Higdon, Robert (1999) The philosophical significance of Leibniz's response to occasionalism. Masters thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
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Leibniz's disagreements with Malebranche are more than theologically significant. By tracing Leibniz's philosophical development, in response to the occasionalism of Malebranche and criticisms of Arnauld, the significance of Leibniz's response to Malebranche's criticism of the Scholastic concept of causation becomes evident. Moreover, as Leibniz recognized in his fully developed philosophy, his criticism of Malebranche had application more widely to Locke and Newton. Much of the eighteenth century movement from Hume to Kant had its predecessors in the seventeenth century debate between Malebranche and Leibniz: while Malebranche creates the context for Hume's critique of the ordinary concept of causation, Leibniz's response to Malebranche suggests the direction of Kant's response to Hume.
|Item Type:||Thesis (Masters)|
|Additional Information:||Bibliography: leaves 56-57|
|Department(s):||Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Heading:||Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716; Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715; Causation; Occasionalism|
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