


NO MIDDLE GROUND:
PENNACOOK-NEW ENGLAND RELATIONS
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES

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JOHN DALY



**NO MIDDLE GROUND:
PENNACOOK-NEW ENGLAND RELATIONS
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY**

by
John Daly

A thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Department of History
Memorial University of Newfoundland

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ABSTRACT

Pressures brought about by the European settlement of northeastern North America during the seventeenth century shaped the history of the Pennacook Confederacy which developed in the Merrimac River Valley. Early contacts with Europeans encouraged the formation of the confederacy as Micmac raids, epidemic disease and initial English settlement pushed the survivors of coastal Pawtucket villages and the inland Nashaways to accept the leadership of Passaconaway, sagamore of Pennecooke village. Passaconaway sought peace with the colonists of New England and his policies were continued by his son and successor, Wannalancet. The period between 1633 and 1675 was relatively stable. In their three villages of Pennecooke, Wamesit and Nashaway the Pennacooks sought to accommodate themselves to the growing English presence, often by trading furs and accepting Christianity. In turn the English provided protection from Mohawk aggression.

After the outbreak of King Philips War in 1675, a peaceful policy became virtually impossible. The majority of the Pennacooks remained neutral yet suffered repeated insults and attacks by the colonists. Nashaways sided with "King Philip" and were destroyed by New England. After the war Pennacook survivors repudiated Wannalancet's peaceful

policy and gravitated to the leadership of his nephew, Kancamagus. Kancamagus cultivated relations with the French as a counter-weight to New Englanders, who had become increasing friendly with the Pennacooks' Mohawk enemies. When England and France went to war in 1689, Pennacooks attacked the English settlement at Dover, New Hampshire which was under the jurisdiction of Richard Walderne. This target was a logical choice because Walderne, a fur trader and militia commander, had been a long-time adversary. By attacking Dover the Pennacooks committed themselves to a permanent pro-French, anti-English orientation. The failure of Pennacook efforts to coexist with the English illustrate the impossibility of Indian attempts to preserve their independence and simultaneously accommodate the New England colonies.

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
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(All maps have been modified from Gordon Day, *Identity of the St. Francis Indians*, Canadian Ethnology Service Paper No. 71 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981), p.2.)



INTRODUCTION

Between the end of King Philip's War and 1689, the Abenaki tribes of New England translated the futile resistance of Metacom into a French alliance which kept most of northern New England in Indian hands until the 1750s. Various aspects of how and why this occurred have been examined. But a full account of the role played by the Pennacook confederacy has yet to appear. The Pennacooks stayed neutral during King Philip's War yet took the lead in renewing hostilities in 1689. Understanding their motives is extraordinarily pertinent to any attempt at explaining Abenaki-New England relations as a whole.

The history of relations between natives and colonists in New England has never suffered from lack of attention. Writings on the subject appeared soon after English settlement as settlers ranging from Governors William Bradford and John Winthrop to the anonymous author of "Mourt's Relation" sought to convey their experiences in the New World. Missionaries such as John Eliot and their allies often wrote tracts back to their supporters in England in order to convince them that the Bay Colony was fulfilling its evangelical mission. Yet relations between settlers and Indians soured after the natives violently opposed colonial expansion in King Philip's War and sided with the French during King William's War and later conflicts. A later

generation of New Englanders, such as William Hubbard and Cotton Mather, chronicled the perceived treachery of the Indians as these prospective converts first rose against their English benefactors and then entered into an alliance with New France and terrorized the frontier for the better part of a century.¹ Although challenged at its outset by Daniel Gookin and modified over time, this view of benighted and inexplicable natives, who were all too ready to betray the settlers to foreign powers and hold back the advance of civilization, suited the needs of the expanding colonies and later the republic. Combined with the experiences of other colonies and modified by the increased secularization of society, these ideas reached their apogee in the works of Francis Parkman. As New England intellectuals became disproportionately influential in American life this school of thought gained widespread acceptance and provided part of

¹ William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation* (Samuel Morison, ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952); John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal* (James Hosmer, ed.) (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1959); Henry Dexter (ed.), *Mourt's relation or journal of the plantation at Plymouth in Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, series 2, Vol. 9; Edward Winslow, *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians of New England* (1649) in *American Culture Series*, Reel 390.9 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms); William Hubbard, *The History of the Indian Wars in New England* (1677) (Samuel Drake, ed.) (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971); Cotton Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum* in Charles Lincoln, *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1677-1699* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913).

the intellectual backdrop for everything from Fredrick Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis, to the novels of Kenneth Roberts and children's Thanksgiving plays.²

Although challenged in the West by the works of Dee Brown and others, this "philiopiestic" historiography was not directly and successfully confronted at its New England root until Francis Jennings published *The Invasion of America* in 1975, demonstrating that many of New England's founders had good reason to, and often did, misrepresent the truth and that historians' uncritical reliance on them had perpetuated their distortions. Aided by the more archaeological and anthropological approaches of ethnohistorians such as Gordon Day, James Axtell, Neil Salisbury and, more recently, Colin Calloway, there has developed a new historical tradition which is more balanced and objective, while less "settler oriented" and self congratulatory.³ The work of these ethnohistorians has

² Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections of the Indians in New England* (New York: Arno Press, 1972); *An Historical Account of the doings and sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England, In the years 1675, 1676, 1677* (1677) (New York: Arno Press 1972); Francis Parkman, *France and England in the New World* (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1983); ; Kenneth Roberts *Northwest Passage* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1937).

³ Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: an Indian History of the American West* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1970); Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America:*

illuminated native cultures as never before, detailing much of their complex diversity. The settlement phase of New England's history is now properly seen as a time when native tribes confronted various unprecedented challenges, not only with the arrival of the settlers themselves, but with the new conflicts European influence caused, both within and between tribes, and the unknown Old World epidemics which Europeans unwittingly carried with them.

These new perspectives have made it possible to write more complete histories of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Hurons and other groups further afield. But these perspectives have not been fully applied to the Algonquian tribes of New England, the earlier assumptions about whose behavior provided New Englanders with their influential writings. To be sure, Jennings, Salisbury, Calloway and the others have explained why the natives of New England were driven to oppose colonial expansion. But the concept of

Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); Gordon Day, *The Identity of the St. Francis Indians* Canadian Ethnology Service Paper no. 71 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981); James Axtel, *The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Neil Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans and the Making of New England 1500-1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Colin Calloway, *Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman, Ok.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990).

"New England natives" was foreign to the indigenous population of the area. The Eastern and Western Abenakis, who became the main portion of Canada's allies in the region, did not think of themselves as a single people in the seventeenth century. Instead they were Sokokis, Missiquois, Pennacooks, Penobscots and others. Each of these groups had very different encounters with varying types of Europeans during this time. Accounts which treat them as a subgroups of a unified Abenaki people cannot adequately explain why Pennacooks (or any of the others) chose the courses of action which they did.⁴

Calloway in particular has concentrated on the Western Abenakis. His book, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont* (1990) and article "Wannalancet and Kancamagus: Indian Strategy and Leadership on the New Hampshire Frontier" (1988) both examined events in northern New England. However Western

⁴ Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: the Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York: Norton, 1984); Bruce Trigger, *The Children of Aetansic: a History of the Huron People to 1660* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976); Calloway, *Western Abenakis*; "Wannalancet and Kancamagus: Indian Strategy and Leadership on the New Hampshire Frontier," *Historical New Hampshire* 43 (Winter 1988); David Stewart-Smith, "Pennacook-Pawtucket Relations: The Cycles of Family Alliance on the Merrimac River in the 17th Century," *Actes du Vingt-cinquieme Congres des Algonquinistes* (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1994).

Abenakis dealt with an entire linguistic group whose members did not perceive themselves as a single people during the seventeenth century. "Wannalancet and Kancamagus" focused on the strategies employed by these two sagamores in dealing with the settlers' presence. David Stewart-Smith's article "Pennacook-Pawtucket Relations: The Cycles of Family Alliance on the Merrimac River in the 17th Century" (1994) concentrates on the genealogies of prominent Indians in the Merrimac area. Therefore, the Pennacooks, a key group of the Western Abenakis, have been examined in relation to their linguistic and cultural category, their leaders and their genealogy. In *Identity of the St. Francis Indians* (1981) Gordon Day has traced their eventual migration to the St. Francis Mission in Quebec. Yet there is no detailed examination of the Pennacook confederacy as a whole which fully takes into account its members' experiences with the settlers, traders, soldiers and missionaries, both English and French. Nor do previously published accounts fully consider the differing experiences of the confederacy's member villages.

It is important to examine the experiences of the Pennacook confederacy, which included non-Abenaki Massachusetts-speakers as well, if we are to understand how and why Abenakis chose to "betray" New England for an

alliance with New France. The confederacy was created in response to forces emanating from European contact. Under the leadership of its founder, Passaconaway, and his son, Wannalancet, the Pennacooks cooperated with the English and many became Christian. Except for the village of Nashaway, the Pennacooks made extraordinary efforts to avoid involvement in King Philip's War while all of their neighbors were fighting. Yet it was the Pennacooks, under Kankamagus, who led the first major raid of King William's War when they attacked the home of Richard Walderne. Because Walderne had been their trading partner for decades, this attack left the Pennacooks extraordinarily susceptible to accusations of treachery. Studying what caused the Pennacooks to behave as they did will shed light on the validity of the New Englanders' claims of native betrayal and the historiographical tradition which they helped to create.

In examining the Pennacooks' experiences it is useful to keep in mind the ideas elaborated by Richard White.⁵ Although his work, *The Middle Ground*, concerns the trans-Appalachian West in a later time period, it contributes

⁵ Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York and Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

valuable insights which can be applied equally to the northern New England frontier. The first is the importance of refugees. A large number of the people who formed the Pennacook confederacy were survivors from Massachusetts villages which had been destroyed along the coast. During and after King Philip's War all Pennacooks had to leave their home villages and search for safer locations for varying amounts of time. In fact, when viewed from a distance, the entire Pennacook experience during the seventeenth century is that of a diminishing number of people being pushed steadily northward. Understandably, such dislocation created a sense of despair and refugees have often been known to commit desperate acts inexplicable to contemporary outsiders. Despite this, Pennacook leaders strove to incorporate peaceful relations with the English into their culture. As long as their contacts were with missionaries and fur traders, both of whom had use for the Indians, a measure of coexistence, ranging from friendship to wary mistrust depending on the individuals involved, was possible. Yet after their areas were dominated by English farmers, who had little use for the land's original occupants, relations between the two groups quickly soured. Additionally, the Pennacooks did not see their predicament strictly as one of Indians versus English. Micmac

aggression was a factor in creating the confederacy. Much like later refugees in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes areas, their prime worry was often the threat of Iroquois attack, in this case from the eastern, Mohawk, nation. Above all, it must be kept in mind that events beyond the pale of European settlement were complex and that authority and societies were fluid and rarely stable in the "frontier" era.

While describing the Dover raid and the outbreak of King William's War, Parkman wrote: "The occasion of this new uprising is not very clear, and it is hardly worthwhile to look for it."⁶ The mindset behind the second half of this sentence has been rightly discredited, yet the first half still stands. By examining the "New England" Indians' experiences in the tribal contexts within which they themselves viewed and evaluated them we can clarify the motivations and options which shaped the colonial New England frontier. There is no better place to start than with the Pennacooks, the people who struggled to stay out of the first uprising and did so much to inaugurate the second.

⁶ Parkman, Vol. II, p.162.



THE FORMATION OF THE PENNACOOK CONFEDERACY

There are few records on the subject, yet it seems clear that the Pennacook Confederacy was created in the early seventeenth century as pressures of disease, warfare and European settlement forced the survivors of the coastal-dwelling Pawtuckets under the protection of Passaconaway, a sagamore of the Western Abenaki village of "Pennecooke", located some sixty miles upstream on the Merrimac river. Much as in the case of the trans-Appalachian refugee societies described by Richard White¹, the twin blows of epidemic disease and warfare created this alliance, although in this instance the first raiders were seaborne Micmacs rather than the Iroquois. Unlike the "middle ground" of the Mississippi Valley and Great Lakes, however, coastal New England was quickly settled by Europeans, and the surviving natives who formed the confederacy did not undertake a long migration, but rather chose to attach themselves to a figure who seemed able to protect them while accomodating the new order.

Before the arrival of Europeans, there was little political organization above the village level in northern New England. Villages would certainly have cultivated alliances among themselves, such as the one that formed

¹ White, *Middle Ground*.

around the leadership of "Bashabes" in coastal Maine, yet each village seems to have been an essentially independent political entity, with its own sagamore or sachem. This fluidity makes description and definition of the various Indian groups in the area difficult, yet, according to Dean Snow, the general pattern of cultural or tribal affiliation above the village level was riverine. Because rivers were the primary routes of transportation, usually by canoe, villages along the same waterway were in frequent contact with each other and came to share a common designation such as "Sacos", "Androscoggins", or "Penobscots". This ancient pattern had begun to break down with the advent of horticulture in southern New England, as increasingly land-oriented villages began to develop networks of trails.² The single greatest division among the Algonquians of New England was between agriculturalists of the south and the hunter/gatherers to the north. By 1600, agricultural practices had spread as far north as the area between the

² Dean Snow, *The Archaeology of New England* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 77,25. "Sagamore" is the Abenaki term for a village or tribal leader, "sachem" is its Massachusetts and southern New England equivalent. Pawtucketts, as speakers of the Massachusetts dialect, referred to their leaders as sachems, while the Western Abenakis of Pennecooke and other upriver villages used "sagamore".

Saco and Kennebec rivers, and the villages of the Merrimac watershed were inhabited by horticulturalists.

The Indians of the Merrimac drainage, who would eventually form the Pennacook confederacy, were not as culturally uniform as their riverine setting would imply. Instead, the lower Merrimac and its tributary, the Concord, were inhabited by various groups of Massachuset-speakers often designated, for simplicity's sake, as "Pawtuckets" after one of their principal villages near Pawtucket Falls. As well, the Pawtuckets had a village downstream at Pentucket (modern day Haverhill, Mass.). Other Massachusett speakers, who were also referred to as Pawtuckets, were scattered along the coast from the Pascataways (Piscataqua River) in the north down through the Aggawams (who had villages between the mouths of the Merrimac and the Ipswich), the Naumkeags (Salem) and as far south as the Mystic River which flowed into Boston Harbor.³ Sometime after 1000 A.D. the already agricultural Massachussets had

³ Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 8-9; David Stewart-Smith, "Pennacook-Pawtucket Relations: The Cycles of Family Alliance on the Merrimac River in the 17th Century," *Actes du Vingt-cinquieme Congres des Algonquistes* (Ottawa: Carlton University, 1994), pp. 447-448. Although Stewart-Smith distinguishes between Pawtucket and Aggawam, I will follow Gookin and refer to the coastal Massachuset-speakers north of the Mystic River as subgroups of the Pawtuckets.

begun expanding up the coast, possibly in search of new land for an increasing population. Archaeological evidence indicates that this expansion was opposed by the still non-horticultural Abenakis, who began building their villages on defensible bluffs and surrounding them with palisades.⁴

Native resistance and harsher weather seems to have halted the Massachussets' advance and left the northern coastline and interior to the Abenaki-speakers. In 1600 their descendants still inhabited village forts at Pennecooke (modern Concord, N.H.), Amoskeag (Manchester, N.H.) and other lesser-known sites along the upper Merrimac. Separated from the sea for centuries, these Abenakis became linguistically distinct from the "Eastern" Abenaki who lived along the rivers and bays of Maine (often referred to simply as "Eastern Indians" by early New England writers). Instead there developed a "Western" Abenaki dialect, spoken by the peoples of the upper Merrimac, upper Connecticut and Champlain valleys. The linguistic and cultural divide between the Western Abenakis and the Pawtuckets (sometimes designated as Upper and Lower Pennacooks) has caused a considerable amount of confusion in classifying the members of the Pennacook confederacy,

⁴ Snow, *Arch. of New Eng.*, p.333.

beginning in 1674 with Daniel Gookin (who wrote that the confederacy was dominated by Pawtuckets), and culminating in the nineteenth century with fictitious articles on the "Pennacook" language. More recent scholars have acknowledged that the Pennacooks had no distinct language but have made little attempt to explain how the confederacy was created.⁵

However, the Western Abenaki villages had also adopted agriculture in the centuries before European contact. A village of four hundred Indians required between 990 and 2,320 acres of cropland, roughly equivalent to what would support fifty English settler families. For these more recently agriculturalized people, the "seasonal round" of subsistence activities was a combination of those of the hunter/gatherers to the north and the more agricultural peoples of southern New England. Maple and birch trees were tapped in the spring, ground nuts were gathered, birds were caught and fish were netted during their spawning runs upriver. In May corn, beans, squash and tobacco were planted by village women in fields cleared by their men. Throughout the summer, the women would tend these crops

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30; Gordon Day, "English-Indian Contacts in New England," *Ethnohistory* 9, no. 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 29-30; Gookin, *Collections*, pp. 8-9.

while the men journeyed upstream in birchbark canoes to fish in Lake Winnepesaukee and other large inland lakes. By autumn they would return for the harvest and winter storage, as well as to catch eels, passenger pigeons and waterfowl while women gathered chestnuts, butternuts and other edible wild plants. Winter snows facilitated the stalking of deer and moose, while bears were hunted in their dens. Beaver, otter and other furbearing mammals were also taken in the winter when their coats were thickest. Corn, stored and buried in woven baskets was eaten throughout the winter and the surplus traded to hunter/gatherer tribes for the superior furs which could be hunted in the northern regions. The Pawtucket's seasonal round was similar, although they may have traveled in dugout pine tree canoes and their fishing trips were often to the ocean, where whole families would camp to harvest shellfish and other marine resources.⁶

⁶ Thomas Morton, *The New English Canaan or New Canaan: Containing an Abstract of New England* (1637) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms Reprint, 1993), p. 42; Peter Thomas, "Contrastive Subsistence Strategies and Land Use as Factors for Understanding Indian-White Relations in New England," *Ethnohistory* 23, no. 1 (Winter 1976), pp. 10-11, 13-14; William Wood, *New England's Prospect* (1639) in *American Culture Series*, Reel 4, No. 30, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms), pp. 77-78; Snow, *Arch. of New Eng.*, pp. 71-83.

By 1600, the Western Abenakis and Pawtuckets were engaging in trade as well as war, as the differing resources of the coast and interior encouraged trading relationships such as those described by Thomas Morton: "so likewise (at the season of the yeare) the Salvages that live by the Sea side for trade with the inlanders for fresh water, reles curious silver reles, which are bought up as such as have them not frequent in otherplaces, chestnuts, and such like usefull things...".⁷ Beside native goods, coastal villages would have controlled the supply of European goods into the interior during the postcontact era, which may have been what Morton was referring to as "curious silver reles". Western Abenaki villages had developed their own networks of foot trails by this time, which could have been used for overland trade, but seem also to indicate an increase in warfare between the still-palisaded villages. Abenaki men at this time were well armed, often carrying a bow with arrows, spear, and a sharpened mace-like war club made from the dense wood of a tree root.⁸

Despite this warfare, the Merrimac region seems to have been prosperous and populous on the eve of European

⁷ Morton, p. 41.

⁸ Snow, *Arch. of New Eng.*, pp. 71-73.

settlement. There have been no major archaeological excavations of Pawtucket or Western Abenaki sites in the region which could provide a population estimate. However, in 1674, the Bay Colony's Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Daniel Gookin, wrote that there had been 3,000 men in the area before the "great sickness." This would have given the valley a pre-epidemic total of about 12,000 people, a figure acceptable to most scholars today. If Peter Thomas' average population estimate of four hundred per village on the Connecticut river held true for the Merrimac, one would expect about thirty villages in the river basin. This fits well with the thirty-one villages John Smith reported hearing of after his 1614 explorations in the area. Much of this population was probably Western Abenakis clustered around the river's source at Lake Winnepesaukee, a region which known archaeological evidence suggests to have been one of the most populous in all of Indian New England.⁹

Village-based Algonquian societies in the northeast lacked the organizational and coercive institutions of European society. Authority within the village was vested in one or more headmen, called a "sagamore" by the Abenakis

⁹ Gookin, *Collections*, pp. 8-9; Snow, *Arch. of New Eng.*, pp.35,37; Day, "English-Indian Contacts", p. 29; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus," p.269.

and other northerly peoples, and a "sachem" by the Massachusset-speakers and other groups to the south. Sagamores and sachems were usually chosen from among the elite families of a tribe or village and would usually consult with a council of elders. In 1610, Marc Lescarbot described the Micmac sagamore Membertou as ruling "not so much as our king over his subjects, but with sufficient power to harangue, advise, and lead them to war, to render justice to one who has a greivance, and like matters." A sagamore would also have a following of younger men who had voluntarily chosen to entrust their welfare with him. Fr. Pierre Biard, a Jesuit missionary, visited the Eastern Abenakis in 1616 and noted that a sagamore received a portion of each hunt's kill and provided "dogs for the chase, canoes for transportation, provisions and reserves for bad weather and expeditions" while "young people flatter him, hunt, and serve their apprenticeship under him". Often his young followers were not allowed any private possessions until they married. Much of a sagamore's authority was kinship based and could be expanded through the marriages of sons and daughters. Although their authority was based on a relatively voluntary obedience and could be challenged by any ambitious upstart within the tribe, their power was real

enough and bred arrogance among some. After visiting the coastal Abenakis of Maine in 1623 and 1624, Christopher Levett stated "The Sagamores will scarce speak to an ordinary man, but will point to their men, and say Sanops, must speake to Sanops, and Sagamores to Sagamores."¹⁰

The other specialized role in Northeastern Algonquian societies was the shaman or pow-wow, usually described as a curer of disease, diviner of the future, game caller, general intercessory with the spirit world and manipulator of human society. Occasionally a leader would be both sagamore and shaman, in which case he was "greatly dreaded" in both his own and surrounding villages. Membertou, the Micmac sagamore at Port Royal in Acadia, combined both offices and used his power to control the Micmacs' associations with French traders and colonists until his death in 1611. His power was great enough that he was able to organize Micmac war parties in canoes and shallops to raid the corn supplies of coastal agriculturalists as far south as Pawtucket territory. These raids helped to drive

¹⁰ Reuben Thwaites (ed.), *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers Co., 1896-1901), Vol. I, pp. 75-77, Vol. III, pp. 87-89; Alvin Morrison, "Dawnland Directors: Status and Role of Seventeenth Century Wabanaki Sagamores," *Papers of the Seventh Algonquian Conference* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1976), pp. 3, 4-6, 8-10, 13-14.

the Pawtuckets from the coast and were a factor in the creation of the Pennacook confederacy.¹¹

The only other known sagamore/shaman in the area was Passaconaway, leader of the Pennecooke village and founder of the confederacy. Passaconaway was described by Thomas Morton, who directed a fur trading station at Wessagusset between 1625-1630 and William Wood who spent four years in New England during the 1630s. Morton described him as "the Sachem or Sagamore of the territories neare Merrimack River a man of the best note and estimation in all those parts". Morton also wrote of him as "a Powah of great estimation amongst all kinde of Salvages" who could cast mists, make ice and work other magic, often at great gatherings. Rather than discount the "great Nigromancer", Morton, an Anglican, attributed his abilities to "the agility of Satan his consort".¹² William Wood was not familiar enough with Pennecooke village to list it as one of the "noted Habitations" in his New England's Prospect but he did describe Passaconaway as "A Sagamore and most noted Necromancer."¹³ Like Membertou, he used the changes brought

¹¹ *Jesuit Relations*, I, pp. 75-77; III, pp. 89-91; Morrison, "Dawnland Directors," pp. 12-14.

¹² Morton, pp. 34-36, 38.

¹³ Wood, p.88.

by European contact and settlement to his advantage, in expanding his power beyond his own village.

In northern New England, sporadic contact between natives and European sailors had begun a century before any permanent settlement. As early as 1524, the Verrazano expedition along the eastern seaboard encountered Abenakis on the coast of Maine. Verrazano reported that the Indians there knew that his crew wanted to trade, but would only do so by lowering baskets from cliffs and would not allow the sailors to land. Apparently these Abenakis were already familiar with, and suspicious of, the motivations of European mariners. By contrast, the inhabitants of Narragansett Bay were unfamiliar with, and hospitable to, Verrazano and his crew.¹⁴ Whether European crews had by this time visited the area between these two regions and ventured to the mouth of the Merrimac or traded with the Pawtucket villages is unknown. It seems likely, however, that some account of these strangers, their ships and goods would have filtered down the coast and inland through trade, diplomacy and intermarriage.

¹⁴ George Winship (ed.), *Sailors' Narratives of Voyages along the New England coast 1524-1624* (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1905), pp. 20-22.

Contact with European mariners seeking to augment their fishing profits with beaver, otter and other skins would have been rare until the 1560s, when a shortage of both beaver and salt in northern Europe encouraged fishermen not only to make landfalls in order to dry their catch, but to engage in a more profitable and extensive fur trade with the local Indians while the fish were drying. The increased contact was evident when Etienne Bellenger visited and explored eastern Maine in 1583 and met inhabitants eager and experienced in trading furs and skins. About three years earlier the John Walker expedition had raided an Abenaki village twenty-seven miles up the Penobscot River and stolen three hundred hides, probably moose, which the villagers had accumulated in expectation of trade. In 1602, Abenakis had had enough contact with Europeans to meet Bartholomew Gosnold's expedition off the Maine coast in a shallop, dressed in some European clothing, speaking some words of a European language and drawing a chalk map of the coast.¹⁵

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 34-35; Snow, "Abenaki Fur Trade in the Sixteenth Century" *Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology* 6(1): pp. 3-11, pp. 3-6; Day, "English-Indian Contacts", pp. 24-40; Gabriel Archer "The Relation of Captain Gosnold's Voyage" (*Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 3rd Series, Vol. 8 [1843]), p. 73; David Quinn, *North America from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements: the Norse Voyages to 1612* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 387-388; *Explorers and Colonies: America, 1500-1625*

During the early decades of the seventeenth century, expeditions to the New England coast, by both the English and the French, became more frequent. The English often alienated the coastal tribes of both northern and southern New England by taking captives back to England. These kidnappings created a legacy of mistrust and hostility, while adding to the Indians' knowledge of Englishmen when captives occasionally returned on later expeditions.¹⁶ Encounters with French expeditions had mixed results. In voyage south from St. Croix island in 1604, Champlain landed on Cape Ann and conversed by signs and drawings with some Aggawom Pawtuckets who drew a map for him. The Indians described the Merrimac River as being very long but having shoals, which may have been what dissuaded Champlain, Smith and all the other expeditionaries from sailing up it. Exploring parties under de Monts and Poutrincourt scouted the coast through Abenaki and Pawtucket country and as far south as Cape Cod in 1606 and 1607. Although most meetings

(London and Ronceverte, West Va.: The Hambledon Press, 1990), pp. 291-292.

¹⁶ *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1677-1733, preserved in the Public Record Office.* (New York: Krause Reprint Ltd., 1964), Vol. I, p. 6; Neil Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence*, pp. 86-96; Dean Snow, "The Ethnohistoric Baseline of the Eastern Abenakis", *Ethnohistory* 23 (1976), pp. 297-298.

with the "Armouchiquois", as the French called the agriculturists living south of the Saco, were friendly, both the de Monts and Poutrincourt expeditions encountered one hostile group, which was enough to convince them both that this densely populated region was too unfriendly to establish a permanent trading station. Furthermore these Indians showed little interest in the European goods offered and seemed to have no need or inclination for fur trading at this time. Perhaps their demand for goods such as kettles (which one native tried to steal from de Monts' party) were already being met by unauthorized traders such as a renegade merchant from Rouen whom de Monts tried to capture without success.¹⁷ The French then returned to Port Royal to trade with Membertou's Micmacs.

This French trade in Acadia (a term which referred to both the present-day Maritimes and northern New England in the early seventeenth century) had unintended consequences for the inhabitants of the Merrimac and surrounding regions. By devoting an inordinate amount of their energies toward

¹⁷ Wood, p. 57; Marc Lescarbot, *Nova Francia, a description of Acadia, 1606* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1928), pp. 44, 52, 108-112; Samuel de Champlain, *The Works of Samuel de Champlain* (H.P. Biggar, ed.) (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-1936), Vol. I, pp. 335-336, plates LXXXI, LXXXII; Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence*, pp. 62-66.

gathering furbearers, the Micmacs neglected their traditional sources of food. Instead they began to raid southward for corn that was being traded between the Pawtuckets and other agriculturists and the non-agricultural Eastern Abenakis further up the coast. These raids commenced after 1606, when a Micmac sagamore was killed in the territory of the Sacos, and would continue until the early 1630s. At first the raids were confined to the certain Eastern Abenaki tribes by their French allies, who did not want to alienate all of southern Acadia for the sake of the Micmacs' friendship. The French established a separate alliance with the Sacos and, in 1613, began building "St. Sauver", which was intended to be a permanent settlement and Jesuit mission under Biard, on Mt. Desert Island. However, French diplomatic and religious influence in southern Acadia was destroyed by the English that same year. From his base at the English colony of Jamestown, Samuel Argall raided the would-be colonists at St. Sauver. Later he sacked the French colony at Port Royal, although scattered Frenchmen remained in the area and maintained a continuous trading presence.¹⁸

¹⁸ Snow, "Ethnohistoric Baseline," pp. 302; Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence*, pp. 66-72, 76-77; Parkman, Vol. I, pp. 224-240.

With lessened French provisions and French restraint, the Micmacs escalated their attacks on New England Indians, and expanded their raids down to the Pawtucket territory where the corn was grown. Although these battles were mostly bow and arrow affairs with few guns and little hand combat, the Micmacs, called "Tarrentines" in English sources, gained a reputation of being "salvage and cruell" and caused the Pawtuckets to build palisaded forts for their own defense. The French became implicated in these raids by their continuing trading association (occasionally of guns) with the Micmacs at ruined Port Royal and elsewhere. Although French traders in New England were reported by John Smith the next year (1614), the natives' animosity seems to have shifted from English kidnappers to French traders. By 1616, at least one French vessel trading in Massachusetts Bay had been attacked and sunk with five members of her crew captured.¹⁹

Bad as the attacks of the Tarrentines were, the Merrimac was about to be visited by calamities far worse beginning in 1616 with an epidemic, possibly bubonic plague, which may have killed seventy percent or more of the

¹⁹ Wood, pp. 51-52, 72; Morton, pp. 22-23; Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence*, , pp. 76-77; Parkman, Vol. I, p. 240.

population in some regions of New England. Ironically, the French presence in Acadia and New England may have been responsible for this disaster also, or at least they appeared so in Indian eyes. Among the Eastern Abenaki, Pierre Biard wrote that "They are astonished and often complain that since the French mingle and carry on trade with them, they are dying fast, and the population thinning out." Indians of Massachusetts Bay later told Morton that before the plague struck, the last surviving Frenchman from the trading vessel captured in the Bay had warned them of God's punishment for their actions. (The crew may well have been infected, which would account for the deaths of the other four captives.) Earlier accounts of Smith, Champlain and other visitors described unravaged villages which indicates that 1616 epidemic was a first, "virgin soil epidemic", which, hitting a previously unexposed population, made it virulent enough to sweep through the coastal areas from the Kennebec river to Narragansett Bay. The areas of New England described as populous by the French ten years earlier became the desolate wastes which the Plymouth colonists, conveniently encountered in 1620.²⁰

²⁰ Sherburne Cook, "The Significance of Disease in the Extinction of the New England Indians," *Human Biology* 45 (1973), pp.490-491; Dean Snow and Kim Lamphear, "European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing

The Pawtucketts were hard hit as well. Governor Thomas Dudley of Massachusetts wrote a description of some of their habitations in 1631. A village near Saugus contained only fifteen people and Naumkeag (Salem) had only two or three surviving families while the once densely populated villages on Nahant Neck and Cape Ann, which Champlain had visited, received no mention at all. The pestilence may have been less severe further up the Merrimac and other rivers, as evidenced by Dudley's description of the region as containing 400-500 men there in 1630.²¹ The accuracy of his figures cannot be verified, but it is certain that the region contained only a fraction of its 1600 population. This horrific mortality was best described by Thomas Morton:

they died on heapes...and the living, that were able to shift for themselves would runne away, & let them dy... For in a place where many inhabited, there hath been but one left alive, to tell what became of the rest, the livinge being (as it seemes) not able to bury the dead, they were left for crowes, kites, and vermin to pray upon. And the bones and skulls upon the several places of their habitations, made such a spectacle after my coming into those partes, that as I travailed in that Forest, nere the Massachussets, it seemed to mee a new found Golgotha."²²

of the First Epidemics," *Ethnohistory* 35, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 21-23; Morton, pp. 22-23; Snow, "Ethnohistoric Baseline," pp. 303-304; Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation*, p. 87.

²¹ Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence*, pp. 103-109.

²² Morton, pp. 22-23.

Some Europeans took this opportunity to begin trading with the surviving Indians, obtaining furs for guns and liquor. Reports of widespread drunkenness and suicide among the New England inhabitants began to circulate.²³

In the early fall of 1621, ten Plymouthmen and the Indian interpreter Squanto traveled by shallop to the Pawtucket country. Their account illustrates further the effect which disease and raids had upon the natives. While entering Boston Harbor, the party noticed that most of the islands had been recently inhabited and that some had been completely cleared for planting. Now however, all the inhabitants had either died or removed themselves. The travelers first made contact with Obbatinewat, a sachem on the Neponset river, who acknowledged the authority of the Massachusetts sachem Massasoit. Obbatinewat claimed he was an enemy of "Squaw Sachem", widow of the sachem Nanepashemet who now led the Pawtuckets, yet he had no trouble leading the New Englanders into her territory, because the Pawtuckets fled and hid themselves from the visitors. There was no move to defend the two palisaded forts which had been built, probably because a recent attempt by the plague-

²³ *Calendar of State Papers*, I, pp. 33; Morton, p. 54; Wood, pp. 51-52.

decimated Pawtuckets to defend their forts had resulted in defeat and the death of Nanepashemet at the hands of Micmacs. Eventually they realized that the intruders were not Tarrentines but English and emerged from hiding to welcome them, show them their two abandoned forts, trade "a good quantify of beaver" and give them "kind entertainment". In all, the Pawtucket Indians whom the traders met seem to have been people in disarray: after the death of their sachem, the survivors were too few to man their forts and "durst not remain in any settled place, for fear of the Tarrentines." Desperate for allies, they were willing to trade what little furs they had to the Plymouth expedition, including the clothes off their women's backs.²⁴

Besides overtures to the English newcomers, the Pawtuckets and their neighbors sought to re-establish viable communities by amalgamating themselves and joining with the Western Abenakis upriver in what would become the Pennacook confederacy. When the sons of Squaw Sachem and Nanepashemet came of age, they married into the other surviving elite families in the region. The oldest son, Wonohaquahan, known to the English as "Sagamore John", married Joane, daughter of Masconomet, the Aggawoms' sachem, and became the leader

²⁴ Dexter, *Mourt's Relation*, pp. 57-58; Bradford, p. 89.

of Winisimet village (Chelsea, Mass.). Wenepaweequin, another son, took two wives. One was Joane Ahawayetsquanie, surviving daughter of the Nahant sachem Poquanum, and the other was an unnamed daughter of Passaconaway. A third son, Montowampate ("Sagamore James" to the English) married another daughter of Passaconaway (possibly named Wenhus) and established himself as the leader of Saugus village. Passaconaway, the esteemed sagamore and shaman of Pennecooke, was the logical choice to lead this new system of kinship and alliance. He may have already extended his control over the Abenakis downstream at Amoskeag and the surviving Indians of the once-populous Lake Winnepesaukee further north. This would explain why neither Winnepesaukees nor Amoskeags receive much mention in later historical records, which treat Passaconaway as the unrivaled sagamore of the entire Merrimac. His domain was far enough inland to be safe from the violence of the Micmacs and relatively buffered from the steadily increasing incursions of fishermen, traders and settlers in Piscataqua, Salem and, after 1630, Massachusetts Bay. Each year a "multitude" of Abenakis and Pawtuckets would gather at Pawtucket Falls near the village of Wamesit to catch fish during their spawning runs and participate in games and other diversions. This

annual meeting, which the Puritan missionary John Eliot compared to an English fair, may have originated in the prehistoric era, or may have been inaugurated at this time to cement the alliance of the two peoples.²⁵

Despite their dire straits and the relative power of Pennecooke, the Pawtucket sachems did not abjectly surrender their authority. When Montowampate married Passaconaway's daughter, he brought his new bride back to Saugus accompanied by a guard of her father's warriors. Later she went to revisit her father and was escorted their by the men of Saugus. When she was ready to return to her husband, Passaconaway sent word to Montowampate to send his own men to pick her up. The younger sachem believed "that it stood not with his reputation to make himself or his men so servile", refused and replied that Passaconaway should use his own men. Although Passaconaway "was intraged to think that his young son in law did not esteem him at a higher rate," Montowampate "was determined not to stoope so lowe" and stood his ground. The resolution of this standoff is unknown. Montowampate's brother, Wonohaquahan of Winisimet, concluded an independent alliance with the Narragansetts.

²⁵ Winslow and Eliot, *Glorious Progress*, pp. 8-9; Morton, p. 86; *Calendar of State Papers*, I, p. 33; Stewart-Smith, pp. 448-449.

He and another sachem traveled down with "all their men" to help the Narragansetts fight the Pequots in 1632. Tellingly the Winisimets could muster only thirty men.²⁶

When the Puritans of the "Great Migration" began to arrive and occupy Massachusetts Bay in 1630, both Passaconaway and the Pawtucket sachems sought to accommodate them. Passaconaway reportedly dreamt that the English could not be opposed. (Later Puritan writers would draw a parallel between his shamanistic vision and Numbers 23:23: "Surely there is no enchantment against Jacob, neither is there any divination against Israel" casting themselves as the new Israel and the Pennacooks as sensible Canaanites.)²⁷ Although he did not formally submit to Massachusetts' Governor John Winthrop until 1644, Passaconaway had befriended the English at Odiorne Point (on the coast of Maine) as early as 1623. By 1632, English traders were staying in Pennacook villages. When one of them was robbed and murdered that year by an Indian living west of the Merrimac Valley, Passaconaway had the murderer apprehended and returned, presumably to the English authorities.²⁸

²⁶ Morton, pp. 38-40; Winthrop, *Journal*, Vol. I, p. 76.

²⁷ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp. 463-464.

²⁸ Stewart-Smith, p. 449; Winthrop, I, pp. 91-92.

Within months of the Puritan colony's founding, Montowampate and Wonohaquahan established their own good relations with these near neighbors and potential allies. In February 1631, the two sachems visited Winthrop and sought his aid in recovering twenty beaver skins which had been forced from them by a trader now thought to be in England. Winthrop wrote to his brother-in-law on their behalf. Wonohaquahan encouraged other, more distant sachems to ally themselves with the English. On April 4, he brought in Wahginnacut, a Connecticut River sachem, who invited Winthrop to establish a settlement among his people on that strategic and fur-laden waterway. On July 13, he brought the son of his ally Canonicus the "great sachem of Naraganset" who exchanged gifts with Winthrop and spent the night.²⁹

Perhaps emboldened by these new alliances, Masconomet of Aggawam (Wonohaquahan's father-in-law) began retaliatory raids against the Tarrentines. In early August, 1631, one hundred Micmacs in three large canoes struck back against Aggawom. Armed with French guns, the raiders managed to kill seven Pawtuckets and wound others including

²⁹ Winthrop, I, pp. 60, 61, 65.

Montowampate and Wonohaquahan, before the Pawtuckets could gain English protection. Once the local settlers had been alerted, the Micmacs retired to their canoes.

Montowampate's wife (apparently returned from Pennecooke) was taken hostage, but returned within a month when Abraham Shurd, an Englishman settled in Maine, paid a ransom of wampum and skins. Unwilling to fight heavily armed Europeans, the Tarrentines never harried the coast again.³⁰

The sachems' strategy, to welcome the English for the security they might provide against raiders, had worked, but this security had its price. As Puritan settlers continued to arrive, it became increasingly difficult for the two cultures within the Bay to coexist. English pigs, cattle and sheep became a nuisance to the Indians who did not keep livestock and resented the enclosure of their hunting territories as well as the damage that free roaming pigs did to their own, unenclosed fields. By June, 1631 Wonohaquahan had been reprimanded because one of his Winisimets had injured cattle. That same month a Neponset River sachem was

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68; Edward Johnson, *The Wonder Working Providence of Sion's Savior in New England* (J. Franklin Jameson, ed.) (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1959), p. 50; Wood, pp. 51-52, 72; William Hubbard, *A General History of New England*. (1680), (Boston: Little and Brown, 1848) (Library of American Civilization microfiche 13230), p.145.

fined because one of his men had shot a pig. As well, the colonial authorities denied the Pawtuckets any right to buy firearms. Montowampate, perhaps fearing another Tarrentine attack, purchased "a piece and pistol with powder and shot" from a Watertown man in 1632. One of Montowampate's men informed the colonial authorities after they had promised to conceal the informer, who feared for his life. By the next year Montowampate and his people were recorded as being in debt to the English and it is possible that the informer was trying to curry favor with creditors. Regardless, that the sachem was betrayed by one of his own followers indicates that the social fabric of the Pawtuckets was under considerable strain. By 1633, Indians who had been friendly with the English "began to quarrell with them about their bounds of Land". New Englanders began to suspect Indian plots against them.³¹

In November, 1633 all quarrels and plots, real and imagined, ended when a second wave of disease hit New England's Indian population. This smallpox epidemic was caused by another pathogen to which natives had no prior

³¹ Winthrop, I, pp. 69, 90, 91-92, 114-115, 119; Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, p. 51; Virginia Anderson, "King Philip's Herds: Indians, Colonists and the Problem of Livestock in Early New England", *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. LI, No. 4 (October, 1994), pp. 601-624.

exposure or immunity. The resulting mortality among the already reduced tribes may have been greater than in 1616. The Pascataways ceased to exist as a people: by December only one or two of them survived. The rest of the Pawtuckets fared almost as badly. After converting to Christianity and promising to live as an Englishman if he was spared, Montowampate died. Wonohaquahan and almost all of the adult Pawtuckets were dead by early December. Many Pawtucket orphans were taken in and cared for by the settlers but by February all but three of them had died. The few remaining survivors, including Squaw Sachem, consolidated themselves once again, this time below Pawtucket Falls in the single village of Wamesit. Four decades later, these surviving Pawtuckets and their descendants, now known as Wamesits, numbered only about 150 individuals.³²

Although they still retained a local sagamore as late as 1675, this 1633 smallpox epidemic destroyed Pawtucket independence. Too few to resist, Squaw Sachem and the other survivors acquiesced to English encroachment and sold their

³² Winthrop, I, pp. 111, 114-115, 119; Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, p. 51; Nathaniel Bouton (ed.), *New Hampshire Provincial Papers*, (Concord, Nashua and Manchester, N.H.: 1867-1873), Vol. I, p. 106; Gookin, *Collections*, p. 46.

rights to the Concord River for a few fathoms of wampum and some European goods in 1636. Furthermore, the epidemic had wiped out Pawtucket leadership while the Pennacooks' survived. Although still severe, the disease had left about 250 men (perhaps 1,000 or more people total) alive upstream. Passaconaway survived and, without any resistant sons-in-law, became the acknowledged sagamore of the Pennacooks, Wamesits included.³³

Passaconaway also extended his authority over one other group, the Nashaways who lived further west along the Nashua, a tributary of the Merrimac River, and in the vicinity of Wachusset Mountain. Because of their inland position, comparatively little is known about these natives, who were often confused with their western neighbors, the Nipmucks of the Chicopee River basin. Old men of the Massachusetts tribe told Daniel Gookin that their chief sachem had once "held dominion" over the Nashaways and other petty tribes, before the disruptions of the seventeenth century. Passaconaway may have arranged a marriage between

³³ Charles Wolcott, *Concord in the Colonial Period* (Boston: Estes and Lavriat, 1884), pp. 13-15; Gookin, *Collections*, p. 9; Nathaniel Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England* (Boston: William White, 1853-1854), Vol. IV, Part II, pp. 94-95.

one of his sons to the daughter of a Nashaway sachem, which would explain why John Eliot described one of his older sons as "a Sachim at Wadchuset" in 1648. This may have been Nanamaconuck, who was granted a quarter of an acre near Groton (on the Nashua) by the General Court of Massachusetts before October, 1663. After this son agreed to begin praying at Pawtucket Falls in 1648, Eliot planned to preach the next year at another, more distant, fishing spot which may have been a fish weir the Nashaways had built on the Nashua near Lancaster. Like the Pawtuckets, the Nashaways were ravaged by disease, probably in 1634, when the smallpox spread up the Connecticut drainage causing a 95% mortality in some areas and may have been introduced to Wachusset by the Nipmucks or other nearby tribes. When Lancaster was founded in the early 1640s, the settlers named the Nashua's northeastern branch the "Penacook River." The records of Gookin and others indicate that the later Nashaways were about equal in number to the inhabitants of Wamesit, yet more factionalized and dispirited. Because of this factionalism, Pennacook control appears to have been less complete. Factionalism also helps to explain why some Nashaways, especially those who lived around Groton, removed themselves to Wamesit and Pennecooke in later years.

Ultimately, the discrepancy in Pennacook control between partially-confederated Nashaways and fully-confederated Wamesits, would encourage the two groups to take very different paths, and suffer very different fates, during King Philip's War.³⁴ .

Like the later *pays d'en haut* of the middle west, the Pennacook confederacy and identity was a creation of refugees. In both cases the survivors of epidemic disease were driven from their original villages by settler encroachment and attacks by a large, more aggressive native society. The essential difference is distance. Tribes such as the Hurons and Delawares trekked hundreds of miles and were able to re-establish themselves well beyond any forward edge of European settled society. In contrast, the Pennacooks established themselves in constant proximity to the expansionistic New Englanders. Instead of having decades to prepare for any confrontation with Europeans and their descendants, Passaconaway, his heirs and the other Pennacooks would have no respite. This continual need to plan for, react to, confront or evade New England in all her

³⁴ Gookin, *Collections*, p. 8; Eliot, *Glorious Progress*, pp. 9-11; Bradford, p. 270; Henry Nourse (ed.), *Early Records of Lancaster, 1643-1725* (Lancaster, Mass.: 1884), p. 33; Caleb Butler, *History of Groton* (Boston: 1848), pp. 19-23. See Chapter Four.

manifestations, would determine the subsequent history of the Pennacooks.

COEXISTENCE

The epidemic of 1632 struck the Pennacooks in time to forestall the land conflicts between them and the rapidly growing population of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Yet, despite their much reduced populations, the people of Wamesit, Nashaway and Pennecooke itself soon found themselves confronted by an expanding colonial presence. Contact between Pennacooks and colonials took place in three arenas: diplomatic and religious, as Passaconaway and other Pennacooks felt increasing pressure to acknowledge the authority and faith of Massachusetts Bay, and trade, a less official interaction between individuals of both societies. All three were interrelated. For example, Thomas Hincksman, a fur trader who was appointed by the Court to investigate the murder of another New Englander at Pennecooke, was later elected to the colonial legislature and later still helped Eliot and Gookin convert Wannalancet, Passaconaway's son, to Christianity. Richard Walderne who had a lengthy career as a fur trader at Dover on the Piscataqua, was the militia commander for the area and also had significant diplomatic dealings with the Pennacooks during King Philip's War. Most of the Pennacooks' recorded dealings with New England, whether diplomatic, religious or commercial, were conducted with men of influence in the government of Massachusetts. All of these dealings advanced the interests of

Massachusetts at the expense of Pennacook culture and autonomy, although to varying degrees. Pennacooks were often aware of this and, at times, responded by opposing or subverting colonists' advances. Yet the most common response was eventual accomodation which, although it guaranteed continual erosion of the Pennacook domain, allowed the two cultures to coexist in peace for a time.

One of Massachusetts' earliest overtures to the leader of the Pennacooks, Passaconaway, in September of 1642, was both tactless and overbearing. Alarmed by rumors that Miantanomo, a Narragansett sachem, was organizing a united Indian rebellion against the settlers, the General Court ordered all Indians in what they considered their jurisdiction disarmed. Although the Pennacooks had not as yet acknowledged the Court's authority, (and sources contain no evidence that any Pennacooks were plotting against New England at this time) a forty-man militia detachment was sent to Passaconaway in order to ensure his compliance. Because of rain, the detachment did not reach the sagamore's wigwam and went instead to his son's. The meeting was less than diplomatic and ended with the unnamed son managing to escape after being shot at and missed, and his wife and child taken by the militia, and led captive to Newbury.

Upon hearing of the soldiers' excesses, the Court was alarmed and fearful that the incident might provoke Passaconaway into open hostility. They sent Cutshamekin, a friendly sachem from near Braintree, Massachusetts, north to tell Passaconaway that "what was done to his son and squaw was without order" as well as to justify the New Englanders' actions and to persuade him to come into the General Court and declare his innocence of any plot. To prevent the outrages done to the Pennacooks' sagamore from becoming a pretext for war by other Indians, two messengers were dispatched to Miantanomo to warn him that Massachusetts was aware of his alleged plot and that "the injury done to Passaconaway" was a mistake, although Massachusetts claimed it was done "through his own pvocation". Passaconaway, for whom there is no evidence linking him to any plot, declared that he would not treat with the colonial authorities until his son (apparently still in the woods) and his son's family (still in custody) were returned to him. The daughter-in-law and grandchild were released from Newbery where they had been held and the son seems to have made his own way home. Passaconaway never came in to the authorities himself, but instead sent Nanamaconuck, his oldest son, who delivered the Pennacooks' firearms to the Court. Wishing to smooth over

relations once again, the Court decided that the Pennacook sagamore be given unmentioned "satisfaction" toward the end of September.¹

Despite this sort of bungling, Passaconaway, whether through the interpretation of his dream or the conscious evaluation of his limited options, chose to formally submit to Massachusetts two years later, in 1644. Earlier that year in March, Squaw Sachem of Pawtucket, Nashacowam (who may have been a Nashaway sagamore), Cutshamekin and other Indian leaders whose people lived near English settlements had already acknowledged the "protection and government" of the Bay Colony. Later, on May 20, 1644 Passaconaway and his sons followed suit. The fact that the Pawtucket and Nashaway leaders had submitted before him indicates that Passaconaway may have seen no alternative. Two of the villages in his confederacy had already acknowledged New England's overlordship. Although Pennecooke itself was still well upstream from any white settlement, Passaconaway

¹ Winthrop, *Journal*, II, pp. 74-75; Shurtleff, *Gov. and Co.*, Vol. II, pp. 23-24, 27. Passaconaway had at least three sons: Nanamaconuck, his oldest, Nanaleucet, the second, and Wannalancet. Nanamaconuck fathered Kancamagus. As well, he had at least two daughters: "Wenhus" and one other. See Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 1), pp. 430-432; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p. 276; Stewart-Smith, pp. 448-449.

must have realized that if he stayed out of Massachusetts' alliance network, he would almost inevitably lose power over Wamesit and Nashaway. In April, 1645 he and his sons reaffirmed the submission of "themselves and their people and lands" to the General Court.²

Most contacts between Pennacooks and colonists before 1675 can be assigned to the realms of either religion, diplomacy or trade. Although all three are interrelated, each of the three themes will be examined sequentially for clarity's sake. The chapter concludes with an account of the relationship that developed between the Pennacooks and Richard Walderne. Walderne's story has large elements of both trade and diplomacy and is central to the later history of the confederacy, therefore it merits a section of its own.

RELIGION

Because Pennacook submission to colonial authority was seen by Massachusetts as submission to God and the Ten

² Winthrop, II, pp. 160, 169, 223; Nourse, p. 11; Shurtleff, Vol.II, p.73.

Commandments as well, John Eliot, the Puritan missionary, began preaching to the Merrimac natives soon after 1645. Eliot's stated strategy was the time-honored Christian method of converting rulers in the hope that the ruled would follow their lead. Effecting the conversion of Passaconaway would have been especially significant: not only was he a powerful sagamore, but Eliot was also well aware that Passaconaway "hath been a great Witch in all mens esteem". Converting him would have been a true Puritan triumph over native shamanistic practices. Accordingly, Eliot traveled to Pawtucket Falls in 1647 when the populations of both Pennecooke and Wamesit gathered there for their spring fishing. Passaconaway and his sons fled for their lives as Eliot, possibly accompanied by an armed guard, approached. However, most of the Pennacooks remained at the falls and listened to the missionary. During the spring fishing of 1648 Eliot came again, and Passaconaway, whose flight the year before may have cost him a considerable amount of prestige, stood his ground. Eliot chose to preach an interesting modification of Malachi 1:11: "From the rising of the Sun, to the going down of the same, thy name shall be great among the Indians, and in every place prayers shall be made to thy name, pure prayers, for thy name shall be great

among the Indians." This was a significant departure from the passage's original words: "for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of hosts". We cannot know whether Passaconaway thought the passage referred to his own name, but Eliot recorded that he responded warmly to the preaching, and told the missionary "that indeed he had never prayed unto God as yet, for he had never heard of God before, as he now doth." Passaconaway then pledged that he would begin praying and would persuade his sons to do the same. Later he told Simon Willard, with whom the Pennacooks traded frequently, that he would gladly give Eliot some land if the missionary would live among them and teach the Pennacooks. Eliot was much encouraged by these results and noted that although the annual Pawtucket Falls gathering used to be an occasion of "gaming and much evill", it was now assuming a far more Christian character, at least outwardly. As well, he made plans to visit a far less accessible "great fishing place", perhaps Nashaway or Lake Winnepesaukee, controlled by Passaconaway in 1649. Ultimately however, Eliot's efforts to convert the old sagamore and shaman failed. Whether out of disappointment that his prayers never resulted in the earthly rewards that Eliot's first sermon seemed to promise him, or his inability

to persuade the elders of Pennecooke, who as late as 1669 still "refused to pray to God", Passaconaway died sometime after 1662 without ever formally converting to Christianity.³

Passaconaway was succeeded by his son Wannalancet, who did convert in 1674 at Pawtucket Falls. Although he inherited his father's sagamoreship, Wannalancet did not become the Pennacooks' powwow, nor did anyone else. The lack of any powwow to replace Passaconaway indicates that, village elders notwithstanding, the old religious beliefs of the Pennacooks were dwindling in the face of epidemics and the rapid encroachment of a European Christian society. By 1668 there were reports of widespread drinking and disarray at Pennecooke. Other factors in Pennecooke had also changed by 1674. Most of the village elders who had resisted conversion were killed by Mohawks in 1669. After their deaths, the villagers were better disposed to listen to the Christian message, and by the end of 1670 Eliot had dispatched a newly converted Indian named Jethro to preach to them. The deaths of so many of the remaining staunch pagans in 1669 removed the last significant obstacles to

³ Winslow, *Glorious Progress*, pp. 9-11.

Christianity. Although it meant abandoning a significant portion of traditional culture, Wanalancet's conversion in 1674 may have been an attempt to enlist new, more powerful supernatural aid in the battle to restore cohesiveness to a village that had lost its old spiritual moorings.⁴

Eliot met with greater success among the Pawtuckets. Because English settlements were so close, many Pawtuckets (who had already lost their coastal lands between Boston and the Piscataqua) would have been particularly fearful of further white encroachment and may have embraced Christianity in an effort to legitimate their own land claims. Also, nearby settlers used their regular contact with Wamesit to assist the conversion efforts. These factors, coupled with the influence of Eliot's annual trips to Pawtucket Falls, had enough of an influence that by November 1649, Pawtuckets were praying and visiting the missionary to hear his teaching. In the ensuing decades, the influence of Eliot (and later Gookin) transformed the

⁴ Gookin, *Historical Collections*, p. 47; John Eliot, *A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians of New England* (1671) in *American Culture Series*, Reel 86 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms), p. 10; Waters, *Chelmsford*, pp. 79-80; "Penacook Papers", *Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society* 3 (1832), (Concord, N.H.).

Pawtuckets into "Wamesits" and the village of the same name into a "Praying Town" with about half of the population baptized by 1674. Squaw Sachem's death was unrecorded, but in 1646 the Pawtuckets along Concord River had Tahattawan as their Sachem. Tahattawan desired that his people could settle within Concord town so as to be more easily instructed in the Gospel. Although some Pawtuckets opposed it, by the next decade Wamesit had been established as a praying town. By 1670 their sachem was a Christian Indian named Numphow, whom Eliot referred to as "a Man of a real Noble Spirit." Because Eliot could only visit once a year, he appointed another convert, George (also known as "Mystic George") to instruct the Wamesits on a daily basis. Numphow's son Samuel (or "Sam Numphow") was sent to school, taught to read and write, and returned to Wamesit by 1674 to become a teacher. Despite all of these Christian inroads, Eliot wrote pessimistically in 1670 that the Wamesits "have not much esteem for Religion.", after many had joined in an attack on the Mohawk village of Caughnawaga. Nevertheless, from their behavior during King Philip's War it appears that many Wamesits had genuinely converted to Christianity and were initially willing to place their trust in Massachusetts Bay. Of the three Pennacook villages, missionary efforts

were most successful at Wamesit, where the English presence was most pronounced.⁵

Although they began in a promising manner, missionary efforts were least successful among the Nashaways. As early as 1648, Eliot wrote that their sagamore, Showanon, had decided to "embrace the Gospel & pray unto God." Despite the distance from the more settled areas of New England, Eliot traveled there four times that year, because Nashaway was still a heavily populated area "and sundry of them do gladly hear the word of God". The next year Eliot visited again and was protected by a guard of twenty warriors led by Showanon himself when he traveled on to the village of Quabogud (Brookfield, Massachusetts). All of this goodwill was squandered in 1654 when Showanon died and the General Court dispatched Eliot and Increase Nowell to ensure that the sagamoreship did not pass to "Sam...(a) very deboist & a drunken fellow, and no friend to the English" but rather to "Mathew...(who) is very hopefull to learn the things of

⁵ Eliot, *Glorious Progress*, pp. 23-24; *Brief Narrative*, p. 9; Gookin, *Historical Collections*, p. 46; Wolcott, pp. 100-101; Jennings, *Invasion of America*, pp. 242-243; Thomas Shepard, *The Clear Sunshine of the Gospel Breaking Forth Upon the Indians of New-England...* (1648) in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society 3rd Series*, 4 (1834), p.38.

Christ". Although the General Court succeeded in the short run, many Nashaways lost respect for the missionaries and the colonial government, which offered them no protection from Mohawk attacks or the encroachment of the nearby settlements of Lancaster and Groton. The once populous Nashaways became a faction-ridden and dispirited group much reduced by Mohawk depredations. The General Court may have made Mathew the Nashaway sagamore for a time, but they had irrecoverably damaged their reputation and religion in the process. When King Philip's War began, many Nashaways would break with the neutrality of the Pennacooks and follow "Sagamore Sam" in wreaking havoc along the Nashua Valley.⁶

DIPLOMACY

In 1652 the General Court followed up on Passaconaway's submission by sending an exploratory party deep into Pennacook territory. Massachusetts's 1628 charter had fixed the colony's northern boundary at three miles north of the Merrimac's source. Although an exploring party had been ordered up there in 1638, its discoveries were apparently

⁶ *Glorious Progress*, p. 14; Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 53-54; Shurtleff, Vol.IV (Part 2), p. 210; Nourse, *Lancaster*, pp. 16, 38-39.

inconclusive. Simon Willard and Edward Johnson were appointed to procure assistants, journey up the river and determine its source. Willard and Johnson hired two settlers to aid them in surveying and determining latitude.

They also hired Pontauhun and Ponbakin "two Indians well acquainted with Merremack Rivere & the great lake (Winnepesaukee)...; born and bred all their daies thereupon...." These Indians led them upriver to the Merrimac's confluence with its western branch, the Pemigewasset. Here the guides turned along the eastern branch and led the party to Lake Winnepesaukee, although both Willard and Johnson believed that the "westerly river...was bigger than the other." Nevertheless, the explorers allowed themselves to be guided up the shorter branch to the lake, and determined Massachusetts's northern boundary to be on its shore at 43°40'12" north latitude, a spot later named Weir's Beach. When the expedition returned, the Court was also skeptical that the river's source was on its eastern branch. One of their number, Richard Walderne, who was one of the area's most significant traders, later swore that the Pennacooks called both branches the Merrimac River.⁷

⁷ J. Kimball, "Exploration of the Merrimac," *Historical*

The Pennacooks had an excellent reason for keeping the western branch outside the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. Its headwaters began deep in the White Mountains, within twenty miles of both the Androscoggin, which flowed into the Eastern Abenaki territories in Maine and the Ammonoosuc, which ran into the Connecticut. Traveling upstream to the Connecticut's headwaters would bring one within a few miles of the Coaticook River, one of the headwaters of the St. Francis, which flowed in turn to the St. Lawrence River Valley. Control of this hinterland was vital to any Pennacooks who wished to maintain unhindered contact, not only between two Abenaki tribes, but also to a new group of European colonists, the French to the north. Although sporadic overland contact between the Merrimac and St. Lawrence River Valleys may have begun in pre-contact times, it had achieved a new significance in the 1640s. Intercourse with the French along the Atlantic coast had

Collections of the Essex Institute 14, no. 3 (July 1877), pp. 151-167; Nathaniel Bouton, *The History of Concord* (Concord, Mass.: Benning W. Sanborn, 1856), pp. 49-50; *Documents and Records of New Hampshire*, Vol.I, p. 290; Shurtleff, Vol.III, p. 278; Vol.IV (Part 1), pp. 98, 109; Vol.IV (Part 2), p. 242. The first expedition in 1638 may have been searching for a passage to the Connecticut River, rather than trying to establish the colony's northern bounds. See Winthrop, I, pp. 109-110.

ceased about the time of the 1616 epidemic, but by 1645, Abenakis had visited the Jesuit mission at Sillery, next to Quebec on the St. Lawrence. By 1647 the Abenakis had begun a modest beaver trade at the mission. English settlers' awareness of this developing French influence may have influenced the Massachusetts General Court's prohibition of foriegn fur traders in 1650.⁸

Yet French influence continued. In September 1650, the Jesuits had also dispatched Fr. Gabriel Druilletes to convert the Eastern Abenakis to Catholicism in September 1650. Traveling down the Kennebec, Druilletes began the mission at Norridgewock, a post which would bedevil New England's eastern frontier over half a century later, then ventured along the Atlantic coast and up the Penobscot. Later in 1650, Druilletes made a formal diplomatic visit to Boston and Plymouth in an attempt to form an alliance between New France, New England and the Abenaki nations against the Iroquois League, which had recently devastated Huronia and attacked Abenakis and other French allies. Although the Jesuit was suprisingly well received, New England saw no reason to antagonize the Iroquois in order to

⁸ *Jesuit Relations*, Vol. XXX, p. 185; XXXVII, pp.241-261.

secure French and Abenaki interests. Druilletes had more success with the Western Abenakis, to whom he had broached the idea of an alliance in November 1650, on his way back from Boston. That winter the Sokokis (from the upper Connecticut), Pennacooks, Pocumtucks (middle Connecticut), and Mahicans (upper Hudson) had all met in council and agreed to ally themselves to New France, with or without New England. Druilletes was informed of this when he returned the next April. This alliance provided no aid to the Pennacooks and the other tribes because it was abandoned by the French in 1653 when they made peace with the Iroquois. Yet contacts with the St. Lawrence region must have continued because Pennacook men, with wives from the Jesuit missions of Sillery and Tadoussac, were reported on Lake Huron in 1675. Whether the English were aware that Passaconaway's tribe, which had submitted to their own authority in 1644, was now engaged in an independent alliance with New France is unknown. However, Druilletes' mission was certainly no secret, and, in light of his activities, it is not surprising that Massachusetts dispatched the Willard and Johnson expedition to clearly define her northern bounds in 1652. Nor is it surprising that the Pennacooks wanted to keep the western branch of

their river, the route to New France, out of English jurisdiction.⁹

During the decades following the establishment of Massachusetts, the Pennacooks, like so many other natives in the Northeast, warred with the Iroquois League, especially its easternmost tribe, the Mohawks. As early as 1639, William Wood had reported that frequent warfare had created such fear of the Mohawks that "the very name of a *Mohack* would strike the heart of a poore *Abergenian* (New England Indian) dead" and that the New England tribes looked to the English for protection similar to that which they had provided against the Tarrentines. Fear of the Mohawks and other Iroquois created Druilletes' alliance with the Abenakis in 1651, and fear of the same caused a desperate New France to abandon this alliance and seek peace with the Iroquois League two years later. By 1662, various economic, cultural and diplomatic factors had combined to encourage an

⁹ *Jesuit Relations*, Vol.XVI, p. 101; XXIV, pp. 55-65; XXX, p.185; XXXVI, p. 83-111 especially pp. 75-81, 101-103; XXXVII, pp. 77, 241-261; XXXVIII, pp. 17-43; Shurtleff, III, pp.208-209; Gordon Day, *Identity of the St. Francis Indians*, Canadian Ethnology Service Paper No. 71, (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981),p. 16; Daniel Richter and James Merrill, *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America 1600-1800*, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 64; Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers*,p.336-337.

increase in Mohawk aggression eastward as far as the trading station at Pentagoet on the Penobscot River.¹⁰

New England's colonists sought to stay clear of these battles and Massachusetts' authorities tried to discourage Pennacooks and other Indians in their jurisdiction from engaging in hostilities. As a result, their details are largely unrecorded. Yet it appears the Mohawks did not always have the upper hand against the Pennacooks and other Algonquian adversaries. In September 1664 the Mohawks requested aid from the English government of New York if they were "beaten" by the "Ondiakes, Pinnekooks and Pacamtekookes (Pocumtucks)". The Iroquois also entreated New York not to aid these three tribes, to whom a Mohawk leader had "brought ransomes & presents to them on a treaty of peace" only to be murdered during his embassy.¹¹

¹⁰ Wood, pp. 49-50; Neil Salisbury, "Toward the Covenant Chain", in Richter and Merrill (ed.s), *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, pp. 33 n.95; Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers*, pp. 260-262; See Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd Series XLI (1983), pp. 528-559 for an exploration of the cultural factors involved in Iroquois warfare.

¹¹ Edmund O'Callaghan, ed. *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1869-1916), Vol.III, pp. 67-68.

Nevertheless, continued Mohawk attacks eventually got the better of the Pennacooks and their allies. Daniel Gookin wrote that the Nashaways in particular were "consumed by the Maquas' wars" and attributed much of their population loss to Mohawk depredations. John Eliot stated that the Wamesits "have much ado to stand their ground" against the attackers, some of whom killed the brother of their sachem, Numphow, while he was fishing on the Merrimac. Gookin, as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, tried to protect Wamesit from Mohawk attacks by placing a garrison there in 1669.¹²

In August 1669, the Pennacooks, Sokokis and others, under a leader named Chickataubut, mounted their largest offensive against the Mohawks. Many "Sachems and Men of Note" in Pennecooke were enthusiastic supporters of the expedition. These warriors visited their Wamesit confederates and, despite Gookin's garrison, enlisted a great many of them. Numphow went to avenge his brother's death and many other Wamesits probably had similar motivations. Estimates for the size of the expedition vary between three hundred and seven hundred Algonquians, but all sources agree that it was a disaster. After besieging the

¹² Eliot, *Brief Narrative*, p. 9; Gookin, *Historical Collections*, p.53.

Mohawk village of Caughnawaga for two hours on August 18, the Algonquians were repulsed and ambushed. Although Numphow survived, as many as one hundred warriors were killed, including many Wamesits and influential Pennecooke elders who had resisted conversion to Christianity. This defeat marked the end of any significant Pennacook aggression against the Mohawks. Yet Mohawk raiding continued up to, and beyond, King Philip's War and remained a constant threat. The Pennacooks would seek protection from New England governments that became increasingly unwilling to provide it.¹³

TRADE

The exchange of beaver and other peltry for European goods provided the Pennacooks with a means to interact with colonists on a more or less equal footing and to materially profit from their contacts. Despite these apparent advantages trade was a complex phenomenon, with the

¹³ *Jesuit Relations*, LIII, pp. 137-145; Elliot, *Brief Narrative*, pp. 9-10; Salisbury (Richter and Merrill, ed.s), "Toward the Covenant Chain", p. 68.

potential to disrupt both colonial and native societies, which Massachusetts authorities sought to regulate. Lacking the coercive institutions with which to regulate itself, Pennacook society was vulnerable to exploitation as dependence on trading relationships grew more pronounced, unless colonial authorities held less scrupulous traders in check. Thus, to understand how and why fur trading impacted the Pennacook confederacy as it did, one must also examine the Merrimac fur traders and their positions within New England society.

The earliest white settlements along the Merrimac and its tributaries contained men who were influential in colonial society and dominated the fur trade with the Pennacooks. Yet, inland New England towns were intended to be agricultural settlements. Those who engaged in fur trading did not attempt to establish permanent centers for trucking with the local Indian villages. Instead they encouraged growth and development by English families. Profits they made by surveying, dividing and opening the areas to farming, as well as building roads and mills, usually exceeded anything earned by dealing with the natives for fur. However, the trade around Concord seems to have formed the basis for a fairly amicable relationship between

the two races. Contacts and trading seem to have been infrequent and less amicable along the Nashua. Trade relationships in the Pennecooke-Piscataqua region were the most enduring as well as the most turbulent. Whether amiable or not, the links which developed between fur trading town founders and local natives set the tone for Pennacook-New England relations up until King Philip's War.

One of the most substantial figures in this inland trade was Simon Willard who also played a leading role in Massachusetts' government and military affairs. Emigrating from Kent in 1634, he soon became involved in dealings with the natives. Within two years he made the acquaintance of the Pawtuckets and became a "chief instrument" in the settling of Concord, the first Massachusetts town erected beyond the tidewater.¹⁴ Edward Johnson's *Wonder-Working Providence of Sion's Savior in New England* relates how Willard led twelve families, through difficult, swampy terrain and dense undergrowth for several days until they reached their destination where several smaller streams join to form Concord River in a watery, pond-filled area more

¹⁴ Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, p. 110; John Winthrop, Vol. I, p.158n.

suited to beaver habitat than farming.¹⁵ Squaw Sachem and two other leading Pawtuckets, Tohaltowan and Nimrod were given wampum, hatchets, hoes, knives, shirts and cloth. Squaw Sachem seemed to have taken a new husband, Wappacowet, who may have been a powwaw, and was given additional gifts of "a new suit of cotton cloath, a linnen band, a hat, shoes, stockings and a great Coat..."¹⁶

Willard may have chosen the town site with fur trading at least a partial consideration, for although some residents later complained that "the badness and the weetness of the meadows" might compel them to abandon the plantation, the town's nine miles of streams and seven ponds were an excellent beaver habitat. Despite the scarcity of good agricultural land, Concord soon expanded its physical bounds. In 1642, the General Court once again empowered Willard to buy land for the town, this time some 3,700 acres on Concord river from Nattahattawants, presumably a Pawtucket.¹⁷ Fur trading and land sales were not the only

¹⁵ Charles Wollcott, p.17; Johnson, *Wonder Working Providence*, pp. 111-115.

¹⁶ Wolcott, pp. 13-15; Stewart-Smith, "Pennacook-Pawtucket Relations", p. 448.

¹⁷ Wolcott, pp. 17, 39-40,61; Winthrop, Vol.II, p.68.

ways in which the two cultures interacted, and may not have been the only means by which Pawtucketts acquired European goods. Thomas Shepard described how the two cultures interpenetrated one another in various ways in his tract *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel in New England*. Natives sold handicrafts of their own manufacture, as well as berries, grapes and venison they had taken from the land, to the inhabitants of Concord. They were also employed in limited numbers as farm labor during harvest and haying time. The natives seemed to prefer their traditional pursuits of hunting and fishing, which increasingly became a source of friction between them and a settler society which relied on domesticated animals able to roam unenclosed land. Thus the deal with Nattahattawants stipulated that no Indians were to set traps on the newly bought land "so as any cattle might receive hurt thereby." At some point Willard drew up a code of conduct for the Pawtucketts in the area, after consulting with them. Possibly this was to reduce the number of conflicts which would be likely to arise between the two societies. Shepard stated that Willard, along with Rev. Bulkeley, desired to live in peace with their Indian neighbors and to assist them in conversion to

Christianity.¹⁸ During the General Court's October 19, 1658 session, fur trading licenses were explicitly required for the first time. Four men were granted licenses to trade furs on the Merrimac. One was Simon Willard, who had left the area and moved to the town of Lancaster, in the Nashua River valley that same year (John Tincker, not Willard, had the trading rights along the Nashua). Two others, "Mr. Brenton" (William Brenton, who lived in Boston until 1659 when he moved to Rhode Island) and "Ensigne Wheeler" (Timothy Wheeler, whose only recorded dealing with Indians was not until 1684) were financial backers for the truckhouse. The fourth man, Thomas Hincksman, was a resident of Chelmsford, where the Concord and Merrimac join. From his geographic position and extensive record of interactions with the Pennacooks one must conclude that Hincksman was the active partner.¹⁹

¹⁸ Shepard, *Clear Sun-shine*, pp. 28-29; Wolcott, *Concord*, pp. 61, 101-102; See also Virginia Anderson, "King Philip's Herds: Indians, Colonists, and the Problem of Livestock in Early New England," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. LI, No. 4 (October, 1994), pp. 601-624.

¹⁹ Shurtleff, Vol.I, pp. 96, 294-295; Vol.II, p. 146; Vol.III, pp. 62-63; Vol. IV (Part 1), p. 354; Henry Nourse, ed., *The Early Records of Lancaster, Massachusetts, 1643-1725* (Lancaster, Mass.: 1884), pp. 15, 271-272; James Savage, *A Genealogical Dictionary of the First Settlers of New England...*, (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co.,

Thomas Hincksman was admitted as an inhabitant of Concord in 1654, four years before the licenses were granted, and was quick to prove himself a valuable addition to the village. That October, the General Court, with Major Simon Willard as a one of the assistants, restricted the ability of New Englanders to trade liquor for peltry, much as the weapons for peltry trade had been restricted earlier.²⁰ Whether the Court suspected its new law was being flouted or not is unknown, but some time before November 13, 1655 they dispatched Hincksman and Ensign Joseph Wheeler to the unsettled area where Concord river joined the Merrimac. The two apprehended John Cromwell whom the Court later fined twelve pounds for trading a gallon of liquor, almost half a pound of powder and ten pounds worth of shot to the Indians. In the same Court session, John Tincker, who was emerging as a prominent figure in the Nashua valley's fur trade and society, was also fined ten shillings for paying the Indians with a gill of liquor "now

1971) Vol.I, p. 242; Vol.IV, pp. 501; Wolcott, *Concord*, pp. 57, 66, 68, 70-73, 76-78, 89, 91-92, 114.

²⁰ Wilson Waters, *History of Chelmsford*, (Lowell, Mass: 1917), p. 537; Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 1), p.201. For firearms restrictions see *Ibid.* Vol. I, pp. 76, 99-100, 196.

& then." It is unknown how Tincker was caught, there is no mention of any apprehending agents being paid for his arrest. Unlike Tincker, John Cromwell was not a prominent figure and appears to have had no positive links to the local or provincial authorities. Before returning to obscurity, he appears in the record twice more, once when the paternity of his wife's child was in question and again in May 1657, when Simon Willard and Edward Johnson presented a letter to the General Court which shut Cromwell's illegal trade down by granting the land he was using along the Merrimac to the young town of Billerica. Since May 14, 1656 the Court had recognized Billerica's (founded in 1655) right to an eight thousand acre parcel belonging to the town of Cambridge, provided Cambridge was willing to give it up. No agreement ever resulted between these two towns, and by October the Court seems to have concluded, off the record, that a grant of eight thousand acres along Merrimac river, occupied as it was by Cromwell, would be a convenient end to the dispute.²¹

Whether or not John Cromwell's establishment on the Merrimac influenced the Court to restrict the liquor trade

²¹ Shurtleff, Vol.IV (Part 1), pp. 237, 251, 261, 269, 277-285, 295, 302.

in 1654, the Court went to considerable lengths in the next few years to put him out of business. Cromwell, who was also supplying weapons to the natives, was nearer to the source of the fur, and was almost certainly siphoning off profits from Concord, the home of Willard, Wheeler and Hincksman. Although no account records exist to illustrate the volume of Cromwell's trade, he was a man apparently without any other source of income, who paid a considerable fine in 1655 yet was still in business two years later. Both the goods John Cromwell had provided the Pennacooks and the competition he had provided the more established traders were no doubt fresh in the General Court's mind when it established licensure requirements for fur traders in October 1658.²²

Thomas Hincksman was involved at least once more in enforcing the prohibition on unlicensed liquor trading, this time against a far more substantial figure than Cromwell. In June of 1668, word reached Governor Richard Bellingham and Superintendent for Indian Affairs Daniel Gookin, that intoxicated Indians at a truckhouse at Pennecooke had murdered Thomas Dickinson, a servant of Peter Coffin, of

²² *Ibid.*, p. 354.

Dover. The Governor and Gookin dispatched Hincksman to investigate. He traveled upriver to Pennecooke and spoke with several "sagamoses & other Indians, on y^e place" who accused Captain Richard Walderne (the trading house owner and a Deputy of the Court), Lieutenant Peter Coffin, and Walderne's son Paul, of giving liquor to Thomas Payne and Dickinson to trade with the Pennacooks who subsequently killed Dickinson when drunk. After receiving Hincksman's report, several warrants were issued for those concerned to appear before the Court in late October. Thomas Payne left Massachusetts before the summons could reach him. The two Waldernes and Coffin denied the charges and went so far as to level an unspecified accusation at Hincksman and others who testified against them. When given a chance to clear themselves by taking an oath of innocence Walderne and his son did so, but Peter Coffin balked, confessed to giving liquor to Payne to trade with the Indians, and was fined £50.²³ In contrast to his 1656 "investigation" of Cromwell, Hincksman in 1668 was in charge of investigating a similar, but far more serious case, which led to the indictment of one of the General Court's own deputies. Clearly the

²³ Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 414-415.

Court's estimation of Hincksman's character and abilities in dealing with the natives had risen in the intervening years.

It is not known when Hincksman moved from Concord to Chelmsford, but it is likely that he was there by late 1658.

His partners were well established in their own communities and it seems that the younger, less established Hincksman was designated as the active partner and sent to run the truck house on the banks of the Merrimac, not far from where their rival Cromwell had recently been evicted. By 1660 Hincksman appears to have won the trust of the local Wamesits, at least in the eyes of the English, when he was involved in settling the boundary between Chelmsford and the "Indian Plantation" of Pawtucket. Soon after the town of Chelmsford was created in 1655, it agreed to share some land along the south bank of the Merrimac with the natives. This agreement did not seem to work out and by 1660 the English, at least, wanted to make the division more clear. The inhabitants of Chelmsford drew up a plan which established a boundary line through the "Great Swampe" northeast of which would be Pawtucket Indian territory, southeast, Chelmsford.

Hincksman and others went to consult with the Pawtuckets, who gave their consent on April 5, 1660. The formal signing took place in a public meeting on May 14, when Hincksman,

along with John Eliot were among the seven white signatories. Although Eliot was recognized as the guardian of these natives' interests by the General Court, it was Hincksman and the two others who had convinced the Pawtuckets one month earlier to agree to the land swap. Eight Pawtuckets: Puntahhun, John Tohatowan, Kussinauscut, Pannobotiquis, Nomphon, Peter, Noinnoit and Wompannooun, gave their consent. All but John Tohatowon put a mark rather than signing.²⁴

Hincksman was soon reappointed by the Court as an official liaison with the natives of the Merrimac. This time his contact was beyond Wamesit and involved the sons of Passaconaway himself. On October 21, 1663 the General Court noted that although Nanamaconuck, Passaconaway's oldest son, had been granted a plot of land of about one quarter square mile near the new town of Groton upon which he had been living, neither the grant nor the bounds of the grant had been recorded. Therefore, the Court dispatched Ensigns Hincksman and John Evered (also known as John Webb) to:

lay out & bound...one hundred acres of land in a square peece, as neere as they cann, including his planting ground which he liues vpon;

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol.IV (Part 1), pp. 430-432; Waters, *Chelmsford*, pp. 29-33.

At the same session Passaconaway's second son, Nanaleucet, "having many children, & no land of his owne to plant vpon," was granted a similar hundred acre parcel under the same conditions.²⁵

Hincksman continued to serve as a liaison between the two cultures. By 1665, John Eliot had established Wamesit as a praying town on the eastern border of Chelmsford. As had been the case with Chelmsford and the Pawtucket village, the initial boundaries between the two communities and Billerica were ill defined and in need of revision by 1665.

Hincksman, and William Fletcher, with whom he had helped revise the Pawtucket boundary in 1660, were appointed to consult with two men from Billerica and six Indians. The ten agreed on a new border in June, which put the boundary of Wamesit adjacent to a parcel of meadowland owned by Thomas Hincksman. Although such neighborliness could lead to disputes, none are found in the record.²⁶

Perhaps two incidents above all illustrate the significance of Hincksman as a go-between in the cultural exchanges taking place in the Merrimac valley. In 1670 a

²⁵ Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 94-95.

²⁶ Waters, p. 34.

small group of Wamesits were attacked by a Mohawk raiding party in the woods north of the Merrimac river. The only survivor was a girl, left for dead after she was scalped, who was found by other Pennacooks and taken first to Hincksman's residence where her life was saved. Furthermore by 1674 he had forged enough of a bond with Wannalancet, the chief Pennacook sagamore, to be one of four whites named as present in his wigwam when Wannalancet converted to Christianity in May. Also present were Richard Daniel of Billerica and Daniel Gookin, who wrote an account of the conversion, and John Eliot.²⁷ These incidents suggest that Pennacooks recognized Thomas Hincksman, whether as a fur trader, a land surveyor or otherwise, as a trustworthy and influential ally.

Yet Hincksman was an exception. Simon Willard, the area's original fur trader, opened the Concord river to white settlement and soon became preoccupied with other matters. As Willard moved to Lancaster, he left the remnant of Concord's trade to Thomas Brookes and became, along with William Brenton and Timothy Wheeler, only a financial backer of Hincksman's Chelmsford venture. Nevertheless, the

²⁷ Waters, pp. 79-80; Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 23, 47.

relationship established by Willard and Passaconaway was continued by Hinckman and Wannalancet, sparing Concord and Chelmsford much of the misery during the 1670s.

Despite the assertions of some nineteenth and early twentieth century historians, fur trading in the Nashua river valley amounted to little compared to that of the Concord. A truckhouse was established there in the early 1640s and one of the original owners, Thomas King, may have traded with the Nashaways. But the site was purchased by John Prescott in 1647, and there is no hard evidence that Prescott used it for anything other than farming. When the Court issued its fur trade licenses in 1658, only John Tincker, who had been arrested for selling the Indians liquor three years earlier, was authorized to trade in "Nashaway & Groaton". Tincker removed to Connecticut in 1659, leaving his Lancaster holdings to Simon Willard. Geography worked against the ability of a Nashua establishment to compete with the trade already in place on the Concord. The distance, traveling in a canoe from Pennecooke to Concord or Pennecooke to Lancaster, was nearly identical, but half the trip to Concord was down the broad, navigable Merrimac, whereas the journey to Nashaway was almost entirely upstream on the smaller Nashua tributary.

Furthermore, Nashaway was about one hundred feet higher in elevation than Concord. Once the local supply of beaver ran out around Nashaway, traveling to Lancaster, whether to trade with Prescott or Tincker, meant an additional sixteen miles of paddling against the current up a small river with frequent stops to portage around shallow areas. Concord had been established first, and for any non-Nashaway Pennacook to transport furs to Nashaway instead, simply did not make sense. Once Hincksman (or even Cromwell) had established himself right on the Merrimac, the choice was even clearer.²⁸

²⁸ For Thomas King: Nourse, *Lancaster*, pp. 9-10. For John Prescott: *Ibid.*, pp.10, 15,22-23, 28, 32-34,39-40,46-50, 56, 64-66, 71,73, 74-78, 90-91, 275-276; Winthrop, *Journal*, Vol.II, p. 155; Shurtleff, Vol.II, p. 75; Vol.III, p. 428; Wolcott, *Concord*, p. 41; Caleb Butler, *History of Groton*, (Boston, Mass.: 1848) pp. 47-49. For the traditional view of John Prescott as the founding father of Lancaster, Mass. see Nourse, "John Prescott, the Founder of Lancaster," *Bay State Monthly* Vol. 2 (Feb. 1885) and Francis Moloney, *The Fur Trade in New England, 1620-1676* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1967) pp. 71-72. For John Tincker: Nourse, *Lancaster*, pp. 20, 31, 40, 50, 69, 262-264, 271-272; Shurtleff, *Gov. and Co.*, Vol.IV, Part I, pp. 251, 354; Bernard Bailyn, *New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) pp. 24-25, 29; Butler, *Groton*, p. 16n. For Geographic Factors: U.S. Geological Survey. *Boston*, (map) Eastern United States 1:250,000, NK 19-4. (Reston, Va.: U.S.G.S. 1970.); see map in Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, for the geographic knowledge of seventeenth century New Englanders.

The failure of a fur trade to thrive on the Nashua is paralleled by the settlers' neglect in fostering any sort of positive relations with the Indians. Petapawag, before it became Groton, was cultivated by the Nashaway inhabitants who also maintained a fishing weir nearby. Another weir was in use upstream near Nashaway plantation until at least 1658, so the area was certainly frequented by natives, although they may have spent much of their time a few miles to the west near Wachusett Mountain. Yet there does not seem to have been much contact between the English and natives. Despite the fact that the Nashaways maintained a third weir at "the wading place through Penicooke (Nashua) river", the settlers ran their road to Concord right through it, a move which would not have endeared them to potential trading clients. The Nashaway population seems also to have been declining drastically during this period. After John Eliot visited them in 1648 he wrote that "there be more people by far, than be amongst us." By 1674 Daniel Gookin observed that although they had once been numerous, the Nashaways had been reduced to sixteen families or less. Gookin blamed this on Mohawk attacks which had hit the Pennacooks hard by 1674,²⁹ but disease almost certainly played a role also.

²⁹ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, pp. 19-23, 39; Nourse, *Lancaster*,

Seeing their population dwindling rapidly, the English may have concluded that the Nashaways were a doomed people and their presence insignificant.

Because it involved an exchange which appeared advantageous to both parties and did not require any submission to colonial authority, trade was the natural arena in which the two cultures could peacefully coexist. Where it occurred, Pennacooks (and perhaps English) could hope that symbiotic, mutually beneficial relations could continue. Yet not all of the fur trades' potentialities were benign, as the story of Richard Walderne illustrates.

WALDERNE

Richard Walderne, the man who played the most decisive role in Pennacook-New England relations, was born in Warwick County, England in 1616, settled on Cochecho River in what became the town of Dover and was certainly the most powerful seventeenth century settler on the Piscataqua.³⁰ He had business interests in shipbuilding, forestry, mills and government, and was situated east of Pennecooke village.

p. 60, 97; Winslow, *Glorious Progress*, p. 8; Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 9, 22, 53-54.

³⁰ Savage, *Genealogical*, Vol. IV, p. 390.

Cochecho itself was in the former territory of the Piscataquas, who had been a Massachuset-speaking group akin to the Pawtuckets, and Walderne conducted a durable, if not friendly, business with Pennacooks and other Abenaki groups to the east right up until the night of his death.

By his own recollection, Walderne had been active in the fur trade since 1635. The local natives of Piscataqua had been wiped out in the 1633 epidemic and, without them, the would-be traders of Piscataway Plantation seem to have been reduced to hunting their own peltry, for a 1635 plantation inventory included thirty-two "beaver spears". Settler society was not conducive to beaver hunting, which was almost unheard of among North American colonists. In order to make fur profitable, Walderne had to expand his trade to include the newly-formed Pennacook confederacy. Richard Walderne and his older brother William both signed the "Hilton Patent" in October 1640 which declared that Piscataqua settlers would govern themselves until the Crown could make arrangements for them. The area soon came under Massachusetts' jurisdiction, yet Walderne remained a local power throughout his life. One year later Walderne began the plantation "Cochecha" (Cochecho or "Quochecho") where a tributary of the same name ran into the Piscataqua. He

owned land on both sides of the broad river and at some point erected a sawmill and cornmill on one side and an additional sawmill on the other, taking advantage, no doubt, of the area's massive pines.³¹

Throughout the 1640s, the General Court seems to have paid little attention to Walderne or his outpost on Piscataqua river. Although the small settlements which dotted the coastline north and east of Cape Ann in this period were dominated by English fishermen and their families who cared little for Boston and Puritanism, the settlement around Dover seems to have been an exception, and Bay Colony authorities came to regard Richard Walderne as a trustworthy man of influence. At some point he received a commission in the militia, and was referred to as "Captain Walderne" by 1653 when he was keeping the county court at Dover. He was a member of the General Court as early as 1649

³¹ Charles Clarke, *The Eastern Frontier* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 55; Albert Batchellor, ed. *Laws of New Hampshire...*, (Manchester N.H.: John B. Clarke Co., 1904), pp. 746-747; Bouton, ed., *N.H. Prov. Papers*, Vol. I, p. 115. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 540-541. The beaver spears may have been trade items. Ralph Pastore, personal communication, Sept. 1997.

and was Dover's regular choice as Deputy for almost every year between 1654 and 1678.³²

While his authority was strengthened at home, enabling him to grant land on the south side of Piscataqua Bay and at times, marry Dover couples, Walderne proved himself to be a staunch defender of the Puritan colony. By 1662 the town had become a hotbed of Quakerism and Walderne was directed to suppress the Society of Friends, which he is remembered as doing quite zealously. When some petitioners in nearby Portsmouth asked Charles II to grant them a government separate from Massachusetts, Walderne helped call a town meeting and put his weight behind a counter-petition which proclaimed Dover's loyalty to the General Court. He and Peter Coffin (his fur trading partner in 1668) were part of a committee to erect fortifications at Portsmouth Harbor in 1666. By 1661 the General Court was trying to extend its power up the coast into Maine, the colony tenuously and intermittently governed by the heirs of Sir Ferdinando Gorges. In May, Walderne and two others were sent to Falmouth (present day Portland) to straighten out a land

³² Clarke, *Eastern Frontier*, Chapt. I-V; *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 153; Vol. IV (Part 1), p.133; lists of deputies in Vols. III, IV(Parts 1 and 2), and V.

claims dispute between planters Cleaves and Jordan, thereby strengthening Massachusetts' authority in the area. By October 1663 the area around Falmouth had been incorporated as York County and Walderne traveled there to give the county commissioners their oaths.³³

Although Walderne was now profitably involved in almost all aspects of the Piscataqua economy: milling, shipping, allocating lands and governing the area, his own testimony acknowledged peltry trafficking to be a long term, and presumably profitable, activity. When the Willard and Johnson expedition returned claiming that the Merrimac issued from Lake Winnepesaukee, and not the more distant headwaters of the western branch of the Merrimac River, Walderne was called upon in May, 1665 to give an oath about the river to the Court. He swore that, to the Pennacooks, both the eastern and western branches were known as the Merrimac and based his knowledge on decades of trading experience with the area's inhabitants.³⁴

³³ Shurtleff, Vol. III, pp. 409-411 and Vol. IV (Part 2), p. 47; Vol. IV (Part 1), p. 69; Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 11, 69, 268-269, 306; George Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War* (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill Press, 1906), p. 294..

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV (Part 1), p. 303; Vol. IV (Part 2), p. 242; Bouton, *N.H. Prov. Papers*, Vol. I, p. 290.

In the same oath of 1665, Walderne told how "about six years since, being sent for by Passaconaway & several other sagamores" he traveled to the Pennacooks' main village "where there was a great many Indians...at the fort which was by the rivers side...." It is not known why Passaconaway and the others were interested in Walderne around 1659, but that same year was one in which Walderne seems to have been very interested in Pennecooke. Citing "the need of multeplyinge of towneshippes for the enlargement of the contrey, and accomodateinge of such as want oppertunity to improve themselves," his name headed the list of twenty-two inhabitants of Dover and Newbury who petitioned the General Court for twelve square miles of land at "a place which is called Pennecooke." Peter Coffin was also a signer. On May 18, 1659 a committee of the General Court granted them an eight square mile plantation under the condition that the petitioners make a report to the Court at its October 1660 session on how, and with whom, they intended to settle the area.³⁵

³⁵ Bouton, *N. H. Prov. Papers*, Vol. I, p. 290; "Penacook Papers," *Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society* 3 (1832), Concord, N.H., pp. 212-213.

Despite the official sanction, there was no report to the General Court in October, 1660 and no settlement of the area was made. In light of this, Walderne's 1665 aside about being sent for by Passaconaway "about six years since," becomes significant. Because of his comment that the village contained "a great many Indians" at the time of his visit, it seems likely that Walderne visited the Pennacooks in the summer or early fall of 1659, when they were concentrated in the village for the agricultural phase of their annual subsistence cycle. Walderne had been active in the area's fur trade for almost a quarter century and was a known figure to the natives. It would have been a coincidence indeed, if Passaconaway and the other sagamores had felt the need to send for Walderne over some matter unrelated to the General Court's unilateral grant to him and the others of eight square miles of Pennacook land a few months earlier. Although relations between settlers and Indians in New England were peaceful at the time, the petitioners seem to have concluded that settling among the Pennacooks, thirty-five miles inland from Dover and fifty miles upstream from Chelmsford, was unwise, and the grant was allowed to lapse. Three years later, in 1663, some

residents of Salem obtained the grant which was also allowed to lapse for unrecorded, though probably similar, reasons.³⁶

Walderne's interest in Pennecooke was far from sated however. As an experienced fur trader, he knew that a truckhouse up the Merrimac from Hinckman's would siphon off a far more lucrative trade than his own establishment on the smaller, less accessible Piscataqua. There could be no more convenient location than next to the Pennacooks' main village. He and Peter Coffin, another Dover resident who had joined the original petition to settle Pennecooke, became partners in a new fur venture.³⁷

Walderne might still have been eyeing the area for white settlement, for his servant Thomas Payne later stated that Walderne and Peter Coffin "did intend to send Carpenters to build there, and also to have ground broke up to be improved." By this time, 1668, fur traders on the Connecticut river, led by John Pynchon, had begun to compel their clients to settle debts they had contracted. As the local fur supplies dwindled, sagamores' personal dependence on access to European trade goods increased, and in order to

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

maintain their status among their people, they sold large tracts of the Connecticut valley. Almost ten years after his first attempt to settle the area had been frustrated, Walderne may have felt the time was ripe for another try.³⁸

Walderne and Coffin were licensed to trade for peltry with the Pennacooks, but not to sell them liquor. Nevertheless, when the Pennacooks learned in April or May of 1668 that Captain Walderne planned on setting up a trucking house in their midst, they must have suspected that liquor would be sold there because three of them, Paucohauntee, Pehaugan (described as "antient Indians") and Nobhow, made the trip to Dover asking "him not to send, or suffer any Liquors to be sent to ye sayd house." Despite their entreaty, Walderne and Coffin sent for four others, Nacontation, Wapsooget, Ahogmooitt and Moshaumpa, to come to Walderne's house in Dover where Walderne and his son Paul loaded them with fifty-six quarts of liquor. Peter Coffin accompanied them back to their village, where eager Pennacooks bought the liquor before it could be carried into

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 220; Peter Thomas, "Cultural Change on the Southern New England Frontier, 1630-1665", *Cultures in Contact: The Impact of European Contacts on Native American Cultural Institutions, A.D. 1000-1800* William W. Fitzhugh (ed.) (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1985), pp. 150-151.

the truckhouse. It is not known whether this trade was paid for by peltry or if the Indians contracted a debt, but it appears to have been profitable enough for Walderne and Coffin to continue it at a brisk pace that spring. It also appears to have disrupted Pennecooke enough that Paucohauntee, Pehaugen and Nobhow again begged the traders to stop, fearing that the Mohawks would take advantage of their drunken disarray to kill them.³⁹

Nevertheless the truckhouse "did continue sending greate quantityes of Liquors" until mid-June when Walderne's servant, Thomas Payne, and Coffin's servant, Thomas Dickinson, were running the site. Payne and Dickinson sent several unnamed Indians to the Piscataqua saying they would obtain "Gunns, Powder, Shott and Cloath" from their masters.

The Indians were disappointed in their attempt to obtain the prohibited weaponry and returned with only cotton cloth and enough liquor to keep one hundred of their fellow villagers drunk for a day and a half.

At some point in the revelry Payne and most of the Pennacooks left the trucking house for the fort, leaving Dickinson alone with one unnamed Pennacook who stabbed him

³⁹ "Penacook Papers," pp. 216-217; Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 22, 36.

to death, then wandered into the fort with the bloody knife and fell asleep. When he regained consciousness, the murderer remorsefully admitted "that he had not done it, had he not been drunk...(and that) he was willing to dye for it, and that he was much sorry for the death of the said Englishman...." A council of elders was held and the murderer was shot to death the next day.⁴⁰

When Richard Walderne learned of Dickinson's death he dispatched his son Paul "to see the corpse, and enquire vnto his death." Paul arrived before either body had been buried and, after attending to Dickinson's burial, returned home. He would later swear in his deposition that the Pennacooks had denied the murderer was drunk and had given no answer as to why he had killed Dickinson.⁴¹ Paul Walderne's testimony was contradicted by John Page, Robert Parris, Thomas Tarball and Joseph Blood who testified that they had gone "to Pennycooke to enquire after cattle yt were lost." Although the New Englanders also spoke with Thomas Payne (apparently left behind by Paul Walderne in case the trucking operation could be restored) who denied that the natives were drunk

⁴⁰ "Penacook Papers", pp. 214-217.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

when the crime occurred, the Pennacooks "sayd yt Payne much lyed." The cattlemen were also shown an empty six gallon cask in the truckhouse and a quart of liquor in a bladder, which had been saved by the Indians as evidence. The mood at the fort seems to have become far more sober and remorseful. One Pennacook stated that when the crime occurred "all Indians were drunke or else they had not killed Englishman," and Tahanto, a sagamore who had not previously been identified with the anti-alcohol faction, "being afrayd that we had brought Liquors to sell, desired us if we had any that we would power it uppon the ground, for it would make ye Indians all one Divill."⁴²

Thomas Hincksman's appointment to investigate the murder has already been mentioned. After an investigation in August, a trial by the General Court (because the scene of the crime was out of any County magistrates' jurisdiction and it involved a Court Deputy) was set for October. Warrants were issued for the Waldernes, Coffin and his son, three of the cattlemen, four other New Englanders, and Hincksman was directed to procure Thomas Payne and twenty-seven inhabitants of Pennecooke. Payne left the area.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

Peter Coffin refused to swear to his innocence and, after pinning most of the blame on the servants, Dickinson and Payne, admitted his partial culpability in the Pennecooke liquor trade and was fined. Despite all the testimony against them, Walderne's fellow deputies refused to convict either him or his son after they swore that they would maintain their innocence "before the Judgement seate of Christ another day."⁴³

The story of the Pennecooke trucking house, reconstructed as it is from the records of Hinckman's investigation, is not a very flattering one. Although it is the only detailed description of how a Merrimac trading business actually operated, it is probably atypical. Others were convicted of unauthorized trading, but even John Cromwell was only convicted of selling a gallon of liquor, some powder and shot, not fourteen gallons at a time, as was delivered from the Piscataqua. Nor were any murders recorded as taking place at other trucking establishments. Other, more stable operations lasted for years along the Concord, while the frenzied activity at Pennecooke could not maintain itself for more than a few months.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-224; Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 414-415.

The manic nature of Walderne and Coffin's truckhouse invites scrutiny. John Cromwell could make a living and affect the local trade enough to attract the General Court's attention with his modest operation in 1655. After the stocks had been depleted for another thirteen years, it is almost inconceivable that the Pennacooks would be able to offer Walderne, who after decades of trading presumably knew the market price for peltry, on one single occasion, anything comparable in value to the amount of liquor needed to get one hundred of them inebriated. Even if the Pennacooks' testimony was exaggerated somewhat, Hincksman and the cattlemen also commented on the prevalence of empty liquor casks⁴⁴ and the amount of liquor given the natives would have forced them into debt. John Pynchon had been obtaining tracts along the Connecticut from indebted clients, and Walderne and Coffin probably planned to do the same, which would explain Thomas Payne's comment (made to the cattlemen) that his master intended to send for carpenters, break up and improve the land.

The evidence gathered by Hincksman also illuminates Pennecooke village society at a time when the distance

⁴⁴ "Penacook Papers," pp. 214, 220.

between it and the colonists was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Although both the Court and Walderne, in his settlement petition, had described the area as "remote", the four Englishmen who had lost their cattle must have been herding them somewhere near Pennecooke. Despite the antipathy that Indians often had toward livestock, these cattlemen do not seem to have suspected that the Pennacooks had destroyed their animals. Instead they appear to have been comfortable with the villagers and mistrustful of Payne. This suggests that the relations between both cultures over livestock was not nearly as strained along the Merrimac as it was elsewhere.⁴⁵ Pennecooke was also suffering from the depredations of frequent Mohawk raids⁴⁶ and the village was described as a "fort" by all deponents, Indian and white. The fort seems to have been populous, holding over one hundred adult men, at the time of Dickinson's death. Although village elders Paucohauntee, Pehaugan and Nobhow took a consistent stance against the alcohol, there was a strong demand for it at

⁴⁵ All four cattlemen were living in Groton at this time. It is not known whether herding cattle along the Merrimac was a common practice in the 1660s. *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221; Savage, *Genealogical*, Vol. I, p. 204; Vol. III. pp. 330, 346; Vol. IV, pp. 255-256; see also Anderson, "King Philip's Herds".

⁴⁶ Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 22, 26.

Pennecooke. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the story is that Wannalancet is nowhere to be found in any of the testimonies. Passaconaway's death is usually dated around 1665⁴⁷ and Wannalancet, his son, is conventionally recognized as his immediate successor. It is likely that throughout much of the spring he was downstream fishing at Pawtucket Falls. He was there in May, 1674 when he converted to Christianity and John Eliot had annually met his father there as far back as the 1640s.⁴⁸ Such a trip often had diplomatic significance for the English (and possibly the Pawtuckets) in the area and might have even taken precedence over the disruptions in Wannalancet's home village. But he did not participate in the August investigation or the trial in October either. Chieftainship in the Pennacook confederacy may have been a more fluid institution at this time than it is usually considered by the area's historians.

⁴⁷ Frederick Dockstader, *Great North American Indians*, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1977), pp. 207-208; Samuel Drake, *Biography and History of the Indians of North America, from its First Discovery*, (Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey & Co., 1848), Book III, p. 94.

⁴⁸ Winslow, *Glorious Progress*, pp. 8-9.

The trial and verdicts must be put in the context of New England society. Although the Court was willing to hear a case involving the misbehavior of their Speaker, they had other pressing concerns. After three years under the control of Sir Ferdinando Gorges' heirs, Massachusetts had resumed her governance of Maine in 1668. Eager to establish the authority of Puritan rule over the reluctant eastern settlers, the Court had appointed Walderne one of the Magistrates for York County in May, while his and Coffin's Pennecooke enterprise was getting under way. In the following months the Court had instructed the magistrates to strengthen the authority of Massachusetts loyalists during the York county court session, and bring those who were disloyal to trial. Walderne and his two fellow magistrates had traveled to York in early July, and established the Court's authority in a three day long town meeting. On October 23rd the Court heard the results of the July trip but was still concerned. Desiring that "the lawes of this jurisdiction be duely executed amongst them, & the people religiously governed" the Court opted "for the strengthenig therefore the hands of those that are there already in place..." and reconfirmed their Speaker's magisterial authority over York county. One week later the same man was

on trial, accusing Hincksman and swearing his innocence before his fellow Deputies and the judgment seat of Christ. For the Deputies to have found Walderne guilty would have meant recognizing that their esteemed colleague and bulwark of their authority on the eastern frontier was not only a liquor trader, but a liar and a blasphemer as well.⁴⁹

Coffin's punishment was light. His £50 fine was halved after he petitioned the Court the next year. In 1672 he and Walderne were both elected to represent Dover in the Court of Deputies.⁵⁰

There is little to indicate that Walderne's reputation among New Englanders suffered after his Pennecooke enterprise. Though he would not be elected Speaker again until 1673, he was consistently reelected to Court.⁵¹ Up until the outbreak of war his appointment as a magistrate for troublesome York was renewed yearly, twice at the York deputy's request, and when the heirs of Mason and Gorges tried once again to revive their claims to the disputed area, he was one of eight authorized to write a letter to

⁴⁹ Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 372-373, 404, 406, 414-415; "Penacook Papers", p. 223.

⁵⁰ Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 427, 507.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 418, 449, 485, 507, 551.

the king on Massachusetts' behalf. The Bay Colony found his service valuable enough in 1671 to grant him 230 acres "as a smale recompence," and a larger recompense of 1,200 acres the following year.⁵²

Also in 1674, the Court acknowledged Captain Walderne's ability in commanding and exercising the York militia's regiment of foot and horse by promoting him to major.⁵³ From his early station as a settler and trader on the Piscataqua river he had grown in the esteem of his countrymen: trader, officer, deputy, and magistrate. Although Dickinson's murder had frustrated his enterprise in Pennecooke, the Pennacooks would have to deal with Walderne again, this time in his military capacity after hostilities had begun along the Massachusetts frontier in 1675.

In the forty-three years separating the calamity of smallpox from the tragic consequences of war, the Pennacook confederacy was at its most stable. Passaconaway peacefully consolidated his hold on Wamesit and, to a lesser extent, Nashaway. After his death, his son Wannalancet inherited the sagamoreship and continued his policies without serious

⁵² *Ibid.*, Vol. IV (Part 2), pp. 424, 451-452, 496, 501, 516, 540, 554; Vol. V, pp. 5, 30, 34.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 22.

disjuncture. To be sure, New England's expansion subjected the Pennacooks to an array of steadily increasing pressures and influences. Some, such as fur trading, were embraced, while others, such as Christianity and submission to the General Court were accepted slowly and perhaps grudgingly. In a few instances, as during Druillettes' alliance and Willard and Johnson's Merrimac expedition, New England's policies were circumvented and, in at least one case, the planned white settlement at Pennecooke, perhaps successfully opposed. Because their main village was inland and Passaconaway's policies were fairly accomodationist, both he and his son were remembered as friends by the colonists. Yet Pennacooks could not acquiese to New England's expansion indefinitely. One year after Wannalancet's conversion, the colonies' policies elsewhere precipitated a war during which New Englanders could not be accomodated and the cost of appeasement became intolerable.



KING PHILIP'S WAR

The relationship that Wannalancet had established between his people and frontier New England's fur trading town founders and missionaries could not last. By 1675 fur trading had lost whatever brief importance it had once held in the area. Despite Wannalancet's personal conversion the year before and the fact that Pawtucket village now included the "praying town" of Wamesit, King Philip's War would be justification enough for most New Englanders to consider all Indians, Christian or not, as potential enemies.¹ Within two years this was made clear to all the natives who lived along the Merrimac and its tributaries whose only options would become revolt, internment, death or continuing to accomodate the increasingly hostile colonials.

Judging from the testimony given to Thomas Hincksman when he examined the "antient Indians", it appears likely that the total population of Pennecooke was over 450 in 1668.² Despite the desultory war with the Mohawks up until

¹ For an excellent examination of wartime hostility toward the Christian Indians see Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "Massacre at Hurtleberry Hill: Christian Indians and English Authority in Metacom's War," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. LIII, No. 3 (July 1996), pp. 459-486.

² Tohanto, Sagurmoy and the others told Hincksman that "there were at least one hundred of Indians drunk." They seemed to have been referring only to men. Gookin stated that there were thirty-three men and a total population of approximately 145 in Wamesit in 1674. Using this ratio (approximately 1 to 4.4) gives Pennecooke a population of 440.

the early 1670s, there is no record of any significant mortality in the village-fort and it seems likely that a similar population was maintained until the outbreak of the war. Pennecooke seems to have been reasonably secure from Mohawk raiding parties and distance gave the inhabitants some safety from New England settlers, who were much further downstream, or on the Piscataqua through the woods to the east. Such distance helped Wannalancet and his people avoid direct confrontations with angry settlers and militiamen, making a position of neutrality in the war appear feasible.

Unfortunately for the southern villages of Nashaway and Wamesit, their environs were well settled by New Englanders. Although Lancaster was still considered a frontier town, the Nashaways seem to have suffered more than the Pawtuckets of Wamesit in the pre-war decades. A Nashaway approached Daniel Gookin in September 1674 while he was visiting Nipmuck villages, and told him that many of the Nashaways

This does not include an unspecified number of sober Pennacooks, twelve of whom are recorded, and their families, which would bring the population of Pennecooke fort to over 490 in 1668. These are the roughest of estimates and I have chosen to err on the low side. Although others have estimated Pennacook population to be about 1,250 in 1674 (see Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kankamagus," p. 270) I believe that the total number of Wamesits, Nashaways and Pennecooke inhabitants was closer to 850 in that year.

were "very wicked and much addicted to drunkenness" causing many disorders and making it impossible to practice Christianity in the community. The unnamed Nashaway asked Gookin to exert personal control over his people. However, when Gookin offered to appoint him constable, the informant replied that he must first check to see if he had enough support from his friends (presumably the other Christians) in the area. Instead, the missionary followed his original plan and sent off a Natick praying Indian called Jethro with a letter to the sagamore Shoshanim authorizing Jethro to become a minister to the Nashaways. Gookin stated that the Nashaways at this time lived at "Weshakim", two ponds about five miles southwest of the center of Lancaster. Because of the recent Mohawk raids and other causes, they numbered "not above fifteen or sixteen families" in 1674.³ From Gookin's writing it seems that the surviving Nashaways clustered around the ponds were a dispirited people. Although sagamore Shoshanim was recognized by Massachusetts' authorities, his influence seems not to have extended far beyond the Christian faction and opposition to this faction

³ Walter Bickford and Ute Janik Dymon (ed.s), *An Atlas of Massachusetts River Systems: Environmental Designs for the Future* (Amherst: University of Mass. Press, 1990), pp. 51, 81; Daniel Gookin, *Historical Collections*, pp. 53-54.

appears to have been significant enough that Gookin's visitor never accepted the constable's post offered him.

The Wamesits near Chelmsford appear to have prospered more than the Nashaways. Each spring they were visited by many of their Pennacook confederates, who fished the ample salmon, shad, sturgeon, bass, and lamprey eels at the nearby falls. John Eliot took advantage of this natural congregation to preach there each May. By 1674 he had converted enough Pawtuckets to establish the praying town of Wamesit. With a 1674 population, estimated by Gookin, of seventy-five individuals broken up into fifteen (presumably nuclear) families and led by Numphow, the Christian Indians of Wamesit grew corn on 2,500 acres allotted to them. There were also a number of unconverted Indians in the area during fishing season, although there is no indication of the sort of religious factionalism that plagued Nashaway. The total population in 1675 was counted at about 145, with an estimated thirty-three able bodied men.⁴

⁴ Gookin, *Collections*, p. 46; *Doings and Sufferings*, pp. 472, 475. After the war's outbreak about thirteen "suspicious Indians...who did not properly belong" to Wamesit were noticed among the men of the village. If these men brought their families with them, it may account for the disparity in population estimates.

The Algonquian peoples of southern New England faced similar pressures from expanding New England. Although many of them had allied themselves with the English against the Pequots during the 1630s, the Narragansetts became embroiled against land claimants from Rhode Island, Connecticut and Massachusetts by 1659. The predicament of the Wampanoags was grimmer. They had been losing land to Plymouth Colony and by 1670 were bottled up on the Mount Hope Peninsula (in present-day Rhode Island). Because settlers were more numerous in southern New England and pressures on the natives were greater, frictions were exacerbated and war scares among colonists became frequent. Consequently an apprehensive yet expansionist Plymouth placed increasingly degrading restrictions on the Wampanoags and their sachem Metacom (King Philip). By 1675 Philip's people had become so hemmed in by colonial encroachment that armed resistance was virtually unavoidable.⁵

⁵ Douglas Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War*, (Macmillan Co.: New York, 1959), Chapt. II. Leach has written the best military history of the war. For a fuller examination of the role which competing land claims played in the war's outbreak and its prosecution by New England see Jennings, *Invasion of America*, Chapt.s 15-18. For the war's consequences among Western Abenakis see Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, Chapt. 4.

King Philip's War began among the Wampanoags but quickly spread throughout New England. Fearing a widespread conspiracy involving all the Indians of New England, and seeing opportunities to secure lands disputed by rivals, the colonial governments of Massachusetts, Plymouth and Connecticut quickly demanded the natives submit to new restrictions on their movements and firearms. Military expeditions quickly provoked other groups to join the Wampanoags and raid outlying areas of the belligerent colonies as well as neutral Rhode Island. Fears of a general conspiracy among the Eastern Abenakis provoked local authorities along the coast of Maine into similar overreactions with similar results. By December of 1675, after being humiliated and forced to the edge of starvation by restrictions on their weapons and movements, the Indians of the Kennebec, Penobscot and other rivers were waging a devastating war against coastal settlements. Due partly to disarray in the various colonial forces, Metacom and many of his warriors escaped from the Mount Hope area and made their way to the lands drained by the Chicopee River. These lands were inhabited by the Nipmucks, who proved to be enthusiastic supporters of Metacom's cause. Soon the

Pocumtucks, Squakheags and other Connecticut River groups to the west joined the Nipmucks in arms.⁶

The dispirited Nashaways clustered around Weshakim ponds embraced Metacom's cause wholeheartedly. For four decades the Pennacooks and Wamesits had been moderately successful in their conciliatory policies toward the newcomers, encouraged as they were by traders like Willard and Hincksman as well as Elliot's missionary activity. In contrast, the Nashaways had met with indifference from the English who settled along the Nashua. By 1675 they had been pushed from their riverine fishing weirs to the dismal, swampy environs of Weshakim, and alcohol seemed to have had more of an effect on their culture than Christianity. The disorder of Weshakim affected their white neighbors enough that Lancaster at this time began to train "six stout Dogs" which were to "fly upon (any Indian)...and tear him down."⁷ Because of this disparity in their experiences with nearby

⁶ William Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp. 128-129; Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, Chapt. V; Jennings, *Invasion of America*, Chapt. 16,17.

⁷ Mary Rowlandson, *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, Together with the Faithfulness of His Promises Displayed; Being a Narrative of the Captivity and Restauration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson*, in Richard Van Der Beets (ed.) *Held Captive by Indians: Selected Narratives, 1642-1836* (Knoxville: University of Tenn. Press, 1973), p.43.

English communities, the Nashaways became increasingly estranged from their confederates. There is nothing to indicate that Wannalancet or any other leading Pennacook was consulted before the Nashaways embarked on their belligerent course.

In addition to the general climate of hostility between Nashaway and English, individual Nashaways undoubtedly had personal grievances which they felt could best be settled by war. As early as 1654 settlers in the area had intervened in tribal affairs to ensure that the pro-Christian "Mathew" was chosen as sagamore rather than "Sam", whom they considered a debauchee.⁸ By 1674 Shoshanim was the leader whom Gookin recognized despite the limited control he exercised among his people. When war broke out most Nashaways followed "Sagamore Sam" into battle. He was most likely the same man whose authority the English had for so long refused to acknowledge. Conversely, some Nashaway individuals chose not to fight with Sam against the English, preferring instead to leave Weshakim and seek Wannalancet's protection at Pennecooke in early October.⁹

⁸ See the preceeding chapter.

⁹ Josiah Temple and George Sheldon, *A History of the Town of Northfield, Massachusetts, for 150 Years, with an Account of the Prior Occupation of the Territory by the Squakheags*,

Although Gookin estimated them to number no more than sixteen (again, presumably nuclear) families, Sagamore Sam led a more sizable force than this would indicate. Nineteenth-century historians Josiah Temple and George Sheldon estimated the Nashaways to have had forty fighting men. Most likely many Nashaways had chosen not to live at Weshakim but had gravitated toward neighboring villages during the Mohawk conflict, or settled around Wachussett mountain, which was used as a rally point during 1675 and 1676.¹⁰ Others may have moved to the praying town of Okonhamesitt or their old cornfields of Petapawag, since occupied by the town of Groton.

Regardless, the Nashaways quickly took advantage of hostilities. "One-eyed John", another Nashaway leader, led a raiding force against Lancaster, killing seven or eight English in August, 1675, before rejoining Sagamore Sam to reinforce a band of Squakheags in early September. The combined force of Nashaways and Squakheags then attacked

(Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell, 1875) pp.82-83; Henry Nourse, ed., *The Early Records of Lancaster, 1643-1725*. (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1858), pp.38-39; Shurtleff, Vol. IV (Part 1), p.210; Waters, *Chelmsford*, p.107.

¹⁰ Temple and Sheldon, *Northfield*, pp. 80,88.

Northfield on the Connecticut river.¹¹ Indians later told Mary Rowlandson that John had led "Marlborough's [Okonhamesitt's] Praying Indians" against Lancaster, which suggests that that some Nashaways had joined this community earlier.¹² According to Gookin, a group who lived by Groton led by a Nashaway named Nathaniel, raided Chelmsford that same autumn, burning houses and haystacks.¹³

After One-eyed John had attacked Lancaster in August and rejoined Sagamore Sam and the Squakheags in September, the Nashaways likely remained with the Squakheags until their famous raid on Lancaster, in which Mary Rowlandson was captured. The importance of this raid, which occurred on February 10, 1676, is underscored by Sagamore Sam's ation leadership of the raiding party. Perhaps because of his age, Sam usually ceded the honor to One-eyed John instead. His participation in the Lancaster raid indicates that attacking that town was especially significant. Although two of the town's three blockhouses held out against the attackers, the inhabitants were aware of the enmity that the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73; Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p. 456, 459; Rowlandson (Van Der Beets, ed.), *Narrative*, p.46.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹³ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p. 471.

local natives held for them and realized that this was not an isolated attack, but part of an effort to destroy the settlement. The next day, John Prescott and the other townsmen petitioned the General Court to remove them to safety. This was accomplished later that month by the Middlesex county troop of horse, commanded by Simon Willard, now a major. The town remained abandoned for at least three years. One month after the Lancaster fight, One-eyed John led a force downstream which burnt much of Groton, causing the inhabitants to abandon the town and seek refuge in Concord. Local tradition held that Willard's house was burnt first.¹⁴

In contrast to Sagamore Sam and One-eyed John, Wannalancet could only have viewed the outbreak of war with dismay. The people of Wamesit and Pennecooke had maintained a friendly and profitable relationship with nearby settlers, in spite of tensions such as were caused by Walderne's liquor trade. The Pawtuckets of Wamesit were now half Christian and intertwined with the town of Chelmsford.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 459; Temple and Sheldon, *History of Northfield*, p. 73; Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, i, p. 165; Joseph Willard, *The Willard Memoir: Life and Times of Major Simon Willard* (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1858), pp. 275-276; Nourse, *Early Records of Lancaster*, pp. 108, 119-120; Leech, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, p.165.

Pennecooke itself was near enough to English settlements that cattle could conceivably wander to the village. Indeed, if it were possible to trace a frontier on a map of the area, the line would bisect the Merrimac between the two Indian communities. As Wannalancet's people straddled the frontier, Wannalancet tried to straddle the belligerents. Although it cannot be ascertained what, if any, communication passed between Nashaways and Pennacooks, Gookin and others wrote that Wannalancet had received solicitations to fight the English, which he chose to reject.¹⁵

The General Court in Boston showed little appreciation for the Pennacook position. To the south and west, groups of Indians long considered docile were taking up arms. The same was happening to the north and east, where Maine's coastal peoples killed about fifty English settlers by November, 1675.¹⁶ Natives along the Connecticut River near Springfield and Northampton, who had long been involved in a

¹⁵ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p. 464-465; *A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences That have hapned in the Warre Between The English and the Indians in New-England* (Benjamin Billingsley: London, 1676) in *Early English Books 1641-1700* T 2385: Reel 1160, No. 33 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1981), pp.4-5.

¹⁶ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp. 128-129.

fur trade similar to the Merrimac, attacked nearby towns, encouraging an outbreak of anti-Indian sentiment among colonists.¹⁷ Even "praying Indians" from Marlborough raided towns with One-eyed John, as Mary Rowlandson noted.

On August 30, 1675, the General Court responded to the crises by attempting to separate and control those Indians who did not yet seem inclined toward hostility by issuing their "Order in Council." The Order commanded those Indians within Massachusetts' jurisdiction to confine themselves in praying towns and forbade them to venture over one mile beyond them without an English escort. Any Indian found outside these bounds would be presumed an enemy and could be legally apprehended or killed. Within the praying towns, loyal Indians were forbidden to harbor "strange Indians" or receive enemies' plunder without reporting it. Even those praying Indians who already lived within the pale of English settlement in established villages "were reduced to great sufferings", unable to harvest their crops, obtain meat either from hunting game or tending livestock as the settlers had taught them, or work for their English neighbors. Those who, either through hunger or pride,

¹⁷ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p. 454.

defied the Order in Council "were daily exposed to be slain or imprisoned, if at any time they were found without their limits."¹⁸ If Wannalancet would not join his Indian neighbors in war, neither would he uproot his people and move downstream to live under the thumb of the English in one of their praying towns, which would mean the end of their way of life as well as much of his personal authority.

Weeks passed, and the Pennacooks gave no indication to colonial authorities that they would comply with the Order in Council. By September 27, the Court appointed the Chelmsford garrison's commander, Daniel Henschman, to march upriver to Pennecooke with eighty militiamen. Possibly fearing that this would goad the Pennacooks into war, many prominent residents of Middlesex County, including Simon Willard, protested that these militiamen were sorely needed to defend the county's scattered settlements.¹⁹

While county and colonial authorities dithered, Captain Samuel Mosely, frustrated in his efforts against Philip in

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 450-451.

¹⁹ Waters, *Chelmsford*, pp. 105-106; Willard, *Willard Memoir*, pp. 255-258. It is not known whether Daniel Henschman was a relative of Thomas Hinckman, whose name was often spelled similarly. Savage does not indicate any relationship. Savage, *Genealogical Dictionary*, Vol. II, pp.402-403.

the south, marched his command to the northern frontier and wasted no time entering Pennacook territory. Although similar actions on a larger scale goaded the Narragansetts into war later that year, Wannalancet chose instead to withdraw his people into the the nearby woods when scouts warned him of Mosely's approach. From hiding, the Pennacooks watched while Mosely's men entered their fort and, finding it deserted, began to burn wigwams and the winter's store of dried fish. Incensed at being treated like an enemy, some of the younger men who wanted to ambush Mosely while they had the chance, were restrained by Wannalancet.²⁰

Although Captain Mosely was too popular an officer to be punished, the Court was alarmed by his rash and unauthorized act. In order to mend relations, Thomas Hincksman was chosen to act as a liason once again. On September 30, Lieutenant Hincksman was ordered to choose two trustworthy Wamesits to find the Pennacooks and convey the government's written message to them. Addressed to Wannalancet, the letter reminded him of the good relations that his people had always enjoyed with the English and his

²⁰ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p. 464; Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, pp. 84-85.

promise to Passaconaway to live in peace with them. It gave safe passage for six Pennacooks to travel to and from Hincksman's garrison house at Naamkeake and treat with Gookin and Eliot about "termes And Articles of friendship Amity & subjection as was made & concluded between the Englise and old Passaconaway...." Hincksman chose Sam Numphow, son of the Wamesit leader and another Indian to carry the message.

The fact that the colony opted for Daniel Henchman's military expedition before Thomas Hincksman's diplomatic mission in order to deal with the neutral Pennacooks says much about New England's attitude toward the natives in 1675. No doubt Wannalancet sensed that same attitude in Mosely's unauthorized raid. When Sam Numphow reached Pennecooke with the Court's message, he found only a few inhabitants who told him that Wannalancet and most of the Pennacooks had travelled north to the Pemigewasset, a northern tributary of the Merrimac. The messengers travelled on until they reached Lake Winnepesaukee, where they met other Pennacooks who told Sam Numphow that the sagamore had left Pemigewasset three weeks earlier and gone "toward the french," in Canada. When Sam Numphow returned from his unsuccessful mission, he found that a number of

"groton indians," the peaceably inclined Nashaway refugees from Weshakim, had arrived at Pennecooke. Realizing that Wannalancet and most of the Pennacooks had abandoned the fort, they asked to be taken in by the Wamesits.²¹

Because the power of a sagamore rested upon maintaining consensus within his tribe, Wannalancet's withdrawal may have been an attempt to placate both war and peace factions within the community by simply removing the Pennacooks from the area. But, by the end of October, facing a winter short of dried fish and shelter, he sent two men, Monnipaugh and his son Mannasset, to treat with the colonists. Despite the earlier guarantee of safe conduct, the two were not treated as emissaries, but captured at Wamesit and sentenced by the General Court to be sold as slaves. Although the Court recognized its mistake by November 3, and attempted to locate and recover the two men, their fate is unrecorded.²²

Notwithstanding official expressions of goodwill, it was now evident that the government of the Bay Colony lacked either the ability or the will to restrain its people from

²¹ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.462-463; Waters, *Chelmsford*, pp.90, 106-107; Pulsipher, "Massacre at Hurtleberry Hill," p. 485.

²² Shurtleff, Vol. V, p.68.

venting their hostility on Pennacooks. Despite the hardships involved, Wannalancet concluded that the safest course would be to abandon their homes and spend the winter somewhere in the woods to the north.

With the Nashaways at war and the Pennacooke villagers fled, the only members of the confederacy that remained in peaceful proximity to New Englanders were those Pawtuckets living in the praying town of Wamesit, whose experiences with their Chelmsford neighbors would soon vindicate the wisdom of Wannalancet in removing. Although the area's Indian population had been evenly split between Christians and non-Christians on the eve of the war, the Pawtuckets were exclusively referred to as "Wamesits" after 1675, and no further mention is made of the non-Christian element that was once so prominent. However, Daniel Gookin's population estimate for Wamesit nearly doubled between 1674 and October 1675, so it appears that many, if not all, of the Pawtuckets complied with the Order in Council of August 30 and repaired to the praying town. Obedience to the order would have strained Wamesit's resources and this is born out by

Gookin's observation that many there were naked and short of food.²³

In late September or early October, a haystack was burnt on a farm in Chelmsford, and the Wamesits were suspected. The entire village, including Monnipaugh and Mannesett, who had just arrived with their message from Wannalancet, was rounded up and marched to Boston, where the women and children were immediately released and allowed to return home. The men were examined for a few days until three suspects, who were not regular inhabitants of the praying town, were isolated and "William Hawkins, Indian", as well as the Pennacook emissaries were sentenced by the Court to be sold as slaves on October 13. Such was the strength of anti-Indian feeling that one of the Wamesits was shot dead while travelling back home.²⁴

Upon the Wamesits' return, Lieutenant James Richardson of Chelmsford was appointed their guardian and caretaker. Sometime before November 15, his barn, stored full of hay and corn for the winter, was burnt to the ground. The

²³ Gookin, *Collections*, p. 46; *Doings and Sufferings*, pp. 450-451, 472, 474-475.

²⁴ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.472, 474-475; Shurtleff, Vol. V, p.58; Waters, *Chelmsford*, p.102.

raiders were Nashaways led by Nathaniel, although their identity was unknown at the time, and the Wamesits were immediate suspects. If this was a deliberate attempt to destabilize relations between Chelmsford and Wamesit, it was highly successful, for English reaction was swift.²⁵ A patrol of about fourteen men, sent out to search for the enemy, decided instead to kill Wamesits in retaliation. After calling the Wamesits out of their wigwams, at least two of the patrol opened fire. One twelve year old boy was killed, while his mother (a daughter of Wonohaquahan) and five other women were wounded. Two of the patrol members, Lorgin and Robbins, were later tried for murder but acquitted.

After the attack, the Wamesits hastily fled their praying town, with little or no provisions, seeking the protection of Wannalancet. As soon as the Court learned of their flight, they once again ordered Hincksman to persuade them to return. As before, Hincksman chose an Indian messenger, this time a man named Wecoposit (tribal

²⁵ This, and other attacks, may have been occasioned by a Wamesit runaway who told hostile Indians how the village was "well among the English," according to a letter from Numphow and the other village leaders to the governor. Waters, *Chelmsford*, p.109.

affiliation unknown), to carry a letter. Like Wannalancet, the Wamesits also refused to return, but they replied in writing:

To Mr. Thomas HENCHMAN, of Chelmsford.
I, Numphow, and John a Line, we send the messenger to you again (Wecoposit) with this answer, we cannot come home again, we go towards the French, we go where Wannalansit is; the reason is, we went away from our home, we had help from the Council, but that did not do us good, but we had wrong by the English. 2dly. The reason is we went away from the English, for when their was harm done in Chelmsford, they laid it to us and said we did it, but we know ourselves we never did harm to the English, but we go away peaceably and quietly. 3dly. As for the Island,²⁶ we say there is no safety for us, because many English be not good, and may be they come to us and kill us, as in the other case. We are not sorry for what we leave behind, but we are sorry the English have driven us from our praying to God and from our teacher. We did begin to understand a little of praying to God. We thank humbly the Council. We remember our love to Mr. HENCHMAN and James Richardson.

The mark of & JOHN LYNE

The mark of > NUMPHOW²⁷

²⁶ Deer Island on the Massachusetts coast, where, after October 1675, many Christian Indians were interned during the war.

²⁷ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings.*, pp.482-483. Samuel Drake raised the possibility that "John Lyne" was the same man as "John Linde," an Indian who, along with "John Sampson" and "Cromwell," killed a man and his son between Exeter and Hampton, New Hampshire the previous September, and was either killed, enslaved or reported to be with the Kennebecs by 1677.

For the first time, all three principal communities of the Pennacook confederacy were abandoned. The populations of both Wamesit and Pennecooke, over five hundred men, women and children, were preparing to survive the winter on whatever subsistence they could find in the northern woods.

Although the Pennecooke villagers may have harvested their corn and taken it with them, the Wamesits almost certainly did not.²⁸ Faced with the real possibility of starvation, all but eighteen of the Wamesits did return to their wigwams in December. During their absence, about fifty Indians from the praying town of Nashoba had been sent to live in nearby Concord, with Willard, Gookin and Eliot ordered to mind them. On December 13, the Court extended their guardianship to cover the returnees. Apparently confident in the ability of these three to protect them, the eighteen reluctant Wamesits were also persuaded to return.²⁹

Given what has been reported about Lyne's character, this seems unlikely. See Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp.111-113.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.483.

²⁹ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.484-485; Wollcot, *Concord*, p.115; Willard, *Willard Memior*, pp.260-262.

December and January were comparatively peaceful in the Merrimac Valley, although Numphow, John Aline and other leading Wamesits feared attacks by hostile Indians would begin again in the spring. In early February they petitioned the Governor to provide a safer place for them to live. February also brought renewed violence as unknown Indians attacked a relief force of militia headed towards Groton and burned some buildings in Chelmsford. Ten days later, February 12, a Chelmsford man and his son barely escaped with their lives when ambushed by another band of about ten Indians. Although these incidents were fairly minor, deadly battles, such as the Lancaster raid and the burning of Medfield, were taking place at the same time and beleaguered Englishmen in Chelmsford began menacing the local Indians.³⁰ Alarmed by threats the Wamesits petitioned the Court to move them elsewhere on February 5. When the Court, preoccupied as it was by larger matters, did not reply within a few

³⁰ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, i, pp. 165, 195; Waters, *Chelmsford*, p.109; Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p.490-491; Hubbard's *Indian Wars* is a good example of the anti-Indian sentiment which prevailed among New Englanders during and after the war. For an expression of the fear and suspicion prevalent in Chelmsford that winter, see the "Letter from the 'Committee of the militia' of Chelmsford," *Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society*, Vol. III, (Concord, N.H.: 1832), pp.97-98.

days, the Wamesits once again left their homes and fled north in search of Wannalancet, leaving behind only six or seven individuals who were too old to travel. Surviving records are unclear on whether they left before or after events such as the Nashaways' raid on Lancaster and the February 12 skirmish in Chelmsford, but the Wamesits refusal to stay in obedience to the General Court was enough to indict them in the minds of most New Englanders. William Hubbard expressed a popular view of Wamesit behavior when he wrote:

The Indians about Wammeset and Pascataqua that had joined with their Country-men in their rising against the English last Winter, when they were pinched with Hunger in the cold Winter following, returned to the English, and desired to make Peace... yet when their own ends were answered, and another Opportunity was offered of doing further Mischeif of like Nature, they³¹ presently returned to their former Practice....

After they had left, local anti-Indian feeling intensified. Captain Mosely, again without orders, seized the Nashoba Indians who had been living at Concord and marched them to the Deer Island internment camp off the

³¹ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.491-493; Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, p. 95.

coast, where many died of disease and starvation. Gookin attributed this to a reaction to the burning of Medfield, not to the Wamesits' removing themselves. If he was correct, it is likely that the Wamesits would have shared the Nashobas' fate, had they stayed in the area. Regardless, some locals were able to vent their hostility on the old Wamesits who had been left behind, when they burnt them to death in their wigwams that same month.³²

Small raiding parties burnt one house in Chelmsford the next month and fourteen or fifteen in April. Hubbard blamed the Wamesits and even Gookin admitted that some may have participated. It is more likely that the raiders were Nashaways and Nipmucks who had attacked the town before, because the main body of the tribe, led by Numphow, had by this time joined Wannalancet.³³

When they removed a second time, the Wamesits seem to have forfeited the rights to their lands in the eyes of colonial authorities. The General Court did not let the area stay unused for long. By March, 1676 Thomas Hincksman had petitioned the Court about "quitting his house at

³² Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.491-493, 495-496.

³³ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, i, p.222; Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.492-493.

Merrimack." The men of his Naamkeake garrison were apparently dissatisfied at being so far from homes that needed defending and farms that needed spring planting. Trying to solve problems of scarce food supply and far flung garrisons at once, the Court ordered Hincksman's garrison to remain in place and empowered him "to grant such persons liberty to improve any part of the Indians' land within the bounds of Wameset and Naamkeke," on March 21.³⁴ Later that spring, a fort was also built at Pawtucket Falls, manned by a detachment of Englishmen and loyal Indians from the Naamkeake garrison, under the command of Samuel Hunting.³⁵

Meanwhile, the Wamesits had joined with Wannalancet, their whereabouts unknown to the English. Gookin stated only that the Pennacooks spent the winter around the head of the Connecticut River.³⁶ Gordon Day has stated that although they may have gone all the way to French Canada, they probably spent the winter no further north than the confluence of the Baker and Pemigewasset rivers (modern day Plymouth, N.H.).³⁷ Nevertheless, there is strong evidence

³⁴ Coll. N.H. Hist. Soc., Vol.III (1832), pp.98-99.

³⁵ Ibid., p.99; Shurtleff, Vol.V, p.87.

³⁶ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.462-463.

³⁷ Day, *St. Francis Indians*, pp.17-18, 21.

that, although Wannalancet and the majority of the Pennacooks did not travel to Canada, a smaller band did spend the winter at the Jesuit mission of Sillery, just above Quebec City on the St. Lawrence. Fr. Jaques Vaultier wrote that a group of Abenakis, "dreading" the war's consequences, "Resolved to take Refuge in the country inhabited by the french" and were living at Sillery by May, 1676. Although they were enthusiastic students of Roman Catholicism, they were not allowed baptism before they left the mission in November.³⁸ More revealing is the relation of Fr. Thierry Beschefer, who wrote that King Philip's War had "at the outset compelled about thirty of them to leave Their country." Beschafer indicated that these "Abenakis" desired neutrality. Arriving destitute, they were won over to the Jesuits by charity, and later returned to "acadia" in order to bring their friends and relations back to the mission.³⁹ This squares very well with Gookin, who wrote that Wannalancet was visited in September, 1677 by his "kindred and relations" who "lived with the French" and

³⁸ *Jesuit Relations*, Vol. LX, pp.231-233.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. LXII, pp.259-267.

convinced him and fifty other Pennacooks to return with them.⁴⁰

This visit to Sillery is significant. Despite the confident belief of the New Englanders that, "As for the French at Cannada they live at too great a Distance to have much Commerce with our Enemies," this was not the case.⁴¹ Some hostile Indians had attempted to obtain gunpowder from Canada.⁴² As well, this small group of Pennacooks, although not hostile, had been mistreated by the English and found refuge in New France. Once there, they were well received, and a pro-French orientation began to seem not only a possible, but a desirable, alternative to the abuse they were suffering at the hands of their supposed allies in New England. The experience at Sillery would encourage the growth of an anti-English faction among the Pennacooks, at odds with the traditional, and increasingly disastrous, policy of Passaconaway and Wannalancet.

The Pennacooks did not fare well in the forest. Although they had removed themselves from the English

⁴⁰ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p.521.

⁴¹ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, p.266.

⁴² Rowlandson (Van Der Beets, ed.), *Narrative*, p.66.

menace, they were forced to adopt a mode of living, hunting and gathering, that their ancestors had abandoned centuries earlier. Instead of using game killed in winter hunting to augment the autumnal harvest, they were forced to depend entirely on what they could hunt and scavenge in the dead of winter and early spring. The result was widespread malnutrition which lowered resistance in a population already at risk for disease because of its lack of adequate shelter.

Famine and sickness claimed the lives of many Pennacooks, among them the Wamesits' sachem Numphow and the praying town's teacher Mystic George.⁴³ By spring the weather had turned, but the opportunity for spring planting had been missed. Faced with the starvation of his people, Wannalancet chose to make contact with Richard Walderne.

Despite their past differences, Walderne was the natural choice for Pennacook overtures. He was the most powerful man in those eastern settlements which he had earlier brought into the fold of puritan government. At the outbreak of the war, Massachusetts had entrusted him, now a militia major, with the security of Dover, Portsmouth and York county, which basically endowed him with overall

⁴³ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p.492.

command of New England's northeastern frontier.⁴⁴ As fighting wore on, many Maine Indians who had removed themselves from the area (whether out of hostility or neutrality is not recorded) felt the pinch of hunger and by February, 1676 they began to return to their old lands. The General Court empowered Walderne, who may have already entered into negotiations with the returnees, to treat with the natives. Walderne was authorized to show favor to those who were agreeable to their terms, as well as to "dispose of" those who were not, either "by shipping them off or otherwise."⁴⁵

At some point Walderne made peace overtures to the Pennacooks as well, and the option must have appeared increasingly attractive. The fact that they were not at war with the English, and therefore should not have had to make peace, was never particularly relevant to the Massachusetts authorities, and must have become more irrelevant to the Pennacooks as time wore on. Given their past dealings with him, the Pennacooks were reluctant to approach Walderne right away. Instead they chose to approach their old

⁴⁴ Shurtleff, Vol.V, pp.53, 101.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol.V, p.72.

associates in Chelmsford. On or about June 4, 1676, Wannalancet and other Indians came to Edward Tyng's garrison house. It is not known what transpired there, but Wannalancet decided, or was convinced, to take his people to Walderne at Coheco, where he arrived ten days later. Upon their arrival, the Pennacooks declared their desire to live in peace with the English and, as tokens of their goodwill, turned over six English captives whom they had purchased, as well as three of the Indians who had a hand in capturing them. Despite warnings received that at least one Indian, Hankancor, who had accompanied Wannalancet to Chelmsford, had been in combat against New England, the Governor's Council had enough faith in the Pennacooks to send "some presents by way of Gratuity" to Wannalancet, and to instruct Walderne to employ Pennacooks against the enemy still in the field.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p.465; Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, p.213; Waters, *Chelmsford*, pp.119-120; *A True Account*, pp.4-5. It is not known exactly how the Pennacooks acquired these captives. They may have been obtained from hostile groups around the Piscataqua whom the Pennacooks had been in occasional contact with since at least October (Waters, *Chelmsford*, p.107). Nothing is known about Hankancor, except that some Chelmsford residents claimed he had guided a party which ambushed Lt. Hinckman and others earlier in the war.

Wannalancet stayed at Dover and met with Walderne for one month before a treaty was signed between them on July 3, 1676. Although the agreement pledged the fidelity of many native groups between the Merrimac and the Kennebec, Wannalancet was the principle signer and the Pennacooks the largest groups of Abenakis. Wannalancet's diplomatic role indicates that he enjoyed a high degree of prestige among other Abenaki tribes.⁴⁷

Although the Nashaway war effort had subsided after the destruction of Groton, the Nashaways had shown little inclination to seek peace up until this time. They spent the rest of the winter and the early spring travelling in western Massachusetts, between Mount Wachusett and the Connecticut Valley, with their observant captive, Mary Rowlandson. That summer, they joined Wannalancet around Dover, where he had concluded the peace treaty with Walderne. Although this was seen by contemporary writers as nothing more than a cunning "endeavour to hide themselves", the Nashaways seem to have considered themselves combatants who had come in to negotiate rather than beaten fugitives.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, i, pp.280-281; ii, p.133; Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p.465.

⁴⁸ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, p. 131.

According to Mary Rowlandson, they were never low enough on ammunition to trade her to Albany for powder and shot as they had discussed.⁴⁹ Nor was starvation a threat. Although often disgusted by the Indians' varied diet of ground nuts, acorns, boiled bones, tree bark, bear meat and the guts, ears and feet of horses (supplemented when possible with more appetizing cattle, corn and game), Rowlandson marveled that "strangely did the Lord provide for them; that I did not see (all the time I was among them) one Man, Woman or Child, die with hunger."⁵⁰

Despite the fact that hostile Mohawks had been pressuring New England's enemies from the west since February, they seem to have had little effect on the warriors encamped on Mount Wachussett. The Nashua River had been cleansed of English settlement that winter. Having achieved his war aim, Sagamore Sam sought to confirm it in a treaty. He sent word in early May that if New Englanders were willing to come to terms, he was willing to grant them peace.

Two months later, he had changed his tone, facilitated in part by Pennacook efforts. Simon Detokam, a literate

⁴⁹ Rowlandson (Van Der Beets, ed.), *Narrative*, p. 59.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82 and throughout.

Wamesit who had been a scribe at the praying town and spent the winter with the Pennacooks, travelled to Wachussett and drafted letters for the Nashaways. It is unknown if this was at the behest of Wannalancet, who may have been influenced by negotiating with Walderne, Shapleigh and other colonial officials. The Nashaway (and Nipmuck) leadership's change of heart was evident in the first letter they sent to Governor John Leveret, which was dated July 6, 1676, and signed by Sagamore Sam and three other headmen: Muttamuck, Upanippaquem and Pakaskoag. Citing military reverses and the capture of Muttamuck's wife, the sagamores declared that they had spoken with some Nashoba praying Indians and, invoking Jesus Christ, they (Nashaways and Nipmucks) desired peace. On July 17, a delegation of two sagamores and four other Nashaways travelled to Boston, but were told that English captives must be released before negotiations could begin. They returned to Wachussett with this message, and were sent back to Boston with a hostile Indian's scalp, signifying Sagamore Sam's desire for peace. Then Sam dictated another letter to Simon Detokam. In it he claimed to have travelled to Connecticut (whether the colony or the river is unclear) to obtain the release of some English captives, but learned that the New England forces had

"destroyed" the hostile Indians there. Upon his return, he found that "we were also destroyed." King Philip and another hostile Indian leader, Quanapun, who had been with the Nashaways since February, had left after they learned "of our offer to joyn with the *English*." Sam also claimed threatened their lives if they harmed Englishmen who fell into their hands.

Despite these entreaties, Massachusetts would not allow a notorious figure such as Sagamore Sam to escape with his life. They replied that, although those who were merely "soldiers" could expect mercy if they would surrender themselves and their weapons, the "treacherous Persons who began the War, and those that have been barbarously bloody, must not expect to have their lives spared." This policy may well have influenced the 160 men, women and children from Wachussett who surrendered to the English on July 27. Most, including two described as "sachems," were Nipmucks, but some Nashaways also surrendered.⁵¹

⁵¹ A True Account, pp.5-8. There was a third peace letter included in A True Account, signed by "Pumkamun, Ponnakpukun, or, Jacob Muttamakoog." The letter made no reference to Simon Detokam and seems to be unrelated to the Nashaway overtures. In it, the authors claimed to have been "at Penakook" and spoken there with Numphow, Sam Numphow and John Aline, all of whom urged them to kill Philip. The authors seemed to agree that the titular head of the uprising should be killed. This letter is difficult to reconcile with what is known about

Clearly, Nashaway fortunes were dimming. As warriors and their families abandoned the fight, Sagamore Sam, One-eyed John and other leaders realized that Mount Wachussett was becoming increasingly vulnerable. Not only were the English clearly gaining the upper hand but, since January, New York had been encouraging Mohawk raids against tribes hostile to the colonies. "Dread of the Mohawks" was causing masses of Eastern Abenakis to surrender in Dover, and King Philip himself was hunted down and killed in August, leaving Wachusset the sole significant area remaining in Indian hands. The Nashaways could soon expect all of New England's military fury directed at them. Yet, were they to surrender, these leaders would forfeit their lives. The only other option was for the Nashaways to rejoin, quietly, their erstwhile confederates. Wannalancet had never engaged in hostilities with New England, had voluntarily brought his people into Dover, received presents and concluded a treaty

Pennecooke, which was abandoned by September 30, 1675, as well as Gookin's statement that Numphow died in the northern woods the winter before the letter was written. (*Doings and Sufferings*, p. 492) If such a meeting did take place it must have occurred very early in the war (July to September 1675) or in an abandoned Pennecooke during one of the Wamesits two northward retreats in the late fall and winter of 1675-6. It seems more likely that this letter was a bogus claim by other Abenaki leaders seeking peace and unaware of Numphow's death.

with colonial officials. In order to write his letters of peace, Sagamore Sam had relied on the Pennacook's scribe. Perhaps he could rely on their sagamore's authority to save the lives of his followers and himself.⁵²

Walderne and his men were of course aware that Eastern Abenakis who had previously been hostile were now encamped with the Pennacooks around Cocheco (Dover), but it soon became apparent that large numbers of Nashaways, including Sagamore Sam, One-eyed John and Nathaniel, leader of the provocative attacks on Chelmsford, were there as well. This could have been construed as a violation of the "Order in Council," which the General Court had issued the year before, and required that friendly natives not "entertain any strange Indians" without revealing them to English authorities "on penalty of being taken as our enemies." Whether Wannalancet believed that his Nashaway confederates qualified as "strange" is debatable. Whatever his reason, Wannalancet, in his role as mediator, did not

⁵² A True Account, p.7; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp.78-79. It is possible that some Nashaways or Nipmucks chose not to surrender and were among those who were active around Wachussett one year later. See John Stockwell, *The Account of John Stockwell of Deerfield, Massachusetts. Being a Faithful Narrative of His Experiences in the Hands of the Wachussett Indians 1677-1678* (Somerville, N.J.: Clark S. Yowell, 1928), p.9.

see fit to point out the Nashaways' presence. This led New Englanders, already mistrustful of any Indians, to believe that the Nashaways were concealing themselves among the others, and possibly plotting with the Eastern Abenakis to continue destroying settlements along the eastern frontier.⁵³

At some point that summer Walderne decided that these formerly hostile Indians should be apprehended. Dover also contained troops raised in Massachusetts to subdue the area. Their commanders, Captains William Hawthorne and Joseph Sill were agreeable, as was Captain Samuel Hunting, whose command, composed of English and Indians, had been detached from Gookin's garrison at Pawtucket. The colonial forces numbered over one hundred and thirty militiamen and forty Indians under the overall command of Major Walderne and his aide Captain Charles Frost of Kittery.⁵⁴

The Abenakis around Dover now numbered around four hundred men, women and children. They were invited to a parley and their warriors invited to participate in training

⁵³ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.450,471; Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, p.133; *New Hampshire Provincial Papers*, Vol.I, pp.357-358.

⁵⁴ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp.131,179; Shurtleff, Vol. V, pp. 85, 87, 91.

and a mock battle on September 6. During the "battle" the Abenakis discharged their weapons first, then discovered to their dismay that the exercise was actually a ruse, enabling the New Englanders to surround the disarmed warriors, herd them and their families together and place them under guard according to plan.⁵⁵ This incident can be viewed as a measurement of either native gullibility or the depth of Walderne's bad faith. Regardless, the Pennacooks had become prisoners.

Within a few days the militia had sorted the prisoners. Two hundred were deemed hostile and sent to the governor in Boston. The Nashaways were among these. Also taken were many "Piscataq Indians" (probably Pigwacketts) "who before the Pease had been very active against us, but since have all lived quietly and attended order" and even some Wamesits.⁵⁶ Once in Boston the Governor and Council decided

⁵⁵ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp.130-134; Samuel Drake, *Aboriginal Races of North America* (New York: Hurst and Co., 1880), Book III, p.281; Jeremy Belknap, *The History of New-Hampshire*, (Boston: Bradford and Read, 1813), (Microfiche, Library of American Civilization, 20669-70), Vol. I, pp.116-118. Belknap based his account on local tradition, which Drake seems to have followed. Belknap also portrayed Walderne as caught between his commitment to the Abenakis and the desire of Hawthorne and Sill to fulfill their warrants by seizing Indians.

⁵⁶ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.492-493; N.H. Prov. Rec., Vol.I, pp.357-358. The traditional account of

that those who had "imbrued their hands in English blood should suffer death here." Nashaway leaders Sagamore Sam, One-eyed John and Nathaniel were among the the eight or nine individuals hanged. No further effort was made to differentiate any degree of guilt among the captive Nashaways, Pigwackets and Wamesits, all that were not executed, women as well as men, were sold into slavery, most to ships bound for the West Indies. Years later Rev. John Eliot, who had opposed enslaving enemy Indians from the start of the war, learned that the ship owners had been unable to find buyers in the Carribbean and had instead left them in North Africa at Tangier. Eliot wrote British officials on their behalf with unknown results.⁵⁷

The remaining two hundred who were not taken to Boston were "quietly dismissed to their own places." Although almost every non-Nashaway Pennacook was released,

Walderne's suprise at Dover is taken from Samuel Drake, *Aboriginal Races of North America*, Book III, p.281.

⁵⁷ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp.131-133, 280-281; Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.471, 492; Nathaniel Bouton (ed.), *Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire* (Concord, N.H.: George E. Jenks, 1867), Vol. I, p.357-360; Belknap, *History of New Hampshire*, (New York and London: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970), Vol. I, p.126 n.; Letter from Eliot to John Boyle, Nov. 27, 1683 in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Vol. III (1794), pp. 182-183; Waters, *Chelmsford*, p. 103.

Wannalancet now appeared to be a dupe of the English and his following was much diminished. Six or seven of his men accompanied him back to Pennecooke as well as a few Wamesit men and several more women and children who chose to make their homes at Pennecooke rather than to revive the praying town.⁵⁸

Walderne's seizure was viewed favorably by New Englanders, who saw in it the apprehension of hostile natives, authorized by the Order in Council, rather than treachery. King Philip himself had been killed the previous month and the scattered pockets of resistance in southern New England were quickly disappearing. Wannalancet's treaty with Walderne was viewed as a capitulation and to separate the guilty from the innocent was only logical. The next task in establishing security was for New England to tighten its hold on the frontier and the surviving Indian groups so that such a rebellion would not be able to reignite itself. Accordingly, it was ordered in May 1677 that all Indian children who were under the care of whites were to remain servants until they reached the age of twenty-four, unless their parents "have been in hostility with us, or have lived

⁵⁸ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp.492.

among our enemies in the time of the warr" in which case they were to become virtual slaves for life. Those Indians who remained nonservants within the jurisdiction of the General Court, whether Christian or not, were required to live in one of four praying towns: Natick, Punkapaug, Hassanamesit or Wamesit; to be recorded and inspected, and prohibited from entertaining "forrein Indjans" without alerting the authorities. Indians venturing outside of their bounds were required to have passes issued by Maj. Gen. Denison and Maj. Gookin or, east of the Merrimac, by Maj. Walderne.⁵⁹

This order seems merely to be a confirmation by the Court, of what Walderne had already been doing. As early as August 1676 an Abenaki called Simond was familiar enough with Walderne's passes to counterfeit one. Despite Walderne's reputation among Abenakis, a few allied Indians were still willing to work for him in 1677. That January he paid bounties to some after they had tricked, killed and scalped other Indians who had come in to make peace. In

⁵⁹ Shurtleff, Vol. V, pp. 136-137.

April, Gookin accused Walderne of employing Indians sent to him without pay or adequate provisions.⁶⁰

As might be expected, Major Walderne's policies were not conducive to establishing peace on the eastern frontier.

Two Indians, named Simon and Andrew, had come in to Dover to make peace at the same time as the Pennacooks, but were imprisoned instead. Prior to the general seizure they managed to counterfeit passes and escape to the natives of the Androscoggin and Kennebec valley, whom they incited to renew hostilities along the Maine Coast with such fervor that the York County Court of Associates could not meet in September and an alarmed Walderne wrote Boston the enemy had "carried all clean before him as far as Wells" by October. When Walderne tried in 1677 to initiate a peace similar to the Pennacook peace of the previous year, these Eastern Abenaki tribes rejected his overtures.⁶¹ After these approaches failed, he sailed up the coast in two sloops with a force of soldiers, as well as Indians under Capt. Hunting, in February 1677. Although the expedition attempted to

⁶⁰ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp.141-142, 145, 205-207; Bouton, *N.H. Prov. Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 362-363.

⁶¹ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp. 95, 134, 141-142, 146, 151-153; Maine Historical Society, *Province and Court Records of Maine*, (Portland: 1928-1958), Vol.2, p.510.

parley with various groups for the release of captives it also used a combination of liquor and treachery in order to kill and enslave members of a small Penobscot band on the 27th, after prisoners had been released.⁶²

The propensity to take Indian captives, who could be sold for a profit, gave Walderne's 1677 expedition among distant tribes more the appearance of a slave raid than a peace overture. He did authorize at least one expedition, under a man named Laughton, solely for the purpose of enslaving hostile Eastern Indians. Rather than risk attacking an already hostile and alert group, Laughton sailed all the way to Cape Sable to entice aboard and enslave neutral Micmacs. This incident provoked Micmac retaliation against New England fishermen and others along the Maine Coast.⁶³ Although the war had ended in the south

⁶² Walderne's dispatch justifies his seizure by stating that the Penobscots had stored their weapons nearby and were therefore planning treachery. Walderne was leading a hostile military expedition and it would have been unusual if either party did not have weapons nearby. Furthermore, the Penobscots drank liquor given to them in lieu of beaver skins, unusual behavior for those allegedly preparing an ambush. Walderne himself admits to preparing to surprise and seize the Penobscots during negotiations. In light of all this, Walderne's accusation that the Penobscots were planning treachery is dubious at best. Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp. 218-223; Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, p. 516.

⁶³ Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp.136, James Axtell, "The Vengeful Women of Marblehead: Robert Roule's Deposition of

and west of New England, Richard Walderne's actions along the northern and eastern frontiers ensured that the Abenakis would remain in a state of overt or latent hostility to the English. Despite this, the Court considered him an effective negotiator and a commander able to defend the colony's eastern flank. In 1678 the Court was still authorizing him to negotiate peace with those he considered suitable, while exhorting him to be on guard against spring attacks.⁶⁴

In contrast to Walderne's, Wannalancet's authority had been dealt a severe blow. His neutrality policy had cost his people dearly. From a population which had numbered over five hundred non-Nashaway Pennacooks in 1674, only two hundred left Dover in 1676, most of the rest having perished in the woods while hiding from the English. The Nashaways themselves had been destroyed after placing themselves in Wannalancet's protection. Wamesit was not resettled either.

Indeed, so great was their disgust, that only a handful "of his near friends" returned with Wannalancet while the rest

1677," *William and Mary Quarterly* Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 647-652.

⁶⁴ Bouton, *N.H. Prov. Papers*, Vol. I, p. 365.

of the Pennacooks "fled from him either among their friends or enemies."⁶⁵

Neutrality had been a disaster. The confederacy of villages, which had been developed decades earlier, was unable to protect its constituents from hostile colonists, and it collapsed into a remnant village. Although Pennacook warriors had allowed Passaconaway's son to restrain them as they watched Englishmen ransack their homes, they would never permit him to do so again, nor would they forget their humiliation at Dover.⁶⁶ For Pennacooks the years between King Philip's and King William's wars were years of displacement when survival itself was difficult. New Englanders may have regarded these years as peacetime, but many Pennacooks awaited an opportunity to continue the war which colonists had forced upon them.

⁶⁵ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp. 465, 492.

⁶⁶ Belknap, *History of New Hampshire*, (Johnson Reprint), Vol.I, pp.125-126; Stockwell, *Narrative*, pp.7,14; John Williams, *The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion* (Freeport N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp.27-28.

THE DEATH OF WALDERNE

The Pennacooks who remained with Wannalancet returned, under "English protection," to Pennacooke and did not seem to have been molested by their New England neighbors. Yet English policies began to encourage cooperation and alliance between the New England colonies and the Iroquois Confederacy. Of course, this came at the expense of the Pennacooks and other Algonquians. Wannalancet desired to restore the peaceful policies of coexistence which had typified English-Pennacook relations prior to the war, yet the bulk of his people eventually rejected his leadership in favor of that of his nephew, Kancamagus. Historians, from the eighteenth century on, have written about this shift. Jeremy Belknap and Samuel Drake stressed Kancamagus' role and Calloway analyzed his leadership as a part of Pennacooks' overall survival strategy. All mentioned the influence of the French although Drake and Calloway downplayed it.¹ But Pennacook actions during the interwar years were shaped by more than grudges, French machinations, and Kancamagus. Larger forces, involving the shifting diplomatic situation between England, the Iroquois and

¹ Belknap, I, p. 126; Samuel Drake, *Biography and History of the Indians of North America, from its First Discovery* (Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey & Co., 1848), Vol. III, pp. 113-114; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus".

France, increasingly circumscribed Pennacook options in ways that have not yet been fully explored. As well, a close examination of some of the finer details of the Pennacooks' experience between 1677 and 1689 will shed more light on what motivated them to engage in hostilities against their former allies.

Although the returned Pennacooks were not harmed by the neighboring settlers, other familiar troubles soon arose. In March 1677 an alarmed Wannalancet came to Hincksman's farm telling how his son, while hunting upstream, had been fired upon by fifteen Mohawk warriors.² Earlier raids had been strictly Indian affairs, which the colonists, considering them disruptive, had discouraged. Due to King Philip's War, much had changed and the Mohawks gained tacit English support. London now considered New England a troublesome place, full of fractious colonists as well as unruly Indians. Governor Edmund Andros of New York (who would soon be given control of New England as well) was instructed by the crown to use his province to impose order on the area. A key element in this plan was to strengthen the alliance between New York and the Iroquois Confederacy, which New York had inherited from the Dutch. What had begun as a

² Letter from J. Parker, *Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society*, Vol. III, p. 100.

trading alliance in the days of New Amsterdam was strengthened into a military alliance by Andros after 1674.

This policy had paid off after hostilities broke out, when Philip and his warriors had traveled to the refugee village of Schaghticoke in order to garner support among the Algonquian peoples there. Backed by Andros, the Mohawks attacked the village in January 1676, driving Philip back into New England and eventual defeat.³ Mohawk raiders, such as those who had fired on Wannalancet's son, continued to attack praying towns such as Hassanamesit and Natick as late as September 1677. Although Mohawks had agreed not to raid friendly New England Indians at a meeting between New York, New England and Iroquois leaders in Albany the previous April,⁴ English authorities were understandably reluctant to hold them to their word. The Mohawks were powerful members of the Iroquois League, whose influence stretched from the Acadian coast to the Illinois country: vast territories disputed between England and France. It would have been foolish indeed to strain this new alliance in order to safeguard the few disgruntled remnants of Algonquian tribes

³ Neal Salisbury, "Toward the Covenant Chain," *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America 1600-1800* (Daniel Richter and James Merrell, ed.s) (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987) pp. 69-71.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.71.

that remained in New England. How much of this was known to Wannalancet is uncertain, but it was apparent that their traditional enemies had returned, now with tacit English support, at a time when the Pennacooks could muster "not above eight men; and those, except two or three, unarmed."⁵

A second problem arose in May 1677, with the General Court's decision that all Indians remaining in their jurisdiction were to be relocated to one of four praying towns, unless they were bound servants. Because of their former neutral status and their presence on the New England frontier, Pennacooks seem to have occupied a grey area in the Court's plans for surviving Indian groups. The Court ordered that "the Indjans about Pascataqua" were to be resettled in Cocheco (Dover) "as shall be further ordered by the councill."⁶ Instead of a praying town, the Pennacooks were to be forced into Dover, under the care of Richard Walderne. The Pennacooks would have to face the Mohawks alone or accept Walderne's dubious protection.

Almost providentially, a third way appeared before Wannalancet. In September, as the Mohawks who had raided

⁵ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp. 519-521.

⁶ Shurtleff, *Gov. and Co.*, V, p.136.

Hassanamesit were returning to Iroquoia, two parties of New England Indians returned from the French. One party raided Hatfield, the other arrived at Naamkeake where the Pennacooks were encamped and proved to be their "Kindred and relations," including Wannalancet's brother-in-law and possibly his oldest son. These were most likely some of the thirty Abenakis whom Fr. Beschafer remembered at Sillery. Recent experiences with New Englanders had made a pro-French orientation understandably attractive to many Pennacooks and the thirty returnees quickly persuaded Wannalancet and all but two families and one widow to return with them to the Jesuit missions.⁷

With the waning of King Philip's War, the Pennacooks no longer were seen as posing as immediate a threat to the New England frontier and interest in recording their whereabouts dwindled. It is therefore difficult to track their movements after they left for Quebec in September 1677. Some seemed to have migrated to the Champlain Valley by 1687. Instead of traveling north with Wannalancet, some former Wamesits may have moved just upstream from their old village, to Wiccasset Island under the supervision of

⁷ Gookin, *Doings and Sufferings*, pp. 520-521; Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, pp. 239-241; *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 1st Series, 3, pp.177-188.

Jonathan Tyng, then removed to the Canadian missions, probably before 1684. Gordon Day believed that Pennecooke itself may have been abandoned from 1677 to 1685.⁸ Wannalancet himself had returned to the area by 1683, in need of New England's goodwill and money. Local tradition had it that he visited Rev. Fiske in Chelmsford and reminded him that it was through his influence that the town had been spared during the war. He petitioned the General Court in 1683 for compensation and was awarded ten pounds in 1685.⁹ Although still recognized as a sagamore by New Englanders, Wannalancet's standing among his own people never recovered after Walderne had seized Pennacooks at Dover, and he became increasingly dependent on the English to maintain influence in Pennacook society. In September 1685, the surviving Wamesits had formally acknowledged the end of their influence in the Chelmsford area by selling their former village to Thomas Hinckman and Jonathan Tyng. Perhaps bowing to the inevitable settler encroachment, Wannalancet sold Wiccasset Island to Jonathan Tyng in October 1685, as the island had been granted to Tyng by Massachusetts two years earlier. Over time Wannalancet's dependence on the New

⁸ Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 82, 84; Waters, p.83; Day, *St. Francis Indians*, p. 22.

⁹ Waters, p.126; Shurtleff, *Gov. and Co.*, V, pp.500-501.

Englanders increased and he would spend the last years of his life on Jonathan Tyng's estate.¹⁰

The Pennacooks had gone north to Canada in order to escape the twin threats of the Mohawk attack and English expansion. Yet leaving New England was only a temporary remedy, for the Pennacooks were caught in a conflict which, although dormant at the time, was expanding throughout eastern North America and would soon surface as King William's War (1689-1697). For reasons of European diplomacy the Houses of Stuart and Bourbon, ruling England and France respectively, had been allied since 1667. England and France would remain in alliance until William of Orange took the English crown from James II in 1688. Across the Atlantic this dynastic alliance was recognized for what it was, merely a temporary restraint on overt hostilities. In North America both sides sought to gain the advantage in the coming struggle by cultivating alliances with, and fighting proxy wars between, the tribes of the region.¹¹ Although well beyond the control of Wannalancet or any other Pennacook, the course of North American diplomacy made

¹⁰ Waters, pp. 136, 512.

¹¹ Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p. 134; William L. Langer (ed.), *An Encyclopedia of World History*, (Kingsport, Tenn.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 427.

Pennacook concerns increasingly marginal in English considerations.

The greatest factor in these intercolonial maneuverings was the Iroquois League, and two factors made the League England's natural ally. One was the legacy of hostility between Iroquoia and New France which had continued since Champlain's 1608 expedition. The other was the geography of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, which encouraged French traders to bypass Iroquois control and trade directly with the interior tribes, thus infringing on what the Five Nations considered to be their trading rights.¹² Meanwhile the British had transformed a trading relationship at Albany, into the military alliance that had ejected Philip's forces from New York in 1676. However, the French made sporadic attempts to improve relations with the Iroquois in the late 1670s and early 1680s. French Jesuits sought converts among the Mohawks and many Mohawks had migrated to their mission community at Caughnawaga. Rather than improve relations, this alienated the non-converted Mohawk majority

¹² Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers*, pp. 260-262; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, Chapt. 6-8; For an example of this hostile legacy, see Lawrence Leder (ed.) *The Livingston Indian Records: 1666-1723 in Pennsylvania History*, XXIII (1956), pp. 35-36.

who resented this schism in their tribe.¹³ New France's Governor La Barre (1682-1685) had cultivated an influential pro-French faction among the Onondagas in the early 1680s and had attempted to win favor with the League's westernmost members, the Senecas, by curtailing French support for their Illinois rivals, still further west. La Barre damaged this attempted rapprochement beyond repair when he launched an expedition of French soldiers and allied Indians against Onondaga in 1685. The expedition, which included many Abenakis (some possibly Pennacooks), was ravaged by fever just before reaching Onondaga. Although La Barre was able to conclude a treaty of friendship with the Onondagas, New France was discredited and weakened in the eyes of the League as a whole. The English soon took advantage of the situation as Governor Thomas Dongan of New York (1683-1688) organized three Iroquois trading ventures to Michilimackinac, where Lakes Michigan and Huron meet. Had these ventures been allowed to continue, they would have ruined the French Great Lakes trade.¹⁴

¹³ Jennings, "'Pennsylvania Indians' and the Iroquois", in Richter and Merrell (ed.s), *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, pp. 176-177.

¹⁴ Richard L. Haan, "Covenant and Consensus: Iroquois and English, 1676-1768," *Ibid.*, p.49; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp. 188-189; *Jesuit Relations*, LXIII, pp. 81, 91-93.

La Barre's loss of control in the West and his failed Onondaga campaign had also discredited him in Paris. Louis XIV's government replaced him with the Marquis de Denonville (1685-1689) who believed that "the English are the principle fomenters of the insolence and arrogance of the Iroquois, adroitly using them to extend their [own] soveriegnty,"¹⁵ and confronted Iroquois expansion head on. In July 1687 he attacked the Senecas and burned their villages. In order to prevent warnings of the attack from reaching them, he had several Iroquois in New France detained prior to the raid and eventually sold as galley slaves. The Senecas launched counterattacks on the French and the whole League became firmly committed to the alliance with the British colonies.¹⁶ Conversely, the French now required anti-Iroquois Abenakis more than ever before.

The governments of New York and New England, combined by this time as the "Dominion of New England" under Edmund Andros, wasted no time. In meetings during the winter of 1687-1688, New York's Governor Dongan strengthened the

¹⁵ Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p.194; *Jesuit Relations*, LXII, pp. 159-161; The English held similar views of the French, see Edmund O'Callaghan, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*(N.Y.C.D.) (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1869-1916), Vol. 3, p.611.

¹⁶ Haan in Richter and Merrell (ed.s), pp. 49,51; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp. 189-191.

Iroquois alliance and confirmed its anti-French character. The two sides agreed to share power over the tribes of the northeast as well as to block the ambitions of French traders and officials.¹⁷

The English colonies' main objective was to strengthen their alliance with the Iroquois. Some feeble overtures were made by Gov. Dongan of New York to keep the League's "North Indian" enemies from falling into the French camp. Andros, Dongan's predecessor had established Schaghticoke, a village for New England Indian refugees, where the Hoosick River meets the upper Hudson. Schaghticoke's population swelled after King Philip's War when Andros offered the refugees protection from New Englanders. After La Barre's 1685 fiasco, Dongan persuaded some of those who had settled in Canada to relocate to Schaghticoke, thereby winning them back to the English fold. By July 1, 1685, over one hundred and fifty Indian men, women and children had arrived in Albany and declared that, although the governor of Canada "did Embrace them as his Children", they wished to resettle at Schaghticoke (possibly to escape creditors). Dongan assured them of his protection and gave them a wampum belt

¹⁷ *Liv. Ind. Rec.*, pp. 94, 97-100; Haan in Richter and Merrell, pp. 42-43, 49-50; Jennings gives a thorough explanation of this alliance in *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*.

which they were to deliver to their fellow "North Indians" who were still in Canada as an invitation for them to settle at Schaghticoke as well. Learning that a group of North Indians was visiting their "brethren and frinds" at Pennecooke, they took the wampum there instead. A Pennacook named Wamsachko appears to have already settled at Schaghticoke. When the wampum-bearing delegation arrived, they spoke with Pennacook "sachems" who knew "yt Wamsachko and his People liv'd verry well and Peacably att Schachkook and yt ye governr was inclined to draw ye Indians" there. On August 4 the emissaries had returned to Albany and reported that the Pennacooks' brethren from Canada "will probably resolve to come" but asked New York to entice them further. Instead of offering additional wampum or other incentives, Albany officials merely instructed the emissaries to tell the Pennacooks once again that the "Path" was "open for all Indians yt are willing to come and live Peaceably under this government" where they would receive land, protection and be "Civilly used". At the time this offer was being made, Pennacooks feared that the English in New Hampshire were plotting with the Mohawks to destroy them (see below) and there is no record of Dongan's lukewarm effort producing any results. Instead, as Wamsachko was dying in December 1685 and his Pennacook followers were

instructed to choose another leader, they declared that they would no longer be North Indians (Abenakis) "butt all River Indians and therefore we will keep our Residence at Skachkook and endeavor to Increase our number and behave our selfs like River Indians and not depart." Perhaps because they despaired of any more Pennacooks joining them, Wamsachko's followers self-consciously chose to assimilate themselves with their fellow refugees at Schaghticoke.¹⁸ This lack of results showed anyone who cared to look that the Pennacooks were becoming increasingly skeptical of the English offers of protection.

Dongan made a final attempt not to alienate the Abenakis. On August 5, 1687, after Denonville's attack on the Senecas had given the Iroquois no alternative but to ally themselves with the English, Dongan urged the League's representatives to smooth over their differences with neighbors such as the Mahicans and "North Indians".¹⁹ It had no discernable effect on the Pennacook's situation. The previous decade had shown them that neutrality was not viable when New England was at war. Although settling in New York, at Schaghticoke, had been an option during the

¹⁸ *Liv. Ind. Rec.*, pp. 77-79, 82, 95-96.

¹⁹ Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p. 191.

last conflict, New York, recently joined with New England, had firmly allied itself with the Iroquois, including the hated and feared Mohawks. The only remaining option was to look for protection among the French, in whose missions many Pennacooks had lived during the interwar years. By the end of 1687, North American alliances in the approaching war had solidified around the Pennacooks, anchoring the majority of their sympathies to the north.

Although escape from the English and Iroquois was initially the main attraction for Abenakis²⁰, New France had become more than simply a place of refuge as time went on. Pennacooks are among those the Baron de Lahotan mentioned as visiting Chambly, on the Richelieu River, "in shoals" to trade before 1685. In contrast, an Indian told Father Jacques Bigot that the English "would give us nothing but liquor for all our peltries" that same year.²¹ Fr. Bigot aggressively recruited Abenakis, Pennacooks among them, for his mission at Sillery. Between 1681 and 1685 he sent Abenaki converts back to their original homes "to induce the remainder of their people to abandon the evil ways that prevail in their country, and to come and receive christian

²⁰ *Jesuit Relations*, LXII, p. 135; LXIII, p. 117.

²¹ *Ibid.*; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p. 276.

instruction here...they have brought a great many persons hither."²² The Jesuits found the Abenakis to be remarkably sober and eager converts. Their conversion efforts were successful enough for a group of Indians to later refer to Catholicism simply as "the religion of the Penikook Indians."²³ Even as staunch a Puritan supporter as Samuel Penhallow ruefully admitted that, despite English merchants offering better trade goods, the Indians flocked north because "*the Friars taught them to Pray.*"²⁴

The Jesuits had other motives as well. As early as October 1682 they had advanced the opinion that the English were supporting the Iroquois in an attempt to destroy all the tribes friendly to the French, after which New France would be attacked. Bigot, who had a very high opinion of their military prowess, sent three Abenakis himself and urged the government to send a canoe laden with presents to "Acadia", in order to enlist Abenakis in La Barre's 1684 expedition against the Onondagas. Between sixty and one

²² *Jesuit Relations*, LXII, p. 37; LXII, pp. 51, 57, 63, 67, 123-125.

²³ *Ibid.*, LXII, pp. 259-267; LXIII, p. 129; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, p. 48.

²⁴ Samuel Penhallow, *Penhallow's Indian Wars: A Facsimile Reprint of the First Edition, 1726* (Edward Wheelock, ed.) (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971) Introduction.

hundred Abenakis joined in the failed campaign.²⁵ After the failure, some Abenakis wished to return south but were restrained by Bigot. Although, he acknowledged in 1685 that many Abenakis would prefer to leave the missions, Bigot could note with satisfaction that more were arriving as well.²⁶

As the French courted Abenaki tribes, relations between New England and Pennecooke grew increasingly tense. By March 1684, the Council of New Hampshire had become convinced that there was "an appearance of Insurrection of the Indians, in this and other his Majesty's Colonies of New-England." Alarmed, the Council wrote Gov. Dongan in New York to supply them with "Mohawk, Seneca or other Indians" to discourage or subdue any uprising, and offered to pay for their services. The matter was deemed serious enough to warrant a personal visit to Dongan by New Hampshire's Governor, Edward Cranfield.²⁷

Upon hearing from four Indians from Albany, that the Mohawks intended to kill all the Indians in New England from

²⁵ *Jesuit Relations*, LXIII, pp. 55-57,67.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 113,131.

²⁷ Nathaniel Bouton, ed., *New Hampshire Provincial Papers: Documents Relating to the Province of New Hampshire* (Concord, Nashua and Manchester, N.H.: 1867-1873), I, pp.499-501.

"Mount Hope [Rhode Island], to the eastward as far as Pegypscot [on the coast of Maine]", the Pennacooks became frightened. Rather than rally around Wannalancet, they chose a new leader, Kancamagus. Little is known about Kancamagus up until this time except that he was a grandson of Passaconaway and seems to have been the son of Nanamocomuck, Wannalancet's older brother who had been granted the hundred acres near Groton by Massachusetts in 1663. It is not known how much time Nanamocomuck and his family spent on this grant, or how much of an opportunity they had to observe the effects settlers had on the Nashaways, but Kancamagus had enough contact with the colonists to acquire the name John Hogkins, and may have learned to read and write.²⁸ Earlier historians wrote that he had lived as a warrior among the Indians of the Androscoggin River in Maine.²⁹ He did not appear in New England's records before 1685 and his associations during King William's War indicate an affinity with Maine's more bellicose Eastern Abenaki tribes.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.589; Shurtleff, *Gov. and Co.*, Vol. IV, Part II, pp. 94-95; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", pp. 267-268.

²⁹ Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War*, p. 300; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p.266.

Whatever his past, in the spring of 1685, Kancamagus opted to sue for peace by traveling with his retinue to Great Island (New Castle, N.H.) to plead with Edward Cranfield, Governor of New Hampshire. He submitted a series of letters to the governor, written either by himself or by Simon Detogkam, the former Wamesit scribe. The first letter had a servile and desperate tone and emphasized the extreme fear of the Mohawks, which had caused men to leave Pennecooke, presumably for New France. Nevertheless, Kancamagus still hoped that Cranfield would arm him against those warriors who were quickly becoming English allies. Kancamagus told the governor that he would submit to New Hampshire's authority in return. Later the same day he sent the governor a present of beaver pelts and a second entreaty, in which he stated that he wished to meet with him and recalled the good relations New Englanders had enjoyed with Pennacooks during Passaconaway's lifetime. Kancamagus wrote a third letter that day and claimed that alcohol was having a corrosive effect on his people and that alcohol-related incidents were causing jurisdictional problems between the Pennacooks and the English. Unfortunately, Edward Cranfield had left office and was embarking a ship for Jamaica that same day. Kancamagus learned that his concerns had been turned over to council member Robert Mason

and so he addressed a final petition to Mason the next day.

His tone had changed from desperation to impatience and the letter merely told Mason to come see him that day because the sagamore wanted to return home.³⁰

Kancamagus returned home without any reply from the colonial authorities. In July the Pennacooks received Dongan's wampum and weak assurances, which were insufficient to calm their fears. That August Kancamagus led most of Pennecooke eastward to the Androscoggins. The Eastern Abenakis of the Saco River (known as Sacos or Pigwackets) also harvested their corn and withdrew from their village, after threatening some of the inhabitants of Kittery and killing some of their dogs. Citing the "old proverb 'forewarned, forearmed'", the captain of Kittery's local militia alerted the new governor Walter Barefoot, who ordered an unnamed agent to travel to Pennecooke and investigate.

³⁰ Bouton, *N. H. Prov. and St. Papers*, I, pp. 583-585. These letters were signed by other Indians including Simon Detokam and "mr. hope+hoth" who was most likely Wahowah also known as "Hope-hood and Androscoggin who had fought the English in King Philip's War and was also present in Pennecooke at the signing of the peace articles the next September (see below). His presence in the village proves that Pennacooks had begun to associate with Eastern Abenakis who had been active against the English. Hubbard, *Indian Wars*, ii, pp. 113,156.

The investigator was met at Pennecooke by Wannalancet and Mesandowit, a Pennacook sagamore who "came down" from hiding with Kancamagus. A Saco sagamore, Natombamat, also met the messenger at Pennecooke, but Kancamagus himself was not there. The New Englander read his orders from New Hampshire to the assembled natives, "which were very kindly received by them." The Pennacooks then explained that they had fled out of fear of the Mohawks, due to the rumor that they planned to kill all Indians from Mount Hope to Pegypscot. Natombamat told a similar story, then left to return his Sacos to their village and meet with Capt. Francis Hooke (the Kittery militia captain) five days later. Wannalancet and Mesandowit then told the messenger that they had neither the desire nor the means to to launch a war "being about twenty-four men, besides squaws and papooses."

Before leaving the messenger asked why, if they feared Mohawk attack, "they did not come among the English, as formerly". The Pennacooks answer, that they thought "the Mohawks would kill all the English, for harboring them" was probably a disingenious way of evading the issue of the English-Iroquois alliance. However, the fact that it was used by the Pennacooks and apparently accepted by the New Englander, illustrates the Mohawks' reputation at the time.

It also showed the messenger to be ignorant of Kancamagus'

journey to the Governor that May, when he had in fact attempted to "come among the English" but had been ignored.³¹

This meeting reestablished enough trust between Pennacooks, Pigwackets and New Hampshire to be followed by articles of peace signed on September 8. The articles meant to create "a lasting peace, friendship and kindness" between natives and colonists. Provisions were made for punishing Indians who harmed settlers, as well as settlers who harmed Indians. The transgressors would be punished by their own societies and either witnessed by New Hampshire officials, in the case of Indian offenders, or with satisfaction presented to wronged Indians. More importantly, the Pennacooks and Sacos agreed to warn the colonial officials of any Indian designs against New England. In return, the government of New Hampshire agreed to protect the Pennacooks and Sacos against the Mohawks or any other aggressors. The articles were signed by six New Hampshire officials and then

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 586-587; Twenty-four may have been the total number of men at Pennecooke, but many were elsewhere in 1685. The total number of Pennacook men was estimated to be between ninety and one hundred in 1690, giving the tribe a total population of about 390-440. See Day, *St. Francis Indians*, pp. 30-31. For an example of the Mohawks' reputation extending as far as the Maliseets on the St. John River, see John Gyles, *Odd Adventures*, in Richard Van Der Beets, ed., *Held Captive by Indians* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973), pp. 106-107.

given the marks of Mesandowit and four other Indians. The treaty was next taken to Saco where John Davis and Francis Hooke added a stipulation that the Sacos would not leave their villages near English settlements without giving prior notice. Violation would be considered an act of war. Natombamat and three others also put their marks to the treaty. Kancamagus, however, was not sufficiently convinced of English goodwill to sign the treaty until September 19.³²

Although he was not a signatory, Wannalancet seems to have abided by these articles most explicitly. On November 7, 1685, rumors reached Boston that he had gone to Chelmsford to warn of the "mischevous designs" of three or four hundred unidentified Indians in the vicinity.³³ Nothing came of the report, but it illustrated that at least one prominent Pennacook was willing to put his faith in the

³² Bouton, *N.H. Prov. and St. Papers*, I, pp. 588-589; The Indians who had accompanied Kancamagus to New Castle and signed his petitions were: Simon Betagkom, Joseph traske, king hary, Sam linis, wapeguanat Taguachuwashat, old Robin, mamosques andwa, peter Robin, Mr. George Roddunonukgos, mr. hope hoth, John Tonah, John Canowa, John owamosimmin, Natonill Indian. Those who signed the articles of peace at Pennecooke were: Robert Mason, Walter Barefoot, Robert Eliot, Henry Green, John Davis and Francis Hooke for New Hampshire, and Mesandowit, Wahowah alias Hopehood, Tecamorisick alias Josias, John Nomony alias Upsawah and Umbesnowah alias Robin. Those who signed the amended articles at Saco were: John Davis and Francis Hooke for New Hampshire and Netambomet, Wahowah, Ned Higgon, Newcom, Kancamagus and Bagesson alias Joseph Traske.

³³ Waters, p. 127.

agreement. Whether the New Hampshire government intended to abide by it became a moot point when its authority was absorbed by the Dominion of New England, with its staunchly pro-Iroquois orientation, the following year.

The treaty most likely saved the Pennacooks from disaster. Had they chosen to fight in 1685, France's alliance with James II would have precluded any active aid for their cause, regardless of Bigot's wishes. Mohawk war parties would have made short work of the Pennacooks and Sacos. Whatever their desires, Kancamagus and Mesandowit realized that they did not yet have sufficient support to begin a war with New England or her Indian allies.

Among colonial governments, the maneuvering for Indian loyalties accelerated. Some English authorities sought to capitalize on this treaty and win back mission Abenakis. In September 1687, Major Peter Schuyler learned of dissatisfaction among some Abenakis in Quebec (possibly because of measles, smallpox and trading debts) and wrote Governor Dongan of another plan to send wampum to Pennacooks, and have them send it on to their friends in Canada as an invitation to return to the English fold.³⁴ The Jesuit Bigot effectively countered these English

³⁴ Day, *St. Francis Indians*, pp. 23-24; *N.Y.C.D.*, III, p.482.

overtures. Denonville had begun his war against the Iroquois that July. Rather than merely make plans to send wampum, Bigot and some mission Abenakis covertly visited northern New England in order to recruit Abenaki warriors.³⁵ The next spring, 1688, Governor Andros himself sailed in a frigate to plunder Pentagoet, the French fort and trading post located where the Penobscot ran into Casco Bay. The commander of the post, Baron de Castine, had married the daughter of the Penobscot sagamore Madokawando, whose people had suffered in Walderne's 1677 expedition up the Maine coast. New grievances added to old injuries made Castine and the Penobscots enthusiastic supporters of renewed war between Abenakis and New Englanders.³⁶

Officials from the opposing colonies were now encroaching on their rivals' jurisdictions and the threat of war became imminent. Both Wannalancet and Kancamagus came to the colonial authorities and promised continued friendship with the English. This growing threat of war strained relations within the village as a group of Pennacooks offered to move closer to the New England towns,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, IX, p. 354.

³⁶ Bouton, *N.H. Provincial and State Papers*, III, pp. 46-47; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p. 282. See preceding chapter for Walderne's coastal expedition of 1677.

perhaps in response to the advice of Capt. Francis Nicholson that they would be safer there.³⁷ But most of the Pennacooks rejected the old policy of accomodation, choosing instead to remain at Pennecooke and eventually to support Kancamagus. The English grew increasingly suspicious: William of Orange had unseated James II, thus ending the formal alliance with France. Closer to home, rumours circulated that the French governor had offered Pennacooks and other Abenakis ten beaver skins for scalps of Englishmen and that the French were fortifying Pennecooke.³⁸

This tenuous peace first cracked open on New England's eastern frontier between July and September, 1688. After a period of threats by Abenakis and arrests by Englishmen, a party of settlers began building a fort above Casco. A party of Indians, most likely instigated in part by Castine, attacked and killed several of them, then went on to attack settlements in Merrymeeting Bay and the town of Sheepscot. In order to prevent further violence, Andros assembled an army of between seven hundred and one thousand men and led them into Maine that November to awe and subdue the natives.

³⁷ Bouton, *N.H. Prov. and St. Papers*, II, p. 47; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p.282; *N.Y.C.D.*, III, pp. 550-554.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 561-562; *Calendar of State Papers*, p. 583.

The army constructed forts at Pemaquid and Pejebscot (modern day Brunswick) and garrisoned them throughout the winter. This expedition and the weather brought about a cessation of hostilities, but the English notified the Iroquois League in March 1689 that the "Eastern Indians had murdered diverse of there Majes Subjects" as a prelude to bringing the League into hostilities.³⁹ Due to a variety of grievences, New Englanders overthrew Andros in April 1689 and resumed their previous forms of government. With the old regime back in power "the state of the War became wholly New", in the words of Cotton Mather. Among other measures, Major Richard Walderne was appointed Commander in Chief of New Hampshire, and his partner in the 1676 Pennacook seizure, Major Charles Frost, was given control of Maine's West Regiment. Yet, two messengers were dispatched on different occasions that spring to "make discovery of the number of Indians at Pennecooke" and to treat with them.⁴⁰ New Hampshire appointed other negotiators on June 14, 1689 to try to end hostilities in Maine and treat with the still neutral Pennacooks in order to ensure "that they continue

³⁹ Cotton Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum* in Charles Lincoln, *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913) pp. 187-195; *Liv. Ind. Rec.*, p.151.

⁴⁰ Bouton, *N.H. Prov. and St. Papers*, II, p.47; Mather, *Dec. Luc.*, pp. 189-190, 195.

their neutrality and mainteine their ancient friendship with us."⁴¹

These efforts were too late. England had entered the War of the League of Augsburg against France, and Louis XIV had dispatched Count Frontenac as Governor of New France with specific orders to conquer New York.⁴² If Kancamagus had been forced to agree to English terms four years earlier because he lacked French support, he lacked it no longer. He entered into alliance with the tribes to the east, primariially Pigwackets and Androscoggins, but some of his warriors came from as far away as the Maliseets of the St. John River. Although Kancamagus' plans did not enjoy universal support in the village, Pennecooke seems to have become a rally site for anti-English Indians including those Pennacooks returned from Jesuit missions and servants run away from their New England masters. In all there seem to have been between ninety and one hundred men in Pennecooke during this time, quadruple the number in 1685.⁴³

⁴¹ Albert Batchellor (ed.), *Laws of New Hampshire*.... (Manchester, N.H.: John E. Clarke Co., 1904-1922), Vol. I, p. 288.

⁴² Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p. 195. Frontenac did not arrive until October, however. He had no part in early Indian attacks on New England, such as the Cocheco Raid.; Day, *St. Francis Indians*, p. 25.

⁴³ Gyles, *Odd Adventures*, p. 100; Belknap, Vol. I, p. 126; Evan Haefali and Kevin Sweeney, "Revisiting the Redeemed

Kancamagus' coalition planned to attack Walderne's settlement at Cocheco or Dover. Calloway and others have attributed this choice less to the "thirst of revenge", which figured so prominently in Belknap's account, then to a belief that an "accommodationist strategy...was bankrupt."⁴⁴

Although the Pennacooks had largely recognized neutrality in war to be impossible and repudiated Wannalancet's leadership, this was to be a very intimate war, fought by combatants who had known each other for decades. There is strong evidence, both from the written sources and local tradition, that revenge was the prime reason behind the raiders' choice of targets.

However, the Pennacooks were not all of one mind. Perhaps only as many as thirty younger Pennacooks actually accompanied Kancamagus. According to Cotton Mather some had answered New Hampshire's most recent negotiators with "fair pretences and Promises of Amity", and others were "all this while peaceably Conversant at Quochecho." Furthermore, on

Captive: New Perspectives on the 1704 Attack on Deerfield," *William and Mary Quarterly* Vol. LII, No. 1 (Jan. 1995), pp. 23-24; Day, *St. Francis Indians*, pp. 30-31; Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus," pp. 281-282; Drake, *Biography and History*, Vol. III, p. 114.

⁴⁴ Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p. 282; Belknap (Johnson Reprint), I, p. 126; Drake, *Bio. and Hist.*, III, p. 114.

June 22 two Pennacooks, Job Maramasquand and Peter Muckamug, arrived at Thomas Hincksman's in Chelmsford. As was required by the treaty of 1685, they had turned to the Pennacooks' long time friend and former trading partner to warn the English of the impending raid. Having thus betrayed their community they decided to leave "yr habitation and corn at Pennacook." Job Maramasquand's fate is unknown but Peter Muckamug and his family were granted asylum in Concord the next month.⁴⁵

Hincksman sent the informants on towards Boston to alert the Governor and Council, with a letter to speed their way. The letter's second half showed that Hincksman was not without mixed feelings:

Sr, I was verrey loth to trouble you and to expose myself to the Censure and derision of some of the confident people, that war pleased to make sport of what I sent down by Capt. Tom. I am constrained from a sense of my duty and from love of my countrymen to give the acct. as above. So with my humble service to your Honor, and prayers for the safety of an Indangered people,

I am, Sr, your humble servant,

Tho: Hinchman⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", p. 283; Mather, *Dec. Luc.*, p. 195; Waters, p. 129; *N.H. Prov. Laws*, Vol. I, p. 310. The "peaceably conversant" Pennacooks Mather mentioned may well have been scouting for the raiders.

⁴⁶ Waters, p. 129.

Whether Hincksman had sent earlier warnings concerning the Indians which were derided, or whether he was recalling something which had occurred twenty years before, when he had brought Walderne to trial for selling liquor at Pennecooke, is unknown.

The Council does not seem to have heard Job's and Peter's story until June 27, five days after Hincksman had dispatched them. The Council Secretary then wrote another letter to be sent to Cocheco, "with all possible [haste]", warning Walderne that "one Hawkins" (Kancamagus) was going to lead some Indians from Pennecooke to Dover and that "they have a particular designe against yourself and Mr. Peter Coffin...to betray you on a pretense of Trade".⁴⁷ That Kancamagus also specifically targeted Coffin, Walderne's partner in the 1668 liquor truckhouse, indicates that older grievances than Walderne's seizure also motivated the raiders.

Although he was the military commander of the province, Walderne seemed to be oblivious to any danger, and Pennacooks continued to trade at his Dover truckhouse. Local traditions related that an old Indian woman was heard to recite: "O Major Walderne, you great sagamore, what will you

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 129-130.

do, Indians at your door?" but none of the settlers deciphered her meaning.⁴⁸ Indian women were integral to the plan. Two were to go to each of the town's five garrison houses and ask to spend the night there, a common occurrence in peacetime. They were to ask how to open the gates, in case they had to go outside during the night. After each houses' occupants had retired, they would open the gates and signal the warriors hiding nearby to enter. The women were admitted to all garrison houses except one which belonged to Peter Coffin's son, and those that entered Walderne's house told him that more Indians would be arriving to trade the next day. Mesandowit was at supper that evening and asked Walderne what he would do if the "strange Indians should come?" Dismissing the question, Walderne answered that "I could assemble a hundred men by lifting my finger." Mesandoit may have left the house and given the raiders a description of its inhabitants and defenses.

On the night of June 27th no guard was posted and, except for one whose inhabitants were warned by a barking dog, the warriors entered the houses according to plan. Walderne woke and, by all accounts, fought well for an octogenarian, until he was stunned by a hatchet blow. The

⁴⁸ Mather, *Dec. Luc.*, p. 195; Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philip's War*, p. 315; Belknap (Johnson Reprint), I, p. 126.

Abenaki raiders then bound him to a chair and forced his family to feed them. As they began to torture him, they are reported to have asked him to "judge Indians again", perhaps a reference to the sorting of captives after his trickery during King Philip's War. Other reported taunts and tortures harked back to his fur trading practices. His tormentors slashed him saying "I cross out my account" and asked "Now will your fist weigh a pound?" as they cut off his fingers. Finally, they cut off his nose and ears and forced them into his mouth, which seems to have been a Penobscot practice.⁴⁹ As Walderne fainted, his own sword was held under him, which he fell upon and died. Peter Coffin and his family were taken captive and escaped, but not before Coffin was reportedly forced to scatter his own money to the raiders. In all, twenty-two New Englanders were killed that night and, after burning the town, Kancamagus' warriors left with twenty-nine captives.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Gyles, *Odd Adventures*, p. 104.

⁵⁰ I know of no surviving eyewitness accounts of the raid. This account is a composite from Bouton, *N.H. Prov. and State Papers*, II, pp. 49-50; Belknap (Johnson Reprint), I, pp. 126-127; Drake, *Bio. and Hist.*, III, pp. 114-115 and Gyles, pp. 99-100. All the accounts are essentially similar and, except for Gyles, probably derive from the same sources. Some of the details are undoubtedly embellished, but indicitive that the embellishers, presumably Walderne's fellow New Englanders, believed that his treatment of the Indians contributed mightily to his own end.

The messenger arrived in Dover on June 28, the morning after Kancamagus had struck.⁵¹ There is no evidence that Hincksman ever sent another messenger on the more direct route, down the Merrimac by canoe or other vessel. Had he done so, he almost certainly would have saved the life of the man who had accused him before the Governor and Council of Massachusetts Bay two decades earlier.

On June 28 news of the raid was dispatched to the rest of New England. Curiously, the most detailed and emotionless dispatch was written by Walderne's own son. Notice was given for frontier settlements to prepare their defenses in earnest. Soldiers under a Capt. Noyes went to attack Pennecooke but found it empty and had to content themselves with burning the corn. Coheco's remaining garrison did not feel secure enough to venture forth until it was reinforced by forty or fifty men under Maj. Appleton on July 3. Following the raiders week-old trail for twelve miles, they found only the body of one dead captive. The militia of Piscataqua were more aggressive. After hearing that the Pennacooks and their allies were encamped on Lake Winnepesaukee, they marched inland to the vicinity where "they kill'd One or Two of the Monsters they Hunted for, and

⁵¹ Bouton, *N.H. Prov. and St. Papers*, II, pp. 48-49.

cut down their Corn." Some young Saco settlers went out to join them but ran into an ambush, probably layed by Kancamagus' forces, and were killed as were other Saco men who set out to recover their bodies. Hostile Indians were reported to be "skulking" daily around Kittery and Oyster River and an outlying farm on the north bank of the Merrimac was attacked.⁵² Kancamagus had reignited war along New England's northern frontier.

⁵² Bouton, *N.H. Prov. and St. Papers*, II, pp. 50-55; Mather, p. 196.

CONCLUSION: NO MIDDLE GROUND

The Pennacooks themselves had scattered. Some went northwest to Cowass and possibly as far as Missisquoi in the northern Champlain Valley. Others may have removed to the Kennebec Valley before leaving for Acadia in 1696 or 1697.¹ Kancamagus led his followers to the Androscoggin and stayed at the fort of his ally Worombo, about thirty miles upstream from the river's mouth. The next year, while most of the warriors were in the Saco Valley, the fort was attacked by Massachusetts' seasoned Indian fighter Col. Benjamin Church. Although Kancamagus was not present, his sister was killed and his wife, four children and brother-in-law, along with Worombo's wife, were captured. Church destroyed the fort's corn, killed the prisoners deemed non-essential and sent word for the two to meet him if they wished "to hear of their wives and children." Church was attacked at Casco on September 21, but repulsed the Indians after a sharp fight. The two sagamores then came to Wells and, declaring that their French allies "had made fools of them", promised to end their war. In the negotiations that followed, Kancamagus played a major role in brokering peace between

¹ "Revis. Redeemed Capt.", pp. 21,29; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 97-98.

New England, the Pennacooks and Androscoggins and other Eastern Abenaki tribes (Winnipeasaukees, Ossipees, Pigwackets and Kennebecs). But neither he nor Worombo attended the final treaty signing. The man who first led the Pennacooks against the English does not appear in the records again and it is likely that he died soon after 1690.

The New Englanders captured at Dover were taken north as well. A warrior captured in the Connecticut Valley during 1690 reported that some were being held at Cowass. John Gyles, taken captive in a separate raid, saw others as far north as the Maliseets' "Medocktack fort" on the St. John River, where they were being tortured months later. Only one, a seven year old child named Sarah Gerrish, who was taken to the Intendant of Quebec and then ransomed by Phipps' expedition in 1691, is known to have been returned.²

An aged Wannalancet returned to Jonathan Tyng's estate, with Wattanamunton and other Indians under a truce flag in 1692. He was imprisoned in Cambridge before being allowed to live under Tyng's care until he died in 1696.³

² Calloway, "Wannalancet and Kancamagus", pp. 284-285; Drake, *Hist. and Bio.*, III, p. 116; Gyles, pp. 99-100; Mather, pp. 199-201.

³ In the nineteenth century a small tablet was placed to mark his grave by the Massachusetts Society of Colonial Dames. Waters, p. 136.

Wannalancet had kept faith with Passaconaway's policy, but his people had abandoned it. During the winter and spring of 1699-1700, an unnamed Pennacook sagamore took the lead in trying to form an anti-English coalition among the Indians "from the Penobscot into the Mohawk country". Although the Kennebecs declined to join and the coalition did not materialize, the sagamore was well aware that peace between the English and French would not last and that when war came the French would aid them.

English treatment of the Pennacooks had left a legacy of mistrust that would not be overcome. An unsuccessful treaty between New England and the new Pennacook sagamore Wattanamunton at Casco Bay in 1703 revealed this. At the conclusion of the treaty, when ceremonial volleys were to be fired, the memory of Walderne's seizure was in the forefront of Abenaki minds: "the *Indians* desired the *English* to fire first, which they readily did, concluding it no other than a complement; but so soon as the *Indians* fired, it was observ'd that their Guns were charg'd with Bullets". Less than a year after the treaty signing, Wattanamunton and his followers had thrown in their lot with the French and joined on the raid of Deerfield, Massachusetts. After Reverend John Williams was captured at Deerfield and carried back to St. Francis, a Jesuit "justified" the raid by "rehearsing

some things done by Major Walden above thirty years ago". Williams and much of New England seem to have forgotten their past dealings with the Pennacook confederacy, but Wattanamunton, who died fighting the English in 1712, and his people could not.⁴

New Englanders as a whole had made very few attempts to cultivate a true alliance with the Pennacooks. Early conflict over the land around Massachusetts was only averted by epidemics which virtually destroyed the Pawtuckets. During King Philip's War Pennacook neutrality was repeatedly violated, so much so that the non-belligerents were tricked and rounded up like combatants during Walderne's seizure. After the war New England and New York made extensive efforts to cultivate an alliance with the Iroquois while making only a few token efforts to maintain good relations with the Pennacooks themselves. When the Pennacooks repudiated the English it was probably out of a realization that the alliance no longer existed.

In light of this, what is unusual is that the reverse was so long in coming. Although most Nashaways chose war in the 1670s, the other Pennacooks held on to their New England

⁴ Penhallow, *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, p. 4; Williams, *Redeemed Captive*, pp. 27-28; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 99-100, Haefall and Sweeney, "Revis. the Redeemed Captive," p. 21, n.69.

"alliance" with remarkable tenacity. Even Kancamagus sought peace with New Hampshire as late as 1685. It is the peaceful inclination of the Pennacook confederacy which requires explanation.

The most obvious, yet most difficult step to understanding their actions is to discard all hindsight and remember that the Pennacooks faced an unprecedented situation. There is no mention of any Pennacook watching boatloads of immigrants and goods arrive in Boston Harbor and they would have had no way of knowing that the vision which guided these new arrivals was of a godly commonwealth of land owning families.⁵ Their most immediate problem was to reconstruct their societies in the face of inexplicable epidemics and, later, Mohawk attacks. Any potential threat posed by the English would have seemed slight by comparison.

Geography also played a role. English settlement began in the coastal areas and the confederacy was inland. Both Pennecooke and Nashaway were inland villages and only the refugee Pawtucketts came from, and abandoned, the coast. This distance meant that during the decade when English migration was heaviest (1630-1640), most of the confederacy

⁵ For a detailed examination of the goals and motivations of the early New England settlers see Daniel Vickers, "Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in North America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (Jan. 1990), pp. 3-29.

was not threatened with displacement. Therefore Passaconaway's village, buffered by its upstream location, remained intact and became the basis for a new inter-village coalition. Although they were far enough from the initial settlement to preserve village intact, the inhabitants of Pennecooke were near enough to the Mohawks to be threatened by their extensive raids. Once attacked, the need for European protection became acute. The French were too far away and New Englanders were the only logical choice.

The importance of individuals in shaping the Pennacooks' experience should not be underestimated. Passaconaway, the powerful shaman and sagamore of Pennecooke, was a leader under whom the harder-hit Pawtuckets and Nashaways could regroup. The writings of Morton and Wood indicate that the earliest English settlers respected his power and, after the bungled and quickly repudiated kidnapping of his son in 1642, the Massachusetts authorities dealt with him respectfully as well. Another indication of his influence and prestige is that his son, Wannalancet and much of the confederation attempted to maintain his pro-English orientation long after it had lost its utility.

If the Pennacooks judged the colonists by the individual English whom they dealt with, a true alliance

would have seemed possible in New England's early decades. The Pawtuckets saw that the settlers were able to guard them from Micmac raids. After they had moved inland to Wamesit, they and the Pennecooke villagers dealt with fur traders. Some were respected figures like Simon Willard and Thomas Hincksman, at least one, John Cromwell, was a renegade but what they all had in common was a need to maintain Pennacook goodwill in order to turn a profit. They maintained a genuine friendship with Hincksman long after the beaver stocks had been depleted around Wamesit. Even Richard Walderne, only one trader among many at this time, seems to have abandoned his plans to settle the upper Merrimac in the face of Pennacook opposition. Soon after the traders came missionaries, first John Eliot and later Daniel Gookin. Although Passaconaway never converted, he eventually listened and responded warmly to Eliot's preaching. Many other Pennacooks, especially at Wamesit, were won over to Christianity without overt force. Eliot could also provide some protection against the Mohawks as when he had a garrison stationed at Wamesit in 1669. The interrelationship between traders and missionaries in establishing good relations with most of the Pennacooks is underscored by contrasting it with the Nashaways' experience. No significant fur trade ever developed in the

latter's territory, few positive links with the local settlers were fostered, and Eliot was reduced to blatant meddling in their internal politics. Under Sagamore Sam, the Nashaways seized the first opportunity to fight the English.

King Philip's War caused a drastic shift in which aspects of colonial society the Pennacooks had to deal with among the English. Most New Englanders now perceived the surviving Algonquians tribes as threats to settlers' security rather than potential converts and trading partners. Colonial authorities began to court the Mohawks to put down any future rebellion and authority to deal with the Pennacooks and Eastern Abenakis was transferred to Walderne in his double role of trader and military commander. Pennacook attempts to forge links with other authorities, such as Kancamagus' 1685 journey to Governor Cranfield of New Hampshire, came to nothing.

The transformation in who the Pennacooks dealt with was critical. While Pennacook territory occupied a frontier zone a profitable trade could be maintained with local fur trading farmers such as Simon Willard and Thomas Hinckman. Before war poisoned relations along this frontier, Pennacooks were seen as potential converts to Christianity by the colonial government. The missionaries John Eliot and

Daniel Gookin were charged with managing official relations with Indian tribes, while traders often played a supporting role. As beaver stocks decreased and the area became more populated with English families the fur trade declined in importance and became concentrated under Richard Walderne's control. Once pressures of settlement had precipitated a general war along the entire New England frontier, missionary efforts were discredited. Official relations with Indians became, and remained, a military concern. For Pennacooks this meant that New England society had adopted the attitudes of Richard Walderne, an exploitive fur trader and hostile military commander with no real regard for Indian well-being. Yet links which were developing with New France were dominated by traders and missionaries. When the Pennacooks finally attacked Walderne, they did so because they had cultivated better European allies and because they realized that, whatever the case may have been in Passaconaway's time, New England was not dominated by men concerned with furs and souls but rather by the likes of their old enemy in Dover.

A detailed examination of the Pennacook confederacy in the seventeenth century illuminates a more widely applicable theme. Unlike what occurred in the Great Lakes region, European penetration of New England was swift and gave

natives little time to develop a response. Pennacook history was constantly shaped by proximity to English settlement. The Confederacy's creation was an attempt to regroup in the aftermath of disasters (coastal raiders and most especially disease) brought on by European contact. Its initial policy of accommodation was shaped by the recognition that the new settlers on the coast would be the dominant power in the area. This policy changed after the painful realization that there could be no "middle ground" where Pennacooks could maintain some degree of autonomy. The new society was too close and too powerful to have any need to accommodate Pennacook interests which did not coincide with its own. A thorough study of the Pennacook's seventeenth century history reveals the futility of any native attempt to appease New England.

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