# RESPONSIVENESS IN CANADIAN FEDERAL MINISTERIAL

RESIGNATIONS FROM 1945-2011

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Responsiveness in Canadian Federal Ministerial Resignations from 1945-2011

By

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ABSTRACT

Responsiveness literature has focussed primarily on the relationship between public opinion and policy outputs. The thermostatic model in particular provides both a comprehensive and well supported framework for this relationship. This thesis adds to the responsiveness literature by exploring the potentially thermostatic relationship between public opinion and ministerial resignations in Canada from 1945 to 2011. The impact of changes of public opinion on resignations is explored qualitatively to highlight relevant variables. This analysis is complemented with the use of honour ratios to test other potential causes of resignations that have been highlighted in the qualitative analysis and resignation literature. Finally, regression models are used to determine the significance of the impact of public opinion on ministerial resignations and resignations on public opinion. Though no significant relationship is found, the complexities of ministerial resignations and public opinion are explored and illuminated.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about substantive democracy. Particularly to what extent government outputs are influenced by public opinion.   It is easy to assume that a country is democratic just because there are free and fair elections. Some academics have even defined democracy by the institution of elections (Schumpeter 1950). It is not to say that elections are not essential to democracy, but are they a sufficient condition? How about when the government is not even directly elected? The answer is not a simple yes or no. It depends on if a substantive measure of democracy exists. Substantive democracy, a governance system that empowers the population, may be created through elections, but it cannot simply be assumed that elections will create a substantive democratic state. Therefore, some fundamental element of substantive democracy must be selected and measured to determine if the institutions of a country do in fact create substantive democracy. There has consequently been a growing effort to measure democracy.

For a government to be truly democratic, many scholars believe that its outputs should represent the articulation of the public will (Rousseau 1762, Mill 1861, Lijphart 1984, and Dahl 2000). The relationship between public opinion and government policy outputs has therefore received considerable attention. This body of research has created considerable controversy because it rests on the rather dubious assumptions that the public is: (1) knowledgeable enough to both form and communicate firm opinions about government outputs and (2) respond to changes in government outputs. Despite this debate, attempts to demonstrate a responsive government, requiring a responsive public, have determined that in fact the government does respond to public opinion (Wlezien 1995; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erickson 1995). However, this responsiveness should not be overstated. It would seem that responsiveness is not the norm, but rather occurs under certain circumstances (Burstein 2003). Government outputs tend to show

responsiveness to public opinion in issues that are salient and require only simple analysis. That should not be mistaken to only mean simple issues, but rather simple responses. Wlezien (1995) developed the thermostatic model of responsiveness which required the public simply to desire more or less spending in broad policy areas as opposed to specific issues requiring complex responses. Unfortunately, all government activity cannot be measured in broad spending categories. The search for responsiveness in other activities is also required.

The primary goal of this thesis is to attempt to identify government responsiveness to public opinion in the resignation of cabinet ministers as well as public responsiveness to cases where ministers resign in Canada. This thesis seeks to probe a small, but novel, relationship between public opinion and government action. It is argued that there is no responsiveness in ministerial resignations in Canada; however, it is noted that a lack of observations or lack of unit homogeneity may account for the lack of significance in the findings. Further, it links the literatures of democratic representation and ministerial turnover to address a broader concern in democratic governance: public control over representative behaviour. Like policy, the composition of government in Westminster democracies is not performed directly by the electorate (Franks 1987). Instead, elected representatives create the government composition for the electorate much like the creation of policy is indirect through elected officials. This issue is increasingly important as the government creates most legislation and oversees the administration of the government apparatus (Mallory 1971). Consequently, a democratic government should also include an articulation of the public will in the composition of the government. Where the public has no mechanism to enforce the selection of cabinet ministers or articulate their choice of candidates, the study of responsiveness in government composition can only be measured in the deselection of ministers. The public can call for the resignation of

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cabinet ministers that they do not prefer. The government can therefore demonstrate responsiveness by forcing the resignation of cabinet ministers. Should responsiveness be found in the deselection of cabinet ministers, it can be said that the public has some control over the choices of those who represent them and create policy on their behalf.

Chapter1 will discuss the importance and nature of responsiveness in representative democracies. The plausibility of government and public responsiveness will be discussed by assessing the nature of elite behaviour and the limits of public opinion. This chapter will also provide a brief overview of findings concerning responsiveness, which leads to the selection of thermostatic responsiveness as the preferred model for this study. Chapter 2 will focus on the development of the Canadian political process and governing institutions which will identify the mechanisms and individuals which will need to be explored when considering the decision to force a cabinet resignation in the modern Canadian context. An overview of ministerial resignation literature will identify what data should be collected and how it should be coded to evaluate responsiveness in ministerial resignations. Finally, the methodology of Dewan and Dowding (2005) will be introduced as a substitute for measuring the impact of public opinion on ministerial resignations and the impact of these resignations on public opinion. Though the methodology will not be identical, the results should act as a comparison with the United Kingdom where Dewan and Dowding (2005) found responsiveness does occur in ministerial resignations.

Chapter 3 and 4 provide the specific methodology and results of this study. Chapter 3 includes a qualitative analysis of the resignation of former Liberal Cabinet Minister Lawrence MacAulay. This resignation provides an example that clearly illustrates public opinion

favouring the governing party dropping after a minister's scandal, then increasing after the minister resigned. It also highlights motives and constraints on resignations other than public opinion fluctuations. This analysis is followed by a series of variables that affect resignations. Honour ratios, the number of resignations divided by the total number of resignation issues, are calculated for each attribute of relevant variables to determine which variables are significant. Chapter 4 provides the Dewan and Dowding (2005) ordinary least squares regressions performed on the Canadian case and a reverse regression to determine if public opinion affected resignations. A discussion is included identifying possible reasons why no responsiveness seems to be present in ministerial resignations in Canada.

This thesis concludes that the concentration of power to the Prime Minister of Canada may threaten the foundations of individual ministerial responsibility. Even the public seems to care very little about the activities of cabinet ministers unless they are involved in some serious scandal.

The interrelationship of public opinion and government activity is central to functional democracy. In direct democracies, the institutional relationship between the public and government outputs is clear; the public makes governance decisions. Unfortunately, modern democracies do not function so directly; in the modern sense, democracy refers to representative democracy (Lijphart 1994). This chapter will introduce the government responsiveness as the measure of substantive democracy in representative systems of government. A government responsive to public opinion requires a public to be motivated and able to respond to government action and a government that is motivated and able to respond to public opinion. This chapter also demonstrates that these conditions are possible. A literature review on responsiveness then concludes that the thermostatic model is best suited for understanding the complex relationship between public opinion and government output. The thermostatic model thus becomes a desirable tool for measuring substantive democracy.

Responsive Representation and Substantive Democracy

The word democracy is derived from two route words *demos* and *cratos*. These ancient Greek words mean people and power respectively. Consequently the first usage of the word democracy referred to a system of governance whereby the people had the public power. In the time of ancient Athenian democracy, this meant direct democracy. Each individual citizen who had the time, interest, and capacity to participate in governance could go to the public square for public debate. Not only did the citizen vote on every major decision, but was also free to fully take part in all major deliberations (Manin 1997). The Athenians valued their political equality

so much that they felt it was better to select public officials randomly by lot than to vote. They were concerned that elections would enhance the power of the elite. A few offices were selected by popular election, but their tenures were limited to prevent any individual from attaining long-term power over others. If a citizen was believed to have accumulated too much power or influence, then the public could vote to have that citizen ostracized (Forsdyke 2005). This meant that the citizen had to leave Athens and the surrounding countryside for 10 years. The punishment for returning early was death.

Even in the most democratic of states, institutions were put in place to manage democracy. For practical reasons these institutions were changed. The ostracism was eventually removed, more positions were elected and terms of office extended (Forsdyke 2005; Manin 1997). This allowed highly competent people to have increased influence for the benefit of the whole state. Despite the fact that Athens made these changes, representative democracy was still not considered democracy at all (Aristotle *Politics*). The Romans used elections to select political elites, but they too separate this practice from the term democracy. Despite the antidemocratic sentiment of the Roman elite, modern electoral democracies were founded with elected representation to facilitate democracy (Manin 1997). The modern representative democracy is thus different than the ancient electoral democracy or direct democracy.

The separation of election and democracy by ancient Athenians and Romans should call into question the democratic nature of modern representative democracies. Notwithstanding variations of meaning associated with "liberal democracy", there remains a fundamental component of the term democracy. That is, if representative democracies are in fact democratic,

then the representatives must somehow simulate what the full public would have otherwise done; they must be responsive to public opinion.

Pitkin (1967) provides an appropriate outlay for various conceptions of representation that have been proposed by influential scholars leading up to Pitkin's time. Most importantly, Pitkin highlights that institutions cannot guarantee perfect representation, neither is "representation" a concept that is easily defined. However, throughout Pitkin's discussion of issues relevant to representation and the types and components of representation, some ideas of what is required for democratic representation are explored and highlighted.

Institutions are required to facilitate democratic decision making. None are perfect. Athenian direct democracy was a very close approximation except that it excluded all women, minors, foreigners, and slaves (Manin 1997). Further, those citizens who could not afford to leave their work to attend countless public meetings were largely excluded from all but the most important debates. Representative democratic institutions face different challenges, not the least of which is Aristotle's perspective that elections can only create aristocracy or oligarchy; however, through their analysis there is room for optimism concerning substantive democratic representation.

Pitkin (1967) highlights the importance of authorization of representatives. This formalistic approach to understanding representation requires little more than that. Unfortunately, as a standalone principle of representation, having only elections as an institution to legitimate representatives guarantees nothing more than a continuous parade of representatives. These representatives could act in any way they see fit between elections. This

hardly creates a substantive democracy; however electoral selection is preferable to self-selection.

Just as important, Pitkin also highlights the development of "standing for" those that are being represented. Pitkin states that this can be symbolic or descriptive. First, symbolically speaking, if a representative looks like constituents, they may have enhanced legitimacy because the represented feel a closer link to their representative. For example, a member of a minority group may feel better represented by a member of that group because the representative acts as a symbol for the represented member. Descriptive representation, where the representative's personal characteristics represent the common members of a riding may also enhance legitimacy. Having common characteristics means that the representative will likely have a common experience and understanding and thus share interests which she can then better represent at an electoral assembly.

Pitkin further and more importantly suggests that representatives should "act for" those they represent; a capacity that could be enhanced by descriptive representation, but which holds more substantive implications for representation. "Acting for" necessitates action; that the representative acts on behalf of those that are represented. This concept is not a simple one; Pitkin goes to considerable lengths to describe the families of analogies that exist to describe the relationship of acting for a group. She concludes, though she does so with caveats, that the representative must act in the "interests" of those that are represented. This is not easy because the represented have different and sometimes conflicting interests. Further, one person is limited in capacity and cannot fully represent even a single other person. The goal of democratic institutions, according to Pitkin, is to best facilitate representation for the citizenry by the

representatives. The institutions should be changed in time to better serve this ideal. Nevertheless, there remains a significant debate over how the representative is best able to act for the represented. The representative could attempt to do what public opinion favours or do what the representative believes is in the best interest of the public.   This debate has been labelled the mandate-independence controversy and is often attributed to Edmund Burke's 1770 *Speech to the Electors of Bristol*.

After being elected to the British Parliament, Burke offers a speech to those who have elected him as their representative to the House of Commons. Burke discusses the main controversies surrounding what a representative should do in Parliament. He explains that the representative is responsible to do what he thinks is in the best interests of the constituents. This is because the constituents have selected someone who they think is particularly able to conduct their public business on their behalf. If the constituents disagree with the representative, the representative should still do what he deems most appropriate for the public (Burke 1770). Burke chose to follow his own opinions rather than the public's when acting as their representative, though he was not re-elected.

Since Burke, many influential scholars including Rousseau (1762), Mill (1861), Lijphart (1984), and Dahl (2000) indicate that democracy should incorporate an articulation of public will. For a representative democracy to be substantively democratic the government must be responsive to public opinion. For this to be the case, the government must be able to know the public's aggregate preferences and be motivated to act according to those preferences.

Preconditions of Responsiveness

If we accept that representative democracy should produce a government that is responsive to public will, public sentiment, public opinion or some such phrase, then we should explore if and how a government acts responsively to public opinion. The first step is to explore the basic components of responsive government. Elected representatives must be motivated and able to respond to public opinion. The public in turn must have preferences or opinions that are stable, rational and can change given new information. If either of these criteria cannot be met, then responsiveness cannot exist and any covariation of public opinion and government output must be driven by some other variable or coincidence. Representative behaviour and public opinion will thus be explored.

Representative Behaviour

Discussions of elite behaviour have been common since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers. These discussions were mostly normative considerations about how elites should act and the potential consequences of these actions on the state. These early scholars such as Socrates (The Republic) and later during the Renaissance, Machiavelli (The Prince), relied on analogy and historical examples to demonstrate why rulers should make decisions in various ways that reflected the needs of the polity. These normative based arguments, though they sometimes discussed democracy, by no means included the need for formal mechanisms to ensure the rulers behaved this way. They simply indicated that if interests were not served, then the polity or leaders would suffer. Later scholars who considered the role of the representative, such as Burke (1770) and Pitkin (1967), addressed these concerns in their works. These works

continued to lack a theoretical framework that described why elites would behave in a way beneficial to the public that could be empirically verified. Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) was an early attempt to make the change from normative analysis to empirical. The result was a seminal addition of economic theory to political science.

The Economic Theory of Democracy proposed by Downs (1957) is both deductive and positive. Unlike the more normative models that preceded it, this model focuses on what elites do and why, instead of what they should do and why. As well, it provides a testable theory that can be falsified. As Downs admits, there are some problems with the assumptions. These problems are in large part created because economic theories of behaviour are heavily simplified. The result is a considerable increase in parsimony at the expense of explanatory power. The discussion of representative behaviour that follows largely centres on rational choice theories because elites tend to have the incentive and capacity to act rationally in pursuit of their interests. Psychological and cognitive theories which often challenge rational choice theories also tend to identify elites as those most capable of acting rationally and in a self-interested way[1]. In the later section concerning public opinion, rational choice explanations will be complemented with a greater inclusion of psychological and cognitive theories to determine the plausibility of public responsiveness.

Economics theories require the assumption that individuals are motivated to pursue their interests rationally. That is, they are able to choose a preference or rank order preferences in a series of alternatives. Further, as resources are scarce, individuals not only pursue that which they seek to maximize, but also minimize their costs. Thus preferences are maximized and costs

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[1] These theories are discussed in the Public Opinion section later in this chapter.

minimized (Flanagan 1998). If the preference which is sought to be maximized can be identified, then the means by which a rational actor will attempt to maximize that preference can be identified. Downs applies this to government by assuming that democratic electoral governments want to maximize public support. In the context of modern representative democracies, parties must also be considered. Downs assumes that the goal of a governing party is to gain re-election and the goal of opposition parties is to form government. Each party seeks to maximize public support. Parties are therefore seen to produce policy as a means to win elections rather than winning elections to produce policy (Downs 1957).

Some have questioned the notion that individuals are highly rational, with set orders of preferences, and that they also have the capacity to logically organize competing ideas (Converse 1964). Psychologists and cognitive scientists have spent considerable effort understanding what has been termed 'bounded rationality'. In an effort to reduce the costs of decision making, humans rely on intellectual decision making shortcuts called heuristics (Popkin 1991). However, there is more evidence that elites are particularly adept at fulfilling their rational choice expectations. Even Converse (1964) identified that educated elites tend to hold internally coherent systems of beliefs and are able to abstractly evaluate new information and ideas in terms of their pre-existing preferences. Political elite are therefore able to propose policy that is rationally determined to be more favourable for re-election than alternative policies that may be seen as better for society.

Despite the fact that many scholars have found rational choice explanations for elite and government behaviour to be valuable, the parsimony comes with a loss of explanatory power which gives rise to exceptions (Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 2000). One such exception that

has brought about increased attention to elite behaviour is minority governments in parliamentary systems. Given that in a minority government, the opposition's combined strength exceeds the majority of the parliament, it is unclear why these parties do not force an immediate election to mount a new attempt at achieving government. Strom (1990) re-examines the motives of opposition parties and is able to explain this by expanding their maximands to include office and policy concessions. As such, he argues that many parties are well aware that they cannot obtain government and thus these second order preferences are attainable through minority government or coalition. The minority government in turn has lost out on a chance to form a coalition and ensure stable government with some concessions. Strom again determines that this is due to rational future electoral motivation. Minority governments are often able to perform well, though they are less durable than coalitions or majority governments. Most importantly, minority governments tend to outperform their coalition alternatives in their next election. Minority governments are thus acting as rational choice theories would expect them to, but under certain institutional constraints and conditions.

Despite the exceptions to rational choice expectations of elite behaviour addressed by Strom (1990), the elites of political parties do not always seem to behave in ways that maximize public support for their parties. Separating party behaviour from the behaviour of the elites that lead the parties is necessary to better understand why their decisions sometimes does not appear to be simply public support maximization. Advocates of policy responsiveness understand that the government produces outputs that do not always serve to maximize public support (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This too can be understood when considering the complexities of motives facing political elites in governing parties. Principal-agency theory, also known as agency

theory, is a modeling technique imported from economics which sheds light on the conflicting motives of political elites, specifically the leader of the governing party (Miller 2005).

Agency theory, like the rest of rational choice theories, is derived from economics. Specifically it concerns the relationship between a principal who provides compensation to an agent who performs some sort of service on the principal's behalf (Miller 2005). In the case of representative democracy, individuals run in competitive elections for a government office. In exchange for prestige, compensation, and power, these individuals (agents) provide services for the public (principal). Opponents perform a monitoring function by bringing to light the shortcomings of those elected. This helps prevent shirking of agent responsibilities (Laver 1991). Most democracies require a group of individuals that are elected or running for election to assemble as a political party. If together they form government, then they split the rewards and the responsibilities of that agency. In practice this normally requires the selection of a leadership group from within the party to actually form the government (Laver 1991). This leadership group is in turn the primary agent to the electorate and the agent to the party as a whole. As a result policies offered are chosen in an effort to satisfy both of these principals in exchange for continuing to hold the office.

To remain in government, the leadership of the governing party must anticipate future electoral reprisals if they fail to provide popular outputs. Consequently, government may be expected to consult heavily with public opinion when producing policy outputs, especially in salient issues or issues that threaten to become salient if handled poorly (Burstein 2003). The leadership must also provide outputs that are favourable to the party as a whole. This normally involves a balance of outputs that reflects the interests of its membership and will not threaten

loss of government in the next election (Laver and Shepsle 1996). This balance can be difficult, but a government that produces popular outputs that maximize its public support is unlikely to lose its party support as a result. Continued governing by the party is usually popular amongst its membership. It guarantees greater capacity for outputs favourable to them especially on nonsalient issues. Consequently, a government can be expected to produce outputs that are responsive to public opinion and still behave in a highly self-interested way.

The governing party and the elites who run it have ample motive to be responsive to the public if in fact the public will be responsive to their actions. Further, the government has the resources necessary to indentify aggregate public opinion and public opinion changes. This information can be communicated to the government rather easily through national media, public opinion polls, or direct communication from members of the public (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).

It is, however, not enough for the government to respond to public opinion. The public must also have rational preferences that are responsive to the government's actions. They must be aware of what the government is doing and change their preferences accordingly. The public's ability to meet these demands is more questionable than the government's. The discussion of public opinion will consider rational choice theories, but also focus more heavily on psychological and cognitive theories of behaviour because they call into question the public's capacity to act responsively to government output.

Public Opinion

It would be desirable to be able to state that the public either does or does not have the capacity to respond to government actions. Instead, it seems as if the public does have this capacity, but with a number of serious limitations. To better understand when and where a public is likely to be responsive to government activity, it is essential to understand how the public makes and changes its preferences and attitudes.

To review Downs (1957), each individual should act in a way that is both rational and self-interested. Though Downs focuses on voter choice, the logic of the public's decisions should not change between elections when asked who they would support. Each individual should consider the actions of government and support the governing party when it acts in a way that favours her own interests. Unfortunately, information is limited and can be costly to acquire. Each individual, when considering their party support must consider two counteracting factors. First, the potential benefits of their actions. The level of support that an individual can muster, one vote, is almost too small to ever have a significant effect. The second, the cost of accurately choosing which party supports the individual's interests can be high. Acquiring and understanding all the parties' policies and platforms, gaining the understanding of the implications to the individual and finally evaluating the follow through is costly. Downs (1957) suggests that the individual member of the public thus relies on a number of mechanisms to reduce the cost of obtaining information. First, the most relevant information is selected by political parties, interest groups and media for distribution. Second, it is transmitted for low cost through pay and free media. Third, there are a number of individuals and groups that will analyse it and provide the results. Even the decision to interpret what results are desirable is

simplified through the use of ideologies; that is, simplified abstractions of what would a good society is and what it takes to create it (Downs 1957).

Unfortunately, Downs' optimistic evaluation has been called into question, perhaps most pointedly by the concept of the voter paradox. Even in the event of an election when the public has the most influence in government, the weight of cost and benefit of voting seems to indicate that a rational individual would never put any time into voting choices. Despite the lowered cost of information, the actual weight of one vote in deciding a representative, let alone in determining policy output is so small that no effort is justified (Blais 2000). Despite this fact, many individuals still vote. This seemingly irrational choice calls into question the public's ability to behave rationally. An exploration of psychological and cognitive explanations of public opinion and behaviour may help to determine if the public can act responsively to government activity.

Psychological theories apply particularly well to individuals and in types of aggregate behaviour like voting (Easton 1965). Converse (1964) has demonstrated that people hold beliefs which are not logically consistent with either their interests or other related beliefs. Though this may not be true of all people, Converse demonstrates that some people are more susceptible to idiosyncratic beliefs than others. Unfortunately for the public who rely on political elites to control the government, they are the most likely (with some exceptions) to hold logically inconsistent beliefs and beliefs that do not reflect their self-interest. Converse (1964) explains that this is due to lowered access to information and education. Though there are considerable ways in which individuals can access information and improve their ability to vote for a party that most closely reflects their preferences, Converse and Easton's findings seriously cast a

shadow on the use of economic models to understand mass preferences and voting patterns. In fact Converse claimed that when answering questions on preference, nearly 80% of Americans seemed to generate an opinion on the spot. He termed such instances "nonattitudes".

If up to 80% of citizens demonstrate nonattitudes, then 20% have valid attitudes and preferences. Many of the earlier psychological theories were equally as pessimistic about the public's capacities. They focussed on individual differences and how they attribute attitude formation and persuasion (Cacioppo and Petty 1982). This group of theories also leads to the conclusion that the public cannot be responsive to government outputs. There is a difficulty with understanding attitude formation and persuasion as unique to each individual; that is if every individual is fundamentally different, then how can aggregate responsiveness of a population be understood predictably by political elites? Parties would be forced to compete using random promises of outputs and just hope that they are congruent with the random preferences of some large group of voters. Outputs would no longer be ideological or rational, but rather an eclectic random mix of policy. Fortunately, though individual differences are pronounced and complex, political psychologists have managed to find important differences that can be understood and categorized.

Newman (1986) proposed the Three Component Model of public sophistication. The three categories are salience, knowledge, and conceptualization. These factors taken together determine to what extent an individual is capable of making sophisticated assessments of policies and other government outputs. The higher up this scale, the more likely an individual will act as rational choice suggests. This model interestingly highlights similar characteristics to Petty and Cacioppo (1986) dual-process model of persuasion. Petty and Cacioppo's model suggests that

individuals who have both the ability and motivation are prone to use what they term the central route to persuasion. That is, they rely on the content of arguments to form or change their attitude on a particular issue. When individuals are not able or motivated, they rely on simple heuristics or cues to form their opinions. The selection of route is not entirely based on individual differences that are long lasting, but rather route selection is decided by individuals on an issue-by-issue basis. This distinction is important because the quality of information available to the public may determine whether or not the public has the capacity to select attitudes or preferences rationally. It also makes the distinction that salient issues will bring about rational decision making in a way that nonsalient issues will not. These distinctions will become important when considering the quality and availability of information disseminated through the media.

Further, Page and Shapiro (1992) offer a response to earlier claims of an irrational public, specifically Converse's nonattitudes. Their findings, based on survey research, bring the experimental based work of Newman (1986), and Petty and Cacioppo (1986) to actual real world findings. It was found that the survey design of many earlier scholars led to considerable error rather than measuring random fluctuations in public opinion. These errors ranged from ambiguity in forced choice answers, considerable key punching response errors, and the pressure of the test-like survey situation. Later research corrected for these errors and found promising results for a public that has rational and stable attitudes and preferences. Through very comprehensive analysis of other scholars' findings, the analysis of a large dataset of public opinion on a variety of issues, and a focus on many relevant factors, Page and Shapiro (1992) found optimistic conclusions concerning the public's aggregate ability to meet the needs of responsiveness. The public, they found, have real and coherent preferences which are stable, but

change in understandable and predictable ways. These opinions reflect their sense of the public good and their own interests. Page and Shapiro do warn however that these opinions are not ideal. The public is susceptible to not noticing issues that are not salient. The public may also be misled by government, and do not always contemplate a large variety of alternatives.

Later criticisms of Page and Shapiro (1992) have demonstrated weaknesses in their work. Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) found that the public rely heavily on the use of heuristics such as framing and cues to form their opinions. These frames and cues are normally disseminated to the public through national media which lacks the capacity to provide highly descriptive analysis. These information short cuts make the public susceptible to manipulation and thus potentially unable to create their rational self-interest. Though this criticism is valid, responsiveness only requires that the public responds to government action, not that it responds in a way that systematically favours the majority.

The aforementioned findings indicate that a public can be responsive, but only when citizens are motivated to pay attention to an issue and quality information on the issue is available, simplified, and accurate. Though promising, many of these necessary preconditions require that the media provide the right information about issues that will capture the public's attention and thus create saliency. Failing this, the public cannot be expected to be responsive. Though not mentioned to this point, there is also a component of the magnitude of an issue that must be met to stimulate the public's interest in engaging it. Stimson (1991) proposes that a zone of acquiescence exists on a traditional policy dimension. So long as policies fall within this zone, the public largely does not believe that change is required. On the other hand when current policy falls outside of this range, either through changes in policy output or change in the

boundaries of the zone of acquiescence range, then the public increasingly demands either more or less output in that policy domain. Consequently, public opinion may only influence policy outputs when the difference between public preference and actual output is adequately large and noticeable.

The public it would seem is also motivated and able to be responsive. Unlike the government which gets its information through means such as polling, the public must receive its information about government activity through a more complex route. The media is most responsible for sending information to the public about government activities and changes in government outputs. The complexities of these signals must also be considered to ensure the information is available in a useful format for the public to respond to.

Signals to the Public

Important issues are brought to most people's attention through the media. However, interpretation is also required so that members of the public can contextualize the loose facts that are presented to them (Shapiro 1998). The media in turn must also provide interpretations of facts to the public. It is important then to understand how this information is disseminated through the media and how the public may respond to these signals. Though most scholars have identified that some small minority of the population will produce highly informed and rational opinions based on adequate information, the rest, who make up the bulk of the aggregate public opinion, will create their opinions in a different way.

Perceptions of credibility are very important when individuals rely on the media for information and interpretation. This heuristic helps individuals to decipher what interpretations should be allowed to alter their attitudes. Page and Shapiro (1992) found that commentaries by journalists and experts were the most persuasive sources of information in the media. Though the reasons for the enhanced persuasiveness of journalists in particular could be ambiguous, these two groups are often seen as unbiased and competent which are characteristics highly important to persuasion. Governing and opposition parties were found to be considerably less persuasive. This too makes sense because their biases and personal motives are well known. They must rely on other mechanisms to persuade the public that their policies or party are correct and worth supporting or that their competition is not. In Downs' parlance, this would increase the expected party differential between governing party and opposition party and thus increase the likelihood that voters will abstain from voting for the opponent or change their vote altogether.

Outside of issue publics and elites, the general public requires information dissemination from opinion leaders (Lazarsfeld and Katz 1955) or through simplified messages disseminated through the media. The focus in this study is the latter. If the public generally uses heuristics in their attitude formation and persuasion, then it is important to understand how governing parties and opposition parties attempt to effectively use heuristics in the media. Where they are already considered biased and not persuasive on their own merits as sources of communication (Page and Shapiro 1992), then the content of the message is important to understand.

The framing of issues is a predominant and effective tool in this regard to help the public understand complex and competing issues (Shapiro 1998). Framing effects occur when an issue

is discussed in the context of other considerations. The issue is embedded in consideration of something else. For example, if a hate group rally is described in terms of freedom of speech, it should gain more support than if it is described in terms of public safety (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). The elicitation of opinions concerning the value of freedom of speech cause increased support whereas elicitation of the danger of hate groups to public safety reduced it. Frames are an important yet concerning tool for persuasion. On one hand, properly framed issues provide the right information so that individuals who know little about an issue can contextualize it and fit it in their better developed more general belief systems. Unfortunately, when leveraged exclusively for persuasive reasons, frames can be used to manipulate discussions on issues and persuade individuals from their rational preference (Kuklinski and Quirk 2002). Framing effects are so powerful that they are considered to be one of the central means of elite influence (Druckman and Nelson 2003). The prominence and effectiveness of frames has thus caused concern that substantive democratic theory which rests on the articulation of preferences is threatened by manipulative rhetoric (Page and Shapiro 1992; Kuklinski and Quirk 2002).

Experimental research on framing effects has thus proliferated. The nature and effect of frames has gained serious attention. Because most investigation concerning frames has been experimental, there has been concern for the external validity of the findings. Chong and Druckman (2007) demonstrated that in competitive contexts, stronger frames were more persuasive than weaker ones and repetition had no impact after exposure to competing frames. However, it should be noted that framing is not an all powerful form of persuasion.

Druckman and Nelson (2003) found that the effects of competing elite rhetoric are negated by conversations with other who hold differing points of view. This finding is

particularly important as salient issues and particularly those relevant at election time will be subject to public discussion. Frames also lack significant effect when an issue is of great personal importance to the recipients (Price, Nir and Cappella 2005) and when the source is not perceived as credible (Hartman and Weber 2009). These findings draw attention to the importance of political parties as sources of frames and how the public may receive these frames. Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) found that party sponsorship mattered on frames that were conflict issues between parties. An individual who identifies with a party will exhibit a greater framing effect if a frame is generated from that party and will not be affected by frames of other parties. Unless on consensus issues. Those who are not strongly attached to a political party should not be as effected by the source of the argument and more likely to be affected by the content. So framing is most influential on voters who are most likely to be willing to change their party preferences at election time.

To conclude, the public does appear to have the capacity to be responsive to government activities. Through information disseminated by the media, simplified through heuristics, and verified through public discussion, the public as an aggregate can decide if its preferences are met or need to be changed in one direction or another. It is however important to remember that for the public to be responsive to government activities, these activities must concern salient issues that have been communicated through mediated sources and that are preferably simplistic.

Responsiveness

Scholarly Findings

The public and their representatives both seem to have the capacity to respond to the actions of one another, when certain conditions are met. Responsiveness is thus plausible. Scholarly work on the opinion-policy relationship has also generated some positive results. This literature is diverse and demonstrates that opinion does affect policy, but again only under certain conditions.

Indirect methods have been used to suggest that representative democracy does include an articulation of the public will. A number of scholars have considered the relationship between public opinion and party/representative rhetoric or the content of policy documents (Cohen 1999; Rottinghaus 2006). Though a positive relationship between the two seems to reflect the impact of public opinion government activities, this may not be the case. All this demonstrates is that the government is in fact able to understand what the public may want, but it does not mean the government will do it. This relationship may only be as deep as rhetoric.

Other scholars have focussed on comparing attitudes of publically elected officials and public opinion. Again, a positive relationship was found (Verba and Nie 1972; Hill and Hinton-Anderson 1995). However, it is important to note that sharing common opinions does not equate acting on them. Weissberg (1978) has identified that in the United States, representatives do in fact vote in ways similar to the preferences of their constituents. This relationship is known as dyadic representation. Though the presence of dyadic representation supports a substantive element to representative democracy, it does not guarantee that the actions of government will in fact be responsive to the public's opinions. This problem is particularly relevant when

considering the opinion-policy relationship in systems where there is heavy party control over voting. In Canada for example, representatives vote according to party lines, those that do not can be removed from the caucus (Savoie 2010). Dyadic voting would not be likely in such systems.

Others have found, such as Shapiro and Page (1983), that beyond dyadic voting there is a correlation between public opinion and policy outputs (Soroka and Wlezien 2007). Despite the covariation of policy outputs and public opinion, when assessing the relationship between two variables, it is important not to mistake correlation for causation. The democratic responsiveness model requires that policy makers must be receptive to changes in public opinion, through interest groups, political parties, opinion polling, or other direct communication (Petry 1991; Manza and Cook 2002). One factor that could cause a correlation between public opinion and policy output is that through regular elections, new elected officials replace old ones whose opinions are no longer congruent with the electorates. As such, responsiveness is not motivated by changes in public opinion, but through replacements of elected officials. Bartels (1991) found that in the United States Congress, on issues of defence spending that without much turnover in elected officials there was a considerable correspondence between public opinion change and policy outputs change. This conclusion supports responsive elected representatives.

Further, policy responsiveness has been established in the United States, Canada, Germany, and a number of other countries (Burstein 2003). Policy responsiveness has also been found in a variety of U.S. institutions including Congress, the Presidency, and even the judiciary and across domains (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erickson 1995; Burstein 2003). Of equal importance for identifying a causal relationship, the responsiveness of representatives tends to

follow trends in public opinion that fluctuate temporally at the same pace as the representative's electoral cycle. Elected officials, with shorter tenures in office, are more responsive to short-term fluctuations in public opinion. Court judges, who have seven-year terms, tend to respond more slowly and to longer-term trends in public opinion change (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995).

A more compelling piece of evidence to support the causal relationship between public opinion and government activity is determining temporal precedence. If public opinion is to cause a change in policy output, then the change in public opinion must precede the change in policy output. If government action were to change public opinion, then the temporal direction would be reversed. Time series regression analysis has demonstrated that public opinion change does in fact occur prior to the changes in government output. Many studies (Soroka and Wlezien 2010) use this form of regression whereby the correlation of two variables is measured with a time lag[2].

The common theoretical argument leveraged is that elected officials respond to changes in public opinion due to the anticipation of future electoral consequences (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erickson 1995; Wlezien 1995). This relationship stands to reason only if the electorate in turn responds to government outputs. As outlined in the public opinion section, there is debate concerning the public's capacity to do so. Burstein (2003) warns that responsiveness is not the norm, but is only evident sometimes. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) also acknowledge that three factors must be considered to understand how public responsiveness may work and when. It may work because only a small number of individuals need to change their opinions to move

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[2] Time lags for opinion-policy relationships are generally 3 months unless government output requires a greater period of time to implement.

aggregate public support or opinion, politicians use heuristics such as framing and cues to help simplify issues for the public, and the public only need to focus on a limited number of major issues which become salient. That is, responsiveness on policy issues can occur, but only when the public cares.

Without public responsiveness, politicians have no incentive to follow public opinion. Consequently, for opinion to influence policy outputs, policy outputs must in turn produce changes in public opinion. These changes must also correspond with the direction and magnitude of the changes of the policy output. That is, if the public wants an output and gets it, the public must show some form of satisfaction with this outcome and some form of dissatisfaction if they do not receive it. The flow of information in turn must run from the public to the government and from the government to the public. Both must respond.

The Thermostatic Model

The Thermostatic Model of Responsiveness provides a comprehensive model which takes into account all the aforementioned requirements of responsiveness. It also works given the restrictions placed on elite and public rationality. Consequently, the methods of this thesis will be based on the Thermostatic Model. Its description follows.

Thermostatic Responsiveness, a model first proposed by Wlezien (1995), is the most complete model of responsiveness currently in use. First, public opinion on an issue can be understood as normally distributed not unlike Downs' understanding of the median voter. The median is known as the ideal point of policy preference on the given issue. This point is located

on a thermometer of output. Like policy preference, actual policy output can also be placed on the same thermometer. The magnitude and direction of difference between the ideal public preference point and actual output is known as the public's relative preference.

A signal is sent to policy makers indicating the public's relative preference and the magnitude of the difference between that point and actual policy output. If responsiveness is present, government will change output in the direction of the public's ideal point which reflects the magnitude of difference. A new and smaller public relative preference will thus be established. The public then receives a negative feedback signal indicating the policy response and thus adjusts its own signal to reflect the new magnitude and direction of the public's relative preference. Without a responsive public and a feedback signal, policy makers would lack a reward or punishment for their responsiveness or lack thereof. Policy outputs would not be linked to public support for the governing party and thus no difference in electoral outcome would be realized for reducing the public's relative preference.

The thermostatic model has been successfully implemented by Wlezien (1995). Issues where surveys have asked the public for their desire regarding more or less spending have been used to gauge the public's preference in large spending domains. Further, reliable information on actual spending can be easily obtained. Time-series regression analysis is conducted for policy responsiveness to allow for budgetary processes that occur over the course of a year. The same is true for public responsiveness; a time lag is required for changes in government outputs to be reflected in public opinion. Thermostatic responsiveness has been found to occur in the United States (Wlezien 1995), the United Kingdom (Soroka and Wlezien 2005), and Canada (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Increased issue saliency has been found to increase responsiveness as it

makes the electoral consequence of policy outputs more likely to affect votes and thus increase the potential of an electoral penalty for failure to produce the right amount of policy. Also, institutional arrangements which demonstrate clear lines of accountability increase public responsiveness and policy representation (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).

There are limitations to these findings. Public opinion is affected by variables other than policy outputs, such as leadership attributes (Savoie 2010). Policy outputs are also affected by variables other than public opinion, such as the policy preferences of party elites (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Further, governance is not limited to policy domains of large spending. Therefore, other avenues require exploration using this general model.

This study will explore one of these avenues. An often ignored aspect of the electoral system in Westminster democracies is that the electorate does not elect the government; it elects the House of Commons. From that, a prime minister is selected. In turn, that prime minister selects a cabinet of ministers. This cabinet produces most of the legislation that is passed and also oversees the administration of government departments (Franks 1987). The Canadian case provides an excellent opportunity to investigate potential responsiveness in the composition of government. Together with actual policy outputs, this function is of primary importance of the governing system. Cabinet ministers oversee the operations of government and thus policy implementation as well as the production of policy from their administrative jurisdictions. This is particularly important as these individual representatives are responsible for policy outputs that do not reach high levels of salience. Policy outputs require responsiveness to public opinion to substantiate democratic representation, analogous to this is the substantive democratic selection

of government itself. If no responsiveness exists in the composition of cabinet in Canada, then government selection is not democratic just because the House of Commons is elected.

To this end, this study will apply the thermostatic model of responsiveness to ministerial resignations in Canada. Though it would be useful to understand responsiveness in the selection of ministers, this cannot be measured as they have not been able to demonstrate if they can produce what the public wants. On the other hand, if the public expresses dissatisfaction with a minister, the minister can be forced to resign. Therefore thermostatic responsiveness may be seen in ministerial resignations. Ministerial positions cannot be filled or removed on a scale; the public cannot want greater or lesser degrees of a given minister. Rather, the public can either want a minister to stay or to resign. The thermostatic analogy is thus not entirely accurate. A light switch model may be more appropriate. Though the aggregate public preference is still one of degree, the government's option for response is dichotomous. Like a light switch, which can be turned on or off but not in between, a minister can be allowed to continue to hold his position or be forced to resign. For the sake of consistency with the rationale behind Wlezien's (1995) model, the term thermostatic responsiveness will continue to be used to describe responsiveness in ministerial resignations.

An exploration of the Canadian case will be undertaken to determine if responsiveness exists in Canadian ministerial resignations. Chapter 2 will focus on the institutional context of Canada, both formal and informal, and on ministerial resignations as a topic different than other actions of government and thus warrants further exploration.

CH2 – MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS IN CANADA

Ministerial resignations have largely been overlooked in discussions of government responsiveness, but they can be important for ensuring the public gets some accountability in their government leaders. The electorate can select and remove Members of Parliament at election times. This is the central mechanism of democratic representation in electoral democracy. However, anticipation of future elections has been demonstrated to motivate policy responsiveness between elections (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erickson 1995). The electorate therefore has some power to influence government actions between elections through this mechanism. This finding is interesting as it may relate to the tenure of ministers in the government. In Westminster parliamentary systems, the electorate selects Members of the House of Commons, but it does not select a government (Russell 2008). The mechanisms of government selection occur after the seats in the House have been allocated via the electoral system. The selection and deselection of the members of the government may also follow a similar democratic process. Through the anticipation of future elections, ministers may be selected who are believed to maintain or increase government popularity and those that do not may in turn be replaced to prevent or correct potential or actual losses in public support (Dewan and Dowding 2005). If so, the electorate may in fact have some degree of control over the composition of government beyond the selection of Members of Parliament.

To investigate responsiveness in ministerial resignations in Canada, it is important first to explore the Canadian democracy. An overview of the Canadian political system will first be required to understand how the concepts of representation have evolved and how power has been distributed. This overview will be followed by a description of the changes that have occurred

and the consequences for representation and governance. The chapter continues with a short discussion of how ministerial resignations can be understood as the ultimate reprimand for violations of ministerial responsibility and how their actual usage may change the understanding of the responsibility of ministers. It ends by concluding that the Dewan and Dowding (2005) model used to determine the impact of public opinion on ministerial resignation should be used to measure thermostatic responsiveness in ministerial resignation in Canada.

Basic Westminster Institutions in Canada

Canada inherited its governing institutions from the United Kingdom. It is thus a Westminster parliamentary system. Though Westminster systems can have a diverse set of institutional arrangements, they all inherit conventions originally developed in the United Kingdom. A brief description of Canada's formal institutions follows.

Canada has a number of governance institutions. These include, but are not limited to a monarch (and the monarch's representative, an unelected Senate, an elected House of Commons, and judiciary (Franks, 1987). Due to the unelected nature of all but the House of Commons, if democratic responsiveness is to be found in Canada's governance institutions, then it would be found in the House of Commons.

Inherited from the United Kingdom, the Canadian electorate selects the members of the House of Commons through a first-past-the-post electoral system (Mallory 1971). The country is divided into geographical ridings that together encompass the entire country with no overlap of constituency. The borders of each riding are selected so that the population in each is roughly

equivalent, though given population change and the need to distribute ridings on a provincial basis, there is notable variance in populations in ridings. The members of the electorate in each riding may each cast a single ballot for a single candidate. The candidate that receives the most votes in the riding wins a seat and thus a vote in the House of Commons. The full composition of the House of Commons is selected this way with each riding contributing one representative. Through periodic elections, the electorate of each riding decides if their representative has adequately represented them. If so, the Member of Parliament may be re-elected, but if the electorate decides that a competing candidate may make a better representative, then the Member of Parliament may be replaced.

Formally, this is the selection and deselection mechanism for representative democracy in Canada, however at this point the electorate has selected the composition of the House of Commons, but has not chosen a government (Russell 2008). Government selection may then be indirectly influenced by electoral pressure as policies are. If so, the mechanisms of this process must be understood. Unlike the selection and deselection of the House of Commons, the process of selecting and deselecting government is based more on unwritten convention and has changed over time (Carty, Cross, and Young 2002).

Early Concepts of Ministerial Responsibility

The Westminster Parliamentary system developed through convention over hundreds of years in the United Kingdom. Parliaments selected a primes minister and cabinet which provided an executive function and lead role in policy development. The prime minister was selected as a Member of Parliament who could form a government that could maintain the

support of the House of Commons. Cabinet ministries were given out as patronage to popular Members of Parliament in exchange for support. A concentration of power in this executive was inherited from the original power of the Monarchy, but unlike the Monarch, the prime minister requires the assistance of a number of cabinet ministers to administer the large government apparatus as well. These ministers are drawn almost exclusively from the elected House of Commons which provides some democratic representation in the executive, albeit indirect. Consequently, the responsibility of ministers also developed at this time (Woodhouse 1994).

Marshal and Moodie (1971) identify four trends in the discussion of ministerial responsibility. First, ministers are seen to be legally responsible for acts of the Crown because the Crown is not responsible in person. Second, ministers are both responsible and subordinate to the Commons. Third, ministers have moral culpability for their actions. And fourth, ministers are constitutionally accountable to Parliament, which can force penalties for disapproval. These trends clearly reflect the tradition of a powerful monarchy and Parliament in the early British system. Despite considerable change, these trends shaped modern conventions of ministerial responsibility that would guide the emergence of more democratic government. Two types of government responsibility emerged based on the aforementioned responsibility of ministers: collective ministerial responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility (Sutherland 1991). These two conventions more adequately describe the modern concept of ministerial responsibility.

Collective ministerial responsibility is the idea that the prime minister and cabinet ministers as a collective government propose the vast majority of legislation and are responsible for the executive function of Parliament and in turn defend their decisions in front of the House

of Commons. Each minister acts as part of this collective. If major motions are defeated, then the government is said to have lost the support of the House of Commons and must resign (Sutherland 1991). This convention originated from the need to protect individual ministers from being isolated and attacked by the Crown (Ward 1987). In modern use, a prime minister may protect an individual minister from attack by extending collective responsibility and allowing the government as a whole to take responsibility for a policy choice or action taken as an executive. Through collective responsibility, the whole government can be forced to resign if it loses the support of the House of Commons.

As opposed to collective ministerial responsibility, there is also individual ministerial responsibility. A minister was responsible for all acts performed by the department over which the minister held responsibility. Through this mechanism, the civil service and administration of government apparatus have a democratic responsibility through the elected Member of Parliament who has been assigned to take that responsibility (Sutherland 1991). The capacity of a minister to understand all the operations and workings of his department was originally a realistic expectation. A minister was, at one time, able to do much the ministry's work himself or with the assistance of a small staff (Denton 1979). If a cabinet minister made an error, he could be forced to resign while the rest of the government could continue.

By the mid-nineteenth century in the United Kingdom, Parliament experienced its pinnacle of influence. Ministerial responsibility and accountability was easiest to understand. A minister could be realistically expected to understand all the workings of his department and thus could be held accountable for the actions of the entire department. The House of Commons

could hold the minister to account and directly force his resignation (Woodhouse 1994). The result was that all members of the government were individually accountable to the House.

Before parties and party discipline, theories of representative authority and responsibility were easier to understand. The electorate authorized an MP to act on its behalf through an election. All the MPs as a group selected amongst themselves a prime minister who could maintain support of the House. This prime minister selected the additional cabinet ministers to form a government. The government, as a group and as individual ministers, were accountable to the House of Commons. The House could vote to either force the resignation of the government as a whole or vote to force the resignation of an individual cabinet minister. The Members of Parliament were then held accountable to their individual constituents for their actions in Parliament through the next election (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009).

The conventions of ministerial responsibility in Westminster Parliamentary systems were inherited from these democratic authority and responsibility relationships. By 1867 in Canada, factions of Members of Parliament were coalescing into more stable alliances based on the common interests of those they represented. Further, departments were becoming larger and more complex which would make the relationships between democratic authority and ministerial responsibility more complex (Franks 1987).

Changes in Canadian Democracy

A number of factors have changed the nature of Westminster democracy in Canada. The ascendency of parties, changes in media technology, and changing demographics and cleavages

have all affected the relationship between the electorate, Members of Parliament, cabinet ministers, and the prime minister (Carty, Young and Cross 2002). The result has been major changes in the lines of democratic authority and government responsibility.

Though the time of Parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom was over by the time of Confederation in 1867, Members of Parliament were still voting against their own party on a regular basis (Franks 1987). This came to an end when parties began to solidify power. Until around 1917, parties only existed within the Parliament. Members of Parliament would compete in highly localized elections and patronage was used to bind them into somewhat stable parties (Campbell and Christian 1995). The parties that formed from combining factions, though they were named after ideologies, were never as entrenched in society through ideologies and class as in other countries. This set the foundation for the modern Canadian brokerage parties (Wolinetz 2002).

Around the late 1910s and the 1920s extra-parliamentary parties began to grow. The Liberals and then Progressive Conservatives began to select their leaders at party conventions. Media was still highly localized and other than the actual party leader, very powerful regional bosses emerged who became powerful cabinet ministers in exchange for gaining regional support for the party. The parties relied on these popular individuals and personal connections to win support from the electorate (Carty, Young and Cross 2002). The parties were primarily vote seeking and were even willing to make alignments on both sides of cleavages in an attempt to gain more votes. Except for the leader and regional bosses, most Members of Parliament relied on party label to win a seat more than parties relied on individual candidates. This was considered the golden age of parties (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999).

After the Second World War and into the early 1960s another change occurred. Parties increasingly organized on a national scale. Greater emergence of national media and party leaders became more important for elections and attracting votes (Carty, Young and Cross 2002). The supremacy of party over individual candidates was fully established with the leader being the only individual of serious significance and influence. Even the powerful regional ministers had largely disappeared (Bakvis 1991). In 1963, Pearson told his ministers that their function would move from regional organization to Parliamentary activity, weakening their public image (Azoulay 1999). Increasingly, candidates owed their victories to the party and leader instead of parties owing their victories to individual candidates.

A new age emerged in the early 1990s that continues to evolve. Though there are different interpretations of what sorts of changes are occurring in politics, media, the electorate, and party systems, several changes are commonly acknowledged. Media has become more prevalent both during and between elections (Savoie 2010). Parties select leaders on their capacity to win elections more so than ever as the personalization of national campaigns have become paramount. The image of the party leader has grown in importance while the role of the potential or past ministers has seen a significant loss of importance in elections (Azoulay 1999). Further, the media has become less interested in in-

depth coverage of substantive topics and more interested in simple and sensational stories that rely on polls and other easily reported phenomena (Swanson and Mancini 1996; Dalton 2002). The personalization of politics with a focus on scandal and controversy predominate media coverage (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999). The leader's capacity to win votes through positive image is essential for electoral success.

Though party label still remains the best indicator of voter intention, there is considerable reason to believe that the personalization of the leadership is become increasingly important. Up to 44% of the Canadian population are apolitical; they have no strong affiliation with any political party (Cody 2008). These voters therefore rely on short-term considerations when deciding which party they favour and how they will vote. Such short-term considerations include leadership image, polls, parties' responses to other current salient issues, and events that are easily recalled (Miller and Niemi 2002). This demonstrates a clear erosion of stable partisan bases of support for parties. With a growing number of alternative parties available to attract an unattached electorate, short-term issues must be considered more important to electoral success than they once were.

Conventions, such as ministerial responsibility, change with usage over time; they are not concrete and set in stone (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009). With the substantial changes that have occurred in Canada's Westminster parliamentary system, ministerial authority and responsibility must be reconsidered. The roles of prime minister, party, Parliament and cabinet minister have all changed as has the balance of power between them. The original conventions that assured ministerial responsibility have to be reconceptualised.

Reconceptualising Concepts of Democratic Authority and Ministerial Responsibility

As the new focus on ministerial responsibility centres on the application of ministerial resignations, the power balance and responsibilities of government elites must be reconsidered. Principal-agent theory will be used to demonstrate how the prime minister has co-opted the power to enforce ministerial responsibility for his own advantage and how Members of

Parliament have lost influence. The lines of authority and responsibility have changed accordingly. The following analysis will be considered assuming majority government status. Minority government will be discussed later.

Members of Parliament have lost a considerable amount of their autonomy and power. It is almost unthinkable to consider a cabinet minister being censured by the House. Through party discipline, if a Member of Parliament votes against her party, she may be expelled from the party. As such, the House, under majority government is unable to hold ministers to account (Page 1990). Consequently, ministers are not agents to the House.

Members of Parliament have given up this power because they need to be members of a party to exert influence. First, to get elected, parties are the most enduring measure of voting intention (Docherty 1997). As such, having a party label is almost essential for a candidate to gain an electoral victory. Parties are also used to determine who is going to form government. In Canada, the leader of the party that has won the most seats in the House of Commons is given the opportunity to form government by the Governor General. The prime minister then selects the cabinet ministers almost exclusively from his party's Members of Parliament. To become a cabinet minister or a prime minister requires being a member of a party, but this comes with the loss of autonomy. Members of Parliament outside of the cabinet, with the exception of leaders of opposition parties, have virtually no power due to party discipline. They are basically forced to vote with the party on all matters. If they do not, they can be demoted from committee assignments and even kicked out of the party itself, leaving them completely vulnerable in the next election (Franks 1987). A Member of Parliament can only act as a riding ombudsman to secure personal support in upcoming elections, a limited role that impacts the votes they may

receive less than party affiliation or even the popularity of the party leader (Docherty 1997). Given this relationship, the Member of Parliament is a nearly powerless agent to a party principal.

The decline in power of the Member of Parliament, caused largely by the increased role of the political party, sets the modern relationship between the House and the government. This relationship, solidified after the end of the Second World War, turns the relationship between the House and the government backwards. It has been said that the House is responsible to the government instead of the government being responsible to the House (Ward 1989). This new relationship changes the nature of ministerial responsibility and how it can be studied.

Parliamentary power has shifted from the House to the cabinet, but over time, this power has become largely centralized with the prime minister. To further understand the application of concepts of ministerial responsibility it is essential to understand the modern role of the members of cabinet. This model is appropriate to use since the end of the Second World War, though the concentration of power since then has centralized progressively further into the hands of the prime minister. The responsibility of the cabinet minister, as will be explained shortly, has shifted from Parliament to the prime minister as well. Principal-agency theory illuminates how changes in *de facto* power bring about changes in relationships of responsibility.

Instead of starting the description of democratic authority and responsibility with an elected House, the description must now start with political parties. Each party selects a leader. This leader is responsible, particularly leading into and during elections, to gain as much public support for the party as possible. The primacy of the party leader in election campaigns has been increasing with the development of the new age of campaigning which requires heavily

personalized leadership races (Savoie 2010). Through the popularity that the leader is able to leverage, and the work of candidates and organizations affiliated with the party in each riding, the citizenry selects its House of Commons through the first-past-the-post electoral system. The party leader is thus an agent of a party principal. If the party is satisfied that the leader has performed well in maximizing its electoral support, then the agency is maintained. If not, a new leader is selected by the membership of the party.

For the party that successfully won the most ridings and thus obtained the most seats in the House, the leader is appointed prime minister by the Governor General. As prime minister, the party leader has a second principal, the entire citizenry. The prime minister is given responsibility to form and lead a government that will produce public outputs for the country (White 2005). However, they are also still the leader of their political party and are required to produce outputs that favour the party's membership as well. This often means policy outputs that favour the party's supporters either directly or ideologically where possible, but it also means maintaining or maximizing public support for the governing party. Producing outputs that are popular enhances public support for the governing party and thus continued opportunity to govern (Wlezien 1995; Dewan and Dowding 2005). Continued governance is essential to maximize the party membership and supporters payoffs from assuming government, so a prime minister who continues to maintain or enhance popularity will continue his agency to the public and party.

The prime minister still needs to select cabinet ministers to assist in the running of the massive government apparatus. These cabinet ministers enjoy considerable advantage and benefits over backbenchers. As a cabinet minister, a Member of Parliament has substantially

enhanced influence, executive function, prestige, pay, and usually an electoral advantage in the next election if she does a good job (Docherty 1997). The cabinet ministers are agents to the prime minister, as the prime minister selects them and can force their resignations. In other Westminster democracies, this relationship is not as straight forward as the prime minster may be replaced by the parliamentary caucus. In Canada however, a large party convention is required where the combined deselection power of the cabinet ministers, though potentially influential, is a small fraction of the whole deselectorate. Consequently, in Canada, prime ministers are rarely replaced (Weller 1985).

To further understand this balance of power an assessment of formal power and informal constraints facing the prime minister must be considered. Formally, the prime minister of Canada has more power than his contemporaries in other Westminster parliamentary systems. Despite the original intention that the prime minister would be the first among equals, the reality is that the prime minister's cabinet ministers are agents with little formal power beyond what the prime minister assigns (Savoie 1999). Savoie (2010) lists these powers as follows:

> ...prime ministers chair Cabinet meetings, establish Cabinet processes and procedures, set the Cabinet agenda, establish the consensus for Cabinet decisions, appoint and fire ministers and deputy ministers, establish Cabinet committees and decide on their membership; they exercise virtually all the powers of patronage and act as personnel manager for thousands of government and patronage jobs; they articulate the government's strategic direction as outlined in the Speech from the Throne; they dictate the pace of change and are the main salespersons promoting the achievements of their government; they have a direct hand in establishing the government's fiscal framework; they represent Canada abroad; they establish the proper mandate of individual ministers and decide all machinery of government issues; and they are the final arbiter in interdepartmental conflicts. (p.133).

In terms of actually running the government, the prime minister enjoys considerable administrative support from the Prime Minister's Office and the Clerk of the Privy Council who can be used to bypass a minister and control a department (Atkinson and Thomas 1993).

There is thus a new line of authority from the public to government and responsibility back to the public. Authority is passed from the public, indirectly through elections to a party to form government. That party authorizes its leader to select the cabinet. In turn, the leader enforces individual ministerial responsibility on his cabinet. If a cabinet minister attracts negative attention that threatens public support for the governing party, then her authority can be revoked by the prime minister who can force her resignation. If the prime minister is unable to maintain public support for the party, the party can replace its leader and thus hold the prime minister accountable. This is rarely the case unless an election is lost and the public authorizes a different party to govern. A deeper analysis of the role of individual ministerial responsibility follows.

Prime Minister and Ministerial Responsibility

The House of Commons no longer has the capacity to enforce individual ministerial responsibility; this power is vested in the prime minister alone. However, the enforcement of responsibility may not meet the normative standards that were once the focus of scholarly discussion. A prime minister must consider the informal constraints placed upon him; there may be backlash for a ministerial resignation. The resignation may, in turn, threaten the agency of the prime minister to the party or the electorate.

Cabinet ministers tend to be popular themselves. They are the talent pool from which replacement leaders are most likely drawn and some of them represent informal leadership to some faction of the governing party. A disgruntled ex-minister would be in an excellent position to organize a coup against the prime minister at the next leadership convention. Though Canadian prime ministers tend to resign at their leisure, unless defeated in the polls, this possibility still exists (Weller 2003). Jean Chrétien discovered that, despite his ability to win elections, his rival and former Finance Minister Paul Martin had the capacity to challenge his leadership. Due to Martin's pressure Chrétien felt the need to announce his resignation. He gave himself 18 months to do so, but again due to the pressure from Martin's supporters Chrétien resigned several months earlier than planned (Chrétien 2007).

One of the greatest constraints comes from the fact that most cabinet ministers are selected from a relatively small talent pool of MPs who tend to have short careers. This lack of experience makes it difficult to create a cabinet of ministers who are not accident prone. Further, a prime minister must consider an additional set of constraints. Cabinet is expected to have ministers from every province and some degree of gender representation (Kerby 2009). Also, some prominent MPs bring support and finance to the party which should be rewarded with cabinet appointment. Given these constraints, it would be inadvisable for a prime minister to force the resignation of a cabinet minister on the normative grounds of convention alone.

Certain demographic factors may also help to protect a minister from resignation. There is an expectation that provinces will be represented in cabinet. This expectation is in fact quite strong. Seldom do prime ministers risk violating this expectation for fear of losses in public support from the affected province. So ministers from provinces with few Members of

Parliament that could be replacements should experience some additional protection from resignation (Heard 1991). Further, there has become a growing expectation that women will be represented in cabinet. Both the provincial and gender imperatives are enhanced by the smaller number of possible replacements that may exist in the number of government MPs (Heard 1991). Age may also be a characteristic that affects resignation likelihood. Younger ministers have longer careers ahead of them and are thus more likely to resign over differing opinions in policy preference (Dewan and Dowding 2005).

Forcing resignations can also damage support for the governing party or prime minister himself. A resignation is often the first indication the public receives that something is wrong in government. Resignations tend to attract negative media attention to issues that may not have otherwise gained salience (Dewan and Dowding 2005). Further, if the prime minister forces the resignation of too many ministers it may call into question the capacity of the prime minister to manage government, further threatening his agency. Thus it should be expected that the prime minister would be willing to force resignations if public popularity is at stake or in the event of a leadership challenge, but would prefer to avoid them where possible. This balance of willingness to force resignations also may be affected by the idiosyncrasy of individual prime ministers and parties.

To this point, majority government status has been largely assumed, however in the case of Canada, when the largest party has failed to gain more than 50% of the seats in the House of Commons, minority governments have formed (Russell 2008). Under these circumstances, the prime minister is required to gain the support of at least one opposition party to pass legislation. In the event that this is not achieved for a confidence motion, the government falls and typically

an election will be called (Forsey 1964). It cannot be assumed that under minority government that the House has regained its lost power to authorise government, just that opposition party leaders gain some leverage over the government. The key to continued governance is policy concession (as membership in cabinet as a condition of support is a coalition). However, opposition parties may not want an election even if they can force one (Strom 1990). If the public support for the governing party is equal or higher than it was at the previous election, the opposition parties gain nothing by forcing an election. Consequently, a prime minister may be more prone to force the resignation of a minister to prevent losses in public support under minority government. The potential backlash is lower as well. Because the governing party would be aware of potential losses of public support by an internal power struggle, such an event would be less likely. Further, the prime minister does not have the luxury of assuming that she will hold office long enough for the negative impacts of forcing too many resignations to accumulate. It should also be noted that if the prime minister does in fact force a minister to resign, then there are fewer potential replacement ministers. Minority government therefore creates additional incentives and constraints on enforcing individual ministerial responsibility.

Principle-agency theory provides a new understanding of the concept of ministerial responsibility. The cabinet minister is no longer understood to be responsible to Parliament or the electorate, but rather to the prime minister. During majority governments, the House is also responsible to the prime minister through party discipline. The prime minister is responsible to a party and the electorate, the prime minister's job is largely focussed upon ensuring maintenance of public support. In turn, maintenance of public support is the responsibility of the cabinet minister to the prime minster. The cabinet minister's duty is to avoid unpopular outputs from her

department, avoid unpopular conduct of the department's employees, and avoid becoming
unpopular herself.

The line of democratic authority moves from electorate to the party to the prime minister
to cabinet ministers. Responsibility is enforced on cabinet ministers by the prime minister, who
in turn can be removed from power by a party. Finally the party is responsible to the electorate
through elections. In terms of ensuring individual and collective ministerial responsibility, the
House of Commons has become an intermediate vote count and Members of Parliament little
more than numbers that gauge relative party strength.

Context of Research - Ministerial Resignations

The early scholarly literature on the subject of ministerial resignation was motivated by
the same normative ideals that motivated the discussion on ministerial responsibility. The focus
was primarily on when a minister ought to resign, when ministers should have resigned, and how
prime ministers have failed to properly enforce individual ministerial responsibility (Page 1990).
It would be easy to underestimate the value of understanding convention because the literature
on the subject is rife with normative connotation. However, there may be more practical value to
understanding this research. Convention plays a role in how elites, media, and the public
interpret the actions of individual ministers and prime ministers. Convention may help frame
public debate on an issue or the prime minister's response to an issue. The need to
systematically understand the reasons behind actual ministerial resignation is of greater
importance. Understanding why ministers resign should, in turn, affect our understanding or

expectations about when they should resign. Convention after all is at least partially defined by its usage.

Given the complexity of both constraints and motives to force resignations, beyond normative reasoning, a diverse literature has developed. Motives for resignation that have been outlined so far include protection for loss in popularity (Dewand and Dowding 2005), punishment for challenges to the government (Dowding and Kang 1998), and holding to convention (Page 1990). Further, promotions to better appointments outside of cabinet, particularly true in the immediate post-war period, were often considered better patronage than the cabinet minister position. Consequently, some ministers have resigned to take a promotion. Motives are often broken down into reasons for resignation instead. This provides a larger possible typology of resignations. Though the possible typologies vary and cannot be listed, to demonstrate the diversity a few will be included. In considering Australia's ministerial resignation issues, Page (1990) refers to three categories that include act of the minister's department, act or policy of the minister acting in the ministerial capacity, and an act of the minister in private capacity. Sutherland (1991) identifies a more comprehensive list of 12 causes of resignation which involves dividing some of Page's categories into smaller reasons and adds a variety of other reasons.

Constraints have also been discussed at length. These include formal constraints such as institutional characteristics. For example, constitutions can dictate whether or not a prime minister can select replacements from outside of Parliament. The requirement to select from within reduces the number of possible replacements which makes forcing a resignation less desirable (Dowding and Dumont 2009). There are also informal constraints. For example, in a

coalition government, a prime minister may be required to consult the leader of a junior coalition partner before she is able to force the resignation of a minister from the coalition partner's party (Fisher and Kaiser 2009).

As a result of the flourishing of typologies of resignations and institutional arrangements, a diverse literature has developed concerning ministerial resignations. The result has been a desire to conduct systematic analysis and produce comparable findings. There has thus been a call to develop comparable datasets of resignations between states (Dowding and Dumont 2009). Also, a selection bias has been identified in the study of ministerial resignations. Most studies have failed to properly focus on when ministers do not resign (Dowding and Kang 1998). That is, a systematic analysis of potential incidences when ministers could have been expected to resign, but did not, have largely been excluded from research.

More recent scholarly activity has made an attempt to address both problems. Datasets, though painstaking to collect, are emerging that include full lists of nonresignations as well. Scholars have been identifying variables which can be compared across states, but also those that are relevant to particular states (Dowding and Dumont 2008). However, the link between electoral pressure and resignation has been made, but only as one of many potential causes. Dewan and Dowding (2005) made the first attempt to determine if ministerial resignations resulted from losses in public support and if they in fact corrected those losses. They did so by conducting an ordinary least squares regression analysis. This analysis included a rich set of economic and political control variables to ensure that changes in public support generated by other factors would be taken into account. Further, they incorporated instrumental variables to control for other factors that account for resignations. This methodology allowed Dewan and

Dowding to properly conclude that in the United Kingdom resignations do result from losses of public support and that a corrective effect does occur.

These findings are very interesting. Though they are not directly related to responsiveness in Dewan and Dowding (2005), they follow the responsiveness literature script nicely. In representative democracy, representatives are elected to produce policy on behalf of the electorate. This indirect relationship means that responsiveness of policy output cannot be taken for granted and must be measured. The results have been positive in salient policy domains (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The same indirect relationship exists between the electorate and the government, yet ministerial responsibility is rarely understood in terms of responsiveness.

The Dewan and Dowding (2005) methodology, applied to Canada would serve several functions. First and foremost it would determine whether or not the government was responsive to public preference in the use of the ultimate application of ministerial accountability, the resignation. It would also provide an appropriate ministerial resignation comparison between Canada and the United Kingdom; specifically with the creation of a full dataset of nonresignations for Canada. This research also has the capacity to support the motivation for ministerial resignations given that the practice does not tend to follow the traditional concepts of when ministers ought to resign.

Chapters 1 and 2 have provided the necessary background to understand the importance of responsiveness in ministerial resignation. They have also provided the necessary information about the Canadian context and identified the appropriate models to use in the upcoming

analysis. Chapters 3 and 4 will provide the data, analysis, and discussion of findings of the thesis.

CH 3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RELEVANT VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION

The relationship between public opinion and government output is complicated. There are many factors which shape public opinion and particular government outputs. Ministerial resignations are particularly complex outputs and thus add a greater degree of complexity to an otherwise complicated relationship. To that end, this chapter will provide a qualitative analysis of an individual ministerial resignation. The qualitative analysis will demonstrate the ideal thermostatically responsive relationship between public opinion and ministerial resignation in a Canadian case. In doing so, it will also bring light to a number of the motives and constraints placed on a prime minister when facing a resignation issue. To that end, the 2002 resignation of Lawrence MacAulay (Liberal, 37th Parliament) has been selected for qualitative analysis. This case was selected because it fits the proposed model of how losses in public support for the governing party may influence the prime minister's decision to force a cabinet minister to resign. MacAulay's resignation is an exception to the norm because the proposed relationship is so clearly defined. It also highlights some of the most relevant factors affecting ministerial resignations. The exceptionalism of this case points to the need for a rich set of control and variables as no other case so clearly shows the predicted thermostatic responsiveness.

Second, a number of other variables, determined by existing Canadian literature mentioned in chapter 2, will be explored that may affect the decision to force resignations. Honour ratios for these variables will be calculated to determine which ones will be used as control variables and which ones may be omitted from further analysis. After this section is complete, not only will Dewan and Dowding's work be replicated in the Canadian context, but it can be modified to include otherwise important omitted variables and exclude potentially

irrelevant variables present in Dewan and Dowding's model. The result will be a Canadian measure of thermostatic responsiveness in ministerial resignation that is both more efficient and which minimizes bias (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

Qualitative Analysis: Lawrence MacAulay

Lawrence MacAulay's resignation in 2002 is an ideal case for qualitative analysis. Unlike most cases, MacAulay's resignation has public opinion data available before the event, between the call for resignation and the actual resignation, and after the resignation occurred which makes discussion of public opinion possible. Additionally, though all relevant variables pertaining to ministerial resignation in Canada do not come into play, many of the most important ones do. MacAulay's resignation provides insight into the prime minister's motives to force a resignation, constraints that favour extending protection to the affected minister, and contextual information which highlights the role of other factors in this decision.

Lawrence MacAulay was a long-term supporter of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. He was a Prince Edward Island co-chairman of Chrétien's Liberal leadership bid in 1984 and remained an adamant Chrétien loyalist ever since (Globe and Mail 2002a). The Liberal Party was divided into two factions with each having its loyalists and leaders. One camp was led by Chrétien who was considered the ideological successor of Pierre Trudeau and the other was led by Paul Martin who was considered the ideological successor of John Turner. After a divisive leadership contest in 1990 Chrétien gained leadership of the Liberal Party and in 1993 he became prime minister (Delacourt 2003). MacAulay, a long-time Chrétien supporter and competent MP was rewarded and given a series of sub-cabinet and cabinet posts. These posts included

Secretary of State (Veterans) from 1993-1997, Secretary of State (Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency) from 1996-1997, Minister of Labour from 1997-1998, Solicitor General of Canada 1998-2002, and regional minister for Prince Edward Island from 1997-2002 (Parliament of Canada Website 2011a). MacAulay received little critical attention until spring 2002 when opposition attacked him over his attempt to secure federal funds for a college operated by his brother. At that point, MacAulay was defended by Prime Minister Chrétien who fended off the attacks (Globe and Mail 2002b). The media focus on MacAulay was largely overshadowed by coverage of the ongoing Martin challenge to Chrétien's leadership of the Liberal Party and the sudden resignation of Defence Minister Art Eggleton (Liberal, 37th Parliament) over an untendered contract awarded to his ex-girlfriend.

Spring 2002 thus highlights a turning point for the Liberal Party. Chrétien, who had enjoyed a heavily splintered opposition since elected in 1993 and a strong economy (Clarkson 2005) now faced two threats. First, Paul Martin, a long time party rival of Chrétien was at odds with and challenging the Prime Minister long enough to merit his resignation from cabinet (Delacourt 2003). This battle received considerable coverage in national media. This coverage did not focus on the need for Paul Martin to step down; instead it focussed on when Chrétien should resign and hand the reigns to Paul Martin. The second threat came from a growing sense that the Liberal party was soft on patronage. Chrétien had long considered it a point of pride that his governing Liberals had not endured a scandal; however, in spring 2002 Art Eggleton was forced to resign because of a financial scandal, as noted above (Delacourt 2003). In Westminster Parliamentary systems, individual ministerial responsibility – enforced through resignation – is a convention which is not one that is applied uniformly throughout time or between prime ministers, but rather evolves over time with its usage (Dowding and Kang 1998). In forcing

Eggleton to resign, Chrétien set a benchmark where he was tough on patronage. The media would use this benchmark in coverage of later financial scandals. This point is particularly difficult for Chrétien as he set an image for himself of administering a scandal free government; an image that cannot be upheld in the face of resignations based on scandal (Globe and Mail 2002b).

In October 2002, Lawrence MacAulay was publically accused of another financial scandal. This time he gave a contract to a friend's company for strategic advice. The friend was MacAulay's official agent in past elections. Part of his defence was that another partner in the friend's firm handled the actual work. The particular partner in the friend's firm who provided the strategic advice turned out to be the former deputy minister for Veteran Affairs who served under MacAulay as Secretary of State (Veterans). Minister MacAulay then publically defended himself by claiming he had previously paid the former deputy minister out of his constituency budget for work pertaining to MacAulay's role as regional minister for Prince Edward Island. The Prime Minister also tried to defend MacAulay by claiming it was a small technical error; however opposition linked this event with Chrétien and his government being soft on patronage (Globe and Mail 2002b).

The financial scandal was portrayed as the newest iteration of ongoing Liberal cronyism and patronage; the exact opposite of the image that Chrétien promoted of his government. The responsibility for allowing this patronage was placed on Chrétien who was accused of letting these issues slide. To the public this would seem like a reasonable accusation. That same year many other Liberal ministers had received public criticism and calls for resignation covered by

the Globe and Mail for wrongdoings including: Alfonso Gagliano, Don Boudria, Denis Coderre, and of course Art Eggleton, each of whom were Chrétien supporters (Delacourt 2003).

Chrétien then had to face a difficult choice. Forcing MacAulay to resign could restore lost public support and improve the Liberals chances of winning government in the next election. Though that election was still several years away, the Liberals' popularity had been stagnant for some time. More importantly, in September 2002, support for the Liberals was 44% (Environics September 2002), but by October, after the calls for resignation of MacAulay had received considerable attention, support for the Liberal Party dropped to 41% (Environics October 2002). Though the impact of a 3% loss in public support could be weathered by the government over two years, it was still unclear if support would continue to be lost because of this event. Also, the string of scandals had not stopped at that point and a message to the cabinet could prevent future scandals which could have caused further losses in public support.

On the other hand, there were a number of constraints that would have made it difficult for Chrétien to force MacAulay to resign. MacAulay was an important and longstanding Chrétien ally. After years of working together, MacAulay would have certainly built a personal relationship with Chrétien. More importantly, as a longstanding Chrétien supporter and ally, he would have been a useful in defeating Paul Martin's leadership challenge. Instead, as a potentially disgruntled ex-minister, MacAulay could have become a newfound Martin supporter. In the end, Chrétien forced the resignation of MacAulay and replaced him with Wayne Easter (Liberal, 37th Parliament), who assumed the roles of Solicitor General and minister representing Prince Edward Island (Parliament of Canada 2011b).

It would seem that the resignation of MacAulay did in fact correct for losses in public support generated by his scandal. In September, prior to MacAulay's call for resignation, the Liberal Party enjoyed 44% public support. In October, after the call for his resignation, Liberal Party support dropped to 41%. Finally in December, after MacAulay's resignation, the Liberal Party had risen back to 44% (Environics December 2002). A scandal free quarter followed showing an elevation of Liberal support to 50% (Ipsos-Reid April 2003).

The long-term results of these events are also worthy of consideration. Though the decision to force MacAulay to resign did seem to correct for losses in public support generated by the scandal, it would seem that Chrétien misjudged the relative weights of the threats to his agency as prime minister. Paul Martin was eventually able to replace Chrétien, though Chrétien was able to drag out his eventual departure by 14 months (Delacourt 2003). An extra ally in the cabinet may not have been enough to fully protect Chrétien, but it would seem as though continued high levels of public support were not enough either. Despite his efforts to crack down on patronage, the accusations of patronage in the Liberal Government under Chrétien would set the backdrop for the Sponsorship Scandal and later Gomery Commission which played a considerable role in the downfall of the Liberal government under Martin (Gidengil, Blais, Everitt, Fournier, and Nevitte 2006).

The case of MacAulay's resignation highlights the important factors surrounding the choice to force a minister to resign. The motives to force the resignation of a minister all come to bear, including: public support for the party, agency as leader of the party, and parliamentary convention. The predicted impacts of scandal and subsequent resignation are also visible in this case. An additional factor that is largely overlooked in the narrative, but important to the

government, is that MacAulay was a minister from Prince Edward Island and thus the single minister responsible for that province. Given the perceived importance of provincial representation in cabinet (Mallory 1971), MacAulay should have been protected because so few alternatives exist who could represent his province. The reason may have been that despite the low number of possible replacements, one did exist. Wayne Easter did not only replace MacAulay as the provincial representative in cabinet, but was also given the position as Solicitor General (Parliament of Canada Website 2011a). This indicates that Chrétien considered Easter competent enough to be in cabinet and not only serve as a symbol to his province. The type of resignation issue was also relevant. Unlike policy errors, scandals are very visible to the public and challenge the public's trust in government. It requires very little of the public to envision a politician who has inappropriately given government money to a friend or family member. The reason for a resignation issue will also be important to consider in any quantitative analysis.

Given the complexities of the aforementioned case, it is evident that quite a few variables factor into resignation decisions. The next section of this chapter briefly describes, explains and tests a number of potentially relevant variables. Those variables with attributes which have substantially different honour ratios will be included in the responsiveness models of chapter 4.

Relevant Variable Identification

To explore additional variables that may be relevant to the decision to force a minister to resign first requires the identification of relevant variables and then analysis to determine their impact. To that end, a dataset of resignation issues has been collected. A resignation issue is an event where the prime minister has a motive to force a resignation. It is easy enough to identify

resignations as they attract considerable attention, but it is not so easy to identify when a resignation may have occurred but the prime minister chose not to. A content analysis of The Globe and Mail was conducted to determine calls for resignation from 1945 to 2011. All calls for resignation were coded for affected minister, party, prime minister, age of affected minister, gender of affected minister, minority/majority government status, province of constituency, reason for resignation, and resignation type (see Table 1). Further, the level of coverage received in the Globe and Mail was recorded. This will be considered in Chapter 4. As some resignations occur without a preceding call for resignation, Dr. Matthew Kerby provided a full dataset of ministerial resignations that was added to the calls for resignations. Overlapped calls for resignation that were also found in the resignations were removed from the dataset. Resignations that occurred without a preceding call were also coded. Consequently, resignation issues are defined as the sum of resignations and nonresignations as defined in Dewan and Dowding (2005).

Honour ratios are calculated to determine the impacts of the aforementioned variables on ministerial resignations. Honour ratio is a concept developed by Dowding and Kang (1998) to determine how often ministers resigned when faced with a resignation issue. As the name implies it assesses how often prime ministers act honourably and enforce individual ministerial accountability. Honour ratios are thus calculated by dividing the number of resignations by the number of resignation issues. Here, the concept is used more widely. It is not used to assess how honourable prime ministers have been. Instead it is used to identify variables that may be relevant in prime ministers decisions to force resignations. If substantial differences are found in attributes of a particular variable, then it should be included in regression analysis. Therefore, the honour ratio is calculated for every attribute of a variable. Substantially different honour

ratios for the different attributes of any given variable indicate that the variable has an impact on the decision to force a resignation. For example, if the honour ratio is considerably higher for male minister than female ministers, then it can be said that women have greater protection from forced resignation than men. Because age is a variable with a large number of attributes, it was made into a categorical variable for the purpose of calculating honour ratios.

Variables that are relevant should have large differences in the honour ratios in the attributes of the variable. Honour ratios have thus been calculated for reasons for resignation, party, prime minister, gender, government status, age, and constituency of affected minister to determine how these variables affect resignations (see Table 1).

Table 1 Honour Ratios for Selected Variables

Variable	Resignations	Nonresignations	Resignation Issues	Honour Ratios	%	Type 2	Type 3	Resignations per Year
Prime Minister								
Harper	3	28	31	0.097	9.7	3	0	0.545
Martin	2	6	8	0.25	25	1	1	1
Chretien	6	38	44	0.136	13.6	2	4	0.6
Campbell	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mulroney	10	59	69	0.145	14.5	7	3	1.11
Trudeau	9	73	82	0.11	11	6	3	0.581
Clark	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Pearson	5	23	28	0.179	17.9	2	3	1
Diefenbaker	3	17	20	0.15	15	2	1	0.5
St. Laurent	0	20	20	0	0	0	0	0
King	2	10	12	0.167	16.7	1	1	0.667
Party								
Liberal	24	170	170	0.141	14.1	12	12	0.521
Conservatives	16	106	122	0.131	13.1	12	4	0.78
Province								
British Columbia	1	21	22	0.045	4.5	0	1	
Alberta	1	12	13	0.077	7.7	0	1	
Saskatchewan	1	12	13	0.077	7.7	0	1	
Manitoba	1	10	11	0.091	9.1	1		
Ontario	16	118	134	0.119	11.9	9	7	
Quebec	15	69	84	0.179	17.9	11	4	
New Brunswick	2	5	7	0.286	28.6	1	1	
Prince Edward Island	1	1	2	0.5	50	0	1	
Nova Scotia	1	16	17	0.059	5.9	1	0	

Newfoundland and Labrador	1	10	11	0.091	9.1	1	0	
Yukon	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	
Northwest Territories	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Nunavut	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Gender								
Male	36	248	284	0.127	12.7	22	14	
Female	4	28	32	0.125	12.5	2	2	
Reason								
Policy Disagreement	10	6	16	0.625	62.5	7	3	
Personal Error	10	169	179	0.056	5.6	6	4	
Performance	1	25	26	0.038	3.8	0	1	
Departmental Error	0	13	13	0	0	0	0	
Other Controversy	5	43	48	0.104	10.4	1	4	
Sexual scandal	2	2	4	0.5	50	2	0	
Financial Scandal	9	18	27	0.333	33.3	4	5	
Personality Clash	3	0	3	1	100	3	0	
Age								
34-44	12	45	57	0.211	21.1	8	4	
45-54	13	136	149	0.087	8.7	7	6	
55-64	13	75	88	0.148	14.8	7	6	
65-74	1	18	19	0.053	5.3	1	0	
Government Status								
Majority	26	213	239	0.109	10.9	15	11	0.5
Minority	14	63	77	0.182	18.2	9	5	0.966
Totals	40	276	316	0.127	12.7	24	16	

*All values were calculated from 1945-2011. ** Age values exclude 2 nonresignations and 1 resignation associated with Suzanne Blais-Grenier because her age was not available.

The first two variables that will be considered are "reasons for resignation" and "resignation type". These two variables can cause problems with assumptions of unit homogeneity in the later regression analyses. "Resignation type" will not be discussed in terms of honour ratios because the types will either be defined as incidences where resignations have occurred or have not. No type will include both.

Reasons for Resignation

A minister can either threaten to remove the prime minister's agency as party leader (Weller 2003) or threaten to lose the party's control of the government (Dewan and Dowding 2005). Both of these threats can be managed if the prime minister maintains or increases public support for his party. She must also protect against attacks from possible usurpers from within the cabinet itself (Dowding and Dumont 2009). To protect public support the prime minister may force the resignation of a minister who has caused losses in public support, who is prone to errors which may cause losses in public support, or who internally is mounting a challenge against the prime minister's authority. The last case is perhaps the most threatening as it is not just a challenge, but a challenge that can have the effect of causing losses of public support which further weakens the prime minister. Further, convention may also dictate when prime ministers force resignations. Though convention does not directly threaten agency, it can potentially shape the nature of public discourse around an event.

Reason of issue was also coded as per the coding scheme outlined in Dowding and Kang (1998). The following coding scheme was applied: 1 – policy disagreement, 2 – personal error, 3- performance, 4 departmental error, 5 – other controversy, 6 – sexual scandal, 7 – financial scandal, 8 – personality clash. This coding scheme was created by Dowding and Kang (1998) and is intended to help make more comparable cross-national studies. Despite this, these categories are not entirely mutually exclusive. Often, a resignation issue may comprise elements of more than one category or the given reason for a resignation may fit one category, but the obvious reason (publicly discussed) fit another. A third problem is that the difference between "personal error" and "other controversy" is somewhat subjective a distinction. For the coding of

this dataset, "other controversy" was used when the media discussed a scandal that did not adequately fit either of the "sexual scandal" or "financial scandal" categories. Performance required media discussion of continued problems in conjunction with the current event or simply long-term problem criticisms.

The findings are telling as to how the prime minister interprets his threats. The most lethal forms of resignation issues are personality clash (honour ratio of 1.000) and policy disagreement (honour ratio 0.625). This should not be interpreted to mean that if a minister and the prime minister do not like one another personally or disagree on any issue that the minister should be forced to resign. Prime ministers would have considerably more important things to consider than whom they did not like or who did not agree with a decision (Alderman and Cross 1985). If however the rift is so severe as to merit public attention, then the threat of resignation becomes staggeringly high.

It makes sense that these are among the most lethal issues as they represent ministers who are in leadership roles in the party who represent party members – both Members of Parliament and extra parliamentary – and members of the public who disagree with the prime minister. These cases are thus direct challenges to the prime minister's agency as party leader. Further, they represent a breakdown of apparent party cohesion. This can potentially cause losses of support for the governing party which in turn threatens the party's ability to form government and thus maintain the leader's agency as prime minister (Sutherland 1991). When the ministers do retract their challenge, the prime minister is able to increase control over that potential rival and show support for the faction they may represent. The difference in resignations and

nonresignations in either personality clashes or policy disagreements comes down to the minister's decision to defy the prime minister or not, with clear-cut ramifications.

A second group of causes for resignation are scandals. Sexual scandals, financial scandals, and other controversies encompass the range of scandals in the resignation issue dataset. This group of events is the next most lethal form of resignation issue. They tend to encompass a serious threat to losses in public support and are well defined as events where ministers ought to resign in the normative literature on individual ministerial responsibility. These are the times when ministers just have to go (Dowding and Kang 1998). Because a scandalous minister can bring shame to a party, it would seem as if they are less of an internal threat to the prime minister and as such provide less of a threat to replace the prime minister as leader.

Sexual scandals, though quite rare, are also highly lethal. The minister normally resigns immediately to avoid tarnishing the image of the party and government. Robert Coates and Francis Fox both resigned before calls were even made. Half the ministers affected by sexual scandal resign (honour ratio 0.5). Financial scandal is also quite lethal. Scandals, financial ones in particular, are easily sensationalizable by the media and fit the image of corruption and untrustworthiness. As a result a prime minister would be well advised to force the resignation of a minister who has been accused of being involved in a financial scandal. It would be difficult to imagine that Maurice Lamontagne and Rene Tremblay (both Liberal, 26th Parliament) could have been kept in cabinet after a lengthy investigation resulted in the discovery that they accepted furniture from organized crime. The decision to force these resignations created problems for maintaining Quebec representation in cabinet, but despite this fact it seems obvious that there

would have been public backlash had they not resigned (Globe and Mail 1965). "Other controversies" was the least lethal of the scandal categories (honour ratio 0.104). This may be somewhat misleading. This category acts as a catch-all for those issues that do not fall into other categories, but largely involves cases that may have been a financial or sexual scandal, but for some reason did not adequately fit either category. Examples include Helena Guergis' (Conservative, 40th Parliament) resignation because it was related to a poorly defined scandal or Bev Oda (Conservative, 40th Parliament), because it pertained to doctoring a memo which was neither sexual nor financially beneficial to her.

The least lethal group of reasons are the traditional individual ministerial responsibility categories. They include personal error, performance, and departmental error. Personal error was the most lethal of the three, though a minister who has made an error should not feel that she is in danger of serious reprisal (honour ratio 0.056). Gerry Ritz (Conservative, 39th Parliament) received criticism for making a joke about the Listeria outbreak in 2008. A more likely penalty would be a shuffle to a lower position or out of cabinet at a later date. Performance issues imply longer term problems with a minister; that is one that is prone to error (honour ratio 0.038). An alternative measure would be to count calls for resignation for each minister and designate any minister exceeding a certain number of calls to be error prone. The method used here is preferable because ministers who have received many calls for resignation may also be the most talented and thus were given difficult portfolios that tend to draw negative attention. It should be noted however that it is difficult to accurately distinguish between a call for resignation based on a personal error that is the latest of a string, such as Helena Guergis, and a minister forced to resign based on the string of personal errors, such as Maxime Bernier (Conservative, 40th Parliament). The difference in this analysis, though not numerically significant, is that the call

must prominently feature reference to the long standing string of errors. Finally, departmental error produced no resignations (honour ratio 0). An example would be Gerry Ritz's department not adequately controlling to prevent the Listeria outbreak. The joke received a higher level of media coverage than the department based blame.

The traditional individual ministerial responsibility group does not represent risk to the prime minister of a rival taking his place, it does however speak to potential losses in public support and traditional norms of individual ministerial responsibility. Strangely, being prone to attracting calls for resignation does not seem to increase the likelihood that a minister will be force to resign as a result. Some examples include: Allan Rock (Liberal, 35th-37th Parliament) received 8 calls for resignation over 7 years or Donald Fleming's (Liberal, 24th Parliament) 8 calls for resignation over 2 years. The fact that no minister has had to resign for the conduct of her department speaks volumes to the power of the traditional notion of individual ministerial responsibility in Canada. Canada was not a country when the golden era of the minister occurred (Franks 1987). In fact it ended in 1867. As a result, this convention may not have developed in the minds of parliamentarians, the media or the public. Furthermore, prime ministers responding to calls for resignation was not remotely common until 1963[3]. A decade later saw the expansion of the civil service which would render any practical idea that a minister could predict and prevent any problem arising within the department untenable. This demonstrates that the public may have rational expectations of what a minister can actual do to prevent problems arising from within the department. It seems to be understood that calls for resignation and/or making errors are not that serious in the eyes of the public or the prime minister. The public may simply expect

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[3] Between 1945-1962 there were only 2 resignations of which only 1 was associated with a call for resignation. Both were in 1945 shortly after the end of the Second World War.

ministers and departments to make errors and are forgiving of them or at least do not notice. The high turnover in the Canadian Parliament may also keep the population of potential ministers in the governing party low enough that unless there is very good reason, the prime minister would prefer to avoid losing a minister if possible (Kerby 2009). This may be particularly true in the event that a minister is from a province with a low number of MPs, or in a minority government situation. Both situations would dramatically reduce the number of potential replacements.

It seems that ministers tend to resign when they challenge the prime minister or engage in a serious scandal. Though exceptions do exist, ministers do not seem to be held to account for: (1) smaller personal errors, (2) being error prone, or (3) the actions of their departments. In Canada, potential ministers may not be those who are good at administering or directing a department, but often will be those who will not cause a scandal or challenge the prime minister.

Typology

An assumption underlying thermostatic responsiveness in ministerial resignations is that they occur to restore losses in public support. Unfortunately for this model resignations do not always follow calls for resignation. The resignation/nonresignation dichotomy may require further analysis. As such, a typology of resignation issues has been created to allow for distinction between resignations that occur after a call for resignation has been made and those that occur without such a call. Figure 1 illustrates this typology.

Figure 1 Typology of Resignation Issues

		Resignation	
		No	Yes
	No	*Type 1*	*Type 2*
		(not resignation issue)	*(Resignation)*
Call for Resignation			
	Yes	*Type 4*	*Type 3*
		(Nonresignation)	*(Resignation)*

Type 1 is defined as no call being made and no subsequent resignation. Most days, months, or quarters can be described this way. The lack of calls for resignation and lack of resignations is most prevalent in the summer months when Parliament does not sit and in the months leading up to elections. In the months leading up to elections attention focuses away from ministers and towards the governing party or prime minister himself. In turn with elections winding up and government activity winding down, it is not the time to force the resignation of a minister. This could act as a lightning rod for unwanted attention when changes of support for the governing party are most important.

Type 2 is a resignation without prior call for resignation. This kind can be difficult to interpret. It is more likely to be the result of internal political matters. But, it can also be that a resignation occurred that had been receiving coverage, but no call had been made yet. The first incidence is more likely not to follow the internal logic of the call-then-resign situation because the resignation likely alerted the public to the problem and thus caused a loss in public support. The latter type should be more like a low coverage Type 2 resignation and should still have the

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same effect. For these reasons, the Type 2 resignation may not be expected to follow the internal logic of the OLS regression. Consequently, 13 of the 21 resignations in the OLS regression may not even be valid.

Type 3 is an event where there has been a call for resignation and a resignation has followed. This type is the kind described by Dewan and Dowding (2005) and motivates their theory. A call for resignation signifies a problem in government that should result in the loss of public support. The subsequent resignation indicates to the public that the problem has been corrected. The result is that the government's popularity should be restored labelled by Dewan and Dowding as a corrective effect. The amount of coverage received by the resignation issue should affect this relationship. Low coverage calls for resignation may reflect issues unimportant to most people or unread by most people. The resulting impact on public support should thus be reversed. A resulting resignation would draw high coverage and may have the impact of lowering public support.

Type 4 is a call for resignation without a subsequent resignation. Also referred to as a nonresignation, this is the most common type of resignation issue.

Types 2 and 3 are important to consider for purposes of unit homogeneity. If Type 2 represents cases where losses of public support would have occurred without the resignation, then the units may remain homogenous. However, Type 2 may also represent cases where the resignation is the first sign to the public that a minister was affected by anything. This would challenge the assumption of unit homogeneity.

The following variables are factors that may affect a prime minister's decision to force a resignation. If there is substantial difference in the honour ratios of the attributes of these variables, then they should be considered as controls in a government responsiveness regression.

Party

The particular party in government may have an impact on a prime minister's willingness to force a cabinet minister to resign. A party that has a socially conservative base of support may be less forgiving of sexual scandal than a party with a liberal ideological base of support. A party with a Canadian populist ideological base would be more untrusting of a Bay Street or Ottawa-based leader (Campbell and Christian 1996). Financial scandal may be less tolerable to this base of support. Consequently, the Progressive Conservative party or later Conservative party (from here on both will be called the Conservative party) whose base of support included social conservatives and populists may therefore be more willing to force the resignation of ministers caught in scandal. On the other hand, they may deny potential allegations of scandal where possible to avoid legitimizing these claims and thus protect ministers from resignation. Though the direction is not predictable, party may impact ministerial resignations.

From 1945 to 2011, the Conservative party has an honour ratio of 0.131 and the Liberal party 0.141. These ratios are based on 292 observations: 170 resignation issues for the Liberal party and 122 for the Conservative party. This suggests that the particular party that governs does not substantial impact ministerial resignations.

Prime Minister

Other than party, each prime minister personally plays a role in deciding which ministers are forced to resign and which are not (Page 1990). Though there is limited variability in the honour ratios of most prime ministers this variable is worth further consideration. First, the prime minister is the individual who decides whether or not a minister resigns (Savoie 2010). The personality and idiosyncrasies of each prime minister may play a very important role in the relationship between resignation issues and actual resignations. Further, it provides information about the effect of time period on resignations. As each prime minister governs for a specific time frame, changes in honour ratios that occur chronologically over time may be seen through examining prime minister honour ratios.

Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent should be considered first and perhaps in isolation of the rest. It is conceived that prior to 1963 the party system in Canada was such that parties were dominated not just by prime ministers, but by ministers who acted as regional bosses (Bakvis 1991). These ministers were responsible for ensuring public support for regions they represented. This may be the last vestige of the preparty faction period of Canadian Parliament, but it has implications for responsiveness in resignations. There were few calls for resignation from 1945-1960 and even fewer resignations. There were two in 1945 which should be considered exceptions as they occurred in the same year as the Second World War ended. This period was characterized with heavy turmoil as the economy which was nearly completely controlled by the government was transitioning back into private hands (Bothwell 2007). There were also massive resource commitments made by government. The government had promised massive housing construction, benefits for returning soldiers and exports to devastated allies

(Finkell 2006). At the same time, they promised reprivatisation of major industries. The result was inadequate improvements in the lives of many Canadians causing large scale strikes and unrest, inadequate distribution of basic commodities to Canadians, inadequate housing development and an unsatisfied international community (Finkell 2006). To add to matters it was not unlike ministers to call people and groups who troubled them stupid (O'Leary 1946). Despite this, there were nearly no resignations at all. St. Laurent's honour ratio was 0, despite 20 calls for resignation. This honour ratio was only shared with Prime Ministers Joe Clark and Kim Campbell who had only one call each in their short tenures, whereas St. Laurent was prime minister for nearly ten years.

A turning point occurred in the early 1960s when calls for resignation and then actual resignations increased dramatically. Though honour ratios remain low, compared to their United Kingdom counterparts (Dowding and Kang 1998), they did increase with some variance among prime ministers after St. Laurent. Of this later timeframe Martin had the highest honour ratio (0.250), though only based on 8 events, and Harper the lowest (0.097). Projecting an image of a new party and new leadership was paramount to maintaining their public support as the Sponsorship Scandal was looming and an image of cleaning house would help separate Martin from the previous leader, but his short tenure makes too much inference unwise. Strangely enough Stephen Harper, who was elected partly in response to the corruption of the Liberal government (Gidengil, Blais, Everitt, Fournier and Nevitte 2006), did not differentiate himself by maintaining a high honour ratio. In fact he did the opposite. Of 31 resignation issues, Harper only had the resignation of three ministers. Maxime Bernier was the only minister forced to resign over repeated calls – eventually stepping down because of a scandal in which he left sensitive documents at his girlfriend's house; a woman who had connections to criminal biker

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gangs (LeBlanc 2008). Helena Guergis, an unpopular Member of Parliament within the party who was involved in a large scandal was also forced to resign. It involved allegations of influence selling and lewd behaviour, neither of which would be popular in a party with deep social conservative ties (Campbell and Christian 1995). Finally Michael Chong (Conservative, 39th Parliament) resigned due to policy disagreement with the Quebec as a nation issue. Mr. Chong felt this was not acceptable in a multicultural society, a feeling supported in the party's western base as well as Ontario. As a young MP he would have plenty of career left to recover from a resignation due to policy disagreement with the prime minister. At 35, Chong likely has plenty of career time left to eventually regain a cabinet position.

Gender

  Given the low number of women represented in the governing parties in Canadian Parliaments, ministers who are women should have increased protection from resignations. The honour ratio of women and men were separated to determine whether or not it was in fact lower for women. Surprisingly the honour ratios for both genders were identical 0.125 for women and 0.125 for men. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. Trimble and Arscott (2003) indicate that there is a perceived sense that women have reached equality and improving representation in the House or cabinet is no longer necessary. This would account for why there would be little public backlash for failing to ensure high female representation in cabinet. Only a cabinet with no women at all, or close to it, would draw negative public attention.

  The government has an alternative mechanism to keep at least some women in cabinet. Women are often relegated to lower level cabinet portfolios, often as Ministers of State or

Secretaries of State. These positions are counted in cabinet, but would rarely draw public attention or scrutiny as they tend to focus on issues of perceived limited importance, hence their lower cabinet status. The result would be that for the few women who enter important or controversial portfolios there would be no additional protection from resignation. With a few low ranking women in cabinet, the prime minister would not be limited by gender in the selection of a replacement for the affected female minister. The prime minister thus has an equal number of possible replacements for an affected male or female minister, so the women in cabinet have the same honour ratio as the men.

Government Status (Majority/Minority)

Government status provides an interesting point to consider. The conditions of minority government are very different than that of majority government. A majority government has a major advantage when considering how to deal with a minister affected by calls for resignation. Calls for resignation that occur early in a majority term that threaten the support for the government can be waited out giving the public many years to forget about the issue before the next election. Consequently, a prime minister may have a greater capacity to extend the protection of cabinet solidarity over an affected minister (McLeay 2009). In a minority government, the opposition can opportunistically defeat the government if the governing party's support is low and electoral prospects for the opposition look good (Russell 2008). This would indicate that a majority government should have a lower honour ratio. On the other hand, a majority government also has a larger caucus and thus a larger pool of potential replacements for affected ministers, thus one less constraint on a prime minister's choice to force the resignation.

The honour ratios do indicate a substantial difference between minority (0.182) and majority government (0.109). It would seem that despite the prime minister's lowered number of potential replacements, they find it more desirable to respond to calls for resignation during minority governments than in majorities. This finding may in fact be stronger than it appears on the surface. Of the 14.5 years of minority rule in Canada since 1945, Prime Minister Harper accounts for five and a half years. He has a notoriously low honour ratio, thus other prime ministers, particularly those who governed in both minority and majority, must have been considerably more responsive during minority governments.

Age

As Dewan and Dowding (2005) have suggested, age may be a variable which can affect a minister's willingness to resign. This is especially true when considering resignations based on policy difference. The motivation provided by Dewan and Dowding is that older ministers have less career left to worry about will be more prone to make ideological choices to help create a personal legacy or pay back old debts than younger ministers. The motive of course being that resignation is a lesser penalty if there are fewer years left to take away. On the other hand, younger ministers may also be more prone to resign over ideological issues. The motive being that they have a longer potential career to consider. Ideological choices could be forgiven by the prime minister over time and could also help to sure up an ideological base of support by party factions. Honour ratios for age showed substantial differences in the age categories. The 65-74 category was the least affected (0.052) and the youngest range of 35-44 was the most affected (0.211). An example of each occurred in the 2000s. The young minister is representative of his

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age group whereas the older, though he fits the logic presented by Dewan and Dowding, is the exception for his age range.

Michael Chong resigned without call in 2006 at age 35 over the issue of Quebec being recognized as a distinct nation within Canada. As a Chinese Canadian he argued that this was not fair to other nationalities in the country to have one elevated above the others (Spector 2006). On the other end of the spectrum, Joseph Comuzzi (Liberal, 38th Parliament) resigned without a call for resignation in 2005 at 72 because he opposed the same sex marriage bill being promoted by the Martin Liberal government of the time (Valpe, Alphonso, and Seguin 2006). Again, such legislation is not as popular amongst older Canadians who tend to be less socially liberal than their younger counterparts (Nevitte 2002). This being said, a concentration of resignations has occurred in ministers under 45 for both ideological reasons, but also because they seem to be more prone to accident or scandal. On the older end of the age spectrum this does not seem to be the case. Comuzzi was the only minister above 63 to resign. That being said most other ministers over that age served before 1963 and would not have been expected to resign anyway.

Province of Constituency

One of the most important considerations that a prime minister must make when selecting cabinet ministers, other than merit perhaps, is to ensure that there is representation in cabinet from nearly every province (Mallory 1971). Chrétien acknowledges that when he formed his first cabinet he made a list of provinces and selected the top potential ministers from each. Difficulty arose from making selections from the provinces with the fewest elected Liberal MPs. According to Chrétien, the most difficult selections were from Ontario where talented MPs were

not given cabinet positions after the provincial representatives were selected (Chrétien 2007). Because of the low number of MPs elected to the governing party from certain provinces, the representation imperative is not always fully met. In fact Mallory (1971) suggests that a province receives more representation from a cabinet minister whose riding is in that province than their entire Senate allocation combined (including Quebec and Ontario). Consequently provinces with few seats in the House of Commons will have few potential replacements. A prime minister should take this into consideration when considering forcing a resignation of such a minister because a replacement might be harder to find.

The results indicate that this is indeed the case. Other than New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Ontario have the highest honour ratios; 0.179 and 0.119 respectively. It would seem that Quebec experiences none of the added protection that might come from the special province status that it receives, but all of the ministerial replaceability of a highly populated province. With the exceptions of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, lesser populated provinces' ministers do have additional protection (for honour ratios see table 1). When considering reasons for resignation, this relationship becomes increasingly obvious.

Nearly every resignation that occurred in the lower populated provinces came as a result of some scandal or challenge to the prime minister. The honour ratios would have been very low indeed in these provinces without these cases. The type of issue also becomes relevant in Quebec. Its honour ratio appears so high because the resignation issues associated with Quebec tend to more heavily favour scandal and challenges to the prime minister. This impact is most readily noticeable prior to the formation of the Bloc Quebecois when the seats were more readily available to the parties which could form the government.

New Brunswick and Prince Edward, as previously stated, are outliers. Both have low populations, but the highest honour ratios. It is unclear exactly why this might be the case. It seems most likely that the low number of events, 7 and 2 respectively, makes determining rates fairly meaningless. Even 1 resignation dramatically alters the ratio in either province. Speculating as to why these provinces may be different than the others is premature; more observations are needed.

The discussion of potential relevant variables has illuminated 4 which may be useful control variables for government responsiveness. They are age, province of constituency, reason for resignation, and government status. Chapter 4 will thus consist of substitute regression analyses for the Thermostatic Model. In doing so Dewan and Dowding's (2005) analysis will be replicated in Canada. This model will substitute for public responsiveness and an additional regression model will be proposed for government responsiveness.

Regression Methods and Results

Responsiveness literature has made heavy use of regression analysis in measuring

whether or not government outputs are responsive to public opinion (Bartels 1991; Burstein

2003; Manza and Cook 2002; Stimson 1991) and in turn whether or not public opinion is

responsive to government outputs (Wlezien 1995; Soroka and Wlezien 2005). The data

collection for these studies has not been problematic because long-term collection of public

opinion on certain salient issues and domains is available. Further, measures of government

action such as voting records, judicial decisions, government spending, and decrees have also

been collected over decades. Time-series regression analysis can be conducted to determine if a

correlation exists and provide insight into causal relationships between variables. If public

opinion changes directionally, followed by – after a short time lapse – a government output

change in magnitude and/or direction, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there is a causal

link. Control variables will be used to strengthen the regression model. The government's

responsiveness to very specific policy preference or general ideological trends can thus be

established, and the opinion-policy link can be accepted or rejected in narrow or broad terms.

The thermostatic model adds a measure of public opinion responsiveness to government

output. This relationship is harder to measure. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) have done so by

collecting public opinion data concerning whether or not the public would prefer more or less

spending in a broad policy area. Actual government spending can then be measured allowing

for a determination in whether or not government output responded to public opinion. In turn, by

reversing the operation and creating a time lag between government spending and public

opinion, the impact of spending changes on public opinion can be determined. In fact, Soroka and Wlezien (2010) find that not only do policy responsiveness and public responsiveness occur, but they vary from state to state based on institutional characteristics. The more these characteristics blur the lines of accountability, the less responsive the public and government are. The Soroka and Wlezien (2010) model for policy responsiveness is defined as follows:

$$\Delta Pt = \rho + \gamma IRt - l + \gamma 2Gt - 1 + \mu t$$

Where (ΔPt) is changes in policy in year t, (ρ) is the intercept and (μt) is the error term, ($\gamma IRt-I$) is public policy preference from the previous unit of time and ($\gamma 2Gt-1$) is the governing party control form the previous time period.

The public responsiveness formula is defined as follows:

$$Rt = \alpha + \beta IPt + \beta 2Wt + et$$

Where (Rt) is the public's relative preference, (α) is the intercept and (et) the error term, (βIPt) the actual level of policy and ($\beta 2Wt$) a set of control variables.

A serious problem exists when attempting to use this methodology in the study of ministerial resignations. Most importantly, there are no longitudinal opinion polls measuring public opinion concerning the desire to force particular ministers to resign. Consequently there are no values for relative preference. The dependent variable is thus unmeasured to date. The closest approximation available is the overall level of public support for the governing party. Unlike the Soroka and Wlezien model, a regression model for responsiveness to ministerial resignation would require a richer set of control and instrumental variables. These variables are

required to take into account those factors which affect resignation issues other than public opinion and factors which affect public opinion other than resignation issues.

Dewan and Dowding (2005) have created an ordinary least squares regression analysis that measures the impact of resignations and nonresignations on public support for the governing party. This method will be used in substitution for the Soroka and Wlezien public responsiveness equation. It conceptually incorporates all the elements required of thermostatic responsiveness as well as producing results that can indicate the presence of public responsiveness (in the study of responsiveness in ministerial resignations, government responsiveness will be substituted for policy responsiveness as resignations are not exactly a policy decision). A replacement equation for government responsiveness will then be considered consisting of the control variables identified in chapter 3. Public responsiveness will be considered before government responsiveness to help contextualize the role of public opinion in the decision to force a minister to resign. Before introducing the public responsiveness equation, a description of relevant variables is required and how they fit the criteria for thermostatic responsiveness.

The dependent variable is support for the governing party, specifically their lead over the most popular opposition party. Data collection for this variable was collected primarily from Gallup Canada Incorporated through ODESI. Gallup polls constitute all data collected from 1945-2000 when Gallup discontinued its Canadian public opinion polling. The answer to the question "If a Dominion election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favour?" from 1945 to 1975 or "If a Federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favour?" from 1976 to 2001 was used. This data was

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supplemented by other public opinion polls from 2002 onward. For 2002, Environics polls were recorded for the question "If a Canadian federal election were held today, which one of the following parties would you vote for?". For 2003, Ipsos-Reid polling was used and for 2004-2011, Angus-Reid was used. Both used the question "What party would you vote for in the next federal election?". The public support for the most popular opposition party was subtracted from that of the governing party. Public support is calculated quarterly.

The primary independent variables are "resignation issues". Resignation issues have two possible forms: resignations and resignation issues. The later is the sum of resignations and nonresignations. To fully capture the impact of resignations on support for the governing party it is also essential to record when resignations could have happened as well. Though many potential resignation issues may have occurred behind the closed doors of cabinet meetings, these events would be impossible to record and would also be unknown to the public making them meaningless to this analysis. Consequently, calls for resignation covered by the Globe and Mail from 1945 to the end of the Harper government in 2011 have been recorded. In the event that a resignation occurred, it was recorded as such. In the event that a call was made and no resignation resulted, it was recorded as a nonresignation.

As stated earlier, a number of variables other than resignation issues are believed to impact public support for the governing party. A set of control variables is thus included. Dewan and Dowding (2005) indicate that economic variables may be the most important control variables. Though they use a set of economic variables derived from Pissarides (1980), these will not be used in the Canadian case because they have not been tested in Canada. The economic variables that have been found to affect support for the governing party in Canada by

Happy (1992) are included as substitutes for those of Pissarides (1980) in the RHS of the regression model[4]. They include inflation rate, unemployment, real personal disposable income, and real personal direct taxes. These variables were calculated from CANSIM tables generated by Statistics Canada. The collection of these variables is the limiting factor for the number of observations used in this regression. Real personal direct taxes data range from 1982-2008 making it the limiting variable on both ends of the range. The descriptive statistics for the regression (Table 2) are thus different than those of the qualitative analysis which range from 1945-2011.

TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics (OLS Regression Analysis)

Variables	Measure	Mean	St. Dev.	n
Political				
Resignations	No. in quarter	0.194	0.045	21
Resignation issues	No. in quarter	1.52	0.151	164
Economic				
Unemployment	quarterly rate	8.57	0.194	
Inflation	yearly rate	0.73	0.077	
Real disposable income	average quarterly percent change	0.124	0.002	
Real direct taxes	average quarterly percent change	0.066	0.006	
Political				
Quarters to nearest election	Quarterly	3.83	2.81	108
Terms in office	Quarterly	1.78	2.6	108
Instruments				
Age	average age in quarter	51.1	0.733	
Age squared	average squared age in quarter	2653	74.9	

Notes: Descriptive statistics for the "Liberal in power" and "at war" variables have not been included because they are dichotomous variables and thus mean and standard deviation offer little useful information.

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[4] Happy (1992) is an attempt to replicate comparable findings to Pissardes (1980) for the Canadian context. For that reason Happy's economic variables are used in this study.

Further, a group of political variables have been included as control variables that may impact support for the government. These variables were derived from Dewan and Dowding. (2005) They include the number of quarters to the nearest election, a Liberal government in power dummy variable, the number of consecutive terms in office, and a dummy variable indicating if the country is at war. The quarters to the nearest election should account for midterm blues that cause a drop in support for the governing party between elections. Liberals in power indicates the impact of the dominant political party holding office which is predicted to potentially reduce the impact of resignation issues. "Consecutive terms in office" is included because it is predicted that in time governing parties lose support. Finally, governing parties may experience a lowering of public support during war time during an unpopular war or protection during war time if the war is deemed essential (Dewan and Dowding 2005).

The regression model follows:

$$L_q = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2(ECON_{iq}) + \alpha_3(POL_{iq}) + \alpha_4(RES_q) + \alpha_5(RES.ISSUE_q) + \alpha_6(HCRES.ISSUE_q) + \alpha_7(RES_q*RES.ISSUE_q) + \alpha_8(RES_q*HCRES.ISSUE_q) + \mu_q$$

The dependent variable, L_q, is the governing party's lead over the most popular opposition party. $ECON_{iq}$ is the group of econometrics that have been found to influence support for the governing party. POL_{iq} is the group of political variables that have been found to affect the popularity of the governing party. RES_q is the number of resignations that occur in a given quarter. $RES.ISSUE_q$ is the quarterly number of resignation issues. $HCRES.ISSUE_q$ is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that a high coverage resignation issues has occurred within a given quarter and 0 that no high coverage event has occurred. $RES_q*RES.ISSUE_q$ is the interaction between quarterly resignations and quarterly resignation issues. $RES_q*HCRES.ISSUE_q$ is the

interaction between quarterly resignations and a dummy variable indicating if a high coverage issue has taken place in that quarter. μ_q is an error term. To control for first-order serial correlation, $L_{q,(t-1)}$ will be added to the right hand side of the equation[5].

The logic of how this model can substitute for the thermostatic model used by Soroka and Wlezien (2010) may not be obvious, but it does measure the relationship between public opinion and a government output. Most clearly, the government's willingness to force a minister to resign or not is analogous to policy output. If the government forces resignations when it perceives that the public wants resignations, then it can be said to be responsive in ministerial resignation. The public's support for the governing party fluctuates based on a number of variables including responsiveness in ministerial resignations. This model accounts for those other variables and thus can demonstrate whether or not the public is responsive to government outputs in ministerial resignations. The signal to the government that the public wants a resignation is broadcast through the media in the form of a call for resignation. The strength of this signal is reflected in the degree of coverage it receives. To that end, articles in the Globe and Mail that receive first page coverage, that are editorials, or have a word count greater than 1000, are coded as high coverage. In turn, any decision by the government to force a resignation is signalled to the public through media coverage as well.

Public responsiveness is measured through the regression coefficients of resignation issues, resignations, and their interactions. They would indicate whether or not (and in what direction) the public responds to the government's choice to force a resignation when a call has been made.

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[5] hime t-1 refers to the previous quarter.

Table 3 illustrates the results of the regression with the resignation effects, economic variables and quarters to the nearest election (1), with a control for first-order serial correlation (2), and with all control variables derived from Dewan and Dowding (2005) and their Canadian equivalents (3)[6].

The only significant results were found in the serial correlations term ($p<.05$), which indicates that the dependent variable correlates with itself overtime. No other significant results have been found for public responsiveness. Dewan and Dowding (2005) also include instrumental variables of age and age squared as well as a number of statistics to ensure the significance of the findings have not been biased due to first and second order serial correlation. IV estimates were conducted using age and age squared which produced greater significance, but again no significant result was obtained. As a result, further measures of first and second order serial correlation were not conducted as they would only serve to further reduce significance.

Government responsiveness may still occur, though it seems unlikely if there is no public responsiveness to drive it. Government responsiveness does seem to occur to some extent as seen through the calculation of honour ratios. With 164 resignation issues and 21 resignations; the overall honour ratio in Canada from 1982-2008 is 0.128. This indicates that the government is responsive 12.8% of the time. However, these honour ratios are rather simple and may miss the underlying motives of resignation.

Where public opinion was not found to be responsive to resignation issues, the government would have no incentive to force resignations due to the perception resignation issues. An ordinary least squares regression has thus been conducted to determine if changes

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[6] An OLS regression was conducted without economic variables with no significant results.

Table 3 OLS Estimates of Resignation Effects on Governing Party Popularity

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
dependent variable (t-1)			0.766	0.000	0.612	0.000
			(0.067)		(0.086)	
Resignation Issue Effects						
Resignations	-18.867	0.364	-2.674	0.844	-1.643	0.901
	(20.702)		(13.559)		(13.225)	
resignation issues	1.691	0.390	1.192	0.352	1.204	0.334
	(1.956)		(1.275)		(1.239)	
high coverage issue dummy	-2.686	0.594	-0.650	0.843	-1.156	0.718
	(5.016)		(3.272)		(3.197)	
res*resissue	-1.423	0.591	-0.796	0.645	-0.132	0.938
	(2.641)		(1.721)		(1.683)	
res*high coverage resissue	23.668	0.251	3.889	0.773	1.765	0.893
	(20.498)		(13.463)		(13.121)	
Economic Effects						
unemployment rate	-2.974	0.003	-0.064	0.926	-1.372	0.129
	(0.974)		(0.683)		(0.897)	
inflation rate	-3.471	0.206	-2.733	0.128	-2.545	0.147
	(2.727)		(1.778)		(1.739)	
real disposable income	41.308	0.745	112.004	0.178	80.629	0.321
	(126.474)		(82.617)		(80.813)	
real personal direct tax	-72.961	0.024	-30.802	0.147	-47.911	0.036
	(31.875)		(21.084)		(22.461)	
Political Effects						
quarters to nearest election	-0.336	0.686	-0.224	0.680	-0.084	0.873
	(0.829)		(0.540)		(0.528)	
terms in office					-4.016	0.026
					(1.771)	
liberal in power					9.267	0.007
					(3.355)	
at war					-0.276	0.927
					(3.489)	
R squared	0.707583		0.678		0.233	
Observations	108		108		108	

Notes: Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance is provided in italics.

in public opinion cause ministerial resignations to occur. The following equation substitutes for the Themostatic Model's government responsiveness equation.

$$\text{Res}_q = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 L_q + \alpha_3 \text{COV}_q + \alpha_4 \text{REAS}_q + \alpha_5 \text{PROV}_q + \alpha_6 \text{AGE}_q + \mu_q$$

Where Res_q is the number of resignations in a quarter, L_q is the percent lead in support for the governing party, α_1 is the intercept and μ_q is the error term. COV_q is a dummy for high coverage events. REAS_q is a dummy variable where 1 is a high probability of resignation. All reasons for resignation which achieved an honour ratio of 0.1 or higher were considered high probability. These events include scandals and direct challenges to the prime minister. PROV_q is a dummy variable where 1 is assigned to Ontario and Quebec as provinces with many potential replacement ministers. AGE_q is the age of affected ministers at the time of the event. Possible control variables, as discussed in chapter 3, have been omitted from this model because they were demonstrated to have little impact on resignations. Results can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4 OLS Estimates of Variables on Resignations

COV_q	0.197	*0.000*
	(0.043)	
REAS_q	0.189691	*0.000*
	(0.044)	
PROV_q	0.027783	*0.535*
	(0.044)	
AGE_q	-0.00417	*0.172*
	(0.003)	
L_q	-0.00065	*0.617*
	(0.001)	
R Square	0.18645	
Observations	213	

Notes: Standard errors are provided in parenthesis. Significance is provided in italics.

Because the honour ratios were used to define the control variables in the government responsiveness equations, it is not surprising that some of them were significant. More importantly, the OLS regression equation demonstrates that public opinion does not affect the prime ministers choice to force ministers to resign. Instead, the reason for resignation and the level of coverage were the only factors that were significant at (p<.05). The significant results of reason for resignation indicate that the typical conceptions of individual ministerial responsibility, ministerial error, departmental error, and performance are significantly less lethal than scandal or challenging the prime minister. Further, high coverage of an event means it is significantly more likely that the event will result in a resignation. It should be noted however that age was nearly significant and there is speculation that older ministers may also be more prone to resign which would counteract some of the predicted findings that younger ministers will be more prone to resign.

Discussion

Dewan and Dowding's prediction that finding the corrective effect in ministerial resignations may be difficult in other countries has proven true, but perhaps not for the predicted reasons. They suggested that institutional considerations such as party systems creating coalitions or where clear lines of responsibility from cabinet minister to prime minister are not so strong may make this relationship unclear. Canada should have presented the most ideal country to replicate this work and produce similar findings; however this was not the case.

The reason may simply have been that data collection of relevant variables in Canada has not produced the quantity of observations needed to generate significant findings. From 1982 to

2008 there were only 108 observed quarters including 183 calls for resignation and 21 resignations. These numbers are small, especially considering that so many variables affect public support for the governing party and so many variables affect the decision to force a resignation. Even after removing variables shown to be irrelevant and adding new control variables, resignations, resignation issues, and their interactions do not produce significant results.

A second reason that no significant effect was discovered could be that that the model performed appropriately, but that government responsiveness or public responsiveness is inadequate to drive a thermostatic relationship. To explore this we must consider the 4 elements of thermostatic responsiveness: public opinion change, signal to the government, government output, and signal to the public.

The signal strength to the government may first come into question. Given that public opinion polls in Canada have been administered inconsistently and sporadically until the mid 1970s, the government's ability to use them to measure public opinion may be called into question. This explanation may be more useful prior to the mid 1970s, but most of this research focuses on a time frame where public opinion has been measured consistently. The signal to the government does not necessarily come from public opinion polls asking for general support for the governing party, but rather the calls for resignation themselves. These calls are defined as being made publicly in The Globe and Mail (and presumably in a range of other media as well) and are thus unlikely to have been overlooked by the prime minister who would have known the public was also reading the coverage of those events. As Soroka and Wlezien (2010) have also identified, this signal comes in the form of a variety of communiqués from constituents as well.

Thus there is little reason to doubt the signal to the government at least in the form of media coverage if not polls.

The signal from the government to the public is equally as apparent. A government's decision to force the resignation of a cabinet minister always receives heavy coverage in the Globe and Mail. Even those ministers who resign for personal reasons or retirement tend to receive considerable coverage. A public capable of signalling a problem to the government that can be linked to a minister will also be able to receive the signal that something has been or has not been done about the problem. Consequently, the lack of apparent responsiveness must come from the government's lack of interest in responding to public opinion, or the public's lack of concern about this sort of response.

First, the government's responsiveness will be considered. A prime minister has all the de facto power she may need to force the resignation of a cabinet minister. In fact, of the Westminster systems, the Canadian prime minister is the most powerful vis a vis constraints imposed by other party members, within Parliament or within the extraparliamentary party (Weller 1983). That being said, forcing the resignation of a cabinet minister is still not a desirable option. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Antlee has said that it is the most distasteful decision a prime minister can make, a sentiment shared by most other British prime ministers and is unlikely to be different in Canada (Alderman and Cross 1985). The affected cabinet minister usually has considerable pride in the position and removing them from it can be personally devastating for the minister who the prime minister has likely built a close relationship with. That being said, a prime minister must first protect his agency which necessitates ensuring continued or increased public support for the governing party (Weller

1985). As such, cabinet ministers are forced to resign under circumstances where they threaten government support or challenge the prime minister publically. In the event that the prime minister perceived no public backlash from not forcing a minister to resign, it could be expected that ministers would never be forced to resign (except if they challenge the prime minister directly). Given that they are, government can be responsive, but does not seem to be reliably so. Perhaps the public is not adequately responsive.

The responsiveness of the public has been called into question more heavily than any other aspect of responsiveness. There has been considerable question concerning the public's capacity to form enduring opinions about government actions (Shapiro 1998), though there has been some positive analysis indicating that they do (Soroka and Wlezien 2005). Public responsiveness may be the location in this equation where thermostatic responsiveness in ministerial resignation breaks down. If the public is not responsive there is no motive for the government to be responsive.

The evidence available seems to lead to the assumption that the public should be responsive. The public has in fact demonstrated responsiveness to policy outputs in salient domains (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The limitations in other areas often come from the fact that the public is not adequately aware of events and government activities to form coherent opinions and update them with new information. This should not be a problem for ministerial resignations. Low coverage resignation issues may be overlooked, and for this reason they were separated from high coverage. High coverage events on the other hand have all the hallmarks of affecting public opinion. A scandal for example has the capacity to capture public attention and is simple enough to understand. If a minister misuses her office for personal gain or behaves in

an otherwise scandalous way the public may easily understand and respond to this. Failure to force a resignation could be interpreted as condoning the activity of that minister. Consequently, the public should be able to respond. The fact that the public does not seem to respond may be the result of the variety of reasons why calls are made for resignation and resignations are actually forced. This leads into the third possibility why no thermostatic responsiveness seems to exist in ministerial resignation.

The third possible reason that the results were insignificant is that resignation issues may not be as homogenous a group as needed. There are several reasons why the assumption of unit homogeneity in resignation issues should be questioned. First, for a resignation issue to provide an adequate signal to the government, it must receive enough media coverage to be of concern. Low coverage of events should thus be removed. Second, not all resignations fit the expectation of call for resignation and response. Consequently, resignations may not fit the logic of responsiveness where resignations precede actual media coverage. Resignations have been divided as Type 2 and Type 3 based on this distinction. In fact, a greater number of Type 2 resignations have occurred. That means that calls for resignation followed by resignations are less likely to occur than resignations that occurred without a preceding call being made.

Dewan and Dowding (2005) presented an interesting way of dealing with this problem. They created two groups of resignations as well. They removed all resignations that would have likely been the first the public heard about a problem existing. That is, they removed all low coverage resignation issues and all resignations that first brought attention to an issue. The remaining resignation issues were those that received a preceding call for resignation and those that were concerning circumstances that the public had already been aware. Dewan and

Dowding found a greater corrective effect based on that definition of resignation. Unfortunately, dividing a group of 21 resignations would result in a new group so small that significance is almost certainly impossible to find.

The unit homogeneity problem with ministerial resignations also calls into question the utility of honour ratios as an overall measure of government responsiveness. The willingness to force the resignation of ministers seems to lean towards the motive of weakening challenges to party leadership rather than exclusively protecting against potential losses in public support. There is thus a bias in the overall honour ratio of 0.128 towards greater government responsiveness than should actually be interpreted from this number.

The dependent variable may also have been problematic. As previously stated, there are no consistent surveys for whether or not a minister should resign. Consequently, the public may be responsive in their desire to have a minister removed, but not so much that it changes their support for the governing party. The time lag may also have been inappropriate. Though quarterly measurements are the smallest interval that could have been effectively used and longer time lags may have meant that a resignation issue has been forgotten, it is quite possible that each issue required its own unique time lag. Whereas many issues disappear almost immediately, other issues drag on for years. Unfortunately it would not be possible to create a model that facilitates unique time lags for each issue.

The Canadian political culture has so far been overlooked as a potential element in this responsiveness. It has been described that Canadians expect a lot in the way of output to deal with problems, but are passive to its actions (Nevitte 2002). That is, Canadians may be more responsive to outputs, but are willing to turn a blind eye to the activities of the members of the

government itself. Canada has a long history of deference to government and elites. The long history of British control or part control in the Canadian government is a sign and symptom of this condition. A change can be seen in public opinion beginning in the 1980s and through quite a number of significant political upheavals in the 1990s that challenge these assumptions (Nevitte 1996). This is interesting as the current study primarily focussed on this time period. It was also found that Canadians' belief that the government is responsive to their attitudes declined sharply in the mid 1980s. Unfortunately this belief would hold for either political party. If the public holds such negative opinions about all politicians, then the idea of holding ministers to account simply to be replaced by other corrupt or inept ministers may not inspire changes of public support for parties. The result would be less motive for a prime minister to force their resignations.. In this time frame, attitudes concerning political effectiveness of the individual and trustworthiness of government institutions and individuals began a somewhat lengthy decline. Believed largely to be the result of higher education levels and post materialism one cannot help but notice the dramatic increase in calls for resignation in the 1980s (Nevitte 2002). The numbers of resignation issues in that decade were double the previous and the next. The result was not a doubling of actual resignations. This lack of responsiveness would of course add to public discontent.

The results of this decline in deference may not be visible in the OLS regression analysis, not because the public remain passive, but because resignation issues do not adequately reflect the major issues in Canada. The very mechanism that provides the Canadian prime minister power to enforce resignations may also be what prevents the utility of this action in general. The prime minister centred government which has been developing since the early 1960s and has progressively centred on the prime minister since has made the prime minister centre of all

government activities and the face of government as a whole (Savoie 2010). The prime minister has thus become the focus of major issues in Canada instead of ministers. Alderman and Cross (1985) suggests that the public is more than able to notice that a minister has been used as a scapegoat and forcing their resignation may reduce support for the prime minister and thus the governing party. Consider the impact of the following events on public opinion: Liberal corruption culminating in the Gomery Enquiry, the Liberal leadership challenge of Paul Martin, the NAFTA debate, the National Energy Policy, and the Constitution debates. These events, which had considerable impact on public support for the governing party focussed almost entirely on the prime minister and party. A ministerial resignation would have had little impact. Of particular interest would be the leadership challenge of Paul Martin against Jean Chrétien. Despite this lengthy and public challenge which threatened the reputation of the Liberal Party, no call for resignation was made against Paul Martin. Instead, the focus of negative attention was placed against the prime minister. When Paul Martin was finally forced to resign there was no evidence that this action protected support for the Liberals. It would seem that in Canada, the prime minister's place of prominence may mean that issues serious enough to dramatically affect public opinion bypass the minister level and go straight to the prime minister. This would make the ministerial resignation an unusable tool to protect against serious losses in public support.

Before concluding, a discussion of the significant political and economic variables should also be included. Of the economic variables that were included in the OLS regression analysis only real direct taxes achieved significance. This indicates that taxes, independent of perceptions of economic performance, are receiving separate consideration by the public when choosing which party they support. This is interesting as taxes are rarely reported by the public as an important election issue in Canada (Happy 1992).

Of the political variables, "terms in office" and "Liberals in power" reached statistical significance. The significance of the terms in office variable supports that the midterm blues reduction in support for the governing party reported in other countries also occurs in Canada (Dewan and Dowding 2005). The positive significant relationship of Liberals in power and support for the governing should not come as a surprise. The OLS regression analysis only included 3 Progressive Conservative/Conservative prime ministers: 3 years of Harper governments, the rather unpopular Mulroney governments, and the short lived Clark government. The highly significant and positive value for the Liberals simply reflects the unpopularity of Clark and Mulroney's Progressive Conservative governments during most of their tenures.

CONCLUSION

The results of this thesis speak to a number of relevant discussions in democratic responsiveness. First, the prime minister does not appear to force ministers to resign because of public opinion. This finding does support the notion of a rational and self-interested prime minister. After all, the public does not seem to respond to resignation issues, therefore the motive of future electoral consequence has no bearing on the prime minister's decision. It also answers a question posed by Dewan and Dowding (2005), that if the public did not respond to resignation issues, then why would a prime minister ever force the resignation of a minister? The answer in the Canadian context is that the affected minister must either pose a risk to the prime minister's agency as party leader or be involved in a serious scandal, which may be a matter of convention.

The results also speak to the limits of responsiveness in Canada. All the conditions were met for a thermostatic relationship to exist in ministerial resignations, but they do not. This is an interesting finding in the context of government responsiveness, because it would intuitively seem that if thermostatic responsiveness exists in something as complex as policy, then it should exist in simple issues like ministerial errors. However, it does not. This represents a limit beyond salience in responsiveness.

This result also speaks to the debate concerning the presidentialization of the prime minister. Savoie (1999) argues that power has centralized not only from the parliament to the cabinet, but also from the cabinet to the prime minister. The findings of this thesis seem to support the alternative point of view presented by White (2005) and Bakvis (2001). They suggest that the prime minister is the boss, but has limits on her authority. One such limit is the

influence of a few powerful cabinet ministers. They are needed to ensure continued party support for the prime minister as well as offer talent in administering government; a task which the prime minister cannot conduct alone. This need for talent in the cabinet is supported by the prime minister's unwillingness to force the resignation of cabinet ministers for all but the most serious of offences such as financial or sexual scandal, or direct challenges to his authority.

The primary question that remains is why would no responsiveness occur, especially given that in the United Kingdom, which has very similar institutions, it does? Deferential political culture, a weak historical convention of individual ministerial responsibility in Canada, poor unit homogeneity, and simply inadequate observations have each been considered, but further research is required. The only solid conclusions that can be drawn are that the generalizability of findings, even between most similarly matched cases, should not be assumed and the systematic collection of a greater amount of relevant Canadian data should be made a priority.

Future research should seek to determine what exactly constitutes a threat to the prime minister's agency. Direct challenges from within the party are obviously met with reprisal, but given that the public does not seem to respond to resignations it is not fully clear why some ministers are forced to resign over scandals and others are not. Examining the relationship between ministerial scandal and the public's perception of the prime minster, as recorded in public opinion surveys, may shed some light on this question. It may be that the prime minister's choice to force the resignation of a minister is being affected by changes in his popularity rather than the party's public support.

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