now faced with the imminent threat of a French attack and with the effects of a land-based assault on an unprepared defender newly etched in his mind, Governor Graves created his plans to defend his new capital of Placentia. Effectively, Graves proposed building up the old Fort Royal, now called Castle Graves, building more barracks in the New Fort, arming the New Fort and then abandoning Fort Frederick (Graves 1762a). His reasoning for doing so was simple. The New Fort would be easier to defend from a ground attack than the very low and small Fort Frederick. Also, the larger New Fort could hold more barracks and, therefore, men and by moving the garrison entirely onto the northern side of the Gut, the English forces would no longer be divided. The New Fort and Castle Grave would be rendered capable of mutual support against threats from both land and sea (Graves 1762b).

Governor Graves appears to have abandoned the single fort system of seaward defence which had initially underpinned the New Fort's, as well as Fort Frederick's, design. He had chosen to return to the two fort system the French had adopted when they built Fort Louis and the Royal Redoubt. While it is difficult to judge exactly how much of the construction proposed by Graves was ever actually conducted, what is important is that in his writings as well as those of Engineer Smelt and Governor Edwards, it is clear

that the English had changed their assessment of the role that the New Fort was to play in the defence of Placentia, going from virtually no role at all to one requiring the support of Castle Hill.

In summary, the New Fort was constructed on and off between 1742 and 1762. These years were ones of contrast, shifting between periods of relative activity and inactivity. Such shifts reflected the threat level which the English felt regarding their strategic situation in the region and the role Placentia should play. The priority given to construction in general and to specific structures in particular appears to have coincided with the English perceptions of the threat level and potential for French attack. These in turn necessitated changes in the role of the New Fort from that for which it was originally designed. For example, the early prioritization of completing the seaward facing ramparts of the fort, the later refocusing on the construction of barracks and magazine and the enclosure of the fort while the ramparts were most likely unable to perform their originally intended function due to lack of artillery each demonstrated a particular military concern shaped by changing imperial relationships, financial resources and military strategy.

5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

For the purposes of this study, two kinds of environmental concerns are addressed: those to do with the climate and ground conditions of the site and those related to the availability of local resources useful in the construction of the New Fort. Both of

these concerns influenced the actions of those responsible for the construction of the New Fort. The impact of both is revealed in the archaeological remains and the documentary records.

In discussing the climate and site conditions of the area in which the New Fort was constructed, there are three primary influences which the English appear to have considered during the building process: the harshness of the weather; the erosive action of the sea; and, the softness and wetness of the ground. Each of these influences is clearly visible in the construction of the New Fort and the ways in which they impacted the decisions of the English are easily recognized once the physical remains of the fort are compared with traditional European thought on how to adapt to such harsh conditions. Because of the close interaction of these factors, all three are considered together in this analysis. As well, this approach reflects the way the various agents processed information to arrive at a decision. The division of the military concerns into two distinct sub sections in the previous chapter was done to aid in the understanding of the somewhat complicated architectural concepts and terminology. Otherwise, the more holistic approach used for the environmental concerns would have been applied. In fact, the first example of the influence of climate and site conditions on the construction of the New Fort makes it clear why it is impossible to consider separately the weather, the sea and the available resources when discussing the overall influence of environmental considerations on the decisions and actions made by the English during the construction of the New Fort.

Perhaps one of the stranger aspects of the New Fort's construction is that its ramparts were built with revetments of stone. The documentary and archaeological data

are in complete agreement on this. However, building these ramparts, which were to take the brunt of any attack, out of stone had several disadvantages. Europeans were well aware by this point that stone was much less effective than earthen works at stopping incoming ordinance. More significantly in terms of the climate of Placentia, noted for its rain and fog, European builders also knew masonry was nearly impossible to maintain in wet and cold climates (Duffy 1996: 61). This was due, not just to the fact that wet and cold weather caused water to penetrate the stone and mortar, causing them to expand and contract, thus readily breaking apart, but also because it was very hard to get the mortar used by Europeans at the time to set unless it was allowed to dry properly in warm, dry conditions (Duffy 1996: 44) This raises the question of why, when they knew of these disadvantages, the English used stone for construction of the ramparts in a place where wet and cold are the best adjectives to describe the weather much of the year? Having had various contacts with this part of North America for some decades, the English certainly were aware of the weather conditions of the north Atlantic.

The answer is related to the proximity of the site selected for the New Fort to the relentless wave action of the sea. In fact, the English may have tried to copy the French construction in Placentia. In the closing days of the French occupation of the site, an extensive effort was made to reface the earthen ramparts of Fort Louis in stone so as to protect them better from the actions of the sea. It seems that the English likely built the New Fort's ramparts in stone for the same reason. Why select a site that was subject to so much harsh wave action? As the military concerns revealed, the English probably selected the site of the New Fort largely because it suited the tactical concerns they had at

the time. These concerns trumped the fact that the site they selected necessitated constructing the fort out of a material known to be difficult to maintain in the cold and damp climate of the area. Cognisant of the fact that they had to contend with several environmental factors, the English clearly chose the course of action which they believed would best allow them to meet their military goals. Nevertheless, the military concerns did not always over-ride the environmental ones. Having made the selection of a site, its environmental conditions played a significant role in influencing the builders' subsequent decisions.

One of the most common features of the New Fort encountered during archaeological excavations was a 1 - 2 meter thick rubble layer which separated the earlier French occupation of the site from that of the later English New Fort period (Mills 2006; Mills 2007; Fry 2009; Simmonds 2009). This rubble layer corresponds to the raising of a large area utilizing stone rubble from the New Fort site during the construction process (Mills 2006: 3). However, excavation had uncovered this rubble fill in all areas of the fort while the plans of the New Fort show it only to have been utilized in fairly specific areas. It is also interesting to note that even during modern excavation at the site of the New Fort, the water table rarely rises above the top of this rubble fill, which appears to aid in drainage. This can be attested to by any of the field crew who attempted to pump out their units after a heavy rain only to see more water coming in like waterfalls through the rubble layer.

Why did the English make more use of a rubble layer than the designers had indicated? The evidence indicates that during the construction process, the builders found

the ground around the New Fort to be wetter, lower and/or softer than they had anticipated. As a result, they decided to extend the fill throughout the majority of the site. While this fill layer is useful for archaeologists today as it effectively seals off the earlier French occupation from the later English occupation, it is clear that the amount of labour that would have gone into creating it must have been massive. Judging by the excavations conducted so far, almost, if not all of the New Fort's 102 m X 80 m area is covered to a depth of 1-2 meters of rubble resulting in a minimum of 8160 m³ and a maximum of 16,320 m³ of fill having been moved. Of course, that is assuming that only the areas inside of the fort's walls were filled. It is also interesting to note that one map of the New Fort shows that the rubble was being removed from the face of Castle Hill which makes sense as it would have been the closest readily available source of large quantities of stone. An incredible amount of rubble was obviously transferred. With a modern wheelbarrow, assuming a capacity of 0.7m², it would take somewhere in the range of 11,500-23,500 trips to move that amount of stone. Clearly the English, mindful of the weather and ground conditions at the site they selected for the New Fort, were willing to put in a huge amount of labour to be able to use that site. This should not be taken, however, to mean that the English were blindly willing to put in large amounts of labour when there were easier solutions available. The removal of rubble from Castle Hill illustrates that they made a conscious decision to take this course of action to meet their needs.

Given the softness and wetness of the ground on which the New Fort was built and the amount of time and effort the English put into building the area up with rubble, it

is very strange that they did not utilize a common European fortification technique for securing walls in such conditions: the placing of pilings and grates under stone foundations (Duffy 1996: 47). Excavations along the interior of the western rampart have been extensive and despite being conducted to a depth greater than the base of the wall's foundation, no evidence of such features has been uncovered. Furthermore, while only select areas of a number of the interior structures in the New Fort have been excavated all the way down to the bottom of their foundations, those that have been provide no evidence of pilings or grates.

This is especially interesting when one notes that Engineer Smelt's report of 1751 states that the ramparts of the New Fort were already bulging by that point, suggesting that either the foundations were sinking unevenly or that the mortar and stone were failing due to the unfavourable climate (Smelt 1751). This is exactly the kind of collapse that pilings and gratings were meant to prevent and their inclusion here surely would have assisted in preventing these failures. The question then is: why did the English decide to not include them? After all, it would have reduced the amount of rubble that had to be carted from Castle Hill.

One possible explanation has to do with time. The builders may have concluded that the lengthy process of laying pilings would have prevented the fort from becoming operational in time to be used in the anticipated war with France. At first this interpretation seems to make sense when combined with what appears to have been the urgent prioritization of the completion of the southern and western ramparts early in the construction process. However, on further consideration it seems unlikely that time was

the reason given the fact that pilings were used just outside of the New Fort to build a breakwater to protect the rest of the structure from the action of the sea.

It is impossible to say much about these pilings and their associated breakwater as no archaeological evidence of them has been uncovered. In fact, a test pit sunk in 2010 in hopes of uncovering the exterior scarp revetment of the western rampart found no trace of the breakwater wall's presence. It seems likely that between the constant pounding of the sea and the construction of a large breakwater in the twentieth century any evidence of the English breakwater or the pilings has long since been destroyed or washed out to sea. Nevertheless, documentary evidence does exist. The breakwater and pilings are present on several plans of the New Fort and were expressly mentioned by Smelt. This suggests that they were in fact put in place early in the construction of the New Fort (Smelt 1751). Aside from this, the huge amount of work that went into bringing in the rubble fill all around the site remains a bit of a mystery, though it is possible that the rubble was not moved at one time but was moved in on an ad hoc basis. Still, the question remains as to why there is no archaeological evidence of pilings or gratings present in any of the areas which have been excavated when their use was common practice at the time under those environmental conditions.

Perhaps the best explanation is simply that the English judged them to be unnecessary and the rubble was readily available. This then raises the question: why did they reach that conclusion when they already had recognized the difficulties of building on the site and had taken other steps towards overcoming them? Clearly, there must have been some particular motivation for this judgement call, perhaps some pre-existing factor

which tipped the decision making in favour of not using pilings or gratings to support the walls. One possibility is that suit trees for creating pilings were not available, though this is conjecture. Perhaps the best case for such a pre-existing factor would be the existence of already stable foundations which could have served the same purpose as pilings and gratings.

There is evidence to suggest that at least one location in the New Fort was indeed built on top of the French Fort Louis foundation. A decision to not use pilings to support the various walls of the New Fort in favour of employing readily available old, firm foundations, which were likely from Fort Louis, to serve the same purpose represents a premeditated choice on the part of the English to use what resources were at hand in the most efficient manner possible. It seems that this was exactly what the English did as the evidence of them utilizing pre-existing, likely French, foundations in the construction of the New Fort was uncovered in the governor's quarters. This technique may also have occurred elsewhere on site. After the excavation of a relatively small area of the western wall of the governor's residence in 2007, Steve Mills concluded that, due to the architectural features and associated artefacts unearthed, it was possible the footings of the foundations were actually of French origin. Further excavation conducted in 2010 under the supervision of Matthew Simmonds added further credence to this conclusion.

The evidence uncovered in 2010 is extremely strong. It can be best understood when explained by making reference to the photos below (Figure 5.1). The image on the left shows the interior of the eastern wall of the governor's quarters, adjacent to the triangular hearth feature visible on the left side of the image which is visible in many of

the plans of the New Fort. The right image is a close-up of the bulk present on the left side of the first image. The presence of a definite lip separating the top and bottom phases of the foundations is clearly visible in both images.



Figure 5.1: Photo of English reuse of French foundation

However, this by itself is not sufficient to conclude that the lower section is an old French foundation while the upper section is English. Indeed, all of the excavated foundations of the New Fort's interior structures show such an offset and even the plans of the western rampart clearly show one. Further evidence fortunately is present.

To begin, the rubble visible in the top left of both of the images is the fill layer which was previously discussed. Its presence is very good evidence that any structures below it are from an earlier period than the construction of the New Fort. Furthermore, below the fill layer there is a layer of mortar which penetrated into the wall and separated

the upper and lower sections. Such a layer of mortar or cement was commonly used to level off the top of old foundations in order to provide a flat building surface for new structures (Duffy 1996: 48). In fact, the reuse of old foundations and even entire structures was an established part of European fortifications at the time (Duffy 1996: 30, 48). Therefore, the English, faced with the task of building a new fort and finding that they had pre-existing, firm foundations available to them, opted to incorporate them in the construction (Duffy 1996: 30, 48). This is especially true given the poor soil conditions of the site.

The best evidence for the lower section of the foundation being of French origin can be found in examining the associated stratigraphy. As seen in the right-hand image, the lower section of the foundation is abutted by a thick, dark organic layer, which was labelled as event 221. As well, there is a smaller event below this labelled 242. The artefact assemblages, including glass and pottery shards, produced by these events were deemed to have originated from the French occupation of the site by both the project leader Matthew Simmonds and the lab supervisor David Fry. This conclusion was met despite the presence of several wares more typically associated with the English during the eighteenth century. However, their presence was deemed to be accounted for by the English military occupation of Fort Louis from 1713 to 1717 and the fact that the site then remained effectively open to civilian use from 1717 until the construction of the New Fort began in the early 1740s. For the sake of completeness, the following table (Table 5.2) shows the raw shard counts for these events separated by ware type. As these events abut the lower section of the wall and as there is no builder's trench present, which is usually

associated with the construction of stone foundations, these events and their associated artefacts must have been deposited after the foundation was built (Duffy 1996). Given all of this evidence, it seems safe to interpret these lower foundations as being of French construction.

Table 5.2: Ceramic assemblages associated with French Foundation

Ware Type	Event 221	Event 242
Beauvais	18	34
Bristol Staffordshire	1	9
English Salt Glaze	1	0
Iberian	33	17
Jackfield	2	0
Merida	41	16
Normandy	124	60
North Devon	6	11
Nottingham	1	0
Pearlware	2	0
Redware	26	10
Rhenish Brown Salt Glaze	1	1
Saintange	62	65
South Somerset	5	0
Tinglaze	30	17
Totnes	5	2
Westerwald	1	1
Unidentified	36	23

While the governor's quarters present the best evidence for the reuse of old French foundations by the English, it is by no means the only structure of the New Fort which may do so. Amanda Crompton and Blair Temple, after their excavations at the site in 2005 and 2006, theorized that the three structures present in almost all the historic plans of Fort Louis might be the same structures as the barracks, store room and powder

magazine present in the plans of the New Fort (Crompton 2005). Although this interpretation has essentially been abandoned by the current Placentia Archaeology Project Team at the time that this analysis is being conducted, it may be time to reconsider. Interestingly enough, superimposing the set of three structures found in plans for Fort Louis and those for the New Fort yields unexpected and intriguing results. As Crompton and Temple suggested, the three structures present in the New Fort and Fort Louis appear to be perfectly matched to one another in size and shape. Furthermore, the main bastion of Fort Louis and one of the New Fort's bastions, while not identical in shape or size, line up very closely. Similarly, while not matching as closely, a significant portion of both forts' seaward curtain walls also overlap (Figure 5.2).



Figure 5.2: Map illustrating position of Fort Louis resulting from Crompton/Temple theory of reuse

Steve Mills has put forward another interesting theory regarding the reuse of French foundations by the English. This theory runs slightly counter to that of Crompton and Temple. It stipulates that the powder magazines of Fort Louis and the New Fort are, in fact, the same structure or were, at least, built on the same foundations (Mills 2010/2011 Personal Correspondence). The initial stage of testing this theory, the overlaying of the powder magazines, produces encouraging results as the dimensions of the buildings on both plans match very well. However, in other respects the results of this overlay are not encouraging as a large section of Fort Louis, an entire bastion in fact, ends up in the




Figure 5.3: Map illustrating position of Fort Louis resulting from Mill's theory of reuse

water (Figure 5.3). While this could be dismissed as a result of erosion over the last two centuries, a quick consultation with the available plans of Fort Louis makes it clear that the entire orientation of the Fort produced by this overlay is incorrect.

Neither of these theories should be taken as gospel for assessing to what degree the English reused the foundations of Fort Louis. The first is poorly supported by archaeological data and the second simply seems incorrect when compared to historic maps. Nevertheless, recent archaeological excavations conducted during the 2009 and 2010 field seasons suggest that some sections of the western rampart of the New Fort were constructed on old foundations which, due to the occupational history of the site, imply that they must have been of French origin.

After excavating a 5 metre wide section of the western rampart's interior revetment in 2009, Matthew Simmonds concluded that there were two phases of construction present. The top phase he determined was similar to the other known English masonry work on the site and the bottom phase he judged to be of French origin. (Simmonds 2009: 26). However, after studying standard fortification foundation construction techniques of the 1700s as well as the plans of the New Fort's rampart revetments, it seems more likely that these phases are actually the different levels of the foundations shown in these plans and that the rubble hardcore at the bottom represents the footings which underplayed the foundations.




Figure 5.4: Drawing of interior of western rampart wall showing the possibility of two phases of construction by Matt Simmonds

Previous test pitting at the northern extreme of the western rampart's interior, however, had not uncovered this rubble hardcore. As a result, during the 2010 excavation several test pits were sunk along the length of the rampart's interior as well as another 5 metre unit directly north of that excavated in 2009. Unfortunately, beyond being able to conclude that the southern half of the western rampart is constructed on top of a rubble hardcore while the northern half is not, neither the test pits nor the larger units provided any further evidence to suggest whether these variations are due to the reuse of old French foundations or not. Nonetheless, just as in the case of the governor's quarters, it does seem likely that if presented with the opportunity to reuse pre-existing foundations as a means of stabilizing or expediting the construction of the New Fort, the English

might well have seized the opportunity as a means of overcoming the other various environmental concerns which they faced.

There is another type of reuse which appears to have occurred during the construction of the New Fort which also illustrates that the English were willing to make use of whatever resources were available to them on site. The foundations of all of the northern structures of the New Fort show a considerable variation in the size, shape and quality of the stones utilized for both facing and filling of the walls. There does not appear to be any architectural reasoning behind the relative location and use of these stones so an explanation must be sought elsewhere. The variation in quality can be seen in the following image (Figure 5.5) although it should be noted that in other areas of the foundations the good quality stone was not used at the corners as quoin stones which, if it were the case everywhere, could be explained as a means of securing the building. One possible reason for the presence of both good quality and poor quality stone is that the large, well-dressed stones in the foundations were taken from any number of other large masonry structures which were present in Placentia at the time. The most likely candidates were Fort Frederick and the Royal Redoubt, although if there had been any stone left over from Fort Louis' late reconstruction it is possible that some of its stone could have been used as well. In fact, it may even be possible that some stone from the Fortress of Louisbourg while the English held it was shipped over and utilized (Peter Pope Personal Correspondence 2010/2011).



Figure 5.5: Possibly reused stones in New Fort storehouse

The reuse of such stones was common place not only for military purposes but civilian (Duffy 1996: 42). The motivation behind doing so is easy to understand. Military engineers and masons knew that hard stones, irregular boulder type stones and stones which had been exposed to the elements before being quarried were of poor quality and were susceptible to the forces of weather and water. They also provided a poor bonding surface for mortar (Duffy 1996: 42). Since the English were mindful of the havoc the local climate and sea conditions would undoubtedly play on their construction materials, it is easy to understand why they might decide to remove good quality stone from unused buildings in order to improve the quality of what they thought was going to be the primary defensive structure of the colony. Furthermore, Engineer Smelts in his report had indicated that construction in Placentia, in order to last any length of time, had to use stone and lime imported from England or New England as there were few suitable

raw materials available locally or the means to extract those that did (Smelt 1751). Based on this observation it makes even more sense that the English were inclined to pilfer good quality stones from wherever they could.

Despite this, it does appear that local stone, similar to that extracted from the face of Castle Hill and which was largely utilized as fill, was also incorporated into the New Fort's ramparts as well as the foundations of many of the interior structures. While this judgement is based entirely on visual inspections and, therefore, would require geochemical analysis to provide ultimate confirmation, their inclusion would suggest that even given the knowledge of the poor quality of the stone, the English were motivated by some over-riding factor to utilize them. Given the presence of good quality reused stone, as well as poor quality locally quarried stone in the same foundations, the most likely motivation for the English to use both types was a desire to build the New Fort as quickly as possible. Once again, time was a consideration driven by military exigencies and imperial rivalries.

Clearly, if time was of the essence the English builders would have turned to whatever construction materials were readily available. They would not have waited for shipments of materials from England or New England. They would not have tried to rely on only new materials. True, cost may have been a factor, but time was an even greater one if attack seemed imminent. This justification of the reuse of old stone and the use of substandard local stone as a means of expediting construction supports the earlier interpretation of the prioritization of construction presented in the first half of this chapter.

5.6 CONCLUSIONS

In summary, all aspects of the construction of the New Fort reflect the actions and decisions made by its English builders in light of the many environmental and military concerns which they faced. Everything from why structures were built in a particular order, to the materials used and even the reason why the fort was never completed are based on how the various environmental factors of the site and military concerns of the time were processed by the English and embodied in the decisions they made to best meet their immediate goals and priorities. As this chapter and the one which preceded it have outlined, it is impossible to fully understand the reasons behind all of the design of construction features of the New Fort without first fully contextualizing them within the historical and environmental conditions in which those responsible of their creation existed and acted.

Once this has been done it becomes possible to examine these features, compare them to traditional practices of the time as well as the available documentary sources of the period in order to ascertain what the exact motivations behind the actions of the English in Placentia were, and then from this interpret what external factors most directly influenced these actions. This process of analysis, based in the understanding of agency discussed earlier in this work, has allowed us to form interpretations of the reasoning the English used while creating the New Fort based solely on the material and documentary remains of the fort and which at no point resorted to a comparison of modern day counterfactual discourse nor judgemental modern day moralization. This aspect of the

analysis is key to its use the study of colonialism and will be further outlined in the next and final chapter.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

From the start, this thesis had three goals. The first was to produce an original study and analysis of a subject worthy of academic examination. In this case, the subject chosen was rooted from the military history of Placentia and related archaeological work which, even today, generally receives scant attention from either the local populace or the academic community. The second goal was to draw greater academic and public awareness to the ongoing archaeological project underway at Placentia. This project, begun in 2002 and headed now up by Mr. Matthew Simmonds, has and will continue to produce data that is of considerable significance in terms of studying and interpreting the approaches and experiences of European imperial habitation and military activities in North America, especially Newfoundland. The third goal demonstrate the value of utilizing an agency based method combined with archaeological evidence for studying colonialism and imperialism introduction as a means to overcome the sometimes contradictory and heated debates which can arise when such topics are discussed using more traditional historical approaches.

The achievement of the first goal lies in the fact that there is a limited body of secondary academic literature, in French or English, about the New Fort and its interplay with the foundations of Fort Louis. Any contribution to the historiography of Placentia and its imperial role during the English regime, in light of the limited work done so far, is of necessity original to some degree. Perhaps only time can provide evidence of the success of the second goal. It may take awhile for people to process the importance of the

archaeological findings and the continuing work at Placentia in terms of the acquisition of historical knowledge and the development of the tourism potential they can stimulate. The satisfaction of the third goal, however, requires closer consideration as realizing it is a far more complex challenge.

For the third goal to be met, this analysis must meet two criteria. Firstly, it must successfully integrate archaeological data into an historical analysis. Secondly, it must illustrate how doing provides a viable method of approaching the study of European Colonialism which allows contentious topics in that field to be discussed without falling into the traps of counterfactuals and inflated moralization. The topic of this study is clearly historical in focus and context. Because it is based on primary document research as well as secondary writings and because the related archaeological data is an integral source of first-hand evidence upon which the thesis' arguments and interpretations are based, the first requirement of the third goal has been met.

The crucial question regarding whether the third goal of the thesis has been realized lies in answering whether the analysis of the New Fort's design and construction proves that the theoretical and methodological approaches which were used offer a viable means of studying colonial/imperial topics which overcomes the traditionally highly controversial nature of discourse in that field. In answering this question, one needs to briefly review what the thesis covers and what it argues in terms of how imperial agents responded to military and environmental concerns while they were building the New Fort to meet and protect British colonial aspirations in the second half of the eighteenth

century. Then, one can determine to what degree the thesis is successful in presenting these arguments in the wider context of British imperial historiography.

With the exception of some of the historical background provided in order to contextualize French-English imperial relations prior to as well as after 1713, the entire thesis focuses on analysing the design and construction of the New Fort at Placentia. The documentary and archaeological evidence related to the design and construction make it possible to identify the specific goals of those responsible for the fort's creation and to interpret how the influence of external factors, namely military and environmental ones, determined the actions and decisions these agents made in their efforts to meet these goals. Never forgetting the general purpose of the fort itself in the larger imperial context, the builders of the New Fort constantly had to weigh the often changing military and environmental concerns against each other and settle on the most practical, the most viable, or the most affordable solution to the problems presented to them. The degree of threat and the nature of the threat often shifted through the decades. The weather and the sea were constantly changing realities. Features were omitted and features were added to the plans. Sometimes inferior materials were used, sometimes new ones were used and sometimes previously used ones were used again. Sometimes work forged ahead and at other times it came to a grinding halt. Sometimes traditional building methods were adopted and sometimes new techniques were developed. Virtually nothing about the building of the New Fort followed what, under perfect circumstances, would have been expected practice in the construction of a mid- eighteenth-century fortress, even one in a

remote part of British colonial territory. The military and environmental factors ensured that the circumstances were far from perfect.

How then is this analysis useful as a means of illustrating how this method of approaching the study of colonial histories can be utilized by historians and archaeologists as a means of overcoming many of the difficulties which are faced when dealing with this divisive issue? At the root of all the arguments and analysis of the New Fort's construction is a single concept whose central premise is that individuals generally act in ways which they believe are most likely to achieve the results they desire given the situation in which they find themselves. This concept is referred to as "agency".

As discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, the concept of agency holds to a Giddensian view which states that, "human beings are neither to be treated as passive objects, nor as wholly free subjects" (Giddens 1979: 150). From this key understanding of the nature of human agency more complex concepts have evolved. The most important one in terms of this thesis is Byers' concept of "intentionality" which provides a means of conceptualizing how individuals actually go about making decisions and thereby exercise their agency (Byers 1999). This conceptual model of how individuals, or agents, weigh multiple external factors when making a decision was incorporated into the methodology used to determine why things were done as they were done in the construction of the New Fort, particularly when some of the actions, on the surface, might appear to be unexpected or inappropriate. One example of this was the decision to use as reinforcing fill thousands of meters of rubble in lieu of new pilings and grates. By using the concept of intentionality within the larger context of the theory of agency, it was possible to develop

reasonable interpretations of how the perceptions and views of the relative importance of military and environmental concerns held by the English designers and builders changed during the time the New Fort was being built.

It is the ability to examine the motivations and contributing factors which caused colonial agents, such as the English at Placentia, to make the decisions and take the actions they did, which makes this method of examination valuable in the broader discussion of colonialism and imperialism. By adopting an approach which contextualizes the actions of colonial agents within their historical and environmental conditions and by using Byers' model for understanding how individuals make decisions, this work has successfully avoided the pit falls of counterfactual debate and moral accusations which often accompany studies of colonial history by reflecting what the actions of these individuals means to them and not contributing modern, post-colonial ideals and concepts onto them. Consider this approach in comparison to Niall Ferguson's 'balance sheet' in *Empire* and the advantages are all but too clear (Ferguson 2002).

The goal of this thesis was to determine whether the methodology and theoretical approach outlined above would provide . If it was unable to produce the kind of results and interpretive scope which was desired, then it clearly would not have been of use at all and would have been a failure. Based on the amount of information that has been deduced from the archaeological work and from the documentary record regarding the decisions made by the designers and builders constructing the New Fort, what was built and what was not, what was used and what was not, where the fort was located and so forth, and by

the colonial representatives such as the governors, it seems fair to say that the methodology and theoretical approach worked well.

It appears that given the set requirements for its use which were outlined in Chapter 3, this method can be applied to any colonial situation. It can help to determine and understand the intersectionality, the points of intersection between the agents and the internal and external factors which shaped the decision making of the various agents. The fact that this study of the New Fort did not include a discussion of interaction between colonizers and colonized does not diminish the fact that the concept of agency can be successfully applied to situations which do as well as those that do not. This theory is applicable to the study of any colonial/imperial setting and topic given the existence of the necessary kinds of archaeological and documentary evidence. It is safe to say that this analysis of the construction of the New Fort at Placentia during the British colonial regime in Newfoundland provides an example of how and why this historical and archaeological agency-based approach to the study of colonial histories can and should be utilized for the study of colonialism.

Appendix




A	Fort Louis/ The New Fort	D	The Gut
B	Fort Frederick	E	The Road
C	Castle Hill/Castle Graves	F	The Beach

Appendix 1: Modern satellite image showing locations of important structures and features in Placentia


NMC

10010302


PLAN of the new FORT at PLACENTIA.




Appendix 3: "Plan of the New Fort At Placentia, Nfld." From 1751




Appendix 4: "Plan of Part of the New Fort At Placentia Which is Erected and the Adjacent." Grounds Copied 1938



Appendix 5: "A Perspective View of Castle Hill, Mount Gallardin and the spot of Ground on which the New Fort is now Erecting, with the entrance into the Harbour." From 1749



Appendix 6: "Plan of the New Fort Erecting at Placentia on the North Side of the Harbour."
From 1748



Appendix 7: Approximate Outline of Excavated New Fort Architecture

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